EUTRAPELIA:

THE RIGHT ATTITUDE TOWARD AMUSEMENT

T ⇥ ✓ H ⌃⌃ ⇤

Some of Aristotle’s most original contributions to moral philosophy are found in

book IV of the Nicomachean Ethics. There he discusses seven moral virtues and the
passion of shame, none of which are included in Plato’s and the Stoics’ scheme of
the four cardinal virtues. One who reads the Nicomachean Ethics for the first time
is likely to be surprised to find among these virtues one that concerns amusements.
But it is precisely the inclusion of a virtue like this in the catalog of moral virtues
that witnesses to the finesse of Aristotle’s ethics, where the point is not merely to
avoid evildoing, but above all, with the help of good upbringing, to develop human
excellence in all dimensions of human life. For Aristotle, relaxing amusements are
an important dimension of life, and with regard to these, we can either go wrong by
excess or deficiency, or, thanks to the virtue he calls ⇧ ✓ ⇣⇧ , we can hit the right
mean.
What is most original in Aristotle’s ethics is also what was most unfamiliar
to Latin medieval commentators, whose moral theories prior to the rediscovery of
the Nicomachean Ethics had been shaped mainly by scriptural, patristic, Stoic, and
Neoplatonic sources. Several Aristotelian virtues and vices posed specific challenges
to medieval thinkers, either concerning the proper understanding of Aristotle, or as to
the reconciliation of Aristotle’s account with Christian doctrine, or with respect to
both. Eutrapelia is not the prime example for these di⇥culties, but it does pose both
an exegetical and a doctrinal challenge to the Latin medieval readers of Aristotle1 .
In what follows, I will examine the reception of eutrapelia by three prominent
readers of the Nicomachean Ethics: Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and Gerald
Odo. The interest of this study is both philosophical and historical. Philosophically,
the main issue is to clarify in which sense eutrapelia is a virtue, indeed a moral
virtue. Historically, it is a case study of how a specific Aristotelian topic is approached
differently in works of various authors or in diverse works by the same author. I will
begin with a brief summary of Aristotle’s account of eutrapelia; then I will examine
its reception in Albert’s two Ethics commentaries, in Aquinas’s Ethics commentary
and in his Summa theologiae, as well as in Gerald’s Ethics commentary.

⇤
I am grateful to Francis Feingold and Kevin White for helpful comments.
1
Notice that in Grosseteste’s translation, as well as in the Ethica vetus (an earlier translation of
books II and III of the Ethics), the Greek word is transliterated, but not translated. The exact meaning of
the word depends on how one defines its subject matter, which constitutes a di⇥culty in itself.
268 TOBIAS HOFFMANN

1. Aristotle A
the E
We are of course in a more advantageous position to grasp Aristotle’s understanding
one
of eutrapelia than the Latin medieval authors were, who read his account only
is do
in Grosseteste’s translation of the Nicomachean Ethics (and in the case of Albert
close
also in Averroes’s Middle Commentary Nicomachean Ethics), and who had no
of fu
interpretational support other than a few philological explanations by an anonymous
word
Greek commentator, who was also translated by Grosseteste2 . The portion of the
wher
Eudemian Ethics that contains the treatment of eutrapelia was not accessible to them.
than
In what follows, I will briefly expound Aristotle’s account in the Eudemian Ethics and
attitu
the Nicomachean Ethics, and I will raise a few exegetical and philosophical questions
indis
that are of interest for our study of Albert, Aquinas, and Gerald.
jokes
In Eudemian Ethics III, 7, Aristotle discusses eutrapelia along with five other
to sa
means between deficiency and excess: righteous indignation ( ⇧◆ ⇤), shame ( ⌧⌅⇢⇤),
disti
friendliness (⌃ ), dignity (◆⇧ ! ⇤) and truthfulness (which Aristotle names only
by ed
by its concrete instantiation, « the truthful person », ⌫ ⌦⇡⇤). Interestingly, he
A
does not consider them to be moral virtues, because they do not involve choice
the N
(⇣✓✏ ⇣⇧◆ ⇤)3 . Rather, he calls them passions (⇣ ⌦⇡  ) and natural virtues (⌃ ◆ ↵
Gros
⌫✓⇧ ). Although they are not virtues in the full sense, they are praiseworthy, since
« am
they are means between deficiency and excess. Furthermore, each of these passions
jokes
has a tendency to a specific virtue; for example, righteous indignation and shame have
think
a tendency toward justice and temperance, respectively4 . Eutrapelia is concerned
as, p
with what is humorous (⌥⇧ ✏ı̃✏ ), and there are two ways in which one can go wrong:
eutra
an individual who indiscriminately takes pleasure in what is funny is a buffoon
T
(⇥ ✏ !⌘✏⇤), whereas one who accepts it only with di⇥culty is boorish (⌫⌥✓✏ı̃↵✏⇤).
in w
In contrast, eutrapelia involves taking delight in what is humorous as reason directs,
least
and even accepting mockery that is directed against oneself5 . Eutrapelia concerns not
more
only the right attitude toward humor, but also – as he mentions only in passing – the
this s
capacity to be humorous6 . Notice that to present eutrapelia in a positive light was a
Furt
novelty, and soon after Aristotle this term regained a negative connotation7 .
is, w

2
Grosseteste’s translation of the Nicomachean Ethics is of 1246/47. He published it together
spirit
with the translation of Greek commentators. Averroes’s Middle Commentary, a paraphrase (which 8
the medievals considered to be a translation of the Nicomachean Ethics), was translated to Latin
Aristo
by Hermannus Alemannus in 1240. For the treatment of eutrapelia, see A⌘ ✓◆ ◆⇧↵⇧✓, Ethica
only a
Nicomachea. Translatio Roberti Grossateste Lincolniensis sive Liber Ethicorum. A. Recensio Pura,
variou
R.-A. G ◆ ⇧⌘ (ed.), AL XXVI,1-3, fasc. III, Brill/Desclée de Brouwer, Leiden/Bruxelles 1972,
involv
p. 223-224; J.B. K ⌘⇧↵⇧⇤, « Mittlerer Kommentar von Averroes zur Nikomachischen Ethik des
Nicom
Aristoteles », Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 31 (1992), p. 61-118, at p. 98-100; A ⌫ ✓,
see E
Aristotelis Moralium ad Nicomachum quartus, in H.P.F. M⇧⌘⇤⌦⇧ (ed.), The Greek Commentaries on 9
the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle in the Latin Translation of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln 10
(†1253), I, Brill, Leiden 1973, p. 364-367.
3 on so
A⌘ ✓◆ ◆⇧↵⇧✓, Ethica Eudemica, III, 7, 1233b16-1234a3.
4 134.
I⇥ ⌅., 1234a23-34. 11
5
I⇥ ⌅., 1234a3-23.
6 fun o
I⇥ ⌅., 1234a14-17.
7 Nicom
A⌘ ✓◆ ◆⇧, L’Éthique à Nicomaque, II, 1, trad. R.-A. G ◆ ⇧⌘, J.Y. J ↵ ⌃, Peeters/Nauwelaerts,
Oxfor
Louvain-la-Neuve 2002, p. 316-317; H. R ⇧⌘, « Eutrapélie », in M. V ↵↵⇧⌘ (ed.), Dictionnaire de
conce
 EUTRAPELIA 269

Aristotle’s account of eutrapelia in Nicomachean Ethics IV, 8 builds upon that of

the Eudemian Ethics, but it is considerably more elaborate and differs from the earlier
nding
one in two respects that are relevant to the purposes of this paper. One difference
only
is doctrinal. Aristotle now presents eutrapelia as a moral virtue and associates it
lbert
closely with friendliness and truthfulness (which he likewise promotes to the status
d no
of full-blown moral virtues), to form a trio of virtues that concern social relations in
mous
words and actions. Eutrapelia and friendliness make human interaction delightful,
f the
whereas truthfulness assures its honesty8 . Aristotle now emphasizes the active more
them.
than the passive dimension of eutrapelia; one who is eutrapelos not only has the right
s and
attitude in hearing jokes and decent mockery, but also in uttering them. Someone who
tions
indiscriminately takes every occasion to get others to laugh, even by means of indecent
jokes and condescending mockery, is a buffoon, whereas an individual who is unable
other
to say something funny and disapproves of others who do so is boorish9 . Aristotle
⌅⇢⇤),
distinguishes between « free » and « slavish » amusements, as well as between those
only
by educated and by uneducated people10 .
y, he
Another difference with respect to the Eudemian Ethics is terminological: in
hoice
the Nicomachean Ethics, eutrapelia is presented as concerning amusement (⇣ ⌅ ⇠).
◆↵
Grosseteste translates this by ludus. Both the Greek and the Latin words mean
since
« amusement » in the large sense, which ranges from children’s play to sophisticated
sions
jokes and mockery. The chapter taken as a whole, however, suggests that Aristotle is
have
thinking above all of jokes and teasing, which may be done by words or deeds (such
rned
as, presumably, by making faces). Modern English translations accordingly translate
rong:
eutrapelia with « wit » or « wittiness »11 .
ffoon
There are three issues in the medieval reception of eutrapelia that I will discuss
↵✏⇤).
in what follows. For one, the medievals tend to expand the scope of eutrapelia. At
rects,
least for Albert and for Aquinas in the Summa theologiae, it concerns amusements
s not
more generally, that is, not only witty conversations, but also play. As we shall see,
– the
this semantical shift had a positive effect on the reputation of the profession of actors.
was a
Furthermore, the medievals discuss something that Aristotle does not specify, that
is, why eutrapelia can be considered a moral virtue. This problem splits into two

gether
spiritualité, IV, 2, Beauchesne, Paris 1960, col. 1726-1729, at col. 1727.
which 8
A⌘ ✓◆ ◆⇧↵⇧✓, Ethica Nicomachea, IV, 8, 1128b4-9; see also I⇥ ⌅., II, 7, 1108a9-14. Although
Latin
Aristotle does not explicitly call eutrapelia a virtue even in the Nicomachean Ethics, but speaks of it
Ethica
only as a mean, he clearly thinks of it as a virtue. In Nicomachean Ethics II, 7, he catalogs it among the
Pura,
various means that exemplify the definition of virtue he gave in the previous chapter, as a disposition
1972,
involving choice ( ⌦⌅⇥ ⌥ ⌃ ⌅ ⇤ ⌅⇧↵) that concerns the mean between deficiency and excess; see Ethica
k des
Nicomachea II, 6, 1106b36-1107a2. It is only of shame that he says it is not a virtue, but rather a passion;
⌫ ✓,
see Ethica Nicomachea, II, 7, 1108a31-32 and IV, 9, 1128b10-11.
ies on 9
I⌅., IV, 8, 1127b33-1128a12.
ncoln 10
I⇥ ⌅., 1128a20-22. – Aristotle’s own writings contain numerous witty observations. For comments
on some of these, see I. T ↵  ⌦ ✓, « Witz und Humor bei Aristoteles », Tekmeria 2 (1996), p. 120-
134.
11
C.C.W. T ⌫↵ ⌘ comments that « [t]he topic of this chapter is humour, in particular making
fun of people, which the Greeks appear to have regarded as the basic kind of humour »; A⌘ ✓◆ ◆↵⇧,
Nicomachean Ethics. Books II-IV, translated with a commentary by C.C.W. T ⌫↵ ⌘, Clarendon Press,
laerts,
Oxford 2006, p. 233. See I⇥ ⌅. for references to the Poetics and the Rhetoric that clarify Aristotle’s
ire de
concept of wit.
270 TOBIAS HOFFMANN

distinct questions. First, why can it be considered virtuous in the first place? From virtu
the perspective of Christian theology, this question is relevant in light of the fact that does
patristic authors tended to have a negative attitude toward laughing and playing12 . addi
Second, why is it a moral virtue rather than an intellectual virtue? After all, not only susta
games but also witty conversations require skill. recre
and t
2. Albert the Great Othe
the p
As the first Latin commentator on the section of the Nicomachean Ethics that contains scan
the discussion of eutrapelia, Albert had a significant influence on later accounts. (that
His main contribution lies in expanding on the subject matter of eutrapelia and in bow,
clarifying its status as a moral virtue. The accounts in his Super Ethica, a questions- he w
commentary dating from 1250-1252, and in his Ethica, a paraphrase-commentary avoid
probably written in 1262, differ in the manner of presentation but not doctrinaly. the a
Right at the outset of his discussion in Super Ethica, Albert defines eutrapelia as a men
mean in ludis, and likewise in his Ethica he introduces it as a habit that concerns what A
is delightful in ludo. By this he quite literally means play; the examples he gives are also
childish play, physical exercise, gaming, and spectacle13 . (Albert disapproves not only by m
of gaming, but apparently also of spectacle14 .) Once eutrapelia is set up as a virtue anot
about amusement in general rather than about amusing conversation, the interpretation
becomes somewhat awkward. While Albert takes into account the numerous passages
3
where Aristotle talks about arousing laughter, about mockery, and about the lack of a
sense of humor, he fails to see that in Aristotle’s description of eutrapelia, there is Wha
no mention of play, and that the one reference Aristotle makes to comedies is merely inter
meant to serve as a comment on the kind of humor employed in these15 . Furthermore, the l
Albert does not explain very well the connection between play and witty mockery. treat
As he says, some games do indeed involve mockery16 ; but this is only an incidental secu
connection between wit and play. they
Albert has some original thoughts on the sense in which eutrapelia is a virtue. com
In particular, Albert clarifies how eutrapelia contributes to happiness. Recall that
Aristotle defines happiness (or flourishing) as activity of soul in conformity with 3
Acco
12
H. R ⇧⌘, Man at Play, transl. by B. B ◆◆⇧⌘✓ , E. Q , Herder and Herder, New York Ethic
1972, p. 92-99. the l
13
A↵⇥⇧⌘◆✓ M ⌥ ✓, Super Ethica, W. K⇢⇥⇧↵ (ed.), in Opera omnia, XIV, 1, Aschendorff,
Münster 1987, lib. IV, lectio 15, n. 344, p. 292, 81 (childish play); I⇥ ⌅., n. 350, p. 298, 17-18 (physical
exercise and gaming); I⌅., Ethica, A. B ⌘⌥ ⇧◆ (ed.), in Opera omnia, VII, Vivès, Paris 1890-1899, 17
lib. IV, tract. 3, cap. 4, n. 100, p. 325a (spectacle). See also I⌅., Super Ethica, lib. X, lectio 10, n. 891, 18
p. 745, 34-41. Grosseteste’s translation cannot be faulted for Albert’s understanding of ludus in such a p. 296
general sense; the translation begins the chapter as follows: « Existente autem requie in vita et in hac tract.
conversacione cum ludo, videtur et hic esse collocucio quedam consona, et qualia oportet dicere, et ut. by I
Similiter autem et audire » (A⌘ ✓◆ ◆⇧↵⇧✓ L ◆ ✓, Ethica Nicomachea. Translatio Roberti Grossateste Summ
[. . . ] Recensio Pura, lib. IV, cap. 7, p. 223, 4-6.) 19
14
A↵⇥⇧⌘◆✓ M ⌥ ✓, Ethica, lib. IV, tract. 3, cap. 4, n. 99, p. 324a: « abusive tales histrionice Ethica
ludentes ». 20
15
A⌘ ✓◆ ◆⇧↵⇧✓, Ethica Nicomachea, IV, 8, 1128a22-25. are in
16
A↵⇥⇧⌘◆✓ M ⌥ ✓, Ethica, lib. IV, tract. 3, cap. 4, n. 100, p. 324b; see also I⌅., Super Ethica, it is o
lib. IV, lectio 15, n. 350, p. 298, 10-11.
 EUTRAPELIA 271

From virtue17 . For Albert, this implies that each virtue contributes to happiness. Eutrapelia
t that does so, according to Albert, not essentially (as prudence and justice do), but as an
ng12 . additional benefit (secundum bene esse). According to Albert, human nature cannot
only sustain constant effort in the active and the contemplative life. To secure the quiet and
recreation of someone who is active, one needs decent amusements (ludi honesti),
and there needs to be a virtue that orders these amusements in view of regeneration.
Otherwise, Albert writes, the « subject of virtue » would be destroyed. To illustrate
the point, Albert recounts a charming episode from the Vitae patrum. An archer was
tains scandalized by the recreational activities of friars in the desert. So the sanctus pater
ounts. (that is, St. Anthony, whom Albert does not mention by name) asked him to pull his
nd in bow, and to pull it further and further. He replied that it would break, whereupon
ions- he was told that « likewise one occasionally has to rest from the effort of virtue, to
ntary avoid the ruin of virtue »18 . Albert thus strongly emphasizes the connection between
y. the amusements ordered by eutrapelia and the need of rest, a point Aristotle only
a as a mentions briefly at the beginning of Nicomachean Ethics, IV, 7.
what A more prominent point in Aristotle, the idea that eutrapelia is a social virtue, is
s are also picked up by Albert, albeit only briefly. Eutrapelia orders individuals to others
only by making the companionship more pleasant, for, as Albert says, nobody can live with
irtue another unless it is pleasant19 .
ation
sages
3. Thomas Aquinas
k of a
ere is What makes the study of Aquinas’s reception of Aristotelian themes particularly
erely interesting is the fact that we can study it in two significantly different literary genres:
more, the literal commentary on Aristotle and systematic theology. I will present first the
kery. treatment of eutrapelia in his Ethics commentary and then the treatment in his Secunda
ental secundae20 , which both date from 1271-1272. Since they are contemporaneous,
they allow us to observe how differently Aquinas approaches the same issue in a
irtue. commentary and in a systematic work.
that
with 3.1. Sententia libri Ethicorum
According to Aquinas, the virtues Aristotle discusses in book IV of the Nicomachean
York Ethics differ from courage and temperance, which are examined in book III, in that
the latter concern secondary goods, while the former concern those goods by which
ndorff,
ysical
-1899, 17
A⌘ ✓◆ ◆⇧↵⇧✓, Ethica Nicomachea, I, 7, 1098a7-17.
n. 891, 18
A↵⇥⇧⌘◆✓ M ⌥ ✓, Super Ethica, lib. IV, lectio 15, n. 344, p. 292, 67-73; p. 293, 10-37; n. 349,
such a p. 296, 61-67. Cf. Vitae patrum V, libellus 10, n. 2, PL 73, col. 912C-D. See also I⌅., Ethica, lib. IV,
in hac tract. 3, cap. 4, n. 97, p. 323a; n. 102, p. 325b. Aquinas takes up the same anecdote, but as it is related
, et ut. by I ⇧✓ C ✓✓ ✓, Collationes 24, cap. 21, PL 49, col. 1312B-1315A; see T ✓ ⌅⇧ A⇣ ,
ateste Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 168, a. 2, corp.
19
I⌅., Super Ethica, lib. IV, lectio 15, n. 346, p. 294, 73-75; n. 347, p. 295, 21-26. See also I⌅.,
onice Ethica, lib. IV, tract. 3, cap. 5, n. 103, p. 326a.
20
While Aquinas’s Sentences commentary, De virtutibus in communi, and De virtutibus cardinalibus
are in general important for the study of his reception of the Nicomachean Ethics, in the case of eutrapelia
Ethica, it is only the Summa theologiae that offers an elaborated treatment of this virtue.
272 TOBIAS HOFFMANN

human life is preserved21 . While he makes this distinction between primary and issue
secondary goods, he carefully avoids attributing to Aristotle the Stoic view that spec
distinguishes between cardinal and annexed virtues, that is, between primary and a bad
secondary virtues22 . matt
On the whole, Aquinas’s presentation of Aristotle’s account is close to the text and Amb
faithful to the Aristotelian position. Aquinas classifies the subject matter as ludicra; Sene
not all playful matters, but specifically those one says or listens to23 . Eutrapelia attitu
concerns the active and passive attitude toward decent funny remarks or gestures24 . of Lu
Aquinas thus presents the Aristotelian eutrapelia as the virtue of wit, rather than as a deno
more general virtue concerning play. Aqui
A noteworthy gloss on Aristotle is Aquinas’s clarification of why eutrapelia is This
a virtue. In a brief digression, he explains in what sense amusement (ludus) has an soul
aspect of goodness. He starts by saying that unless amusement is a good under some to th
description, it does not qualify as a virtue. Like Albert he expands on Aristotle’s certa
cursory remark at the beginning of the chapter and writes that, just as the human being at th
needs to rest from time to time from bodily work, so he or she also sometimes needs nece
to grant some rest to the mind, and this is done by amusement25 . It is because rest that
is necessary for human life that boorishness, the failure to engage in and to listen to of hi
humorous conversation, is a vice26 . theo
case
3.2. Secunda secundae A
to en
The Secunda secundae incorporates Aristotle’s eutrapelia and some of the aspects burd
it involves (such as joking and mockery) into a scheme that is ordered according rathe
to completely different criteria than Aristotle’s organization of the virtues in the less
Nicomachean Ethics. Simply because the Secunda secundae explicitly adopts the the f
scheme of the cardinal and annexed virtues, while the Nicomachean Ethics does I
not, the treatment of the virtues in the Secunda secundae is destined to be non- a co
Aristotelian27 . The supernatural dimension of the virtues in the Secunda secundae beca
of course marks an even greater distance from Aristotle’s virtues. Nevertheless, the not p
comparison between the Ethics commentary and the Summa theologiae is fruitful, its co
for it manifests which elements of Aquinas’s own thought are conscious variations of only
Aristotelian themes. eutra
In the Secunda secundae, question 168, articles 2-4, Aquinas discusses a virtue Aris
and its contrary vices in ludis28 . According to the Secunda secundae, this virtue play
belongs to modesty, which is annexed to the cardinal virtue of temperance. The I

21
T ✓ ⌅⇧ A⇣ , Sententia libri Ethicorum, in Opera omnia, XLVII,2, Ed. Leonina, Roma 1969,
see al
lib. IV, lectio 1, p. 202, 1-6.
22 buonu
Aquinas is conscious of the fact that Aristotle does not employ the scheme of the cardinal virtues; 29
see Sententia libri Ethicorum, lib. I, lectio 16, p. 58, 96-100. 30
23
I⌅., Sententia libri Ethicorum, lib. IV, lectio 16, p. 256, 3-4; 24-27; p. 257, 103-104.
24 Roma
I⇥ ⌅., p. 257, 66-69; 119-120. 31
25
I⇥ ⌅., p. 256, 10-20. 32
26
I⇥ ⌅., p. 258, 188-190. Selec
27
Cf. T ✓ ⌅⇧ A⇣ , Summa theologiae, II-II, prol. 33
28
For a close reading of these articles, see F.-X. P◆ ↵↵ ⇠, « Petites miettes de philosophies », in the vi
Th.D. H ⇥⌘⇧⇤ ◆ (ed.), Saint Thomas d’Aquin, Ed. du Cerf, Paris 2010, p. 591-616, at p. 596-600;
 EUTRAPELIA 273

and issue here is play more generally, as it includes not only joking but also, for example,
that spectacles and even shows by jongleurs, that is, itinerant artists, who generally had
y and a bad reputation. Aquinas identifies the virtue that disposes one correctly in these
matters with Aristotle’s eutrapelia, but his interlocutors are not only Aristotle, but also
t and Ambrose, John Chrysostom, and Gregory the Great, as well as Cicero and pseudo-
dicra; Seneca (Martin of Braga). Aquinas deliberately departs from the extremely negative
pelia attitude of Ambrose and Chrysostom concerning laughter and play. On the grounds
res24 . of Luke 6:25: « Woe to you who laugh now, for you will mourn and weep », Ambrose
n as a denounced all joking, while Chrysostom alleged that play is the work of the devil29 .
Aquinas, by contrast, defends the necessity of play as a remedy for mental fatigue.
lia is This remedy is the very pleasure that is found in play and joking, for « the rest of the
as an soul is pleasure ». Of course, in order to be virtuous, play must be ordered according
some to the rule of reason: one has to avoid indecent words and deeds, one must retain a
otle’s certain seriousness, and one has to respect due circumstances (e.g., that play be done
being at the right time and place, as well as by a person whom it befits)30 . Because of the
needs necessity of play for human life, Aquinas defends the performing arts and even argues
e rest that actors deserve a salary31 . He thus implicitly opposes the policies of the rulers
en to of his time, kings Louis IX of France and Frederick II of Sicily, both of whom, for
theological and political reasons, prohibited spectacles, games of chance, and (in the
case of Louis IX) even chess32 .
Aquinas not only rehabilitates play, but also denounces as a vice the failure
to engage in play and to tolerate it, because it is against reason to make oneself
pects burdensome to others. Yet since pleasure and rest are not goals in themselves but are
ding rather instrumental for activity, Aquinas considers the vice of deficiency in play to be
n the less evil than the vice of excess of play, which consists either in indecent play or in
s the the failure to observe the fitting circumstances required for decent play33 .
does In a large sense, Aquinas’s Secunda secundae q. 168, a. 2-4 can be seen as
non- a commentary on Aristotle’s account of eutrapelia in Nicomachean Ethics, IV, 8,
ndae because in these articles Aquinas explains this Aristotelian notion. But Aquinas does
s, the not present them as an explanation of the Aristotelian account of eutrapelia and of
itful, its contrary vices. In article 2, where he asks whether there is a virtue in ludis, he
ns of only mentions at the end of the corpus articuli that the virtue he described is called
eutrapelia by Aristotle. Likewise in a. 4, on the deficiency of play, he mentions the
irtue Aristotelian term for boorish people only in passing, while in a. 3, on the excess of
irtue play he makes no reference to Aristotle at all.
The If we are looking for explanations of Aristotle’s description of eutrapelia in the

1969,
see also C. D⇧ M ⌘⇤ , L’affabilitas nei rapporti sociali: Studio comparativo sulla socievolezza e il
buonumore in Tommaso d’Aquino, Thomas More e Francesco di Sales, EDUSC, Roma 2010, p. 151-159.
irtues; 29
Cf. T ✓ ⌅⇧ A⇣ , Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 168, a. 2, arg. 1-2.
30
I⇥ ⌅., in corp. See also I⌅., Expositio super Isaiam, in Opera omnia, XXVIII, Ed. Leonina,
Roma 1974, cap. 3, 24, p. 32, 566-590.
31
I⌅., Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 168, a. 3, ad 3.
32
A. M ⇤I ◆⌫⌘⇧, « Natural Law as Subversive: The Case of Aquinas », in I⌅., Ethics and Politics:
Selected Essays, II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006, p. 41-63, at p. 45-57.
33
For the vice of excess of play, see T ✓ ⌅⇧ A⇣ , Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 168, a. 3; for
s », in the vice of deficiency in play, see a. 4.
6-600;
274 TOBIAS HOFFMANN

Summa, we must also take into account Aquinas’s discussion of mockery, in q. 72 of strai
the Secunda secundae, which belongs to the treatment of justice34 . In Grosseteste’s Buff
translation, Aristotle describes the witty individual as someone who makes good boor
use of mockery (bene conviciantem)35 . In q. 72, a. 2, Aquinas asks whether insult conv
(contumelia) or mockery (convicium) is a mortal sin. In the first initial argument, he and
refers to Aristotle’s claim that it belongs to eutrapelia to make good use of mockery. virtu
In the reply, Aquinas specifies that such mockery is not done in order to insult or He th
sadden an individual, but for the sake of pleasure and amusement. As long as teasing A
is done for this reason and not in order to make someone sad, it is not sinful36 . As of eu
Aquinas specifies in the body of the article, a derisive word can be used to correct for th
someone rather than to insult him or her. In this case, it is mockery only materially, for th
not formally37 . can b
that i
4. Gerald Odo years
W
The treatment of eutrapelia by Gerald Odo, a Franciscan writing his Ethics that
commentary in the third decade of the 14th century, is relatively independent from and
Albert and Aquinas, and it offers some new perspectives38 . My exposition focuses on the p
how Gerald characterizes the subject matter of eutrapelia and on his discussion of some
eutrapelia as a virtue. in w
Gerald presents eutrapelia as a virtue having ludus as its subject matter. Yet apart tend
from a brief remark about actors, about whom Gerald comments that their play is not in 11
gratuitous because they play in order to receive a pay, Gerald presents eutrapelia in his amus
literal commentary not as a virtue having to do with play in general, but specifically
with wit. In fact, as a part of amusement there are verbal exchanges that involve
speaking and listening in a manner that should conform to reason. Joking and teasing modo
have a place in these39 . Gerald’s emphasis on wit rather than on play is even more et tali
de soc
procu
34
See P◆ ↵↵ ⇠, « Petites miettes de philosophies », p. 602-607. « Nob
35
A⌘ ✓◆ ◆⇧↵⇧✓, Ethica Nicomachea. Translatio Roberti Grossateste Lincolniensis sive decen
Liber Ethicorum. B. Recensio Recognita, R.-A. G ◆ ⇧⌘ (ed.), AL XXVI,1-3, fasc. IV, inter
Brill/Desclée de Brouwer, Leiden/Bruxelles 1973, IV, cap. 7, p. 450, 20 (1128a25). 40
36
T ✓ ⌅⇧ A⇣ , Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 72, a. 2, arg. 1 et ad 1. qui et
37
I⇥ ⌅., in corp. immo
38
Since I have not undertaken an exhaustive study of all commentaries written prior to Gerald’s, I dicen
cannot claim any originality for Gerald’s ideas. It is striking, however, that the treatments of eutrapelia cachi
by Radulphus Brito and Walter Burley, who write after Aquinas and before Gerald, are not original at Descr
all. Brito only repeats Albert’s comments; Burley likewise follows Albert and adds some ideas from et sol
41
Aquinas’s Summa theologiae. John Buridan’s comments on Aristotle’s discussion of eutrapelia, in
contrast, rely heavily on Gerald’s. For Gerald’s influence on Buridan more generally, see J.J. W ↵✓ , anxie
« Some Relationships between Gerald of Odo’s and John Burdian’s Commentaries on Aristotle’s Ethics », esse o
Franciscan Studies 35 (1975), p. 237-275. Walsh dates Gerald’s commentary before 1329, see I⇥ ⌅., opus
p. 245. B. K⇧ ◆ accepts this dating and proposes 1322 as terminus post quem and conjectures that it was opus
most probably written after 1325; see her Aristotle and the Franciscans: Gerald Odonis’ Commentary esse v
on the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’, Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, New York 1984, p. 624-625. hac pr
39
G⇧⌘ ⌘⌅✓ O⌅ ✓, Sententia et expositio cum questionibus super libros Ethicorum Aristotelis videtu
42
cum textu eiusdem, Venezia 1500, IV, lectio 22, f. 90rb: « Probans [scil. Aristoteles] autem ludum esse
materiam virtutis et vitiorum [. . . ]. Et videntur esse aliqua verba qualia in ludo oportet dicere et ut, seu consil
 EUTRAPELIA 275

72 of straightforward in his description of the opposite vices and of the virtuous mean.
este’s Buffoons go to excess in mockery and in their attempts to make people laugh; the
good boorish neither tell nor tolerate jokes; but the eutrapeli have the gift of enriching
nsult conversations and of provoking cheerful laughter40 . Unlike Albert’s commentaries
nt, he and Aquinas’s Summa theologiae, where eutrapelia is taken in a broad sense as the
ckery. virtue of play, Gerald presents an accurate account of eutrapelia as the virtue of wit.
ult or He thus follows in the footsteps of Aquinas’s Sententia libri Ethicorum.
asing A quaestio that Gerald adds to the literal commentary clarifies the virtuous nature
. As of eutrapelia. As a general principle, Gerald states that every action that is necessary
rrect for the well-being of human life can be the work of virtue. As a remedy for disquiet and
ially, for the sake of regeneration, ludus is necessary for human well-being, and therefore it
can be the work of virtue41 . Albert’s insistence that amusement is good to the extent
that it is recreational thus still has a trace in Gerald’s commentary, written about eighty
years after Albert’s.
What is most interesting in Gerald’s account of eutrapelia are brief comments
thics that clarify in what sense eutrapelia, like every moral virtue, involves deliberation
from and choice. This allows him to clarify also the roles of prudence and skill (ars) in
es on the practice of this virtue. Gerald writes that virtue and prudence determine that
on of something amusing is in order, but not how it is to be accomplished. The manner
in which it is to be realized is the task of epidexia (which medieval commentators
apart tend to distinguish from eutrapelia, although Aristotle presents both as synonyms
s not in 1128a33). Eutrapelia, then, is the virtue that inclines one to do or say something
n his amusing as prudence commands, while epidexia is the skill required in wit42 . Gerald
cally
volve
asing modo quo oportet dicere, similiter et audire ab aliis [. . . ] multum differt talibus verbis iocosis talia dicere
more et talia audire [. . . ] vir bonus et discretus volens consolabiliter et decenter ludere potest et debet aliquem
de sociis moderate deridere et seipsum gratiosum non onerosum reddere, et cum hoc risum convenienter
procurare [. . . ] ». (Changed punctuation; my emphasis.) Concerning the play by actors, see f. 90va:
« Nobiles enim viri ludunt et solatium ducunt liberaliter, non mercedis causa. Et ideo attendunt solum ad
sive decentiam. Histriones vero ludunt similiter mercedes gratia, et ideo non attendunt nisi ad placere, quare
IV, inter istorum et illorum ludum magna est differentia ».
40
I⇥ ⌅., f. 90rb: « [. . . ] bomolochi sunt et esse videntur illi qui superabundant in derisione aliorum,
qui etiam sunt onerosi, non gratiosi in conspectu assistentium qui sunt desiderantes omnino risum, non
immoderatum risum [. . . ] agrestes et silvestres homines sunt illi qui deficiunt in duobus, scilicet in
ld’s, I dicendo et audiendo, qui quidem non ipsi dicunt aliquid ridiculum in truffam iocum, verbum risu et
apelia cachino dignum et aliis talia dicentibus molesti sunt, de nullo solatio gaudere uel ridere uolentes [. . . ].
nal at Describit medium, scilicet eutrapelum, id est bene conversivum vel bene esse vertentem verba in risum
from et solatium ».
41
lia, in I⇥ ⌅., q. 44, f. 91ra: « [. . . ] ludus [. . . ] factus autem in via medicine ad necessitatem releuandi
W ↵✓ , anxietatem et tedium, fatigationem et fastidium et ad recreationem et requiem presentis vite fragilis, potest
hics », esse opus virtutis. Quoniam omne opus uoluntarium necessarium ad bene esse humane vite potest esse
I⇥ ⌅., opus virtutis [. . . ]. Sed ludus secundo modo acceptus [scil. via medicine et non via concupiscentie] est
it was opus voluntarium ut de se patet, et necessarium ad bene esse, quia necessarium ad predicta. Quare potest
entary esse virtutis opus ». See also f. 90rb: « Requie existente in vita humana fatigabili et requie existente in
625. hac presenti conversatione fragili cum aliquali ludo tedium et anxietatem curarum humanarum remittente
totelis videtur hic, id est in hoc ludo, esse quedam collocutio rationi consona propter necessitatem premissam ».
42
m esse I⇥ ⌅., q. 44, ad 4, f. 91ra: « [. . . ] opus ludicrum est opus preconsiliatum et preelectum ut fiat, sed in
ut, seu consilio et electione non est preordinatum qualiter fiat; hoc enim pertinet ad epidexiam aptitudinem sicut
276 TOBIAS HOFFMANN

is the only one of our three commentators who discusses the aspect of wit that is an for, w
intellectual virtue. hum
T
Conclusion furth
or le
From the foregoing study of different accounts of eutrapelia, what is striking, first prese
of all, is that they posit a virtue having to do with amusements. That joking and into
playing require justice and moderation is quite obvious. Yet in the view of Aristotle synth
and his medieval commentators, eutrapelia is a distinct virtue having its own subject Than
matter, contributing something unique to human excellence. Aquinas attenuates the the r
irreducible nature of eutrapelia by making it a kind of modesty, a virtue annexed to
temperance.
The reason why eutrapelia is a moral virtue is worked out more clearly by the
medieval commentators than by Aristotle himself. In their writings, the ethical
dimension of eutrapelia is approached from four different perspectives:
(1) Starting with Albert, all the authors considered in this paper point to the
recreational aspect of the leisure one finds in play and conversation. They consider
recreation particularly useful for the life of study (vita contemplativa), and therefore a
crucial aspect of the moral life. What they fail to explain, however, is why conversation
must be witty in order to be recreational. Often pleasure and rest can be found
in conversations that are not necessarily humorous. In contrast to the medieval
commentators, Aristotle seems to be interested more in the intrinsic value of wit than
in its recreational dimension.
(2) Aristotle presented eutrapelia as a social virtue concerned with the pleasure
given to others. Albert and Aquinas pick up this idea, especially where they argue
that lack of playfulness and wit (boorishness) is a vice. Pleasure is not only seen in
a positive light, but it even has a deontological aspect: in social interaction we are
called to be agreeable to others by making reasonable use of wit43 . Eutrapelia shares
this dimension with the virtue of friendliness44 .
(3) A further ethical dimension of eutrapelia consists in its significance for moral
education. This dimension has been at the center of a recent debate about the virtuous
aspect of a developed sense of humor, but it is only marginal in the authors considered
here45 . Only Aquinas mentions it in his discussion of mockery.
(4) Like every moral virtue, eutrapelia requires prudence as a necessary condition.
Gerald specifies that prudence assists eutrapelia in determining when humor is called

cum virtus et prudentia imperant et preordinant quod fiat unum opus artificiosum, non tamen imperant
qualiter fiat artificiose, quia hoc spectat ad artem; sic etiam cum virtus et prudentia imperant opus
ludicrum, non preordinant ei modum qui spectat ad illam aptitudinem epidexiam que sine deliberatione
rationis exequitur ludum sicut et ars que non deliberat, ut habetur, 2˚ Topicorum ».
43
According to L.R. K ✓✓, eutrapelia is therefore an important virtue for a dinner guest (while
generosity is the virtue of the host). See his The Hungry Soul: Eating and the Perfecting of Our Nature,
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago/London 1999, p. 178-182.
44
For a perceptive study of Aquinas’s account of friendliness (affabilitas) and truthfulness, the two
virtues which together with eutrapelia are Aristotle’s social virtues, see K. W ◆⇧, « The Virtues of Man
the Animal sociale: Affabilitas and Veritas in Aquinas », The Thomist 57 (1993), p. 641-653.
45
See R.C. R ⇥⇧⌘◆✓, « Humor and the Virtues », Inquiry 31 (1988), p. 127-149 and J. L ✏✏ ◆◆, « Is
a Sense of Humour a Virtue? », The Monist 88 (2005), p. 72-92.
 EUTRAPELIA 277

is an for, while a different intellectual virtue, epidexia, provides insight into how to be
humorous.
The study of the medieval reception of Aristotle’s account of eutrapelia is
furthermore interesting from a historical point of view. We can observe how – more
or less consciously – an author will take a different approach when he is trying to
first present Aristotle in his own terms and when he is integrating Aristotle’s contribution
g and into his own synthesis. In Aquinas’s case, the contribution of Aristotle to his own
stotle synthesis is significant even where Aquinas goes beyond the letter of Aristotle’s text.
bject Thanks to Aristotle’s virtue in ludis, Aquinas has a strong argument ex auctoritate for
s the the rehabilitation of play and spectacles.
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