G.R. No.

L-9966            February 14, 1916

TRINIDAD DE AYALA, ET AL.,  vs. ANTONIO M. BARRETTO, ET AL.,

Facts:
The complaint alleged that the erection and operation of a combined brewery and ice plant
on Calle General Solano in the city of Manila, constitutes nuisance.
The twenty-two plaintiffs are either residents of property owners on Calle General Solano.
Twelve of them are actual resident of the street and of these twelve, six are lessees of
property owned by other plaintiffs. This street connects Echague and Aviles Streets. All three
parallel the Pasig River. Echague is almost wholly given over to industrial enterprises, and
Aviles also has some factories, etc., upon it, including the San Miguel Brewery. This latter
brewery is a long established business, is adjacent to many residences, and is, in fact,
closer to some of the plaintiffs than is the proposed brewery. 

Issue: whether the plant will create a nuisance.

Held:
No. After a careful consideration of all the evidence of record, we have come to the
conclusion that the locality surrounding the site of the proposed plant has not sufficiently the
impress of a residential district as to justify us in holding that the plant will be incongruous
with its surroundings. This conclusion is made easier in view of the fact that another brewery
is in fact closer to several of the plaintiffs than that of the defendants will be. The fact that
this latter brewery is not on the same street is immaterial. Distance is what counts in a
matter of this kind. Noise, smells, and smoke are no respecters of streets.
Is there evidence of record that the proposed plant will be operated so carelessly as to
materially increase the noise, smells, and smoke emanating therefrom? We think not. On the
contrary, the evidence is that a brewery, properly run, is not an unbearable neighbor and that
the defendants are installing modern machinery in every respect. For the defense, there is
evidence of engineers and others that there will be no noise, vibrations, or smells, and but
little, if any, smoke which will materially affect nearby residents. We think that the
preponderating weight of the evidence is to the effect that the new brewery will be operated
with a minimum of offense to nearby residents, and that in view of the semi-industrial
character of the locality, what noise, etc., is produced, cannot be held to be unreasonable.
 G.R. No. L-17760            October 31, 1962
RAMCAR, INC.,vs. EUSEBIO S. MILLAR, ET AL.

Facts:
Ramcar has been engaged in the auto repair and body building business since 1938 up to
the present, except when it was interrupted during the Japanese occupation. It transferred its
place of business to its present site from 1049 R. Hidalgo Street, Manila, on December 20,
1951 because the old location was within the 100-meter radius from the Jose Rizal College,
in violation of City ordinances. the nature of the corporation's activities, actually engaged in,
consists in repairing and building bodies of motor vehicles, and involves the use of tools and
machinery that give rise to much noise and annoyance during all hours of the day up to
nighttime; and its employees oftentimes work on Sundays and holidays. At the time of the
transfer, respondent Eusebio S. Millar and his family were already residing on his own land
adjacent to that of Ramcar, Inc. He and his co-respondents repeatedly petitioned the city
authorities for the closure of the shop to no avail, because city authorities were "at
loggerheads as to whether the immediate vicinity where the business of Ramcar, Inc. is
located is a residential or a commercial zone

Issue: whether or business is a nuisance in its present location.

Held:

ART. 697. The abatement of a nuisance does not preclude the right of any person injured
to recover damages for its past existence.;
and, in the general provisions on Damages, the same Code states:
ART. 2196. The rules under this Title are without prejudice to special provisions on damages
formulated elsewhere in this Code . . .
However, the business of the petitioner is not a nuisance per se. It is only on account of its
location that it is a public nuisance. To abate it, it is not necessary, as the appealed decision
decrees, to remove all building an structures built in the place where it is presently located
as these, or parts thereof, may be utilized for pursuit that are not forbidden by law or
ordinance.
The decision appealed from is modified by permanently enjoining the petitioner only from
operating its body building operations or activities in its present location, without requiring
the demolition of the existing building.
 G.R. No. L-7012            March 26, 1913

ILOILO COLD STORAGE CO. vs. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL

FACTS:
Plaintiff is the owner of an ice and cold storage plant. Nearby residents made complaints
regarding the smoke that the plant emits saying that it was very injurious to their health and
comfort. The defendant made investigations and later on passed a resolution which
demands that the smokestacks of the said factory be elevated or else the factory operations
will be closed or suspended. Plaintiff opposed by filing for injunction.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the resolution alone issued by the municipal council is sufficient to label and
abate the supposed nuisance in this case?

RULING: NO.
There are two kinds of nuisances: nuisances per se and per accidens. The former are
recognized as nuisances under any and all circumstances. The latter are such only because
of the special circumstances and conditions surrounding them. The former may be abated
even by private individuals however the latter is different; it needs a determination of the
facts which is a judicial function.

The question of nuisance can conclusively be decided, for all legal uses, by the established
courts of law or equity alone, and that the resolution of officers, or of boards organized by
force of municipal charters, cannot, to any degree, control such decision. City Council
cannot, by a mere resolution or motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance which has
not theretofore been pronounced to be such by law, or so adjudged by judicial determination.