TOUGHER SANCTIONS NOW: Putin's Delusional Quest for Empire

Author(s): Aurel Braun

Source: World Affairs, Vol. 177, No. 2 (JULY / AUGUST 2014), pp. 34-42
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/43556200
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 TOUGHER SANCTIONS NOW
Putin's Delusional Quest for Empire

Aurel Braun

T his spring, as Russia's puppet government in Crimea moved clo

forward two hours to coincide with Moscow time, Vladimir Putin seeme
intent on moving the historical clock backwards to the age of nin
teenth-century Russian imperialism. As the leader of an economica
weak and vulnerable country with a corrupt governing class, the Russ
president acted with brazen disregard for international law and nor
while the democratic West played a totally reactive role, and a feckless
at that. Ignoring very reluctantly introduced, and very limited, sanctio
Putin reciprocated with utter contempt for capitalist democracies, wh
he believes profits will always trump principle, and especially for Presid
Obama, who, in the Russian dictator's view, finds Western unity only
weakness, not in strength. But even though what appear to be irreversi
faits accomplis occur every day in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, it is n
too late for the West to seize the initiative, mobilize its vast economic
political capacity, and put Putin and the "yes" chorus of siloviki, who s
round and encourage him, truly on the defensive.
What is presently taking place in the region may seem self-contain

Aurel Braun is a visiting professor in the department of government at Harvard Universit

and a professor of political science and international relations at the University of Toront
His latest book is NATO-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century.

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 Aurel Braun

but there is actually a great deal at stake politically, econom

strategically for the international community. The window for
action, moreover, is quickly closing. The West needs to underst
and be willing to make certain painful sacrifices, if it is to bring in
sanctions against Putin and disabuse him of his delusional an
ous imperial ambitions. If the present course of weakly and inc
reacting to Russia's initiatives continues to be pursued, the w
ultimately even the Russian people, will very likely pay an imm
heavier price in terms of chaos and conflict in the future.

P art of figuring out how to deal with Putin involves unders

not only what he is doing but what he thinks he is doing. This i
of some speculation among world leaders. Angela Merkel, the
German chancellor, let it be known following conversations
during the initial crisis that she felt that he was out of touch wi
Similarly, former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has
ized Putin's current actions as delusionary. I myself have argued
that his domestic policies represent a kind of "political magical
combining the fantastic with the real (with the emphasis incre
the former) as a substitute for rational political and econom
resulting in a political order that is simultaneously repressive a
In the Crimea and Ukraine, Putin may be acting out of a certai
entation as a result of the definitive nature of the Maidan movement's

rejection of his Eurasian Union, which he felt he had secured by alli

with the now decamped Yanukovych government in Kyiv, and its st
embrace of the European Union's Eastern Partnership. Without Ukra
Putin has little hope of rebuilding the Russian Empire and once a
attaining superpower status.
It would be a mistake to think of his imperial dreams as backed b
master plan. Putin may be bumbling and reckless in some regard
he has revealed himself as a master at seizing the main chance. R
than carefully blueprinting a realistic Russian future, it seems that h
bought into former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov's dre
imitating the nineteenth-century Russian chancellor Alexander Go
kov's success in restoring Russia's great-power status following Mosc
defeat in the Crimean War. Gorchakov's adroit use of maneuver, and

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 TOUGHER SANCTIONS NOW

exploitation of differences among rivaling states on Russia

ever, occurred in a different world, and involved a subtl
invasion of the Crimea shows he has not bothered to cultivate. He wants

to rebuild what he considers nineteenth-century Russia's grandeur in

former Soviet space, but he doesn't want to acknowledge the obstacle
such a desire posed by Russia's failing economic monoculture, the
rosiveness of his country's endemic corruption, or the fact that, while
might manage to swallow Ukraine, actually digesting its political activ
would, ironically, deeply threaten his hold on power.

Russia's stark violation of Ukrainian sovereignty in annexing Crim

is not just a frontal offense against international law and norms b
long-term threat to the entire international system - from the regio
level to the global. Russia lacks the Soviet Union's universalistic ideolo
and vast military power, but even though this is not a new cold war, Pu
aggressiveness has profoundly dangerous implications. The invasion
a setback in the effort to control nuclear proliferation. Prime Minist
Stephen Harper of Canada, visiting the Ukrainian capital on March 22
correctly pointed out that Ukraine had agreed, in 1994, via the Budap
Memorandum, to give up its nuclear weapons in return for guarantee
its sovereignty by Russia and Western powers. In breaching the expli
Russian guarantee of Ukraine's territorial integrity (including Crim
Harper declared, "President Putin has provided a rationale for th
elsewhere who needed little more encouragement than that already fu
nished by pride or grievance to arm themselves to the teeth." It is do
ful that Russia would have dared invade Crimea had Kyiv retained
nuclear weapons, and equally unlikely that this lesson is lost on Iran a
other nuclear aspirants. Also, because of the weakness of the Western
especially the American response, the invasion of Crimea will become
object lesson for China and countries in the Middle East about what is
missible on the world stage. Coming at a time of reduced military bud
in Washington, Obama's vaunted pivot to Asia, designed to deal wit
increasingly assertive China, is beginning to look more like a comic p
ouette. Middle Eastern states from Israel to Saudi Arabia are likely to
forced to re-examine the credibility of American military commitmen
as are American allies everywhere.

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 Aurel Braun

By generating crisis in Ukraine, Putin has validated his st

"frozen conflicts," which he used in Transnistria, Nagorno-Kar
South Ossetia and Abkhazia to manipulate or threaten (or bot
va, Armenia, and Georgia, respectively. Moscow, for all intents
poses, has already annexed South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In Tr
an unrecognized breakaway region of Moldova run by a thug
torship protected by Russian troops, Moscow has been makin
threats - all under the rubric of protecting Russian-speakin
Russia's Ultranationalist deputy prime minister, Dmitry Rogozi
claimed on March 18th that Transnistria was under "blockade"
and warned Moldova against signing the Eastern Partnership
with the EU, which Moldova had initialed last fall. Much to NATO's
alarm, Transnistria's leadership has itself called for annexation to Russia.
Further, on May 9th, Victory Day for the Red Army against Nazi Germany,
Rogozin flew to Transnistria, threatened to wipe out fascism with "a bullet
in the head," and, after claiming that Romania and Ukraine had refused
his aircraft transit in their airspace (despite safely returning to Moscow
on May 10th), he threateningly tweeted that the next time he would "fly
a TU-160" bomber to Moldova's breakaway region. It is little wonder that
Romanian and Moldovan leaders have urged the EU to offer Moldova
membership to provide the country with security.
In the case of Armenia, Moscow was able to use the threat of withdraw-
ing its support regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, a largely Armenian enclave
within Azerbaijan, to induce the Armenians to abruptly switch policy, from
joining the Eastern Partnership with the EU to starting the process of
becoming part of the Kremlin-controlled Eurasian Union.
In sum, Moscow has been able to "unfreeze" these "frozen" conflicts at
will to pressure and bully various post-Soviet republics. All this has been
part of the larger Kremlin goal of re-creating a Russian-controlled empire
within the former Soviet space.

In their strong desire for a non-confrontational solution to Russian

aggression in Crimea, especially one that does not challenge Putin direct-
ly, a number of prominent Western analysts have increasingly talked about
federalizing or "Finlandizing" Ukraine. Leaving aside the rather dubious
moral and historical logic of comparing Ukraine to Finland (Helsinki

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 TOUGHER SANCTIONS NOW

entered the war against Stalin on June 26, 1941 - four day
many invaded the Soviet Union - as a co-belligerent), "Fin
not likely to work in Ukraine for two key reasons.
First, Ukraine, a country of some forty-four million
Crimea) , an innocent victim of aggression, has clearly ch
ization and modernization, which many of its citizens pai
lives at the Maidan. The Kremlin, playing on the fears
speakers in eastern and southern Ukraine, cannot delete t
regardless of its intensive propaganda and provocations. I
unlikely that the people of Ukraine, therefore, would
tional humiliation of the censorship and self-censorship t
to live with following Helsinki's coerced signing of th
Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance" with t
in 1948, which involved banning books and movies th
anti-Soviet. More importantly, despite its political hum
enjoyed a very large degree of economic and legal freedom
lin would be unlikely to tolerate in a "Finlandized" Ukrain
crisis is not about Ukraine joining NATO, a move for w
great public demand. Rather it is about the possibility th
reject integration into the Eurasian Union, which is key
sies of rebuilding a Russian Empire. He could not accep
of a successful, Europeanized Ukraine, prosperous and
rule of law, where a "Ukraine virus" might be bred that
"infect" Russia. Ukrainian federalism would also be a false solution. Put

aside for the moment Russia's own constitutional arrangement,

resembles Western federalism in form only. In the case of Ukraine,
would use federalism as a justification for new legal pressures and
to separate and then annex additional regions, or to destabilize U
as a whole to force Kyiv to rejoin Russia. Though Putin has acted
mentally so far, there is little doubt about his ultimate goal of not o
economic but also the full political integration of Ukraine into a "G
Russia." During his triumphalist visit to Crimea on May 9th, for ins
he called the illegal annexation of that territory "... affirming fide
the historical truth and the memory of our ancestors." It is also not
thy that Putin has taken to calling southern and eastern Ukraine
imperial Russian term, Novorossiya (New Russia) .

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 Aurel Braun

European leaders, who on March 6th threatened to impose

nomic sanctions if Moscow engages in "further steps to destab
ation in Ukraine," certainly didn't follow through with their
Russia invaded and annexed Crimea. These same leaders also u
ignored the Kremlin's ongoing - beginning with Obama's
2009 - and increasingly bold, and under international law illi
that it had a right to protect Russians living in former Sovi
that Moscow had made this part of Russian military doctrine
had also ignored threats, going back to 2013, that Putin leve
it signed the Eastern Partnership with the EU. Adding to W
fectiveness, Obama, during the current crisis, bizarrely lect
their telephone conversations that he was "on the wrong side o
which the Russian leader might well have reflected to himself, C
"Depends on what your definition of 'history' is." In contras
and hand-wringing in the West, Putin seems not only resolut
ingly powerful within Russia. His popularity, fueled by seemi
conquest and relentless media manipulation, reached eighty-tw
the end of April 2014, just below the high of eighty-five perc
2008 (after which it fell precipitously), according to polling
pendent Levada Center. As with much else in Russia, howeve
appearance here do not necessarily coincide. Putin's popularit
likely to be ephemeral, given that chauvinism is subject to its
diminishing returns. There have been some significant de
against his policy in Ukraine already, although they are und
the West, and we should not forget the mass protests he face
2012. The Russian economy continues to do poorly and is stu
low base, and Russia's association with various nefarious and
torships is hardly likely to increase Moscow's prestige in the w
As a result, the West has many options beyond the reactive
that has characterized its approach to the crisis thus far. But
into the game, it needs to take the initiative both politically
cally. Soft power alone has not deterred Russia, and neither h
sanctions it has imposed. This is why the West has to move
that will be a form of hard power, even though they will not
International political prestige is central to Putin in h
Russian restoration. Significant international ostracism, a
the wrist slaps employed thus far, would be a painful blow

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 TOUGHER SANCTIONS NOW

this regard, the West has many options. Chancellor Me

stated, for instance, that "at the moment, the G8 doesn't
referring to the Group of 8's temporary boycott of Russ
It is encouraging that Germany, which conducts a great d
Russia and has a considerable degree of dependence on
is indicating that it is prepared to make important sacrif
more significant for Russia to be formally expelled from
Steps should also be taken at the UN to try to expel Ru
Human Rights Council. There are mechanisms for doing t
not successful the West would be putting Putin on the def
the United States and its allies should push for additional
resolutions by the Security Council to force Russia to use
tinue to have China abstain. Though the immediate impac
at the United Nations may be limited, the cumulative eff
both humble Russia and keep it off balance.
So far though, any suggestion that Putin has blinked in
accepted the results of the Ukraine presidential election is
mature; it goes against the evidence that he has maintain
goals regarding Ukraine, even if his most recent tactics,
gradualist approach. He continues to insist on "federali
which in the current Russian imperialist lexicon, as noted
annexation slice by slice, and has maintained Moscow's
pressure on Kyiv. Seminally, the Kremlin continues its large
presence in eastern Ukraine and in some ways has enha
in more professional and disciplined forces like the com
Vostok Battalion to bring order to the secessionists and t
strengthen Moscow's control in key parts of the region.
Further, the extremely limited sanctions that the Wes
on Russia seem to have little ill effect on Moscow's other activities. Putin

was invited by President François Hollande to attend the June D-Day c

memoration in Normandy and dine with him at the Elysée Palace. Fra
despite objections from its allies, has indicated that it intends to deli
the two advanced $1.3 billion helicopter carriers to the Russian navy,
contracted. At the St. Petersburg International Economic forum in M
major Western oil companies, including America's Exxon Mobil, sat do
with Russian oil giant Rosnefťs Western-sanctioned chief executive, I
Sechin, and virtually fell over themselves trying to indicate that they
continue or even enhance their business ties with Russia. BP, which alr

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 Aurel Braun

has a close to twenty percent stake in Rosneft, signed a major ag

jointly explore hard-to-recover oil in Russia with its Russian par
Petersburg, BP CEO Bob Dudley declared that "We have a respon
stand with our [Russian] partners in difficult times," while Chr
Margerie from France's Total, which reached a deal with Russia
proclaimed, "My message to Russia is simple - business as usual."
Moscow in May also reached the largest energy export deal in his
it signed a $400 billion agreement to supply China with natural
at the end of May, Putin and the leaders of Kazakhstan and Bel
a broad customs union, the Eurasian Economic Union, which,
Russia's Eurasianism, is meant to bring the economies of the tw
states under Moscow's control. Armenia and Kyrgyzstan are also
come under Moscow's full tutelage as they face unrelenting pres
the Kremlin. Consequently, President Obama's suggestion, in
foreign policy speech at West Point on May 28th, that the curren
and his administration's ability to shape world opinion "helped is
sia right away" hardly rises above the risible.
Economic sanctions, however, can have a real impact on Russ
omy, as it is largely one-dimensional, and very different from t
Soviet system. There are now vast Russian assets abroad, a stock
Moscow, Russian sovereign bonds, and a huge number of oligarc
tied to Putin. The Russian banking system functions within th
tional one, and for all the fear generated by the possibility that
off the gas valves, Russia is even more dependent on energy ex
Europe is on such imports.
For the West to take the initiative, given the long-term cost
checking Russia's dangerous imperial delusions, economic sanc
to be applied massively and decisively. Swedish economist Ande
therefore, is quite correct about the desirability of a Powell Do
approach - shock and awe - to economic sanctions against Putin
Sanctions against hundreds of oligarchs would have an en
disruptive effect not only on those close to the Russian preside
the vulnerable Russian economy itself. It would greatly dampen
enthusiasm for Russian foreign adventurism as the costs begin
Comprehensive banking and commercial sanctions would caus
dous disruption and some pain not only for the jet-setting rich
ordinary Russians. Assessments by Bloomberg, for instance, ha
just how grave the risk gauges for Russia are, particularly in ter

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 TOUGHER SANCTIONS NOW

values, sovereign funds, and ruble volatility, among other

Debt to Equity Hit on Crimea Seizure," available at Bloom
Energy is another pivotal area where the West could
European dependence on Russian energy has been dim
even German leaders have indicated their readiness, under certain cir-
cumstances, to impose sanctions despite their large reliance on Russia
for energy imports. The West has also taken steps to be able to supply
more-vulnerable states in Europe by developing the capacity to reverse
flows in pipelines. The Europeans need to sharply increase such a capac-
ity and spread the burden. The US can also help by signaling that in the
future it will bring its vast energy resources to bear by authorizing the
future sale of liquefied natural gas to Europe on a significant scale, and
by approving the Keystone Pipeline. Further, the West should abandon
once and for all the Russian pipeline project South Stream, which would
transport Russian natural gas through the Black Sea to Bulgaria and then
to Greece, Italy, and Austria, and focus all its efforts on reviving its rival,
the moribund Nabucco pipeline, which would bring natural gas from the
Central Asian republics to the European states.
The global energy picture is changing rapidly thanks to vast new dis-
coveries of natural gas in shale and additional sources of offshore oil in
various parts of the world. Russia knows that its ability to use energy black-
mail and pipeline diplomacy is diminishing. The West should indicate, in
no uncertain terms, that it knows this too, and that it will no longer truckle
to Putin's clumsy bullying.
The West's willful helplessness in the face of Russian aggression is not
only incomprehensible but, if Ukraine is sacrificed, will be historically
unforgivable. The West has the capacity to act effectively to stop and even
reverse Russia's aggression. But for the West to be successful here it also
needs to appreciate that in dealing with Russia, "soft" and "hard" power
cannot be segregated or confused with one another. Soft power alone is
like having cream in the morning without the coffee. There is no reason
for the West to be reactive and defeatist. O

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