Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2018) 1e11

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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

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Kant and the scope of the analytic method

Brigitte Falkenburg
Institut für Philosophie und Politikwissenschaft, Fakultät 14, Technische Universität Dortmund, 44221 Dortmund, Germany

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The paper investigates Kant’s pre-critical views on the use of analytic and synthetic methods in New-
Received 19 January 2017 tonian science and in philosophical reasoning. In his 1755/56 writings, Kant made use of two variants of
Received in revised form the analytic method, i.e., conceptual analysis in a Cartesian (or Leibnizean) sense, and analysis of the
28 May 2018
phenomena in a Newtonian sense. His Prize Essay (1764) defends Newton’s analytic method of physics as
Accepted 23 June 2018
appropriate for philosophy, in contradistinction to the synthetic method of mathematics. A closer look,
Available online xxx
however, shows that Kant does not identify Newton’s method with conceptual analysis, but just suggests
a methodological analogy between both methods. Kant’s 1768 paper on incongruent counterparts also
Keywords:
Analytic method
fits in with his pre-critical use of conceptual analysis. Here, Kant criticizes Leibniz’ relational concept of
Kant’s pre-critical philosophy space, arguing that it is incompatible with the phenomenon of chiral objects. Since this result was in
Analogy between metaphysics and science conflict with his pre-critical views about space, Kant abandoned the analytic method of philosophy in
Experiment of pure reason favour of his critical method. The paper closes by comparing Kant’s pre-critical analytic method and the
way in which he once again took up the methodological analogy between Newtonian science and
metaphysics, in the preface B to the Critique of Pure Reason, in the context of his thought experiment of
pure reason.
Ó 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction (Kant, 1755a); and conceptual analysis in a Cartesian (or Leibni-

Even though it is well known that Kant referred to Newton’s
analytic method in his pre-critical writings (Kant, 1764; see;
Friedman, 1992), his use of the method has not yet been sufficiently
analysed. Indeed, he used several variants of “the” analytic method,
which belonged to a widespread 18th-century tradition of adopting
aspects of the “analytic-synthetic” method of early modern science
in order to establish the foundations of metaphysics. An influential
version of the method stemmed from ancient geometry, i.e., from
Pappus’ commentary to Euclid’s Elements (Pappos 1589). Newton
transformed it into a method of inference to the best explanation
(Newton, 1687, 1730). In metaphysics, the method came to be used
in a diversity of ways and gave rise to the “battlefield” criticized
later by Kant in his first Critique (1787, B XV), to which he himself
had also contributed in his pre-critical writings. After a short his-
torical survey of the method (sect. 2), and in particular Newton’s
version (sect. 2.2), I discuss Kant’s pre-critical uses of the method
(sect. 3).
In his 1755/56 writings, Kant made use of two variants of the
analytic method: i.e., analysis of the phenomena in a Newtonian
sense, as in the Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens
E-mail address: brigitte.falkenburg@tu-dortmund.de.
zean) sense, in the Monadologia physica (Kant, 1756). The former
amounts to a mechanistic explanation of structure formation in the
universe in terms of atoms and forces, and an inference to God as
the best explanation of the structures observed in the universe. His
Prize Essay (1764) defends Newton’s analytic method of physics as
the appropriate method of philosophy, in contradistinction to the
synthetic method of mathematics. Kant seems to merge both
methods, by appealing to Newton in connection with conceptual
analysis, supported by examples taken from the Monadologia
physica. A closer look, however, shows that Kant only suggests a
methodological analogy. The way he applies the analytic method in
his 1768 paper on incongruent counterparts (sect. 4) follows the
same line of reasoning. Here, Kant criticizes Leibniz’ geometrical
program of an analysis situs, and argues that Leibniz’ relational
concept of space is incompatible with the phenomenon of chiral
objects. The 1768 argument was an important step towards his
critical turn. For Kant, the argument showed that his pre-critical
project to incorporate Newtonian physics into a Wolffian system
of metaphysics had failed. The moral he drew from this led to his
abandoning the analytic method of philosophy in favour of his
critical method and the position of transcendental idealism. When
he once again took up the methodological analogy between natural
science and metaphysics, in order to support the thought

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experiment suggested in the preface B to the Critique of Pure Reason 2. “to divide each of the difficulties under examination into as
(CPR), he did so in a crucially different way (sect. 5). many parts as possible, and as might be necessary for its
adequate solution” (Descartes [1637], 2001, Part II)
2. The analytic-synthetic method in early modern science and 3. “to conduct my thoughts in such order that, by commencing
philosophy with objects the simplest and easiest to know, I might ascend by
little and little, and, as it were, step by step, to the knowledge of
Kant’s analytic method belonged to the methodological tradi- the more complex” (Descartes [1637], 2001).
tion of the analytic-synthetic method, which traced back to ancient
geometry. The method was omnipresent in early modern science
In the Meditations (Descartes, 1641), Descartes applied the 2nd
and philosophy. A particularly influential version of it was available
rule to the contents of our consciousness in order to find the un-
in the Latin translation of Pappos’ commentary on Euclid’s geom-
doubtable truth of the cogito. The basis was the analysis of clear and
etry (Pappos 1589). According to Pappos, analysis and synthesis are
distinct ideas, or concepts, in accordance with the 1st rule of the
the complementary parts of a combined regressive-progressive
Discours (the so-called evidence rule). In 17th/18th-century meta-
method of mathematical demonstration. Its ‘analytic’ part is
physics after Descartes, the mathematical method of analysis and
regressive, proceeding from something that is given or assumed to
synthesis was very popular. Philosophers as different as Hobbes,
the underlying principles; its ‘synthetic’ part is progressive, con-
Spinoza, or Leibniz all used different variants of it. Hobbes, who
firming the principles by deriving from them what one had initially
sharply criticized Descartes’ dualism, nevertheless followed him in
given or assumed:
identifying scientific reasoning with the method of decomposition,
“Now, analysis is the path from what one is seeking, as if it were or analysis, and re-composition, or synthesis:
established, by way of its consequences, to something that is
“There is therefore no method, by which we find out the causes
established by synthesis. That is to say, in analysis we assume
of things, but is either compositive or resolutive, or partly
what is sought as if it has been achieved, and Iook for the thing
compositive, and partly resolutive. And the resolutive is
from which it follows, and again what comes before that, until
commonly called analytical method, as the compositive [.]
by regressing in this way we come upon some one of the things
synthetical.” (Hobbes [1655], 1999, 194)
that are already known, or that occupy the rank of a first prin-
ciple. [.] In synthesis, by reversal, we assume what was ob-
tained last in the analysis to have been achieved already, and,
setting now in natural order, as precedents, what before were
following, and fitting them to each other, we attain the end of 2.2. Newton: the elaboration in physics
the construction of what was sought. This is what we call
‘synthesis’.” (Pappos [1589], 1986, 82) Galileo and Newton elaborated the analytic-synthetic method in
physics. Both combined experimental analysis with mathematical
deductions. Galileo’s resolutive-compositive method traces back to
A primary philosophical source of the method was Aristotle’s
Zabarella (Engfer, 1982, pp. 90e99). For Galileo, resolution included
Posterior Analytics. In the course of time, philosophers, mathema-
the experimental and mathematical decomposition of phenomena,
ticians, and scientists elaborated Pappos’ account of the method in
and composition included the derivation of the observed phe-
many ways. There are detailed investigations of analysis and syn-
nomena from mathematical principles. Newton followed Galileo
thesis as methods of mathematical demonstration (Hintikka &
and Pappos (Engfer, 1982, pp. 100e102). For him, the inductive part
Remes, 1974), the ways in which they were transformed in medi-
of the method (analysis or resolutio) was the regress from the
eval science (Crombie, 1953, 1990), and their 17th/18th century
phenomena, as given, to their components and causes, as the
successors in Descartes, Leibniz, and Wolff (Engfer, 1982) (for a
principles sought. In order to support the regress from the given
recent general survey see Beaney, 2014). Most investigations focus
phenomena to the principles of a physical theory, Newton per-
on mathematics, but the method was also familiar to the pro-
formed experiments and analysed the observations. For him, the
ponents of early modern science and philosophy.
regress from the phenomena to the principles includes mathe-
In the tradition of Pappos, analysis and synthesis were two
matical idealization and conceptual analysis. It is exploratory, or
complementary tools of scientific method, both of which have to be
heuristic, and hence belongs to what 20th-century philosophy of
employed one after the other in order to demonstrate truths, or to
science called the context of discovery. The deductive part of the
prove principles. In empirical science, the complementary regres-
method (synthesis or compositio) was the opposite progress from an
sive and progressive parts of the method corresponded to inductive
axiomatic theory of the parts and causes to the phenomena. It was
and deductive elements of reasoning. A well-known variant is
explanatory, and belongs to what 20th-century philosophy of sci-
Galileo’s resolutive-compositive method (Losee, 1993; Wallace,
ence called the context of justification.
1992), which traces back to the work of medieval and Renais-
Even though Newton relied on Pappos’ account of analysis and
sance predecessors such as Grosseteste and Zabarella (Crombie,
synthesis, as Descartes had done, he completely rejected Descartes’
1953; Engfer, 1982).
account of the method. He discarded Descartes’ approach to ge-
ometry and mathematical demonstrations (Guicciardini, 2009), as
2.1. Descartes: the philosophical generalization well as the principles of Cartesian physics. In particular, Newton
considered the mathematical and experimental analysis of the
Descartes’ views of the analytic-synthetic method shifted from phenomena as crucial for physics. In sharp contrast to Descartes,
a more complex regressive-progressive account in the unpub- analysis for him has inductive features, as the terminology of the
lished Regulae, to the decomposition and composition of problems Principia indicates. There, Newton spoke only of “induction” or
in the Discours (Beaney, 2014; Engfer, 1982). In the 2nd and 3rd “deduction from the phenomena”.
rule of the Discours de la méthode (1637), Descartes generalized Cotes, however, took up the method of analysis and synthesis in
the method to any kind of problem. The 2nd rule and 3rd rule order to explain Newton’s scientific method, in the preface to the
propose: second edition of the Principia. After criticizing the Cartesians who

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 B. Falkenburg / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2018) 1e11
“[.] take the foundations of their speculations from hypothe-
ses, even if they then proceed most rigorously according to
mechanical laws, are merely putting together a romance [.]”
(Newton [1713], 1999, 386),
Cotes describes the method of
“those whose natural philosophy is based on experiment.
Although they too hold that the causes of all things are to be
derived from first the simplest possible principles, they assume
nothing as a principle that has not yet been thoroughly proved
from phenomena.” (Newton [1713], 1999)
Then, he emphasizes that
“they proceed by a twofold method, analytic and synthetic.
From certain selected phenomena they deduce by analysis the
forces of nature and the simpler laws of these forces, from which
they then give the constitution of the rest of the phenomena by
synthesis.” (Newton [1713], 1999, 386)
Hence, one should not confuse Newton’s account of “induction”,
or of the “analytic” method, with induction in an empiricist sense,
i.e., mere empirical generalization. Engfer’s otherwise very
instructive book Philosophie als Analysis unfortunately does so, in a
tradition tracing back at least to Mach ([1883] 2013). In his com-
parison of Galileo’s and Newton’s methods, Engfer reproaches
Newton of an “empiricist doctrine of method” (Engfer, 1982, p. 100).
He misinterprets Newton’s famous Rule 4 in an empiricist sense of
induction and criticizes Newton for taking the phenomena as a
truth criterion for theories (Engfer, 1982, 101).
It is easy to show that Newton’s method, standing in Pappos’
tradition, is much more complex. According to his Rules 1 and 2, it
employs causal analysis. Rule 1 is a principle of causal parsimony,
admitting of “no more causes” than are “sufficient to explain the
phenomena”. Rule 2 derives from Rule 1. It requires assigning the
same causes to “natural effects of the same kind” (Engfer, 1982, p.
794e795). Only Rule 3 is inductive in the sense of an empirical
generalization. It claims that the extensive properties “which are
found to belong to all bodies within the reach of our experiments,
are to be esteemed the universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever”,
down to the “smallest parts” of bodies (Engfer, 1982, p. 795), i.e., the
atoms. Hence, even though Newton’s method contains inductive
elements in the usual empiricist sense, it is much more complex. In
particular, it implies causal analysis (Rules 1 and 2) and the
decomposition of wholes into their parts (Rule 3). His rules of
reasoning give rise to an inference to the best explanation
(Achinstein & Snyder, 2004; Achinstein, 2013; Worrall, 2000) and
fit in with the method of analysis and synthesis (Falkenburg, 2000,
2011; Ihmig, 2004, 2005). In addition, they fit in with Bacon’s ac-
count of induction, which also belongs to the tradition of analysis
and synthesis (Falkenburg & Ihmig, 2004).
A closer look at Newton’s account of the method shows how he
realigned Pappos’ method of analysis (or resolution) and synthesis
(or composition) in the context of physics. His most prominent
remarks on analysis and synthesis are in Query 31 of the Opticks,
where he explicitly compares the method used in natural philos-
ophy to the corresponding method of mathematics.
“As in Mathematicks, so in Natural Philosophy, the Investigation
of Difficult Things by the Method of Analysis, ought ever to
precede the Method of Composition.” (Newton [1730], 1979,
404)
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In Query 31 of the Opticks, Newton also depicts the reinterpre-
tation of Pappos’ mathematical method in terms of parts and causes
of the phenomena, which traces back to Galileo and Zabarella
(Engfer, 1982, pp. 100e101).
“By this way of Analysis we may proceed from Compounds to
Ingredients, from Effects to their Causes, and from Motions to
the Forces producing them; and in general, from Effects to their
Causes, and from particular Causes to more general ones, till the
Argument end in the most general. This is the Method of
Analysis: And the Method of Synthesis in assuming the Causes
discover’d, and establish’d as Principles, and by them explaining
the Phaenomena proceeding from them, and proving the Ex-
planations.” (Newton [1730], 1979, 404e405)
The quotation shows that for Newton the causal analysis of the
phenomena has two aspects, namely the search of the ingredients
or parts of a given compound and the search for the forces behind
the motions.
Even though Newton does not explicitly mention the method of
analysis in the Principia, it is obviously identical with the famous
“induction” of “propositions gathered from phenomena” to which
Newton’s methodological Rule 4 at the beginning of Book 3 of the
Principia refers (Newton [1713], 1999, 796). Indeed, a further
remark in Query 31 of the Opticks makes it clear that analysis, or
resolution, is the inductive method corresponding to the method-
ological rules of reasoning pinned down at the beginning of Book 3
in the Principia.
“This Analysis consists in making Experiments and Observa-
tions, and in drawing general Conclusions from them by In-
duction, and admitting of no Objections against the Conclusions,
but such as are taken from Experiments, or other certain Truths.
For Hypotheses are not to be regarded in experimental Philos-
ophy.” (Newton [1730], 1979, 404)
Newton’s account of analysis and synthesis became very influ-
ential in 18th-century metaphysics as well as in all the empirical
sciences. In the Principia, Newton explains the motions of the ce-
lestial bodies and other mechanical phenomena in terms of gravi-
tation as a universal force, in accordance with his method of
analysis and synthesis. The analysis of the phenomena, i.e., the
motions of the planets around the sun according to Kepler’s laws
and the free fall of bodies on earth according to Galileo’s law, gives
rise to the assumption of gravitation as the cause of all mechanical
motions. In turn, the law of gravitation makes it possible to explain
these phenomena (and more phenomena, like the tides) by means
of mathematical derivation, or deduction, in the synthetic part of
the method. In the Opticks, Newton explains the constitution of
light and other optical phenomena in terms of colours and hypo-
thetical light atoms. In particular, he shows how experiments with
a prism decompose white light into the colours, and how an
experiment with two parallel prisms can recompose the white light
from its coloured components by superposing the spectra (Newton
[1730], 1979, 147.) In both fields of physics, the phenomena are the
starting point of causal analysis.
The crucial difference between the Principia and the Opticks is,
however, that Newton is able to give a full-fledged mathematical
theory of gravitation explaining the phenomena of mechanics,
whereas he is not able to do so for the atomic constituents of light
or matter, their forces, and a mathematical description of the latter.
Without establishing well-defined, empirically confirmed princi-
ples that explain the phenomena under investigation, the second
step of the analytic-synthetic method, the synthetic part, is
4 B. Falkenburg / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2018) 1e11
missing, and the method remains incomplete. Kant will come back
to this issue after his critical turn, in connection with his thought
experiment of pure reason, in 1787 (see below sect. 4).
2.3. Post-Cartesian philosophy: the emergence of methodological
struggles
In Post-Cartesian philosophy, the two parts of Pappos’ or New-
ton’s analytic-synthetic method were split. Philosophers started to
consider them as two different, rival methods of metaphysics. The
splitting had already begun in Descartes’ day: according to the
Discours (Descartes 1637, 2001), both parts of the method belong
together, forming two out of four rules of the scientific method. In
the Meditations (1641), Descartes practised the analytic method in
order to find his allegedly evident and undoubtable principles of
philosophy. Mersenne, in his objections to the Meditations, asked
Descartes to also present the principles of his philosophy more
geometrico, that is, according to the synthetic method. Descartes
replied that he considered the analytic method to be appropriate
for demonstrating the way in which one discovers something. In
addition, he presented the contents of his philosophy more geo-
metrico, in terms of definitions, postulates, and axioms, giving an
impression of metaphysics as an axiomatic, quasi-mathematical
discipline.
In addition, the influential Port Royal school of logic merged
Descartes’ method of the Discours with the methods of empirical
sciences, by distinguishing analysis and synthesis as follows:
“analysis, or the method of resolution” is a “method for
discovering truth, [.] which may also be termed the method of
invention”, and “synthesis, or the method of composition [.]
may be also called the method of doctrine.” (Arnauld / Nicole
[1685], 1891, 309).
In the Port Royal logic, analysis is an inductive method
interpreted in the double sense of decomposition and causal
analysis, as in early modern science. However, the examples of
decomposition given in the Port Royal logic did not only concern
the analysis of natural phenomena into their parts. They also
demonstrated the analysis of phenomena into their properties,
thus making the bridge to the analysis of concepts, in particular
in mathematics. Subsequently, the tradition of Leibniz’ logic
induced a shift of the philosophical account of analysis to con-
ceptual analysis only (see, e.g., Koriako, 1999, p. 28). In this way,
the use of the analytic method in 18th century metaphysics on
the one hand remained in the Cartesian tradition of conceptual
analysis, yet on the other came close to 20th century analytical
philosophy.
In the Leibniz-Wolff school, therefore, Pappos’ analytic-
synthetic method proliferated into confusingly many variants.
A more detailed examination shows that according to Leibniz,
there is even no clear and unambiguous relation between the
analytic and synthetic method and an inductive, heuristic ars
inveniendi and a deductive ars demonstrandi, respectively
(Engfer, 1982, pp. 199e208). Wolff, too, put this traditional
correlation in question. It is only present in the Latin logic,
whereas it was not found in the earlier German logic (Engfer,
1982, 227e228). In this way, the attribution of analysis and
synthesis to the well-defined partial methods of Pappos, which
was very clear in Descartes’ philosophy, became rather unclear
in 18th-century philosophy.
In addition, there arose methodological struggles concerning
the correct method of metaphysics. Philosophers replaced the
use of the compound analytic-synthetic method of mathematics
and empirical science by the use of either the analytic or
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synthetic method, defending one of the two parts as “the” proper
method of metaphysics. Whereas Descartes or Hobbes defended
the “analytic” part of the method as the appropriate procedure
for deriving their respective philosophical principles and sys-
tems, Spinoza, in his ethics more geometrico (1677), followed the
“synthetic” method of giving definitions and axioms and
deducing theorems from the axioms. Spinoza’s ethics more geo-
metrico is indeed the most famous example of a one-sided use of
the “synthetic” method in metaphysics. The metaphysical system
of Wolff, too, and its elaboration in 18th-century German school
philosophy (Baumgarten, 1739) followed this method. Concern-
ing the quasi-axiomatic structure of the system, it had strong
scholastic features. Based on Leibniz’ principle of sufficient
reason and the metaphysical concept of a monad, it combined
the synthetic method of starting from definitions and axioms
with conceptual analysis, proceeding more geometrico in Spino-
za’s sense.
In the course of increasing criticism of the quasi-axiomatic
approach to metaphysics, the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences
raised the Prize Question for 1763, Are the metaphysical sciences
capable of the same evidence as the mathematical sciences? As is well
known, Mendelssohn was awarded the prize for his answer in the
positive. He attributed the analytic method to philosophy, and
argued that its certainty is comparable to that of the synthetic
method of mathematics (Schönfeld, 2000, p. 211). Kant, in his Prize
Essay Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural
Theology and Morality (Kant, 1764), also attributed the analytic
method to philosophy, but he associated it with Newton’s analytic
method and rejected the synthetic method of mathematics for
philosophy.
3. Kant’s pre-critical uses of analytic methods
Kant’s pre-critical project was to reconcile the metaphysical
principles of the Leibniz-Wolff school, such as the principle of
sufficient reason, and Newton’s physics, in a non-arbitrary way,
facing up the problem that Leibniz’ and Newton’s principles were
incompatible. In order to overcome this problem, his pre-critical
reconciliation project employed the analytic method of Newto-
nian science, with its inductive features. In his Inquiry (1764),
Kant referred to Newton’s scientific method, and to Crusius’ ac-
count of an inductive or regressive method (Falkenburg, 2000;
Friedman, 1992; Schönfeld, 2000; Tonelli, 1959). A closer look at
Kant’s pre-critical writings shows that he used several variants of
the analytic method, without discussing the questions of how
they are related, to what extent they are compatible, and
whether they give rise to coherent foundations for metaphysics.
In his 1755/56 writings as well as in his Inquiry (1764), he used
and defended a combination of conceptual analysis of meta-
physical ideas and causal analysis of the phenomena, and his
method here stands in need of clarification. The Universal Natural
History and Theory of the Heavens (Kant, 1755a) relies on causal
analysis of the structure of the phenomena observed in the
universe, whereas the Nova dilucidatio (Kant, 1755b) and the
Monadologia physica (Kant, 1756) employ conceptual analysis in
combination with a synthetic approach more geometrico. The
method proposed in the Inquiry (Kant, 1764), finally, is the
analysis of metaphysical ideas representing the external world,
or some hybrid of the Leibniz-Wolffian and the Newtonian ver-
sions of analysis. A comprehensive study of Kant’s pre-critical
uses of analytic methods is beyond the scope of the present
paper. Let me just give a preliminary sketch of their crucial fea-
tures, partially based on Falkenburg (2000, 2013) and Schönfeld
(2000).
 B. Falkenburg / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2018) 1e11
3.1. The Newtonian method of the Theory of the Heavens
In the Theory of the Heavens, Kant (1755a) employs causal
analysis of the astronomical phenomena in a Newtonian style.
Following Newton’s Rules 1 and 2, Kant infers from the approxi-
mately planar shape of the solar system to a common cause of the
planetary motions in the solar system, and suggests that they stem
from a rotating primary matter vortex. Following Newton’s Rule 3
and the remarks on atomism in Query 31 of Newton’s Opticks, he
attributes attractive and repulsive forces to constituent parts of
matter that gave rise to the agglomeration of the sun and the other
celestial bodies in the solar system.
In a next step, he infers according to the same principles that the
Milky Way is a rotating star system with an approximately planar
shape, that is, a rotating disk of stars, at the edge of which the solar
system is located, and which we observe as a belt of stars from our
terrestrial and lateral point of view. Then, he applies Newton’s
methodology to the nebulae observed by telescopes and infers that
they are rotating star disks such as the Milky Way. He concludes
further that the whole universe is underlaid by the same processes
of structure formation as the primary matter vortex from which the
solar system emerged, at larger and larger scales.
His 1755 theory of the formation of the solar system, the Milky
Way, and the large-scale structure of the universe is indeed the
birth of physical cosmology as a scientific discipline. Like Newton in
his Opticks, Kant in his Theory of the Heavens is only capable of
presenting the analytic step of the analytic-synthetic method as a
more or less qualitative inference to the best explanation. In his day,
he was not able to complete the method with the synthetic step,
i.e., by deducing the actually observed structure of the solar system,
the Milky Way, and the distribution of other galaxies in the uni-
verse, from a theory of mathematical physics. This can only be done
today by means of elaborate computer simulations of structure
formation in the universe. However, in principle Kant’s methodo-
logical approach to structure formation in the universe was as
correct as his results, at least within his contemporary context of
Newtonian physics.
In addition, Kant provides his physical cosmology with a
metaphysical foundation. He adds to it the so-called physico-
theological proof of God, which Newton’s scientific methodology
does not support. Newton’s Rules 1 and 2 at most support the
assumption that the systematic organization of the celestial bodies
in the universe traces back to a common physical cause, that is, a
primordial rotating matter vortex made up of atoms, as the initial
condition of structure formation in the universe. In a further
regressive step, Kant traces this initial condition back to God as the
creator of the universe. He argues that the laws of nature are pur-
posive, and that God is the cause of the order of nature to which the
laws of physics give rise:
“Matter, which is the original material of all things, is thus
bound to certain laws, if it is left freely to these laws, it must
necessarily bring forth beautiful combinations. It is not at liberty
to deviate from this plan of perfection. Since, therefore, it is
subject to a most wise purpose, it must necessarily have been
placed into such harmonious connections by a first cause that
ruled over it, and a God exists precisely because nature cannot
behave in any other way than in a regular and orderly manner,
even in chaos.” (Kant, 1755a, Ak 1.228)
This physico-theological proof cuts across the delimitation be-
tween Newtonian science and metaphysics. It makes the bridge
from physical (and rational) cosmology to rational theology, as two
parts of the metaphysical specialis of a system of metaphysics in
Wolff’s style.
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3.2. The mixed methods of the New Elucidation and the Physical
Monadology
The New Elucidation (Kant, 1755b) is a closely related work on
the foundations of metaphysics. Here, Kant attempts to establish a
theory of physical influx on the middle grounds between Leibniz’
system of pre-established harmony and Newton’s concept of force,
and to make a bridge from rational cosmology to rational psy-
chology, the latter being the third part of the metaphysical specialis
of a system of metaphysics in Wolff’s style. In addition, he wants to
reconcile Leibniz’ principle of sufficient reason with Newton’s
atomism by rejecting Leibniz’ version of the principle of in-
discernibles. Methodologically, he combines conceptual and logical
analysis with a synthetic approach more geometrico in the style of
the Wolff school, giving definitions, propositions, and proofs. In
addition, he employs a phenomenological argument in order to
support his criticism of Leibniz’ principle of indiscernibles and
Newton’s atomism. The argument relies on an analysis of phe-
nomena and on Newton’s methodological Rules 1 and 2:
“For that bodies which are to be said similar, such as water,
mercury, gold, the simplest salts, and so forth, should agree
completely in their primitive parts in respect of their homoge-
neous and internal characteristic marks, corresponds to the
identity of the use and function which they are defined to fulfil.
This is to be seen from their effects, which we observe by issuing
from those same things, always the same and never with any
discernable difference. Nor it is proper here to suppose that
there is some hidden difference which escapes the senses [ .],
for that would be to search knots in a bullrush.” (Kant, 1755b, Ak.
1.409e410)
Kant’s inference that the same observable effects of the parts of
homogeneous empirical substances are due to the same causes
follows Newton’s Rule 2. His keen comment that to assume hidden
different causes would mean “to search knots in a bulrush” follows
Newton’s Rule 1 of causal parsimony.
In the Physical Monadology (Kant, 1756), Kant argues in favour of
dynamic atomism, which he needs for the physical cosmology
outlined in the Theory of the Heavens (Kant, 1755a). Methodologi-
cally, Kant combines conceptual and logical analysis with a syn-
thetic approach more geometrico in the style of the Wolff school, as
in the New Elucidation. In addition to conceptual analysis, the proofs
of the Physical Monadology employ geometrical constructions. The
principles of Kant’s dynamic atomism of 1756 are similar to those of
the theory developed by Boscovich in 1758 (Boscovich [1758],
1922).
3.3. The methodological analogy between metaphysics and
Newtonian science
In the Inquiry (Kant, 1764), Kant argues that Newton’s analytic
method is the appropriate method for metaphysics, in contradis-
tinction to the synthetic method of mathematics. He claims that
“nothing has been more damaging to philosophy than mathe-
matics, and in particular the imitation of its method in contexts
where it cannot possibly be employed.” (Kant, 1764, Ak. 2.283)
In contradistinction to the synthetic approach more geometrico
of the Wolff school, he proposes two rules for metaphysics: first,
“not to start with definitions”, except nominal definitions based on
analytical judgements (Ak 1.285); and second, “to distinguish those
[.] judgements immediately made about the object [.] with
6 B. Falkenburg / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2018) 1e11
certainty” (Kant, 1764). If these judgements are logically indepen-
dent of each other, metaphysics may take them as the foundation of
a quasi-axiomatic approach (Kant, 1764). These two rules conform
to Newton’s claim in Query 31 of the Opticks that in the investiga-
tion of complex problems the analysis should precede the synthetic
method (see also Falkenburg, 2000, pp. 77e78, and Schönfeld,
2000, pp. 219e221). After giving them, Kant makes the relation
to Newton’s analytic-synthetic method explicit:
“The true method of metaphysics is basically the same as that
introduced by Newton into natural science and which has been
of such benefit to it. Newton’s method maintains that one ought,
on the basis of certain experience and, if need be, with the help
of geometry, to seek out the rules in accordance with which
certain phenomena of nature occur. [.] Complex natural phe-
nomena are explained once it has been clearly shown how they
are governed by these well-established laws.” (Kant, 1764, Ak.
2.286)
Here, the requirement “to seek out the rules” corresponds to the
analytic step of Newton’s analytic-synthetic method, and the issue
that “natural phenomena are explained” by “well-established laws”
corresponds to the synthetic step. The omission in the above
quotation is a proviso indicating the limitations of physical
knowledge as concerns the ultimate principles underlying the
phenomena:
“Even if one does not discover the fundamental principles of
these occurrences in the bodies themselves, it is nonetheless
certain that they operate in accordance with this law.” (Kant,
1764)
Then, Kant proposes carrying this Newtonian method over to
metaphysics by analogy. The appropriate method of metaphysics is
to start with conceptual analysis, in order to lay the grounds for a
quasi-axiomatic procedure based on it:
“Likewise in metaphysics: by means of certain inner experience,
that is to say, by means of an immediate and self-evident inner
consciousness, seek out these characteristic marks which are
certainly to be found in the concept of any general property.”
(Kant, 1764)
Hence, the conceptual analysis of metaphysics applies to our
ideas of inner experience, i.e., the concepts we have in mind.
Adding an analogous proviso indicating the limitations of meta-
physical knowledge as concerns the real definitions of metaphysical
concepts, and following his second methodological rule, he
continues:
“And even if you are not acquainted with the complete essence
of the thing, you can still safely employ those characteristic
marks to infer a great deal from them about the thing in ques-
tion.” (Kant, 1764)
Kant scholars differ on the significance of Kant’s methodological
comparison of metaphysics with Newtonian science. Against
Schönfeld (2000, p. 224), it has to be emphasized that Kant does not
identify the inner experience of certain marks of metaphysical
concepts with Newton’s outer experience. He just equates both
kinds of experience by analogy. An analogy is a double ratio A: B ¼
C: D (as, e.g., in the traditional metaphysical analogy “God relates to
the World as the watchmaker to the clock”). Kant’s methodological
analogy in the Inquiry indeed exhibits this structure of a double
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ratio, too. According to the above quotations, Newton’s analytic-
synthetic method relates to natural phenomena and their expla-
nation in terms of laws, just as conceptual analysis and the de-
ductions following it relate to the phenomena of inner experience
and the inferences drawn from its characteristic marks.
Falkenburg (2000, p. 79) positions this methodological analogy
within Kant’s overall reconciliatory strategy, in the context of his
pre-critical project of incorporating the principles of Newton’s
physics into a system of metaphysics in Wolff’s style. The analogy
between the methods of Newtonian science and of metaphysics
will recur in Kant’s experiment of pure reason, in the preface to the
second edition of the CPR (see below, sect. 5). Friedman (1992, pp.
21e22) interprets Kant’s comparison of both methods in such a
weaker, analogical sense, too, noting that according to Kant,
metaphysics has to “adopt a quasi-inductive or regressive method
[.] explicitly following the example of Crusius” (Friedman, 1992, p.
22).
4. The scope of the analytic method
The scope of Kant’s methodological analogy is controversial, too.
In the Inquiry, Kant supports his argument in favour of the analytic
method of metaphysics by recalling from the Physical Monadology
the analysis of the concept of a body occupying space (Kant, 1764,
Ak. 2.286e287). Friedman (1992, pp. 23e24) infers from this crucial
example that
“the data for Kant’s Newtonian method of metaphysics consist
in uncontroversial metaphysical propositions [.] on the one
hand, and established results of the mathematical exact sci-
ences, on the other.” (Friedman, 1992, 24)
Based on this conclusion, he suggests a model of metaphysics
according to which “it is possible to regulate e and if need be to
correct e metaphysical reasoning” by means of “interaction with
the exact sciences” (Friedman, 1992, p. 24). Schönfeld (2000, p. 224)
counters that Kant’s Inquiry does not restrict the method of meta-
physics to the concepts of natural science, given that Kant’s pre-
critical metaphysical project also embraces the foundations of
rational theology. Indeed, in the Inquiry Kant makes the claim that
“the fundamental principles of natural theology are capable of the
greatest philosophical certainty” (Kant, 1764, Ak. 2.296). Falkenburg
(2000, pp. 78e79) and Schönfeld (2000, p. 225) agree however that
the path to metaphysical certainty suggested in the Inquiry is highly
problematic. Kant overestimated the scope of the analytic method
in metaphysics, as the subsequent collapse of his pre-critical proj-
ect shows.
4.1. The collapse of the pre-critical project
In my previous work (Falkenburg, 2000, 2013), I have disagreed
with Schönfeld (2000) concerning the way in which Kant’s pre-
critical project collapsed in the 1760s. My work focuses on Kant’s
pre-critical theory of nature and on his life-long project of giving
metaphysical foundations to natural science. In contrast, Schönfeld
focuses on Kant’s pre-critical metaphysics beyond the cosmology
part of a Wolffian system of metaphysics, and on his likewise life-
long project of making the bridge between theoretical and prac-
tical philosophy, or in other words the metaphysics of nature and
the metaphysics of human freedom and morals.
According to my approach, until the mid-1760s Kant maintained
his pre-critical project for a system of metaphysics in Wolff’s style
reconciling the principles of Leibniz’ metaphysics and Newton’s
physics. I argue that in the late 1760s Kant became aware of a fatal
mismatch between the analytic methods of his day and his own
 B. Falkenburg / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2018) 1e11
attempts to give reliable foundations to metaphysics on that basis.
My analysis focuses on Kant’s pre-critical attempts to incorporate
Newton’s physics within a metaphysical system in Wolff’s style,
neglecting the Dreams of a Spirit-Seer (Kant, 1766) and interpreting
Kant’s argument on incongruent counterparts (Kant, 1768) as the
definitive collapse of the pre-critical project. I consider Kant’s 1768
criticism of Leibniz’ relational concept of space as a crucial first step
towards the critical turn: in particular, towards the critical account
of space and time as forms of pure intuition, first elaborated in
Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation (Kant, 1770).
Schönfeld, in turn, argues that Kant had already abandoned his
pre-critical project in the early 1760s, in the face of the problem of
convincingly incorporating human freedom into the pre-critical
system. He draws attention to an important tension between
defending the analytic method of metaphysics in the Inquiry (Kant,
1764), on the one hand, and playing down the certainty of all
demonstrations of the existence of God, including Kant’s own, in
the Only Possible Argument (Kant, 1763), on the other. Schönfeld
focuses on Kant’s pre-critical attempts at giving foundations to
metaphysical concepts beyond natural science and cosmology. Ac-
cording to him, the Dreams of a Spirit-Seer (Kant, 1766) indicates the
definite collapse of the pre-critical project, given that Kant’s acid-
tongued criticism of Swedenborg’s spiritualism implicitly also
attacked his own pre-critical views about the interaction between
body and soul, set out in the New Elucidation (Kant, 1755b).
Schönfeld’s book, however, ends with a discussion of the Dreams,
neglecting the role of the argument on incongruent counterparts
(Kant, 1768) in Kant’s critical turn.
In the final analysis, both approaches complement each other.
Schönfeld shows that after writing the Only Possible Argument
(1763) and the Inquiry (1764), Kant recognized increasing problems
concerning metaphysical certainty in the foundations of meta-
physics beyond natural science, culminating in the Dreams of 1766. I
want to show, further, that the pre-critical project failed even for
the foundations of the cosmology part of metaphysics. Schönfeld
restricts his discussion of the analytic method in Kant’s writings to
Kant’s Inquiry (1764), whereas I attempted to reconstruct Kant’s
uses of analytic methods from the Theory of the Heavens (1755a) to
the Ultimate Ground (1768). Let me summarize here how Kant’s
1768 paper relates to his analytic methodology proposed in the
Inquiry and to his 1755/56 writings.
4.2. The argument on incongruent counterparts
The paper Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation
of Directions in Space (Kant, 1768) deals with the phenomenon of
incongruent counterparts, i.e., the empirical observation of right-
(or left-) handed objects such as snails, screws, and hands, which
cannot be transformed by translation or rotation into their left- (or
right-) handed counterparts. Kant argues that this phenomenon is
at odds with Leibniz’ relational account of space. Given that he had
adopted Leibniz’ relational concept of space from his very first
writing (Kant, 1749), tacitly assuming that it is compatible with a
Newtonian account of objects in space (see Walford, 1999), his pre-
critical cosmology now faced a serious problem.
The Ultimate Ground begins with a criticism of Leibniz’ mathe-
matical program of an analysis situs, the project of deriving
Euclidean geometry from spatial relations as primitive concepts. De
Risi (2007, pp. 101e107) shows that Kant and his contemporaries
could have no detailed knowledge of this project, given that Leib-
niz’ writings on it were unpublished; hence, Wolff’s or Lambert’s
remarks on it could also not be telling. The meager knowledge that
Kant could have had of this project prompted him to relate it to
Leibniz’ metaphysics of space (De Risi, 2007, 283), i.e., relationalism.
In the context of Kant’s pre-critical project of establishing a system
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of metaphysics by means of the analytic method, the argument of
the 1768 paper aims at the metaphysical foundations of physics, at a
metaphysical analysis of the concept of space.
Kant analyses the concept of space with regard to the spatial
structure of the phenomena, taking the results of his analysis as a
touchstone of the adequacy of Leibniz’ relational concept of space.
His analysis reveals the spatial property of chirality, which in his
view does not derive from Leibniz’ relational account of geometry.
In physical space, we find empirical objects such as hands and
screws, which have chirality and hence are incongruent to their
counterpart obtained by mirroring. The crucial conclusion of Kant’s
argument is the claim that the chirality of a right-handed or left-
handed object is an absolute property which derives from its rela-
tion to absolute space:
“What we are trying to demonstrate, then, is the following
claim. The ground of the complete determination of a corporeal
form does not depend simply on the relation and position of its
parts to each other; it also depends on the reference of that
physical form to universal absolute space, as it is conceived by
the geometers.” (Kant, 1768, Ak. 2.381)
His main objection against Leibniz’ relational concept of space is
the following thought experiment concerning a human hand
imagined as the first piece of creation:
“[.] imagine that the first created thing was a human hand.
That human hand would have to be either a right hand or a left
hand. The action of the creative cause in producing the one
would have of necessity to be different from the action of the
creative cause producing the counterpart. [.] However, there is
no difference in the relations of the parts of the hand to each
other, and that is so whether it be a right hand or a left hand; it
would therefore follow that the hand would be completely
indeterminate in respect of such a property. In other words, the
hand would fit equally well on either side of the human body;
but that is impossible.” (Kant, 1768, 2.382e383)
This argument looks like a non sequitur. Note, however, that it
refers to a hand on its own which, as the first piece of creation,
makes up the whole world; and to which God in the next step adds
the human body. Hence, the argument applies to a handed universe,
to the chirality of a possible world. It is a cosmological argument
applying to the universe as a whole (Falkenburg, 2000, pp. 111, 117;
Falkenburg, 2006). Viewed from the later, critical doctrine of the
antinomy of pure reason, its crucial point is that metaphysics goes
astray by striving for explanatory completeness.
According to Leibniz’ relational concept of space, the left-
handed and the right-handed universe are indiscernibles, and
hence, according to Leibniz’ principle of indiscernibles, they are one
and the same. De Risi (2007) shows that, surprisingly, Leibniz
himself discusses this option in a late paper:
“Indeed, it was Leibniz who suggested the most radical hy-
pothesis. In a little page from his last years [.] Leibniz explicitly
makes the example of the creation of the whole universe ac-
cording to the two orientations (thus, without appealing to any
other body on which right or left can possibly be measured). The
example leads him simply to regard the two states as indis-
cernible.” (De Risi, 2007, 289)
In Kant’s view, this option is “impossible”. In the long philo-
sophical debate on Kant’s 1768 argument (see, e.g., van Cleve 1991),
the argument has often been misunderstood as merely geometrical
8 B. Falkenburg / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2018) 1e11
(for criticism, see Walford, 1999). In addition, most interpreters
read Kant’s term “impossible” in the sense of logical impossibility.
According to Falkenburg (2000, pp. 114e122; 2006), however,
Kant’s term “impossible” does not indicate a logical contradiction
here, but the real impossibility, or inconceivability, of a Leibnizean,
relational account of the universe as a whole, according to which a
left-handed and a right-handed universe were identical. With this
reading of the term “impossible”, the impression of a non sequitur
vanishes. Kant’s conclusion was simply that in view of the phe-
nomenon of incongruent counterparts, Leibniz’ relationalism is
incompatible with our inner experience of the certain features of
space, that is, with chirality as one of the “characteristic marks [.]
certainly to be found in the concept” of space (see Kant, 1764, Ak.
2.286, quoted above in sect. 3.3).
To Kant himself his conclusion must have seemed inevitable.
The result of the 1768 paper was fatal for the cosmology part of his
pre-critical project, given that his own pre-critical relational ac-
count of space turned out to be incompatible with the phenomenon
of chirality. Applied to the concept of space, the method of con-
ceptual analysis defended in the Inquiry went astray for the foun-
dations of cosmology. Hence, to apply the analytic method, as
suggested in the Inquiry, turned out to be incoherent. In the New
Elucidation (1755b), Kant inferred from phenomenal substances
such as water or gold on the lines of Newton’s Rules 1 and 2 that
Leibniz’ principle of indiscernibles does not preclude the existence
of numerically different objects with identical internal properties.
His 1768 argument, however, infers from the phenomenon of
incongruent counterparts that two numerically different meta-
physical objects, namely universes with identical internal proper-
ties, but opposite orientation, cannot exist.
4.3. Towards the critical turn
Several Kant scholars noted that even if Kant’s 1768 argument
defeats a Leibnizean relational account of space, it does not support
Newton’s opposite absolute concept of space (most prominently,
Friedman, 1992, pp. 28e29; see also Walford, 1999). In addition, the
sophisticated historical investigations of De Risi (2007) support the
following observation of Falkenburg (2000, p. 127). In a certain
sense, Kant’s critical views about the ideality of space and time, first
presented in De mundi sensibilis (Kant, 1770), indeed make a step
back from his pre-critical realistic relational account of space to
Leibniz’ authentic idealistic account of space, as the coexistence of
mere phenomena.
The 1768 argument, however, definitely defeats the use of the
analytic method in metaphysics, if the Dreams of a Spirit Seer (Kant,
1766) did not yet. According to the Inquiry (Kant, 1764), the analytic
method should be able to derive an adequate cosmological concept
of space; but it was not. Hence, Kant concluded from his 1768
argument that the analytic method is not the adequate method of
metaphysics. Therefore, he developed the critical method of clari-
fying the conditions of the possibility of experience (called the
“transcendental” method by the Neo-Kantians: see Cohen (1885),
89, 95). Hence, let us finally have a look at Kant’s use of the analytic
method in his critical philosophy.
5. The experiment of pure reason
In the course of the critical turn, Kant’s account of the analytic
and synthetic methods substantially shifted, and his uses of the
terms “analytic” and “synthetic” did so, too (for details, see Caygill,
1995, pp. 67e73 and 382e384; Engfer, 1982, pp. 43e49). In two
footnotes to the preface to the second edition of the CPR (Kant,
1787), however, he once again takes the analytic-synthetic
method of Newtonian science up in a methodological analogy.
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The context is the experiment of pure reason, a thought experiment
by means of which Kant wanted to justify his critical philosophical
position of transcendental idealism.
5.1. Kant’s thought experiment
It is possible to reconstruct Kant’s experiment of pure reason
as a transcendental argument. Kant’s critical method aims at
justifying objective knowledge via the necessary conditions a
priori for the possibility of such knowledge. A transcendental
argument, as understood in the recent philosophical discussion,
takes up this line of argument. It takes a premise X (here, the a
priori conditions of knowledge of the CPR) to be a necessary
condition for the possibility of a given Y (here, objective
knowledge) (Stern, 2017). The “experiment of pure reason” in the
preface to the second edition of the CPR follows this line of
reasoning. According to it the necessary premise X of the tran-
scendental argument is the philosophical position of transcen-
dental idealism; whereas the given Y the possibility of which
depends on this premise is our knowledge of the world. In the
“experiment of pure reason”, the world is the object of cosmol-
ogy, i.e., the totality of empirical phenomena and their condi-
tions, which according to the transcendental dialectics of the CPR
gives rise to the antinomy of pure reason. The experiment of pure
reason has to be a thought experiment, given that it deals with
intelligible objects such as the world as a totality given “merely
through reason” but in no way by experience:
“As for objects insofar as they are thought merely through
reason, and necessarily at that, but that (at least as reason thinks
them) cannot be given in experience at all e the attempt to think
them (for they must be capable of being thought) will provide a
splendid touchstone of what we assume as the altered method
of our way of thinking, namely that we can cognize of things a
priori only what we ourselves have put into them.* (CPR, B XVIII)
“* This method, imitated from the method of those who study
nature, thus consists in this: to seek the elements of pure reason
in that which admits of being confirmed or refuted through an
experiment. Now the propositions of pure reason [.] admit of
no test by experiment with their objects (as in natural science):
thus to experiment will be feasible only with concepts and
principles that we assume a priori [.].” (CPR, B XVIII)
According to the footnote, this thought experiment imitates
the method of Newton’s (and Bacon’s: Fulkerson-Smith, 2013a, b)
science in the approach already taken by the pre-critical Inquiry
(see sect. 3.3). It does not copy Newton’s method but makes
analogical use of it. The experiment of reason proceeds by means
of conceptual analysis of the logical consequences of a specific
metaphysical position, just as the experiments of natural science
proceed by analysis of the phenomena under given conceptual
preconditions. In this way, Kant continues the analogy between
philosophical cognition and Galileo’s or Stahl’s experiments (CPR,
B XIII-XIV). His thought experiment aims at confirming or
refuting the “propositions of pure reason”, just as an experiment
of physics or chemistry aims at confirming or refuting a specific
scientific hypothesis.
The thought experiment is a “touchstone” of Kant’s critical
metaphysics of transcendental idealism, as characterized by the
famous Copernican turn (B XVI-XII). It aims at clarifying whether it
is possible to replace this critical metaphysics by transcendental
realism, according to which we can have cognition of things in
themselves. In order to do so, the experiment of pure reason re-
alizes the test of two opposite philosophical hypotheses:
 B. Falkenburg / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2018) 1e11
“[.] thus to experiment will be feasible only with concepts and
principles that we assume a priori by arranging the latter so that
the same objects can be considered from two different sides, on
the one side as objects of [.] experience, and on the other side
as objects that are merely thought [.] for isolated reason
striving beyond the bounds of experience.” (CPR, B XVIII)
Kant argues that the latter position is untenable, given that
transcendental realism gives rise to the antinomy of pure reason,
whereas the former position does not:
“Now if we find that on the assumption that our cognition from
experience conforms to the objects as things in themselves, the
unconditioned cannot be thought at all without contradiction,
but that on the contrary, if we assume that our representation of
things as they are given to us does not conform to these things as
they are in themselves but rather that these objects as appear-
ances conform to our way of representing, then the contradic-
tion disappears; and consequently that the unconditioned must
not be present in things insofar as we are acquainted with them
(insofar as they are given to us), but rather in things insofar as
we are not acquainted with them, as things in themselves: then
this would show that what we initially assumed only as an
experiment is well grounded.*” (CPR, B XX-XXI)
The “contradiction” is the antinomy of pure reason. Kant claims
that in the transcendental dialectic of the CPR he demonstrates that
the antinomy is inevitable, if and only if transcendental realism is
presupposed. Hence, in his view, the experiment of pure reason
shows that transcendental realism is untenable; whereas the only
other option, transcendental idealism, is (in his view) a necessary
condition for our knowledge of the world. In this way, the tran-
scendental argument sketched above is completed.
The context of this thought experiment is Kant’s attempt to
show how metaphysics may take the “secure course of a science”
(CPR, B XIV). In the experiment of pure reason, the analogy between
the methods of metaphysics and of Newtonian science once more
seems to be most important for Kant. Indeed, the footnote to the
last phrase of the passage quoted above takes the analogy up once
again.
5.2. The analytic-synthetic method revisited
The last phrase of the passage quoted above was
“then this would show that what we initially assumed only as an
experiment is well grounded.*” (CPR, B XXI)
These words strongly recall Pappos’ method, and Newton’s
claim that, in physics, first comes analysis, “[.] assuming the
Causes discover’d, and establish’d as Principles [.]” (Newton
[1730], 1979, 405), followed by synthesis, “[.] explaining the
Phaenomena proceeding from them, and proving the Explana-
tions.” (Newton [1730], 1979)
In the corresponding footnote, Kant establishes an explicit
analogy between the “method of those who study nature” (CPR, B
XIX) and his method of investigating the possibility of metaphysical
knowledge:
“* This experiment of pure reason has much in common with
what the chemists sometimes call the experiment of reduction,
or more generally the synthetic procedure. The analysis of the
metaphysician separated pure a priori knowledge into two very
heterogeneous elements, namely those of the things as
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appearances and the things in themselves. The dialectic once
again combines them, in unison with the necessary rational idea
of the unconditioned, and finds that the unison will never come
about except through that distinction, which is therefore the
true one.” (CPR, B XXI)
Here, he compares the synthetic procedure of chemistry to the
experiment of pure reason, emphasizing the synthetic character of
the transcendental dialectic of the CPR. In addition, he compares
chemical analysis to the transcendental analytic, which dissects
philosophical knowledge a priori, or cognition from pure reason
(CPR A 840/B 868), into “things as appearances” or phenomena, and
“things in themselves” or noumena, as the elements of a priori
knowledge e just as the chemical analysis dissects compound
substances into their components. (Note that the transcendental
analytic ends with a chapter on the distinction between phenomena
and noumena.) The transcendental dialectic, in turn, investigates
how the elements of pure reason may recombine, just as chemical
elements unite to form compound substances.
This comparison is part of a four-fold (at least) analogy between
natural science and metaphysical cognition, as I have elsewhere
shown in more detail (Falkenburg, to appear). Traditionally, an
analogy is a double ratio A: B ¼ C: D, as already mentioned above
(sect. 3.3). In the preface B of the CPR, the stages of this four-fold
analogy are as follows.
(1) Kant compares human cognition to the insights of Galileo,
Toricelli, or Stahl. According to the comparison, human
cognition relates to its objects as the experiments of natural
science relate to their results, in “that reason has insight only
into what it itself produces to its own design” (CPR, B XIII).
(2) Next, he compares the experiments of natural science to a
trial. According to this analogy, the experiment relates to
nature as the judge relates to the witnesses, in order to make
them “answer the questions he puts to them” (CPR, B XIII).
(3) Then, after his famous remarks about the Copernican turn (B
XVI), he compares the critical method of the CPR with the
experimental method of natural science. This method is
twofold. First, the scientist or the metaphysician designs an
experiment, which indeed gives the desired result. Here, the
experiment of natural science and its expected outcome are
analogous to the method a priori of the transcendental an-
alytic, which guarantees metaphysics the secure course of a
science (B XVIII-BXIX). Second, the thought experiment of
pure reason provides an additional touchstone for the falsity
or truth of the opposing options concerning metaphysical
cognition, i.e., transcendental realism vs. transcendental
idealism. In this part of the analogy, the experiment of pure
reason relates to consistency as the experiments of natural
science do to falsifiability (footnote B XVIIIeXIX).
(4) Finally, Kant equates the method of metaphysics to the
method of chemistry, by claiming that the transcendental
analytic of the CPR relates to the transcendental dialectic
(and in particular, the antinomy of pure reason) as chemical
analysis relates to chemical synthesis (footnote B XVIIIeXIX).
In the latter analogy, Kant obviously cannot refer to chemical
elements in a modern sense. He rather refers to Stahl’s theory
already mentioned at the first stage of the analogy (B XII-BIII).
According to Stahl, combustion is the loss of phlogiston, and
metals are composed of phlogiston and the ash-like materials ob-
tained by calcination or oxidation (Hudson, 1992, p. 47). The main
idea behind chemical analysis and synthesis in Stahl’s chemistry
was Newtonian, however, as it is still today. It remained unchanged
10 B. Falkenburg / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2018) 1e11
when Lavoisier, Dalton, and their followers replaced Stahl’s phlo-
giston theory by the modern theories of oxidation, of chemical
atoms, and the synthesis of compound substances out of them. Up
to the present day, chemical analysis means the dissection of
compound substances into elements, whereas chemical synthesis
means the composition of compound substances from the ele-
ments. This account of analysis and synthesis perfectly fits in with
Newton’s account of analysis and synthesis in the Opticks. Ac-
cording to the remarks in Query 31, analysis proceeds “from Com-
pounds to Ingredients” (Newton [1730], 1979, 404), and synthesis
proceeds as
“assumed in the Method of Composition for explaining the
Phaenomena arising from them: An Instance of which Method I
gave in the End of the first Book.” (Newton [1730], 1979, 405)
Here, Newton refers to his optical experiments that showed how
it is possible to recompose white light from the colored light
spectra by means of two or more prisms (Newton [1730], 1979,
147e148 and 186e189).
However, Kant’s analogy between chemical synthesis, or the
“experiment of reduction” (CPR, B XXI), and the experiment of pure
reason makes yet another point. According to Stahl’s chemical
theory, reduction is the recovery of a metal from its ash-like calx by
recombining the latter with phlogiston (Hudson, 1992, p. 47). Ac-
cording to Kant’s experiment of pure reason, the transcendental
dialectic is the recovery of metaphysics from its ashes by uniting the
elements of pure reason in the right way, namely such that the
“rational idea of the unconditioned” (CPR, B XXI) takes the
distinction of phenomena and noumena into account. By doing so,
the “reduction” of metaphysics just gives rise to the use of the
traditional metaphysical ideas as regulative principles, in the
domain of our cognition of the phenomena.
5.3. Comparison with Kant’s pre-critical use of the analytic method
Finally, let me compare Kant’s critical experiment of pure reason
and his way of illustrating it through the analogy with chemical
synthesis, with his pre-critical analogy between the method of
Newtonian science and the analytic method of metaphysics (sect.
3.3). In contradistinction to his pre-critical philosophy, Kant now
seems to assume that only the complete analytic-synthetic method
(that is, analysis completed by the corresponding synthesis
following it) guarantees the “secure course of a science” (CPR, B
XIV). The way he employs the experiment of pure reason strongly
recalls Pappos’ analytic-synthetic method, and in particular Pappos’
account of problematic analysis. According to Pappos, the “prob-
lematic” analysis and the corresponding proof by synthesis are a
touchstone of the possibility of a certain assumption:
“There are two kinds of analysis: one seeks after truth, and is
called ‘theorematic’; while the other tries to find what was
demanded, and is called ‘problematic’. [.] In the case of the
problematic kind, we assume the proposition as something we
know, then proceeding through its consequences, as if true, to
something established, if the established thing is possible and
obtainable, which is what mathematicians call ‘given’, the
required thing will also be possible, and again the proof will be
the reverse of the analysis; but should we meet with something
established to be impossible, then the problem too will be impos-
sible.” (Pappos [1589], 1986, 84)
Kant’s experiment of pure reason aims at showing that the
metaphysical position of transcendental realism gives rise to
Please cite this article in press as: Falkenburg, B., Kant and the scope of the analytic method, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (2018),
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.06.005
contradiction, and hence is impossible. The preface to the second
edition of the CPR experiment gives an outline of the experiment
which the doctrine of the antinomy of pure reason in the Tran-
scendental Dialectic performs in detail. The resolution of the an-
tinomy given in the transcendental dialectic, which is based on
transcendental idealism, in turn demonstrates in his view that the
“thing” which is “established” by the transcendental analytic, i.e.,
the position of transcendental idealism, is “possible and obtain-
able”. The question of whether here he still just deals with real
possibility, as in the 1768 argument on incongruent counterparts,
or with logical impossibility, needs more detailed investigation.
6. Conclusions and outlook
Kant’s experiment of pure reason and the underlying analogy
with Newton’s and Pappos’ methods stand in need of a much more
elaborate interpretation, which would exceed the scope of the
present paper. My main results here are as follows. Kant’s pre-
critical uses of the analytic method in metaphysics rely only on
an analogy with Newton’s method, as concerns the claims that
analysis should precede synthesis and that the starting point of
analysis should be the phenomena rather than arbitrary meta-
physical concepts. Kant never wanted to merge the methodological
standards of natural science and metaphysics; rather, he suggested
methodological analogies between both disciplines. His 1768
argument on incongruent counterparts, however, shows how he
struggled with their limitations.
In his critical experiment of pure reason, Kant comes back to the
methodological analogy between metaphysics and Newtonian
science, in order to support his critical position of transcendental
idealism. In contradistinction to his pre-critical philosophy, he now
appeals to Newton’s and Pappos’ quest for the complete analytic-
synthetic method, suggesting that it guarantees the secure course
of a science. Here, Kant’s critical views seem to be even more
optimistic than the methodological analogy drawn in the Inquiry
(Kant, 1764).
Newton’s analytic-synthetic method, however, only supports an
inference to the best explanation and the predictive power of a
scientific theory resulting from it. In contrast, a thought experiment
(in philosophy as well as in natural science) aims at logical cer-
tainty, on pain of contradiction. This indeed seems to be the goal of
Kant’s way of employing the experiment of pure reason in the
preface to the second edition of the CPR. Nevertheless, his analogy
between the transcendental analytic and dialectic, respectively, and
the analysis and synthesis of chemistry weakens his appeal to the
logical strength of thought experiments. It appeals merely to the
results of an inference to the best explanation in natural science,
which is substantially weaker, as we know today (see Falkenburg,
to appear). Hence, the question of the logical strength of Kant’s
experiment of pure reason needs further investigation.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the editors of the present volume, Silvia De
Bianchi and Katharina Kraus, for their helpful comments. In addi-
tion, I am very grateful to the anonymous referees for their
instructive criticisms of an earlier version of this paper, which led
me to substantially revise my argument.
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