IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
State of Delaware,
Plaintiff, ID No. 2110001942
v.
Kathleen McGuiness,
Defendant.
DEFENDANT’S APPLICATION FOR SANCTIONS IN RESPONSE TO
IMPROPER AND MATERIALLY PREJUDICIAL EXTRAJUDICIAL.
STATEMENTS BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL -;
Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 42, the Sixth Amendnight to the
United States Constitution, and Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitysion, ‘the
Defendant hereby moves this Court for sanctions in response to certaly pubilic
remarks made by the Attorney General. The remarks are improper, and they are
more likely than not to have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an
adjudicative proceeding in this case as those terms are defined by the Delaware
Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct. The Defendant therefore requests such
sanctions to include (1) a ban on all extrajudicial comments pertaining to this
matter by the Attorney General and other employees of the Attorney General’s
Office and (2) a finding of fact that certain statements made by the Attorney
General as specified herein constitute a violation of the Delaware Lawyers’
MEL 377984670.Professional Conduct Rules. In support of this Motion, the Defendant avers the
following:
The Law
1. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1,
§ 7 of the Delaware Constitution guarantee that a defendant who is otherwise
entitled to a trial by jury is entitled to a trial by an impartial jury. E.g., Hughes v.
State, 490 A.2d 1034, 1040 (Del. 1985). “Few, if any, interests under the
Constitution are more fundamental than the right to a fair trial by ‘impartial’ jurors,
and an outcome affected by extrajudicial statements would violate that
fundamental right.” Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991),
2. A defendant’s decision to invoke his or her constitutional rights to
silence and against self-incrimination upon advice of counsel is not admissible as
evidence at trial in the State’s case-in-chief. E.g., Capano v. State, 889 A.2d 968,
976 (Del. 2006); Burroughs v. State, 988 A.2d 445, 450 (Del. 2010); see also
D.RE. 512 (the claim of a privilege “is not a proper subject of comment by judge
or counsel” and “no inference may be drawn therefrom”). See also Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 360, (1966) (reversing a criminal conviction because of
inherently prejudicial pretrial publicity, and criticizing the prosecution for publicly
disseminating the Defendant's refusal to cooperate to provide inadmissible
(MEL 37738461¥.1evidence to the police, noting that (“The exclusion of such evidence in court is
rendered meaningless when news media make it available to the public.”)
3. The Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“DLRPC”)
serve as an important additional means of safeguarding a criminal defendant’s
constitutional right to a fair trial by jurors whose impartiality has not been
compromised by improper extrajudicial statements. DLRPC 3.6(a) reads in
pertinent part as follows:
Rule 3.6 Trial Publicity.
(a) A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the
investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial
statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be
disseminated by means of public communication and will have a
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative
proceeding in the matter.
DLRPC 3.6(d) clarifies that “[nJo lawyer associated in a firm or government
agency with a lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited by
paragraph (a).”
4 The Comments to DLRPC 3.6 provide additional and specific
guidance to all Delaware lawyers who choose to make extrajudicial statements that
they know will be disseminated by public media. Comment [5] to Rule 3.6 reads
in pertinent part as follows:
[5] There are, on the other hand, certain subjects which are more
likely than not to have a material prejudicial effect on a proceeding,
particularly when they refer to a civil matter triable to a jury, a
3
MEL 377554671criminal matter, or any other proceeding that could result in
incarceration. These subjects relate to: ... (2) in a criminal case or
proceeding that could result in incarceration, the possibility of a plea
of guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of any confession,
admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or that
person’s refusal or failure to make a statement; ... (5) information
that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be
inadmissible as evidence in a trial and that would, if disclosed, create
a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial... (emphasis added).
5. DLRPC 3.8 applies to all prosecutors in criminal matters. DLRPC
3.8(£) requires that a prosecutor shall “refrain from making extrajudicial comments
that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the
accused and exercise reasonable care to prevent...making an extrajudicial
statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6 or
this Rule.”
6. Rule 2-14.4 of the National Prosecution Standards (3 ed.) of the
National District Attorneys Association is in accord with DLRPC 3.6 and 3.8
insofar as it warns prosecutors against any public, extrajudicial statements about
the contents of statements made by accused persons during an investigation.
The Facts
7. On October 10, 2021, a Grand Jury returned an indictment in the
above-captioned matter.
8. Within a few hours, the public relations staff of the Attorney
General’s Office sent out a media advisory to most of the major print and
MEL 377384670.electronic media entities in Delaware and Philadelphia announcing that the
Attomey General “will announce a major public trust indictment.” Media
recipients were advised that the announcement would occur outside of the Leonard
L. Williams Justice Center on October 11, 2021 at 2:30 p.m. Recipients were
asked to “RSVP” to the Attomey General’s public relations staff, and were advised
that “media in attendance will have the opportunity for Q & A.” On information
and belief, a copy of the media advisory is available from the Attorney General’s
Office.
9. The press conference described in the preceding paragraph occurred
as scheduled. Photographs and videos of the event show that the Attorney General
delivered her remarks to the assembled media representatives from behind a
podium affixed with microphones bearing the identifying logos of media outlets
from Delaware, Philadelphia, and Maryland, including Delaware Online (the
website of the Wilmington News-Journal), CBS 3, 6 ABC, NBC 10, and Fox 29
{all television stations in Philadelphia), WBOC-TV (a television station in
Salisbury, MD), WDEL (a radio station in Wilmington), and WDDE (a radio
station in Dover). Photographs and videos depicting the aforementioned are
publicly available atthe ~—-Delaware_-—- Online — website at:
https:!/www.delawareonline.con/story/news/politics/2021/10/1 1/de-attorney-
general-announce-major-public-trust-indictment/5914972001/
MEL 37755467110. During the course of the press conference, and after the Attorney
General concluded her prepared remarks, the following exchange occurred
between the Attorney General and an attendee who was presumably one of the
invited reporters:
Q: Has the auditor had any response to this or reaction?
‘A: (by the Attorney General): “Look, I have not spoken to the defendant
and that has been deliberate. I can tell you that the division of civil rights
and public trust has reached out to the Auditor on several occasions and
she has declined to speak with them.” (emphasis added).
11. As of the date of this filing, a video of the press conference described
in Paragraphs 9 and 10, which contains the Attorney General’s comments as
specified in Paragraph 9, has been publicly available on the Delaware Online
website here: https://www.delawareonline.com/videos/news/2021/10/11/delaware-
state-auditor-kathy-meguiness-indicted-two-felony-charges-attorney-general-
kathy-jennings/6094498001/.!
12. At least one other major media outlet, 6 ABC in Philadelphia, has
publicly disseminated the Attorney General’s comment on the Defendant’s
exercise of her constitutional rights to silence and against self-incrimination. See
| The media advisory described in Paragraph 6 above also represented that the
press conference would be “recorded and made available for media who are unable
to join in person.” Given that representation, on information and belief, a copy of
the video of the press conference is available from the Attorney General’s Office.
6
MEL 37755460¥ |https://6abc.com/delaware-state-auditory-kathleen-meguiness-attorney-general-
kathy-jennings-del-official-charged-indicted/11116835/.
ARGUM:
11. The Attorney General's comment to a reporter—at a press conference
she called and her staff arranged—about the Defendant’s choice to follow the
advice of counsel and exercise her constitutional rights to silence and against self-
incrimination was obviously improper. Such comments clearly violate DLRCP 3.6
and 3.8. The plain text of those rules, and the comments thereto, forecloses any
credible attempt to claim otherwise.
12. First, DLRPC 3.6 expressly prohibits the Attorney General and her
staff from making any comment that she or they “knows or reasonably should
know will be disseminated by means of a public communication” if the statement
would “have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative
proceeding.” In this instance, the Attorney General’s comment concerning the
Defendant’s choice to follow the advice of counsel and exercise her constitutional
rights to silence and against self-incrimination was (1) made at a press conference
organized at and by the Attorney General’s office; and (2) made to members of the
electronic and print media who the Attorney General’s staff specifically invited to
the event. Clearly, the Attorney General and her staff knew, or should have known,
that her comments would be “disseminated by means of public communication.”
MEL 37755467v.113. Second, Comment [5](2) to DLRPC 3.6 explicitly provides that a
public comment upon a criminal defendant’s invocation of his or her constitutional
right to silence and against self-incrimination is “more likely than not to have a
materially prejudicial effect” upon a criminal proceeding. The Attorney General
made exactly such comments, thus materially prejudicing the Defendant's pending
criminal proceeding and further violating DLRPC 3.6.
14. Finally, Comment [5](5) to DLRPC Rule 3.6 explicitly provides that a
public comment upon evidence that a lawyer “knows or reasonably should know is
likely to be inadmissible at trial” is “more likely than not to have a materially
prejudicial effect” upon a criminal proceeding. Both the Delaware Supreme Court
and the Delaware Rules of Evidence make it clear beyond any doubt that evidence
about the Defendant’s choice to exercise her constitutional rights to silence and
against self-incrimination will be inadmissible at trial. This prohibition has existed
in constitutional law and the Delaware Rules of Evidence for many decades. Surely,
the Attorney General must have known, or should reasonably have known, that her
comment constituted a public comment about evidence that will almost certainly
be inadmissible at trial. By making such comments, the Attorney General caused a
materially prejudicial effect on the Defendant’s proceeding and further violated
DLRPC 3.6.
MEL 37755467¥.115. Undersigned counsel has been a criminal law practitioner in Delaware
for more than 35 years, including 31 years as a prosecutor in the Attorney
General’s Office. Undersigned counsel cannot recall a single instance where an
Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General publicly commented before trial
upon a criminal defendant’s refusal or failure to make a statement during the
course of a criminal investigation. Nor does diligent research disclose any
instances of such comments made by a Delaware prosecutor and challenged by a
defendant in Delaware’s courts. That the comments at issue here appear to be the
sole instance of such in recent Delaware history is strong circumstantial evidence
that it has long been widely understood among Delaware’s prosecutors that such
comments are improper and violate DLRPC 3.6 and 3.8.
16. This Court has the authority to enforce the DLRPC when necessary
for the “fair or efficient administration of justice.” State v. Siple, 1995 WL 264669,
at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 1995) (citing Matter of Estate of Waters, 647 A2d
1091, 1096 (Del. 1994) and Appeal of Infotechnology, Inc., 582 A.2d 215, 221
(Del. 1990). See also In re Hurley, 257 A.3d 1012, 1018 (Del. 2021) (upholding
the Superior Court’s authority to find an attorney to be in civil contempt for his
violation of a previously-imposed “gag order”). While the contemptuous conduct
of counsel in Jn re Hurley occurred after the issue of a gag order, here the Attorney
General's violation of DLRPC Rules 3.6 and 3.8 have already occurred before any
MBI3775S467¥.1such order can even be made. This warrants the imposition of a more rigorous
prohibition against extrajudicial statements to prevent any future comments by the
Attorney General’s office that may further prejudice the Defendant's right to a fair
trial before an unbiased jury.
17. The conduct at issue in Jn re Hurley involved the conduct of defense
counsel. Here, the improper comments in violation of DLRPC 3.6 and 3.8 were
made by a prosecutor, who “has the responsibility of a minister of justice...and
specific obligation to see that the defendant is afforded procedural justice...”
DLRPC 3.8, Comment [1]. The comments at issue here were made in derogation
of that obligation.
18. The violation of that prosecutorial duty here further supports the
Defendant’s application for sanctions requiring the Attorney General and her staff
to be prohibited from making any additional extrajudicial comments pertaining to
this matter. A lesser sanction would unduly depreciate the Attorney General's
failure to meet her obligation to “see that the defendant is afforded procedural
justice” by making public statements that are more likely than not to have a
materially prejudicial effect upon this criminal proceeding.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set herein, the Defendant hereby moves this Court for
sanctions in response to the public remarks made by the Attorney General which
MEI 377584679.are more likely than not to have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing
an adjudicative proceeding. The Defendant requests such sanctions to include (1) a
ban on all extrajudicial comments pertaining to this matter by the Attorney General
and other employees of the Attorney General’s Office; and (2) a finding of fact that
certain statements made by the Attorney General as specified herein constitute a
violation of the Delaware Lawyers’ Professional Conduct Rules.
Dated: October 14, 2021 McCARTER & ENGLISH, LLP
/s/ Steven P. Wood
Steven P. Wood (#2309)
Chelsea A. Botsch (#6715)
Renaissance Centre
405 North King Street, 8" Floor
Wilmington, Delaware 19801
Tel: (302) 984-6300
Attorney for Defendant
MEL 377854671CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Thereby certify that on the 14% day of October, 2021, I caused to be served
via email a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document upon all
counsel of record.
/s/ Steven P. Wood
Steven P. Wood (#2309)
MEL 37755467V.1IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
State of Delaware, )
)
Plaintiff, ) ID No. 2110001942
)
v. )
)
Kathleen McGuiness, )
Defendant.
ORDER
THIS MATTER, having come before the Court by way of the Defendant’s
Application for Sanctions in Response to Improper and Materially Prejudicial
Statements by the Attorney General, and opposition having been filed thereto by
the Attormey General, and the Court having considered the moving and non-
moving papers and other competent information referenced therein, and for good
cause shown,
IT IS on this___ day of 2021, hereby ORDERED, that (1) no
extrajudicial comments may be made pertaining to this matter by the Attorney
General and other employees of the Attorney General’s Office; and (2) the
statements made by the Attorney General as specified in the Defendant’s
Application for Sanctions constitute a violation of the Delaware Lawyers’
Professional Conduct Rules.
JUDGE
MEL 377547960.