Energy Research & Social Science 43 (2018) 33–40

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Energy Research & Social Science

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Original research article

Historical institutionalist perspective on the shift from feed-in tariffs T

towards auctioning in German renewable energy policy
⁎,1
Merethe Dotterud Leirena, , Inken Reimerb
a
CICERO—Center for International Climate Research, Gaustadalleen 21, 0349 Oslo, Norway
b
Freie Universität Berlin, Environmental Policy Research Center, Ihnestraße 22, 14195 Berlin, Germany

A R T I C LE I N FO A B S T R A C T

Keywords: An early implementer of feed-in tariffs, Germany soon became feed-in champion, continuously resisting pres-
Europeanisation sures – from the European Commission in particular – to adopt a competition-oriented approach. The European
Germany Commission never approved of the German feed-in tariff, seeing it as illegal state aid. However, after the good
Historical institutionalism results in deployment of renewables, other countries followed suit and feed-in tariffs became the most popular
Renewable energy
support scheme for renewables in Europe. Despite this success, the nature of the Energiewende changed. Germany
broke with its feed-in tradition two and a half decades later, introducing pilot auctions for solar energy in 2014.
In 2016, it moved from a scheme under which every provider of renewable energy was entitled to support to a
competition-oriented approach based on auctioning. Drawing on perspectives of historical institutionalism and
adopting qualitative methods, we argue that the success of the feed-in tariff in terms of deployment of renew-
ables altered coalitions of interests in Germany. The German government introduced auctioning with a view to
controlling cost developments and protecting the conventional energy industries from insolvency. This happened
under considerable EU pressures, given the European Commission’s state aid guidelines, which prescribe a
competition-oriented approach.

1. Introduction
Germany has received considerable attention since 2000, when the
government introduced its policy plans for a pioneering energy transi-
tion, the Energiewende. The government had introduced strategies for
this ambitious transformation already in the 1970s and has con-
tinuously reinforced such strategies ever since. To enable this transi-
tion, the government has introduced various policy instruments, in-
cluding generous feed-in tariffs. This policy instrument has been
globally important for the development and provision of renewable
energy technology, and Germany’s feed-in tariff instrument has at-
tracted considerable attention as a role model for other countries.
However, in 2014 Germany introduced pilot auctions for solar energy.
Two years later, the government – controversially – decided to switch
from feed-in tariffs to auctioning. That turn was decisive, marking a
fundamental shift from a scheme under which every provider of re-
newable energy was entitled to support to a competitive approach
based on auctioning. The turn changed the nature of the Energiewende,
which is exceptional in terms of being an ‘energy democracy’, a concept
that merges the technological energy transition with a strengthening of
democracy and public participation [1]. It also has implications for the
design of the energy system transformation [2]. This is because in-
dividuals, small companies and communities that have installed solar
panels on their roofs and invested in windmills have driven the En-
ergiewende forward. This actor diversity has created widespread ac-
ceptance. In contrast, auctions tend to favour big companies [3]. The
shift has been instrumental in changing the power relations between
actors, because changes in support schemes influence the development
of small-scale energy providers [4]. It is an example of political polar-
isation over sustainable energy transformation in Germany (see also the
Introduction in this special issue [5]).
The policy change occurred at the same time as the European
Commission (Commission) changed its state-aid guidelines in 2014.
These new guidelines prescribe a competitive approach, one not com-
patible with feed-in tariffs. The EU has thereby been assumed to bear
the responsibility for the introduction of auctioning [6,7]. This con-
trasts with earlier studies holding that national governments tend to
adopt support schemes voluntarily (see e.g. [8]). Why did Germany
introduce major changes to its renewable energy policy two and a half
decades after initiating it, thereby breaking with its feed-in tradition?

⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: merethe.leiren@cicero.oslo.no, merethe.leiren@medoleir.oslo.no (M.D. Leiren), reimer@geographie.uni-kiel.de (I. Reimer).
1
https://www.linkedin.com/feed/.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.05.022
Received 13 January 2018; Received in revised form 11 May 2018; Accepted 18 May 2018
Available online 26 May 2018
2214-6296/ © 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY-NC-ND/4.0/).
M.D. Leiren, I. Reimer
To explain this, we draw on insights from historical institutionalism
and the Europeanisation literature. The Europeanisation literature is
relevant for understanding whether and in what ways the EU has in-
fluenced the development of renewables policy in Germany.
Researchers in the Europeanisation literature no longer treat the EU as
an independent force for change, but instead hold that existing in-
stitutional arrangements in the member states influence adaptations to
the EU [9,10]. Thus, it is also important to draw on perspectives that
highlight factors potentially causing change domestically. In this re-
spect, the perspectives of gradual institutional change are particularly
relevant, as the German Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) was
never meant to be static: it has been continuously evaluated and has
changed accordingly. Since 2000, when the Act was first introduced,
the German Parliament has reformed the law five times. Therefore, we
assess whether the radical change in 2016 came about gradually or was
propelled by a change in EU law.
The case study is important, given the increasing influence of the EU
on national policies. The selection of Germany as a case provides the
possibility of learning something about the nature of the relationship
between a big member state with particularly strong interests in re-
newable energy policies and the EU, in a domain (i.e. energy policy)
that is primarily a national responsibility. Moreover, auctioning is on
the verge of becoming a predominant renewable energy policy instru-
ment in Europe. This case study may help to explain why countries
introduce auctioning, emphasising how the EU may contribute towards
strengthening change agents within the countries.
The following sections begin by presenting the theoretical frame-
work. Second, we elaborate on the methods employed in this study,
before describing the development of Germany’s policy of support for
renewable electricity generation. Finally, we discuss the evidence in
light of our theoretical framework. We conclude that, while the
European Union has helped to speed up the process of introducing
competition-oriented auctions for renewable energy support, an already
existing push for change in the German political system made this
possible. Due to increasing costs and insolvency issues that affected the
big utilities, the political majority wanted to control the pace of re-
newable energy development and gradually introduced changes that
radically changed the support policy for renewables.
2. Theoretical perspectives
One approach that social scientists have used to explain the devel-
opment of the Energiewende is historical institutionalism. Christoph
Stefes [11] uses this approach, arguing that new policies have con-
solidated the path of the Energiewende. Carol Hager [12] draws on in-
stitutionalism showing that the ‘push for renewables in Germany arose
almost entirely outside the prevailing channels of institutional power’.
However, there is a need to update this literature and explore whether
historical institutionalism also contributes to explain the more recent
changes to the EEG, which seems to break with the path highlighted in
the aforementioned literature.
Historical institutionalists focus on how institutions develop over
time and affect the positions of actors in ways that may have been
unintended or undesired by their creators. They study how institutions
reinforce themselves, create path dependencies and lock-ins, and argue
that it may be difficult to alter certain institutions, as reversals are
costly or difficult [13]. Hence, one virtue of historical institutionalism is
the ability to explain the stability of political institutions.
An important notion is ‘path dependency’, defined as ‘social pro-
cesses that exhibit positive feedback’ ([13], 21). It implies that in-
stitutions over time are characterised by inertia. Path dependency
curtails policy options through self-enforcing mechanisms that con-
tribute to generating ‘increasing returns’ that benefit existing paths
more than other solutions ([14], 94).
Despite the stability inherent in path dependency, policy change
occurs. There are two distinct perspectives that explain policy change:
34
Energy Research & Social Science 43 (2018) 33–40
one highlights triggering events or sudden punctuations such as ex-
ternal shocks, crises or other events that disrupt periods of stability (e.g.
[15]); the other perspective emphasises the slow-moving, continuous
processes of reforms [16,17]. The first perspective highlights ‘critical
junctures’, defined as ‘brief moments in which opportunities for major
institutional reforms appear, followed by long stretches of institutional
stability’ ([13], 134f). The second perspective is a theory of gradual
institutional change developed by Kathleen Thelen and co-authors
[16,17].
The model presented by [18] views the type of institutional change
as depending on the type of the dominant change-agent in the context
of the political system and the characteristics of the ‘targeted’ institu-
tion. The authors assume that actors who did not benefit from the old
system will push for new institutions. Gradual displacement will ensue
if those who favour the old system are unable to prevent new rules.
They note four key types of change: displacement, layering, drift and
conversion. Our focus here is gradual displacement and layering, as we
are interested in the actual shift of rules, and not the interpretation of
rules or whether actors abide by them – aspects more prominent in
connection with drift and conversion. We find theories of gradual in-
stitutional change useful for studying policy change, because policies –
like institutions – entail rules.
‘Displacement’ refers to the replacement of existing rules. While
displacement may be radical and may seem abrupt, the gradual in-
stitutional perspective proposes that it has occurred slowly. ‘Layering’
differs from displacement as it entails revisions or additional ‘layers’ to
existing rules, rather than replacing them by completely new ones. Such
‘differential growth’ [19] occurs when opponents, unable to shift the
original rules, manage to circumvent the rules from within the system
by introducing new voluntary rules on top of the existing ones [17].
Displacement is unlikely when the defenders of the existing rules are
powerful: under such circumstances, layering is more likely [18].
The two perspectives within historical institutionalism suggest dif-
ferent ways by which to understand the role of the EU, and we are
particularly interested in such an understanding, given that the state aid
guidelines were changed about the same time as Germany introduced
auctions: The EU can be considered as an external force or as an en-
dogenous change-agent.
There is support for the external shock perspective in the
Europeanisation literature. For example, court rulings are considered
important formative moments for affecting policy change in favour of
liberalisation (e.g. [20,21]). Hence, court rulings or the threat of liti-
gation trigger policy change to otherwise stable institutional arrange-
ments by bypassing reluctant member states or nudging them to com-
promise. However, whereas researchers used to treat the EU as an
independent force for change, a new generation of literature holds that
in a multilevel administrative system like the EU, the EU is not external
to the member states; instead, there is bureaucratic inter-penetration
across levels of governance (see [10]). One relevant example is state-aid
guidelines, whereby the Commission ‘bans’ certain activities and ne-
gotiates with the member states rather than simply implementing
formal decisions [22].
Drawing on such an understanding of Europeanisation, the EU may
be considered a ‘change agent’ within the political system – or European
political order may have created a context that has benefited certain
actors at the expense of others. Given the Commission’s promotion of
competition and ‘dislike’ of feed-in tariffs, we expect the EU to have
helped strengthen change agents that have promoted a change in the
existing feed-in tariff policy.
3. Methods
To explain the shift from feed-in tariffs towards auctioning, we
perform an in-depth analysis, exploring a case where such a shift did
not seem likely. It did not seem likely due to the strong emphasis in
Germany on energy democracy that has developed with the feed-in
M.D. Leiren, I. Reimer
tariff. Our data are primarily qualitative: official documents (e.g. policy
papers), consultancy reports, hearings, newspaper articles, and the
homepages of state authorities such as the German Ministry of
Economics (with in-depth information on the changes of the Renewable
Energy Source Act) as well as the websites of various interest organi-
sations. We draw on secondary literature especially when describing
the earlier phases, as there is an extensive literature on the
Energiewende.
We have also collected data through 15 interviews conducted in
Berlin or by telephone in November and December 2016 and
February–April 2017. The aim was to collect data that may not have
been written in any documents, e.g. insights into the negotiations be-
tween government and the Commission. Informants were chosen for the
purpose of integrating perspectives from the national and EU admin-
istrative levels, including relevant actors who are not part of govern-
ment administrations. Our informants include representatives of a ci-
tizens’ NGO (Interview 1), a renewable energy association (Interview
2), an environmental NGO (Interview 3), an economic association
(Interview 4), a large energy utility (Interview 5), as well as the poli-
tical advisor to Green Party politician (Interview 6), an energy transi-
tion policy advisor (Interview 7), a Green Party politician (Interview 8),
a civil servant in the Ministry of Economics (Interview 9), a former
Green politician (Interview 10), a representative of a renewable energy
association (Interview 11), a consultant (Interview 11), a representative
of a Brussels-based renewable energy association (Interview 13), a re-
presentative of an environmental NGO (Interview 14), and an energy
expert (Interview 15). Topics included respondents’ perceptions of the
rationale behind the development of the policies, administrative or
organisational factors, patterns of conflict, coordination among actors,
influence from the EU, as well as economic aspects and structural fac-
tors of the national energy systems. Anonymity ensured that informants
could speak freely, which we deemed more important than the possible
benefits gained from making known the source of each statement.
4. From feed-in-tariffs to auctioning
It is important to know the roots of the German energy democracy
to understand the emergence of the feed-in tariffs as well as the switch
to auctioning and the resistance to that change. Analysing the process,
we pay attention not only to domestic political dynamics but also to
reactions from the European level and negotiations between domestic
and EU actors and institutions, searching for change agents to have
influenced the process. We begin with our empirical analysis in 1990,
when the first law to deal with renewable energy was introduced in
Germany.
4.1. 1990 Grid Feed-In Law
In October 1990, Germany introduced the Grid Feed-In Law. Two
backbenchers representing the conservative Christian Social Union
(CSU) and the Green Party proposed the feed-in tariff [23]. They gained
support from other MPs interested in renewable energy, and eventually
from all factions in the Bundestag [24]. The Federal Council (Bundesrat)
also favoured the support scheme, as it would reduce the financial re-
sponsibilities of the German states [24]. The private utilities benefited
from exclusive supply contracts with the municipalities; they estab-
lished regional monopolies and could refuse feed-in to their grid by
local renewable energy producers [25]. When the German reunification
occurred in 1990, the utilities sought to position themselves in the re-
structuring of the East German power sector [26]. However, renewables
did not fit the utilities’ business models and the Grid-Feed-In Law of-
fered no incentives – financial or legal – for them to focus on renewable
energies, as corporations were excluded from its provisions (Interview
5; StrEG 1990 §1.2; also EEG 2000 §2.1).
The Grid Feed-In Law obliged power companies to purchase elec-
tricity from renewable sources, and pay for it. To those who fed into the
35
Energy Research & Social Science 43 (2018) 33–40
system, it granted compensation covering at least 90 per cent of the
average cost to private customers. However, the Commission chal-
lenged the law. While the Commission’s DG Competition initially ar-
gued that Germany should decrease the rates, the Commission [27]
later approved the law because the amount of the compensation offered
and its impacts on electricity prices were minimal. In 1998, the German
court questioned the European Court of Justice about the interpretation
of EU law related to proceedings between the electricity suppliers
PreussenElektra AG and Schleswag AG [28]. The renewables energy feed-
in tariff policy, as introduced through the Grid Feed-In Law, was
challenged as it was deemed inappropriate ‘state aid’ [29]. This was the
beginning of a long-lasting controversy between Germany and the
Commission.
The Grid Feed-In Law encouraged small, decentralised energy gen-
eration (involving the participation of individuals and citizen in-
itiatives) and contributed towards creating jobs and boosting tax in-
come. This broad base of participation in renewables also led to
widespread acceptance among the public as well as politicians. In 1998,
the Green Party campaigned with the slogan, ‘we want 100,000 roof
photovoltaics’ (Interview 8). The campaign was inspired by the Social
Democrat Hermann Scheer, who together with Green Party politician
Hans-Josef Fell initiated the German feed-in tariff system. The topic
became part of the coalition negotiations between the SPD and the
Green Party, leading to the first red-green coalition (Interview 8). The
SPD had close ties to trade associations, including miners, so coal was
an important issue. However, one central figure behind the law, Scheer,
was able to break the opposition from the coal interests in his party and
facilitate a coalition in favour of renewables by introducing mine gas
into the discussions [1]. This led to the introduction of a more generous
feed-in tariff.
4.2. EEG 2000
In 2000, the German government replaced the Grid Feed-In Law
with the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG 2000). The EEG provides a
feed-in tariff for not only renewables but also mine gas from coalmines.
In contrast to its predecessor, the EEG differentiated to a greater extent
between the various renewable energy sources. The EEG tariffs differ-
entiated between technologies, depending on the energy source, capa-
city and/or location of the plant. The criterion of plant locations was
introduced to ensure the profitability of wind turbines, including in
Germany’s less windy regions, aiming to achieve a more even dis-
tribution of wind power plants throughout the country [30].
The new law became the key policy instrument for the Energiewende.
The aim was to strengthen and promote the sustainable development of
energy supply within climate and energy protection (§ 1 Abs. 1 EEG
2000). The target set by the EEG was to increase the share of electricity
generated from renewable sources from 5 to 10 percent by 2010. To
achieve this, grid operators were obliged to prioritise renewable energy
facilities; and to ensure predictability, producers of renewable elec-
tricity would get a fixed rate of return over 20 years from the initiation
of a project, decreasing each year. This combination of a fixed rate and
an annual decrease in support ‘has been of global importance for the
introduction of renewables and the development of such technology’
(Interview 8; see also [23]). However, pressure against renewables
grew, i.e. the Federation of German Industry was concerned about
national competitiveness, arguing that the EEG 2000 would create ex-
cessive burdens for the industry and drive up electricity prices [25].
Similarly, the German Utilities Association criticised the law for im-
posing higher costs on consumers (ibid). The Ministry of Economics
recognised such concerns, but its role was weakened as the second red-
green coalition (elected in 2002) decided to shift responsibility for re-
newable energy to the Ministry of Environment. The transfer brought
greater awareness of renewable energy in the German governmental
administration and strengthened support for the feed-in tariff ([31], p.
15). This happened despite the increasing power of the utilities. Several
M.D. Leiren, I. Reimer
energy companies had merged at the turn of the millennium, eventually
resulting in the ‘Big Four’: E.ON, RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall. This was a
result of the revision of the Energy Industry Act in 1998, which liber-
alised the energy market so as to accommodate an EU market directive
[32]. While new firms took advantage of the feed-in tariffs and started
to expand in the renewables sector [32], the Big Four did not find it
particularly interesting to invest in renewables because the rates of
return were too low (Interview 5; 8) and their key interest was in coal
and nuclear.
One major election promise of the Green Party had been to phase
out nuclear power plants, and the SPD was not particularly keen on
nuclear energy either [33]. In 2000, the red-green coalition and the
energy utilities reached a ‘nuclear consensus’ [34], a major political
accomplishment, which was transposed into law two years later. It gave
Germany’s remaining 19 nuclear power plants a lifetime of 32 years.
This strengthened the case for proponents of renewables, as renewables
became the ‘only’ climate-friendly energy source.
At the EU level, the Commission incorporated concerns about re-
newable energy in its state aid guidelines in 2001. The dispute between
Germany and the Commission about whether the feed-in tariff should
be deemed ‘illegal state aid’ continued. The PreussenElectra verdict in
2001 settled the issue: the European Court of Justice decided that this
feed-in tariff, under the given conditions, did not constitute state aid,
because there was no involvement of financial sources by the state in-
volved.
4.3. EEG 2004
The second red-green coalition began to revise the EEG after re-
election in 2002. In 2003, the Bundestag, following an initiative from
the Ministry of Economics, decided that energy-intensive industry
would be exempted from the EEG surcharge (Special Equalisation
Scheme Act 2003). Industrial interests and power suppliers wanted
exemptions for industrial consumers to protect German firms so that
they would continue to be able to compete internationally [35]. This
exemption was important for maintaining consensus about the EEG
(Interview 7). When the Bundestag decided to amend the EEG in 2004,
cost-efficiency concerns were important. According to the revised act,
plant operators were responsible for paying for grid connection,
whereas the grid operator would have to cover costs related to up-
grading the grid [36]. The increased tariffs for PV lead to a solar boom
in 2004 [36]. EEG 2004 also broadened the applicability of the feed-in
tariffs so that bigger corporations and utilities were also allowed to
participate (EEG 2004 §2).
A political conflict ensued between the Minister of Environment
(Green Party) and the Minister of Economics (SPD) [36]. Arguing that
the rates were too high, the latter disagreed with feed-in tariff as a
principle and proposed a tendering system, a proposal that was not
included in the amended EEG 2004, as the red-green majority in the
parliament opposed this proposal.
Criticism of the EEG arose among utility companies and the Free
Democratic Party (FDP). In addition, certain Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) politicians began to question whether a feed-in tariff with
such high rates was still necessary. They argued, for instance, that the
EEG was too expensive, that it contravened market rules, led to in-
creased regulation and a massive extension of the grid (see [36]). This
played a role in the election campaign in 2005, when all parties (CDU,
SPD, the Greens [Grüne], FDP, Linke) took up climate or energy con-
cerns and called for renewable energies as part of the country’s energy
mix, but disagreed on nuclear phase-out and how to support renewable
energy [37]. The Green Party and the SPD foresaw that the EEG would
make Germany an industrial world leader in PV and wind energy
[38,39]; the CDU/CSU and FDP, however, wanted to change the scope
of German renewable energy policy. The CDU called for a 12.5 per cent
share of renewables in the overall electricity mix ([40], p. 19), whereas
the FDP wanted to abolish the EEG and replace it with a more market-
36
Energy Research & Social Science 43 (2018) 33–40
friendly model ([41], p. 18).
4.4. EEG 2009
After the 2005 elections, the CDU/CSU and SPD created the ‘grand
coalition’ under Angela Merkel, with Sigmar Gabriel (SPD) as Minister
of Environment. Although industrial interests like the German
Chambers of Commerce and Industry called for Germany to abandon its
ambitions aimed at climate leadership [42], the coalition agreement
between CDU/CSU and SPD continued along the same path as its pre-
decessor, the red-green coalition, as regards climate and energy policy
[43]. The grand coalition initiated a new policy formulation process
[44], leading to new amendments in 2009. The EEG 2009 increased the
renewables target (to 30% by 2020) and introduced a growth corridor
with flexible degression. The 2009 amendment had made the EEG levy
jump abruptly, without providing compensation to those who had to
cover the costs of the support scheme (Interview 10).
Another important change in the legal framework for energy policy
was the EU’s Third Energy Packet, which obliged member states to
separate energy supply and generation from the operation of trans-
mission networks so as to avoid unfair infrastructure access [45].
Germany transposed these rules into its Energy Sector Law (enforced in
2010). This regulation resulted in unbundling, forcing the integrated
power companies to sell their electricity transmission network opera-
tors [46,47]. The changes have been called ‘a big mistake’ because the
unbundling made the financial situation of the big utilities more diffi-
cult (Interview 12).
After the Fukushima disaster in March 2011, German Chancellor
Angela Merkel announced a temporary shutdown of the nuclear ex-
tension plan, a safety check of all nuclear power plants and the shut-
down of the seven oldest ones [48]. Suddenly there was consensus
amongst all political parties in Germany that nuclear power was no
longer an option [49]. The fact that this decision was made by a coa-
lition government between CDU/CSU and FDP (elected in 2009), shows
that supporting nuclear was no longer politically feasible in Germany.
The FDP in particular had previously been a strong advocate for
keeping nuclear power. In July 2011, the Bundestag voted over-
whelmingly in favour of shutting down eight nuclear power plants and
phasing out the remaining nine by 2022 at the latest [48].
This was accompanied by a surge in electricity and heat generation
from renewable sources – this rapid development was a cause for great
concern. In addition to the increasing surcharge on power, there were
technical challenges, high cable costs related to offshore wind-parks
and a lack of grid infrastructure for transferring electricity from the
Germany’s northern states to the southern states, where there is a de-
mand for more energy [48].
The good financial situation of the Big Four began to change as
demand for electricity decreased during the economic crisis. In 2004,
the Big Four had generated 90 per cent of the electricity and owned 82
per cent of electricity production capacity in Germany [50]. By 2010,
generation had fallen to 77 per cent and the share of the total capacity
of renewable energies was 6.5 per cent [51]. In 2009 and 2010, the
companies responded by cutting costs [32]. In 2011, the market effects
of the EEG became clearer; the economic crisis had also affected the
companies’ earnings in foreign markets. With these developments, in
addition to the phase-out of eight nuclear reactors, the Big Four were
now faced with a crisis.
4.5. EEG 2012
The EEG was modified again in 2012 due to party preferences
within the conservative-liberal coalition. The government introduced a
German market premium scheme as an option to feed-in tariffs [52].
Transmission network operators would no longer be responsible for
selling the electricity on the market; instead, the plant operators
themselves would market power. The intention was to create stronger
M.D. Leiren, I. Reimer
alignment to price signals in the market [53]. Politicians from the
Green Party and the left-oriented Linke, as well as NGOs and many
scholars criticised the introduction of direct marketing, holding that
this would no longer benefit the diversity of renewable energy produ-
cers (Interview 14). The feed-in tariff had gained broad social accep-
tance as it included a wide range of actors – from single households to
corporations.
With investments in renewable energies continuing to grow, the
debate about whether to control the volume of renewable energy be-
came more heated (Interview 9). As anyone who produced electricity
from renewables was entitled to support, there was no control of those
who had access to the feed-in tariff or how the costs would develop.
Opponents criticised over-supply and the remuneration for solar elec-
tricity, which was far above the market price for electricity [54].
4.6. EEG 2014
A key topic in the federal election campaign in September 2013 was
the cost of the Energiewende. The Minister of Environment from May
2012 to December 2013, Peter Altmaier (CDU), indicated that it would
cost about €1000 billion until 2030 [55]. Together with Philipp Rösler
(FDP), he proposed reducing the feed-in tariffs for new plants by € 1
billion each year. The German utilities RWE and E.ON favoured a strong
European internal market and emissions trading, arguing that such
measures would serve to bring renewables forward [56].
Referring to the threatening cost scenario, Altmaier increased the
pressure on the opposition, the Green Party in particular [57]. Sigmar
Gabriel (SPD) followed suit by making costs a key topic, arguing that it
was important to stabilise costs while also protecting the export-or-
iented German industry, not to endanger jobs [58]. Industrial compe-
titiveness was a key topic (Interview 5):
The Energiewende will become a model of success only if it is eco-
nomically feasible. And Germany […] can afford a lot of invest-
ments, but only if, in the end, the German industry becomes sub-
stantially able to compete because of this transition, otherwise it
fails. (Interview 7)
CDU/CSU won the 2013 elections and created another ‘grand coa-
lition’ with the SPD. The new government decided to transfer respon-
sibility for renewable energy from the Ministry of Environment to the
Ministry of Economics (Interview 15). The intention was to concentrate
the energy responsibilities in one ministry, which the Vice Chancellor,
Sigmar Gabriel (SPD), wanted to head (Interview 7; 8; 15). Our re-
spondents held that the emphasis on costs increased after the shift, due
primarily to the person who became the new minister (Interview 4; 6; 7;
8).
The issue of how to control volume in order to lower the costs was
also disputed (Interview 9). In hearings, the organisations did not
propose alternatives to auctioning: some (including the four transmis-
sion system operators, Industrial Energy Association) promoted auc-
tioning; others (like the Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, the German
Trade Union Federation) were critical.
The large four utilities continuously lost market shares and volume
from 2010 until 2013 amounting to around 6 percentage points. The
generated electricity of the four utilities together decreased by 16 per
cent ([59], p. 30). Of the four big utilities, E.ON was hit hardest. The
company recorded a decline in their profits of 1.9 billion Euros in 2011
– the year the German nuclear phase-out was decided [60]. In contrast,
the share of renewables in gross power generation increased by up to
25.8 per cent in 2014, thereby also increasing competition in the power
market. The utilities, which were close to bankruptcy, favoured auc-
tions and put the Ministry of Economics under strong pressure (Inter-
view 3; 8).
Competition procurements by tender is considered advantageous for
large companies: because they have more large-scale projects, they can
make more competitive offers than smaller companies (Interview 5). On
37
Energy Research & Social Science 43 (2018) 33–40
the one hand, environmentalists declared that the utilities had only
themselves to blame for not having invested in renewables, although
there was some understanding about bankruptcy concerns in the green
camp. Highlighting the role of Germany as a role model for other
countries, one informant stated: ‘Mr. Gabriel made an argument that I
can personally understand: if one of the Big Ones goes insolvent, then
the German Energiewende will no longer be a good role model to the
outside world’ (Interview 3).
While Germany is able to pay the remuneration rates, following suit
is too expensive for other countries (Interview 5). The grand coalition
promised to revise the EEG scheduled for 2014 [61]. Their coalition
agreement introduced a growth corridor and stated that the govern-
ment would introduce measures to control the development of renew-
ables within this corridor, mentioning procurements by tender as one
such measure. As argued by one civil servant, ‘At that point it was re-
latively clear that we would get procurements by tender and goals
[volume] that would be controlled’ (Interview 9). One politician in the
opposition agreed; ‘We realised early on what the deal was [auctioning]
and could not change much’ (Interview 8). Here he was referring to the
fact that the influence of the opposition is limited under the conditions
of the great coalition (Interview 6).
In the coalition agreement, the government stated that it would
initiate a dialogue with the Commission and other EU member states as
soon as possible on how to develop the support scheme for renewables
in accordance with EU law. In fact, the interaction between the
Commission and Germany had already started. In December 2013, the
Commission had notified the German government that it would open an
inquiry into whether Germany’s EEG was compliant with the EU
guidelines for state aid [62]. In the framing of its opening decision, the
Commission noted the scope of inquiry and the remuneration for dif-
ferent technologies. Arguing that Germany had substantially amended
its EEG, the Commission doubted the compatibility of EEG 2012 and the
relevant Treaty articles related to state aid ([29], pp. 138–39). The
Commission considered the aid unlawful and pointed out that the
support scheme was considerably different from the PreussenElektra
case.
Among the issues that the Commission criticised was the levy re-
duction for energy-intensive industries. The intention behind this ex-
emption is to prevent such industries from relocating to other countries
where electricity costs are lower [29]. The Commission’s focus on the
exemptions from the EEG levy for energy-intensive industries was
particularly difficult for the German government, ‘because the in-
dustrial exceptions from the EEG levy are central for creating political
consensus for the Energiewende’ (Interview 7). Without the exemptions,
energy-intensive industries would have to pay a much higher price for
electricity. For some companies, this price would be too high for them
to compete internationally [63]. Focusing on the exemptions meant
that the entire Energiwende was in danger, ‘because without the ex-
ceptions for the industry, the EEG system and the whole transition
cannot achieve consensus in Germany. I have to say, their [the Com-
mission’s] focus was cruel, building up maximum pressure’ (Interview
7).
Furthermore, according to this respondent, the legal consequence of
the formal letter that opened the inquiry into state-aid guidelines was
that, from that moment, a member state is no longer allowed to im-
plement further measures that may be viewed as aid that is prohibited.
If the subsidy is found illegal, the companies’ mandatory repayment
could amount to billions of Euros. The attack on the EEG levy exemp-
tion therefore meant that the German government had less than a year
to respond to the requirements of the Commission, as the exemptions
are re-issued every year.
From that point, the government negotiated with the Commission,
trying to find a ‘landing zone’ for the reformed EEG and at the same
time trying to reform the EEG. The Ministry of Economics, while
drafting the EEG amendment, was in constant contact with the
Commission (DG Competition), to make sure the proposal would be in
M.D. Leiren, I. Reimer
line with the guidelines for state aid. One MP interviewed for this study
held that the process was very opaque, because the Bundestag did not
get continuous information and that the EU was a ‘shadow negotiator’
during the EEG discussions (Interview 15). In presenting the draft to the
Bundestag in June 2014, the Minister of Economics argued that this
could no longer be changed because it had already been negotiated
with the Commission [64].
In 2014, the EEG was amended. The reform represented substantial
changes, including growth corridors, caps and direct marketing. The
German government followed up its intentions to test tendering pro-
cedures in practice [61]. In order to test the viability of auctioning to
determine future support levels, the new EEG provided for the in-
troduction of a tendering process for freestanding PV installations, as a
pilot project. The first auctions were held in 2015. This was politically
far more controversial than introducing the quantity control itself (In-
terview 9).
4.7. EEG 2017
In parallel to the inquiry in Germany, the Commission was re-
forming its state aid guidelines, which entered into force in August
2014. In its 2014 state aid guidelines proposition, the Commission re-
quired member states to align their renewable support schemes to
competitive bidding processes. Bidding procedures were already under
discussion in Germany, but the state aid inquiry contributed towards
speeding up the process (Interview 7, 9, 15). One policy advisor in-
terviewed for our study argued that the transition to a tendering system
‘would certainly not have been so fast, […] if the Commission had not
said, “no matter what you do, we need the tender as default”’
(Interview 7).
In 2016, the government eventually transposed the auction system
for different renewable technologies (photovoltaics, onshore wind,
offshore wind, and biomass) into law. The auction design is tailored for
each of the different technologies. There are exceptions from the ten-
dering system for small installations. Small renewables installations of
under 750-kilowatt (kW) capacity (in the case of biomass, under
150 kW) continue to receive feed-in tariffs [65]. The intention here is
for citizen cooperatives and small project developers to continue to
operate small renewables plants. However, there are no exceptions for
wind-farms with fewer than six turbines. Instead, the government has
introduced simpler and more transparent rules for such onshore wind
installations. There are special rules for citizen energy projects. Unless
they are very small, citizen energy projects must compete in auctions
but enjoy benefits such as automatically receiving the highest feed-in
tariff accepted in the tender (even if their own bid is lower) [65].
5. Discussion
The previous section has described the origin and development of
Germany’s feed-in support scheme for renewables and the shift to
auctioning. In the following, we relate the evidence to the theoretical
perspectives, highlighting how layering serves displacement.
In line with historical institutionalism, the EEG development af-
fected the positions of actors in a way that was unforeseen when it was
first introduced. No one had thought renewable energy would grow so
much and so quickly as a result of the feed-in tariff. Initially the feed-in
tariff did not pose any threat to the established utilities’ market shares.
For more than two decades, the feed-in tariff reinforced itself. Although
the act was contested, it gained considerable support and was con-
sidered stable [11]. The policy instrument re-enforced itself through its
popularity among those who benefited from the policy instrument,
namely, interest groups promoting renewables, academics who em-
braced the successful deployment rates and other countries that con-
sidered Germany as an example to follow. In the early years of the
policy development, politicians from unusual party constellations such
as CSU and the Green Party (until 1999) and SPD and the Greens
38
Energy Research & Social Science 43 (2018) 33–40
(around 2000) cooperated to push for the feed-in tariff, in order to
gather sufficient votes. Generous budgets for renewables, as well as
political experience and support from the Green Party and the Ministry
of Environment, all served to strengthen the lobby groups promoting
renewables. Under these conditions, the feed-in tariff generated certain
increasing returns that historical institutionalists adopt to explain path
dependency over time.
However, the EEG also created certain effects that began to un-
dermine the feed-in tariff rather than re-enforce it. When historical
institutionalists discuss increasing returns, they refer to factors such as
actors’ strong incentive to stick with the solution that they have already
invested resources in. Yet the rapid deployment of renewables as a
consequence of the feed-in tariff increased the costs to an extent that
the investment costs eventually seemed minor compared to the costs
that the feed-in tariff entailed. Rather than generating returns that
benefitted the existing path, the rise in costs started to benefit other
solutions that would curb the deployment of renewable energy.
One key change agent was the FDP, which paved the way for the
shift towards auctioning, voicing criticism of the EEG already in 2004,
and noting the cost issues related to its rapid deployment. The coalition
between CDU/CSU and FDP, formed in 2009, prepared the ground for
introducing auctioning, finally implemented by the grand coalition that
came to power in 2013. FDP and CDU/CSU, and later SPD, used costs to
legitimise the shift to auctioning. The evidence shows that from the
viewpoint of big industries, this cost argument was useful. While others
argued that most energy costs were coming not from the EEG but from,
for example, infrastructure, the cost argument proved effective espe-
cially as costs are more visible with renewables than with other energy
sources (this is itemised on every customer’s bill).
The shift towards procurement by tender happened under the con-
ditions of increasing encroachment on the market shares of the big
utilities by producers of renewable energy. Around 2013, it was clear
that the big utilities could face future bankruptcy. This created in-
creasing resistance to the support scheme and made organisational
actors more ‘utility-friendly’. Given the intermittent character of the
electricity provided by producers using renewable energy sources, it
would simply not be in the interest of the energy system to let the es-
tablished utilities go bankrupt. In 2013, the grand coalition transferred
the responsibility for renewable energy to the industry-friendly
Ministry of Economics. Under the dominance of the grand coalition, the
defenders of the feed-in tariff were a minority in the parliament.
The EU created a political context that benefited those agents that
wanted to change the EEG. This was due to the state aid guidelines
introduced by the Commission. Although the state aid guidelines are
not EU law that mandates member states’ compliance, they are un-
derstood in practice as rules that the member states have to adhere to.
The state aid guidelines are therefore an example of what Jarle Trondal
[10] labels bureaucratic inter-penetration across levels of governance.
While there has been controversy related to the Commission’s
guidelines for state aid since 1990 when Germany first introduced a
feed-in tariff, a key ‘window of change’ opened around 2013. Over time,
Germany had made numerous changes to the EEG. The many EEG re-
forms and the high political attention given to costs in domestic poli-
tical debates provided the Commission with an opportunity to attack
the German feed-in tariff.
The Commission did more than just create a political context fa-
vourable to change agents: it acted as a change agent itself. The evi-
dence shows that the notification by the Commission in 2013 was
crucial: the notification that the Commission would open an inquiry
into compliance of the EEG with the guidelines for state aid. The
Commission attacked the exemptions from the EEG levy for energy-
intensive industries in its opening letter [62] and would not accept such
exceptions before Germany would introduce procurements by tender
[66].
However, in view of the long-lasting debates on cost and quantity
control, the evidence indicates that the German government would
M.D. Leiren, I. Reimer
probably have introduced a tendering system even if the Commission
had not pushed for this. Nevertheless, the Commission’s threat of liti-
gation helped pro-auctioning actors to speed up the process (see also
[64], p. 336). The possibility of putting the blame on Brussels (i.e. the
Commission), which had served as a ‘shadow negotiator’ during the
EEG policy-making process, made it possible for the government to
escape the decision-making trap (i.e. the many veto positions in the
German political system) much sooner than would otherwise have been
expected. We therefore find support for the anticipation that the EU has
contributed towards strengthening agents who have promoted a change
to the feed-in tariff policy.
The evidence suggests that the policy change did not occur as a
sudden punctuation via an external shock, as commonly suggested by
many historical institutionalists, but rather incrementally, over time,
where layering ended up as displacement. The EEG was never meant to
remain fixed and unchanging. The German system has regular evalua-
tions of many of its laws, among others the EEG. Therefore, there was a
certain degree of openness to change endogenous in the EEG. This
gradual process of change is best described with the type of change that
[18] label layering: the revisions of the EEG increasingly added ele-
ments of increased market-orientation; for example, voluntary direct
marketing in 2012, which was made compulsory in 2014, and auction
pilots within one technology (solar) before the feed-in tariff for large-
scale electricity generation was radically displaced in 2016.
6. Conclusions
This study has described the development of the German support
policy for electricity generation, and explained the shift from a feed-in
tariff support scheme to auctioning. Although it did not get much at-
tention when the first feed-in tariff was introduced in 1990, the Grid
Feed-in Law created a surprisingly powerful political and societal dy-
namic. For almost three decades, the feed-in tariff survived external
pressures from the Commission and internal pressures from industrial
interests, from the Ministry of Economics, liberals, conservatives and
eventually also social democrats, all urging a shift to a more market-
oriented support scheme. However, the fact that the support scheme
was successful also gave rise to concerns about costs, and fears that the
utilities would go bankrupt. Brussels was aware of the increasing con-
cerns and the wish of organisational and political field actors to revise
the system. The Commission therefore found an appropriate time to
instigate its inquiry into state aid and the German feed-in tariff law,
putting pressure on the German government. This was in 2013, which
represents the key turning-point year of the policy-change to auc-
tioning. Having raised concerns, framing the feed-in tariff as entailing
unreasonable costs, the FDP had prepared the ground for the following
grand coalition government to introduce auctioning, first as a pilot for
solar energy in 2014 and full-scale in 2016.
The EU emerges as important because it created a political context
(i.e. when initiating a process of reforming the state aide guidelines)
that benefited those agents who wanted to change the EEG. The EU (i.e.
the Commission) also acted as a change agent itself, opening an inquiry
into compliance of the EEG with the guidelines for state aid and at-
tacking elements related to the EEG that are central for creating poli-
tical consensus for the Energiewende (i.e. exemptions from the EEG levy
for energy-intensive industries). We find that the shift to auctioning,
although seemingly abrupt, came about gradually through a process of
layering. Politicians were continuously revising the EEG, incrementally
adding elements of greater market-orientation – including voluntary
direct marketing in 2012, which was made compulsory in 2014, and
auction pilots within one technology (solar), before more radically re-
placing the feed-in tariff for large-scale electricity generation in 2016.
New actors manage to unsettle dominant practices and impose their
own preferences. The issues of costs and insolvency made defenders of
the feed-in-tariff vulnerable to displacement.
39
Energy Research & Social Science 43 (2018) 33–40
Acknowledgements
The Research Council of Norway has funded this study through the
Large-scale Programme for Energy Research ENERGIX (REMIX, project
no. 243756). Statkraft, Statnett, The Norwegian Water Resources and
Energy Directorate, Swedish Energy Agency and Energy Norway have
also funded this project and contributed with valuable feedback in
discussions. We are grateful to the interviewees, who have given some
of their time to talk to us, making it possible to accomplish this study.
The participants at the event ‘Germany: Energiewende at a crossroads?’
in Brussels, 26 April 2018, and the panel 'Climate and energy: EU re-
newable energy in comparison’ (P046) at the General ECPR Conference
2018 in Oslo have contributed to improve our work by challenging us
with questions. We also thank our colleagues in the REMIX project and
the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments to earlier
versions of this article.
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