Rule 1-14

Part 1
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as Amended
Rule 1
General Provisions
Section 1. Title of the Rules. - These Rules shall be known and cited as the Rules of Court.
Section 2. In what courts applicable. - These Rules shall apply in all the courts, except as otherwise provided by the Supreme Court.
Section 3. Cases governed. - These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings.
(a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or prevention or redress of a wrong;
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to the specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
In the event that it may seem in conflict with the rules provided for ordinary civil actions, the prescribed rule for that special civil action shall prevail.
If no specific rule is provided to govern a special civil action, then the rules on ordinary civil action shall be applied.
(b) A criminal action is one by which the State shall prosecute a person for an act or omission punishable by law.
(c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.
Section 4. In what cases not applicable. These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by
analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
Section 5. Commencement of action. - A civil action is commenced by the filling of the original complaint in court. If an additional defendant is impleaded in later pleading, the action is commenced with regard to
him on the date of the filling of such later pleading, irrespective of whether the motion for its admission, if necessary, is denied by the court.
The actual date appearing on the stamped receipt placed by the court on the pleading is the date of its actual filling.
When an action is filed through other modes, say by mail, the date of mailing thereof as appearing on the stamp mark placed by the postal service shall be deemed as the date of its filling. This
is, however, subject to the requisite payment of the docket fees.
It bears to stress that commencement of the action effectively interrupts the running of the prescriptive period for such cases.
Thus, with this express provision of the Rules as to when an action is deemed commenced, it can readily be determined if the action has prescribed or not, prior to its filling in court as to the
defendant or defendants name therein.
When an action is eventually dismissed without prejudice to its refilling, the period which lapsed prior to the commencement of the action and the period which lapsed during the intervening
period prior to re-filling may be determined with certainty.
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These periods may then be used as reference in determining whether or not the re-filling of such action is already barred by the Statute of Limitations.
Section 6. Construction. - These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
The basic issue for resolution in this case is whether or not the counterclaim of petitioner is compulsory or permissive in nature. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the
regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
In Valencia v. Court of Appeals, this Court capsulized the criteria or tests that may be used in determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, summarized as follows:
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim as well s defendant's counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?
Another test, applied in the more recent case of Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, is the "compelling test of compulsoriness" which requires "a logical relationship between the claim and
counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court."
Petitioner's counterclaim for commissions, bonuses, and accumulated premium reserves is merely permissive. The evidence required to prove petitioner's claims differs from that needed to
establish respondent's demands for the recovery of cash accountabilities from petitioner, such as cash advances and costs of premiums. The recovery of respondent's claims is not contingent or
dependent upon establishing petitioner's counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials will not result in the substantial duplication of the time and effort of the court and the parties. One
would search the records in vain for a logical connection between the parties' claims. This conclusion is further reinforced by petitioner's own admissions since she declared in her answer that
respondent's cause of action, unlike her own, was not based upon the Special Agent's Contract. However, petitioner's claims for damages, allegedly suffered as a result of the filing by respondent
of its complaint, are compulsory. 24
There is no need for need for petitioner to pay docket fees for her compulsory counterclaim. On the other hand, in order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over her permissive
counterclaim, petitioner is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.
The rule on the payment of filing fees has been laid down by the Court in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. V. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion-
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or
nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The
court may allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
In Suson, the Court explained that although the payment of the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment does not result in the automatic dismissal of the case
provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
Coming now to the case at bar, it has not been alleged by respondent and there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner has attempted to evade the payment of the proper docket fees
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for her permissive counterclaim. As a matter of fact, after respondent filed its motion to dismiss petitioner's counterclaim based on her failure to pay docket fees, petitioner immediately filed a
motion with the trial court, asking it to declare her counterclaim as compulsory in nature and therefore exempt from docket fees and, in addition, to declare that respondent was in default for
its failure to answer her counterclaim.
However, the trial court dismissed petitioner's counterclaim. Pursuant to this Court's ruling in Sun Insurance, the trial court should have instead given petitioner a reasonable time, but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, to pay the filing fees for her permissive counterclaim.
Petitioner asserts that the trial court should have declared respondent in default for having failed to answer her counterclaim. Insofar as the permissive counterclaim of petitioner is concerned,
there is obviously no need to file an answer until petitioner has paid the prescribed docket fees for only then shall the court acquire jurisdiction over such claim.
Meanwhile, the compulsory counterclaim of petitioner for damages based on the filing by respondent of an allegedly unfounded and malicious suit need not be answered since it is inseparable
from the claims of respondent. If respondent were to answer the compulsory counterclaim of petitioner, it would merely result in the former pleading the same facts raised in its complaint.
The compulsory counterclaim of petitioner for damages filed in Civil Case No. 89-3816 is ordered reinstated. Meanwhile, the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 134) is ordered to require
petitioner to pay the prescribed docket fees for her permissive counterclaim (direct commissions, profit commissions, contingent bonuses and accumulated premium reserves), after ascertaining
that the applicable prescriptive period has not yet set in.
A counterclaim (or a claim which a defending party may have against any party) may be compulsory or permissive.
A counterclaim that (1) arises out of (or is necessarily connected with) the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim; (2) falls within the jurisdiction of the
court and (3) does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, is compulsory. Otherwise, a counterclaim is merely permissive.
When Mercado sought to annul the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment (which he executed as security for his credit purchases), he in effect sought to be freed from them.
While he admitted having outstanding obligations, he nevertheless asserted that those were not covered by the assailed accessory contracts. For its part, aside from invoking the validity of the
said agreements, SMC therefore sought to collect the payment for the value of goods Mercado purchased on credit.
Thus, Mercado’s complaint and SMC’s counterclaim both touched the issues of whether the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment were valid and whether Mercado had
outstanding liabilities to SMC. The same evidence would essentially support or refute Mercado’s claim and SMC’s counterclaim.
Based on the foregoing, had these issues been tried separately, the efforts of the RTC and the parties would have had to be duplicated. Clearly, SMC’s counterclaim, being logically related to
Mercado’s claim, was compulsory in nature. Consequently, the payment of docket fees was not necessary for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.
In fine, the docket fees paid by respondent were insufficient.
In Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, hence, it
concluded that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
It bears emphasis, however, that the ruling in Manchester was clarified in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion when this Court held that in the former there was clearly an effort to
defraud the government in avoiding to pay the correct docket fees, whereas in the latter the plaintiff demonstrated his willingness to abide by paying the additional fees as required.
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The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern and the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the filing of the
original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by
paying the additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had that sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the additional docket
fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change of stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be ordered.
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which the clerk of court of the lower court
and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must require the private respondent to pay the same.
Thus, the Court rules as follows:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or
court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
The ruling in Sun Insurance Office was echoed in the 2005 case of Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Achilles Melicor:
Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as
the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. Thus, when
insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.
In the case at bar, respondent merely relied on the assessment made by the clerk of court which turned out to be incorrect. Under the circumstances, the clerk of court has the responsibility of
reassessing what respondent must pay within the prescriptive period, failing which the complaint merits dismissal.
With respect to the interest accruing after the filing of the complaint, the same can only be determined after a final judgment has been handed down. Respondent cannot thus be made to pay
the corresponding docket fee therefor. Pursuant, however, to Section 2, Rule 141, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94, respondent should be made to pay additional fees which
shall constitute a lien in the event the trial court adjudges that it is entitled to interest accruing after the filing of the complaint.
Sec. 2. Fees as lien. - Where the court in its final judgment awards a claim not alleged, or a relief different or more than that claimed in the pleading, the party concerned shall pay the additional
fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of court shall assess and collect the corresponding fees.
In Ayala Corporation v. Madayag, in interpreting the third rule laid down in Sun Insurance regarding awards of claims not specified in the pleading, this Court held that the same refers only to
damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading as to which the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
… The amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing of the complaint or any pleading should be specified. While it is true that the determination of certain damages
as exemplary or corrective damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court
may make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although specified are left
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for determination of the court is limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor
speculate as to the amount thereof.
The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City is ordered to reassess and determine the docket fees that should be paid by respondent, BNP, in accordance with the Decision of this
Court, and direct respondent to pay the same within fifteen (15) days, provided the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period has not yet expired. Thereafter, the trial court is ordered to
proceed with the case with utmost dispatch.
Hence, the payment of docket fees is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.
In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, the Court laid down guidelines for the implementation of its previous pronouncement in Manchester under particular circumstances, to wit:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or
court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
In the Petition at bar, the RTC found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that petitioner did not pay the correct amount of docket fees for Civil Case No. 2006-0030. According to both the trial
and appellate courts, petitioner should pay docket fees in accordance with Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
Consistent with the liberal tenor of Sun Insurance, the RTC, instead of dismissing outright petitioner’s Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030, granted petitioner time to pay the additional docket
fees. Despite the seeming munificence of the RTC, petitioner refused to pay the additional docket fees assessed against it, believing that it had already paid the correct amount before, pursuant
to Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
The docket fees under Section 7(a), Rule 141, in cases involving real property depend on the fair market value of the same: the higher the value of the real property, the higher the docket fees
due. In contrast, Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 imposes a fixed or flat rate of docket fees on actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The allegations and reliefs it sought in its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030 appears to be ultimately a real action, involving as they do the recovery by petitioners of its title to and
possession of the five parcels of land from respondents Tan and Obiedo.
A real action indisputably involves real property. The docket fees for a real action would still be determined in accordance with the value of the real property involved therein; the only difference
is in what constitutes the acceptable value. In computing the docket fees for cases involving real properties, the courts, instead of relying on the assessed or estimated value, would now be using
the fair market value of the real properties (as stated in the Tax Declaration or the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the absence thereof, the stated
value of the same.
In sum, the Court finds that the true nature of the action instituted by petitioner against respondents is the recovery of title to and possession of real property. It is a real action necessarily
involving real property, the docket fees for which must be computed in accordance with Section 7(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The Court of Appeals, therefore, did not
commit any error in affirming the RTC Orders requiring petitioners to pay additional docket fees for its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030.
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Moreover, even though the Court exempts individuals, as indigent or pauper litigants, from paying docket fees, it has never extended such an exemption to a corporate entity.
The Decision, dated 22 November 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94800, which affirmed the Orders dated 24 March 2006 and 29 March 2006 of the RTC, Branch 22, of Naga City,
in Civil Case No. RTC-2006-0030, ordering petitioner Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation to pay additional docket/filing fees, computed based on Section 7(a), Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be made strictly in accordance with the provision set by law.
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals from the judgment of the VA shall be taken to the CA, by filing a petition for review within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice of
judgment.
Furthermore, upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the CA clerk of court the docketing and other lawful fees; non-compliance with the procedural requirements shall be a
sufficient ground for the petition’s dismissal.
Thus, payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. It is an essential requirement, without which the decision appealed from would
become final and executory as if no appeal has been filed.
As early as the 1932 case of Lazaro v. Endencia and Andres, we stressed that the payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal.
In Lee v. Republic, we decided that even though half of the appellate court docket fee was deposited, no appeal was deemed perfected where the other half was tendered after the period within
which payment should have been made.
In Aranas v. Endona, we reiterated that the appeal is not perfected if only a part of the docket fee is deposited within the reglementary period and the remainder is tendered after the expiration
of the period.
In the present case, Cobarrubias filed her petition for review on December 5, 2007, fifteen (15) days from receipt of the VA decision on November 20, 2007, but paid her docket fees in full only
after seventy-two (72) days, when she filed her motion for reconsideration on February 15, 2008 and attached the postal money orders for ₱4,230.00. Undeniably, the docket fees were paid late,
and without payment of the full docket fees, Cobarrubias’ appeal was not perfected within the reglementary period.
The VA decision had lapsed to finality when the docket fees were paid; hence, the CA had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal except to order its dismissal.
Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. – Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record
on appeal.
In Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo, as with other subsequent cases of the same ruling, the Court explained that the procedural requirement under Section 4 of Rule 41 is not merely directory, as
the payment of the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional.
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It bears stressing that an appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege.
An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must be made within 15 days from notice. And within this period, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other
lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from.
The requirement of paying the full amount of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period is not a mere technicality of law or procedure.
The payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal.
Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected.
The appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the Decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.
Further, under Section 1 (c), Rule 50, an appeal may be dismissed by the CA, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the ground of the non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees
within the reglementary period as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41. The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In both original
and appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees.
The liberality which petitioners pray for has already been granted to them by the CA at the outset. It may be recalled that while petitioners paid a substantial part of the docket fees, they still
failed to pay the full amount thereof since their payment was short of ₱30.00. Based on the premise that the questioned Decision of the RTC has already become final and executory due to non-
perfection, the CA could have dismissed the appeal outright.
But owing to the fact that only the meager amount of ₱30.00 was lacking and considering that the CA may opt not to proceed with the case until the docket fees are paid, it still required
petitioners, even if it was already beyond the reglementary period, to complete their payment of the appeal fee within 10 days from notice.
Clearly, the CA acted conformably with the pronouncement made in Camposagrado, a case cited by petitioners, that "[a] party’s failure to pay the appellate docket fee within the reglementary
period confers only a discretionary and not a mandatory power to dismiss the proposed appeal. Such discretionary power should be used in the exercise of the court’s sound judgment in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play with great deal of circumspection, considering all attendant circumstances and must be exercised wisely and prudently, never capriciously, with
a view to substantial justice."
The CA’s leniency over petitioners’ cause did not end there. Although they were given only 10 days to remit the ₱30.00 deficiency, the said court allowed an even longer period of nine months to
lapse, apparently in the hope that petitioners’ compliance would be on its way.
But as no payment was remitted, it was constrained to finally dismiss the appeal for non-perfection.
Surprisingly, petitioners were again heard of when they filed a Motion for Reconsideration to which they attached a postal money order of ₱30.00.
Nevertheless, they did not offer any plausible explanation either as to why they, at the start, failed to pay the correct docket fees or why they failed to comply with the CA’s directive for them to
remit the ₱30.00-deficiency.
Instead, they focused on begging the CA for leniency, arguing that the meager amount of the deficiency involved justifies relaxation of the rules. What is worse is that even if the CA already took
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note of the lack of such explanation in its Resolution denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, petitioners, up to now, have not attempted to tender one in this Petition and instead
continue to capitalize on substantial justice, fair play and equity to secure a reversal of the dismissal of their appeal.
The Court cannot, therefore, help but conclude that there is really no plausible reason behind the said omission.
Suffice it to say that "[c]oncomitant to the liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide
by the rules."
Those who seek exemption from the application of the rule have the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious reason warranting such departure.
Petitioners’ failure to advance any explanation as to why they failed to pay the correct docket fees or to complete payment of the same within the period allowed by the CA is thus fatal to their
cause.
Petitioners in this case did not immediately remit the deficient amount of ₱30.00 when required by the CA and only did so after the lapse of more than nine months when their appeal was
already dismissed.
The instant Appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
Essentially, the nature of a counterclaim is determinative of whether or not the counterclaimant is required to pay docket fees. The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to
acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.
On the other hand, the prevailing rule with respect to compulsory counterclaims is that no filing fees are required for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.
In general, a counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice,
arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. A compulsory counterclaim is barred if not set up in the same action.
On the other hand, a counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. It is essentially an independent
claim that may be filed separately in another case.
The four tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not are the following, to wit: (a) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim as
well as the defendant's counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the
parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court? Of the four, the one compelling test of compulsoriness is the logical relation between the claim
alleged in the complaint and that in the counterclaim. Such relationship exists when conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail substantial duplication of time
and effort by the parties and the court; when the multiple claims involve the same factual and legal issues; or when the claims are offshoots of the same basic controversy between the parties. If
these tests result in affirmative answers, the counterclaim is compulsory.
Based on the abovementioned standards, the Court finds that the counterclaim of respondents is permissive in nature. This is because: ( a) the issue in the main case, i.e., whether or not
respondents are liable to pay lease rentals, is entirely different from the issue in the counterclaim, i.e., whether or not petitioner and Kathryn are liable for damages for taking over the
possession of the leased premises and harvesting and appropriating respondents' crops planted therein; ( b) since petitioner and respondents' respective causes of action arose from completely
different occurrences, the latter would not be barred by res judicata had they opted to litigate its counterclaim in a separate proceeding; (c) the evidence required to prove petitioner's claim that
respondents failed to pay lease rentals is likewise different from the evidence required to prove respondents' counterclaim that petitioner and Kathryn are liable for damages for performing acts
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in bad faith; and (d) the recovery of petitioner's claim is not contingent or dependent upon proof of respondents' counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials will not result in the
substantial duplication of the time and effort of the court and the parties.
In view of the finding that the counterclaim is permissive, and not compulsory as held by the courts a quo, respondents are required to pay docket fees.
However, it must be clarified that respondents' failure to pay the required docket fees, per se, should not necessarily lead to the dismissal of their counterclaim. It has long been settled that
while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of filing of the initiatory pleading does not automatically
cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a reasonable period; and (b) there was no intention on the part of the claimant to defraud the government.
Here, respondents cannot be faulted for non-payment of docket fees in connection with their counterclaim, primarily because as early as November 16, 2006, the RTC had already found such
counterclaim to be compulsory in nature.
Such finding was then upheld in the July 2, 2007 RTC Decision and affirmed on appeal by the CA in its assailed Decision.
As such, the lower courts did not require respondents to pay docket fees and even proceeded to rule on their entitlement thereto. Verily, respondents' reliance on the findings of the courts a
quo, albeit erroneous, exhibits their good faith in not paying the docket fees, much more their intention not to defraud the government.
Thus, the counterclaim should not be dismissed for nonpayment of docket fees. Instead, the docket fees required shall constitute a judgment lien on the monetary awards in respondents’ favor.
In Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation v. Legasto, citing, Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the Court held that in instances where a litigant's non-payment of docket fees was made
in good faith and without any intention of defrauding the government, the clerk of court of the court a quo should be ordered to assess the amount of deficient docket fees due from such
litigant, which will constitute a judgment lien on the amount awarded to him, and enforce such lien, as in this case.
Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court provides that in original actions filed before the CA, such as a petition for certiorari, the payment of the corresponding docket fees is required, and that
the failure to comply with the same shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of such action.
The petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court and deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition.
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
In Bibiana Farms & Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, the Court nevertheless explained that while non-payment of docket fees may indeed render an original action dismissible, the rule on payment of docket
fees may be relaxed whenever the attending circumstances of the case so warrant:
Under the foregoing rule, non-compliance with any of the requirements shall be a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. Corollarily, the rule is that a court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, unless the docket fees are paid. And where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fees, the court may
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period .
Verily, the failure to pay the required docket fees per se should not necessarily lead to the dismissal of a case. It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of filing of the initiatory pleading does not automatically cause its dismissal provided that: ( a) the fees are paid
within a reasonable period; and (b) there was no intention on the part of the claimant to defraud the government.
Here, it appears that when Camaso filed his certiorari petition through his counsel and via mail, a Metrobank check dated July 6, 2015 under the account name of Pedro L. Linsangan was
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attached thereto to serve as payment of docket fees.
Although this was not an authorized mode of payment under Section 6, Rule VIII of the 2009 IRCA, the attachment of such personal check shows that Camaso exerted earnest efforts to pay the
required docket fees.
Clearly, this exhibits good faith and evinces his intention not to defraud the government. In this relation, the assertion of the Officer-in-Charge of the CA Receiving Section that there was no
check attached to Camaso's certiorari petition is clearly belied by the fact that when it was examined at the Office of the Division Clerk of Court, the check was found to be still stapled thereto.
In light of the foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it appropriate to relax the technical rules of procedure in the interest of substantial justice and, hence, remands the instant case to the
CA for the resolution of its substantial merits. Upon remand, the CA is directed to order Camaso to pay the required docket fees within a reasonable period of thirty (30) days from notice of such
order.
CIVIL ACTIONS
Ordinary Civil Actions
Rule 2
Cause of action
Section 1. Ordinary civil actions, basis of. - Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action.
Section 2. Cause of action, defined. - A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.
The elements of a cause of action are:

1. A right in favor of the plaintiff, by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
3. An act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of such right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the
plaintiff may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of actions are both no longer available as grounds in a motion to dismiss by reason of the recent amendments to the rules.
Sole proprietorship, which is neither a natural person, nor a judicial person, as defined by Art. 44 of the Civil Code, cannot be a party to a civil action.
There is no law authorizing sole proprietorships to bring suit in court. The law merely recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for profit by
a single individual, and requires the proprietor or owner to secure licenses and permits, register the business name, and pay taxes to the national government. It does not vest juridical or legal
personality upon the sole proprietorship nor empower it to file or defend an action in court.
The complaint in the court should have been filed in the name of the owner.
The allegation in the body of the complaint would show that the suit is brought by such person as proprietor or owner of the business conducted under the name and style. The descriptive
words “doing business as ….” may be added to the title of the case, as is customarily done.
Section 3. One suit for a single cause of action. - A party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action.
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Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. - If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same course of action, the filling of one or a judgement upon merits in any one is available as a ground
for the dismissal of the others.
Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. - A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdiction, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of actions
falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.
Section 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. - Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoinder cause of action may, on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be
severed and proceed separately.
The court should also have jurisdiction over the misjoined cause of action. If the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over a cause of action, and that misjoined cause of action is not so
severed, any adjudication rendered by the court with respect to the same would be a nullity.
The joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special rules.
Petitioner availed itself of the wrong remedy in simultaneously filing (1) a petition for certiorari before the trial court alleging that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in rendering its
June 12, 2006 Decision and June 30, 2006 Resolution and (2) a petition for prohibition seeking injunctive reliefs from this court to enjoin the enforcement of public respondent's June 12, 2006
Decision and June 30, 2006 Resolution during the pendency of the case before the trial court.
Petitioner counters that it was compelled to file the separate petitions pursuant to, and in view of, Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184:
Sec. 58. Report to Regular Courts; Certiorari. - Court action may be resorted to only after the protests contemplated in this Article shall have been completed. Cases that are filed in violation of
the process specified in this Article shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The regional trial court shall have jurisdiction over final decisions of the head of the procuring entity. Court actions
shall be governed by Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
This provision is without prejudice to any law conferring on the Supreme Court the sole jurisdiction to issue temporary restraining orders and injunctions relating to Infrastructure Projects of
Government.
Section 58 could not have envisioned a simultaneous resort to this court by one that had already filed an action before the Regional Trial Court without violating the basic rules on proscription
against the splitting of a cause of action, multiplicity of suits, and forum shopping.
Rule 2, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action." Moreover, Section 4 discusses the splitting of a single cause of
action in that "if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of
the others."
The splitting of a cause of action "violate[s] the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective [is] to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the courts."
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Rule 3
PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS
Section 1. Who may be the parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural and juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. The term “plaintiff” may refer to the claiming party,
the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party plaintiff. The term “defendant” may refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the
third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant.
Article 44 of the Civil Code
The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or
member. (35a
When the defendant prays for relief against the plaintiff in his or her answer, by way of a counterclaim, the title of the case shall remain the same and there is no need to refer to the defendant
as plaintiff in that counterclaim.
A plaintiff may also claim against his or her co-plaintiff. In such cases, they shall be referred to as cross-plaintiff and cross-defendant, respectively. Such a cross-defendant may also file a cross-
claim against the original cross-claimant. This action is called a counter-cross-claim.
In a cross-claim which the defendant may file against a co-defendant, the co-defendant sued shall be referred to as a cross-defendant while the defendant who sued him or he is called a cross-
claimant.
In naming the parties in the original complaint, all of them must be stated. However, in subsequent pleadings, it is enough to place the name of the first party on each side and indicate that
there are other parties involved.
In the subsequent pleadings, it would be sufficient to state that the plaintiffs are First Party, et al. and that First Part, et al. are the defendants.
The term “et al.” is short for “et alia” which literally means “and others.”
In preparing the original complaint, the docket number is obviously not yet available. Hence, the space allotted for the number is left blank. The name of the court which shall be indicated
therein is such court which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. It also indicates the venue where the action is filed.
Section 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgement in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by
law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissed on the ground of lack of cause of action.
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If the identity or name of any defendants is unknown, such party shall be sued as the unknown owner, heir, devise or by other designation as the case may require.
When the identity or true name of such an unknown defendant is eventually discovered, the pleadings must be amended accordingly to reflect the same.
Where an heir institutes an ordinary civil action to enforce ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession, there is no need to secure a prior and separate judicial declaration of his or her
status as an heir through special proceedings.
Section 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the
case and shall be deemed to be a real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting
in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.
When an action is prosecuted or defended by a representative, such representation or relation between the real party in interest and that of the representative must be so stated both in the
title of the case and in the body of the pleading.
The authorization of such representatives, whether in the form of a Secretary’s Certificate or a Special Power of Attorney should be alleged in the body of the pleading and the evidence to that
effect must be attached thereto.
When a private domestic corporation commences an action, the name of that juridical entity shall be indicated as the plaintiff and not its representative.
In both instances, however, their respective authority to institute such action must be stated in the body of the pleading supported by evidence to that effect. This may be in the form of a Special
Power of Attorney, a Board Resolution or a Secretary’s Certificate attesting to such Board Resolution.
Section 4. Spouses as parties. - Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law.
Pro forma parties
A nominal or pro forma party is one who is joined as a plaintiff or as a defendant not because he or she has any real interest in the subject of the litigation or that any relief is demanded from
him or her, but simply because the technical rules require his or her presence on the record.
Under the Rules, spouses are required to sue or be sued jointly for reason that the husband and wife are considered as co-administrators of their property whether they are governed by the
absolute community of property relation or the conjugal partnership of gains
Section 5. Minor or incompetent persons. - A minor or a person alleged to be incompetent, may sue or be sued, with the assistant of his father, mother, guardian, or if he has none, a guardian ad litem.
Section 6. Permissive joinder of parties. - All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transaction is alleged to exist, whether jointly,
severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiff or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to
all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any
proceedings in which he may have no interest.
Section 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
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The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
Non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of the action. The proper remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be dispensable either by motion or upon the
court’s initiative. If the plaintiff refuses despite order from the court, then the case may be dismissed for failure to comply with the same.
Section 8. Necessary party. - A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.
Section 9. Non-joinder of necessary party to be pleaded. - Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted a necessary party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall state why
he is omitted. Should the court find the reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained.
The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the claim against such party.
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and the judgement rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.
Section 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who would be joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained, he may be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint.
Section 11. Misjoinder or non-joinder of parties. - Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by the order of the court on motion of any
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
Section 12. Class suit. - When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to may persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the
court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interest of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect
his individual interest.
Section 13. Alternative defendants. - Where the plaintiff is uncertain against who of several persons he is entitled to relief, he may join any or all thm as defendants in the alternative, although a right to relief
against one may be inconsistent with a right to relief against the other.
Section 14. Unknown identity or name of defendants. - Whenever the identity or name of a defendant is unknown, he may be sued as the unknown owner, heir, devisee, or by such other designation as the case
may be require; when the identity or true name is discovered, the pleading must be amended accordingly.
Section 15. Entity without juridical personality as defendant. - when two or more persons not organized as an entity with juridical personality enter into a transaction, they may be sued under the name by which
they are generally or commonly known.
In the answer of such defendant, the name and addresses of the persons composing said entity must all be revealed.
Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days
after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad liem for the minor
heirs.
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If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within specified time, to
procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the lateer shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
Section 17. Death or separation of a party who is a public officer. - When a public officer is a party in an actions in his official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the
action may be continued and maintained by or against his successor if, within thirty (30) days after the successor takes office or such time as may be granted by the court, it is satisfactorily shown to the court by
any party that there is a substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and that the successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor. Before a substitution is
made, the party or officer to be affected, unless expressly assenting thereto, shall be given reasonable notice of application therefor and accorded an opportunity to be heard.
Section 18. Incompetency or incapacity. - if a party becomes incompetent or incapacitated, the court, upon motion with notice, may allow the action to be continued by or against the incompetent or
incapacitated person assisted by his legal guardian or guardian ad liem.
Section 19. Transfer of interest. - In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or against the original party, unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the interest is
transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party.
Section 20. Action on contractual money claims. - When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before the entry of final judgement in the court in
which the action was pending at the time of such death. It shall not be dismissed but shall be instead be allowed to continue until the entry of final judgement. A favorable judgement obtained by the plaintiff
therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.
Section 21. Indigent party. - A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent party if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has
no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself or his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the docket and
other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgement rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgement is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact
a person with sufficient income of property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution
shall issue or the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.
Section 22. Notice to the Solicitor General. - In any action involving the validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, executive order, presidential decree, rules or regulations, the court, in its discretion, may require the
appearance of the Solicitor General who may be heard in person or through a representative duly designated by him.
Rule 4
VENUES OF ACTION
Section 1. Venue for real actions. - Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the
real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
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Section 2. Venue for personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Section 3. Venue for actions against non-residents. - If any of the defendants does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff, or any property of said
defendant located in the Philippines, the action may be commenced and tried in the court of the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the property or any portion thereof is situated or found.
Section 4. When Rule not applicable. - This Rule shall not apply -
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filling of the action on the exclusive venue thereof.
Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon. It is merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the
place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law.
The stipulation on venue is deemed exclusive by the qualifying or restrictive words, such as “exclusively,” “waiving for this purpose any other venue,” “shall only” preceding the designation of
venue, “to the exclusion of the other courts,” or words of similar import.
In the absence of such restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting the venue to the specified place.
While they are considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of
qualifying or restrictive words. They should be considered merely as an agreement or additional forum, not as limiting venues to the specified place.
They are not exclusive but rather permissive.
If the intention of the parties were to restrict the venue, there must be accompanying language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them be
litigated only at the place named by them.
No restrictive words like “only,” “solely,” “exclusively in this court,” “in no other court save - ,” “particularly,” “nowhere else but/except -,” or words of equal import were stated in the contract.
Venue Jurisdiction
Venue is a matter of procedural law. Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law.
Venue may be waived or made subject to stipulation.
If the party is a corporation, its residence for purposes of determining the proper venue of a civil action is the province or city where its principal place of business is situated as recorded in its
Articles of Incorporation.
The venue for a petition for voluntary insolvency proceeding under the Insolvency Law is the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the insolvent debtor resides.
A corporation is considered a resident of the place where its principal office is located as stated in its Articles of Incorporation.
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However, when it is uncontroverted that the insolvent corporation abandoned the old principal office, the corporation is considered a resident of the city where its actual principal office is
currently found.
In the same manner as in personal actions for ordinary civil actions, venue in actions governed by the Revised Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases lies at the place of residence of the
plaintiff or the defendant, at the option of the plaintiff.
However, in case the plaintiff is in the business of lending, banking or similar activities, the case shall be filed in the city or municipality where the defendant resides and in which the plaintiff has
a branch office.
Where the plaintiff is engaged in the business of lending, banking or similar activities but it has no branch office in the city or municipality where the defendant resides, venue shall lie at the
place of residence of the plaintiff or the defendant at the election of the plaintiff applying the provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure in suppletory character.
The court cannot dismiss a case on its own based on improper venue. The grounds of improper venue may be waived by the parties. Unless such ground is properly raised as an affirmative
defense in the answer, it would be erroneous for the court to order its dismissal.
Failure of the defendant to raise such an issue in the answer shall be deemed as a waiver thereof.
However, the court may affect such motu proprio dismissal if the action is governed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure or by the Revised Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases.
Rule 5
UNIFORM PROCEDURE IN TRIAL COURTS
Section 1. Uniform procedure. - The procedure in the Municipal Trial Courts shall be the same as in the Regional Trial Court, except (a) where a particular provision expressly or impliedly applies only to either of
said courts, or (b) in civil cases governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Section 2. Meaning of terms. - The term “Municipal Trial Courts” as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts.
PROCEDURE IN REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
Rule 6
KINDS OF PLEADINGS
Section 1. Pleadings defined. - Pleadings are written statements of the respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the court for appropriate judgement.
Section 2. Pleadings allowed. - The claims of a party are asserted in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention.
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 (effective April 1, 1994) enumerated different kinds of initiatory pleadings. These are
(1) the original civil complaint;

(2) counterclaim;
The counterclaim, regarded as initiatory pleading, is a counterclaim of permissive character.
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(3) cross-claim;
(4) third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint; or
(5) complaint - in - intervention.
Section 3. Complaint. - The complaint is the pleading alleging the plaintiffs or claiming party’s cause or causes of action. The names and residences of the plaintiff and defendants must be stated in the complaint.
Section 4. Answer. - An answer is a pleading in which a defending party sets forth his or her defenses.
Section 5. Defenses. - Defenses may either be negative or affirmative.

(a) A negative defense is specific denial of the material facts or facts alleged in the pleadings of the claimant essential to his or her cause or causes of action.
The denial must be specific.
The material averments in a pleading asserting a claim or claims shall be deemed admitted, when not specifically denied.
The rule on specific denial, however, does not include denial of the amount of unliquidated damages.
Specific denial is made by the defendant by specifying each material allegation of fact, the truth of which he or she does not admit and, whenever practicable, set forth the substance of the
matters upon which he or she relies to support the denial.
There are three types of specific denials, namely:
Absolute denial is made by the defendant when he or she specifically and absolutely denies the material allegations in the complaint. it is done by specifically denying the material allegation in
the pleading and sets forth the substance of the matters upon which he or she relies to support his or her denial.
Partial denial is resorted to by the defendant who desires to deny only part of an averment. He or she does not make a total denial of the material allegations but specifically denies only a part
of the averment. He or she shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. the defendant must also set forth the substance of the matters upon which he or
she relies to support such denial.
Denial by disavowal of knowledge occurs when the defendant specifically denies a material averment in the complaint on the basis that he or she is without knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth thereof. it is accomplished by so stating, and this shall have the effect of denial.
The denial of an actionable document requires that the specific denial be made under oath.
● When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, such an instrument is deemed an actionable document.
● If the defendant fails to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of that instrument, then the same is deemed admitted.
● the admission of the due execution and genuineness of a document simply means:
1. that the party whose signature it bears admits that he or she signed it or that it was signed by another for him or her with his or her authority;
2. that at the time it was signed, it was in words and figures exactly set out in the pleadings of the party relying upon it;
3. that the document was delivered;a dn
4. that any formal requisites required by law, such as seal, an acknowledgement, or revenue stamp are waived by him or her.
When the law makes use of the phrase “genuineness and due execution of the instrument,” it means nothing more than that the instrument is not spurious, counterfeit, or of
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different import on its face from the one executed.
In Hibberd vs. Rohde, the Supreme Court pronounced that:
“Execution can only refer to the actual making and delivery, but it cannot involve other matters without enlarging its meaning beyond reason. The only object of the rule was
to enable a plaintiff to make out a prima facie, not a conclusive case, and it cannot preclude a defendant from introducing defense on the merits which does not contradict the
execution of the instrument introduced in evidence.”
Negative Pregnant
A “negative pregnant” is an allegation which is stated in the negative form but implies an admission of its affirmative opposite to which it relates. It does not qualify as a specific denial and is
considered to be an admission since it denies only the qualified portion or an incident of the allegation, but not the main or the totality of the allegation.
It is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party.
it is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading.
Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language, and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it was held that the qualifying circumstances alone
are denied, while the fact itself is not squarely denied, is admitted.
(b) An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar
recovery by him or her. The affirmative defenses include fraud, statute of limitations, release, payment, illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge of bankruptcy, and
any other matter by way of confession and avoidance.
Other affirmative defenses are also enumerated in Section 12(a), Rule 8, which include:
1. The court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
2. Venue is improperly laid;
3. The plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
4. The pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
5. A condition precedent for filing of claim has not been compile with.
The affirmative defenses must be raised in the answer.
Failure to raise these defenses at the earliest opportune shall constitute a waiver thereof.
Actions on the Affirmative Defenses
For the ten affirmative defenses enumerated under Section 5(b), Rule 6, the court may conduct a summary hearing thereon within fifteen calendar days from the filing of the answer.
The court shall then resolve the same within thirty calendar days from the termination of such summary hearing.
With respect to the five affirmative defenses enumerated under Section 12(a), Rule 8, the court may motu proprio resolve the same within thirty calendar days from the filing of the answer.
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if these affirmative defenses are granted, the action shall be dismissed.
However, when the same are denied, the order cannot be made subject of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.
The proper remedy is to raise the same grounds during appeal in the event that adverse judgement is rendered by the trial court.
Affirmative defenses may also include grounds for the dismissal of the complaint, specifically, that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause of action, or that the action is barred by a prior judgement.
Section 6. Counterclaim. - A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party.
Section 7. Compulsory counterclaim. - A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the
subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim may be
considered compulsory regardless of the amount. A compulsory counterclaim not raised in the same action is barred unless otherwise allowed by these Rules.
A compulsory counterclaim set up in the answer is not an “initiatory” or similar pleading.
The initiatory pleading is the plaintiff’s complaint.
A defendant has no choice but to raise a compulsory counterclaim the moment the plaintiff files the complaint, otherwise defendant waives the compulsory counterclaim.
The compulsory counterclaim is a reaction or response, mandatory upon pain of waiver, to an initiatory pleading which is the complaint.
A compulsory counterclaim does not require a certificate of non-forum shopping because a compulsory counterclaim is not an initiatory pleading.
Where the counterclaim involves a claim under the Labor Code or administrative in nature, the same cannot be considered as compulsory since they are not cognizable by the regular courts.
However, if the counterclaim constitutes a certain sum of money by way of damages, the same may be considered as a compulsory counterclaim regardless of the amount if the action is filed
before the Regional Trial Court.
This is based on the fact that the Regional Trial Court is a court of general jurisdiction.
Determination of the Nature of Counterclaim

Jurisprudence has laid down tests in order to determine the nature of a counterclaim, to wit:
(a) Are the issue of fact and law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants’ claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
(c) Will subsequently the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs’ claim as well as the defendants’ counterclaim?
(d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?
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A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.
A counterclaim purely for damages and attorney’s fees by reason of the unfounded suit filed by the plaintiff, had long been settled as falling under the classification of compulsory counterclaim
and it must be pleaded in the same action, otherwise, it is barred.
Thus, counterclaims seeking moral, actual, and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees on account of the malicious and unfounded complaint was held to be compulsory.
A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party’ claim.
It is essentially an independent claim that may be filed separately in another case, or is capable of proceeding independently of the main case.
A permissive counterclaim also requires payment of the prescribed docket fees, because it is not only the filling of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fees that vests the court with the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
If the trial court made a mistake by saying that the counterclaim is compulsory and on appeal it found out that the counterclaim is permissive, the counterclaim is not dismissible, the
counterclaimant should be given a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the reglementary period, within which to pay the prescribed docket fees because the counterclaimant should
not be made to suffer due to the mistake of the trial court.
A permissive counterclaim requires a certificate of non-forum shopping because it is an initiatory pleading. Lack of it is fatal, and shall be a cause for dismissal of the counterclaim. The dismissal
is always without prejudice, unless otherwise provided.
Section 8. Cross-claim. - A cross-claim is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein.
Such cross-claim may cover all or part of the original claim.
Section 9. Counter-counterclaim and counter-cross-claims. - A counterclaim may be asserted against an original counter-claimant
A cross-claim may also be filed against an original cross-claimant.
Section 10. Reply. - All news matters alleged in the answer are deemed controverted. If the plaintiff wishes to interpose any claims arising out of the new matters so alleged, such claims shall be set forth in an
amended or supplemental complaint. However, the plaintiff may file a reply only if the defending party attaches an actionable document to his or her answer.
A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to deny, or allege facts in denial or avoidance of new matters alleged in, or relating to, said actionable document.
In the event of an actionable document attached to the reply, the defendant may file a rejoinder if the same is solely based on an actionable document.
Reply is allowed if the answer attaches an actionable document, and rejoinder if the filed reply also attaches an actionable document.
A reply is a response to the answer.
Its filing is allowed only if the defending party attaches an actionable document to his or her answer.
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It is fillable only if the defending party attaches an actionable document to his or her answer.
So, if the plaintiff wishes to interpose any claim arising out of the new matters alleged in the answer, and the new matters alleged in the answer is based in an actionable document attached to
the answer, such claims shall be set forth in a reply.
But if the plaintiff wishes to interpose any claims arising out of the new matters alleged in the answer, and the new matters alleged in the answer is not based on actionable document attached
to the answer, such claims shall be set forth, not in a reply, but in an amended or supplemental complaint.
As regards filling of a rejoinder, the defendant may file a rejoinder if the same is based solely on an actionable document attached to the reply.
Filling of rejoinder is not allowed if the reply fails to attach any actionable document. The remedy of the defendant, if he or she so desires, is to file an amended answer or supplemental answer.
A document can be regarded as actionable when an action or defense is grounded upon such written instrument or document.
Section 11. Third, (fourth, etc) - party complaint. - A third (fourth, etc.) - party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called the third
(fourth, etc.) - party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his or her opponent’s claim.
Section 12. Bringing new parties. - When the presence of parties other than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim, the court shall order
them to be brought in as defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be obtained.
Section 13. Answer to third (fourth, etc.) - party complaint. - A third (fourth, etc.) - party defendant may allege in his or her answer his or her defenses, counterclaims or cross-claims, including such defenses that
the third (fourth, etc.) - party plaintiff may have against the original plaintiff’s claim. in proper cases, he or she may also assert a counterclaim against the original plaintiff in respect of the latter’s claim against
the third-party plaintiff.
Rule 7
PARTS AND CONTENTS OF A PLEADING
Section 1. Caption. - The caption sets forth the name of the court, the title of the action, and the docket number if assigned.
The title of the action indicates the names of the parties. They shall be named in the original complaint or petition; but in subsequent pleadings, it shall be sufficient if the name of the first party on each side be
stated with an appropriate indication when there are other parties.
Their respective participation in the case shall be indicated.
Section 2. The body. - The body of the pleading sets forth its designation, the allegations of the party’s claims or defenses, the relief prayed for, and the date of the pleading.
(a) Paragraphs. - The allegations in the body of a pleading shall be divided into paragraphs so numbered as to be readily identified, each of which shall contain a statement of a single set of circumstances
so far as that can be done with convenience. A paragraph may be referred to by its number in all succeeding pleadings.
(b) Headings. - When two or more causes of action are joined, the statement of the first shall be prefaced by the words “first cause of action,” of the second by “second cause of action,” and so on for the
others.
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When one or more paragraphs in the answer are addressed to one of several causes of action in the complaint, they shall be prefaced by the words “answer to the first cause of action” or “answer to
the second cause of action” and so on; and when one or more paragraphs of the answer are addressed to several causes of action, they shall be prefaced by words to that effect.
(c) Relief. - The pleading shall specify the relief sought, but it may add a general prayer for such further or other relief as may be deemed just or equitable.
(d) Date. - Every pleading shall be dated
An undated pleading shall have the same effect as an unsigned pleading. Hence, it does not produce any legal effect.
Section 3. Signature and address. -

(a) Every pleading and other written submissions to the court must be signed by the party or counsel representing him or her.
(b) The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him or her that he or she has read the pleading and document; that to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
(1) It is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.
(2) The claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or jurisprudence, or by a non-frivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing jurisprudence;
(3) The factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically, so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after availment of the modes of discovery under these rules; and
(4) The denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically, so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.
(c) If the court determines, on motion or motu propio and after notice and hearing, that this rule has been violated, it may impose an appropriate sanction or relief such violation to the proper office for
disciplinary action, on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule, or is responsible for the violation. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly and severally liable for a
violation committed by its partner, associate, or employee. The sanction may include, but shall not be limited to, non-monetary directive or sanction; an order to pay a penalty in court; or if imposed on
motion or warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation,
including attorney’s fees for the filling of the motion for sanction. The lawyer or law firm cannot pass on the monetary penalty to the client.
If the lawyer is supposed to sign the pleading, he or she cannot delegate this act to another person who is not a lawyer.
In Republic vs. Kendrick Development Corp., the answer filed by the defendant was signed by another person who is not a lawyer. Despite the contention of the counsel on record that he
authorized that person to sign it in his behalf and that he ratified such action, it was held that the answer is deemed to be an unsigned pleading, and therefore, has no legal effect.
Thus, the defendant was declared in default.
Other Requirements
Apart from the signature itself, additional information are required to be indicated as part of a counsel's signature. Thus:
1. address of counsel;
2. In B.M. No. 1132, the Supreme Court required all lawyers to indicate their Roll of Attorney’s number;
3. In B.M. No. 287, the Supreme Court required the inclusion of the number and date of the lawyer’s official receipt indicating payment of his or her annual membership dues to the
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Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the current year; in lieu of this, a lawyer may indicate his or her lifetime membership number;
4. In accordance with Section 139 of the Local Government Code, a lawyer must indicate his or her professional tax receipt number;
5. B.M. No. 1922 required inclusion of a counsel’s Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption number; and
6. The Supreme Court, in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC, required the inclusion of a counsel’s contact details.
Section 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit of an affiant duly authorized to sign said verification. The authorization of the affiant to act on behalf of a party, whether in the form of a secretary’s certificate or a special
power of attorney, should be attached to the pleading, and shall allege the following attestations:
(a) The allegations in the pleading are true and correct based on his or her personal knowledge, or based on authentic documents;
(b) The pleading is not filed to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and
(c) The factual allegations therein have evidentiary support or, if specifically, so identified, will likewise have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery.
The signature of the affiant shall further serve as a certification of the truthfulness of the allegations in the pleading.
A pleading required to be verified that contains a verification based on “information and belief” or upon “knowledge, information, and belief,” or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading.
Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. - The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he or she has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency and, to the
best of his or her knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he or she should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or she shall report that fact within five calendar days therefrom to the court wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.
The authorization of the affiant to act on behalf of a party, whether in the form of secretary’s certificate or a special power of attorney, should be attached to the pleading.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless
otherwise provided, upon the motion and after hearing. The submission of false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without
prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. if the acts of the party or his or her counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanction.
Section 6. Contents. - Every pleading stating a party’s claim or defenses shall, in addition to those mandated by Section 2. Rule 7, state the following:
(a) Names of witnesses who will be presented to prove a party’s claim or defense;
(b) Summary of the witnesses’ intended testimonies, provided that the judicial affidavits of said witnesses shall be attached to the pleading and form an integral part thereof. Only witnesses whose judicial
affidavits are attached shall be presented by the parties during the trial. Except if a party presents meritorious reasons as basis for the admission of additional witnesses, no other witness or affidavit
shall be heard or admitted by the court; and
(c) Documentary and object evidence in support of the allegations contained in the pleading.
Rule 8
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MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS IN PLEADINGS
Section 1. In general. - Every pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts, including the evidence on which the party pleadin relies for his
claim or defense, as the case may be.
if a cause of action or defense relied on is based on law, the pertinent provisions thereof and their applicability to him or her shall be clearly and concisely stated.
Section 2. Alternative causes of action or defenses. - A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one cause of action or defenses or in separate
causes of action or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of
one or more of the alternative statements.
Section 3. Conditions precedent. - In any pleading a general averment of the performance or occurrence of all conditions precedent shall be sufficient.
Section 4. Capacity. - Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons
that is made a party, must be averred. A party desiring to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, shall do so by specific
denial, which shall include such supporting particulars as are pecuniary within the pleader’s knowledge.
Section 5. Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. - In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge or other
condition of the mind of a person may be averred generally.
Section 6. Judgement. - In pleadin judgement or decision of a domestic or foregin court, judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgement or decision without setting
forth matter showing jurisdiction to render it. An authenticated copy of the judgement or decision shall be attached to the pleading.
Section 7. Action or defense based on document - Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the
pleading, and the original copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be part of the pleading.
Section 8. How to contest such documents. - When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding Section, the genuineness
and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and set forth what he or she claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath
does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.
Section 9. Official document or act. - In pleading an official document or official act, it is sufficient to aver that the document was issued or the act was done in compliance with law.
Section 10. Specific denial. - A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he or she does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon
which he or she relies to support his or her denial.
Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he or she specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint, he or she shall so state, and this shall have the effect of denial.
Section 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. - Material averments in a pleading asserting a claim or claims, other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed
admitted when not specifically denied.
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Section 12. Affirmative defenses. -
(a) A defendant shall raise his or her affirmative defenses in his or her answer, which shall be limited to the reasons set forth under Section 5(b), Rule 6, and the following grounds:
(1) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
(2) That venue is improperly laid;
(3) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(4) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action; and
(5) That a condition precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with.
(b) Failure to raise the affirmative defenses at the earliest opportunity shall constitute a waiver thereof.
(c) The court shall motu proprio resolve the above affirmative defenses within thirty (30) calendar days from the filing of the answer.
(d) As to the other affirmative defenses under the first paragraph of Section 5(b), Rule 6, the court may conduct a summary hearing within fifteen (15) calendar days from the filing of the answer. Such
affirmative defenses shall be resolved by the court within thirty (30) calendar days from the termination of the summary hearing.
(e) Affirmative defenses, if denied, shall not be the subject of a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, but may be among the matters to be raised on appeal after a
judgement on the merits.
Section 13. Striking out of pleading or matter contained therein. - Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these Rules, upon the motion made y
a party within twenty (20) calendar days after the service of the pleading upon him or her, the court may order any pleading to be stricken out or that any sham or false, redundant, immaterial, impertent, or
scandalous matter be stricken out therefrom.
Rule 9
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. - Defenses or objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgement or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Section 2. Compulsory counterclaim, or cross-claim, not set up barred. - A compulsory counterclaim, or a cross-claim, not set up shall be barred.
Section 3. Default, declaration of. - if the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such
failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgement granting the claimant such relief as his or her pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion
requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court.
(a) Effect of order of default. - A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but shall not take part in the trial.
A defaulted defendant is not actually thrown out of court.
It is because a party in default is entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but shall not take part in the trial.
He loses his standing in court and his right to adduce evidence and to present his defense; and
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If pleading was filed, he should not expect the trial court to act upon their pleadings, unless it also asks, and upon proper motion, for the lifting of the default order.
(b) Relief from order of default. - A party declared in default may at any time after notice thereof and before judgement, file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that
his or her failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence and that he or she has a meritorious defense. In such cases, the order of default may be set aside on such terms
and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.
(c) Effect of partial default. - When a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action against several defending parties, some of whom answer and the other fails to do so, the court shall try the
case against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented.
(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. - A judgement rendered against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayer for nor award unliquidated damages.
(e) Where no defaults allowed. - If the defending party in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the Solicitor General or his
or her deputized public prosecutor, to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated.
Rule 10
AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
Section 1. Amendments in general. – Pleadings may be amended by adding or striking out an allegation or the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate
allegation or description in any other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner.
Section 2. Amendments as a matter of right. – A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within 10 calendar
days after it is served.
Section 3. Amendments by leave of court. – Except as provided in the next preceding Section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave shall be refused if it appears to the
court that the motion was made with intent to delay, or confer jurisdiction on the court, or the pleading stated no cause of action from the beginning which could be amended. Orders of the court upon the
matters provided in this Section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
Section 4. Formal amendments. – A defect in the designation of the parties and other clearly clerical or typographical errors may be summarily corrected by the court at any stage of the action, at its initiative or
on motion, provided no prejudice is caused thereby to the adverse party.
Section 5. No amendments necessary to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. – When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. No amendments of such pleadings deemed amended is necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence.
Section 6. Supplemental pleadings. – Upon a motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him or her to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth
transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the date of pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) calendar days from notice of the order
admitting the supplement pleading.
Section 7. Filling of amended pleadings. – When any pleading is amended, a new copy of the entire pleading, incorporating the amendments, which shall be indicated by appropriate marks, shall be filed.
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Section 8. Effect of amended pleadings. – An amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends. However, admissions in superseded pleadings may be offered in evidence against the pleader; and claims
or defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the amended pleading shall be deemed waived.
Rule 11
WHEN TO FILE RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS
Section 1. Answer to the complaint. - The defendant shall file his or her answer to the complaint within thirty (30) calendar days after service of summons, unless a different period is fixed by the court.
Section 2. Answer of a defendant foreign private juridical entity. - Where the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity and service of summons is made on the government official designated by law to receive
the same, the answer shall be filed within sixty (60) calendar days after receipt of summons by such entity.
Section 3. Answer to amended complaint. - When the plaintiff files an amended complaint as a matter of right, the defendant shall answer the same within thirty (30) calendar days after being served with a copy
thereof.
When its filling is not a matter of right, the defendant shall answer the amended complaint within fifteen (15) calendar days from notice of the order admitting the same. An answer earlier filed may serve as the
answer to the amended complaint if no new answer is filed.
This Rule shall apply to the answer to an amended counterclaim, amended cross-claim, amended third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, and amended complaint - in - intervention.
Section 4. Answer to counterclaim or cross-claim. - A counterclaim or cross-claim must be answered within twenty (20) calendar days from service.
Section 5. Answer to third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint. - The time to answer a third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint shall be governed by the same rule as the answer to the complaint.
Section 6. Reply. - A reply, if allowed under Section, Rule 6 hereof, may be filed within fifteen (15) calendar days from service of the pleading responded to.
Section 7. Answer to supplemental complaint. - A supplemental complaint may be answered within twenty (20) calendar days from notice of the order admitting the same, unless a different period is fixed by the
court. The answer to the complaint shall serve as the answer to the supplemental complaint if no new or supplemental answer is filed.
Section 8. Existing counterclaim or cross-claim. - A compulsory counterclaim or a cross-claim that a defending party has at the time he or she files his or her answer shall be contained therein.
Section 9. Counterclaim or cross-claim arising after answer. - A counterclaim or a cross-claim which either matured or was acquired by a party after serving his or her pleading may, with the permission of the
court, be presented as a counterclaim or a cross-claim by supplemental pleading before judgement.
Section 10. Omitted counterclaim or cross-claim. - When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim or a cross-claim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he or she may, by
leave of court, set up a counterclaim or cross-claim by amendment before judgement.
Section 11. Extension of time to file an answer. - A defendant may, for meritorious reasons, be granted an additional period of not more than thirty (30) calendar days to file an answer. A defendant is only
allowed to file for one (1) motion for extension of time to file an answer.
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A motion for extension to file any pleading, other than an answer, is prohibited and considered a mere scrap of paper. The Court, however, may allow any other pleading to be filed after the time fixed by these
Rules.
Rule 12
BILL OF PARTICULARS
Section 1. When applied for: purpose. - Before responding to a pleading, a party may move for a definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or
particularity to enable him or her properly to prepare his or her responsive pleading. If the pleading is a reply, the motion must be filed within ten (10) calendar days from service thereof. Such motion shall point
out the defects complained of, the paragraphs wherein they are contained, and the details desired.
it should not be couched in such general and uncertain terms as would make it difficult for the defendant to submit an intelligent responsive pleading to the complaint and to adequately prepare for trial.
A bill of particulars must inform the opposite party of the nature of the pleader’s cause of action or defense, and it must furnish the required items of the claim with reasonable fullness and precision;
It will be held sufficient if it fairly and substantially gives the opposite party the information to which he is entitled, as required by the terms of the application and of the order thereof;
It should be definite and specific and does not contain general allegations and conclusions;
It should be reasonably certain and as specific as the circumstances will allow.
As long as the complaint contains the essential elements of a cause of action, even though the allegations therein are vague and ambiguous, the remedy of the defendant is to ask the plaintiff for a bill of
particulars pointing out the defects complained of and the details desired.
As regard to period within which to file the motion for a bill of particulars, Sec. 1, Rule 12 should be read in conjunction with Sec. 1, Rule 11.
The phrase “before responding to a pleading” referred to in Sec. 1, Rule 12 specifically refers to the time frame referred to in Sec. 1 of Rule 11, i.e., within thirty (30) days after service of summons, or at any
time within the period fixed by the court to file answer.
Section 2. Action by the court. - Upon the filling of the motion, the clerk of court must immediately bring it to the attention of the court which may either deny or grant it outright, or allow the parties the
opportunity to be heard.
Section 3. Compliance with order. - If the motion is granted, either in whole or in part, the compliance therewith must be effected within ten (10) calendar days from the notice of the order, unless a different
period is fixed by the court. The bill of particulars or a more definite statement ordered by the court may be filed either in a separate or in an amended pleading, serving a copy thereof on the adverse party.
if motion for bill of particulars is granted, the bill of particulars or a more definite statement may be embodied in an amended complaint, and must be effected within ten (10) calendar days from notice of the
order, unless a different period is fixed by the court.
Section 4. Effect of non-compliance. - if the order is not obeyed, or in case of insufficient compliance therewith, the court may order the striking out of the pleading or the portions thereof to which the order was
directed, or make such other order as it deems just.
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Section 5. Stay of period to file responsive pleading. - After service of the bill of particulars or of a more definite pleading, or after notice of denial of his or her motion, the moving party may file his or her
responsive pleading within the period to which he or she was entitled at the time of filling his or her motion, which shall not be less than five (5) calendar days in any event.
Section 6. Bill a part of pleading. - A bill of particulars becomes part of the pleading for which it is intended.
Rule 13
FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS JUDGEMENTS AND OTHER PAPERS
Section 1. Coverage. - This Rule shall govern the filling of all pleadings, motions, and other court submissions, as well as their service, except for those which a different mode of service is prescribed.
Section 2. Filing and service, defined. - Filing is the act of submitting the pleading or other paper to the court.
Service is an act of providing party with a copy of the pleading or any other court submission. If the party has appeared by counsel, service upon such party shall be made upon his or her counsel, unless service
upon the party and the party’s counsel is order by the court. When one counsel appears for several parties, such counsel shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper served by the opposite side.
When several counsels appear for one party, such party shall be entitled to only one copy of any pleading or paper to be served upon the lead counsel if one is designated, or upon any one of them if there is no
designation of a lead counsel.
Section 3. Manner of filing. - The filing of pleadings and other court submissions shall be made by:
(a) Submitting personally the original thereof, plainly indicated as such, to the court;
(b) Sending them by registered mail;
(c) Sending them by accredited courier; or
(d) Transmitting them by electronic mail or other electronic means as may be authorized by the Court in places where the court is electronically equipped.
In the first case, the clerk of court shall endorse on the pleading the date and hour of filing. In the second and third cases, the date of the mailing of motions, pleadings and other court submissions, and
payments or deposits, as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt, shall be considered as the date of their filling, payment, or deposit in court. The envelope shall be attached to the
record of the case. In the fourth case, the date of electronic transmission shall be considered as the date of filing.
Section 4. Papers required to be filed and served. - Every judgement, resolution, order pleading subsequent to the complaint, written motion, notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgement or similar papers
shall be filed with the court, and served upon the parties affected.
Section 5. Modes of Services. - Pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgements, and other court submissions shall be served personally or by registered mail, accredited, courier, electronic mail, facsimile
transmission, other electronic means as may be authorized by the Court, or as provided for in international conventions to which the Philippines is a party.
Section 6. Personal Service. - Court submissions may be served by personal delivery of a copy to the party or to the party’s counsel, or to their authorized representatives named in the appropriate pleading or
motion, or by leaving it in his or her office with his or her clerk, or with a person having charge thereof. If no person is found in his or her office, or his or her office is not known, or he or she had no office, then
by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the party’s or counsel’s residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then resident therein.
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Section 7. Service by mail. - Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy in the post office, in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or to the party’s counsel at his or her office, if
known otherwise at his or her residence, if known, with postage fully pre-paid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) calendar days if undelivered. If no registry
service is available in the locality either of the sender or the addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail.
Section 8. Substitute service. - If service of pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders and other pages cannot be made, under the two preceding sections, the office and place of resident of the party or his
or her counsel being unknown, service may be made by delivering the copy to the clerk of court, with proof of failure to both personal service and service by mail. The service is complete at the time of such
delivery.
Section 9. Service by electronic means and facsimile. - Service by electronic means and facsimile shall be made if the party concerned consents to such mode of service.
Service by electronic means shall be made by sending an email to the party’s or counsel’s electronic mail address, or through other electronic means of transmission as the parties may agree on, or upon
discretion of the court.
Service by facsimile shall be made by sending a facsimile copy to the party’s or counsel’s given facsimile number.
Section 10. Presumptive service. - There shall be presumptive notice to a party of a court setting if such notice appears on the records to have been mailed at least twenty (20) calendar days prior to the
scheduled date of hearing and if the addressee is from within the same judicial region of the court where the case is pending, or at least thirty (30) calendar days if the addressee is from outside the judicial
region.
Section 11. Change of electronic mail address or facsimile number. - A party who changes his or her electronic mail address or facsimile number while the action is pending must promptly file, within five (5)
calendar days from such change, a notice of change of e-mail address or facsimile number with the court and serve the notice on all other parties.
Service through the electronic mail address or facsimile number of a party shall be presumed valid unless such party notifies the court of any changes,as aforementioned.
Section 12. Electronic mail and facsimile subject and title of pleadings and other documents. - The subject of electronic mail and facsimile must follow the prescribed format: case number, case titled and the
pleading, order or document title. The title of each electronically-filed or served pleading or other document, and each submission served by facsimile shall contain sufficient information to enable the court to
ascertain from the title: (a) the party or parties filing or serving the paper, (b) nature of the paper, (c) the party or parties against whom relief, if any, is sought, and (d) nature of the relief sought.
Section 13, Service of Judgement, Final Orders or Resolutions. - Judgements, final orders, or resolutions shall be served either personally or by registered mail. Upon ex parte motion of any party in the case, a
copy of the judgement, final order, or resolution may be delivered by accredited courier at the expense of such party. When a party summoned by publication has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final
orders or resolutions against him or her shall be served upon him or her also by means of publication at the expense of the prevailing party.
Section 14. Conventional service or filing of orders, pleadings and other documents. - notwithstanding the foregoing, the following orders, pleadings, and other documents must be served or filed personally or by
registered mail when allowed, and shall not be served or filed electronically, unless express permission is granted by the Court:
(a) Initiatory pleadings and initial responsive pleadings, such as an answer;
(b) Subpoenaed, protection orders and wits;
(c) Appendices and exhibits to motions, or other documents that are not readily amenable to electronic scanning may, at the option of the party filing such, be filed and served conventionally; and
(d) Sealed and confidential documents or records.
Section 15. Completeness of service. - Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of ten (10) calendar days after mailing, unless the court
otherwise provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or after five (5) calendar days from the date he or she received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date
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is earlier. Service by accredited courier is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or after at least two (2) attempts to deliver by the courier service or upon the expiration of five (5) calendar days after
the first attempt to deliver, whichever is earlier.
Electronic service is complete at the time of electronic transmission of the document, or when available, at the time that the electronic notification of service of the document is sent. Electronic service is not
effective or complete if the party serving the document learns that it did not reach the addressee or person to be served.
Service by facsimile transmission is complete upon receipt by the other party, as indicated in the facsimile transmission printout.
Section 16. Proof of filing. - The filing of a pleading or any court submission shall be proved by its existence in the record of the case.
(a) If the pleading or any other court submission is not in the record, but is claimed to have been filed personally, the filing shall be proven by the written or stamped acknowledgement of its filing by the
clerk of court on a copy of the pleading or court submission;
(b) If the pleading or any other court submission was filed by registered mail, the filing shall be proven by the registry of receipt and by the affidavit of the person who mailed it, containing a full statement
of the date and place of deposit of the mail in the post office in sealed envelope addressed to the court, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the
sender after ten (10) calendar days if not delivered.
(c) If the pleading or any other court submission was filed through an accredited courier service, the filling shall be proven by an affidavit of service of the person who brought the pleading or other
document to the service provider, together with the courier’s office receipt and document tracking number.
(d) If the pleading or any other court submission ws filed by electronic mail, the same shall be proven by an affidavit of electronic filing of the filling party accompanied by a paper copy of the pleading or
other document transmitter or a written or stamped acknowledgement of its filing by the clerk of court. If the paper copy sent by electronic mail was filed by retired mail, parargahb (b) of this Section
applies.
(e) If the pleading or any other court submission was filed through other authorized electronic means, the samee shall be proven by an affidavit of electronic filling of the filing party accompanied by a
copy of the electronic acknowledgement of its filing by the court.
Section 17. Proof of service. - Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of the party served, or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of
the date, place, and manner of service. If the service is made by:
(a) Ordinary mail. - Proof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing stating the facts showing compliance with Section 7 of this Rule.
(b) Registered mail. - Proof shall be made by the affidavit mentioned above and the registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof, the unclaimed letter
together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.
(c) Accredited courier service. - Proof shall be made by an affidavit of service executed by the person who brought the pleading or paper to the service provider, together with the courier’s official receipt
or document tracking number.
(d) Electronic mail, facsimile, or other authorized electronic means of transmission. - Proof shall be made by an affidavit of service executed by a person who sent the e-mail, facsimile, or other electronic
transmission, together with a printed proof of transmittal.
Section 18. Court-issued order and other documents. - The court may electronically serve orders and other documents to all the parties in the case which shall have the same effect and validity as provided
herein. A paper copy of the order or other document electronically served shall be retained and attached to the record of the case.
Section 19. Notice of lis pendens. - In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his or her answer, may record in
the office of the registry of deeds of the province in which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and the object of the action or
defense, and a description of the property in that province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be deemed to
have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against the parties designated by their real names.
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The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon the order of the court, after the proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.
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Rule 1-14

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Rule 1-14

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Part 1

The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as Amended

In fine, the docket fees paid by respondent were insufficient.

Thus, the Court rules as follows:

Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected.

The instant Appeal is hereby DISMISSED.

The elements of a cause of action are:

Article 44 of the Civil Code

The following are juridical persons:

(1) The State and its political subdivisions;

Pro forma parties

They are not exclusive but rather permissive.

Venue may be waived or made subject to stipulation.

PROCEDURE IN REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS

(1) the original civil complaint;

Section 5. Defenses. - Defenses may either be negative or affirmative.

The denial must be specific.

There are three types of specific denials, namely:

In Hibberd vs. Rohde, the Supreme Court pronounced that:

The affirmative defenses must be raised in the answer.

Actions on the Affirmative Defenses

A compulsory counterclaim set up in the answer is not an “initiatory” or similar pleading.

The initiatory pleading is the plaintiff’s complaint.

Determination of the Nature of Counterclaim

A cross-claim may also be filed against an original cross-claimant.

A reply is a response to the answer.

Their respective participation in the case shall be indicated.

(d) Date. - Every pleading shall be dated

Section 3. Signature and address. -

Thus, the defendant was declared in default.

A defaulted defendant is not actually thrown out of court.

It should be reasonably certain and as specific as the circumstances will allow.

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