Uyghur Extensions Wave 2 - DDI 2016 BAM

Uyghur Affs—BAM Lab
BAM lab—cards in the policy version and the K version may be

interchangeable, but might have tensions—make sure to read before you play
yourself.
The “Consulate” Aff and “Political Prisoners” Affs have distinct plan texts
and solvency mechanisms to better solve their impact claims.
Consulate Aff
1AC—US Cred
Contention 1: Credibility
US cred now because of gitmo releases of Uyghurs—but the plan is key to
keep up our global image
Kadeer 13 (Rebiya Kadeer. head of the World Uyghur Congress and a prominent human rights advocate for the Uyghur
people. Interpreted by Alim Seytoff, President of the Uyghur American Association. Posted by Julie Poucher Harbin, Editor @
ISLAMiCommentary. American Grand Strategy Should Care About the Uyghurs. 3-12-13. DOA: 7-14-16
http://islamicommentary.org/2013/03/rebiya-kadeer-american-grand-strategy-should-care-about-the-uyghurs/ )
From the outset of his administration, President Obama took a stance toward foreign relations that has promoted the U.S. as a multi-
lateral interlocutor in seeking solutions to global issues. After
years of mistrust, the U.S. made a bold
rapprochement with Muslims in President Obama’s Cairo speech delivered in June 2009. The speech gave
hope to millions of oppressed peoples, especially Muslims, across the globe that the United States would stand
firm against the repression of Muslims by authoritarian regimes . In his speech, President Obama referred to
the silence over the slaughter of Muslims in Bosnia and Darfur as “a stain on our collective consciences.” President Obama’s
rapprochement with Muslims could take on no better form than to speak out and act on
behalf of the Uyghur people. The non-refoulement of Uyghurs in Guantánamo to China
enhanced U.S. credibility among not only Uyghurs, but also Turkic peoples and the wider
Muslim world. The saying goes that actions speak louder than words, and in this case the demonstrated
protection of Uyghurs from China by the U.S. government was a shining example of American
concern for all religious and ethnic groups in the world. Uyghur refugees across Asia, including countries where U.S. influence can
be leveraged, have been forcibly returned to China to uncertain fates, under the pressure of the Chinese government. This has
happened mostly notably in Cambodia, Malaysia and Kazakhstan and given the right diplomatic pressure should never occur again.
The erosion of US credibility has crushed the norms-based global order- this
has enabled Russian expansion
RIIA 15 (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, an independent policy institute based in London,
“Challenges to the Rules-Based International Order”, Session paper submitted for the Chatham House
London Conference 2015, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/media_wysiwyg/London
%20Conference%202015%20-%20Background%20Paper%20-%20Session%20One.pdf)
The international order established by the victorious allies after the Second World War has been remarkably
enduring. The framework of liberal political and economic rules, embodied in a network of international
organizations and regulations, and shaped and enforced by the most powerful nations, both fixed the problems that
had caused the war and proved resilient enough to guide the world into an entirely new era. But given its
antique origins, it is not surprising that this order now seems increasingly under pressure. Challenges are coming
from rising or revanchist states; from unhappy and distrustful electorates; from rapid and widespread technological change; and indeed
from the economic and fiscal turmoil generated by the liberal international economic order itself.In general these
challenges
seem serious rather than catastrophic. There is little coherence or common interest among the
challengers, except for discontent with aspects of the current order, and therefore little coordination. There is
no sign of any integrated international opposition movement which might unite the discontented and advocate an alternative system,
leading to the sort of ideological struggle that marked the last century. And, despite continuing conflicts around the world, war
remains an exceptional and disreputable activity rather than, as in much of the past, a proper and attractive tool of international dispute
resolution.These are small mercies. The danger to the current order comes not from a single deathblow from a rival
system, but from its gradual weakening in the face of widespread dissatisfaction among those it
needs to serve. If the system is to survive, its weaknesses must be recognized and resolved, and it must adapt better and faster to
the changing international situation.Three interconnected problems must be resolved. The first is the problem of legitimacy. For a
system based on rules to have effect, these rules must be visibly observed by their principal
and most powerful advocates. In this respect, the decision by the George W. Bush administration to invade Iraq
in 2003 under a contested UN authorization continues to cast a long shadow over America’s
claim to be the principal defender of a rules-based international system. Questioning the
legitimacy of US leadership has not eased under Barack Obama, despite his more multilateral approach to
problem-solving and reticence in using overt military force. The failure to close the Guantanamo Bay detention facility; the Senate
report on the use of torture under the previous administration; the continued use of presidential authority under ‘war on terrorism’
directives to carry out lethal drone strikes in the Middle East and Pakistan; and the exposure by Edward Snowden of the way US
intelligence services used the dominance of US technology companies over the internet to carry out espionage – all have left the
United States vulnerable to the accusation that it is as selective as any country about when it does and does not abide by the
international norms and rules that it expects of others.The danger today is that this
questioning of US global leadership
has opened the space for other countries to pursue a ‘might is right’ approach to their own
policy priorities. Russia has annexed Crimea in violation of commitments to the Budapest Memorandum, has
intervened directly in the conflict in Ukraine, and has laid out a doctrine that brazenly
demands recognition of a Russian sphere of influence around its neighbourhood. The Chinese
leadership is taking steps to turn its contested claims over islands in the South China and
East China seas into a fait accompli. And regional powers in the Middle East, concerned about the current and future
US administrations responding to the post-Iraq experience by being more selective in their support for traditional allies, are taking the
preservation of their security into their own hands. The
question arises, therefore, whether the post-Second World
War institutions and rules can survive these challenges to US global leadership.
Russian aggression risks miscalc and WW3

Fisher ‘15 (Max, Journalist for Vox, Former editor of The Atlantic and Journalist at the Washington Post, “US troops just
paraded along the Russian border. Is that as insane as it sounds?” Feb 26 2015, http://www.vox.com/2015/2/26/8109445/estonia-
russia-army)
Putin does not want World War Three, though, so he's not going to simply invade Estonia. What's more
plausible, and in many ways scarier, is the possibility that he could attempt smaller and more indirect
provocations of the sort he deployed at first in Ukraine. Indeed, shortly after Obama's speech there, a handful of Russian agents
crossed the border and kidnapped an Estonian state security officer. It was not an act of overt war, it certainly seemed like a
provocation intended to signal Moscow's willingness and desire to bully its Baltic neighbors. It's not difficult to imagine how Putin
could follow it up with a more provocative act, then another, then another, until
the US felt some sort of uncrossable
line had been crossed and felt compelled to respond militarily. The core danger is not that Russia
would deliberately start a war. It's that Russia and the US might have different understandings of
where the bar is for what would trigger war. A fear you hear expressed by some analysts is that Russia believes
the US has set that bar very high — that Russia could get pretty aggressive with Estonia without an triggering a retaliation
— but that the US has in fact set it quite low. This mismatch in perceptions is really dangerous,
because it means Putin could accidentally trigger war by misreading American intentions . Parading a
bunch of US Army armored vehicles within sight of the Russian border is meant to convey to Moscow that the US is so serious about
defending Estonia that it would consider Russia stirring up trouble even in this little border town to be a trigger for war. To be clear,
this is distinct from the popular and wrongheaded conservative argument that Obama is emboldening America's enemies by being
insufficiently tough or by not bombing enough countries. The concern is not that Obama is weak (if anything, it's the strength of his
commitment to deterrence in Estonia that is coming into play). Rather, the
concern is that the US and Russia do not
have the same understanding of where the US draws the line for war. Obama is trying to make
that line as clear as possible to Putin — and prevent it from getting crossed.
Norms and institution-based cooperation is independently key to manage

existential threats and preserve great power stability
Graeme P. Herd 10, Head of the International Security Programme, Co-Director of the
International Training Course in Security Policy, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2010, “Great
Powers: Towards a “cooperative competitive” future world order paradigm?,” in Great Powers
and Strategic Stability in the 21st Century, p. 197-198
Given the absence of immediate hegemonic challengers to the US (or a global strategic catastrophe that could
trigger US precipitous decline), and the need to cooperate to address pressing strategic threats - the real
question is what will be the nature of relations between these Great Powers ? Will global order be
characterized as a predictable interdependent one-world system , in which shared strategic threats
create interest-based incentives and functional benefits which drive cooperation between Great Powers? This
pathway would be evidenced by the emergence of a global security agenda based on nascent similarity
across national policy agendas . In addition. Great Powers would seek to cooperate by strengthening
multilateral partnerships in institutions (such as the UN, G20 and regional variants), regimes (e.g.,
arms control, climate and trade), and shared global norms, including international law . Alternatively, Great
Powers may rely less on institutions, regimes and shared norms, and more on increasing their
order-producing managerial role through geopolitical-bloc formation within their near neighborhoods. Under
such circumstances, a re-division of the world into a competing mercantilist nineteenth-century
regional order emerges 17 World order would be characterized more by hierarchy and balance of power
and zero-sum principles than by interdependence. Relative power shifts that allow a return to multipolarity - with three or
more evenly matched powers - occur gradually. The transition from a bipolar in the Cold War to a unipolar moment in the post-Cold
War has been crowned, according to Haass, by an era of non-polarity, where power is diffuse — "a world dominated not by one or
two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power"18 Multilateralism is on the
rise, characterized by a combination of stales and international organizations, both influential and talking shops, formal and informal
("multilateralism light"). A dual system of global governance has evolved. An embryonic division of labor emerges, as groups with no
formal rules or permanent structures coordinate policies and immediate reactions to crises, while formal treaty-based institutions then
legitimize the results.'9 As powerfully advocated by Wolfgang Schauble: Global cooperation is the only way to
master the new, asymmetric global challenges of the twenty-first century. No nation can manage these tasks on its
own, nor can the entire international community do so without the help of non-state, civil society actors. We must work together to
find appropriate security policy responses to the realities of the twenty-first century.20 Highlighting the emergence of what he terms
an "interpolar" world - defined as "multipolarity in an age of interdependence" — Grevi suggests that managing existential
interdependence in an unstable multipolar world is the key.21 Such complex
interdependence generates shared
interest in cooperative solutions, meanwhile driving convergence, consensus and accommodation
between Great Powers.22 As a result, the multilateral system is being adjusted to reflect the realities
of a global age - the rise of emerging powers and relative decline of the West : "The new priority is to
maintain a complex balance between multiple states."23 The G20 meeting in London in April 2009 suggested that great and rising
powers will reform global financial architecture so that it regulates and supervises global markets in a more participative, transparent
and responsive manner: all countries have contributed to the crisis; all will be involved in the solution.24
Current US strategy of containing China fails; engagement with

countries on China’s periphery is key to effective containment –
building trust from Uyghurs is a first step
Tellis, Ashley J. "Balancing Without Containment: A U.S. Strategy For Confronting China's Rise." Washington Quarterly
36.4 (2013): 109-124. Academic Search Complete. Retrieved from http://ry2ue4ek7d.search.serialssolutions.com/?
ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info%3Asid
%2Fsummon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx
%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Balancing+without+Containment%3A+A+U.S.+Strategy+for+Confronting+China
%27s+Rise&rft.jtitle=The+Washington+Quarterly&rft.au=Tellis%2C+Ashley+J&rft.date=2013-10-01&rft.issn=0163-
660X&rft.eissn=1530-9177&rft.volume=36&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=109&rft.epage=124&paramdict=en-US July 12 CS
China’s rise constitutes the most serious geopolitical challenge facing the United States today. On
current trends, China could—many say will—develop a national economy larger than that of the
United States as early as the end of this decade, at least when measured in purchasing power
parity terms.1 China’s national ambitions too are clear: at the very least, Beijing seeks to recover
the centrality it enjoyed in Asian geopolitics until the coming of colonialism.2 Its economic
renaissance since the 1980s has now positioned it to play a major global role that was simply
unimaginable some thirty years ago. With its extraordinary military modernization program,
Beijing has also made tremendous strides toward holding at risk the United States’ forward-
deployed and forward-operating forces in the western Pacific, thereby raising the costs of
implementing U.S. security guarantees to its partners in the region. Its unique characteristics—
being a continental-sized power, possessing a gigantic and technologically improving economy,
having a strategically advantageous location, and rapidly acquiring formidable military
capabilities—add up quickly to make China a consequential rival to the United States, even if it
differs from previous challengers in character, aims, and ambitions. China’s rise, which is but
part and parcel of the larger rise of Asia, has been engendered in great measure by the permissive
benefits of U.S. hegemony since World War II. The U.S.-backed guarantee of open global
commons, especially in the Asia– Pacific region, the creation of stable multilateral exchange
arrangements, and the maintenance of the dollar as an international reserve currency have all
together produced inordinate gains for regional actors and the international economy alike. As a
result, China could actually grow not by the autarkic processes that drove the rise of previous
great powers, but by exploiting the interdependence arising from deliberate U.S. investments in
producing an open international trading system.3 The structural contradiction between the United
States and China is thus defined by the awkward reality that Washington sustains an international
economic order that, although producing great benefits for itself and others, simultaneously fuels
the growth of what could be its most significant geopolitical antagonist over time. Shorn of all
subtlety, Beijing’s rise poses a special problem for U.S. interests because it threatens a
possible power transition at the core of the global system. Preserving American preeminence
and by extension the current global system itself, accordingly, remains the central task for U.S.
policymakers today. This will prove difficult: China’s deep integration with the international
economy, to include the United States, implies that the obvious containment strategies that
worked so effectively vis-a`-vis the preceding rival, the Soviet Union, are unlikely to be
successfully replicated this time around. Forget Containment, not Balancing Containing China—
defined as attempting to suppress its growth by isolating Beijing from its neighbors and the world
—cannot work, for several reasons. For one thing, China has deep economic ties with the
United States and the international community, and all countries enmeshed in these
economic interactions profit from them—even if China accrues greater gains than most. No
state, therefore, would willingly forego its own absolute gains deriving from trade with China.
Even though China’s neighbors in particular recognize that they are contributing to growing
Chinese power, and consequently are most anxious about Beijing’s expanding military
capabilities, they are reluctant to limit their trading relations with China so long as Beijing
does not present an intolerable danger to them and so long as non-military instruments,
such as diplomatic engagement and regional institutions, continue to offer some hope of
constraining China peacefully. China’s incipient centrality has thus resulted in its neighbors
seeking to avoid any stark choices between China and the United States—a preference that could
persist even in the event of conflict between these two powers. A Cold War-style containment
strategy is therefore likely to find little traction with key Asian states, and could in fact backfire if
they are presented with the intolerable binary of aligning with either Washington or Beijing. The
net result of globalization, therefore, is that rising, more powerful states, such as China, can
exploit the phenomenon of interdependence to increase their power and autonomy, even as their
weaker partners become more reluctant to cut off their trading ties for fear of losing out in
absolute terms. This dynamic will persist so long as U.S. military might suffices to protect the
Asian security system, a system that U.S. power has long underwritten. It is not clear, however,
whether this will continue to be the case once Beijing acquires the capacity to The U.S. benefits
from its ties to China in absolute terms, but loses in relative terms. Ashley J. Tellis 110 THE
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & FALL 2013 decisively undermine Washington’s extended
deterrence capabilities in the Asian theater. Further complicating matters, the strong Sino–U.S.
trading relationship (one that was completely absent between the United States and the Soviet
Union during their rivalry’s heyday), China’s emerging role as an important U.S. creditor,
and the political power of key U.S. constituencies that profit from strong ties with China all
combine to frustrate any attempt by the United States to restrain the growth of Chinese
capabilities by cutting off Beijing’s economic links with itself or with other states. The
United States thus finds itself locked in a conundrum: it is tied to China through dense economic
links that have value because of their absolute gains, but it is threatened by the fact that the
relative gains from this relationship are arguably greater for Beijing and are increasingly used to
build up Chinese military forces in a way that threatens the security of the United States and its
closest Asian allies. This problem has no easy solutions. What alone is certain is that containment
is infeasible today, even if it may be most needed as a device for limiting Chinese power. This is
why balancing becomes essential—China’s rising power cannot go unchecked. Even if
Beijing’s intentions are peaceful today, there is no assurance that they will remain so in
perpetuity. China’s rapid growth has already elevated regional anxieties because of the
dramatic shifts in the local “correlation of forces”; it has weakened the credibility of U.S.
security guarantees to the littoral states, thanks to its ability to produce strategic
instruments capable of inflicting great damage on U.S. military assets deployed around the
Indo–Pacific; and it has threatened the traditional U.S. command of the commons as a result
of its growing capacity to deny the United States unfettered use of the seas, space,
cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum. These realities combine to generate a serious
and deepening challenge to U.S. power projection in Asia and, by extended implication, to U.S.
primacy itself. If the United States is to protect its global position amidst these challenges, it
cannot afford not to balance China, even if it must implement this response subtly and politely,
garbed in the language of “strategic partnership.” Given these circumstances, the United States
must pursue a balancing strategy of the kind that has not been attempted before. The core
objective must be to protect, and wherever possible to expand, the extant U.S. advantages in
relative power, but without incorporating those components that would spell containment.
These components include cutting China’s access to the global trading regime; integrating
China’s neighbors into a unified alliance system against Beijing; developing collective
defense strategies against China; and pursuing an ideological campaign aimed at
delegitimizing the Chinese state and its governing regime. Safeguarding U.S. hegemony
requires instead a four-pronged strategy A trading relationship was completely absent between
the United States and the Soviet Union. If the U.S. is to protect its global position, it cannot
afford not to balance China. Balancing without Containment: A U.S. Strategy for Confronting
China’s Rise THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & FALL 2013 111 that Washington must
pursue concertedly in order to balance against growing Chinese power: first, it must support the
rise of other Asian powers located along China’s periphery; second, it must deepen
globalization in specific ways to procure enhanced gains for itself and its friends; third, it must
invest in preserving its extant military superiority; and, finally, it must revitalize the U.S.
economy to sustain its dominance in the new leading sectors of the global economy. Don’t Push
China Down, Raise Others Up First initiated by President George W. Bush but now continued
purposefully by Barack Obama, the first prong of the evolving U.S. strategy for balancing Beijing
aims not at keeping China down, but raising others up—or, to put it differently, to propel the
growth of other nations along China’s periphery as a way of “weaving the net” that produces a
“moderating effect on [Chinese] behavior.”4 The logic of the strategy is simple and aptly suited
to present circumstances. If the consequential states abutting China—such as Japan, India,
Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia, and Australia, among others—can be aided by U.S. power to
realize their strategic potential and to increase their mutual cooperation while deepening their
partnership with the United States, the net effect would be to create objective constraints that
limit the misuse of Chinese power in Asia. These checks would not materialize because the
Asian partners necessarily bandwagon with the United States or even champion all its policies
vis-a`-vis Beijing. Rather, they would be produced by the growing capabilities of these key
nations—aided by the United States—and their increased incentives for collaboration both among
themselves and with Washington. These elements, driven by the regional actors’ own
concerns about China’s increasing power, would position the key Asian states in ways
fundamentally congruent with U.S. interests, especially the core objective of restraining the
potential for Chinese aggressiveness, while at the same time providing “the necessary cushion
that prevents [their] tightened commercial interdependence [with China] from disrupting the
delicate balance between economic gains and geopolitical risks.”5 Such a regional equilibrium
offers the potential for balancing China—and inducing good behavior on the part of Beijing
—without any necessity for containment, let alone conflict. The success of this approach,
however, hinges on the ability of the United States to pay consistent attention to the critical states
abutting China, while at the same time keeping diplomatic relations with Beijing on an even
keel.6 Consequently, the United States (and its friends) ought to engage China at multiple levels,
both bilaterally and multilaterally, avoiding single-issue politics whenever possible.
Disagreement over issues like human rights, political freedoms, the treatment of minorities,
nonproliferation, or military modernization should be handled tactfully. Such an approach
does not require the West to paper over what may be troublesome Chinese domestic, foreign, or
strategic policies, nor to shy away from visible and public confrontations if egregious Chinese
lapses demand it, but rather to ensure that all such responses are sensitive to context,
proportionality, and effectiveness. Put simply, the goal of deepened political engagement with
China ought to be encouraging it to stay committed to peaceful development both within and
without. To the degree that such engagement requires creating new inter-societal linkages or new
fora for bilateral and regional cooperation, these avenues should be explored. Ashley J. Tellis 112
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & FALL 2013 To their credit, recent U.S. administrations
have more or less successfully pursued this emphasis on sustaining productive relations
with China. Such a focus, however, cannot be allowed to eclipse—as it often does in
Washington—the equally vital objective of strengthening U.S. ties with the key power
centers located along China’s immediate and extended outskirts. Since 2001, for example, the
United States has made a special effort to transform its ties with India, the other rising Asian
giant whose large continental size, great economic and demographic potential, significant military
capabilities, and sturdy commitment to democracy—not to mention its own ongoing rivalry with
China—make it a particularly attractive partner for Washington. This rapprochement with India
should extend to other critical Southeast Asian states. Such an effort will require considerable
political attention at high levels in Washington—and a remarkable degree of consistency that in
the past has often been the exception, not the norm. The endeavor is admittedly challenging: the
number of states that Washington must engage successfully is large; the partners themselves are
remarkably diverse in national capabilities and differ in alliance status; they each pursue varying
strategic objectives; and their capacity to respond to U.S. overtures is dissimilar as well. Because
they are all individually weaker than China, they are at times easy to overlook;
nevertheless, their role cannot go underestimated. For that reason, U.S. policymakers
should continually strengthen the national power of these littoral entities even when they
cannot or will not reciprocate U.S. initiatives as fulsomely as may be desired. And if these
nations do reach their strategic potential as a result of preferential U.S. assistance, they
would effectively serve as a powerful constraint on China’s freedom of action in Asia. This
would not only limit Beijing’s capacity to dominate important centers of the global
economy, but would bring China’s entire outer periphery under the influence of nations
friendly to the United States. Thus, U.S. hegemony would gain another, more local level of
protection—and in so doing will buttress U.S. primacy for longer, and more cheaply, compared
to many other alternatives. This approach generates a positive converse as well. If U.S. assistance
strengthens the regional powers, their incentives to expand economic interdependence with China
would grow; they would have no reason to fear that the material gains accruing to Beijing could
be used to threaten their security. The persistence of such a positive-sum game all around, then,
mitigates interstate rivalry and its potential for undermining larger gains in prosperity. The
strategy of nurturing the growth of major powers along the Asian periphery in order to
balance China without containing it, therefore, provides the regional system with the best of
both worlds: an opportunity to limit Beijing’s capacity for malevolence without sacrificing
the common prosperity arising from trade and interdependence.
Hegemonic decline of the US creates instability and mistrust, increasing

risk of war
Bresler, Robert J. 2016 (a Penn State Harrisburg professor emeritus of public policy). “Obama-
led US withdrawal has destabilized the world.” Retrieved from
http://lancasteronline.com/opinion/columnists/obama-led-us-withdrawal-has-destabilized-the-
world/article_1c73c828-19d4-11e5-ab00-d32898937e9a.html July 16 // DDI - CS
American leadership need not mean involvement in endless wars. Past history gives us
examples. The Marshall Plan allowed worn-torn allied governments to provide their people with political stability and
economic development. NATO was an effort to build Western European unity, end the quarrels that had produced two world wars,
and deter Soviet aggression. The United Nations, disappointing in many ways, was a vehicle for broad international efforts
against disease, illiteracy and regional wars. The International Monetary Fund, World Bank and the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs were designed to facilitate international trade, prevent currency wars and
assist in economic development. These initiatives prevented another great power war, achieved a
large degree of European reconciliation, and eased the transition for post-colonial countries
in Africa and Asia. None would have happened without strong and persistent American
leadership. The U.S. negotiated a series of defense treaties with more than 35 nations,
designed to deter aggression, that also eased their burden of self-defense and allowed them
to place more resources into the reconstruction of their economies. In the Middle East, the
Arab States and Israel saw the U.S. as an honest broker, assisting in the negotiation of peace
treaties between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan . During the Obama administration
there has been a steady American retreat from world leadership. NATO is far less effective.
Allies such as Israel, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, the Baltic States and Iraq are no longer confident of
American support. Hence, China, Russia and Iran are asserting hegemonic claims. The
world is now torn by devolution and fractionalization. The forces of global and regional
cooperation are in disrepair. The United Nations stands helpless against Russian aggression,
civil war in Syria and Libya and atrocities by the Islamic State across the Middle East and North Africa;
the European Union is facing possible revolts and threats of secession by the United
Kingdom and Greece and waning allegiance in much of Europe; and NATO offers Ukraine
no more than its good wishes as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s military swallows the country
bit by bit. Our allies are far from steadfast. Their governments are weaker, and vivid world leaders are hard to find among them.
Putin, the insane leaders of the Islamic State and the Iranian mullahs have put fear in the hearts of our allies. Why are these second-
and third-rate powers able to intimidate their neighbors far more effectively than did the far more powerful Soviet Union? Our
democratic allies in Europe, lacking a clear sense of direction, are ruled by unstable coalitions. Even Germany, perhaps the strongest
of our European allies, refuses to confront Putin in his efforts to destabilize Ukraine. When
the Obama administration
made concession after concession to the Iranians over its nuclear program, our negotiating
partners in Europe lost any interest in taking serious steps to keep Iran out of the nuclear
club. In the Middle East tribalism and religious fanaticism have left Iraq, Syria, Libya and
Yemen virtually ungovernable. Iraq, left to its won devices by Obama’s withdrawal after American troops sacrificed
so much to establish a nascent democracy, is now falling apart. In Egypt, a military regime is trying to
forcibly contain the boiling pot that is the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf States, feeling
abandoned by Obama’s rush to a nuclear agreement with Iran, are sensing the quicksand beneath their feet. Warlordism and
radical Islam plague the economically depressed countries of sub-Saharan Africa. A
combination of devolution and chaos becomes normal state of affairs absent a strong
centripetal leadership. In the last half of the 20th century, America provided that force with
persuasion, assistance, assurance and trust. As the Obama administration allows the U.S. to slip into the
shadows world politics, the danger of war increases.
1AC—Central Asia Adv
Contention 2: Central Asia
US maintaining Central Asian stability now—but the plan’s defense of
Uyghurs against China is key to check against China’s western pivot
Stability in China and the Central Asian region are principal goals of the United States . The
resolution of Uyghur issues in East Turkestan (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) and the establishment of a
democratic China are key in realizing these aims . China gave our people promises, such as self-determination; however, in
the sixty years since 1949, we have lost the right to speak freely, the rights to preserve our culture, and the right to practice our
religion. We have lost the right to prosper as a people, the right to gain an education in our own language. The Chinese government
demolished our ancient cities, in particular the ancient city of Kashgar, which was a hub of Uyghur culture and cradle of Uyghur
civilization. In fact, one massacre after another defines the Chinese communists’ rule in East Turkestan. In 1990 in Baren, in 1997 in
Ghulja and in 2009 in Urumchi, Chinese security forces gunned down Uyghurs who showed the slightest dissent against their hard
line policies. China experiences thousands of instances of unrest annually that shows no sign of diminishing as the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) continues to economically marginalize the rural population and especially Uyghurs and other non-Han
Chinese populations with whose welfare it is charged. Simply put, the marginalized of China do not have a voice in the CCP’s vision
for China. In East Turkestan a top down and non-negotiable process ,from central government to local government, determines the
direction of economic development. The Uyghur people are not consulted on the future direction of their communities and their
region, and they are not benefiting from these economic policies of China. Consequentially, policies do not reflect a balance of
interests and lead to disenfranchisement of the Uyghur people. These are not the kind of conditions that engender a stable China, as
the Chinese government often claims, that guarantees a long-term future for U.S. economic interests. The
United States has
made great sacrifices in its work toward the stability in Central Asia, and the U.S. provides a
positive and democratic role model not only for China but also for Central Asian nations
grappling with political stability. Uyghurs are highly pro-American and modern Muslims. They
are natural allies of America in a region where anti-Americanism is strong, such as in Pakistan
and Afghanistan, and to some extent in China. China has made known its interest in Central Asia through
its establishment and dominance of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) . China
specifically spearheaded the creation of the SCO to contain the Uyghurs not only in East
Turkestan, but also in the entire Central Asia region , where there are an estimated 2 million Uyghur people living.
China’s policies in Central Asia are an outward prUyojection of its fears regarding internal security, because its strategic and energy
objectives are based on stability in East Turkestan. Since the founding of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, Chinese leaders
have feared that these states, whose people are culturally and linguistically related to Uyghurs, would sympathize with the Uyghur
situation and support their cause. The Chinese government views the more than 2 million Uyghurs living in those countries as a threat,
worrying that this population might aid Uyghurs in East Turkestan who resist Chinese control of what they consider their traditional
homeland. China has also used the SCO to promote an anti-American agenda and encouraged non-democratic solutions to regional
problems. China’s undemocratic political system and repression of Uyghurs and other peoples in China provides a negative role model
for the maturing Central Asian states. China has launched several joint military exercises with SCO member states over the past years,
including in East Turkestan in order to intimidate the Uyghur population. Although the stated purposes of those exercises have been
improving cooperation among member states primarily in fight against terrorism, the real objective has been to intimidate the Uyghur
population in East Turkestan and to warn the democratic forces in Central Asia not to challenge the authoritarian regimes of the
region. The legitimacy of the Chinese government’s approach to governance should rest further than its role today as the world’s
creditor. Indeed, China may be stepping up its engagement in the Central Asian region through a pivot
to its west, today, as the Obama Administration pivots American foreign policy to the Asia-Pacific region. Policy analysts in
China have proposed a change of focus in China’s strategic and economic interests, called “Marching West.” This is a very
new policy recommended by some of the Chinese policymakers. “Marching West” is basically toward Afghanistan and the ex-Soviet
Central Asian states. While
the suggested pivot has not yet been elevated to an established government
strategy, a pivot to China’s west would be able to exploit the vacuum of the United States’
disengagement from Afghanistan and up inflows of much needed natural resources to eastern
China, as well as offer strategic possibilities .
Chinese repression of Uyghurs is exported to the rest of Central Asia sans the
aff
Kanat 16 (Kilic Burgra Kanat, an assistant professor of political science at Pennsylvania State
University, “The Securitization of the Uyghur Question and Its Challenges” p9-11)
Although China sought to keep the Uyghur question as a “domestic matter” and opposed any form of
involvement or interference from outside forces, outside influence on the issue gradually began to occur alongside China’s
foreign policy. The failure of the government to “handle” the issue and the use of force and
emergency measures was blamed on the existence of active outside forces that support the
“separatist” movements. However, with the absence of a direct link, it was hard for the Chinese government to put the blame
on a specific state or country. Still, an ambiguous “external force” discourse was constantly utilized by the administration. Thus the
Uyghur question began to influence the foreign policy of the PRC. The Chinese foreign policy file on the Uyghur
problem began with accusations and scapegoating of the external forces, later extending to include
bilateral diplomatic relations with other countries. Instead of establishing a constructive dialogue with the
Uyghur community, and making a concerted effort to understand the source of grievances of the Uyghur people, the
Chinese government interpreted the conflict as the result of foreign actors and preferred to look
for a solution outside of its borders. The diplomatic offensive tried to crackdown Uyghur
movements abroad as a method of halting unrest in the XUAR. The first targets in this sense were
the countries with a sizable Uyghur diaspora. In the bilateral relations between The administration tried both to
obstruct political interaction between Uyghurs in XUAR and the Central Asian Republics, and to increase economic and social
relations between these countries and China China, Turkey and the Central Asian Republics, both the developments in the XUAR as
well as the activities of the Uyghur diasporain these countries became a serious issue for bilateral relations. In these years, neither
Turkey nor the Central Asian Republics had a foreign policy agenda regarding the situation of Uyghurs, however interestingly it was
China that brought these issues to the agenda of the diplomatic meetings. These
“strike hard” policies of the 1990s
generated major debates on human rights violations in China against Uyghurs. The international community,
particularly the human rights NGOs became more sensitive to human rights violations in the XUAR. A significant turning point for
the Uyghur question took place in February 1997 when a series of protests for Uyghur rights broke out in the town
of Ghulja, XUAR during the month of Ramadan. Chinese authorities responded to the protests by firing tear gas and shots, as well as
by deploying water cannons and tear gas against protesters. Over
100 people were killed in the crackdown and an
additional 1,600 arrested for “counterrevolutionary activities.” The inconsistency of the official explanations
about the incidents raised question marks in international community. As James Millward expressed in his report about the conflict,
there were serious contradictions about the cause and nature of this event -ranging from denials that it
happened, to calling it a case of “beating, smashing, and looting” by “drug addicts, looters, and social
garbage” and then blaming it on separatists and religious elements bent on stirring up a holy war. 8
Eventually, reports released on the massacre by human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, revealed
cases of torture and police brutality perpetrated by Chinese security forces against Uyghur
demonstrators.9 During this period the international media’s attention was drawn to the region and they also started to report on
the incidents from the city.10 The Ghulja events thrust the Uyghur problem into world attention as a human rights issue. Mass
detentions, rapidly spreading torture claims, and frequent executions in the region became
increasingly visible to the international community. The incidents and its aftermath also led to an exodus of
refugees from Xinjiang. In Ghulja province, young Uyghur activists who joined the protests first
migrated into neighboring countries, then into Turkey and eventually Europe. There they revitalized the existing Uyghur
organizations and increased the power and influence of the Uyghur diaspora.11 China then took several steps that would contribute
further to the internationalization of the Uyghur question. The administration considered both the movement of Uyghurs, who escaped
to different countries at the end of the 1990s, and the
broader cultural awakening of Uyghurs living in the
Central Asian Republics, as serious threats to its security and reputation in the international arena. The PRC
sought to promote relations with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the face of increasing numbers of Uyghur organizations and
movements in these countries. It was hoped that stronger economic relations would increase the leverage of the Chinese government
in the domestic affairs of these countries and thus hinder the activities of Uyghurs and potential cross-border movements. China’s
first goal was to nullify the influence of the diaspora into XUAR and to stop the activities of such
organizations abroad. It increased border controls, signed border agreements with Central Asian
Republics, and worked to protect border security in order to achieve this. The administration tried both to
obstruct political interaction between Uyghurs in XUAR and the Central Asian Republics, and to increase economic and social
relations between these countries and China. Worried that its actions would not be enough, the Chinese government launched a
campaign of “linkage politics” for the XUAR. China
developed a repressive model for Central Asian countries
where Uyghur movements were based. This necessitated the export of policies implemented
against Uyghur dissidents in XUAR to other countries; but it was possible only through more aggressive and
preventive diplomatic traffic between the Chinese government and the regional governments. To accomplish this, the PRC began to
promote bilateral relations, making the Uyghur problem a priority item in bilateral talks and negotiations with its Central Asian
neighbors. China demanded that Central Asian Republics limit the activities of their Uyghur population and used economic relations
in a “carrot and stick” strategy to entice their compliance with this strategy. Trade relations and foreign aid to the same countries
became linked to their positions on the Uyghur issue. In addition, China
took another step to bring the Uyghur
problem as a key element of threat against regional security by trying to project its “strike hard”
policies into other Central Asian Republics. Perhaps the most critical of such attempts was the formation of the
Shanghai Five, the backbone of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and its efforts to spread the “three evil forces” (separatism,
extremism and terrorism) security concept throughout region.12 The
situation created a stifling anti-Uyghur
atmosphere and led to the Central Asian Republics’ adoption of a more liberal economy model
together with the authoritarian political structure– which was labeled the “Beijing Consensus.” 13
The model strengthened authoritarian endurance and continuity in the Central Asian Republics. Later on, a significant part of the
meetings of the organization, which was eventually named “the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)”, was allocated to the
discussion of the Uyghur problem.14 This In the mid-1990s, with the reinforcement of nationalist emotions, the reaction of Chinese
society to the Western world and Japan began to threaten the country’s economy and international image, which had already been
damaged by Tiananmen Square paved the way for China’s foreign policy towards Central Asia to concentrate on the Uyghur issue as a
priority agenda and proved to be very successful, achieving Beijing’s desired outcome that regional Uyghur movements become
largely lımıted ın theır actıons. A group of Uyghur dissidents, who were under suppression both in XUAR and in Central Asia, moved
to Europe and began to organize while others, who were unable to access Western countries, fled to Afghanistan, which was suffering
under the Taliban administration. Both the policy of escalating the profile of the conflict in Central Asia and the migration of Uyghurs
to different areas contributed to the internationalization of the issue.
Scenario 1 is Stability
Xinjiang is the center of geopolitical power struggle in Central Asia—the
intersections of multiple nations interest, culture diversity, and territorial
disputes make conflict extremely plausible.
Hao and Liu 12 (Yufan Hao, Member of the University Affairs Coordination Committee.
Wehiu Liu, UM Senate Member Member of the General Affairs Committee, UM Senate.
“Xinjiang: increasing pain in the heart of China's borderland”2012/2/7)
Xinjiang borders eight countries (the most among all administrative divisions in China that has 15 neighbors) with an
almost 5,600 km long borderline (the longest land border among all frontier provinces and autonomous regions in China), constituting
a quarter of China’s total land border of about 22,000 km (the longest in the world). Through
Xinjiang, China shares
borders of almost 3,200 km with the former USSR to the north-west: 56 km with Russia, 1,718
km with Kazakhstan, 980 km with Kyrgyzstan and 450 with Tajikistan. The other countries
neighboring Xinjiang include Mongolia (1,435 km border) to the north-east, and Afghanistan (80
km), Pakistan (530 km) and India (about 350 km) to the south.18 Xinjiang is located at the center
of the Eurasian continent. The British geographer Sir Halford J. Mackinder was among the first to call attention to the
central importance of Central Asia, calling the region the ‘geographical pivot of history’, or
‘heartland’. In Mackinder’s framework, Xinjiang is included in the pivot area.19 Owen Lattimore, in 1950, also portrayed Xinjiang in
a pivotal position, a ‘new centre of gravity’ in Asia between the great powers of China, the Soviet Union, India and the Muslim
Middle East.20 Zbigniew K. Brzezinski also emphasized the significance of the Eurasian centrality in the analysis of the post-Cold
War geostrategy of the USA.21 In geopolitical terms, Xinjiang and Central Asia is the center of the New Great
Game of the big powers such as China, Russia, India, the USA , North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) countries.22 In the North, Russia is striving to defend its declining
world power status, and itsinfluence in its backyard in Central Asia. In the West, NATO never
gives up its eastern expansion. In the South, India and Pakistan are lagged in ongoing conflicts,
and India wants to become a world power. In the East, the largest developing country and
ascendant power, China, is on the path to ‘immense national rejuvenation’ and tries to join in the
making of new world rules. The USA, although quite far away, also wants more influence in this
region due to its energy security and the anti-terrorism campaign. In the name of anti-terrorism, after
September 11, the USA projected its influence into Central Asia, and formed a part of the “encirclement of China” de facto. Stephen
Blank, a professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, stated that ‘China is the big loser in the war on
terrorism in Central Asia. Virtually every plank of its strategic policy for enhancing its influence and lessening American influence
has failed ...’.23 Driven by the USA, NATO has stepped up its presence in Central Asia. Under the auspices of NATO’s Partnership
for Peace (PFP) program, the Central Asian Battalion (CentrazBat)—the joint peacekeeping force of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan—was established in 1995. Since 1996, these three countries have also conducted annual military maneuvers with the
American army. As a result, ‘Central
Asian states will have less need to accommodate Chinese demands
than before, or use China to balance Russia to gain a greater degree of independence’ .24 Within a
month after the September 11 attacks, the USA army’s 10th Mountain Division was already deploying to Khanbad Air Base in
Uzbekistan, which was the first major deployment of US forces to the territory of the former Soviet Union. Now American and
European forces have been granted semi-permanent basing rights in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.25 In 2001 and 2002, all
of the central Asian states except Turkmenistan signed cooperation and base access agreements with the USA, as well as receiving
economic assistance.26 On the other hand, this region is also at the intersection of different cultural plates —the
Slavic Orthodox civilization to the North, the Hindu civilization to the South, the Islamic civilization to the West, and the Confucian
and Buddhist civilizations to the East. The
collision of different cultures may be transferred to the conflicts
between different countries, and even different ethnic groups in the same country; and the
penetration and expansion of religious extremism and ethnic separatism have become severe
threats to national security in this region. The cultural–political fault line is also often an area of instability and
confrontation. The Sino-Indian territorial dispute has not been resolved; India has claimed
sovereignty over Aksai Chin in Hotan since 1962. In addition, Pakistan, China and India are
mired in conflicts in Kashmir. The contradiction between Uzbekistan with Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan in Ferghana Valley is volatile. Nine years after the invasion of Afghanistan by the USA, peace has not
returned to this precarious land, and the USA is reluctant to withdraw its troops.The direct international threat to Xinjiang is Pan-
Turkism along with PanIslamism, which are promoted by the newly independent Central Asian nations and Turkey explicitly or
implicitly. Turkey is the center of Pan-Turkism, and also a key base for Pan-Islamism. It was the first state to recognize the
independence of the Soviet Central Asian republics, and the first state to open embassies in those countries. In October 1992, shortly
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the first Turkic summit in Ankara was attended by the leaders of Turkey, Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.27 Historically, Central Asia was called ‘West Turkistan’, and Xinjiang was
called ‘East Turkistan’ by the Western colonists. The newly independent states in Central Asia strove to enhance the national Turkic
and Islamic spirits to differentiate them from the Russian influence, which also provided the ideological base for the Uyghur intention
of gaining independence. The countries in Central Asia share a Sunni Islamic culture, and speak Turki except for in Tajikistan. Most
of the ethnic groups in Xinjiang are also Muslim and practice Sunni Islam. The Tajik in Xinjiang and most people in Tajikistan speak
Persian and have cultural ties with Iran, while the Tajik people in Xinjiang practice Shia Islam, which is also the dominant religion in
Iran. The historical and cultural links between theTurkish countries provide support to the national separatist
movements in Xinjiang. Influenced by the turbulent neighboring international environment and
its own historical experiences, Xinjiang is crucial to China’s national security and territorial
integrity. Xinjiang is not a barren desert land, but the soft belly of China. If Xinjiang becomes the focus of competition by the big
powers, as it did around 1900, China’s territorial integrity would face a fatal threat, and China’s status in Eurasia and the world might
return to that of the later Qing Dynasty. The unstable Xinjiang may cut down the Eurasian continental bridge, and impede China’s
communication and cooperation with the Central Asian countries. If Xinjiang were independent, Tibet and Inner Mongolia might
follow, China would lose more than one half of its territory, and the
flames of wars in western China might be
fanned. China proper—the central area of the Chinese civilization—would be directly exposed to foreign countries and the
surviving space of the Chinese would be compressed greatly.
Central Asian conflict draws in great powers and goes nuclear

Blank 12
(Stephen-Blank Strategic Studies Institutes, US Army War College, US Army Research;
“Whither the new great game in Central Asia?” University of Nebraska – Lincoln (US Army
Research – US Department of Defense, 1/1/12;
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1184&context=usarmyresearch)
Although many scholars dislike the term “great game” or “new great game” because to them these terms smack of echoes of the imperial rivalry of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; the point of the term “new
great game” is precisely that we have surmounted the era and what we see now is something entirely different. This difference does not, however, mean that we have seen the end of policies resembling those of the
there is an enormous competition among the US, Russia, India, and China for military bases in
age of imperialism. First,
Central Asia. All of these states either have bases, have had bases, or have sought bases in Central Asia in
the last decade and the growth of the CSTO eloquently testifies to the continuation of the military dimension in the great powers’ search for security in Central Asia. The different factor today is that
local governments of their own accord are actively soliciting US military involvement if not that of Russia and China for the reasons outlined above (Kucera, 2011a). Similarly we see what amounts to naked land
grabs by the great powers, albeit on a relatively small scale in Central Asia. For example, Tajikistan has been induced to surrender to China 1100 square miles (2000 ha of land) to Chinese farmers. Allegedly this
“rectification” of the borders ensures Tajikistan’s inviolability of its borders, definitively solves its border problems with China, and ensures its stability “for decades to come.” (Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2011c) But that
statement implies that without this agreement Tajikistan’s security vis-à-vis China would have been questioned if not at risk. And the further details of this agreement indicate the visible presence of Chinese power in
Dushanbe’s decision-making. This agreement, allegedly based on a prior accord between the two governments in 2002 that was ratified again in 2010 cedes about 1000 square km in the Pamir Mountains to China,
about 1 percent of Tajikistan, albeit a sparsely settled area (Singh, 2011; Pannier, 2011a, 2011b). Tajikistan’s government hailed this as a victory because China had actually claimed some 28,000 km and settled for
only about 3.5 percent of its claims. Moreover, Shukhrob Sharipov, Director of the Presidential Center for Strategic Studies, argued that, “If we hadn’t decided to transfer the land (at this time), we would not have
been able to resist China’s pressure” (Pannier, 2011a, 2011b). This remark basically sums up the nature of Central Asian states’ relationship to China. This agreement clearly also conformed to the pattern we have
seen in China’s earlier expansionist activities vis-à-vis Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Worse yet, the raw material resources in the land ceded by Tajikistan allegedly equals the entire Chinese investment in Tajikistan
to date. Thus China has allegedly recouped its investment at no cost to itself and has both the land and its resources as well as maintaining its investments and penetration of Tajikistan (Singh, 2011). On the other
hand, these deals triggered a strong political backlash in all three countries against China and its perceived intentions. Perhaps Tajikistan’s backlash was triggered more by the fact that between 1500 and 2000
Chinese farmers will settle another 2000 ha of land beyond the border agreement (Pannier, 2011a, 2011b). According to the opposition Tajikistan is becoming increasingly economically dependent on China due to its
large investment in the area and this causes great resentment. Attacks on Chinese workers in other countries also testifies to this backlash across Central Asia. At the same time, we might also point to the following
it is not only the great powers: US,

likely developments in what presently constitutes the great power rivalry for influence in Central Asia. In the current configuration
Russia, China, India, and the EU who are pursuing influence, access, and leverage in
Central Asia, indeed, middle ranking powers: Pakistan and Iran are clearly enhancing their
efforts to improve relations with all the actors in Central Asia as are South Korea and
Japan in order to obtain economic-political and possibly even strategic benefits. Third, beyond these aforementioned trends, regional actors like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have already begun to take actions
to shape their security environment as their power and wealth grows and second, in the expectation of both the US withdrawal and concurrently intensified SinoRussian pressure upon them and rivalry with each other
for precedence in Central Asia. Indeed, we even find Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan thinking of projecting their influence and power into neighboring Central Asian states like Kyrgyzstan either through investments as
in Kazakhstan’s case or in more direct military threats and interference in other states’ economic activity as we often see with Uzbekistan (Weitz, 2008b). But we also find that on occasion, e.g. during the Kyrgyz
revolution of 2010, these two governments engaged each other in substantive discussions about possible reactions and power projection into Kyrgyzstan. Fourth, international financial institutions (IFI) like the Asian
as a
Development Bank, the World Bank, the UN and its agencies like the UN Development Program (UNDP), are also heavily involved in major projects and policies here. Finally, and perhaps most important,
mark of distinction from the imperial past, each of the Central Asian states is now a fully
empowered (at least formally) state and sovereign foreign policy actor. Consequently each one is
conducting its own version, insofar as possible, of a multivector or more accurately balancing approach attempting to balance all the multiple external
sources of benefits to them to enhance their domestic stability. Therefore, based on the foregoing we can point to certain likely developments regarding interstate rivalry and
especially great or major power rivalry and competition in Central Asia for the foreseeable future. First, because S. Blank /
Journal of Eurasian Studies 3 (2012) 147–160 155 the effort to define and gain control over Central Asia or at least gain lasting influence over it coincides with the escalation of the war in Afghanistan since 2008 the
stakes involved in the effort to direct the destiny of Central Asia Central Asia have grown. Though the following assertion by Ahmed Rashid may somewhat exaggerate the importance of these stakes, from the
standpoint of regional governments this is actually an understatement because they believe their fate is linked with that of Afghanistan. Thus Rashid writes that, The consequences of state failure in any single country
are unimaginable. At stake in Afghanistan is not just the future of President Hamid Karzai and the Afghan people yearning for stability, development, and education but also the entire global alliance that is trying to
keep Afghanistan together. At stake are the futures of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union, and of course America’s own power and prestige. It is difficult to
imagine how NATO could survive as the West’s leading alliance if the Taleban are not defeated in Afghanistan or if Bin Laden remains at large indefinitely.(Rashid, 2009, p. xxxix) Those stakes also involve the
other states of Central Asia as well since it is widely believed that a Taliban victory in Afghanistan makes them a prime target for insurgency in the future. Especially in the light of fears for the stability of the Karzai
government and the overall region in the light of a US withdrawal, every state, large or small, is jockeying for greater capability and power in the region and some, like Uzbekistan, clearly expect both to have to
project power and that they will be asked to project power to neighbors to preserve stability in the area after 2014. Second, as Emelian Kavalski has observed, the nature of what we call the “new great game,” the
proliferation of actors in a continuous multi-dimensional struggle for influence in Central Asia precludes any one actor obtaining previous levels of imperial or neo-imperial domination, though Russia still tries for it,
and has led to a situation where, given the concurrent proliferation of actors and agents operating in Central Asia, The simultaneity of these two dynamics reveals that the agency of external actors is distinguished not
by an imperial desire for the control of territory, but by the establishment of ‘niches of influence.’ Consequently, the notion of the ‘new great game’ comes to characterize the dynamics of processing, selection and
internalization of some externally promoted ideas and not others. (Rashid, 2009, p. xxxix). Third, in view of the impending US military withdrawal it is not clear that Washington, confronted by wrenching fiscal
stresses, either has the vision or the means to develop or implement a coherent post-Afghanistan Central Asian strategy, a vacuum could well develop there with regard to the US position that will inevitably be filled
by other actors. Certainly there is no sign yet of what will replace the US military presence after 2014 and no sign of a formal document worked out with Afghanistan that delineates the extent to which a US presence
every regional actor is hedging its bets and preparing for the worst in the future, a trend that
in the region will look like. In the absence of such a policy statement
most likely means intensified competition among the great, regional, and local powers for influence
in Central Asia.
Scenario 2 is Infrastructure
Central Asian instability kills Chinese infrastructure in East Turkestan
China is already using the natural resources of East Turkestan and its strategic location as a
gateway to Central Asia, South Asia, Middle East and even Eurasia to build an infrastructure to
direct Central Asian natural resources to its ever demanding markets on the eastern seaboard. The
CCP is attempting to connect China with the Eurasian landmass, using East Turkestan as a
conduit, with pipelines, as well as highways and railroads. Much of this roadmap for Chinese expansion
has been built on the regional stability established by the U.S ., that the United States has worked hard to
achieve and it also undermines America’s regional objectives to build a prosperous relationship with states in Central Asia, South Asia
and the Middle East.
The nature of the threat has changed—as infrastructure develops, further

unrest places a greater burden on China economic security
Stratfor 13 (Stratfor is a geopolitical intelligence firm that provides strategic analysis and forecasting to individuals and
organizations around the world. China's Ambitions in Xinjiang and Central Asia: Part 3, 10/2,
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/chinas-ambitions-xinjiang-and-central-asia-part-3)
Civil unrest and militancy, whether secular political or Islamist in orientation, have been constant throughout
Xinjiang's recent history, but the nature of the risk posed by unrest in the autonomous region is changing. In the
1990s and early 2000s, violence spurred by ethnic tensions between Xinjiang's majority Uighur Muslim population and Han Chinese
immigrants to the region created a number of political challenges for the Communist Party. Domestically, the unrest stirred anxieties
about the possibility that anti-Party and anti-Han sentiment in China's borderlands could someday coalesce
into more than a minor irritant. Diplomatically, meanwhile, the turmoil in Xinjiang did not help China's efforts to portray
itself as a responsible member of the international community, especially in the wake of the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989.
Throughout this period, ethnic unrest in Xinjiang failed to significantly threaten China's economic and
energy security. Until recently, most of Xinjiang was undeveloped and poorly integrated with the
rest of the country, and with the exception of parts of the Tarim Basin, all of the region's major oil fields were located in Han-
dominated northern Xinjiang, where religiously motivated violence has been much less common. Minor violent incidents in southern
areas around the energy-rich Tarim Basin, such as Hotan and Kashgar, concerned Beijing as portents of increased Islamist militancy,
but their impact on business continuity was minimal. In
the future, this will not necessarily be the case. As
infrastructure in Xinjiang develops, and as more of the province's oil, natural gas and coal make
their way to cars, factories and power generators elsewhere in China, the stakes for maintaining
security in the west will rise.
Chinese economic collapse leads to war - miscalculation and lash out

Carpenter, 15 – [Ted Galen, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor at
The National Interest, The National Interest, “Could China's Economic Troubles Spark a War?”,
9/6/15, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-chinas-economic-troubles-spark-war-13784?
page=2 ]
Global attention has focused on the plunge in the Shanghai stock market and mounting evidence that China’s economic growth is
slowing dramatically. Moreover, the contagion appears to be spreading, characterized by extreme volatility and alarming declines in
America’s own equity markets. Those worries are compounded because there always have been doubts about the accuracy of
Beijing’s official economic statistics. Even before the current downturn, some outside experts believed that Chinese officials padded
the results, making the country’s performance appear stronger than it actually was. If China is now teetering on the brink of recession,
the political incentives for officials to conceal the extent of the damage would be quite powerful. The
focus on the possible
wider economic consequences of a severe Chinese economic slowdown is understandable, since
the ramifications could be extremely unpleasant for the U.S. and global economies . But we should
also be vigilant about how such economic stress might affect Beijing’s diplomatic and military
behavior. It is not unprecedented for a government that feels besieged to attempt to distract a
discontented public by fomenting a foreign policy crisis. In Henry IV, Shakespeare pithily described that process
as the temptation to “busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels.” China’s leaders likely feel increasingly
uncomfortable. The implicit bargain that has been in place since the onset of market-oriented reforms in the late 1970s has been
that if the public does not challenge the Communist Party’s dominant political position, the Party will deliver an ever-rising standard
of living for the people. The bloody Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989 was a graphic reminder of what happens if the Party’s
position is challenged. However, until now, the economic portion of the bargain seemed secure, characterized by breathtaking, often
double digit, rates of growth. It is uncertain what happens if the Party can no longer maintain its part of the
implicit bargain, but it is likely that a dangerous degree of public discontent will surface . Beijing might
refrain from deliberately provoking a major foreign policy crisis, since the Chinese economy depends heavily on export markets, and
access to those markets would be jeopardized by war. However, the
need to preserve and strengthen national unity
and distract the public from mounting economic troubles is likely to impel Chinese leaders to
adopt very hardline policies in at least three areas. And all of those situations entail the danger of
miscalculations that could lead to war. One issue is the South China Sea. Beijing has made extraordinarily
broad territorial claims that encompass some 90 percent of that body of water. China is pressing its claims with air and naval patrols
and the building of artificial islands. Those
policies have brought Beijing into acrimonious disputes with
neighbors such as Vietnam and the Philippines, which have rival territorial claims, and with the
world’s leading maritime power, the United States, which resists any manifestation of Chinese
control over the South China Sea and the crucial commercial lanes that pass through it. The
conditions are in place for a nasty confrontation. Chinese leaders have already stressed the
country’s alleged historical claims to the area , and made it clear that it will not tolerate being subjected to humiliation
by outside powers. Such arguments are designed to gain domestic support by reminding the Chinese
people of the country’s long period of weakness and humiliation in the 1800s and early 1900s. A
second issue is Taiwan. Beijing has long argued that Taiwan is rightfully part of China and was
stolen from the country in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895. Although Chinese leaders have
exhibited patience regarding the issue of reunification , relying in large measure on growing cross-
strait economic ties to entice Taiwan to eventually accept that outcome , Beijing has also reacted very
sharply whenever Taiwanese officials have pushed an agenda of independence, as during the administration of Chen Shui-bian from
2000 to 2008. The
danger or renewed confrontation is rising, since public opinion polls indicate that
the nominee of Chen’s old party, the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, will be
Taiwan’s next leader. A new crisis in the Taiwan Strait would be extremely serious, since the
United States has obligated itself to consider any Chinese efforts at coercion as a “grave breach of
the peace” of East Asia. Yet there is little doubt that there would be widespread domestic support on the mainland for a stern
response by the Beijing government to a Taiwanese attempt to enhance its de-facto independence. Indeed, there might be more
political danger to the regime if it did not take a strong stance on that issue. The
third possible arena for crisis is the
East China Sea. China is increasingly adamant about its claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands,
which are under Japanese control. From China’s perspective, those islands were stolen by
Imperial Japan at the same time that Tokyo took possession of Taiwan following the 1895 war. And ginning up public
anger against Japan is never difficult . China just finished celebrating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II,
which is touted in China as “the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War.”
Recalling Japan’s invasion of China, and the resulting atrocities, was a prominent theme of the
various commemorative events. But the animosity is not based solely on historical grievances. Anger at Japan over
the ongoing East China Sea dispute and other matters has already produced anti-Japanese riots in
Chinese cities, characterized by attacks on Japanese businesses and automobiles . There is a
powerful incentive for Chinese leaders to take an uncompromising stance on the Diaoyu/Senkaku
feud, confident that the Chinese people will back such a stance. All of this suggests that the United States and
its allies need to proceed cautiously about dealing with China, especially on these three issues. Now is not the time to press a Chinese
leadership that likely feels beleaguered by the country’s economic woes. The
last thing we should do is give those
leaders further temptation to distract the Chinese people with a foreign policy confrontation. Such
a strategy entails the grave risk of miscalculation and escalation, and that would be a tragedy for
all concerned.
1AC—Plan
Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its
diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China by establishing a
consulate in Ürümqi, appointing a Special Coordinator for Uyghur issues at
the United States State Department, and instituting bilateral human rights
dialogue over Uyghur issues.
1AC—Solvency
Contention 3: Solvency
Plan solves—forefronts Uyghur issues at a senior level
Uyghurs, today, are starved of a voice in determining their own political future. Like Americans, Uyghurs,
Tibetans, Mongolians, even Han Chinese, and the other groups in China want to freely express their opinions to build a healthy
democratic society. Such a China would not carry the fear of today’s authoritarianism, but would offer a peaceful rise to the world
stage. De-emphasizing the Uyghur issue will not free the Uyghur people from Chinese government
repression and build stability in Central Asia, so it is vital that President Obama and Secretary Kerry
meet with Uyghur leaders to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to creatively resolve Uyghur concerns at a
senior level. I hope that U.S. officials and politicians realize the strategic and geo-political importance of the Uyghurs, in
the long term, and adopt policies accordingly. In order to elevate the Uyghur issue, I also recommend that the
U.S. government incorporate the Uyghur issue and human rights violations against the Uyghur
people as a core element of its bi-lateral relations with China, seek the establishment of a
consulate in Urumchi, the regional capital of East Turkestan to monitor the highly repressive, highly intensified
repression by the Chinese government closely and also appoint a Special Coordinator for Uyghur
issues at the State Department. Lastly, Congressional support for a Uyghur Policy Act, similar to the Tibetan Policy Act of
2002, would be an immeasurable gesture of solidarity for the Uyghur plight during our darkest history. Thank you ”
Expanding bilateral human rights engagement offers redress to Uyghur

grievances—China says yes despite hard-line voices
Rosenzweig 10 (Joshua Rosenzweig, August 3, 2010, Senior Manager, Research & Hong Kong Operations,
“Political Prisoners in China: Trends and Implications for US Policy”, Congressional-Executive Commission on China,
http://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/hearings/2010/CECC%20Hearing
%20Testimony%20-%20Joshua%20Rosenzweig%20-%208.3.10.pdf, ddi ss) Note: Urumuchi = capital of Xinjiang
Autonomous Region
I believe that what we are witnessing today is a manifestation of a Chinese leadership that , though it may
exude confidence in its dealings with the outside world, sees mounting signs
of instability at home in the form of
petitioners seeking redress for grievances, growing numbers of mass incidents, eruption of long-simmering
ethnic tensions in Lhasa and Urumchi, and the messy, hard-to-control Internet, with its channels for expression of critical
opinion and transmission of uncensored news. A sense of imminent and perpetual threat has played into
the hands of a hard-line, “stability-above-all-else” element in the leadership , one particularly
associated with the security forces, the military, and the propaganda apparatus. Though the factors
underlying these developments in China have been primarily domestic, confusion in the international community about how best to
engage with “rising China” on human rights has clearly emboldened some Chinese leaders to pursue certain policies despite
international opposition. For the time being, at least, China’s leadership appears to be pursuing what the Chinese scholar Yu Jianrong
has called “rigid stability,” instead of heeding the voices of those inside and outside the Party who advocate taking stronger steps
toward establishment of a more legitimate rule-of-law system, one that would weaken the authority of the security forces and see Party
oversight of court decisions receding in favor of a more independent judiciary.[15] But as long as the perception remains of a high
level of threat from ethnic separatists, hostile foreign forces, mass incidents, and political subversives, this hard-line faction will try to
continue to hang on to its remaining strongholds long enough at least to have an influence over the formation of the new leadership
group at the 18th Party Congress in 2012. Notwithstanding the strong position of the hard-liners, proponents
of expanding civil rights and further developing rule of law in China still have a voice, particularly via the
media. On a few occasions, backlash against local government officials’ abuse of criminal defamation
charges to prosecute critics of corruption and malfeasance have forced authorities to acknowledge
they overstepped their authority.[16] Major media outlets have been vocal in exposing serious problems such as the use of
“black jails” to incarcerate petitioners, mysterious deaths of detainees in police-run detention facilities, and the torture of criminal
suspects.[17] There have been stirring calls for reform to the laws governing state secrets and household registration, and last month
new rules took effect that should in theory prevent illegally obtained evidence and testimony from being used in criminal proceedings.
[18] In short, there appears to be a constituency within the Party (not to mention among Chinese legal experts and
practitioners and the wider population) that
supports moving more resolutely along a path of reform, a group that
may feel frustrated by the recent lack of progress on political reform and growing reliance on repression. An
important goal of our collective human rights engagement with China should be to support the efforts of
this constituency, particularly at such a moment when it may feel most embattled. At this point, I would like to offer the
following recommendations: First, the bilateral human rights dialogue between the United States and China
should be enhanced and expanded. To this end, we recommend:  Doubling the frequency of the
dialogue to make it a semi-annual event. This would facilitate the establishment of relationships
with Chinese interlocutors and better reflect the importance the US government attaches to the
human rights situation in China. A semi-annual dialogue would also match the frequency of China’s human rights
dialogue with the European Union.  Ensuring that detailed, bilingual prisoner lists an integral part of the
dialogue process. It is also essential that the US government hold China accountable for
responding to these requests for information in a sincere and timely manner .  Establishing a
working group on the rights of political prisoners. Thanks to efforts by the State Department,
China has agreed in principle to establish working groups as part of the bilateral human rights
dialogue. The United States should actively follow up on this agreement and propose that a
working group be established on the rights of political prisoners . The United States must be
prepared to engage China critically in the area of human rights. Disagreements can be expected,
but engagement must be about more than simply “agreeing to disagree.” It should involve
recognizing the value of substantive, critical discussion in which all parties are held equally
accountable for their commitments to human rights under international law .
Contention 2
Western Pivot Bad
Current US strategy of containing China fails; engagement with
countries on China’s periphery is key to effective containment –
building trust from Uyghurs is a first step
Tellis 13, Ashley J. "Balancing Without Containment: A U.S. Strategy For Confronting China's
Rise." Washington Quarterly 36.4 (2013): 109-124. Academic Search Complete. Retrieved from
http://ry2ue4ek7d.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi
%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fsummon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info
%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx
%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Balancing+without+Containment%3A+A+U.S.
+Strategy+for+Confronting+China
%27s+Rise&rft.jtitle=The+Washington+Quarterly&rft.au=Tellis%2C+Ashley+J&rft.date=2013-
10-01&rft.issn=0163-660X&rft.eissn=1530-
9177&rft.volume=36&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=109&rft.epage=124&paramdict=en-US July 12 CS
China’s rise constitutes the most serious geopolitical challenge facing the United States today. On current trends, China could—many
say will—develop a national economy larger than that of the United States as early as the end of this decade, at least when measured
in purchasing power parity terms.1 China’s national ambitions too are clear: at the very least, Beijing seeks to recover the centrality it
enjoyed in Asian geopolitics until the coming of colonialism.2 Its economic renaissance since the 1980s has now positioned it to play
a major global role that was simply unimaginable some thirty years ago. With its extraordinary military modernization program,
Beijing has also made tremendous strides toward holding at risk the United States’ forward-deployed and forward-operating forces in
the western Pacific, thereby raising the costs of implementing U.S. security guarantees to its partners in the region. Its unique
characteristics—being a continental-sized power, possessing a gigantic and technologically improving economy, having a strategically
advantageous location, and rapidly acquiring formidable military capabilities—add up quickly to make China a consequential rival to
the United States, even if it differs from previous challengers in character, aims, and ambitions. China’s rise, which is but part and
parcel of the larger rise of Asia, has been engendered in great measure by the permissive benefits of U.S. hegemony since World War
II. The U.S.-backed guarantee of open global commons, especially in the Asia– Pacific region, the creation of stable multilateral
exchange arrangements, and the maintenance of the dollar as an international reserve currency have all together produced inordinate
gains for regional actors and the international economy alike. As a result, China could actually grow not by the autarkic processes that
drove the rise of previous great powers, but by exploiting the interdependence arising from deliberate U.S. investments in producing
an open international trading system.3 The structural contradiction between the United States and China is thus defined by the
awkward reality that Washington sustains an international economic order that, although producing great benefits for itself and others,
simultaneously fuels the growth of what could be its most significant geopolitical antagonist over time. Shorn of all subtlety,
Beijing’s rise poses a special problem for U.S. interests because it threatens a possible power
transition at the core of the global system. Preserving American preeminence and by extension the current global
system itself, accordingly, remains the central task for U.S. policymakers today. This will prove difficult: China’s deep
integration with the international economy, to include the U nited States, implies that the obvious
containment strategies that worked so effectively vis-a`-vis the preceding rival, the Soviet Union, are unlikely to be
successfully replicated this time around. Forget Containment, not Balancing Containing China—defined as attempting to suppress
its growth by isolating Beijing from its neighbors and the world—cannot work, for several reasons. For one thing, China
has deep economic ties with the United States and the international community, and all countries
enmeshed in these economic interactions profit from them—even if China accrues greater
gains than most. No state, therefore, would willingly forego its own absolute gains deriving from trade
with China. Even though China’s neighbors in particular recognize that they are contributing to growing Chinese power, and
consequently are most anxious about Beijing’s expanding military capabilities, they are reluctant to limit their
trading relations with China so long as Beijing does not present an intolerable danger to
them and so long as non-military instruments, such as diplomatic engagement and regional institutions,
continue to offer some hope of constraining China peacefully . China’s incipient centrality has thus resulted in its
neighbors seeking to avoid any stark choices between China and the United States—a preference that could persist even in the event
of conflict between these two powers. A Cold War-style containment strategy is therefore likely to find little traction with key Asian
states, and could in fact backfire if they are presented with the intolerable binary of aligning with either Washington or Beijing. The
net result of globalization, therefore, is that rising, more powerful states, such as China, can exploit the phenomenon of
interdependence to increase their power and autonomy, even as their weaker partners become more reluctant to cut off their trading
ties for fear of losing out in absolute terms. This dynamic will persist so long as U.S. military might suffices to protect the Asian
security system, a system that U.S. power has long underwritten. It is not clear, however, whether this will continue to be the case
once Beijing acquires the capacity to The U.S. benefits from its ties to China in absolute terms, but loses in relative terms. Ashley J.
Tellis 110 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & FALL 2013 decisively undermine Washington’s extended deterrence capabilities
in the Asian theater. Further complicating matters, the strong Sino–U.S. trading relationship (one that was completely
absent between the United States and the Soviet Union during their rivalry’s heyday), China’s emerging role as an
important U.S. creditor, and the political power of key U.S. constituencies that profit from
strong ties with China all combine to frustrate any attempt by the U nited States to restrain the
growth of Chinese capabilities by cutting off Beijing’s economic links with itself or with
other states. The United States thus finds itself locked in a conundrum: it is tied to China through dense economic links that have
value because of their absolute gains, but it is threatened by the fact that the relative gains from this relationship are arguably greater
for Beijing and are increasingly used to build up Chinese military forces in a way that threatens the security of the United States and
its closest Asian allies. This problem has no easy solutions. What alone is certain is that containment is infeasible today, even if it may
be most needed as a device for limiting Chinese power. This is why balancing becomes essential— China’s rising power
cannot go unchecked. Even if Beijing’s intentions are peaceful today, there is no assurance that they will remain so in
perpetuity. China’s rapid growth has already elevated regional anxieties because of the dramatic shifts in the
local “correlation of forces”; it has weakened the credibility of U.S. security guarantees to the littoral
states, thanks to its ability to produce strategic instruments capable of inflicting great
damage on U.S. military assets deployed around the Indo–Pacific; and it has threatened the traditional
U.S. command of the commons as a result of its growing capacity to deny the United States
unfettered use of the seas, space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum . These realities
combine to generate a serious and deepening challenge to U.S. power projection in Asia and, by extended implication, to U.S. primacy
itself. If the United States is to protect its global position amidst these challenges, it cannot afford not to balance China, even if it must
implement this response subtly and politely, garbed in the language of “strategic partnership.” Given these circumstances, the
United States must pursue a balancing strategy of the kind that has not been attempted before. The core
objective must be to protect, and wherever possible to expand, the extant U.S. advantages in relative power,
but without incorporating those components that would spell containment. These components include
cutting China’s access to the global trading regime; integrating China’s neighbors into a
unified alliance system against Beijing; developing collective defense strategies against
China; and pursuing an ideological campaign aimed at delegitimizing the Chinese state and its
governing regime. Safeguarding U.S. hegemony requires instead a four-pronged strategy A trading relationship was completely absent
between the United States and the Soviet Union. If the U.S. is to protect its global position, it cannot afford not to balance China.
Balancing without Containment: A U.S. Strategy for Confronting China’s Rise THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & FALL 2013
111 that Washington must pursue concertedly in order to balance against growing Chinese power: first, it must
support
the rise of other Asian powers located along China’s periphery ; second, it must deepen globalization in
specific ways to procure enhanced gains for itself and its friends; third, it must invest in preserving its extant military superiority; and,
finally, it must revitalize the U.S. economy to sustain its dominance in the new leading sectors of the global economy. Don’t Push
China Down, Raise Others Up First initiated by President George W. Bush but now continued purposefully by Barack Obama, the
first prong of the evolving U.S. strategy for balancing Beijing aims not at keeping China down, but raising others up—or, to put it
differently, to propel the growth of other nations along China’s periphery as a way of “weaving the net” that produces a “moderating
effect on [Chinese] behavior.”4 The logic of the strategy is simple and aptly suited to present circumstances. If the consequential states
abutting China—such as Japan, India, Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia, and Australia, among others—can be aided by U.S. power to
realize their strategic potential and to increase their mutual cooperation while deepening their partnership with the United States, the
net effect would be to create objective constraints that limit the misuse of Chinese power in
Asia. These checks would not materialize because the Asian partners necessarily bandwagon with the United States or even champion
all its policies vis-a`-vis Beijing. Rather, they would be produced by the growing capabilities of these key nations—aided by the
United States—and their increased incentives for collaboration both among themselves and with Washington. These
elements,
driven by the regional actors’ own concerns about China’s increasing power, would position
the key Asian states in ways fundamentally congruent with U.S. interests, especially the core
objective of restraining the potential for Chinese aggressiveness , while at the same time providing “the
necessary cushion that prevents [their] tightened commercial interdependence [with China] from disrupting the delicate balance
between economic gains and geopolitical risks.”5 Such a regional equilibrium offers the potential for
balancing China—and inducing good behavior on the part of Beijing—without any necessity for
containment, let alone conflict. The success of this approach, however, hinges on the ability of the United States to pay
consistent attention to the critical states abutting China, while at the same time keeping diplomatic relations with Beijing on an even
keel.6 Consequently, the United States (and its friends) ought to engage China at multiple levels, both bilaterally and multilaterally,
avoiding single-issue politics whenever possible. Disagreement
over issues like human rights, political
freedoms, the treatment of minorities, nonproliferation, or military modernization should
be handled tactfully. Such an approach does not require the West to paper over what may be troublesome Chinese domestic,
foreign, or strategic policies, nor to shy away from visible and public confrontations if egregious Chinese lapses demand it, but rather
to ensure that all such responses are sensitive to context, proportionality, and effectiveness. Put simply, the goal of deepened political
engagement with China ought to be encouraging it to stay committed to peaceful development both within and without. To the degree
that such engagement requires creating new inter-societal linkages or new fora for bilateral and regional cooperation, these avenues
should be explored. Ashley J. Tellis 112 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & FALL 2013 To their credit, recent U.S.
administrations have more or less successfully pursued this emphasis on sustaining
productive relations with China. Such a focus, however, cannot be allowed to eclipse—as it often does
in Washington—the equally vital objective of strengthening U.S. ties with the key power centers
located along China’s immediate and extended outskirts. Since 2001, for example, the United States has made a special
effort to transform its ties with India, the other rising Asian giant whose large continental size, great economic and demographic
potential, significant military capabilities, and sturdy commitment to democracy—not to mention its own ongoing rivalry with China
—make it a particularly attractive partner for Washington. This rapprochement with India should extend to other critical Southeast
Asian states. Such an effort will require considerable political attention at high levels in Washington—and a remarkable degree of
consistency that in the past has often been the exception, not the norm. The endeavor is admittedly challenging: the number of states
that Washington must engage successfully is large; the partners themselves are remarkably diverse in national capabilities and differ in
alliance status; they each pursue varying strategic objectives; and their capacity to respond to U.S. overtures is dissimilar as well.
Because they are all individually weaker than China, they are at times easy to overlook;
nevertheless, their role cannot go underestimated. For that reason, U.S. policymakers
should continually strengthen the national power of these littoral entities even when they cannot or
will not reciprocate U.S. initiatives as fulsomely as may be desired. And if these nations do reach their strategic
potential as a result of preferential U.S. assistance, they would effectively serve as a
powerful constraint on China’s freedom of action in Asia. This would not only limit Beijing’s
capacity to dominate important centers of the global economy, but would bring China’s
entire outer periphery under the influence of nations friendly to the U nited States. Thus, U.S.
hegemony would gain another, more local level of protection—and in so doing will buttress U.S. primacy for
longer, and more cheaply, compared to many other alternatives. This approach generates a positive converse as well. If U.S. assistance
strengthens the regional powers, their incentives to expand economic interdependence with China would grow; they would have no
reason to fear that the material gains accruing to Beijing could be used to threaten their security. The persistence of such a positive-
sum game all around, then, mitigates interstate rivalry and its potential for undermining larger gains in prosperity. The
strategy
of nurturing the growth of major powers along the Asian periphery in order to balance
China without containing it, therefore, provides the regional system with the best of both worlds: an
opportunity to limit Beijing’s capacity for malevolence without sacrificing the common
prosperity arising from trade and interdependence.
China Pipeline Good
China Pipeline key to Chinese energy security increases their total supply
Suleimen, 14
(USEN SULEIMEN¶ Ambassador-at-Large at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, “energy Cooperation Between
Kazakhstan and China,” The Astana Times, 1/15/14, doa, 7/15/16, http://astanatimes.com/2014/01/energy-cooperation-kazakhstan-
china/ DDI, NB)
In general, the
two countries’ interests coincide: the key aspects of their mutually beneficial
cooperation are energy and hydrocarbon-resource projects . Kazakhstan, now Central Asia’s energy leader,
accounts for the bulk of the region’s hydrocarbon resources, i.e. oil and natural gas. With its small population size and low
consumption level, Kazakhstan is a significant net exporter of hydrocarbons in Central Asia. However, the bulk of its exports had to
pass through Russian territory or Russian-owned pipelines. At the same time, since the mid-1990s, China
has increasingly
needed more oil imports to maintain its economic growth. Also, China seeks to reduce its
dependence on marine imports by sea due to “the Malacca Dilemma ” and the instability of some
Middle Eastern and African countries.¶ The same mutual desire could be seen during the September 2013 visit to
Kazakhstan by new Chinese President Xi Jinping that led to the signing of energy deals worth $30 billion, including China National
Petroleum Corporation’s (CNPC) acquisition of an 8.3 percent stake in Kashagan, the largest oilfield in the world outside the Middle
East.¶ The fact that Kazakhstan’s oil consumption is substantially lower than its production enables it to export oil massively. In the
past, the biggest barriers to oil exports were limited transportation and infrastructure. In 2003, the newly constructed Caspian
Petroleum Consortium (CPC) line to the Black Sea was put into effect. The subsequent increase in oil exports from the Tengiz and
Karachaganak oilfields contributed significantly to the increase of oil production. Also, during the period 1990 to 2010, the country’s
oil consumption decreased drastically from 21.7 million tons to 9.7 million tons mostly due to increasing energy efficiency and
substitution with natural gas. As a result, Kazakhstan’s oil exports on a net basis skyrocketed from 1.9 million tons in 1992 to 67.1
million tons in 2010. Kazakh oil exports continue to grow rapidly, with infrastructure delivering it currently to world markets via the
Black Sea (via Russia), the Persian Gulf (via swaps with Iran), the north pipeline and rail to Russia, and now via oil pipelines to the
East to China.¶ Currently, the cheapest route for Kazakhstan’s oil exports is via the Atyrau-Samara pipeline, which connects to Russia
through its oil pipeline network. KazTransOil and Transneft jointly own it. The transit tariff is $0.73/tonne/100 kilometres—in other
words, around $2-3 per barrel, excluding the tariff through Kazakhstan. However, both the capacity of the Atyrau-Samara pipeline and
current agreements between Russia and Kazakhstan limit shipments through this route to 15-17.5 million tons a year. For this reason,
government-owned or affiliated oil companies get priority rights to use this pipeline. ¶ The second most feasible route is the Caspian
Petroleum Consortium with its tariff set at $3.70 per barrel. Use of the CPC’s capacity, however, is restricted to CPC members; and,
while they may reassign their capacity to third parties, this requires the approval of all members of the consortium.¶ Another
alternative is for Kazakh producers to ship oil from the port of Aktau in western Kazakhstan across the Caspian Sea to the eastern
shore ports (Baku/Makhachkala), and from there on by rail to either the Russian port of Novorossiysk or the Georgian port of Batumi.
The Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline has a limited throughput and cannot be a strategic export route. Another profitable trans-Caspian
export pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC), became available in 2005. The total expense of shipping through the BTC pipeline
amounts to $3-4 per barrel, including tanker and offloading costs. But here, the main problem is that Kazakhstan has limited export
infrastructure because approximately 80 percent of Kazakhstan oil exports still depend on Russian-controlled pipelines and railway
systems.¶ In December 2007, the Chinese National Petroleum Company pledged to invest $2.2 billion in a 1,800-kilometre, 1.06
trillion cubic feet/year natural gas pipeline that would run from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China.
According to the construction plan, the pipeline is expected to start at Gedaim on the border of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
Approximately 520 kilometres would run through Uzbekistan and the rest through Kazakhstan to
reach Khorgos in China’s northwestern Xinjiang region. In August 2006, Turkmenistan and China signed a 30-
year supply agreement for the gas that will fill the pipeline. The CNPC has set up two entities to oversee the Turkmen upstream
project and the development of the second pipeline that will cross China from the Xinjiang region to demand centers in southeast
China. The total cost of the entire project is expected to be in the vicinity of $7.31 billion. Also, Russia is planning a natural gas
pipeline to China (International Energy Agency (IEA) 2008).¶ Approximately 30 percent of Kazakhstan’s coal production is for
export, mainly to Russia and Ukraine rather than China. Although its coal is inexpensive to produce, there are questions surrounding
the perceived profitability of exports due to the long distances involved.¶ There are two reasons why coal in Kazakhstan is not being
exported to China. First, the markets for Kazakh coal in the former Soviet Union were under contract, meaning that from 1990 on, a
certain portion of coal exports to Russia was contract-based; then, from 1999 on, the remainder was only to meet the country’s internal
demand, notwithstanding the expansion of the economy. Second, China has large coal reserves, especially in its north-western
provinces, e.g., Shanxi and Inner Mongolia.¶ Thus, it is not economically efficient for the north-western and central parts of China to
import coal from Central Asia. In eastern China, coal is imported from Vietnam and Australia. Thus, in effect, cooperation between
Kazakhstan and China in the coal sector is reasonably limited.¶ As mentioned, China
became a net importer of oil in
1993 when its demand for oil surpassed its supplies of oil. By the end of 2002, it had overtaken
Japan to become the second largest oil consumer behind the U.S. The net import dependency of oil soared
from 7.5 percent in 1993 to 53.3 percent in 2011 (IEA, 2012). The Middle East is the principal source of China’s
oil imports, accounting for 40.4 percent in 2005. A further 21.1 percent came from the Asia Pacific region, approximately 23.1
percent from Africa, and 11.7 percent from the former Soviet Union (IEA, 2012).¶ The main way of importing China’s
oil is by ocean tankers, which accounts for 93 percent of the total. But, almost 80 percent of these oil imports
pass through the Strait of Malacca, exposing China to the insecurities of overdependence on a
congested passage. So China realized its need to start looking for new supplies for oil. It was agreed that Russia and
Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan, would account for an increasing share of China’s oil imports by
means of oil pipelines.¶ According to the IEA (2007), China’s dependence on imports will rise from about 50 percent of
consumption in 2007 to 80 percent in 2030, considering that the potential for increasing domestic oil
production is small and the demand for oil is large and growing. The gradual increase in the
country’s oil imports resulted from the stagnation of domestic oil production and a surge in
domestic oil consumption. Although China became the fifth largest oil producer after Iran, the U.S., Russia and Saudi Arabia
in 2007 (IEA, 2008), the growth rate of oil production lagged behind that of oil consumption, a situation borne out by BP statistics.
Between 1990 and 2010, the average annual growth rate of oil production was 1.8 percent whereas that of oil consumption reached 7.3
percent (BP, 2011).¶ The stagnation in oil production is due to limited oil endowment and the aging of the country’s major oilfields.
Although China discovered the Jidong Nanpu oilfield offshore of the Bohai Gulf in 2007, representing the biggest find in 40 years and
the largest offshore discovery ever in China, the growth rate of domestic oil output will likely be moderate (CNPC, 2007). This
discovery, while undoubtedly easing the domestic oil supply pressure, is unlikely to reverse the upward trend of China’s oil imports.¶
Given that most international agencies, with the exception of OPEC, have predicted that oil production will increase from 184.8
million tons in 2006 to only 189.2-199.2 million tons in 2020, the country’s net import dependency is set to go north. China’s demand
for natural gas increased remarkably from 15,250 million cubic metres (Mcm) in 1990 to 69,523 Mcm in 2007, generating pressure on
the supply side. China imported 950 million cubic metres of liquefied natural gas (LNG) for the first time in 2006: its natural gas
imports are projected to increase sharply from 1,200 Mcm in 2010 to 2,800 Mcm in 2015 and 12,800 Mcm in 2030 (IEA, 2007).¶
Most of its imported gas will come by pipeline from neighbouring countries. Beijing has mooted several large-scale pipelines to bring
supplies from abroad, among which is a 3,000-kilometre pipeline from Kazakhstan to Khorgos in Xinjiang, which is due to come on-
stream in late 2014. This pipeline will carry gas mainly from Turkmenistan, which, as mentioned, in 2006 signed a 30-year deal with
China to deliver 3,000 Mcm of gas annually, but also from other Central Asian countries. It will ultimately connect with China’s
planned second west-to-east natural gas pipeline. Its capacity will be 1,000 Mcm per year initially and will rise to 3,000 Mcm per year
by 2014.¶ In addition, the CNPC signed an agreement with Exxon (U.S.) and Russia’s Rosneft for an 800 Mcm capacity pipeline from
Sakhalin-1 Island to the Khabarovsk region. The latest report shows that Sakhalin-1 gas supplies to the Khabarovsk region will reach
10 bcm by November 2013. Two other agreements were also signed between the CNPC and Russia’s Gazprom in 2006 to import gas
through pipelines running first via an as yet undetermined route from western Siberia to China’s Xinjiang, and second from eastern
Siberia to Heilongjiang Province in north-east China. These lines will have a combined annual capacity of 3,000 Mcm per year, with
delivery targeted for 2013 (Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 2007).¶ Other gas imports will include liquefied natural gas (LNG)
shipped in by tankers. The first LNG terminal, which was built by BP and the Chinese National Overseas Oil Company (CNOOC) in
Shenzhen, opened for business in June 2006. Initially, the $10 billion project aimed to allow the import of 450 Mcm of LNG each year
from Australia and up to 1,100 Mcm annually by 2008. BP has a 30 percent equity stake in the project, while CNOOC controls 33
percent Six 320 MW gas-fired power plants will ultimately be fed by gas piped from the terminal (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC), 2006).¶ The Shenzhen LNG terminal is only the first of a dozen terminals planned along China’s coast. The second, which is
located in Fujian province, opened in April 2008. So, now there are five LNG terminals planned to operate in China, including
Shanghai (October 2009), Jiangsu (November 2011) and Dalian (November 2011). These projects will provide fuel to dozens of gas-
fired power plants being constructed in tandem with the terminals or being converted from existing oil-fired facilities—part of a plan
to boost gas-generated power from 960,000 kWh in 2000 (some 0.3 percent of the national total) to 2.8 billion kWh by 2020 (IEA,
2007).¶ China’s coal consumption increased from 1,055 Mt in 1990 to 2,897 Mt in 2010. Largely due to the transport bottleneck
deadlock alluded to above, China’s net imports of coal climbed from 17.3 Mt to 59.8 Mt per year, with its self-sufficiency rate of coal
dropping from 115.3 percent in 1990 to 102.2 percent in 2010 (China Statistics Yearbook, 2011). IEA reported that China has been a
net importer of steam coal since 2007, its coal imports mainly meeting the demand in the country’s coastal provinces (IEA, 2011).
Key suppliers in 2030 will be Indonesia, Australia, South Africa, Mongolia, Vietnam and Russia (IEA 2007). As Kazakhstan is
situated on the west side of China, Kazakh coal will not be an ideal item for Kazakhstan-China energy cooperation.¶ Chinese
decision-making regarding the purchase of oil and gas fields has been affected by the fact that
Beijing was a late-comer in the Kazakhstan market. For this reason, in the early stages, China could only acquire
sites of relatively marginal importance (as it did in Africa). Despite these negative initial conditions, Beijing’s
purchases are still commercially rational . It invests in fields located in the Aktobe region and near the Caspian Sea,
areas that are situated around the energy center of Central Asia. As well, it is also involved in more isolated fields that have the
advantage of being located along the path of the Kazakhstan-China pipeline.¶ In 1997, the CNPC acquired 60 percent of the shares of
the oil company Aktobemunaigaz, which is based in the Aktobe region. It also acquired a 20-year user license for the Zhanazhol gas
site and the Kenkiyak oil site. In its own interests, and in a bid to gain favor with Kazakh authorities, the CNPC committed to
investing $4 billion by 2010, of which $540 million would be made available in the first five years. In 2005, the CNPC launched its
largest foreign acquisition, i.e., Petrokazakhstan (formerly Hurricane Hydrocarbons). The CNPC outbid its Indian competitor Oil and
Natural Gas Corp (ONGC) by offering the sum of $4.2 billion.¶ Rationales of Energy Cooperation between Two Nations¶ Energy
Rationale. The Kazakhstan-China energy cooperation is principally based on the simple fact that
China needs to import energy for development and Kazakhstan needs to export energy to maintain its economic
growth. Although China is a larger crude producer, its far greater population and rapid economic
growth since the 1990s have transformed the country into a net importer of oil. In contrast, Kazakhstan is
not a particularly big crude oil producer: its crude production was only 36.8 percent of China’s in 2007 (IEA, 2009). However, the
country’s very small population and total amount of consumption sizes make Kazakhstan a significant oil exporter in Eurasia.¶ Both
countries have adopted diverse strategies for energy trade. Currently, China’s crude imports are heavily dependent
on the Middle East and Africa, countries that are politically unstable and suffer from active
terrorism and sabotage. In 2005, the Persian Gulf and Africa accounted for 46 percent and 31 percent respectively. China
would like to reduce its dependence on Middle East and African oil by creating alternative
sources. On the other hand, for historical reasons, Kazakhstan’s oil exports have been overwhelmingly dominated by Russia’s
network. Before the operation of the BTC, virtually all of Kazakhstan’s oil exports were towards Russia, or via Russia’s pipeline.
Thus, selling oil to the East also meets the strategic interests of Kazakhstan energy trade policy.¶ Geopolitical Rationale.
Hegemonic decline of the US creates instability and mistrust, increasing risk

of war
Bresler 16 (Robert, a Penn State Harrisburg professor emeritus of public policy). “Obama-led
US withdrawal has destabilized the world.” Retrieved from
http://lancasteronline.com/opinion/columnists/obama-led-us-withdrawal-has-destabilized-the-
world/article_1c73c828-19d4-11e5-ab00-d32898937e9a.html July 16 // DDI - CS
American leadership need not mean involvement in endless wars. Past history gives us
examples. The Marshall Plan allowed worn-torn allied governments to provide their people with political stability and
economic development. NATO was an effort to build Western European unity, end the quarrels that had produced two world wars,
and deter Soviet aggression. The United Nations, disappointing in many ways, was a vehicle for broad international efforts against
disease, illiteracy and regional wars. The International Monetary Fund, World Bank and the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs were designed to facilitate international trade, prevent currency wars and assist in
economic development. These initiatives prevented another great power war, achieved a large
degree of European reconciliation, and eased the transition for post-colonial countries in
Africa and Asia. None would have happened without strong and persistent American
leadership. The U.S. negotiated a series of defense treaties with more than 35 nations,
designed to deter aggression, that also eased their burden of self-defense and allowed them
to place more resources into the reconstruction of their economies. In the Middle East, the
Arab States and Israel saw the U.S. as an honest broker, assisting in the negotiation of peace
treaties between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan . During the Obama administration
there has been a steady American retreat from world leadership. NATO is far less effective.
Allies such as Israel, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, the Baltic States and Iraq are no longer confident of
American support. Hence, China, Russia and Iran are asserting hegemonic claims. The
world is now torn by devolution and fractionalization. The forces of global and regional
cooperation are in disrepair. The United Nations stands helpless against Russian aggression,
civil war in Syria and Libya and atrocities by the Islamic State across the Middle East and North Africa;
the European Union is facing possible revolts and threats of secession by the United
Kingdom and Greece and waning allegiance in much of Europe; and NATO offers Ukraine
no more than its good wishes as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s military swallows the country
bit by bit. Our allies are far from steadfast. Their governments are weaker, and vivid world leaders are hard to find among them.
Putin, the insane leaders of the Islamic State and the Iranian mullahs have put fear in the hearts of our allies. Why are these second-
and third-rate powers able to intimidate their neighbors far more effectively than did the far more powerful Soviet Union? Our
democratic allies in Europe, lacking a clear sense of direction, are ruled by unstable coalitions. Even Germany, perhaps the strongest
of our European allies, refuses to confront Putin in his efforts to destabilize Ukraine. When the Obama administration
made concession after concession to the Iranians over its nuclear program, our negotiating
partners in Europe lost any interest in taking serious steps to keep Iran out of the nuclear
club. In the Middle East tribalism and religious fanaticism have left Iraq, Syria, Libya and
Yemen virtually ungovernable. Iraq, left to its won devices by Obama’s withdrawal after American troops sacrificed
so much to establish a nascent democracy, is now falling apart. In Egypt, a military regime is trying to
forcibly contain the boiling pot that is the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf States, feeling
abandoned by Obama’s rush to a nuclear agreement with Iran, are sensing the quicksand beneath their feet. Warlordism and
radical Islam plague the economically depressed countries of sub-Saharan Africa. A
combination of devolution and chaos becomes normal state of affairs absent a strong
centripetal leadership. In the last half of the 20th century, America provided that force with
persuasion, assistance, assurance and trust. As the Obama administration allows the U.S. to slip into the
shadows world politics, the danger of war increases.
Chinese EconSCS Conflict
Slow growth causes SCS conflict – rally around the flag effect
O’Reilly 15 [Brendan - China-based writer and educator from Seattle. He is author of The
Transcendent Harmony. “The Implications of China’s Growth Slowdown”, World Affairs
Council of Western Michigan, March 5, 2015, http://www.worldmichigan.org/the-implications-
of-chinas-growth-slowdown/]
The once extraordinary rate of Chinese economic growth is slowing. In 2014, China’s GDP grew at an
official rate of 7.4 percent, slightly less than the stated goal of 7.5 percent. Although more recently monthly data have been more
robust, the trend towards slowing growth seems inexorable. A
decelerating Chinese economy, coming at a time of
global economic uncertainty (especially in the eurozone), could have dramatic economic implications
throughout the world. However, the repercussions of a Chinese economic slowdown would not be
limited to the economic sphere. Given the incredible importance of economic growth to political
stability – both within China itself and East Asia in general – adapting to a dampened Chinese
economy will be a pivotal challenge in the Asia-Pacific. While an official GDP growth rate of 7.4 percent
would be the envy of most major economies, this figure represents China’s lowest economic growth since 1991. And of course,
economic data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics is not completely trusted by all observers. Local officials (and the central
government itself) have a vested interest in exaggerating their economic performance. Capital Economics, a London-based research
group, monitors the Chinese economy by looking at the five factors of electricity output, freight shipmen, construction, passenger
travel, and cargo volume. According to this China Activity Proxy, recent annual growth is closer to 5.7 percent. Regardless of the
statistical specifics of the Chinese slowdown, this
development poses some degree of political risk for the
Chinese state. For more than two decades economic growth has been the major factor in ensuring
political stability in China. Many Westerners forget that the massive protests that rocked Beijing and other Chinese cities in
1989 coincided with the biggest economic crisis of the post-Mao era, with annual inflation of 30 percent leading to panic buying
throughout the country. Since 1990, China has been governed by a social contract in which the material lives of ordinary citizens
improve dramatically while the Party keeps a monopoly on political power. Rising wages and standards of living
helped ensure political stability. Historically most revolutions, including the recent upheavals in the Middle
East, only reached critical mass when a majority of a country’s people lost hope in the economic
capabilities of the governing political structure. Recent initiatives by the Chinese state can be
understood in light of these economic concerns. Since coming in to power in 2013, the administration
of President Xi Jinping has launched several populist measures . Posters throughout the country combine traditional
Chinese themes with Communist Party slogans to promote the “Chinese Dream.” Xi’s campaigns against lavish banquets and other
government waste led to a significant drop in the price of high-end liquor soon after his rise to power. Perhaps most
important has been a massive anti-corruption campaign, which has netted thousands of corrupt officials, from
minor bureaucrats to the massively powerful former head of internal security. The anti-corruption campaign in China has been so far-reaching that it is now having
negative effects on the Chinese economy. These effects create something of a contradiction in the Chinese polity, because although the anti-corruption campaign enjoys widespread support, it appears to be having
some detrimental effects on the main economic pillar of Chinese political stability. Besides dampening the high-end liquor market, the anti-graft and ant-waste campaigns have had deleterious effects on industries
from tourism and gambling to real estate. Mao Daqing, deputy chief executive officer of the largest property developer in China, openly warned ofthe economic impacts of the political campaign: “For us developers,
the impact of the anti-corruption campaign on the sales of high-end property is very serious.” China’s once-booming housing market is now deflating, with prices falling in a majority of cities. Prices appear to be
dropping because the rapid increase in housing supply in recent years has outstripped demand. Problems in the real estate market are mirrored by other macroeconomic troubles. Much of the low-hanging economic
fruit in China has been plucked. Rising wages in China have led many manufacturers to relocate to countries such as Vietnam or the Philippines. China’s historically strong international trade is also taking a hit, with
exports down 3.3 percent from a year ago and imports dropping nearly 20 percent. In June 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang pledged to maintain a robust growth rate: “China’s economy needs to grow at a proper
rate, expected to be around 7.5 per cent this year… Despite considerable downward pressure, China’s economy is moving on a steady course. We will continue to make anticipatory and moderate adjustments when
necessary. We are well prepared to defuse various risks.” Indeed, since this pledge and the subsequent slowdown, the central government has used macroeconomic tools to boost growth. The People’s Bank of China
cut interest rates in November, and more recently lowered the reserve requirement ratio, freeing up $100 billion for lending. China has weathered previous economic predicaments, for example the 2008 global
financial crisis, and emerged stronger. A hard landing is by no means a foregone conclusion, and China still has many macroeconomic advantages. However, for all the policy tools at Beijing’s disposal, China’s
leaders cannot guarantee rapid economic growth forever. It may be necessary to lower economic expectations, while shoring up the state’s popular legitimacy through non-economic means. Back in 2013, Xi
criticized the myopic focus on economic growth, saying “We should never judge a cadre simply by the growth of gross domestic product.” More recently an article in China’s NetEase quoted Fudan University
Department of Finance professor Kong Aiguo as saying, “Since we are entering what is called the ‘new normal’, we should not worry about the speed of GDP, bur rather we should focus on livelihood issues, public
Adapting to China’s “new normal” of lowered GDP growth

welfare issues, entrepreneurship issues, and financial transparency issues.”
will be an important challenge for leaders in China and around the world . China does more international
trade than any other country on earth. Besides issues of trade, any problems in the Chinese financial system could have serious global
impacts, especially coming at a time of relative global economic uncertainty. If
China does face a prolonged period of
economic difficulty, the political repercussions could be volatile. The Chinese state might be
forced to look for alternative sources of popular support . China’s leaders could implement additional
populist measures. It is also possible that increased nationalism could come in to play, especially in
the unresolved territorial disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Regional
and global powers would be wise to monitor China’s economic situation closely.
Chinese EconGlobal Econ
Chinese economic collapse causes instant value evaporation around the globe
Gorrie 13 [James - political economist and leading financial journalist. The China Crisis: How
China's Economic Collapse Will Lead to a Global Depression, Wiley]
What ’s Really behind the Great Wall? What some see in China is not the next great superpower, but
rather the next great collapse of a massively complex and brittle regime that is among the most
brutal and oppressive the world has ever known. There is no crystal ball that tells us what will happen in the
future, but there is known history in China, and China ’s modern history is one of great crises and spasms of
social and political violence on a scale unknown anywhere else , with the possible exception of the old Soviet
Union. There is, of course, the history and historical collapse of their former communist neighbor, the former Soviet Union;
that in itself is not a definitive indicator, but it can certainly suggest possible outcomes. After
all, command
economies, wherever they are tried, all suffer from similar fundamental fl aws that have all resulted in
cataclysmic disasters. But it won ’t be just one crisis that China will have to handle; it will be
many, and all at the same time or in quick succession. There will defi nitely be a domino eff ect
in play as the crises overlap and magnify the impacts of the others. Before too long , hundreds of
billions, if not trillions, of dollars will be lost in China—and in Chinese companies around the world.
Chinese economic collapse goes global

Grandi 16 [Kedra – staff writer, “IMF warns that an economic crisis in China could cause
global recession again”, International Business Times, April 6, 2016,
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/imf-warns-that-economic-crisis-china-could-make-world-go-back-into-
recession-1553150]
An economic crisis in China could result in a world-wide recession, warned the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). This was because China's financial links with the rest of the global economy was set
to increase, the organisation said ahead of its spring conference in Washington next week. "It is likely that China's
spillovers to global financial markets will increase considerably in the next few years", the IMF said.
The warning comes at a time when there is continuing concern over the China slowdown and amid the Beijing government's efforts to
shift its manufacturing dependent economy to one that is more dependent on domestic consumption. It also comes at a time when the
central banks of developed nations such as the US Federal Reserve are taking a call on raising their interest rates after taking into
account the economic activity in China and other emerging markets. The
IMF said the impact of emerging
economies on developed nations had increased to such an extent that "spillovers" now accounted
for one-third of price movements across equity and foreign exchange markets of developed nations. The
financial impact of China was also said to grow because of the opening up of its local bond and
other markets to foreign investment. "China's financial integration with the rest of the world is
expected to accelerate, and its financial influence abroad will likely catch up with its economic
prowess" the IMF said. To cite a recent example, the Chinese turmoil at the start of 2016 gave the
world's stock markets the worst start to a year since the financial crisis. The FTSE 100 index lost
5% or £81bn (€101.42bn, $115.49bn) in value, because of a crisis in Beijing. Last week, the Bank of England is said
to have considered a Far East crash as one of the possible reasons for the next recession.
Solvency
Plan Solves HR
Plan’s establishment of a consulate and bilateral human rights engagement
key to check current abuses.
Gershman 10 (Carl, President of the National Endowment for Democracy and former U.S Representative for
the U.N Committee on Human Rights, The Washington Post. “China's invisible atrocity; Who will stand up for Uighur
rights?”, 7/5/2010, https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-25308532.html)
A year ago today, when Chinese police violently suppressed a peaceful protest by the Uighur minority in
Urumqi, the capital of the western region of Xinjiang, theworld essentially looked the other way. This is the message of "Can Anyone
Hear Us?" a report that the Uyghur Human Rights Project recently issued on the unrest. Drawing on eyewitness accounts , the report details
the firing on protesters that led to hundreds of deaths, as well as mass beatings, the arbitrary
detention of thousands and a 10-month communications shutdown that cut off the region from the
outside world. At a Washington conference last week where the report was released, an eyewitness testified that he saw
police handing out steel batons to mobs of Han Chinese, confirming reports that security forces
fomented anti-Uighur violence. Beijing has blamed "overseas hostile forces" for the violence, especially Uighur leader
Rebiya Kadeer, who was exiled to the United States from a Chinese prison in 2005. But the source of the unrest is
entirely internal, the immediate cause being an attack on Uighur workers at a Guangdong toy
factory 10 days before the Urumqi protests. The presence of Uighur workers 3,000 miles east of
Urumqi illustrates China's anti-Uighur policy, which encourages Han Chinese settlement and
employment in the western Xinjiang region while jobless Uighurs, especially young women, are recruited
to work in factories in eastern China. The focus on women is not accidental, Kadeer explained at the
Washington conference: "We believe that it is part of the authorities' efforts to threaten our continuity as a people because they are
taking these women out of their communities at the time they would be getting married and
starting families." In fact, the population transfer that is altering Xinjiang's ethnic composition is one dimension of a
systematic Chinese policy that threatens the survival of the Uighur people. The Uighur language
has been virtually eliminated from school instruction, while hundreds of books on Uighur history
and culture have been banned and even ceremoniously burned. The Uighurs' Muslim faith is under attack
as religious personnel are forced to undergo "patriotic re-education" and the construction of
mosques is strictly controlled. Not least, Chinese authorities are in the process of demolishing the Old
City of Kashgar, forcibly removing 200,000 people in 65,000 households and destroying what
has been called "the cradle of Uyghur culture." U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has called the plan to demolish
22 Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem "provocative" and "contrary to international law." But the wholesale destruction of Old
Kashgar and the entire Uighur culture merits not a word. As George Orwell said with Stalin in mind, "the most enormous crimes . . .
can actually escape notice altogether, so long as they do not happen to fit in with the political mood of the moment." Clearly, the awful
plight of the Uighurs does not fit with the political mood of this moment, even among their co-religionists in the Muslim world. The
report released last week contains recommendations to the Chinese government and the international community. What is noteworthy
about the recommendations to Beijing -- for media freedom and the rule of law, as well as for acknowledgement of the underlying
causes of the Urumqi protests -- is that they are consistent with the principles and goals in the Charter 08 declaration signed by more
than 8,000 Chinese citizens, including the call for a federated republic "within which all ethnic and religious groups can flourish."
Chinese democrats and the Uighur minority are threatened by the extreme nationalism that the Beijing government incites to gain
legitimacy in the absence of democratic authority derived from popular consent. The dialogue they have begun in exile needs to
resonate in China through the extensive communication channels that the regime cannot altogether block, thereby countering
nationalist hatred and reinforcing a common commitment to nonviolence and a different future for China. Much can also be done by
the international community. A resolution introduced by Rep. James McGovern (D-Mass.) would have the United
States raise the issue of Uighur rights in meetings with Chinese officials, request that embassy
staff be allowed to observe trials and seek to establish a consulate in Urumqi. The United States
and the international community should also support the Uighurs' three-month-old call for an
independent international investigation into the events of last July and the opening of a meaningful dialogue with
Chinese authorities. Uighur voices have been crying in the wilderness. It's time to listen.
We must increase engagement with Uyghurs through the establishment of an
embassy
Dywer 5 (Arienne M. Dwyer, a professor of Linguistic Anthropology in the Department of
Anthropology at the University of Kansas, where she also serves as co-director of the KU
Institute for Digital Research in the Humanities. “The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity,
Language Policy, and Political Discourse”
http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/10125/3504/1/PS015.pdf
A civilian American presence in the XUAR would have both practical and outreach functions. A
U.S. trade center in Xinjiang could facilitate doing business in western China; a consulate could
alleviate pressures at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, which currently serves all of north China. (At
present, residents of Xinjiang must travel 4,000 kilometers at considerable cost just to reach the
U.S. embassy in Beijing.) Either facility would have the potential to moderate Chinese heavy-
handedness in the regions, such as the unnecessarily provocative joint Pakistan-China military
exercises of the summer of 2004. Given that the PRC government is uneasy about U.S. bases in
the Central Asia republics, a successful U.S. proposal on Xinjiang would stress the practical
advantages of such an institution.
Uyghurs Want Help
Uyghurs want foreign assistance
Bovingdon 10, Gardner. associate professor of Central Eurasian studies at Indiana University,
Bloomington. The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land. New York: Columbia UP, 2010.
Print. Pg. 3-4
All these issues come together in China's northwest. Just as the Soviet Union formed from the heterogeneous territories of the Russian
czarist empire, the People's Republic of China (PRC) had inherited most of the lands conquered Manchu Qing empire before its
collapse in 1911. In the course of abandoning socialism, the Soviet Union disintegrated, finally disgorging many of the former
imperial territories. In 1979 China's leaders in Beijing embarked on ambitious reforms of the socialist system, and many foreign
observers wondered whether China's transition to postsocialism, if that was indeed what was taking place, would be similarly
cataclysmic. In 1759, Qing generals conquered the vast territory of what is today China's northwestern region of Xinjiang and
incorporated it into the empire. Even 190 years later when the PRC was founded, it remained culturally distinct and geographically
remote from China proper. The substantial population of Muslim, Turkic-speaking Uyghurs, gave Xinjiang its full name: the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region Beijing claims Uyghurs as part of the "great family of the Chinese
nation" and asserts that Xinjiang has been an integral piece of Chinese national territory
"since ancient times." Many Uyghurs, by contrast, believe themselves to be part of a distinct
Uyghur nation, with its own rightful homeland, history, culture, and language. Having seen
their Turkic-speaking, Muslim neighbors to the west Kazakhs, Uzbeks Qirghiz (Kyrgyz), Turkmens, and others-secede
from the "eternal" Soviet Union and found independent states bearing their own names, many Uyghurs
sought, and some still seek, to turn Xinjiang into a sovereign state. Learning of NATO
intervention in Kosovo, many Uyghurs hoped that foreign assistance would make this
possible, since they could not achieve independence on their own wider world It is not surprising that
well into the 199os, few people in the heard of were aware that Uyghurs were Muslims, since very few people had even heard of
Uyghurs. Within two years of the September and subsequent who on of twenty-two Uyghurs in Guantanamo, anyone in the United
States knew of the Uyghurs also knew that they were Muslim. One lamentable consequence of the Uyghurs' coming to international
prominence during the "war on terror has been that they have been fit into a ready-made grand narrative of culture clash, terrorism,
and global Islamic threat. In fact, though, there is scant evidence that more than hundred Uyghurs, if that many ever had any
connection with al Qaeda or the Taliban. One aim of this book is to demonstrate that most
Uyghur resistance to
Chinese rule is prompted by nationalism, not Islamism. But a wider purpose is to explore first, how and why large
numbers of Uyghurs have resisted their incorporation into the Chinese nation-state and, second, how and why the Chinese government
has attempted to overcome that resistance.
Uyghurs can’t handle the issue without intervention—China cracks down

Bovingdon 10, Gardner. associate professor of Central Eurasian studies at Indiana University,
Bloomington. The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land. New York: Columbia UP, 2010.
Print.
Chapter 1 describes how both Uyghur and Han nationalists (including officials in strategically concocted histories to serve political
purposes. It the Chinese state) also illustrates how Uyghurs could have come to the conclusion that Chinese rule over them and
Xinjiang is imperial. I briefly describe the Qing rule over Xinjiang as a colony, how Chinese nationalists at the turn of the twentieth
century sought to retain Qing territories while jettisoning the baggage of empire, and how someofficials in the
Nationalist government acknowledged that Xinjiang was a colony and might be due for
decolonization on the model of India or the Philippines. Having defeated the Nationalists and
consolidated authority over China's interior, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party squelched talk of
decolonization soon after Red Army forces occupied the strategic cities and towns in
Xinjiang. In lieu of independence or a Soviet-style republic, they offered the Uyghurs a system of "minzu regional autonomy," a
truncated version of the one they had set up in Inner Mongolia in 1947. Chapter 2 analyzes the system that the party established in
Xinjiang. I first evaluate the actual system according to international legal standards for autonomy and then examine the particular
components or consequences of that system, showing how each has contributed to the Uyghurs' discontent. Han academics and policy
advisers have proposed various changes to that system since the late 1990s, and in the concluding section of the chapter, I argue that
far from accommodating the demands of Uyghur protestors and critics, these proposed
changes portend the further consolidation of power by Han party officials, more policy-
driven Han immigration, and the perpetuation of policies that many Uyghurs oppose . Officials
and public security personnel have kept a tight lid on public protest in Xinjiang. As a consequence, most protest has been individual or
private. In chapter 3 I describe many Uyghurs' everyday strategies for criticizing and defying the system of governance they find so
objectionable. I contend that while these strategies have done little to change the region's system of governance, they have nonetheless
strengthened the Uyghurs' collective identity and widely disseminated information about the nature and depth of popular discontent In
chapter 4 I turn to the comparatively rare occasions when that discontent burst onto the public stage, in the form of protests and violent
episodes that brought Xinjiang and the Uyghurs some notoriety in the 1990s…
AT: DA
Appeasement DA
Containment ineffective - instead, strengthen ties with neighboring countries
Tellis 13, Ashley J. senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues. "Balancing Without
Containment: A U.S. Strategy For Confronting China's Rise." Washington Quarterly 36.4 (2013):
109-124. Academic Search Complete. Retrieved from
http://ry2ue4ek7d.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi
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9177&rft.volume=36&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=109&rft.epage=124&paramdict=en-US July 12 CS
China’s rise constitutes the most serious geopolitical challenge facing the United States today. On current trends, China could—many
say will—develop a national economy larger than that of the United States as early as the end of this decade, at least when measured
in purchasing power parity terms.1 China’s national ambitions too are clear: at the very least, Beijing seeks to recover the centrality it
enjoyed in Asian geopolitics until the coming of colonialism.2 Its economic renaissance since the 1980s has now positioned it to play
a major global role that was simply unimaginable some thirty years ago. With its extraordinary military modernization program,
Beijing has also made tremendous strides toward holding at risk the United States’ forward-deployed and forward-operating forces in
the western Pacific, thereby raising the costs of implementing U.S. security guarantees to its partners in the region. Its unique
characteristics—being a continental-sized power, possessing a gigantic and technologically improving economy, having a strategically
advantageous location, and rapidly acquiring formidable military capabilities—add up quickly to make China a consequential rival to
the United States, even if it differs from previous challengers in character, aims, and ambitions. China’s rise, which is but part and
parcel of the larger rise of Asia, has been engendered in great measure by the permissive benefits of U.S. hegemony since World War
II. The U.S.-backed guarantee of open global commons, especially in the Asia– Pacific region, the creation of stable multilateral
exchange arrangements, and the maintenance of the dollar as an international reserve currency have all together produced inordinate
gains for regional actors and the international economy alike. As a result, China could actually grow not by the autarkic processes that
drove the rise of previous great powers, but by exploiting the interdependence arising from deliberate U.S. investments in producing
an open international trading system.3 The structural contradiction between the United States and China is thus defined by the
awkward reality that Washington sustains an international economic order that, although producing great benefits for itself and others,
simultaneously fuels the growth of what could be its most significant geopolitical antagonist over time. Shorn of all subtlety,
Beijing’s rise poses a special problem for U.S. interests because it threatens a possible power
transition at the core of the global system. Preserving American preeminence and by extension the current global
system itself, accordingly, remains the central task for U.S. policymakers today. This will prove difficult: China’s deep
integration with the international economy, to include the U nited States, implies that the obvious
containment strategies that worked so effectively vis-a`-vis the preceding rival, the Soviet Union, are unlikely to be
successfully replicated this time around. Forget Containment, not Balancing Containing China—defined as attempting to suppress
its growth by isolating Beijing from its neighbors and the world—cannot work, for several reasons. For one thing, China
has deep economic ties with the United States and the international community, and all countries
enmeshed in these economic interactions profit from them—even if China accrues greater
gains than most. No state, therefore, would willingly forego its own absolute gains deriving from trade
with China. Even though China’s neighbors in particular recognize that they are contributing to growing Chinese power, and
consequently are most anxious about Beijing’s expanding military capabilities, they are reluctant to limit their
trading relations with China so long as Beijing does not present an intolerable danger to
them and so long as non-military instruments, such as diplomatic engagement and regional institutions,
continue to offer some hope of constraining China peacefully . China’s incipient centrality has thus resulted in its
neighbors seeking to avoid any stark choices between China and the United States—a preference that could persist even in the event
of conflict between these two powers. A Cold War-style containment strategy is therefore likely to find little traction with key Asian
states, and could in fact backfire if they are presented with the intolerable binary of aligning with either Washington or Beijing. The
net result of globalization, therefore, is that rising, more powerful states, such as China, can exploit the phenomenon of
interdependence to increase their power and autonomy, even as their weaker partners become more reluctant to cut off their trading
ties for fear of losing out in absolute terms. This dynamic will persist so long as U.S. military might suffices to protect the Asian
security system, a system that U.S. power has long underwritten. It is not clear, however, whether this will continue to be the case
once Beijing acquires the capacity to The U.S. benefits from its ties to China in absolute terms, but loses in relative terms. Ashley J.
Tellis 110 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & FALL 2013 decisively undermine Washington’s extended deterrence capabilities
in the Asian theater. Further complicating matters, the strong Sino–U.S. trading relationship (one that was completely
absent between the United States and the Soviet Union during their rivalry’s heyday), China’s emerging role as an
important U.S. creditor, and the political power of key U.S. constituencies that profit from
strong ties with China all combine to frustrate any attempt by the U nited States to restrain the
growth of Chinese capabilities by cutting off Beijing’s economic links with itself or with
other states. The United States thus finds itself locked in a conundrum: it is tied to China through dense economic links that have
value because of their absolute gains, but it is threatened by the fact that the relative gains from this relationship are arguably greater
for Beijing and are increasingly used to build up Chinese military forces in a way that threatens the security of the United States and
its closest Asian allies. This problem has no easy solutions. What alone is certain is that containment is infeasible today, even if it may
be most needed as a device for limiting Chinese power. This is why balancing becomes essential— China’srising power
cannot go unchecked. Even if Beijing’s intentions are peaceful today, there is no assurance that they will remain so in
perpetuity. China’s rapid growth has already elevated regional anxieties because of the dramatic shifts in the
local “correlation of forces”; it has weakened the credibility of U.S. security guarantees to the littoral
states, thanks to its ability to produce strategic instruments capable of inflicting great
damage on U.S. military assets deployed around the Indo–Pacific; and it has threatened the traditional
U.S. command of the commons as a result of its growing capacity to deny the United States
unfettered use of the seas, space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum . These realities
combine to generate a serious and deepening challenge to U.S. power projection in Asia and, by extended implication, to U.S. primacy
itself. If the United States is to protect its global position amidst these challenges, it cannot afford not to balance China, even if it must
implement this response subtly and politely, garbed in the language of “strategic partnership.” Given these circumstances, the
United States must pursue a balancing strategy of the kind that has not been attempted before. The core
objective must be to protect, and wherever possible to expand, the extant U.S. advantages in relative power,
but without incorporating those components that would spell containment. These components include
cutting China’s access to the global trading regime; integrating China’s neighbors into a
unified alliance system against Beijing; developing collective defense strategies against
China; and pursuing an ideological campaign aimed at delegitimizing the Chinese state and its
governing regime. Safeguarding U.S. hegemony requires instead a four-pronged strategy A trading relationship was completely absent
between the United States and the Soviet Union. If the U.S. is to protect its global position, it cannot afford not to balance China.
Balancing without Containment: A U.S. Strategy for Confronting China’s Rise THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & FALL 2013
111 that Washington must pursue concertedly in order to balance against growing Chinese power: first, it must support the rise of
other Asian powers located along China’s periphery; second, it must deepen globalization in specific ways to procure enhanced gains
for itself and its friends; third, it must invest in preserving its extant military superiority; and, finally, it must revitalize the U.S.
economy to sustain its dominance in the new leading sectors of the global economy. Don’t Push China Down, Raise Others Up First
initiated by President George W. Bush but now continued purposefully by Barack Obama, the first prong of the evolving U.S. strategy
for balancing Beijing aims not at keeping China down, but raising others up—or, to put it differently, to propel the growth of other
nations along China’s periphery as a way of “weaving the net” that produces a “moderating effect on [Chinese] behavior.”4 The logic
of the strategy is simple and aptly suited to present circumstances. If the consequential states abutting China—such as Japan, India,
Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia, and Australia, among others—can be aided by U.S. power to realize their strategic potential and to
increase their mutual cooperation while deepening their partnership with the United States, the net effect would be to create objective
constraints that limit the misuse of Chinese power in Asia. These checks would not materialize because the Asian partners necessarily
bandwagon with the United States or even champion all its policies vis-a`-vis Beijing. Rather, they would be produced by the growing
capabilities of these key nations—aided by the United States—and their increased incentives for collaboration both among themselves
and with Washington. These elements, driven by the regional actors’ own concerns about China’s increasing power, would position
the key Asian states in ways fundamentally congruent with U.S. interests, especially the core objective of restraining the potential for
Chinese aggressiveness, while at the same time providing “the necessary cushion that prevents [their] tightened commercial
interdependence [with China] from disrupting the delicate balance between economic gains and geopolitical risks.”5 Such
a
regional equilibrium offers the potential for balancing China—and inducing good behavior on
the part of Beijing—without any necessity for containment, let alone conflict . The success of this approach,
however, hinges on the ability of the United States to pay consistent attention to the critical states abutting China, while at the same
time keeping diplomatic relations with Beijing on an even keel.6 Consequently, the United States (and its friends) ought to engage
China at multiple levels, both bilaterally and multilaterally, avoiding single-issue politics whenever possible. Disagreement
over issues like human rights, political freedoms, the treatment of minorities,
nonproliferation, or military modernization should be handled tactfully . Such an approach does not
require the West to paper over what may be troublesome Chinese domestic, foreign, or strategic policies, nor to shy away from visible
and public confrontations if egregious Chinese lapses demand it, but rather to ensure that all such responses are sensitive to context,
proportionality, and effectiveness. Put simply, the goal of deepened political engagement with China ought to be encouraging it to stay
committed to peaceful development both within and without. To the degree that such engagement requires creating new inter-societal
linkages or new fora for bilateral and regional cooperation, these avenues should be explored. Ashley J. Tellis 112 THE
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & FALL 2013 To their credit, recent U.S. administrations have more or less
successfully pursued this emphasis on sustaining productive relations with China . Such a
focus, however, cannot be allowed to eclipse—as it often does in Washington—the equally vital objective of
strengthening U.S. ties with the key power centers located along China’s immediate and extended
outskirts. Since 2001, for example, the United States has made a special effort to transform its ties with India, the other rising
Asian giant whose large continental size, great economic and demographic potential, significant military capabilities, and sturdy
commitment to democracy—not to mention its own ongoing rivalry with China—make it a particularly attractive partner for
Washington. This rapprochement with India should extend to other critical Southeast Asian states. Such an effort will require
considerable political attention at high levels in Washington—and a remarkable degree of consistency that in the past has often been
the exception, not the norm. The endeavor is admittedly challenging: the number of states that Washington must engage successfully
is large; the partners themselves are remarkably diverse in national capabilities and differ in alliance status; they each pursue varying
strategic objectives; and their capacity to respond to U.S. overtures is dissimilar as well. Because
they are all
individually weaker than China, they are at times easy to overlook; nevertheless, their role
cannot go underestimated. For that reason, U.S. policymakers should continually
strengthen the national power of these littoral entities even when they cannot or will not reciprocate U.S.
initiatives as fulsomely as may be desired. And if these nations do reach their strategic potential as a result
of preferential U.S. assistance, they would effectively serve as a powerful constraint on
China’s freedom of action in Asia. This would not only limit Beijing’s capacity to dominate
important centers of the global economy, but would bring China’s entire outer periphery
under the influence of nations friendly to the United States. Thus, U.S. hegemony would gain
another, more local level of protection—and in so doing will buttress U.S. primacy for longer, and more cheaply,
compared to many other alternatives. This approach generates a positive converse as well. If U.S. assistance strengthens the regional
powers, their incentives to expand economic interdependence with China would grow; they would have no reason to fear that the
material gains accruing to Beijing could be used to threaten their security. The persistence of such a positive-sum game all around,
then, mitigates interstate rivalry and its potential for undermining larger gains in prosperity. The
strategy of nurturing
the growth of major powers along the Asian periphery in order to balance China without
containing it, therefore, provides the regional system with the best of both worlds: an opportunity to limit
Beijing’s capacity for malevolence without sacrificing the common prosperity arising from
trade and interdependence.
Japan DA
Japan currently AND historically supports the Uyghurs SPECIFICALLY –
Abe supports Uyghur aid
Hoshur & Vandenbrink 12 (Shohret Hoshur & Rachel Vandenbrink, Prominent Uyghur
Journalist, graduated with a Master’s degree from the Fletcher school of Law and Diplomacy, 4-
24-2012, "Japan Backs Uyghur Rights," Radio Free Asia,
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/japan-04242012181311.html)
Japanese parliamentarians have set up a caucus supporting China’s minority Uyghurs, saying that
Beijing should protect the human rights of the ethnic group in the restive Xinjiang region . The move
came ahead of the exile World Uyghur Congress (WUC) meeting in Tokyo next month which Beijing had been pressuring Japan not
to host. The group of 12 members of Japan’s Diet, headed by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,
established the group Monday in a meeting attended by members of the Japan Uyghur Association. “The current situation [for
Uyghurs] is very serious,” Abe said in the meeting at Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party headquarters in Tokyo. “Japan
should firmly support the human rights of Uyghurs who are facing the dispossession of
their history, culture, tradition, religion, and ethnicity,” he said. He added that China, as a major player
on the world stage, should be held “responsible for ensuring peace and conditions that protect human rights” in the Uyghur region.
The declaration of support for Uyghur rights comes weeks after China demanded Japan stop the WUC, a Germany-based group
representing Uyghurs worldwide, from holding its biennial general assembly in Tokyo. About 100 Uyghur delegates from diaspora
communities around the world are expected to attend the meeting May 14–17, where they will elect new delegates and discuss raising
Uyghur rights issues internationally. Earlier this month, China’s foreign ministry accused Japan of allowing the WUC, an organization
it said “harms China's sovereignty and territorial integrity,” to “use Japanese territory to engage in activities splitting China.” The
Diet members expressed support for the WUC, saying they would work with the WUC and its Japan branch
to support Uyghur human rights. The aim of the Diet caucus is “to reveal the true situation of China’s oppression of
Uyghurs, and, through consultation with the World Uyghur Congress headed by Rebiya Kadeer and the Japan Uyghur Association, to
support activities that protect the human rights of Uyghurs from China’s oppression,” according to a statement on the Japan Uyghur
Association’s website. On the same day, six local Japanese government representatives established a similar alliance at a meeting in
the Tokyo metropolitan government headquarters. WUC General Secretary Dolkun Isa applauded Japan’s
support for Uyghur rights issues and called on Western governments to follow its lead. “For Japan, as the sole leader of
democracy and freedom in the Far East, this is the only correct position [towards Uyghurs ],” Isa said in an
interview. “We believe that [the Diet members’] action sets an example for Western parliamentarians to be true to universal values in
the world.” Isa, who lives in Germany and will travel to Japan for the congress, was detained in South Korea in 2009 on his way to a
democracy forum following pressure from China, which had placed him on a “terrorist” blacklist. China has accused at least 11 other
exile Uyghurs activists, including WUC President Rebiya Kadeer, of inciting terrorism in Xinjiang, and has exerted diplomatic
pressure to prevent other WUC meetings, the organization has said. The WUC’s meeting in Japan will be its first in Asia, after
previous congresses held in Munich and Washington since 2004. Isa applauded the Japanese government for listening to the voices of
Uyhurs who had “suffered under a brutal regime for many years.” “The
parliamentarians have heard these voices
and have shown the firmness of belief and respect among the Japanese people for the universal
values of freedom and human rights,” he said. Japan’s relations with Uyghur politics go back to the
1930s, when a delegation led by prominent general Mahmut Muhiti traveled to Japan seeking help after the
collapse of the First East Turkestan Republic at the hands of Chinese and Soviet collaboration. The short-lived republic was one of
two established in the 1930s and 40s in what is now China’s northwestern Xinjiang region, home to about nine million Uyghurs.
According to the Asahi Shimbun newspaper, around 1,000 Uyghurs live in Japan, where the Japan Uyghur Association was
established in 2008. Members of the Uyghur diaspora also live scattered throughout the United States, Europe, and Australia, as well
as in larger numbers in Central Asia.
Neg
Cred D
No impact to cred
Cowen, 14
(Tyler, American economist, academic, and writer. He occupies the Holbert C. Harris Chair of
economics as a professor at George Mason University, "How much does credibility matter in
foreign affairs?", March 3, marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2014/03/how-much-does-
credibility-matter-in-foreign-affairs.html )
Under one view, credibility is like a chain. If the United States does not keep one of its public promises, the credibility of the chain
falls apart. In essence observers are using the behavior of the American government to draw inferences about its true underlying type.
A single act of breaking a promise or failing to honor a commitment would show we really cannot be trusted, or that we are weak and
craven, and so that characterization of our true type would be applied more generally to all or most of our commitments. ¶ Under a
second view, we
don’t have that much credibility in the first place. To be sure, we can be trusted to do what is
in our self-interest. But there
is not much underlying uncertainty about our true type. So we can
promise Ruritania the moon, and fail to deliver it, and still the world thinks we would defend
Canada if we had to, simply because such a course of action makes sense for us. In this setting, our
violation of a single promise changes estimates of our true scope of concern, but it does not much change
anyone’s estimate of the true type of the American government.¶ Insofar as you believe in the first view,
our inability/unwillingness to honor our commitment to the territorial integrity of Ukraine is a disaster. Insofar as you hold the second
view, our other commitments remain mostly credible.¶ For the most part, I see the second view as more relevant to understanding U.S.
foreign policy than the first. We’ve
broken promises and commitments for centuries , and yet still we have
some underlying credibility. Remember those helicopters evacuating Saigon rooftops in 1975?
Other HR violations tank

Keyel, 13
(Jake Keyel, writer for Global Solutions, September 12, 2013, “U.S. Credibility Begins at
Home”, http://globalsolutions.org/blog/2013/09/U.S.-Credibility-Begins-Home, October 2, 2013 )
Credibility has been the watch word in the run up to a possible, and now delayed, U.S. missile strike against Syrian governmental
targets. In the words of John Kerry the issue of retaliation by the United States for a chemical weapons attack,
attributed to Syrian forces by a new U.N. report, is "directly related to our credibility and whether countries still believe the
United States when it says something." But whether the United States attacks the Syrian government or not, the real issue is not the
believability of U.S. follow-through on threats of the use of force . As history has shown, it is
clear the United States will back up any threats of military intervention with action. What is
unclear, however, is whether the United States can credibly claim to represent and speak for those who demand
the protection of civilians and an end to human rights abuses. Unfortunately, the United States' record in this
regard shows a serious deficit in this type of credibility. Guantanamo Bay remains open, drone wars are on-going in
Pakistan and Yemen, and the war in Iraq, a war called illegal by Kofi Annon, has only just ended. The United States is also the world's
largest weapons exporter. If the United States wants to be a world leader against human rights abuses and violence it needs to lead by
example and not by force. The United States must change its behavior first and foremost before seeking to enforce norms against violence abroad. The
United States can start to make this change, and possibly take the lead, by signing and ratifying the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and the Convention on
Cluster Munitions (CCM). As the world's largest arms exporter it is critical that the United States sign the AAT and establish that it respects international
law and the regulation of arms sales. And arguably more importantly, it must sign on to the CCM. Cluster munitions are deadly devices that
kill not only soldiers during battle, but kill civilians years after wars are over. The United States has been selling these weapons while the Syrian
government has been using them in the current conflict. What message does this send? In the short term I hope that Syria, Russia,
and the United States are able to broker a deal that will result in the destruction of any and all chemical weapons held by Bashar al-Assad's government.
While this would not end the terrible civil war in Syria, it could eliminate at least some risk to the Syrian people. In the long term, in order for
the United States to become a more authentic voice and leader against human rights abuses it must reflect critically on its
own actions. It must understand that it cannot be a leader for the cause of human rights until its words match its deeds.
Russia D
No US Russia war—Putin is rational, we’ll back down and sanctions solve
Lucas, 15
(Edward, Senior Editor for the Economist, “No, We’re Not Facing World War
III,”http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/12/06/no-we-re-not-facing-world-war-iii.html)
Yet the big point is that deterrence worked, and still works . In fact it works better now
than ever . The United States is overwhelmingly dominant in every part of the military spectrum, from space to cyber via conventional and nuclear weapons, just as the
Western alliance with its combined GDP of around $40 trillion, and population of 800 million, is overwhelmingly more powerful than Russia (GDP of $1.7 trillion and population
Putin is a bully, but he is not insane. He may rattle his nuclear saber, but in any real
of 140 million: both shrinking, incidentally).
confrontation with the West, he is the guaranteed loser . He can credibly menace the Baltic states (because in Pentagon war
games, the Russians always get to the coast before the allies get to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). But this ignores the wider context. So long as the West responds to a
geographically limited provocation with a much broader response, Putin is powerless . He is only able to intimidate us if he
frames the conflict in his terms : “Will you risk World War III to protect Estonia?” The
answer to that is (in most Western capitals) clearly no , but it is an answer to the wrong question. Instead,
we should frame the conflict in our terms. The apocalypse which we can wreak on the Putin
regime has nothing to do with enriched uranium and missiles. It comes from exploiting
Russia’s Achilles Heel—its dependence on Western financial markets and systems. The Putin
regime steals tens of billions of dollars every year from the Russian people. But it does not stash those ill-gotten gains in its own rotten realms. It puts them into well-run
gives the West—if it so chooses—the best possible

investment vehicles in the West. Capital flight from Russia is running at $100 billion a year. This
response to Russian military intimidation. We can freeze and if necessary seize the
Kremlin’s assets in the West. We can question and if necessary prosecute the bankers, lawyers, and accountants who have facilitated this huge tide of
dirty money that washes through Vienna, Cyprus, London, and Dubai. We can also investigate the curious behavior of Russian participants in setting energy prices in world
markets. This does not mean we should neglect the military countermeasures needed to deter the Putin regime from bullying its neighbors. We need more troops in Poland and the
Baltic states, with closer integration of non-NATO Sweden and Finland. We need better intelligence—especially about Russia’s battlefield nuclear weapons—better cyber-
defenses, and a resilient economic and political system which can withstand sanctions, propaganda attacks, and the targeted use of corruption. All these are the elements of what in
military jargon is known as “hybrid warfare”—the use of a wide range of military and non-military means in pursuit of a political goal. Hybrid warfare was waged in Ukraine,
initially to dramatically success effect. But it has not succeeded. Russia did not stoke an insurrection all across southern
and eastern Ukraine . It did not best the Ukrainian army (pitifully led and equipped though
it was). It did not succeed in breaking the Ukrainian people’s will, or toppling the elected
government. All that happened for lessons which we should bear in mind in our far
stronger and richer societies: Ukrainians survived because they were not scared . We are losing
because we are. The fear of “World War III” is part of the Kremlin’s psychological arsenal ,
designed to make us think that resistance is futile or suicidally risky. It is not. Russia is in
objective terms a nuisance, not a menace. It becomes a danger only because we let it. Putin is far more scared of us than we should be of
him. After all, we’ve got his money.
Doesn’t escalate
Pifer, 15
(Steven, directs the Brookings Institution Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, “Steven
Pifer: NATO’s deterrence challenge is conventional, not nuclear,”
https://www.iiss.org/en/politics%20and%20strategy/blogsections/2015-932e/april-ea11/natos-
deterrence-challenge-is-conventional-not-nuclear-a56d )
Russia’s
He is correct that Russia has a significant advantage in tactical – also referred to as non-strategic or sub-strategic – nuclear weapons in the European area.
military doctrine envisages use of nuclear weapons in the event of the use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons against
Russia or its allies, or when conventional forces are used and the ‘very existence’ of the Russian state is at stake . Moscow
might even envisage resorting to nuclear weapons in the (most unlikely) case that NATO forces moved into Ukraine and attacked Russian forces there. It is less
plausible that Russia, having launched a conventional attack and seized NATO territory in
the Baltic region, would resort to nuclear weapons to defend against an Alliance counter-
attack aimed at driving Russian forces out of NATO territory . The Kremlin would well
understand that such use would raise the prospect of NATO use of nuclear weapons
against Russian territory. The US nuclear arsenal in Europe is sufficient for this purpose.
NATO has no need to match the Russian arsenal in size or diversity. No ally or NATO
commander wishes to fight a tactical nuclear war in Europe. The purpose of the US arsenal
is political: to assure allies of the US commitment to their defence and, if used, to warn
Russia that the situation verges on escalating out of control, to the strategic nuclear level.
Central Asia D
No Central Asian instability
Marchesoni, 15
(Ettore, program assistant for the Regional Security program at the East West Institute, "Security
Threats in Central Asia and Prospects for Regional Cooperation", Feb 17,
www.ewi.info/idea/security-threats-central-asia-and-prospects-regional-cooperation )
Despite the risks and threats faced by the region, Ambassador Jenča stressed that Central Asian states had
made continuous progress in the past 20 years and had managed to keep the region stable. In this
respect the international community needs to build upon and sustain the developments achieved in the region. As Central Asian
states continue to diversify their foreign policy and partners to face increasing challenges, the EU has the
opportunity to become an even more attractive partner in the region, and may consider more targeted support to
Central Asia.
EU intervention solves Central Asian instability

Putz, 15
(Catherine, the special projects editor for The Diplomat, graduate of the Patterson School of
Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, where she studied
international security and Shippensburg University of Pennsylvania, where she majored in history
with a focus on U.S. diplomatic and conflict history.¶ Previously, Katie worked in several
positions at the Atlantic Council and as a communications consultant at the World Bank. She is a
member of the Military Writers Guild, "Central Asia ‘Extremely Important’ to the European
Union", 12/22/15, thediplomat.com/2015/12/central-asia-extremely-important-to-the-european-
union/ )
With the signing of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA)
between the European Union and Kazakhstan on December 21 in Astana, the EU has elevated its
relations with Central Asia’s largest economy. The EPCA took more than three years to negotiate and will replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that has governed
relations since 1999. It is the first of a new generation of cooperation agreements between the EU and the former Soviet states of Central Asia. ¶ Federica Mogherini, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs
and security policy and vice-president of the European Commission, was in Astana to chair the 11th EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting. Attended by foreign ministers from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan, along with the Kazakh hosts, the meeting yielded no big surprises. ¶ “What happens in this region of the world is extremely important for the European Union,” Mogherini said following the
ministerial.Over the summer, the EU reviewed and revised its Central Asia strategy –previously iterated in 2007. The
update noted specifically that the “main objectives and priority areas of the 2007 EU Strategy for Central Asia remain pertinent.” The document continues to place emphasis on dialogues to tackle human rights
The new EU Strategy on Central Asia is a strong sign of the

concerns, but for the first time actually mentioned torture, specifically. ¶ “
political investment by all EU Member States and the European institutions in a strategic partnership, a strategic relationship with
Central Asia. Only through strengthened cooperation can we solve the challenges we have and take
full advantage of the many opportunities our regions have,” Mogherini said of the strategy. ¶ According to prepared remarks, Mogherini noted the many facets of cooperation between the EU and Central Asia, from
education to energy, from trade to climate change. She noted that the gathered minister discussed issues of security and stability “because we are going through difficult times in the world, especially to counter
radicalisation of our youth…” Mogherini commented that the minister discussed “concrete options for counter terrorism and security cooperation,” but did not elaborate. Economic instability and human rights were
also mentioned in a linked fashion: ¶ Finally, we also have agreed in our Joint Communique that democratisation, respect for human rights and the rule of law are also fundamentally important for the socio-economic
development and also for the business climate, for the investment climate and that strong civil society is also an important element for a successful economy and also for a secure environment. ¶ The EU
plans to spend over a billion euros on programs in Central Asia from 2014 to 2020.¶ The EPCA concluded between the EU
and Kazakhstan illustrates Astana’s central place in how the EU views engagement in Central Asia. According to an EU fact sheet on the relationship, the EU is Kazakhstan’s primary trade partner and its largest
export market. “In 2014, trade to the EU was worth EUR 31 billion (36%), ahead of China (22%), Russia (21%), the US, Uzbekistan and Turkey (2% each).” Most of that trade is in oil and gas. ¶ The EU says that
the agreement “puts a strong emphasis ” on democracy , the rule of law , human rights ,
fundamental freedoms, sustainable development and civil society cooperation. While these areas are
continually mentioned, it’s not clear progress has been made or merely simulated.
Lots of alt causes
Marchesoni, 15
(Ettore, program assistant for the Regional Security program at the East West Institute, "Security
Threats in Central Asia and Prospects for Regional Cooperation", Feb 17,
www.ewi.info/idea/security-threats-central-asia-and-prospects-regional-cooperation )
At the same time, Ambassador Jenča mentioned that the
main challenges and obstacles to stability often lie within
Central Asian states. The succession of political leaders, socio-economic problems,
marginalization, shortcomings in the rule of law, religious extremism, inter-ethnic tensions and organized
crime are issues which need to be addressed by the countries in the region in particular through preventive efforts, which
UNRCCA promotes. Moreover, the more stable, democratic and prosperous the countries will become, the more resistant they will be
to external threats.
Regional forums solve

Markedonov, 13
(Sergey, visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Russia and Eurasia
Program, Washington DC, "SCO key foundation of stable Central Asia", 9/9,
www.globaltimes.cn/content/809872.shtml )
Chinese President Xi Jinping kicked off his visit to four countries in Central Asia on September 3. He also participated in the G20
Leaders' Summit in St. Petersburg and will be present at the upcoming Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) forum in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan on September 13. The focus of his visit is expanding economic cooperation and
increasing bilateral trade with the Central Asian states, especially in energy and transportation. In the meantime, security development
will also be a major topic. The withdrawal of US and NATO troops from Afghanistan will have significant repercussions for Central Asia as well as for
China and Russia. The current status quo raises questions about the ability and available resources of regional integration structures, such as the SCO, and
interested actors, especially China and Russia, to tackle the security challenges and potential risks in Afghanistan. The SCO has formed and developed in
parallel to unfolding dynamics in Afghanistan as well as regional border demarcation between China and the Central Asian countries. The "Shanghai
Five" appeared in 1996, just before power in Afghanistan became concentrated in the hands of the Taliban. The SCO itself was established in 2001, the
same year as the 9/11 attacks that prompted NATO military operations in Afghanistan. Can the SCO succeed in resolving regional security puzzles?
The SCO's potential looks extremely impressive. The entire combined territory of SCO members makes up roughly 60 percent
of Eurasia and its population totals a quarter of the world's. However, such figures do not easily translate into power and influence. It is necessary to
understand the distinctions of the SCO and its differences from other similar integration projects such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO). The SCO stands out among other organizations that engage Eurasian states. Other such organizations, such as the Commonwealth of
Independent States, CSTO, Eurasian Economic Community and the nascent Customs Union, are led by Russia. But the
SCO is structured
around two power centers, Moscow and Beijing. Moreover, in the SCO, Chinese economic potential is no less valuable than Russian.
Other regional actors such as India, Pakistan, and Iran are also observers in the SCO. Turkey also lends additional legitimacy to the SCO with its dialogue
partner status. Such involvement of regional actors could potentially strengthen the SCO and transform it from a
strictly Eurasian regional project to a larger international network dedicated to providing alternative solutions to international security issues beyond
Eurasia, including the Middle East. The SOC will oppose humanitarian intervention and promote principles of national sovereignty. Without the
SCO, some of its members would not normally agree to cooperate on a bilateral basis with one another. For example,
since their independence, Pakistan and India have been embroiled in a series of conflicts, primarily over the disputed territory of Kashmir. Although
Russia and China are the two primary driving forces of the SCO, their approaches and interests are not compatible. Moscow's top priority is security,
while Beijing focuses on economic expansion. Russia would, in theory, like to have China as a reliable partner in the region. Yet Chinese economic
expansion in the region, particularly through building pipelines in Central Asia, worries Russia. Ultimately, the SCO is a valuable regional organization
because of its pragmatism. It is an effective channel of cooperation and interaction between East and West. The SCO has no real
ideological platform and this neutrality is appealing even to NATO member states. This is critical since after all, no matter how the West reacts to the
future of Afghanistan, it will maintain an interest there. As
the US and NATO continue to reduce their military
presence in Afghanistan, they will seek other means to establish stability in the region, likely by
coordinating with the SCO, which is ready to play a role in the peace process and in Central Asia's
security and development issues.
Chinese Economy D
Xinjiang instability doesn’t affect the Chinese economy
CRS 16 (Congressional Research Service. Written by Michael Ratner, Specialist in Energy Policy; Gabriel M Nelson, Research
Assistant, Susan V Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs, May 2, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44483.pdf )
The westernmost region of Xinjiang, which has faced religious and ethnic violence in recent years, is China’s gateway to Central
Asian and Russian pipeline gas supplies, as well as a major producer of oil and gas in its own right.90 Xinjiang contains the second-
highest natural gas reserves and highest oil reserves of any province-level jurisdiction, reportedly producing more than 30 BCM of
natural gas in 2015.91 Xinjiang’s energy infrastructure appears, for the most part, to have escaped the
impact of regional violence, but a 2013 report by security publication firm Stratfor claimed that as the region’s
infrastructure improves and more oil and natural gas are sent eastward, “the stakes for maintaining security in the
west will rise.”92 A 2015 analysis in The Diplomat, however, suggests that Xinjiang’s energy infrastructure may
be more secure than some other analyses have implied .93
Chinese economy resilient

AP, 14
(Associated Press, "China’s economic growth slowing but stable", Nov 10,
www.news.com.au/finance/economy/chinas-economic-growth-slowing-but-stable/story-e6frflo9-
1227118250938 )
CHINA’S economy is shifting to a “new normal” of slower but more stable growth and has the
resiliency to overcome any bumps in the road, Chinese President Xi Jinping said Sunday.¶ Xi also touted the benefits of
Chinese development to the world in a speech to Asian business leaders gathered in Beijing ahead of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit
Monday and Tuesday.¶ China’s outbound investment will exceed $1.25 trillion over the next 10 years, while China will import more than $10 trillion
worth of goods and send more than 500 million tourists abroad over next five years, Xi said.¶ “For the Asia-Pacific and the world at large, China’s
development will generate huge opportunities and benefits and hold lasting and infinite promise,” Xi said.¶ At the APEC
summit of 21 economies including the U.S., Japan, Russia, and Mexico, China is spearheading a free trade initiative — the Free-Trade Area of the Asia
Pacific — seen as part of Beijing’s efforts to counter U.S. domination of global trade and financial regulation. ¶ The summit also gives opportunity for
regional democracy, including a possible icebreaking meeting between leaders of China and Japan after two years of tensions in an island dispute that
raised concerns of a military confrontation between Asia’s two largest economies. ¶ China’s
economy grew by 7.3 per cent in
the third quarter, the lowest level in five years. The International Monetary Fund says China should lower its growth target to no more than 7 per
cent for next year, while the Conference Board, a New York-based research group, predicted that China’s economic growth would decelerate to 4 per
cent a year between 2020 and 2025.¶ However, Xi
said the economy remains robust, with strong job growth, low
inflation, rising incomes and a shift away from investment to services and hi-tech manufacturing. China is also shifting to a consumption-
driven economy, reducing the importance of investment and government inputs and decreasing its dependence on export markets, Xi said. ¶ “Under the
new normal conditions, China’s economic growth has become more stable and driven by more diverse forces,” Xi said at the opening ceremony of the
APEC CEO Summit. The world’s No. 2 economy has shifted down a gear from the torrid rates of the previous decade, but remains among the world’s
most dynamic, he said.¶ Addressing concerns about further declines in growth, Xi said China
recognised emerging risks but
described them as “not that formidable.”¶ “Resilience best equips the Chinese economy against risks,” Xi said.
Alt causes subsume

Matthews, 14
(Christopher, Financial writer for CNN, "China has far bigger challenges than a slowing
economy", April 16, finance.fortune.cnn.com/2014/04/16/china-economy-fears/ )
FORTUNE -- The Chinese economy hasn't fallen from the tightrope yet.¶ Markets in Asia rose Wednesday following the release of
data showing that the growth of the Chinese economy slowed in the first quarter of 2014 to an annual rate of 7.4% from 7.7% the
previous quarter. Though the first quarter saw the slowest growth for the Chinese economy in a year-and-a-half, markets were pleased
with the way in which it was slowing -- with increases in retail sales signaling growth in domestic consumption and a slight decline in
the rate of fixed asset investment growth, which show the Chinese turning away from what China bears see as a dependence on debt-
fueled infrastructure projects.¶ But these statistics don't even begin to tell the story of how radically the Chinese economy continues to
evolve. Millions of people per month continue to emigrate from China's farms to urban areas in search of
work in the country's manufacturing sector, while the number of migrant workers in China is greater than the size of the entire
American labor force. Maintaining an export sector that can supply jobs for all these people is priority No. 1 for China, lest a lack of
economic progress leads to political instability. ¶ MORE: China's lofty currency plans are just getting started¶ And while data released
Wednesday suggest that China is growing quickly enough while managing to slowly rebalance its economy, there
are still
plenty of reasons for critics to doubt they can continue to pull it off. Here are three:¶ 1. Economic
history suggests a seamless ascent isn't likely. ¶ Be it the United States in the 1890s or Japan in the 1990s, it's
common for economies to experience some sort of financial crisis as they make a transition from
emergent to developed. Exceptions to this rule include Singapore and South Korea -- both of these "Asian Tigers" were able
to ascend in status without lasting political or economic crises. Indeed, South Korea's transition from authoritarianism to democracy is
sometimes cited as a model for those hopeful that democratic reforms will come to China. But even these economies were hit hard by
the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s, and neither country is anywhere near as large or diverse as China. ¶ 2.
The Chinese
central government isn't all-powerful. ¶ As former banker and author Satyajit Das pointed out recently, much of the case
for expecting a so-called hard landing is centered around the way the central government interacts with powerful local governments in
China. Writes Das,¶ An ancient Chinese proverb -- shan gāo, huángdì yuǎn -- states "The mountains are high and the emperor is far
away." The saying implies that Beijing's control over its regions is historically weak, with local autonomy and little
loyalty, meaning that central authorities have limited influence over local affairs.¶ Despite the central
government's efforts to curb shadow bank lending to support big, economically questionable, politically motivated
local infrastructure projects, there's plenty of evidence that these and other dodgy investments continue to be
funded, threatening the stability of the system. A JPMorgan report from last year estimated that the size of the shadow banking
sector doubled between 2010 and 2012 to $6 trillion. Even with recent efforts to rein in unregulated lending, much of
the worst could already have been done.¶ 3. Even without a bubble burst, wasteful spending could be a serious drag
on growth.¶ In late January, a Chinese investment company was bailed out by the government after a coal company it was funding
was forced to miss a debt payment. The bailout was arranged to calm fears that this particular fund company going belly up would
spark panic in the rest of the shadow banking sector. The incident shows that the Chinese government is willing to go to great lengths
to prevent a financial crisis, but Beijing
can't do anything to reverse bad decisions made by shadow banks .
Even if China can avoid a bursting of a debt bubble, its
economy will still have to struggle under the weight of
economically unproductive projects.
Solvency—Says No
China has no intention of allowing the US to open a Consulate – Tibet proves
Ching 9 (Frank Ching, author of China: The Truth About Its Human Rights Record, 7-13-2009, "Why the West is silent on
rioting in Xinjiang," Globe and Mail, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/why-the-west-is-silent-on-rioting-in-
xinjiang/article4278997/ accessed 7/13/16 ddi ss)
Rebiya Kadeer, the U.S.-based Uyghur activist accused by Chinese officials of instigating the violence, is seeking
American support for her cause and has urged the United States to open a consulate in Urumqi .
This, she said, "would be a clear signal that the United States is not indifferent to the oppression of my people." China has
denied a request for an American consulate in Tibet and is unlikely to allow one in Xinjiang .
The Urumqi events were followed by demonstrations, mostly by ethnic Uyghurs around the world. Eggs were hurled at the Chinese
consulate-general in Los Angeles, while the one in Munich was attacked by home-made gasoline bombs. (Munich is also home to the
headquarters of the World Uyghur Congress, of which Ms. Kadeer is president.)
Political Prisoners Aff
Derrida 1AC—Advantage
Contention 1: Auto-Immunity
PRC violence against Uyghurs is high, but the US policy toward Xinjiang is
willful neglect
Ching 9 (Frank Ching, author of China: The Truth About Its Human Rights Record, 7-13-2009, "Why the West is silent on
rioting in Xinjiang," Globe and Mail, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/why-the-west-is-silent-on-rioting-in-
xinjiang/article4278997/ accessed 7/13/16 ddi ss)
The rioting in Xinjiang last week echoed violence in Tibet last year but, interestingly, the international
reaction has been very different. Last year, Western countries put pressure on Beijing to hold a
dialogue with representatives of the Dalai Lama, with French President Nicolas Sarkozy even
threatening to boycott the Beijing Olympics if China refused . Beijing's protestations that Tibet was an internal
Chinese affair were disregarded. This time, however, the Western response is muted . The United States has
adopted a mild tone, with President Barack Obama merely calling on all parties in Xinjiang "to
exercise restraint." The European Union has gone even further, taking the position that violence in Xinjiang "is a Chinese issue,
not a European issue." Serge Abou, the EU's ambassador to China, said Europe also had its problems with minorities and "we would
not like other governments to tell us what is to be done." While
there are similarities between events last year in
Tibet and those in Xinjiang this month, the world has changed: China is now seen as an
indispensable partner of the United States and Europe, both of which are facing a financial crisis. Beijing's
diplomatic assistance in resolving the Iranian and North Korean nuclear issues is also seen as too
important to put in jeopardy. What reaction there has been came mainly from Muslim countries. The Saudi-based
Organization of the Islamic Conference, which represents 57 Muslim governments, condemned what it called the excessive use of
force against Uyghur civilians. At least 184 people, both Uyghurs and Han Chinese, have been killed. The OIC statement declared:
"The Islamic world is expecting from China, a major and responsible power in the world arena with historical friendly relations with
the Muslim world, to deal with the problem of Muslim minority in China in broader perspective that tackles the root causes of the
problem." The country that has taken the strongest position is Turkey, whose people share linguistic, religious and cultural links with
the Uyghurs. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan actually went so far as to characterize what has happened as "a kind of genocide"
and said his country would bring the matter up in the United Nations Security Council. Since then, China's Foreign Minister has
spoken on the telephone with his Turkish counterpart and apparently invited Turkey to send journalists to Xinjiang. This would be
good if the journalists would be allowed not only into Urumqi but to other areas as well, such as Kashgar, where foreign journalists
are currently barred. While Indonesian Muslims have voiced support for the Uyghurs, with about 100 attending a mass prayer session
in Jakarta on Sunday, the government itself has not taken a position, even though Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim country.
One problem for the Uyghurs is that the world at large knows little about them. Events of the past week
have served to publicize their cause. Hitherto, publicity on Uyghurs has focused on the 22 who were held by the United States in
Guantanamo, but a link to terrorist suspects is not likely to gain them public support.
Status quo bilateral dialogue is insufficient—Uyghurs are increasingly

detained as political prisoners because they’re seen as endangering PRC
security
Autonomous Region
Moreover, China’s Supreme People’s Court reports that these individuals are being punished more harshly, with a 20 percent increase
in sentences of at least five years’ imprisonment in 2009.[3] One of these harsh punishments was handed down to Liu Xiaobo, whose
11-year sentence for penning a few essays critical of the government and helping to draft the “Charter 08” political manifesto is the
longest sentence known to have ever been handed down in China for the crime of “inciting subversion.”[4] And statistics
suggest that a majority of those punished on state security charges are members of the Tibetan and
Uyghur ethnicities, many of whom were detained for engaging in non-violent protests against
government policies.[5] But we mustn’t limit our concern to formal criminal proceedings on state security charges, because
there are other kinds of political imprisonment in China. Charges of “illegal business activity” are used against the publishers of
politically themed books or distributors of Bibles.[6] Muckraking journalists and environmental activists are charged with “extortion”
or “fraud,” and bloggers who criticize corruption or wrongdoing by local officials can find themselves imprisoned for
“defamation.”[7] Countless practitioners of Falun Gong or members of unauthorized Christian sects are locked away for “using a cult
to undermine implementation of the law” and subjected to specialized regimes of discipline and re-programming.[8] And I have not
even yet mentioned the system of administrative incarceration known as “re-education through labor,” in which so-called “minor
offenses” can be punished for up to three years without proper trial and without legal counsel—a system whose survival despite
violating Chinese law testifies to its expedient value to the preservation of stability.[9] The targets of political repression can expect no
constitutional or legal guarantee that their rights will be protected during the proceedings against them. The geologist Xue Feng, an
American citizen, was held incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological abuse as police failed to honor their
obligations under China’s consular agreement with the United States, and he languished in detention for more than two years while
procedural deadlines were repeatedly ignored.[10] Defense lawyers face obstacles in their attempts to fulfill basic duties, such as
meeting with detained clients and getting access to prosecution evidence, and their eloquent, reasoned defense statements fall on deaf
ears in the courtroom while decisions against their clients are made by external, Partydominated “adjudication committees,”
sometimes before a trial has even begun. [11] Once
imprisoned, these individuals are seldom offered any
clemency, victims of a penal system that equates good behavior with acknowledgment of
wrongdoing and requires that sentence reduction and parole for those convicted of endangering
state security be “strictly handled.”[12] Compared with a decade ago, fewer of the individuals whose
cases are raised with the Chinese authorities by Dui Hua or through the bilateral human rights
dialogues are seeing any changes to their sentences—a situation that is especially true for Tibetans
and Uyghurs. This extends to medical parole, even for gravely ill individuals like Hu Jia, who suffers from serious liver disease, or
Li Wangyang, an activist who has spent nearly all of the past 21 years in prison, much of that time hospitalized because of poor health.
On the rare occasion when medical parole is granted to political prisoners, it tends to be as in the case of Zhang Jianhong, whose
health under the burden of neuromuscular disease deteriorated to the point where he was unable to breathe without the assistance of a
machine.[13]
This narrative of threat construction criminalizes Uyghur dissent for the

purpose of unified harmony
University, “The Securitization of the Uyghur Question and Its Challenges” p14-17)
One of the most significant outcomes of the post 9/11 atmosphere in China in regards to the Uyghur question was
that the securitization of the Uyghur question and the criminalization of Uyghur dissent in the country
started to be accepted by some segments of Chinese society. The Beijing administration, somehow, had
managed to transform the conflict between the State and an ethnic minority into an existential
threat to the Chinese state and society. The constant propaganda of the Chinese state and state-controlled media generated a
significant fear factor which spread to different segments of the society. This policy has led to the marginalization of
the Uyghur communities and further alienation of Uyghurs from the State . More dangerously, this
combination of fear and marginalization has also paved the way for ethnic tension between the
minority Uyghur and majority Han Chinese populations the Han Chinese and Uyghurs and a significant
impediment to the assimilation of Uyghurs in China. In the early 1990s, religious restrictions were imposed in the region, but they
took a more serious turn with the 2005 Religious Affair Regulations, which significantly affected the religious lives of the Uyghur
people. In a report on the repression of Uyghur religious freedom, the Uyghur Human Rights Project argued that “the
regulations… have had the effect of criminalizing peaceful religious practices among Uyghurs
on par with illicit and violent activity. Chinese local and central authorities have implemented policies that have
progressively narrowed the definition of lawful activity. As a result many Uyghurs find that even traditional religious
customs are restricted by the government. ”26 What made things worse for the Uyghurs was the strict interpretation of
these regulations in XUAR. The local administration implemented them in a way that further curbed religious activities.27 Already
criminalized “illegal religious activities” were considered and perceived as a major national
security threats by the state. This led to the further securitization in the field of religious activity
and excessive applications of religious regulations. Examples of the ridiculous interpretation of religious
regulations by overzealous local officials include the prohibition of fasting28 and the forcing of imams to dance in the streets.29
Religious restriction was not the only outcome of the China’s participation in the global war on terror. Following the
implementation of this anti-terror campaign was the adoption of some social and economic
policies that further deteriorated the situation for the Uyghurs in the region. The Chinese government did not
take necessary steps to eradicate the inequality of Uyghurs that escalated in the 1990s. Studies conducted in recent years about the
social and economic situation of Uyghurs demonstrate these increasing inequalities. For example,
according to Brenda Schuster, “the Han and Uyghur populations of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China differ in all
major health indicators. In
life expectancy, infant mortality, maternal mortality and morbidity Uyghur
people are much worse off than Han.”30 In another study, cited by Cappelletti, scholars and scientists of the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences reported that XUAR region was the fifth worst in terms of environmental and health indices in China.31
Researchers also found that in addition to the high level of HIV, the region also witnessed some serious health outbreaks, such as
polio.32 The Chinese government also adopted policies during this period in order to “integrate” Uyghurs to the Chinese society. One
of the most controversial of outcome of these
“securitized” policies adopted by the Chinese government to “protect
and preserve” national unity started to endanger the same “harmonious society” that the Chinese government was
aspiring to build these policies was the relocation of the unmarried “Uyghur girls, aged from 16 to 22
years old, from their villages in the Xinjiang countryside to big cities in Inner and South-Eastern coastal
China, where they usually got a temporary employment in textile factories.”33 Most of these relocations were not conducted
voluntarily but were planned and compulsory.34 It was considered as a serious attack on the family values and traditional way of life
of the Uyghur people. The relocation of young Uyghur girls was not only a form of negative
intervention to the cultural norms and traditions of the Uyghurs, but also generated major
concerns about the safety and fate of these young girls in the larger cities. This new policy significantly increased
the Uyghur community’s grievances with the policies of the state. This led to a serious paradox for the regime. The government
had run a campaign of “otherization” in a bid to foster social unity, but in effect had turned all
Uyghurs in China into “usual suspects.” The outcome of these “securitized” policies adopted by the Chinese
government to “protect and preserve” national unity started to endanger the same “harmonious society” that the Chinese government
was aspiring to build. The lack of any attention to the Uyghur people’s’ grievances led to the
worsening of relations between the State and Uyghur people. The first signs of danger became visible when a
melee among workers in Shaoguan led to the lynching of Uyghurs and a subsequent ethnic
clash.35 Following the incident, Uyghurs in the city of Urumqi protested against the negligence of the State
towards violence and the lynching of Uyghurs. Police brutality targeting Uyghur protesters only
intensified these protests. Mass arrests and disappearances followed, and the clashes turned
into communal violence. 36 Instead of finding a way to provide ethnic reconciliation and a peaceful resolution of the
disputes between different parties, the security forces employed harsh measures targeting mostly the Uyghur demonstrators. The
excessive use of force and disappearances of Uyghurs following the demonstrations deteriorated the situation in
the region. The demonstrations showed the total elimination of inter-group trust between different parties. In addition, the
extraordinary security measures taken by the government, including the
deployment of the troops, the shutdown of
the internet and cell phone reception, and the massive men hunt, demonstrated that the Chinese
government was not willing to address the root causes of the problem but instead approached it
with a policy of securitization. In its official explanation of the incidents to the international
community, Beijing once again preferred to use security focused language. The PRC government resorted
to old methods rather than trying to take control of the situation and preventing further escalation of the inter-ethnic clashes. The State
pointed to the provocations of external forces - particularly the “separatist activities” of the World Uyghur Congress - as motivation
As cited by Zhang and McGhee, the People’s Daily stated that “7.5 riots have a complicated political background. It is a serious
violent crime involving collusion of internal and external hostile forces with organized characteristics. Their aim was to foment
troubles and cause the separation of the country… Therefore we should together move swiftly towards maintaining social stability
with forceful measures and tactics, and strictly combat these violent crimes.”38 Following the Urumqi incident, the Chinese
government further increased the degree of securitization in the region. Chinese
authorities tried to create the
impression that “all unrest in the region was associated with nationalist movements and all
nationalist movements are associated with Islamic fundamentalism.” 39
Harmonism is an auto-immune logic that threatens its own protection—it
purports visions of unity that it actively destroys through elimination of the
Uyghur population—ushers in a politics of disposability
Nordin 15 (Astrid H.M. Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University. “Futures beyond ‘the West’?
Autoimmunity in China’s harmonious world”, 1/4/15,
[http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/73948/2/Futures_beyond_the_West_Final_Author_version_as_accepted.01.04.2015.pdf], DOA 7/13/16,
DDI HRM)
Scholars have long expressed concern that common ways of thinking about difference in and beyond the discipline of Internetional
Relations (IR) close down, rather than open up, alternative futures. Conceiving of others as not properly different, but either
threatening or just behind in a historical queue, leads us time and again to imagine one developmental path where
others will soon become like ourselves or be annihilated. 1 This type of thinking makes it difficult to imagine
change and a positive plurality in the world, and has been complicit with colonial and neo-colonial global
relations.2 It imagines one single future, rather than an openness to a plurality of different futures that may come. In response to
this common and limiting way of thinking, scholars have tried to rethink difference. One set of such attempts have clustered
around the motif of autoimmunity. Thinking about “immunity” has been a staple of critical thought in the 20th
century, and autoimmunity is rapidly joining it.3 Autoimmunity describes a double process where by a subject,
community or system attacks or threatens its own protection . It is the system’s own logic that turns
it against itself. Scholars have seen in this double movement a different way of imagining difference, which
complicates the logic of clear distinctions between threat and protection, inside and outside, self
and other, that is fundamental to the imagination of those definite “others” as expendable or “just
behind”. Operating according to a principle of intermingeled self-defeat and self-perpetuation, this logic keeps the system alive in its
openness to the future and the other. Scholars have therefore been hopeful that autoimmunity
can help us see how
there is no self-identical self there in the first place, because the self contains elements of
difference or otherness. This highlights our dependence on others in the world. It means that we must be open to others, and
to the different futures that they may bring. It is this promise of a genuine openness to the other and to the future which has drawn IR
scholars to the concept of “autoimmunity”, and to examine such logics of contemporary world politics.4 For some, the
immunity/autoimmunity nexus
has come to be understood as “the ultimate horizon in which
contemporary politics inscribes itself”.5 Many have thus deployed the notion of immunity/autoimmunity, but arguably
“no one placed it more forcefully at the centre of contemporary politics than did Jacques Derrida”.6 Derrida used autoimmunity to
describe a number of things, most prominently a democratic system originating in Europe that in seeking to secure itself against a
potentially dangerous future violates itself as the consequence of a non-recognition of the “other” in the self.7 IR scholars who have
drawn on his understanding of autoimmunity also share an empirical focus on logics that operate in or originate from a cluster of
actors or activities that are variously described as “Western”, “European”, “modern” and/or “democratic”. Derrida explicitly claimed
that the self-perfecting logic of autoimmunity (and the open future that comes with it) is specific to such a geo-politically defined
system. The empirical focus of the wider literatures that have drawn on his notion to date have done little to challenge that
understanding. The task at this point is to question that claim. Is democracy really the only political system that operates on an
autoimmune logic? Are there other systems that may display similar logics, and be similarly open to other futures? That is to say,
could we find an example of another system which displays a similarly autoimmune logic, a system politically outside what is
commonly understood by “democracy”, geographically outside what is commonly understood by “Europe” or “the West”, with
origins temporally predating what is commonly understood as the “Enlightenment” or “modernity” that is said to have inaugurated
such a logic? What implications would it have for the openness of the future – and for contemporary thought on autoimmunity – if
such a system could be found? In answering these questions, this article challenges and builds on previous understandings of
autoimmunity. It argues that the system of “harmony”, as deployed in contemporary China, also works on an
autoimmune logic. Drawing on a range of primarily Chinese language texts by officials and academics, it argues that there is
at least one non-European, non-democratic system that operates on a very similar logic to what Derrida and other thinkers of
autoimmunity describe. If autoimmunity does indeed open up a system to the future, this is not only so for European democracy or its
derivatives. The article furthermore explores the consequences of this finding for thinking about autoimmunity in IR scholarship. The
article progresses in four sections. The first section introduces the concept of autoimmunity in IR, its significance and its deployment.
It outlines how the treatment of autoimmunity, particularly by Derrida and many of his followers in IR, positions an “other” to the
”Western” or “democratic” configuration they understand as operating on such logics. The second section outlines how the notion of
harmony is conceptualised in contemporary Chinese policy and academic discourse. It explains my discussion in terms of a “political
elite”, and provides evidence for my claims from official documents and academic texts. The third section argues that the system of
“harmony” currently deployed in China can indeed be characterised as autoimmune, and discusses the political implications of this
finding. The final section argues that the expulsion of “non-Western” others from Derrida’s and his followers’ accounts of
autoimmunity undermines their rethinking of difference by falling back on an immunitary logic, denying China an open future. These
accounts fall prey to a logic that tries to immunise itself against its expunged other. This exclusion is their condition of possibility. At
the same time, this sending off of its other in time and space is what keeps open the promise of its future to come. Put differently,
without positing an “other” in this way, there would be nothing that could come to European democracy and Enlightenment thought
to challenge, change and revive it. Derrida’s European democratic system cannot stay alive without “killing” that other, and
simultaneously imagining its (Asian) outside as an other that threatens to kill it. Paradoxically, the exclusion of the “non-West” is
what keeps the idea of an autoimmune “Western” or European democracy alive. The significance of autoimmunity in IR .The logic of
autoimmunity and the openness of the future. Scholars have increasingly drawn on “autoimmunity” in IR because the term has
helped them to think about alternative political strategies and the future. The impetus behind these deployments seems to be a reaction
against the prevalence of linear thinking in the wider social sciences. This conceptualisation of difference is
problematic for
several reasons. Most immediately, it
is often thought to imply a moral yardstick, where imagining others as
behind comes to connote their lack in value. Moreover, it often implies childlike qualities, which in turn
means “they” need to be guided and socialised by “us”. Even more problematic , perhaps, is the
effect this move has on difference. The otherness of others – that which makes them unique and
ungraspable to my language – is reduced to graspable difference, variations on a theme . This way of
thinking about difference has serious consequences for our ability to imagine a different open future. The imagining of one single
developmental path, where others will eventually become like us, robs others of their own past and future.8 It turns difference into
sameness, other into self. “Their” future is no longer open to choices, it is already inscribed in the story. This
of course robs
“us” of a different future too, because newness must be impossible without otherness: how could
something different emerge from something that is all-encompassing and self-same? In a context
where this kind of thinking is common, various scholars have turned to logics of autoimmunity to better understand contemporary
politics. Thinkers like Baudrillard, Esposito and Derrida see in this process a double and contradictory discourse of concurrent
immunity and autoimmunity in endless circulation, where the system “conducts a terrible war against that which
protects it only by threatening it”. 9 Derrida explained autoimmunity as “that strange behaviour where a living being, in
quasi-suicidal fashion, ‘itself’ works to destroy its own protection, to immunise itself against its ‘own’ immunity”.10 On this
understanding he describes how “the West” since 9/11 operates on an autoimmune logic where it is “producing, reproducing, and
regenerating the very thing it seeks to disarm”.11 It is clear that autoimmunity is understood as a threat to the system. However, it
also brings to the system an openness to the future that keeps the system alive. This is what has attracted many scholars who want to
think about the future in ways that do not fall back on the linear timeline they have found problematic. Derrida famously insists on
the openness of the future “to come” through highlighting the connection in French language of the terms for “future” (avenir) and
“to come” (à venir). In doing so, he insists on the necessity of the absolutely singular other for the possibility to think time and any
future at all. To Derrida “[a] foreseen event is already present, already presentable; it has already arrived or happened and is thus
neutralized in its irruption”.12 Therefore, “[w]ithout the absolute singularity of the incalculable and the exceptional, no thing and no
one, nothing other and thus nothing, arrives or happens”. 13 Put otherwise, “[w]ithout autoimmunity, with absolute immunity,
nothing would ever happen or arrive; we would no longer wait, await or expect, no longer expect one another, or expect any event”.
14 This is why Derrida and others insist on autoimmunity, not only as a threat to the system, but also as a condition of simultaneous
possibility and impossibility of the future “to come” (avenir/à venir). Excluding “non-Western” others from the autoimmune system
As indicated above, scholars associate autoimmune logics with a specific spatioR temporal configuration, related to “the West” and
European democracy. In Baudrillard’s work, it is European democracy, the modern West, or sometimes consumer society more
broadly, that are driven by the “perverse” logic he describes.15 Other places are excluded from such analysis in an attempt at “radical
exoticism”.16 Esposito’s analysis focuses on a logic of community at work in “modernity”, a term that many understand to be
concerned with a specifically European or Western trajectory.17 Derrida recognized that groups beyond such a cluster also contain
autoimmunitary processes.18 Nonetheless, and despite insisting that his claim is not Eurocentric,19 he persists in privileging the
names “Europe” and “democracy” as originating in the Enlightenment that he takes as inaugurating such self-perfecting logics.20
Though China, for example, is recognized as joining the coalition formed around the United States after 9/11, Europe holds an
exceptional position in this postR9/11 world, because Enlightenment Europe is seen as inaugurating the selfRquestioning Derrida
lauds. This can be found, he claims, “neither in the Arab world nor in the Muslim world, nor in the Far East, nor even … in
American democracy”.21 Derrida goes so far as to suggest that the future to come that is opened up by an autoimmune logic is
specific to Europe or democracy. Derrida’s “democracy to come” is chosen in acknowledgement of his debt to a historical and
intellectual heritage. He claims: [o]f all the names grouped a bit too quickly under the category ‘political regimes’ (and I do not
believe that ‘democracy’ ultimately designates a ‘political regime’), the inherited concept of democracy is the only one that
welcomes the possibility of being contested, of contesting itself, of criticizing and indefinitely improving itself.22 As Kimberly
Hutchings has argued, this argument allocates universal relevance to Enlightenment thinking, albeit not identified with a universal
end of history.23 Victor Li sums up this attitude: “Europe, in questioning itself, is exceptional; European exceptionalism, moreover,
seems to be made possible only by the Muslim world or the Far East acting as exceptions to the spirit of critical questioning”.24 A
consequence of this attitude is the outright denial of an openness of the future in these other systems.25 Many of those who have
more recently followed on this thought, and drawn on ideas of such autoimmune logics in IR, have also done so to discuss issues
closely associated with a similar configuration. In these accounts, autoimmunity appears to emanate from “Western” practice or
thought. Dan Bulley, for example, draws on Derrida’s autoimmune to study British foreign policy and democracy.26 Nick
VaughanRWilliams finds it in British border politics.27 Bulley, VaughanRWilliams and others like James Brassett and Marguerite La
Caze follow Derrida and study it in recent acts of “terrorism” in Europe and the United States.28 Goldie Osuri sees it in orientalism
generated by a current “Western” system,29 and writers like Samir Haddad and Alexander J. P. Thomson join this group of writers to
explore its role in contemporary democracy.30 A number of other sources could be cited to similar effect. These are all excellent
pieces of scholarship. They show that contemporary scholars have found the figure of autoimmunity to have significant explanatory
value in a range of areas of concern in contemporary IR. They have drawn on the notion to complicate binaries such as
successful/failed states, inside/outside nation states, cosmopolitanism/terrorism, and powerful/helpless. The most unsettling insight
the concept of autoimmunity leads us to, as aptly summarised in Bulley’s discussion, is that “it is always a matter of the self revealing
the impossibility of the self … it reveals that there is no selfEsame self in the first place”.31 Most importantly for the discussion here,
all these thinkers identify in autoimmunity an opening up to a future to come, an openness that the linear thinking about time tends to
close down or deny. These discussions of autoimmunity in IR matter because they have contributed to a better understanding of these
phenomena and because they have pointed towards new ways of responding to events like 9/11 or 7/7. The fact that the term has
become increasingly used in academic circles is also a reason to critically examine its effects. Taken together, however, these
discussions also show that recent writing on autoimmunity in IR has done little to challenge its Eurocentric implications. As a body of
literature, they are very much focused on the configuration of “the West”, particularly democracy and terrorism “against” (or “by”)
that system. The literatures concerned with autoimmunity to date seem to imply, and sometimes explicitly claim, that systems in
times and places outside of this configuration might not or do not work on this logic. This claim matters because of the association of
autoimmune logics with an open future. That claim then needs to be questioned at this point. Is democracy really the only system that
operates on an autoimmune logic? Are there other autoimmune systems outside what is conceived of as the “modern West” or
“European democracy”? In the next section I turn to the Chinese system of “harmony”, specifically the “harmonious world” that has
been advocated by Chinese authorities and scholars, to argue that there is at least one nonREuropean, nonR democratic system that
operates on a very similar logic. Autoimmune'logics'beyond'“the'West”:'China’s'“harmonious'world” Harmony as a Chinese system In
conjunction with China’s rise, scholars and policy makers have begun to ask how a rising China will reshape international norms.
What would a world under Chinese leadership look like? What norms does China want to promote? The answer many Chinese
officials, scholars and organisations have given to these questions can be summarised in one word: harmony. Every generation of
leadership of the People’s Republic has used set phrases to stamp their mark on Chinese politics. “Harmony” rose on the Chinese IR
research agenda after the previous Chinese president Hu Jintao launched it as an official policy concept around 2004R2005.32 Two
key policies under Hu have been “harmonious society” (hexie shehui 和谐社会) and “harmonious world” (hexie shijie 和谐世界).
At the time when Hu’s harmonious policies were launched, Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up” had been praised for bringing
about the impressive growth of the Chinese economy. With it, however, came growing inequality, continued environmental
degradation and social unrest. Hu’s rhetorical focus on harmony sought to calm unrest which risked growing to a point of
dangerously challenging party rule.33 The term also had its precedents in foreign policy. As pointed out by William A. Callahan,34
harmony was related to policy prior to Hu’s major reuse of the term, both in academic debates on IR and wider social sciences35 and
in Jiang Zemin’s speeches.36 This policy and academic discourse draws on a long history of thinking about harmony in China. The
concept has a central position in Confucian, Daoist and Buddhist thinking, and had a strong influence on Chinese systems of
governance for millenia. The operative term for “harmony” is he (和), which was more recently selected as the Chinese character that
“carries the most meaning for Chinese culture” by a popular Chinese magazine. 37 The concept featured heavily in the line of
propagandistic megaRevents that included the 2008 Beijing Olympics38 and the 2010 Shanghai Expo.39 In academia, it is often
referred to as “foundational” or a “key concept” in Chinese thought.40 Chinese IR scholars Ni Shixiong and Qian Xuming exemplify
this attitude when they claim that: ‘cherishing harmony’, ‘harmony with difference’ and such thought penetrates the inner
world of the Chinese nation, taking shape in the Chinese nation ardently loving peace, upholding a harmonious national
disposition and values.41 Harmony, then, may be understood as an example of a system that has emerged from, and that is currently
operating, outside what is understood as the “modern West” and “European democracy”, and which predates both. Today, Xi Jinping
has taken over after Hu as head of the Chinese partyRstate. Like previous generations of leadership, he has deployed his own slogan
of choice, the “China dream” (Zhongguo meng 中国梦). This slogan has incorporated the notion of harmony and is part of
constituting what KeyRyoung Son has referred to as a discourse of “harmonism”, “an expression of the ethos, identities
and norms of the East Asian political elite with respect to national, regional, and global
governance at the specific historical juncture the world is passing through”.42 The political elite that Son refers to
incorporates policy makers, academics and other stakeholders . Academics in China are increasingly called to
inform senior party members, who in turn inform the development of academic arguments. For example Hu, when he became
General Secretary of the Communist Party in 2002, started collective study sessions for China's top decision unit, the Politburo,
where IR scholars are invited to give lectures. A new Foreign Policy Council similarly brings officials and scholars together. Where
some say scholars act as mouthpieces for politicians, others say it is scholars who put issues on the political agenda and act as a
substitute for the kind of opposition we see in liberal democracies. What is clear is that the leading Chinese scholars discussed here
have become part of the policy process that has expanded in the last decades to include increased influence from universities, research
institutes and other intellectuals. 43 Therefore, discussions of harmony in China are not best separated into “policy” and “academic”
discourse, but analysed together as one system or elite discourse of “harmonism”, as proposed by Son. Before proceeding to look
closer at this dicourse of “harmonism”, four premises of my analysis are worth highlighting. First, the texts I examine are principally
produced by “insiders” of the system. The policy discourse discussed represents versions of harmony that made it to official
documents.44 Most scholarly materials discussed are written for Chinese language audiences at Chinese institutions. 45 Like
“democracy”, “harmony” is a norm that has gained widespread acceptance amongst political elites within a particular system, but this
does not imply that they have a monopoly on articulating harmony. Second, these Chinese political elites do not themselves articulate
an entirely uniform notion of harmony. Just as “democracy” means different things to different people, discussions of “harmony”
represent a diversity of opinion. Nonetheless, just as “democracy” represents a cluster of dominant ideas or a system of governance,
so too can we speak of a cluster of “harmonist discourses that aim to challenge Western hegemonic discourses and create a new
system of governance”.46 Third, this dominant version of harmony does not represent some truth about what harmony “really
means”. Rather, I focus on what “harmony” does where it is deployed by the political elite. I pay particular attention to the
implications of this version of harmony for thinking about diverse futures in relation to the autoimmune logics outlined above.
Scholars argue that “[t]he policy discourse ‘harmonious society’ and its foreign policy alter ego ‘harmonious world’ has become the
defining discourse of the Chinese Communist Party under Hu Jintao”.47 “Harmonism” thus provides the discursive backdrop of
policy making in contemporary China, just like elite ideas about “democracy” do in Europe and the United States. Finally, I
recognise here that all analysis must start from some position, and that that position is in some way arbitrary.
In critiquing
recent thought on autoimmunity for excluding China I do not suggest that a body of thought
could achieve wholeness without exclusions. Indeed, the focus on China in this article is only achieved by other
exclusions. Nor does Derridean deconstruction pretend to be able to do without exclusion, but
rather shed light on it and thereby put it eternally in question .48 Yes, this article shows that Derrida is
factually wrong when he claims that only Europe or democracy works on an autoimmune logic. Nonetheles, what is
attempted here is not primarily a criticism of recent thought on autoimmunity for excluding China, but a demonstration
of the possibilities that are created when this exclusion is ‘brought back in’ . What I hope my
examination will achieve is to make visible the instability and impossibility of the wholeness that is aimed at in the harmony concept.
Thus, whilst acknoweldging my own arbitrary starting point, the analysis here of both harmonious world and autoimmunity aims to
show the “snags, tears, and portals, inviting alternative paths”,49 that may offer room for “thinking otherwise”.50 From
harmonyEwithEdifference to exclusive harmonisation Hu made his definite launch of the “harmonious world” concept to the UN at its
60th anniversary summit in 2005: [w]e should do away with misgivings and estrangement existing between civilizations and make
humanity more harmonious and our world more colorful. We should endeavor to preserve the diversity of civilizations in the spirit
of equality and openness, make international relations more democratic and jointly build towards a harmonious world where
all civilizations coexist and accommodate each other. 51 In December the same year a white paper titled China’s Peaceful
Development Road was published, expanding on the concept,52 and in October 2007 the 17th National Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) wrote the concept into its constitution, calling for the building of “a harmonious world characterized by
sustained peace and common prosperity”. 53 As can be seen from his speech to the UN, Hu wanted to associate “harmony” with
norms of diversity and multiplicity from the outset. A number of texts have since developed the idea that “harmonious world” should
build on the notion of “harmony with difference” or “harmony without uniformity” (he er butong 和而不同).54 In 2011 a second
white paper was issued on China’s Peaceful Development, which has since been widely cited and emphasised in the PRC’s foreign
policy work, including ministers’ and ambassadors’ speeches.55 This white paper reiterated the themes of the previous reports,
including the appreciation of “harmony with difference”: [t]he Chinese people have always cherished a world view of ‘unity
without uniformity,’ ‘harmony between man and nature,’ and ‘harmony is invaluable.’ ... Under the influence of the culture
of harmony, peaceR loving has been deeply ingrained in the Chinese character.… Imbued with the belief that one should be as
inclusive as the vast ocean which admits hundreds of rivers, the Chinese nation has embraced all that is fine in foreign
cultures…. The Chinese people have inherited the fine tradition of Chinese culture of over 5,000 years and added to it new
dimensions of the times. 56 A significant portion of the academic literatures on harmony and harmonious world also stress the
importance of multiplicity and heterogeneity for proper harmony.57 Many texts deploy the term “harmony with difference” to express
the need for difference in order to have the balance of separate elements that is harmony.58 Respecting cultural multiplicity is
emphasised as the only way to a harmonious world and the development of “the civilisation of humanity”.59 One proponent of
harmonious world, Wang Yiwei, offers the concept as an alternative to the problematic timeRspace conceptualisation of difference in
“Western thought”: [i]n their [Westerners’] view, patriotism and nationalism became separated into symbolically advanced
and backward, sameness and difference. This is a typical case of the ‘logic of taking initiative’, the implication is ‘your
life is in our history’ … Therefore, under the hegemonic speech system of the contemporary world, nationalism has already
been derided by the strong, just as though a piece of clothing, worn out by developed countries, was tossed to developing
countries. 60 There is a concern here with the problematic imagination of other as “behind” to which many of the texts that discuss
autoimmunity also respond. Despite this concern, a vast majority of the literatures on harmonious world repeat similarly problematic
moves, for example through arguing that “harmonious world” is a “natural extension and development” of “harmonious society”,
where China builds harmonious society in the external arena.61 As the quote above from China’s Peaceful Development has already
policy discourse also incorporates a strong and repeated suggestion that “China” has
indicated,
privileged access to a “proper” understanding of harmony, and is leading the world towards this
end goal. In the same white paper, this form of being in the world carries forward the Chinese
historical and cultural tradition: [t]he world has been believed to be a harmonious whole in the Chinese culture ever
since the ancient times. This belief has a lasting impact on the thinking and acts of the Chinese nation, which is an important value
that the Chinese people follow in handling interpersonal relationships, the relationship between man and nature and relations
between different countries. 62 Similarly, in China’s Peaceful Development Road’s elaboration of harmony, “China is working hard
to bring about a just and rational new international political and economic order” and is “working harder to get the rest of the world to
understand China”. 63 Harmony, here, is a value specific to the Chinese people, state and civilisation, because of history.64 It is
something that “China” understands, but that others need to be taught. In such linear writing about harmonious world, a number of
these texts explicitly deploy the imagery of “backwards countries” or “countries lagging behind”. 65 Together with China’s “basic
conditions” and its fundamental national and longR term interests, the alleged Chinese cultural predisposition to harmony is said to
have created the “innate force” driving China’s peaceful development. Its vision of a harmonious world is said to align with the
“global trend”, where “those who go along with it will prosper and those who go against it will perish”. 66 Once the story has been
told, or more often the assumption has been made, of “China” and (some) Chinese having privileged access to harmony, it seems only
natural that China’s elites should be the forerunners of global harmonisation. Accordingly, a significant number of scholars are
explicit that the aim of harmony theory, or sometimes what they see as Confucianism more broadly, is the “ultimate goal of
harmonizing the world”. 67 To
achieve such harmonisation, starting from a world of contradiction and
difference, contradiction needs to be resolved .68 To Liu Dongjian, for example: to realise harmonious society, the
most important thing is the need to properly harmonise the relationships of three aspects, namely: the contradiction between
people and nature, the contradiction between people and people, the contradiction between the people and the government.
If it is possible to achieve a proper resolution to these three aspects of contradiction, then there can be a society facing harmony.69
Although he at first does not appear to see the possibility of a final resolution to contradiction that Liu’s “harmonise” seems to imply,
Qin Yaqing also argues that only the melting away of contradictions can lead to a harmonious world: harmonious world is also an
order that incessantly melts away contradictions. International society inevitably realises all sorts of contradictions, old
contradictions are resolved, new contradictions can appear again, the era of globalisation is especially this way. 70 Yet the appeal
of solutions is strong also for Qin, and solutions remain to him the key point of harmony in the text: “only by constructing a
harmonious justice foundation for common existence and common development can the fundamental problems of international
society be genuinely resolved”. 71 Similarly, to Wang Yizhou, there is increasing possibility in a harmonious world to use
international law and practice to resolve differences.72 Wang, Liu and Qin take somewhat different views on the nature of
contradiction, but they share with each other (and with the literatures on harmonious world more generally) a focus on the resolution
of contradiction and divergence. In a similar way, it is common for scholars who analyze harmony to begin by stressing
that it should be a tolerant, open and equal form of “harmony with difference”, only to go on and list the ideas or ways of life
that should definitely be excluded, rejected and/or transformed in order to achieve or protect harmony. For example, Qin Zhiyong
argues that ways of being as diverse as “extreme individualism, money worship, hedonism, Anarchist mentality and concept in the
Western culture are resolutely to be guarded against and rejected”. 73 In a similar vein, Ni Shixiong and Qian Xuming argue that
we need to respect civilisational differences, but oppose (those we designate as) terrorists and make
everyone understand China (or China’s view), whilst accepting only advanced culture in China. 74 Notable here is that Ni and
Qian are writing in Chinese to a Chinese audience, who will be all too aware of who are “terrorists” in contemporary China –
those imagined as ethno-civilisational others in border regions like Tibet and Xinjiang who
are seeking autonomy from Chinese rule. The culture associated with these groups are also regularly portrayed as “backward”
as opposed to the “advanced” cultures that should be accepted.75 Kam Por Yu also stresses that harmony is not unprincipled
compromise, and endorses Confucius’ view that “the gentleman stands his ground, and is not moved by popular opinions, much less
be shaped by them”, which is why “the right kind of harmony is achieved by referring to some principles of proper conduct … [n]ot
all claims can be treated as equal”.76 Another article by Ding Sheng draws on Mencius as a thinker whose ideal is a king that through
benevolence has “no rivals in the world”.77 To Confucius, writes Ding, the virtue of noble families is that they “do not worry about
poverty, but worry about discontent”.78 He quotes Sunzi’s notion that “to subjugate the enemy’s army without doing battle is the
highest of excellence”. 79 We can see this attitude mirrored in Chinese society under CCP rule today. The CCP has overseen a
remarkable shift in economic governance that has pulled astonishing numbers of people out of poverty (where, admittedly, it may be
argued they found themselves because of the CCP in the first place). It appears, however, that the party-state’s main response to
China’s income inequality has been to push for further growth accompanied by campaigns to be “harmonious” rather than envious of
others. One example of this may be the nationalist “eight honours and eight shames” campaign (ba rong, ba chi), which urged China’s
citizens to build a harmonious socialist society by “living plainly, working hard” .80 Harmony as holism and assimilation As can be
seen from the above, many of those who articulate harmony in the Chinese political elite discourse equate “harmonious” with
“consensual”.81 Literatures on harmony moreover typically stress the values they associate it with as “the only correct goal and the
only reachable goal”,82 or argue, in the context of “harmonious world”, that “choosing ‘peaceful rise’ is on the one hand China’s
voluntary action, on the other hand it is an inevitable choice”. 83 The idea of harmony as an “inevitable choice” is prominent also in
policy documents, where the 2005 China’s Peaceful Development Road states that China “endeavors to play a constructive and
locomotive role” and “strive constantly to … promote human civilization and progress”. 84 The “inevitability” of this endeavor is
again based on the particularism of Chinese history and culture: [i]t is an inevitable choice based on China’s historical and
cultural tradition that China persists unswervingly in taking the road of peaceful development. The Chinese nation has always
been a peaceRloving one. Chinese culture is a pacific culture. The spirit of the Chinese people has always featured their longing
for peace and pursuit of harmony. 85 In 2011 China’s Peaceful Development also placed renewed emphasis on the argument that
“China’s Path of Peaceful Development Is a Choice Necessitated by History”. 86 Taking this notion back to Kam Por Yu’s and Ding
Sheng’s proposals above, the idea of their vision of harmony as an “inevitable choice” lends an uncompromising edge to the
argument. Not only is there a tendency in the literatures on harmonious world to fear discord and opposition. The insistence by many
on harmony as a tolerant, open and equal form of “harmony with difference” is laudable, but it is all too often undermined by
positioning harmonious world as the inevitable endpoint of development. Once harmonious world has been positioned as the only
correct goal, the temptation is to start singling out disharmonious elements, those who harbour “terrorist” intentions or lack
“advanced” culture to contribute with. Indeed, the openness and friendly interaction between cultural, national and civilisational units
is still based on some principles of proper conduct. As Yu tells us, these principles must not be defined by popular opinion. The
overwhelming sense we are left with, instead, is that it is those who properly understand harmony that must decide on those
principles, on whose claims should be treated as equal. There are strong assertions that the Chinese have privileged access to such
understanding, but that (some of) its population consists of backwards low-quality people whose opinions should not sway the mind
of the sagely “gentleman”. The implication is that the Chinese political elites that developed “harmonious society” and “harmonious
world” are to decide on such standards. Acting harmoniously, in such a story, means acting in a way that is not discordant with the
views of the Chinese political elites. If everyone behaves harmoniously, an endRstate can be imagined where everyone complies
with, or is coRopted by, the Chinese elite’s notion of what is an advanced culture and a “winRwin” solution: a harmonious world. As
in Ding’s account, it is a state where any enemies or opponents have been subjugated and thus vanished as such. This is an attitude
recognisable from policy documents, where the point of “active communication” and “enhanced cooperation” is to create a form of
harmonious relation that meant “elimination of differences”.87 In practice, this “elimination of differences” is
precisely what is feared by many from China’s ethnic minorities, particularly in areas like
Xinjiang where relations have been frought and violent. In these areas, many in the Uyghur ethnic minority
population resent attempts at being integrated into the party-state’s vision of “ethnic
unity” on Han Chinese terms.88 From the above discussion, we can see that the idea of “harmony” is not simply
considered a local affair. Instead, we end up with a holistic idea of harmony. To some authors, holism is based in the notion of
“harmonism” (hehe zhuyi 和合主义), which one author describes as follows: in Chinese culture, ‘harmony’ (he 和) has many
layers of meaning of ‘kindness’ (heqi 和气), ‘reconciliation’ (hehao 和好), ‘amity’ (hemu 和睦), ‘peace’ (heping 和平), and
so on, and ‘unity’ (he 合) also has the many layers of meaning of ‘merging into one’ (heyi 合一), ‘being agreeable’ (heyi 合
意), ‘coRoperating’ (hezuo 合作).89 In this combination, a concept of harmony is used that emphasises “merging into one” or
“unification”. Following on such an understanding, Fang Xiaojiao claims that harmonious world builds on a feeling of TianxiaRism.
90 Tianxia litterally means “All-under-heaven”, and refers to an Ancient Chinese understanding of world order, which has been
recently reRdeployed as a “better” understanding of world order.91 Fang describes Tianxia-ism as: admitting differences, stressing
that different civilisations, states of different development levels, different social systems and ideologies can get along in harmony
and peace. This kind of peaceful thought respects multiplicity and difference, it is not the unification of Tianxia, but is mutual
forgiveness, mutual respect. 92 Despite this recognition and seeming rejection of Tianxia as a form of holism, however, harmonious
world is then said to incorporate the interests of both self and other: in this sense, the thought embodied in harmonious world
expressed a new concept of Chinese diplomacy, it is Chinese traditional culture and universal world value notion, China’s
own interest and the other’s interest, the outcome of combining the goal of harmony and the method of peace. 93 Similarly, to Li
Baojun and Li Zhiyong, Tianxiaism means an identification with all of humankind, where there is no differentiation or distinction
between people and no ethnoRnational classification.94 There is then an emphasis on wanting to preserve diversity of some sort, but
the proud declaration that the Chinese “nation has embraced all that is fine in foreign cultures” raises the question of the aspects of
(foreign) cultures that were not deemed “fine” by China’s political elites. Elsewhere, it is clear that the “mutual learning” and
“integration” that the partyRstate calls “harmony” may have a decidedly less “equal” or “democratic” appearance than what is
immediately obvious. When
discussing the harmony of “ethnic unity”, for example, a 2009 white paper
demands: all China’s ethnic groups, in the big family of the unified motherland and on the basis
of equality, are required to … promote peaceful coexistence and harmonious development ,
continuously strengthen and develop socialist ethnic relations based on equality, solidarity, mutual assistance and harmony,
devote all to the construction of socialist modernization, and make our country strong, our nation thrive and our people happy. 95
The proposition, then, is that all should be equal, but that they should be so according to the party-
state’s standards (as expressed in slogans and concepts like “peaceful coexistence”, “harmonious development”, “mutual
assistance and harmony” and “the construction of socialist modernization”). In the period that harmonious society and world have
been promoted, however, wavesof riots and self-immolations carried out by members of China’s ethnic
minorities should make it abundantly clear that not everyone wants to be equal on the Chinese
party state’s terms. 96 Similarly, a white paper on China’s Political Party System used “the multi-party cooperation system” to
exemplify harmony with difference, because “[i]t reflects the fine cultural tradition of the Chinese nation, which features all-
embracing and harmony while reserving differences”. 97 Although it certainly does allow for people not to join the CCP (which in
fact consists of a privileged minority), it seems ludicrous to argue that China’s 60 years of CCP rule represents some form of equality
between parties. Rather, it exemplifies how hierarchically organised the partyRstate version of “harmony with difference” is. In this
hierarchical ordering of difference, other parties are reduced to rubberRstamping centrally made decisions in the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), and real opposition is staunchly and often violently opposed as in the cases of Liu
Xiaobo or the Dalai Lama. Both these critical individuals have been labelled as not “harmonious” by the party state, in efforts to
delegitimise their respective causes.98
Above all else it is the fear of radical alterity that drives auto-immunity. In
this case, the figure of the jailed Uyghur dissident in China represents the
Other who America and the PRC make invisible to secure an orderly world.
This is a fundamental denial of ethics and responsibility
Orford 5 (Anne Orford, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Melbourne, 2005, “Critical Intimacy: Jacques Derrida and the
Friendship of Politics.” ARTICLES : SPECIAL ISSUE A DEDICATION TO JACQUES DERRIDA – MEMOIRS. German Law
Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 34-37//ddi:sa)
While in his early work Derrida thus insists on the priority of the question that inaugurates every institution, his later work is marked
by a concern with how one might respond to the call of the wholly other.17 This “radical alterity” is understood as that
from which we set off or push away in order to constitute a subject, an institution or a
tradition.18 For me, The Gift of Death is the text which has set out the possibilities and limits of this ethical turn most clearly.19
Here, Derrida maps the sacrificial tradition of thinking about responsibility, beginning with the story of Abraham, and tracing the
meaning of this story for Christianity and for European politics. Goddemands of Abraham “that most cruel, impossible,
and untenable gesture: to offer his son Isaac as a sacrifice .”20 Sacrificial responsibility involves a
singular relationship with an unknown other. In the Christian tradition, this other is named God, but in the
tradition of international economic law in which I work, we might name this other “the Market.” This responsibility can be
acted upon only in silence, in solitude and in the absence of knowledge. It involves a
relationship to the other to whom we respond, to whom we are responsible. This “form of
involvement with the other … is a venture into absolute risk , beyond knowledge and certainty.”21 Yet, lest
we slip into thinking that this answer or responsibility is something that can easily be generalised or universalised, Derrida reminds us
that whenwe respond to the other, we must betray all the other others . In making the decision, in
answering the call of the other, we can only ever be responsible to the one who makes the
demand. This unique, singular other might be our child, our lover, our brother or sister, or that
irreplaceable other represented in ethics. However, in my writing about international economic law, I have been
interested in tracing the ways in which WTO agreements structure this responsibility so that the market becomes the singular other
whose demand is to be answered by decision-makers.22 It is the global market to whom the decision-maker must be responsible in
this sense. This economy of sacrifice is accompanied by the promise of the reward of the righteous in the future by the Father
(God/Market) who sees in secret.23 WTO agreements ask of most Member States that they sacrifice those values they espouse
publicly and collectively – democracy, civility, politics, the family of the nation – for the global market, and as the price of inclusion
in the community of believers. These agreements require that the decision-maker imagine himself or herself in the position of
Abraham, called to abandon public obligations (the familial tie to his son and wife for Abraham, the civic obligations to citizens and to
values of transparency in the case of the decision-maker) to meet these demands of the market in the expectation of a reward in the
future. The question that remains for me is – how can decision-makers be responsible (rather than
simply “accountable”) to those they sacrifice in such an economy? How might we think about the responsibility of
Abraham to Sarah or to his son Isaac? Is it possible ever to be responsible to all the (other) others who are excluded from the
relationship between decision-maker and those to whom the decision-maker is responsible, those whom we sacrifice when we decide
to respond to the demands of the Father? Can the law encounter or repay the debts owed to those figures
whose bodies seem to be the necessary ground of these internationalist texts, and whose
sacrifices remain outside the economy of risk and reward that these texts establish? 24 The
tension or movement between these two tasks that a text might perform – preserving the self (guarding the question)
and responding to the call of the other – is one that we see played out repeatedly in international
law. For example, this movement informs the current debate about whether the priority of the inherent right of self-defence offers a
basis upon which states are able to derogate from other international norms, such as the prohibition against torture.25 And as I have
argued in detail elsewhere, it
is this tension which gives the human rights victim such a spectral
quality.26 This figure is haunting precisely because it embodies a memory of the trauma of
what was done to the other to secure a self for the West . As Derrida shows us, the return of such
spectres gives us the opportunity to learn from them about justice. If he loves justice at least,
the “scholar” of the future, the “intellectual” of tomorrow should learn it and from the ghost. He should
learn to live by learning not how to make conversation with the ghost but how to talk with
him, with her, how to let them speak or how to give them back speech, even if it is in oneself,
in the other, in the other in oneself: they are always there, specters, even if they do not exist,
even if they are no longer, even if they are not yet. They give us to rethink the “there” as
soon as we open our mouths …27
Auto-immunity is an existential threat—it’s on another level from all other

forms of conflict because the perpetual war it risks causes incalculable
violence
Callus and Herbrechter 4 (Ivan Callus, lecturer in English and literary theory at the University of Malta, and Stefan
Herbrechter, Senior Lecturer in Cultural Analysis at Trinity & All Saints College, ‘The Latecoming of the Posthuman, Or, Why "We"
Do the Apocalypse Differently, "Now."’ Summer 2004, DOA: 7-14-16 online:
http://reconstruction.eserver.org/Issues/043/callus.htm //ddi:sa)
It needs to be said immediately that if "we" are starting to discuss endism differently it is because the
apocalypse can be
done so more unthinkably and incalculably now than was ever the case. The challenge of the nuclear
that provided a focus for "No Apocalypse, Not Now" is one about which it is possible to be almost nostalgic in the context of all the
circumstances that make the posthumanous so immediate to both experience and possibility: the biotechnology revolution and the
various technologies for the prosthesization of the human, the prospect of engineered pandemics, worldwide virality that could be
digital as well as organic, indeed all the
processes that could conceivably operate according to the logic of
autoimmunity, whereby "a living being, in quasi-suicidal fashion, 'itself' works to destroy its own
protection, to immunize itself against its 'own' immunity " (Derrida's emphasis) [26]. According to Derrida,
"what is put at risk by this terrifying autoimmunitary logic is nothing less than the existence of
the world, of the worldwide itself" (Derrida's emphasis; 98-99). This risk, whereby the human itself creates the conditions for that
which might exceed it, doing so without simultaneously immunizing itself against the worst with any adequacy or proper foresight, is
what makes the posthumanous the episteme of our time. Reflections upon it could therefore look like a processual rather than
posthumous epitaph on the human. In that context, the (sur)passing of the human becomes less amenable to the protocols of
poststructuralist counter-intuitiveness than may previously have been the case. Hence, to recast the famous reflections from the
conclusion to Foucault's The Order of Things (1966), the posthumanous is an invention of very recent date, and what is therein
discovered is that the erasability of the human is an all too immediate wager. A grim scenario brings this point starkly home. It has to
do with the fact that the
worries of the Cold War, even the rigors of all previous wars, look -- and one
hopes to be forgiven for saying this -- almost
quaint beside the order and enormity of the
posthumanous understood as the apocalyptic eventuality that is scripted by the various
formulations of the autoimmunity contrived by the human. It is by no means certain, to follow Blanchot
and Rapaport, that humanity will grow quite as blasé about the banality of the end as it had grown inured, through thanatopraxie and
the various resources of the writing of the disaster, to Cold War menaces [27]. Quite simply, that is because it
is possible to do
the apocalypse more inventively now, and through all the inventions that have made
previous technologies of the end obsolete and that will continue , in a paradoxical renewing of their ends,
to do so. This, in fact, is itself a sign of the apocalyptic newness of the "now." Previous apocalyptic technologies
have been obliterated by an accelerated logic of obsolescence , almost as if previous generations seem
datedly exterminable, while "we" appear to be available to more designedly state-of-the-art (indeed practically "designer") endings
the
which are potentially procurable by those -- and this where terrorism comes in -- undeterred by any détente. Consequently,
worst is not merely thinkable, but apprehensible as something on this side of improbability .
In that apprehending the mannerisms of deconstructive, poststructuralist, or postmodernist logic, particularly their counter-intuitive
temporalities and their reluctance to countenance straightforward projections of supersedence, seem to lack le bon ton. Indeed, there is
no greater indication of the appositeness of a different tone and a different temporization of the posthumanous, and of the way in
which even deconstruction finds itself driven to do the apocalypse differently now, than the following statement by Derrida: We are
talking about a trauma, and thus an event, whose temporality proceeds neither from the now that is present nor from the present that is
past but from an im-presentable to come (à venir). A weapon wounds and leaves forever open an unconscious scar; but this weapon is
terrifying because it comes from the to-come, from the future, a future so radically to come that it resists even the grammar of the
future anterior [emphasis added]. [28]
Derrida 1AC—Plan
Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its
bilateral human rights engagement with the People’s Republic of China by
doubling the frequency of dialogue and establishing a governmental working
group over the rights of Uyghur political prisoners.
Derrida 1AC—Solvency
Contention 2: Solvency
Plan solves—expanding bilateral human rights engagement offers redress to
Uyghur grievances and moves away from the “harmony-over-all-else”
mentality—China says yes despite hard-line voices
Autonomous Region
I believe that what we are witnessing today is a manifestation of a Chinese leadership that , though it may
exude confidence in its dealings with the outside world, sees mounting signs of instability at home in the form of
petitioners seeking redress for grievances, growing numbers of mass incidents, eruption of long-simmering
ethnic tensions in Lhasa and Urumchi, and the messy, hard-to-control Internet, with its channels for expression of critical
opinion and transmission of uncensored news. A sense of imminent and perpetual threat has played into
the hands of a hard-line, “stability-above-all-else” element in the leadership , one particularly
associated with the security forces, the military, and the propaganda apparatus. Though the factors
underlying these developments in China have been primarily domestic, confusion in the international community about how best to
engage with “rising China” on human rights has clearly emboldened some Chinese leaders to pursue certain policies despite
international opposition. For the time being, at least, China’s leadership appears to be pursuing what the Chinese scholar Yu Jianrong
has called “rigid stability,” instead of heeding the voices of those inside and outside the Party who advocate taking stronger steps
toward establishment of a more legitimate rule-of-law system, one that would weaken the authority of the security forces and see Party
oversight of court decisions receding in favor of a more independent judiciary.[15] But as long as the perception remains of a high
level of threat from ethnic separatists, hostile foreign forces, mass incidents, and political subversives, this hard-line faction will try to
continue to hang on to its remaining strongholds long enough at least to have an influence over the formation of the new leadership
group at the 18th Party Congress in 2012. Notwithstanding the strong position of the hard-liners, proponents
of expanding civil rights and further developing rule of law in China still have a voice, particularly via the
media. On a few occasions, backlash against local government officials’ abuse of criminal defamation
charges to prosecute critics of corruption and malfeasance have forced authorities to acknowledge
they overstepped their authority.[16] Major media outlets have been vocal in exposing serious problems such as the use of
“black jails” to incarcerate petitioners, mysterious deaths of detainees in police-run detention facilities, and the torture of criminal
suspects.[17] There have been stirring calls for reform to the laws governing state secrets and household registration, and last month
new rules took effect that should in theory prevent illegally obtained evidence and testimony from being used in criminal proceedings.
[18] In short, there appears to be a constituency within the Party (not to mention among Chinese legal experts and
practitioners and the wider population) that supports moving more resolutely along a path of reform, a group that
may feel frustrated by the recent lack of progress on political reform and growing reliance on repression. An
important goal of our collective human rights engagement with China should be to support the efforts of
this constituency, particularly at such a moment when it may feel most embattled. At this point, I would like to offer the
following recommendations: First, the bilateral human rights dialogue between the United States and China
should be enhanced and expanded. To this end, we recommend:  Doubling the frequency of the
dialogue to make it a semi-annual event. This would facilitate the establishment of relationships
with Chinese interlocutors and better reflect the importance the US government attaches to the
human rights situation in China. A semi-annual dialogue would also match the frequency of China’s human rights
dialogue with the European Union.  Ensuring that detailed, bilingual prisoner lists an integral part of the
dialogue process. It is also essential that the US government hold China accountable for
responding to these requests for information in a sincere and timely manner .  Establishing a
working group on the rights of political prisoners. Thanks to efforts by the State Department,
China has agreed in principle to establish working groups as part of the bilateral human rights
dialogue. The United States should actively follow up on this agreement and propose that a
working group be established on the rights of political prisoners . The United States must be
prepared to engage China critically in the area of human rights. Disagreements can be expected,
but engagement must be about more than simply “agreeing to disagree.” It should involve
recognizing the value of substantive, critical discussion in which all parties are held equally
accountable for their commitments to human rights under international law .
In the face of sovereign auto-immunity, it is more important than ever to

refuse to abandon human rights and sovereignty, which are the crucial
grounds for struggling against the closure of democracy. The plan represents
a democracy-to-come that remains a promise, requiring constant vigilance
and self-reflection.
Derrida 5 (Jacques Derrida, Directeur d’Etudes at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, 2005, Rogues:
Two Essays On Reason, p. 86-88)
The expression “democracy to come” does indeed translate or call for a militant and interminable
political critique. A weapon aimed at the enemies of democracy, it protests against all naïveté and every
political abuse, every rhetoric that would present as a present or existing democracy, as a de facto democracy, what
remains inadequate to the democratic demand, whether nearby or far away, at home or
somewhere else in the world, anywhere that a discourse on human rights and on democracy re-
mains little more than an obscene alibi so long as it tolerates the terrible plight of so many
millions of human beings suffering from malnutrition, disease, and humiliation, grossly deprived not only of bread and
water but of equality or freedom, dispossessed of the rights of all, of everyone, of anyone. (This “anyone” comes before any other
metaphysical determination as subject, human person, or consciousness, before any juridical determination as compeer, compatriot,
kin, brother, neighbor, fellow religious follower, or fellow citizen. Paulhan says somewhere, and I am here paraphrasing, that to think
democracy is to think the “first to happen by” [le premier venu]: anyone, no matter who, at the permeable limit between “who” and
“what,” the living being, the cadaver, and the ghost. The first to happen by: is that not the best way to translate “the first to come”?)
The “to-come” not only points to the promise but suggests that democ racy will never exist, in
the sense of a present existence: not because it will be deferred but because it will always remain aporetic in its
structure (force without force, incalculable singularity and calculable equality , commensurability
and incommensurability, heteronomy and autonomy, indivisible sovereignty and divisible or shared sovereignty, an empty name, a
despairing messianicity or a messianicity in despair, and so on). But, beyond this active and interminable critique, the expression
“democracy to come” takes into account the absolute and intrinsic historicity of the only system that welcomes in itself, in its very
concept, that expression of autoimmunity called the right to self-critique and perfectibility. Democracy
is the only
system, the only constitutional paradigm, in which, in principle, one has or assumes the right to criticize
everything publicly, including the idea of democracy, its concept, its history, and its name. Including the idea of the
constitutional paradigm and the absolute authority of law. It is thus the only paradigm that is universalizable, whence its chance and its
fragility. But in order for this historicity—unique among all political systems—to be complete, it must be freed not only from the Idea
in the Kantian sense but from all teleology, all onto-theo-teleology. 2. This implies another thinking of the event
(unique, unforeseeable, without horizon, un-masterable by any ipseity or any conventional and thus consensual performativity),
which is marked in a “to-come” that, beyond the future (since the democratic demand does not wait),
names the coming of who comes or of what comes to pass, namely, the newly arrived whose irruption
should not and cannot be limited by any conditional hospitality on the borders of a policed nation-state.
3. This naturally presupposes, and that is what is most difficult, most inconceivable, an extension of the
democratic beyond nation-state sovereignty, beyond citizenship. This would come about
through the creation of an international juridico-political space that, without doing away
with every reference to sovereignty, never stops innovating and inventing new distributions
and forms of sharing, new divisions of sovereignty. (I refer to inventing here because the to-come gestures not
only toward the coming of the other but toward invention—invention not of the event but through the event.) The discourse
concerning the New International in Specters of Marx (1993) tried to point in this direction. The
renewed declaration of
human rights (and not the “rights of man and the citizen”) at the end of World War II remains an essential
democratic reference for the institutions of international law , especially the United Nations. This ref-
erence is thus in virtual contradiction with the principle of nation-state sovereignty , which there
remains also intact. It is by democratic reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
that one tries, most often to no avail, to impose limits on the sovereignty of nation-states. One example of
this, among so many others, would be the laborious creation of an International Criminal Court. The Declaration of Human Rights is
not, however, opposed to, and so does not limit, the sovereignty of the nation-state in a way a principle of nonsovereignty would
oppose a principle of sovereignty. No, it is one sovereignty set against another. Human rights pose and presuppose the human being
(who is equal, free, self-determined) as sovereign. The
Declaration of Human Rights declares another
sovereignty; it thus reveals the autoimmunity of sovereignty in general .
Though it may be true that in the face of the Other’s death there can be no
adequate language, we must nevertheless refuse to remain silent in the face of
violence against Uyghurs—a failure to do so would confirm sovereignty’s
success at emptying dissent from China. We must affirm a necessarily
imperfect strategy like the plan to bring an ethic of justice into being.
Perrin 4 (Colin Perrin, PhD in Law and Philosophy from the University of Kent, held research positions at the University of
New South Wales and the University of Durham, 2004, 'Breath from Nowhere: The Silent Foundation of Human Rights'. Social and
Legal Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, p. 138-141)
The identification and presentation of human rights violations confront ‘us’ with images and
descriptions of the pain, suffering and death of others. And in order to elicit a response to these violations the efforts
of Amnesty International have consisted in an appeal for language and usually for a letter. What then is the basis of this appeal? It
does not, I will argue, lie in an assumption of the adequacy of language or indeed in the adequacy of human rights. Rather it is exactly
this claim, taken here from Elaine Scarry’s work on torture, that I want to challenge: Amnesty International’s ability to bring about the
cessation of pain depends centrally on its ability to communicate the reality of physical pain to those who are not themselves in pain . .
. [E]mbedded in Amnesty’s work . . . is the assumption that . . . the human voice must aspire to become a precise reflection of material
reality. (Scarry, 1985: 9) The attribution of this assumption to Amnesty International, but more generally to human rights, leaves them
susceptible to the critique of language I have already indicated. But on Amnesty International’s own account, language
is
inadequate to the task of communicating the reality of pain to those who are not in pain. It cannot
‘precisely’ reflect the other’s suffering. This pain and suffering can only be adequately communicated if the violence that produced it
is repeated: a punch in the face ‘multiplied a hundredfold’ can only ‘begin’ to communicate the other’s pain and suffering. So how if
‘words fail us’ are Amnesty International’s use of and demand for language to be understood? Explicitly it is a matter of
‘speaking for those who . . . can no longer speak for themselves’ and in this respect of attesting to their
suffering or dying because they cannot do so. Their suffering takes place ‘in secret’ and ‘after dark’, in ‘remote cells’
and above all in silence. And so language is required in order to ‘expose’ this violence and this suffering
that without it would remain hidden and would continue to take place in silence. How though can one speak for the other without
effacing his or her otherness, without silencing his or her silence in a speech that would take the other’s place and in which, therefore,
it would be as if the other had not been silenced at all? While
the implication here is that one could only do
justice – or at least avoid doing this injustice – to the other by not speaking, by keeping silent and thereby
keeping the other’s place, it is exactly because the other cannot represent his or herself that
here one is called upon to speak. But since this is not the call for an articulate or ‘fine-sounding’ response, again: what is
the nature of this demand for language and of the language it demands? These questions, I suggest, can be addressed and answered via
a consideration of what Maurice Blanchot (1986) calls ‘the disaster’. Here, I am forced to simplify his account which concerns the fact
that the disaster cannot present ‘itself’. The disaster ruins its own possibility for – like silence – it refutes or negates ‘itself’ as
it ruins – or silences – the very terms in which it could be or be represented as a disaster. The disaster is so destructive that it destroys
any trace of its occurrence. This is the immeasurable or incalculable extent of its disastrousness
and it is for this reason that one cannot say or even decide that ‘there is’ the disaster. As Blanchot (1981) says of death: ‘when we die,
we leave behind not only the world but also death . . . it is the loss of the person, the annihilation of the being; and so it is also the loss
of death’ (p. 55). But what in this respect Blanchot goes on to call ‘the impossibility of dying’ – the impossibility of experiencing, or
of being the subject of, one’s own death – is also true of a suffering that he says is less something ‘I’ go through than something that
goes through ‘me’: ‘Suffering is suffering when one can no longer suffer it’ (Blanchot, 1993: 44). Above all therefore the disaster is so
overwhelming that there can be no attesting to it. To present it or to represent it is to efface the very disastrousness that makes it a
disaster. Thought, experience, language: all are inadequate to the disaster. How then can one bear witness to it? Or as Blanchot (1986)
asks: ‘How can thought be made the keeper of the Holocaust where all was lost, including guardian thought?’ (p. 47, emphasis
removed). For Blanchot, this ‘thought’ of the disaster does not produce a resignation to the impossibility of presentation
or representation. Rather it imposes a demand or an obligation insofar as it ‘exposes us to a certain idea of
passivity’ (Blanchot, 1986: 3). But this passivity bears the ruin and self-ruin that characterize the disaster. Its being is similarly
impossible and so it is to this impossibility, to the idea of a ‘self-refuting’ passivity, that the disaster exposes ‘us’. I will come back to
this. But now I want to indicate the relevance of this thought for
the obligation to calculate that Derrida traces
to the incalculability of justice, as well as for the relativist or postmodernist idea of difference indicated at the very
beginning of my discussion. It is also a certain idea of ‘passivity’ that Derrida (2002a) takes up in the name
of what he calls an ‘incalculable and giving [donatrice] idea of justice’ (p. 257); an idea of justice that implies the
sense in which ‘being just’ means being just or responsive or true to something in its difference or its singularity. 12 Again I will have
to simplify Derrida’s argument which concerns the impossible realization of this idea in a
decision that, as ‘finite’, would
always interrupt or cut into the infinite calculation that justice requires (p. 255).13 Such a decision is for
this reason always violent. But while it is never just, it is, for Derrida, nevertheless necessary. There is, he
says, and here after Pascal, no justice before law: ‘Justice isn’t justice, it is not achieved, if it does not have
the force to be “enforced”; a powerless justice is not justice’ (p. 238). ‘It is necessary then to combine
justice and force’ and in accordance with this necessity ‘justice demands, as justice, recourse to force’ (p. 239,
emphasis added). Derrida’s claim, therefore – and here it recalls the argument that silence requires language if it is to ‘be’ – is that
justice can only come into ‘being’ in law, and as it is enforced by law. According to this force, law or the decision
cannot be just. But what Derrida discerns here is a command to calculate or to decide that is – now
recalling the fact that for Amnesty International the other can no longer speak for him or herself – ‘ founded’ upon the fact
that justice cannot present ‘itself’, that it cannot be ‘itself’, before or outside of law. Restated, Derrida’s argument here
is that the ‘difference’ in the name of which (an extreme) relativism would reject human rights is,
before any calculation, beyond its determination even as difference. ‘Difference’ appears as
difference only if it has already been calculated , only if it has already been determined and so at the same time
violated in its ‘difference’. Again, without this determination, without this decision, difference could not appear at all. And so it is
according to this ‘decision’ – a decision that is as violent as it is necessary, as excessive as it is unavoidable
– that relativism must also calculate ; or, more precisely, it must have already calculated. Without law there
can be no justice. And so one has to decide; one has to speak. Why? I am already at the most crucial point
of Derrida’s argument: ‘Abandoned to itself, the incalculable and giving [donatrice] idea of justice is
always very close to the bad, even to the worst’ (Derrida, 2002a: 257). To begin to explain this point, I return to Blanchot’s
thought of the disaster: for the insight of this thought consists in the fact that as the disaster ruins its own possibility, so its occurrence,
its presence, would be unverifiable. There would be no difference between its presence and its absence. And it is this unverifiability
that Amnesty International invokes as the impossibility of interpreting or representing the difference between ‘one’ absence or silence
and ‘another’. ‘You’ve probably never heard of the Marsh Arabs before. You probably never will again’; ‘Kids. You can never find
them when you want them’. And so on. In this undecidable absence or silence, it is impossible to tell whether
the disaster has, or has not, taken place. Again, it is impossible to tell the difference between its presence and its absence
and it is because of this impossibility, I suggest, that in not speaking or deciding one comes very close to ‘the
worst’. In this passivity, in this attempt to respond or do justice to the disastrousness of the disaster, one’s
silence would constitute a ‘killing silence’ in the sense that it would be ‘complicit’ with the
disaster (in its unverifiability). What Amnesty International refers to as ‘the silence of good people’ is, for them, ‘the
deadliest enemy’ for this reason: exactly because it cannot be told apart from that non-response
which reflects a lack of concern with the other’s suffering or with his or her death, and which results from a
failure or a refusal to have been or felt touched by it.14 Unheard, ‘the silence of good people’ remains indistinguishable from a
‘silence’ – or more precisely an absence of silence – that does not ‘expose’ the other’s suffering and thereby allows it to continue in
silence. For as Derrida (2002a) says, it is in its proximity to the worst that the
incalculable and giving idea of justice
can ‘always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation ’ (p. 257). In ‘silence’, silence cannot be
heard at all. Or, after Blanchot, the passivity of this ‘silence’ would be so passive that it would be unable to bear witness to anything,
even to its own passivity. Exposed to this idea of passivity, passivity exposes ‘us’ to its demand: for as Blanchot (1986) says,
‘passivity is a task’ (p. 27). It
is only in speech or in writing that the ‘justice’ of one response can be
distinguished from the injustice of none. And, against Scarry’s characterization, the language demanded by
Amnesty International may be understood on this ‘basis’: already acknowledging its own inadequacy and its own imprecision, it is –
recalling Derrida – the language to which silence, as silence, must have recourse.
An ethic of hospitality toward the Other should be prioritized over their
disads and defenses of utilitarianism because literally no other value, even life
itself, is possible without our prior relationship to the Other. While
calculation is inevitable and useful, the incalculable MUST win out over
calculation to act on our responsibility. Finally, unconditional hospitality
should not be confused for universal hospitality – we must actively condemn
the forces that annihilate alterity. Even if this approach entails a measure of
violence, this violence is irreducible from politics and is a condition of our
responsibility.
Campbell 5 (David Campbell Professor of Geography at Durham University, 2005, “Beyond Choice: The Onto-politics of
Critique” . International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 1, p. 129-132)
As Zehfuss makes clear in her article, a deconstructive strategy is necessary to go beyond the confines of oppositional arguments
which nonetheless share the same structural logics. To argue as much is still to fly in the face of conventional
wisdom,
which, even beyond the academy, wants to tar deconstructive thought with the brush of relativism, fascism
and racism.7 Such popular, wilful and uninformed readings fail to appreciate the politically
affirmative and progressive nature of deconstructive thought , as revealed through its onto-political
character. The onto-political character of deconstructive thought is manifested in those moments where Derrida speaks of
deconstruction’s ontology. For example, when asked by Richard Kearney whether deconstruction can ‘ever surmount its role of
iconoclastic negation and become a form of affirmation’, Derrida’s response is that ‘deconstruction certainly entails a moment of
affirmation’ not the least reason for which is that he ‘cannot conceive of a radical critique which would not be ultimately motivated by
some sort of affirmation, acknowledged or not’. The affirmation, however, does not derive from the conscious desires or intentions of
a subject interested in deconstruction, but from the fact that ‘deconstruction is, in itself, a positive response to an
alterity which necessarily calls, summons or motivates it. Deconstruction is therefore vocation – a response to a call’.8
As the vocation roused by alterity, deconstruction’s onto-political claim is that our condition can be characterised by
the problematic of identity–difference, where neither term can be understood except in
relation to the other, and because of which claims about secure identities, traditionally authorised grounds,
and the political necessities said to flow from them are met with a critical scepticism . It is in this
context that Derrida has asserted: deconstruction is neither a theory nor a philosophy. It is neither a school nor a method. It is not even
a discourse, nor an act, nor a practice. It is what happens, what is happening today in what they call society, politics, diplomacy,
economics, historical reality, and so on and so forth. Deconstruction is the case.9 Deconstruction is ‘at bottom what happens or comes
to pass [ce qui arrive]’.10 That is quite a claim. An onto-political claim. But it is one I would make – and regard as central to asking
and responding to the question of the implication for politics of Derrida’s thought. The beginning of my response would be, however,
that the very structure of the political imaginary – assumptions about actuality and the way we pose the question itself – contains
elements of the answer within it. In Jabri’s article there is a claim about actuality that is worth citing and examining. She writes: We
are, in the present juncture of history, faced with mechanisms of control that are transnational in
reach, that define politics through a discourse of fear and unease, that seek to permeate, circumscribe
and monitor intellectual activity, that manipulate and codify the public sphere, that use emergency
legislation to incarcerate those deemed a danger to safety and security , that juridically legitimise the use of
torture, and that confine thousands of nameless individuals to detention and internment. This outline fits with George’s notion of a set
of global practices currently sanctified by the discourses of war. But what strikes me is how much that
totality fails. It fails
because we recognise it is an attempt at totality, but each element of it is subject to considerable
intellectual and political disagreement. It is the case that the investments of formal politics are more deeply
embedded in this totality now than at previous junctures, and certainly more than any progressive account would want. But we should
not lose sight of the fact that this
totality is radically contested, that radical critique exists here and now,
and we make a contribution to it by denaturalising its claims of realism and necessity
through onto-political interpretation. George may be right that the emerging global justice movement is currently
incapable of mounting the necessary challenge to the dominant structures of power, but should the ever-present and on-
going sites of global resistance congeal or merge into a large-scale challenge, that process will have been
made possible by and depend upon the prior intellectual labours of the activists, citizens,
scholars and others George’s analysis so powerfully surveys. Indeed, his own analysis of ‘pharmacotic war’ – of the way in
which war is both a medicine and poison, both addictive and dangerous for the body politic – is a bold example of how critical
interpretations draw upon and intersect with the intellectual labours of others to launch new understandings onto the field of
discourse.11 We tend to see critical thought and writing – even when like Jabri we understand thought as a
practice – to be insufficient in the face of all the political challenges we face . And it is – to a degree. But
it needs to be stressed that critical thought is also the necessary condition for whatever might follow .
For that reason Emmanuel Levinas’s claim that ‘political totalitarianism rests on an ontological
totalitarianism’ is especially apposite in the current global political climate.12 Of course, all hinges on what
we take to count as ‘ethical’. As George argues, challenging Western ethical discourse, and especially
the limited resources that have underpinned the moral discourse of international politics, ‘is the major theoretical task
confronting intellectuals interested in the ethics of international political engagement’.13 What is important to note is that
this theoretical task is likely to be simultaneously ‘against theory’ in so far as it will depend upon and produce an
understanding of the ethical relation rather than a theory of ethics , where the latter is understood as
systematic, abstract principles.14 One key strand of this endeavour involves an appreciation of Levinas’s
thought, because Levinas more than almost any other intellectual radically refigures our understanding of responsibility,
subjectivity and ethics. For Levinas, the meaning of each is implicated in the other: ‘responsibility [is]
the essential, primary and fundamental structure of subjectivity . For I describe subjectivity in ethical
terms. Ethics . . . does not supplement a preceding existential base; the very node of the subjective is knotted in ethics understood as
responsibility’.15 Of these concepts, responsibility is perhaps the most important because, for Levinas, being
is a radically
interdependent condition, a condition made possible only because of my responsibility to the
Other. We do not have the space here to pursue all the nuances and problems with Levinas’s conception, but it constitutes my onto-
political horizon. But it does not move us very far towards how, when and by whom that unavoidable responsibility to the Other
should be exercised. To make those steps, I think Derrida is better equipped. I agree with him that deconstructive thought
can be considered ‘a stroke of luck for politics, for all historical progress’,16 and that it can be regarded as the ‘at least
necessary condition for identifying and combatting the totalitarian risk’ .17 Derrida works
this out in terms of undecidability and the politics (or ‘madness’) of the decision – that because we
have to decide and act now, immediately, no decision can ever account for the multiple
possibilities inherent in the condition of undecidability. But this is not grounds for avoiding
decisions – it is grounds for understanding no decision is sufficient, so we will have to make
many and (this is crucial) see a constant oscillation and mobility between different positions . It will
involve the idea of ‘the double contradictory imperative’. By itself, none of this is going to help you write a
political manifesto or run for office or get a social movement onto the streets. Derrida has confessed (his term) ‘that I
have never succeeded in directly relating deconstruction to existing political codes and programmes’.18 This ‘failure’ is derived not
from any apolitical sentiment within deconstructive thought, but from the ‘fundamentally metaphysical’ nature of the political codes
within which both the right and the left presently operate. If
we are always already engaged, why assume that
the traditional forms of party, manifesto, movement and office – while undoubtedly important – are the only
or best political forms? The problem for politics that this disjuncture creates is, according to Derrida, that one has ‘to
gesture in opposite directions at the same time: on the one hand to preserve a distance and
suspicion with regard to the official political codes governing reality; on the other, to intervene
here and now in a practical and engagé manner whenever the necessity arises’. This, Derrida laments,
results in a ‘dual allegiance’ and ‘perpetual uneasiness’ whereby the logic of an argument structured in terms of ‘on the one hand’ and
‘on the other hand’ may mean that political action, which follows from a decision between the competing hands, is in the end
insufficient to the intellectual promise of deconstructive thought.19 However, were everything to be within the
purview of the decidable, and devoid of the undecidable, then – as Derrida constantly reminds us –
there would be no ethics, politics, or responsibility, only a program, technology, and its irresponsible
application. Of course, for many the certainties of the program are synonymous with the desires of politics. But if we seek to
encourage recognition of the radical interdependence of being which flows from our
responsibility to the other, then we have a different figuration of politics, one whose purpose
is the struggle for – or on behalf of – alterity, and not a struggle to efface, erase or eradicate
alterity.20 Alterity here means the condition of radical interdependence in which exist multiple possibilities for working out
relations of identity–difference. It is the domain of difference that too often is witness to the rise of otherness. This, then, is what I
would posit as the ethical relation, and the basis both for our engagements and the judgments we make about alternatives. Importantly,
this political figuration of the ethical relation encourages distinctions between antagonisms, conflicts, pluralities and multiplicities. All
is permitted, but not all forms of difference permit all to be. In this sense, a principle concerned with struggle for and on
behalf of alterity cannot be read as an ethic of tolerance for the intolerable . While liberal conceptions of
tolerance are insufficient when it comes to identifying the intolerable (just as liberal conceptions of humanism are insufficiently
attuned to the human), the principle being articulated here goes beyond the static confines of
tolerance and maintains that the active affirmation of alterity must involve the desire to
actively oppose and resist – perhaps, depending upon the circumstances, even violently – those forces that
efface, erase or suppress alterity. That which is to be opposed is not simply that which causes disturbance or irritation.
There will always be an agonistic and sometimes antagonistic relationship between the numerous
identities and settlements which variously contain difference. Life involves and requires resistance. Instead,
what are to be opposed are the relations of power which, in dealing with difference, move
from disturbance to oppression, from irritation to repression, and, most obviously, from contestation to
eradication. In other words, ‘moral visions which suppress the constructed, contingent , relational
character of identity’ – including, but not limited to, racism, xenophobia, neo-liberal globalisation strategies,
ethnic-nationalist violence and fascism – warrant resistance. 21 Siba Grovogui’s conception of a postcolonial
cosmopolitanism to counter continuing colonial relations of power would be one manifestation of this opposition. Others are possible,
for while the principle of opposing or resisting forces that efface, erase or suppress alterity is prescriptive in its political orientation to
radical interdependence, it leaves open for contestation and decision the question of which moral visions it is most concerned with and
how that concern is to be enacted
Auto-Immunity/K Advs
Auto-Immunity
This aggression towards the Uyghurs is reflective of an autoimmune logic.
China’s “harmonious” system cuts off parts of itself in an attempt to protect
and securitize harmony. However, in doing do it cuts itself off from the
harmony it strives for.
Nordin 2015 (Astrid H.M. Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at
Lancaster University. “Futures beyond ‘the West’? Autoimmunity in China’s
harmonious world”, 1/4/15,
[http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/73948/2/Futures_beyond_the_West_Final_Author_versi
on_as_accepted.01.04.2015.pdf], DOA 7/13/16, DDI HRM)
Moreover, the post-‐political vision of politics and harmony is dangerous because its denial of antagonism will tend to alienate those
excluded from consideration. This, Torfing writes, will tend to displace antagonistic struggles from the realm of the political to the
realm of morals, “where conflicts are based on non-‐ negotiable values and the manifestation of ‘authentic’ identities”.121 Such non-‐
negotiable values would be the opposite of the co-‐operative harmony sought. To both Rockman and Torfing, then, complete or
perfect harmony will defeat harmony and create disharmony. In this way, the excessive
production of harmony is what
produces the disharmonious elements that come to threaten it. We can see this happening in
contemporary China, where the “harmonising” policies enforced under the “harmonious society” slogan
have produced a range of oppositional movements, from Chinese youth mocking harmony online
to the increasing number of self-‐imolations we currently witness in and around Tibet. Numerous
scholars argue that in order to imagine harmony, we need to imagine heterogeneity and multiplicity.
We can now add that the problematic organisation of difference that remains in imaginations of harmonious world eliminates the
multiplicity in the here-‐now that is a prerequisite for harmony. What
these renditions of harmony show, I believe, is
that the tensions in and logics of harmony are very similar to the ones that are described by Derrida and
others in terms of the autoimmune. What we see in these accounts is an irresolvable contradiction,
which mirrors the autoimmune logic outlined at the beginning of this article. Harmony must by definition be
universal, but its universalisation by definition makes harmony impossible. In this respect
harmony works on a self-‐defeating and self-‐perpetuating logic that is very similar to what we
saw described in the “modern West” and in “democracy”. 17 Sending harmony away (and back again) To further
understand the implications of the autoimmune nature of harmony, we can draw on Derrida’s discussion of autoimmunity in relation
to the term renvoyer. This term means re-‐sending, sending away, sending back (to the source) and/or sending on.124 Derrida
explains that the autoimmune process “consists always in a renvoi, a referral or deferral, a sending or
putting off”.125 Thus, the autoimmunity of harmony in space demands that harmony be sent off
elsewhere, excluded, rejected. It must be expelled under the pretext of protecting it,
precisely by rejecting or sending off to the outside the disharmonious elements inside it .126
As we have seen, such exiling does not take place only in democracy , as Derrida and others implied, but also in
harmony. It is the expulsion of internal ills that has been promoted by Hu’s harmony. It has been
criticised by theorists of difference in IR. Moreover, “since the renvoi operates in time as well, autoimmunity also calls for
putting off [renvoyer] until later elections and the advent of democracy”.127 So too does it postpone
the coming of harmony. Here, truly “harmonious” behaviour by the Chinese government is
postponed until more harmonious times. China needs to become strong first, be in control of
harmony on the inside first. This renvoi shows that there is no essence to harmony, no self with which
harmony can be self-‐same. To paraphrase Derrida, this double renvoi (sending off – or to – the other and putting off,
adjournment) is an autoimmune fatality or necessity. It is inscribed directly in a harmony devoid of self-‐
sameness. It is a harmony of which the concept remains free in the play of its indetermination . It is inscribed directly in this
thing or this cause that, precisely under the name of harmony, is never properly what it is, never
itself. For what is lacking in harmony is the very meaning of the self same. It defines harmony, and the very
ideal of harmony, by this lack of the selfsame.128 The autoimmune Chinese system is not only a process by which harmony attacks a
part of itself. of the other, of heterogeneity, of the singular, the not-‐same, the different, the dissymmetric, the
heteronomous.129 By undeniable, here, Derrida also means that it is only deniable.
The only way that it is
possible to protect meaning is through a sending- ‐off (renvoi) by way of denial.
Harmony, like democracy, is what it is only by deferring itself and differing from
itself. Although it strives to self-‐perfection through self-‐critique, harmony can
never achieve the indivisibility that it claims as its prerequisite. To the extent that
it tries to do so, it must enforce its law with force (disharmony). In this sense, it is
impossible.
However, this traditionally Eurocentric logic of autoimmunity is itself

autoimmune. It otherizes and denies a future to non-Western entities in a
drive towards total sameness, signifying an end to change and to the self. By
introducing the autoimmunity of Chinese harmony into this discourse, we
begin to resolve the harmful contradiction inherent in our logic and embrace
openness, the other, and the potential of a hospitable future for both
democracy and harmony.
Nordin 2015 (Astrid H.M. Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at
Lancaster University. “Futures beyond ‘the West’? Autoimmunity in China’s
harmonious world”, 1/4/15,
[http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/73948/2/Futures_beyond_the_West_Final_Author_versi
on_as_accepted.01.04.2015.pdf], DOA 7/13/16, DDI HRM)
In this article I have shown the claim that “democracy would be the name of the only ‘regime’ that presupposes its own perfectibility”
to be highly questionable.130 There seems to be little impetus to call the Chinese
processes 18 and ideas that I have examined
above “democracy”. Yet, they operate on the same autoimmune logic that Derrida and others take as
giving “democracy” its future. I have argued that Chinese “harmony” is autoimmune in a similar manner,
and its openness to the future to come should be recognised. If we can detect an autoimmune
logic at work, not only in the “modern West”, Europe and democracy, but also in China’s harmonious
system, we have cause to revisit accounts of the autoimmune and ask how this may affect our understanding of
such accounts. We have seen how notions of autoimmunity purport to offer a way of thinking beyond a
problematic logic that closes down the openness of the future. Yet their own treatment of other
systems falls into the same trap. If the possibility of the future hinges on autoimmune logics at work in a given system,
then the denial of such conjoined self-‐defeat and self-‐ perfectibility in a system means denying
that system the possibility of a future. It means denying that system the possibility of change.
Through showing the autoimmune logics at work in harmony, I have aimed in this article to show
how such a future is also open for China. By extension, we can imagine the possibility of such a logic
at play also in other systems, in other times and places. Against this background, it remains
important to recognise the Western-‐centric move in thinking about autoimmunity, including by
Derrida. His denial of a future to systems other than that of his own spatio- ‐temporal
configuration is as problematic as that of other accounts. It is time then to ask: What is the function of this
expulsion of China or the Far East from accounts of the autoimmune? In querying this expulsion
we can draw again on Derrida’s notion of the renvoi, echoing the above discussion of harmony.
Contemporary thought on autoimmunity immunises itself against Chinese thought precisely through its
renvoi in time and space. It maintains its claim to exceptionality through purifying itself and pretending
to a clean time and space where “Western thought”, “democracy” or “modernity” can be treated in
isolation. In this way, thought on autoimmunity performs the very thing it describes: its account of
autoimmunity is itself autoimmune. It operates on a non- ‐recognition of the other in the self. It
tries to expunge its other, precisely through a renvoi. This other of the “modern Western” autoimmune must
be expelled under the pretext of protecting it, precisely by rejecting or sending off to the outside
the disharmonious or “non-‐Western” elements inside it.131 Moreover, since the renvoi operates in time as well,
autoimmunity also calls for putting off [renvoyer] until later the recognition of this other in the
autoimmune logic.132 This renvoi shows that just as there is no essence to harmony, there is no essence
to the autoimmune, no self with which the autoimmune system can be self-‐same. In Derrida’s very own texts, this double
renvoi is another autoimmune fatality or necessity. It is worth highlighting again that deconstruction never
pretended to do without exclusion, but rather to draw our attention to particular exclusions and
put into question their stability. In this article I have drawn attention to the particular exclusion of
Chinese thought from Derrida’s understanding of the autoimmune. I have aimed to shed light on the
openness of the Chinese system of harmonism . This shedding light has come with its own selective
obscuring, exclusions and 19 closures, which are no more stable or secure than those I have discussed in this article.
Put differently, I have aimed to open autoimmunity up to this openness of Chinese harmony, this
expunged other. This openness, of course, is not separable from closure. The immunitary logic is the condition
of possibility of autoimmunity.133Without differentiation, hostility or exclusion in some form, with total
sameness, holism or inclusion, everything would fall back into the One. That would mean the end
to change, to time, to life – because, again, how could anything new emerge from something
that is all-‐encompassing and self-‐same?134 For this reason, a second effect of the renvoi of the (Chinese)
other from autoimmunity is the promise of a future to that very autoimmune modern “West” and European
democracy that has expelled it. The positioning of this non- ‐ Western, non-‐democratic other
figures as a threat and an opportunity vis-‐à-‐vis this “West”, this “democracy”. It is an other to which
contemporary accounts try to immunise themselves, but to which this thought cannot achieve absolute immunity.
Through the threat of infiltration it poses to an autoimmune democracy and modern West, it
paradoxicaly offers that system the opportunity for openness and hospitality to the potential coming of
this excluded other. Perhaps the denial of a future to this excluded other of contemporary thinking of the
Western autoimmune system is precisely what makes the future of that modern Western
democracy possible.
Autoimmunity means harmony is always at conflict with itself. It is

continually deferred, destroyed, and ignored by those who claim to promote
it, leading to unethical attempts to create harmony inside sovereignty and
calculate incalculable freedom.
Matthews 2013
(Daniel Matthews, teaches contract law at the University of London., 4-1-2013, "The Democracy
To Come: Notes on the Thought of Jacques Derrida," Critical Legal Thinking,
[http://criticallegalthinking.com/2013/04/16/the-democracy-to-come-notes-on-the-thought-of-
jacques-derrida/], DOA 7/15/16, DDI HRM)
In order to elaborate on this deceptively simple phrase I want to assess democracy in relation to “autoimmunity” a key principle in
Derrida’s later work. Autoimmunity both stands-in for and re-orientates a number of Derrida’s earlier “quasi-concepts:” aporia, double
In Rogues, Derrida makes a sustained case for thinking of
bind, the supplement,différance, antinomy and so on.
democracy as being governed by an autoimmune logic. Biologically, autoimmunity describes a kind of bodily
self-destruction whereby the body’s immune system produces antibodies or lymphocytes that work against substances naturally
present in the body. Whilst clearly inspired by the biological inference, Derrida uses the term to describe a gesture of self-defence or
self-preservation of some thing that in fact leads to that thing’s destruction. So, to
suggest that democracy is
autoimmune is to claim that it is threatened internally by its very own logic. This internal
compromise or flaw to democracy is crucial to Derrida’s thinking of the democracy to come . I want
to highlight two ways in which Derrida accounts for this self-inflicted dehiscence within democracy. The first issue involves
the relation between democracy and sovereignty. Derrida suggests that in order for democracy,
understood quite literally as the rule (cratos) of the people (demos), to have any discernable effect in ruling
it must rely on some form of sovereignty. Sovereignty and democracy are inseparable but
contradictory partners. The efficacy of democracy relies on sovereignty: without sovereignty, the
demos would be usurped by some other power and an effective rule of the demos would never be achieved. In striving
to protect itself and guarantee its dominance through a co-option of sovereignty, democracy
suffers from an autoimmune self-destruction. In an attempt to immunise and protect itself from destruction,
democracy destroys itself by closing off, unifying and essentialising the multiplicity that enables the
formation of democracy in the first place. The plurality of the demos must be contained and
restrained in a sovereign community: “the people” or “a nation”. In this move there are inevitable exclusions and elisions
that morph a heterogeneous collectivity into a homogonous unit . These omissions always return to
haunt the supposed sovereignty of any political community, destroying the community’s immunity from
difference and otherness. Democracy and sovereignty are bound in a destructive clasp that means
democracy as such (that is, a democracy without sovereignty) remains an impossibility. The second issue turns
on the canonical problem of the relationship between equality and freedom. Again, equality and
freedom are two necessary but contradictory claims that unite in democracy. Equality hopes to
guarantee that each actor within a community has equal value , most clearly this is seen in the ascription of one
equal vote to each individual in a community. Freedom, on the other hand, is a question of each individual’s
singularity, the freedom to exceed a determination of the same that equality tries to establish . But,
Derrida suggests, freedom is impossible without a concept of equality — the suggestion being that freedom must
always take place in relation to limits imposed by others and we must, in theory at least, all be
equally free. Democratic freedom only makes sense, then, if everyone within the demos is equally
free. So, equality becomes an integral part of freedom and because such equality is inscribed within freedom, equality is no
longer merely a question of number and calculation but itself becomes incalculable . The two
concepts are intrinsically bound but in an autoimmune relation. Equality confines every singularity to a
measurable unit that is infinitely substitutable. Freedom, on the other hand, exceeds this calculation and enables
each singularity to be heterogeneous to others, it is a guarantee of the singularity of each individual, enabling every other to
be treated as (wholly) other. For democracy, these two competing factors are mutually dependent — liberty must take place
in the context of liberty for all — so this represents an internal corruption within the very structure of democracy. Democracy, on this
reading, is always at war with itself, never capable of resolving its inner tensions and contradictions. To put it in terms that echo
Derrida’s earliest concerns with metaphysics of presence, we could say thatdemocracy is never present but is always
deferred. In its claim to presence (“this is democracy here-and-now”) democracy evokes the sovereignty that
calls forth its destruction. Democracy is, then, never fully present in the (sovereign) claim that
democracy has arrived or been achieved. It is in this sense that democracy is always “to come”. Significantly,
the “to come” here is not the positing of some horizon of possibility for democracy, as if it were
just an Idea (in a Platonic or regulative, Kantian, sense) that we must move towards. Rather the “to come” expresses
the dislocation that structures the very possibility of democracy from within . The futural inference of the
“to come” (à venir) is, however, significant. Derrida distinguishes between “the future” — thought of as a future-present, predictable
and programmable — and the à venir which names an unforeseeable coming of the event, a rupture or disturbance that is
unpredictable and open, without telos or knowable destination. The
“to come” in Derrida’s formulation, then, points to a
transformative and disruptive potential at the heart of democracy, it points to a promise of change in the here and
now.
Uyghur Terror Reps
The dominant government narrative homogenizes the Uyghurs as “savage
terrorist” – this only serves to mask the structures of oppression that creates
endless cycles of violence.
Ryono and Galway 14 (Angel Ryono, A professor of Sociology in Saybrook University,
Matt hew Galway, an associate professor of History at the University of British
Columbia,“Xinjiang under China: reflections on the multiple dimensions of the 2009 Urumqi
uprising” p12-13)
An undesirable consequence of pairing westward development with intensified assimilation policies is the increasingly visible
discontent presented by the Uyghur communities. Unlimited Han migration has contributed to significant social friction in Xinjiang,
driving some Uyghur communities to draw more distinct lines around their identity in relation to Hans.69 Chinese authorities
conflate increased Uyghur consciousness – expressed in the form of activist and separatist
activities – as an increase in Islamic terrorist threats. A Council on Foreign Relations report raises concerns
about China’s eagerness to cooperate with the United States, stating that ‘Beijing has a long history of falsifying data … the
Chinese have repeatedly tried to paint their own campaign against Uyghur separatists … as a flank of
the US-led war on terrorism ….’ 70 One such instance is the cooperative arrests by the Chinese and Central Asian
governments that led to the imprisonment of 22 Chinese Uyghurs at Guantanamo Bay in 2002. On 10 June 2007, The New York
Times reported an interview with Uyghur detainees at Guantanamo. Some detainees stated that their travel to Central Asia concerned
‘escap[ing] government harassment’ and a serious lack of economic opportunities in China. Since 2007 the US military court has ruled
that Uyghurs under US custody at Guantanamo are not threats to American security (The New York Times, 14 June 2009). The
release and resettlement of Uyghurs to asylum countries has thus challenged the PRC government’s
claims about Islamic terrorism in the northwest region. A longue durée view of Chinese history provides evidence that a
more reliable source of conflict is located in the actions of Chinese regimes while ethnic tensions are consequences of those actions.
The Chinese state’s ‘imperial expansion and annexation of majority-Muslim regions in Central Asia,’
71 as well as modernizing initiatives in Xinjiang, came at the cost of disrupting the ‘cultural nexus of power’:
state intrusion supplanted the existing power structures, thereby causing a power vacuum that
the state later occupies and entrenches. 72 The PRC government rests on strategies that upset the balance achieved by
local entities, which ‘shap[ed] the exercise of power’ 73 over a long period of time, instead of evolving more cooperative policies.
Continuities shared between the Qing, Republican, and Communist governments therefore reflect ‘state involution.’ The Chinese
state gradually phased out local governing structures and initiated a process of cultural assimilation, or
‘sinicization,’ by eliminating local power structures and facilitating waves of Han migration to
occupy the power vacuum. State involution in Xinjiang denotes the state’s increasing use of brute force in the process of
assimilation, which results in a crucial dimension of the conflict under analysis. Peace and conflict studies concepts applied:
articulating the Uyghurs’ perspective A peace and conflict studies framework counters the skew towards considering ethnicsocial
tensions as a durable basis for analyzing violent conflicts in Xinjiang. To ethnicize the conflict directs attention away
from the rigidity of a Chinese political structure that promotes and exploits inequalities and
ethnic hatred. Peace and conflict studies concepts are premised on restoring the dignity, viewpoints, and legitimate participation
of key parties in a conflict: this restoration becomes a part of the foundation for sustainable conflict resolution. The Urumqi
uprising is one part of a conflict cycle in which the rate and intensity correspond with pressures
that originate in the Chinese government’s contradictory political behavior towards ethnic
minorities.74 We ought to distinguish the Chinese state – a powerful actor in Xinjiang’s conflict situations – and its behaviors
from everyday Han Chinese and their uncoordinated prejudice. While the PRC government’s approach to Uyghur
violence stems from the goal to maintain the security and integrity of state power, it rationalizes
its oppressive response by incorporating stereotypes held by Han majority and, in the case of China’s
fight against global terror, those held by Westerners. The effective manipulation of discourse at the government level thus produces
another layer of marginalization by silencing the perspectives and distorting the identity of the Uyghur people. Henceforth, we use
human needs theory to connect how basic rights and the lack thereof contribute to social conflict; this approach allows us to
simultaneously articulate the Uyghurs’ perspective.75 Daniel Christie’s needs-based theory for violence synthesizes Johan Galtung’s
expanded definition of violence with needs-based psychology. Galtung argues that visible conflicts are the result of a triadic
relationship between direct violence, indirect-structural violence, and indirect-cultural violence.76 Overt physical violence is the result
of a sociopolitical system that produces sustained injustices that are integrated into cultural rubrics. Structural violence refers to the
consequences of political and social decisions that increase the potential for Uyghurs to become
victims of systematic
deprivation of basic needs, unequal access to resource and power (higher-order needs), and
physical harm, when compared with other Chinese citizens . Manifestation of overt conflict occurs
when the state’s denial of basic human needs and unrealized higher-order needs grows absolute.77 Thus ‘[h]uman needs theory helps
to explain why needs for security and identity are often proponent … in destructive identity conflicts.’ 78
Colonialism
China attempt to secure the Xinjiang region is in reminiscence of colonial
provinces—their erasure of the Uyghur identity only spark resentment and
resistance.
Castets 15 (Remi Castets, an associated researcher at George Washington University’s Central Asia
Program and a faculty member of the Department of Oriental Studies and the Far East ,Faculty
Member of the Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilization. “The Modern Chinese State and
Strategies of Control over Uyghur Islam” p 2-3)
Depending upon the political, ideological, and cultural configurations specific to each state, modernity is liable to trigger competition
between the ideological systems it advances1 and the religious systems promoted by traditionalist elites.2 This was the case in the
Xinjiang region of China during the twentieth century. Beginning in 1949, the Chinese Community Party (CCP) imposed its
authority over the entirety of the Chinese territory. Like the Kuomintang before it, the ccp attempted to
forge what Anthony Smith calls a “scientific national state.”3 For the communists, this meant setting up an
institutional system that optimized control over its populations and over their semiotic systems.
This control, imposed through various systems of socialization, was key to the process of homogenizing
representations by which the political and ideological legitimization of the new state could be guaranteed. In China the seizure of
control required a presentation of the new political system, dubbed “new democracy” (xin minzuzhuyi), as the embodiment of the
nation, the ultimate factor of legitimization of power. The ccp, as the embodiment of the new Chinese socialist nation,
had to legitimize its monopoly of power and the ideological foundations of its project of social, economic, and
cultural reform. The ccp declared that the Chinese nation was born with the “will to live together,” at
once linked to a common history and a shared communist future. Its interpretation of the world
was inscribed in socialist and atheist socioeconomic teleologies, but also within a rationale of
revitalizing the great Chinese nation, one into which the majority of Qing Empire minorities had been integrated. The
Chinese communist regime drove the modernization process through the political, social, economic, and cultural
domination of the center. This framework carried multiple socio-psychological tensions for peripheral
societies and generated ideological reactions and increasingly strong anticolonial dynamics.4 The
modernization and unification project went against both the semiotic systems and the socioeconomic models advocated by traditional
Islamist elites and pan-Turkist, anti-colonial reformists. However, the
persistence of economic inequalities along
ethnic lines in Xinjiang,5 combined with Beijing’s strict control over political institution s, tended to
create an environment where the Uyghurs of Xinjiang regarded the Han-dominated
government as a colonial regime. Some reforms were well received but this perception overshadowed the
radiant tomorrows and promises of equality that might have given some Uyghur social groups
greater tolerance for the profound dismantling of local sociocultural structures that accompanied the ccp’s model of
modernization. The ongoing process of confronting and interacting with the state and the Han population generated frustrations
among Uyghurs, adding to the initial defiance shown by the Uyghur noncommunist elites toward the ccp. The situation was further
complicated by the fact that modern Uyghur identity was formed in the early twentieth century around claims to an
ancestry rooted in a history separate from China’s. The feeling of being heirs of once-powerful empires that had
rivaled China, and the memory of several pro-independence efforts over the previous 50 years, caused Uyghurs to question
this “common history” and the “ineluctable character of the integration of Xinjiang into the rest of
China.”6 In Xinjiang, this situation reinforced a “process of politicized alterization,”7 sprouting a desire for creating an
autonomous identity separate from the Sino-modernization project imposed by Beijing. The anti-
colonial political forces in Xinjiang turned to the symbolic reservoir of democratic nationalism, as well as reformist representations of
Uyghur Islam, in a bid to advance an alternative modern socio-political order. The ccp’s ideological framework prevented it from
acknowledging a colonial element to its model of modernization. Therefore it sought to limit the dissemination of rival
ideological/semiotic systems that challenged the legitimacy of its socioeconomic policies or the national model it was trying to spread
among Uyghur society. The
propagation of modernity in Xinjiang brought about major changes in local
attitudes. Opposition to Chinese sovereignty was given renewed vigor and existing modes of
political legitimacy were overturned. The Sufi networks, which had held the keys to political legitimacy since the
Khojas8 (Uygh. Xoja) supplanted the Islamized Mongol princes in the sixteenth century, were weakened. From the start of the
twentieth century, they yielded little by little to a new type of political actor. The project to restore the former sufi theocratic system
vanish
Islamic Feminism
I/L Work
Chinese government mark Uyghur women’s traditional veiling as religious
fanaticism.
Leibold and Grose ’16 [James Leibold is a senior lecturer in Asian studies and Chinese
politics at La Trobe University in Melbourne, Australia. And Timothy Grose is an assistant
professor of China Studies at Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology in Terre Haute, Indiana.
“Islamic Veiling in Xinjiang: The Political and Societal Struggle to Define Uyghur Female
Adornment” The University of Chicago Press Journals //DDI – FS, DA: 07/13]
In this article, we explore the ongoing tussle between the Chinese party-state and Uyghurs over
head, face, and body coverings, highlighting how deveiling has become a symbolic yet ultimately
hollow marker of “progress” in the Party’s efforts to secure political control and social stability in
Xinjiang. We will first provide a brief sketch of the history of veiling in Xinjiang before
discussing government policies and the diverse veiling practices of Uyghur women today. Our
aim is to contrast the state’s sartorial engineering campaign with the variety of meanings Uyghurs
attach to the veil. While the Party views the veil as an emblem of religious fanaticism, Uyghur
women use it to embody a range of Muslim and Uyghur subjectivities in different discursive and
performative contexts. Rather than passive victims of the state’s antiveiling crusade, Uyghurs
continue to inscribe the veil with their own idioms and ethics, finding creative ways to navigate
between conflicting demands while parrying the state’s intrusion into their daily lives. 11
Chinese government’s concern over Xingjiang uncovers Islamicphobia

embedded in the Chinese society
Leibold and Grose ’16 [James Leibold is a senior lecturer in Asian studies and Chine se
In particular, Party officials have been shocked by the dramatic revival of veiling practices over
the last decade and the adoption of imported styles in parts of the Uyghur community. In a recent
article on combating “religious extremism” in Xinjiang, one of the Party’s top ethnic policy
advisors, Zhu Weiqun, blamed overseas Islamic extremists for the proliferation of women
wearing “deeply religious clothing.” He asserted that jilbāb-style black robes that completely
cover the body have never been a part of “Chinese Islamic tradition.”10 To curb this pernicious
trend, he called on the party-state to “persist with the trend of secularizing all aspects of social
life” in Xinjiang.
Islamicphobia rhetoric now target Uyghur in the so-called “deveiling effort”

Minority and Han cultures have long been at odds in modern China with the former symbolizing
“backwardness” and “tradition,” and the latter “modernity” and “progress” in China’s civilizing
project.50 Yet, the religiosity and conservatism in some segments of Uyghur society when
combined with the spike in ethnic and religious violence has heightened the sense of urgency
among government officials, with the veil now targeted as an observable symbol of religious
extremism and cultural backwardness. In the current environment, issues once deemed purely
ethnic, cultural or even personal are being reinterpreted as overtly political and ideological acts
that warrant closer Party scrutiny and intervention. The influential Xinjiang-based social scientist
Li Xiaoxia recently asserted that veiling is neither a personal fashion statement nor a
traditional ethnic custom in Xinjiang but rather a pernicious practice that reflects a
complex and dangerous political situation. “As a result,” she writes, “‘de-veiling’ has emerged
as one of the most important tasks in managing religious activities in Xinjiang.”51 After taking
over as Party Secretary in 2010, Zhang Chunxian called for the promotion of “modern culture” in
Xinjiang, including a “modern lifestyle.” Ethnic minority women (Uyghur women in particular)
were targeted for special attention, with Han women and their fashions put forward as an
unspoken standard of modernity. Officials in Xinjiang expressed concern about a “rebound”
( fantan 反弹) in veiling practices, especially among women under age 30 in urban areas, and
called for urgent “deveiling efforts” (jie miansha gongzuo 揭面纱工作). As the Xinjiang
Women’s Federation admitted in a 2011 internal report, even Uyghur government officials,
schoolteachers, health care professionals, and university students were now “tightly wrapping
themselves in headscarves, jilbāb, long sleeves and long skirts.”52
Chinese government uses “Project Beauty” as propaganda to erase the

culture of religious veiling in Xinjiang
[Chinese government] In order to counter this “regressive fad” and promote a “modern lifestyle,”
the regional leadership initiated “Project Beauty” (liangli gongcheng 靓丽工程) in September
2011. This five-year, US$8 million “engineering project” (the literal translation of 工程) aims to
promote both the fashion and cosmetic industry in Xinjiang and “quality education” (suzhi
jiaoyu 素质教育) among Xinjiang women,53 “encouraging the women of all ethnic groups to
become practitioners, promoters, and disseminators of modern culture.”54 The project seeks to
engender an unbound and deveiled “new-style women.” As a government editorial put it in
2012: “veils and long robes block a women’s splendor and beauty. Without a doubt this is a
backward and regressive trend that deviates from modern development and thus is incompatible
with the vast beauty of Xinjiang. Women represent the love and beauty of the world and they
should personify beauty and serve as emissaries of love. Wrapping oneself up is not only un-
pretty, it can also destroy one’s body and mind. One’s heart and soul can wither due to long
periods in the dark.”55 Over the last four years, the Women’s Federation and other parts of the
XUAR government have staged fashion shows, exhibitions, performances, and other propaganda
exercises, where Uyghur and other ethnic minority women are encouraged to “expose their face
and allow their beautiful hair to flow free.” Major urban centers have created educational posters
and sartorial monitoring stations in Uyghur neighborhoods, while inspection teams have sought
out veiled women for reeducation in the countryside. Rewards and incentives are provided for
deveiling, including an all-expenses-paid trip to cities like Beijing and Shanghai in one case,56
and 5,000 RMB (approximately US$800) worth of colorful ätläs fabric in another.57 At the same
time, editorials in Xinjiang Daily and other newspapers have sought to persuade readers that
niqab, jilbāb, and hijab are not part of traditional Uyghur adornment.58
Government propagandas like “Project Beauty” and “Five-Steps method”

are turning Muslim Uyghur women into suspects, creating physical and
psychological harms
Project Beauty targets Uyghur women through education and persuasion, aiming for “voluntary”
deveiling and gradual transformation. Yet on the ground in many locations, local authorities
have adopted a far heavier hand in policing the veil, especially in the wake of recent
violence. In their search for the roots of instability, local officials are targeting “outward
manifestation” of religious extremism, equating certain types of veiling with extremist thoughts
and activities. Attempts to maintain security and stability now entail blatant ethnic profiling
and maladroit policing tactics that are fueling a dangerous cycle of ethnic and religious
bloodshed. The mass media and government reports mention a range of official grassroots
measures to root out and then eliminate veiling practices. Take, for example, the “five-step
method” pioneered in Shufu county (98 percent Uyghur) in Kashgar prefecture in 2010.63 Step
one is “ferreting out the enemy” (moqing dishu 摸清底数). Female cadres are mobilized to
identify each and every veiled woman. The next step, “combing for causes” (shuli yuanyin 梳理
原因), seeks to understand the reasons for veiling, including extremist religious thought, the
influence of family members, and copying of veiling practices from abroad. In steps three and
four, “building the right atmosphere” (yingzao fenwei 营造氛围) and “education and
transformation” ( jiaoyu zhuanhua 教育转化), Party officials confront veiled women and their
families, explaining “correct” Islamic practices and persuading them to remove their veils. The
final step, “consolidate and raise the bar” (gonggu tigao 巩固提高), has cadres take personal
responsibility for assigned women in order to prevent any reemergence of veiling.
Uyghur women are subject to extrajudicial threat of arrest, fines, and

violence and the governmental propaganda perpetuate islamicphobia within
the Uyghur society that pits the Uyghurs against their own people
Due to [antiveiling policy] its supposed success, the method was rolled out across Kashgar
prefecture in 2012 and appears to have also been adopted in neighboring Hotan prefecture and
other locales.64 In Kashgar city, Party officials claimed a 71 percent success rate in 2012, with
1,565 out of 2,205 veiled women “led to abandon these bad habits; removing their veils; no
longer wearing bizarre, religious-style clothing; and instead pursuing a healthy, scientific,
civilized, and modern lifestyle.”65 In other places, these high-pressure tactics have been
coupled with fines, the threat of arrest, and forms of extrajudicial punishments, with some
women subjected to “custody and education” (shourong jiaoyu 收容教育) or “administrative
detention” (xingzheng juliu 行政拘留) until they agree to remove their veils and pledge not
to reveil.66 There have even been reports of women being forcefully deveiled (qiangzhai
miansha 强摘面纱) in public.67 These actions explicitly violate provincial rules that “prohibit
deveiling on the street” and other “crude methods,” and instead call for a patient attitude and the
use of education and persuasion to get women to voluntarily correct their behavior.68 In Yutian
county (98 percent Uyghur) in Hotan prefecture, Party officials initiated “targeted administrative
measures” in 2012 that sought to compel women to remove their veils.69 Special “red armband”
teams were assigned quotas and zones of responsibility where they were to carry out on-the-spot
inspections. On discovering a veiled woman, officials were instructed to verify the
individual’s port violators through the 110 police hotline. Vehicles that transport the five
types are subject to fines and the cancelation of their licenses. The regulation also stipulates fines
on enforcement personnel of up to 2,000 RMB (approximately US $325) for turning a blind eye
to violators, possible demotion, and Party disciplinary actions. Finally, in February 2015, the city
of Ürümqi outlawed burqa-style head and body coverings (mengmian zhaopao 蒙面罩袍) from
all public spaces, empowering the police to punish violators and imposing fines of up to 5,000
RMB (approximately US$80) for those who fail to enforce the prohibition.75 Unsurprisingly,
these heavy-handed tactics often precipitate violent reactions, especially when popular forms
of head covering like the hijab and headscarves are targeted. An academic at the Party School in
Beijing has expressed concern that these coercive methods will spawn even more resistance to the
Party and its policies while actually increasing the popularity of Islamic-style veils.76 Indeed
over the last couple of years, dozens (if not more) have been killed as a direct result of
antiveiling efforts in Xinjiang. In many cases the violence is between Uyghur Party officials
and Uyghur citizens and has not involved Han officials. For instance, in April 2013,
eyewitnesses told Radio Free Asia that a violent clash which resulted in the death of twenty-one
people in Selibuya (Seriqbuya) township, Kashgar prefecture was triggered by a public act of
deveiling.77 In May 2014, nearly 1,000 Uyghurs demonstrated in front of a government building
in Alahege (Alaqagha) township, Aksu prefecture, after local officials detained up to 25women
and girls who violated a ban on headscarves at a local school.78 Police reportedly fired into the
crowd, wounding five and killing two, according to a village leader. Unconfirmed reports suggest
the incident was touched off by a text message sent to parents of the local middle school: “On
orders from higher-ups, when sending children to school, boys cannot wear the doppa and girls
headscarves or silk scarves. When parents drop off and pick up their children, they cannot wear
the jilbāb.As soon as [any of these prohibited styles of clothes are] discovered, children will
immediately be asked to leave the school.” 75.
Anti-veiling policy continue to perpetuate patriarch ideologies as higher
power continually dictate what it meant to be woman
Rana, a university student in Beijing, completely covers her hair with a hijab, a style virtually
unseen among other Uyghur university students in the capital. Following a visit to Egypt one
summer, Rana told the second author she “accepted” her veil (qobul qildim) as a gift from God
after returning to China: “I’ve come to realize that veiling is a very important part of my religion.
When I cover my head, others will know my religious beliefs. . . . I think by dressing in this
manner, we can prevent other men from gazing at or harming us. I feel very happy every time I
put on my veil, and when I wear it I’m reminded of my religion, my faith, and God. . . . My hijab
is fashionable and matches my clothes. Sure, at first I was influenced by Arabic styles in Egypt,
but then I combined them with my own culture and fashion.” In conversations she embraces both
Chinese and Uyghur identities, as well as a type of transnational Muslim cosmopolitanism. A
similar story was told by a young Uyghur woman who had lived a middle-class lifestyle for
several years with her husband in Dubai. While there, she had worn the style of head covering
typical of Dubai women of her age, a loose-fitting and flowing hijab-like veil. Continuing to do
so in China is a complex act that allows her to navigate between sometimes contradictory notions
of fellowship, piety, beauty, political loyalty, and ethnonational identity. Her fashionable veil
marks a spurning of Han culture and norms, which she believes the older generations have, to an
extent embraced: “Even my mother has been influenced by Han Chinese and does not cover her
head.”
Solvency
Plan Solves
Diplomatic engagement solves
Regencia 16 (Ted, staff writer, (2016). Exiled Uighurs call for China reforms. Retrieved from
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/11/201211814321905928.html July 11, CS)
Just hours before her death sentence and execution, Rebiya Kadeer found herself shackled inside Liudaowan Prison in China's far-
western Xinjiang region. If only to calm her nerves, she assured herself that her death was for her fellow Uighurs, a Muslim minority
in the world’s most populous country. When asked for her last wish, Kadeer requested to see her children. It was denied. Her time was
up. Then she was off to court to hear the verdict of her trial, on allegations that she stole state secrets. After almost six years in prison,
Kadeer was released in March 2005, just a few months ahead of President Bush’s visit to China. Diplomatic pressure
apparently helped persuade China to commute her death sentence. In many ways, Kadeer's personal woes
mirror the troubles confronting the 10 million Uyghurs, whom one activist called "the other Tibetans you never heard of". As China’s
once in every decade leadership transition starts, Kadeer
is calling on the country’s presumptive leader Xi Jinping to
carry out political and economic reforms in the oil and mineral-rich Xinjiang region. “One oppressed nation’s
history and fate can be changed by one thousand or even just one freedom fighter’s voice,” Kadeer told Al Jazeera. “If I’m chosen to
be that voice, I should keep going with my fight." The Uighurs have long alleged discrimination in China because of their culture,
language and Muslim religion. China’s leaders, however, dispute Kadeer’s claims, viewing them as a threat to national sovereignty.
Ma Yuanchun, spokesman for the Chinese consulate in New York, called Kadeer “a separatist out to split Xinjiang from China”.
Xinjiang constitutes one-sixth of China's land area. Kadeer says reforms are critical to the survival of the Uighurs as an ethnic group.
In a seperate statement, she said Uighurs and China "could have a fair and common future" if their cultural and religious rights as
respected. But experts believe issues surrounding minorities in China will continue to be sidelined by other problems such as
corruption, labour unrest and geopolitical disputes with neighboring Asian countries. 'Violent terrorists' When Kadeer talks about
the plight of the Uighurs, it is also personal. Twoof her children are in jail, locked up by the Chinese government
following Kadeer’s election as president of the World Uyghur Congress in 2006. Kadeer said her sons are being punished for her
activism. Follow our special coverage of China's power transition Like any mother fretting about her children, Kadeer mused
about her son Alim being single and unable find “a beautiful bride” while in prison. Meanwhile her other son Ablikim was arrested on
the day his child was born. “I hope that one day Ablikim will be able to hold his son, my grandson, in his own hands,” Kadeer said. “I
pray for them day and night. My family has sacrificed a lot but they are supportive of my fight...” Ethnic tensions in Xinjiang have
sometimes escalated into bloody confrontations like the July 2009 riots in the regional capital Urumqi that left hundreds dead. In
another incident in December 2011, seven Uighurs were killed in the province of Khotan. They were accused of being “violent
terrorists” on their way to “jihad training” in Kashmir. But the US-based Radio Free Asia said the group, which included women and
children, was only trying to escape China so they could freely practice their religion. Kudret Emin, a Uighur college student living in
exile in the US, told Al Jazeera that his people are too afraid to talk about politics and voice their complaints to Chinese officials for
fear of being sent to jail. He says his family are some of the only Uighurs who managed to leave China in recent years. Link to Islam
In all these episodes of violence, the Uighurs' affiliation to Islam has become an excuse for blame, said Henryk Szadziewski of the
Uyghur Human Rights Project. Since 9/11, the situation has worsened, he said. “Islam has undergone a tough time in its image across
the globe,” Szadziewski said. “So yes, there is an image problem.” Dru Gladney, a Uyghur scholar from Pomona College in
California, said what worries China is that the Uyghurs' brand of Islam is “being tied into politics”. In the 1930s and ‘40s there were
two attempts to establish an East Turkestan Republic with a Uighur majority in Kashgar Province. Notwithstanding those strong
sentiments, Gladney said that the Uyghurs “tend not to be resistant” to authorities. But he also pointed out that Uighurs are “very
frustrated” because “they feel disadvantaged” in their native land. Until now, the legitimacy of the Uighurs’ claim of Xinjiang remains
a contentious issue. Bovingdon Gardner, a Central Asia expert at Indiana University said, “there is no clear international historical
answer to the question”. But, he said, that also applies to China’s own claim to the area. "I don’t think that they [Uyghurs] will have a
decisive impact on American foreign policy towards China" - Howard French, Columbia University “There isn’t any universal
agreement on what constitutes sovereign claim of a territory,” Gardner said. “There’s no lever with which to sort of pry apart the
claims of China and Uyghurs in that case.” Pointing to the victory of communist revolutionary Mao Zedong in 1949, Gladney added
that “history is always written by the conquerors”. US policy Despite continued lobbying by the 1,000 or so Uyghur exiles in the US,
members of the minority say the White House has not made significant efforts to address the issue. While then-US President George
Bush met Kadeer twice, no actual foreign policy change toward China was implemented. Neither President Barack Obama nor
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have met Kadeer. “I don’t think that they [Uighurs] will have a decisive impact on American foreign
policy towards China,” said Howard French, a China expert at Columbia Journalism School. Realpolitik dictates foreign policy
priorities, and human rights are not on top of that list, he said. With volatile issues at stake from North Korea and Iran to Syria, where
the US needs China’s cooperation, many observers suggest America would be reluctant to alienate China. “ It’s
clear that
China has successfully pressured the United States” noted Gladney, pointing to China’s
enormous financial leverage. But that does not mean China should ignore the grumblings of
the Uighurs, French said. “If this was a human being and we are talking about medical terms, we would say that it is a
chronic condition,” he said. “It’s not going away.” An enduring fight On the same day she sat for an interview,
Kadeer led more than a hundred people to protest in front of the Chinese embassy in
Washington DC calling on China to stop the “human rights abuses” in Xinjiang and to
release “political prisoners”. Aside from the issue of autonomy, Kadeer also sought attention to Uighur
asylum-seekers, who are oftentimes deported to China, where they sometimes face
imprisonment. Earlier this year, for instance, two Uyghur refugees who fled to Cambodia were deported to China and later
sentenced to life in prison. Another was meted 17 years, according to the state news agency, Xinhua. Recently, Kadeer also
called on China to respect the Uighurs right to observe Ramadan and the Eid celebrations,
which have been banned. She also helped expose the harvesting of live organs in Chinese
prisons, a controversial practice that was recently discussed before the US Congress. “I have to save my people because they are
still living in a prison,” Kadeer said. “As others have fought for my own freedom, I should also fight for other people who don’t have
freedom.” But whether or not China’s leaders, who are gathered in Beijing for the 18th National Congress, are finally listening to
Kadeer’s muted cry, remains a mystery.
HR Good—General
Human rights are essential to giving voice to the suffering of others
In the face of death and in the face of the other who is dying there can be no adequate
expression, no common language, but only the community of its exhaustion: of its limit as the limit of what cannot but must be
said in writing and it might be added – although here only indicatively – as community. It is in one’s ‘own’ dispossession that one
cannot be silent, that one cannot become other. In this dispossession, in one’s inability to hold one’s breath long enough or to keep the
silence, it is one’s finitude which ensures that the suspension of one’s breath is itself suspended. One
cannot die in the
other’s place. It is therefore to the extent of one’s dispossession – recalling here what Peter Benenson, the
founder of Amnesty International, referred to as the ‘sickening sense of impotence’ felt in the face of ‘a report from somewhere in the
world of someone being imprisoned, tortured or executed’ (Benenson, 1961) – that
the other’s silence and suffering
are shared; exactly because they cannot be shared. For Blanchot (1988) it is the death of another
that ‘calls me into question most radically’ (p. 9). In the arrested movement of my imperative but impossible
attempt to be with the other, he adds: ‘This is what puts me beside myself, this is the only separation that can open me, in its very
impossibility, to the Open-ness of a community’ (p. 9, emphasis added). The other’s death is shared because it cannot be. And, just as
one does not hear silence ‘itself’ but rather hears that ‘there is’ silence because it cannot be heard, so it
is the inaccessibility
of the other’s dying or suffering that provides the paradoxical – and paradoxically ‘passive’
– ‘foundation’ of this community. I ‘reach’, or I have already ‘reached’, the other – which is to say his or her otherness
– because I cannot. In Jean-Luc Nancy’s words: ‘I recognize that in the death of the other there is nothing recognizable’ (1991: 33).
Again it is in this dispossession, this impotence, and this passivity that one is impelled to respond. But since
in this situation
one could never find the right words to say, here language is commanded by another
possibility: Language, at this point, is not a power; it is not the power to tell. It is not at our disposal; there
is in it nothing we can use. It is never the language I speak. I never express myself with it, I never address you, and I never invite your
answer. All these features are negative in form. But this negation only masks the more essential fact that in language at this point
everything reverts to affirmation: in this language what denies affirms. For this language speaks as absence. Wordless, it
speaks already; when it ceases, it persists. It is not silent, because in this language silence speaks. (Blanchot, 1982: 51) The disaster is
called ‘before’ language not as an event to be represented or as a story to be told. Rather it
is in the remains left by the
disaster’s ruin of its own presence, and so the very possibility of its representation, that the
other’s pain, suffering and death can only begin to be imagined. All that remained were the handcuffs;
bruised bodies; She carries with her everywhere the memory of this gruesome assault on her young body. With an ugly scar running
from her breast down to her stomach and along her right thigh; A vehicle used in the abduction is discovered. Burnt out, it has blood
stains on the seat covers; children’s corpses, often bearing marks of torture, are turning up at the rate of more than one a day; Corpses
of street children have been found with their eyes burned out and ears and tongues cut out; A grave containing some two hundred
bodies; The silent dead in their thousands. Lolling in the fields. Floating in the rivers. In every case, of course, the
disaster is
not presented or represented ‘as such’. One could never tell the whole story . And this is why,
for Derrida (2002a), justice remains ‘to come’ (p. 256). It is why the demand for language, for law,
and so for human rights, remains insatiable: ‘Writing is the interminable, the incessant’ (Blanchot, 1982: 26). Or
with Amnesty International: there has to be ‘a deluge of letters’, ‘an infinite chain’ of human rights. So no final
solution. But never again? I return, but only very indicatively, to the Holocaust. Is it possible to read something other than the
foreclosure and the forgetting of this event in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? Is it possible then to read this text – or what
remains of it – as a ‘writing of the disaster’, and so to discern in it the very force that I have been trying to describe? Here, I will just
cite the first two paragraphs of the last substantive Article (29) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as it attests to its own
impossibility and to its necessity; ‘founding’ – and ‘re-founding’26 – ‘itself’ under what Blanchot (1986) has called ‘the surveillance
of the disaster’ (p. 4):27 (1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is
possible. (2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law
solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
AT: PQ to DA/K
Our responsibility to the Other is the very foundation of subjectivity itself,
preceding questions of ontology and the utilitarian calculus they engage in –
responsibility to the Other transcends all other impacts and obligations.
Pinchevski 1 (Amit Pinchevski, PhD candidate in the Graduate Program in Communications at
McGill University, Montreal. Freedom from Speech. Diacritics 31.2, Summer 2001, p. 77)
In order to reencounter the Other's side of the freedom to speak, it is necessary to recognize that the
ontological structure
of being-with is precisely what overshadows the Other's side of this practice . Levinas's contention is
radical: one is first in relation with the Other and only later a self . Subjectivity is essentially response-able,
or as Buber contends, the first word one says is "You" rather than "Me." The Other appears before the rise of the self, before its
history, before the self is its own—the Other is "prehistorical," before the origin of the self. And before here does not merely refer to
temporality. As Richard Cohen suggests, this
ethical relation is better than being, better than ontology [8],
better becauseit does not meet social structures, power, calculations, and reason on the same
plane; it transcends and precedes them. The culs-de-sac to which the ontological situation of
being-with the Other leads confront one with the realization that ethical relation comes
before knowledge of what is: "The grounds for ethics cannot be found in the self's being;
neither can they be found in the self's knowledge . . . [ethics] is secondary to nothing : neither to
being, nor to the knowledge of being. It resides before and outside them" [Bauman, Effacing the Face 16]. I am therefore always
already in communication with the Other; I am concerned with the Other before I am concerned with myself, I am a tympanum before
I am a speaker, I am for-the-Other before I am for-myself. Thus, subjectivity
is ethical: I am responsible not
despite the fact that I have emerged as a self, but because I am a self. Responsibility for the
Other—always as the ability to respond to his or her call—is the fundamental structure of subjectivity.
Ethics comes second to nothing, not even to freedom, for I cannot will the freedom of the
Other from my own freedom. If ethics, as described by Levinas, is indeed "First Philosophy," I am first responsible and
only later free: The freedom of another could never begin in my freedom, that is, abide in the same present, be contemporary, be
representable to me. The responsibility for the other cannot have begun with my commitment, in my decision. The
unlimited
responsibility in which I find myself comes from the hither side of my freedom , from a "prior to
every memory." . . . The responsibility for the other is the null-site of subjectivity, where the privilege of the question "Where?" no
longer holds. The time of the said and of essence there lets the pre-original saying be heard, answers to transcendence. [OBBE 10]
The realm of ethical discourse is in the for-the-Other , in a realm beyond ontology, from which discourse
reaches out to the Other. The realm of being for-the-Other is where speech breaks from its Ulyssian circle—it does not return to its
origin; instead, it leaves its sender and is forbidden from returning and reinstating it. Speech
here is already a response,
an address free from rhetoric: it unfolds itself for-the-Other, and regardless of the actual
content delivered, its first word is "Welcome."
Their speech doesn’t begin from a perspective of infinite responsibility, which

means it can’t incorporate any of the calls of alterity. Responsibility must
precede all other considerations – it forms the basis of subjectivity and
politics.
Pinchevski 1 (Amit Pinchevski, PhD candidate in the Graduate Program in Communications at
McGill University, Montreal. Freedom from Speech. Diacritics 31.2, Summer 2001, p. 78-80)
But if
a speaker is never alone, if I am always already situated within a concrete and fundamental back-ground (literally, a
ground that was there before the speech began), my
right to speak for-my-self must imply a certain
heedlessness of anterior calls. My freedom of speech is possible only at the expense of my
response-ability and by choosing to speak for-my-self rather than to respond to the Other .
Thus once speaking for-my-self, my speech has already cut itself off from the fundamental back-ground of responsibility. Yet, if
indeed it has done so, has it not left something when breaking out? Has it not left the traces of its defection, or at least, the traces with
which it had attempted to efface the traces of its defection? In what sense can this speech ever be free? Wouldn't it be henceforth a
fugitive speech under the cloak of freedom? In
being true to the ethical schema in which the Other is the
locus of regard, should it not be concluded that speech is never "free, " but rather mustered from its
anterior responsibilities? Following this schema, when I speak for-my-self, I am already not responding for-the-Other; my speech
conveys my agenda and already reveals my ulterior motive. A so-called free speech consequently unfolds an
alibi: I speak because I have the right to do so, because my calls did not meet any answers, because I want to say
something, because I have a goal in speaking, and so on. Yet no matter what the reason is, I am not
responsible for-the-Other anymore, and for that I owe an explanation. The right to speak
and to be heard assures me that "all is quiet," that I am not called, that I am entitled to
have a say. However, this right was not endowed by the Other: s/he may be still calling . So while
putting forth my case, my speech already blemishes me beyond my control: everything I say for-my-self reverberates my defection. It
can now be admitted that freedomof speech, to paraphrase Levinas, is a difficult freedom: a freedom realized only in
relation to what resides outside the active speaker who is always already situated within a
context of alterity which is calling, imploring a response. Responsibility comes before freedom: it
presides even if one does not recognize its authority or if one does not know how to respond.
The practice of the freedom of speech—along with its politics, rights, and regulations—emerges out of this
fundamental responsibility, or rather, from the split, or the différance, of responsibility and free speech. It is here where
the speaker can become a witness.
AT: HR Bad—Charity Cannibalism
Despite their problems, human rights claims and the accompanying
representations of suffering are the best language we have to articulate
demands against the abuses of power and to pose political alternatives – this
evidence is comparative with their alt
Douzinas 0 (Costas Douzinas, Professor of Law and Head of the School of Law at Birkbeck
College, University of London, 2000, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the
Turn of the Century, p. 244-45)
But human rights hail also from another tradition, that of critique of power convention and law
and, they have developed in two directions. Bloch argued that there are two sources and types of rights. The first is associated with
possession and property as dominium, legal dominance over things and people.36 Its early formal development aimed to protect the
creditor from the debtor in cases of non payment of loans. The concept of human rights emerged from this earlier right to property but
was “adopted in a quite different way by the exploited and oppressed, the humiliated and degraded. It is precisely this that appears in
its incomparable second sense as the subjective catchword of the revolutionary struggle and actively as the subjective factor of this
struggle”.37 This statement remains true today. Rights are the building blocks of modern law and are
the legal
expression of humanism and subjectivity. Human rights were initially law’s critique and
must be distinguished. With the extensive positivisation of human rights, however, the external division between legal and
human rights has been replicated in the body of human rights themselves. When opposed to the state and its laws,
they act as a standard of critique, dissent and rebel lion. When conceived solely as the never-ending
legalisations of desire and the grants of legislative largesse, they join the metaphysics of subjectivity and are twinned with legal
positivism. We can see this bifurcation in the history of human rights. The absolute protection of property led to the impoverishment
of the majority and the introduction of the second generation, and for liberals second-rate, social and economic rights. The rights of
man led to the belated introduction of children’s and women’s rights which, in turn, led to calls for greater parents’ rights and fears of
“male emasculation”.38 The limitless freedom of action led to mastery over the world and control of nature and to the call for new
rights protecting animals and the environment. Boundless free speech led to the right to privacy and the obsession with pornography.
Freedom of movement and establishment across Europe for its citizens, led to draconian restrictions of movement for immigrants and
refugees. The often heard claim that the exercise of freedom carries responsibilities is a piece of unrealistic moralism. Freedom and
rights carry no inherent limitations or moral duties; the only defence against their side-effects is to create even more rights and legal
protections, increasing legalisation endlessly and making conflict the endemic and inescapable condition of the social bond. When
rights justify every claim and sanctify every desire nothing has much value any longer. Despite the problems, however,
human rights are also the main tools we have against the cannibalism of public and private
power and the narcissism of rights. Human rights are the utopian element behind legal
rights. Rights are the building block of a liberal legal system. Human rights are its claim to justice and as
such impossible and future looking. Human rights are parasites on the body of rights,
judging the host. There is a poetry in human rights that defies the rationalism of law : when a
burnt child runs from the scene of an atrocity in Vietnam, when a young man stands in front of a tank in Beijing, when an emaciated
body and dulled eyes face the camera from behind the barbed wire of a concentration camp in Bosnia, a
tragic sense erupts
and places me, the onlooker, face to face with my responsibility, a responsibility that does
not come from codes, conventions or rules but from a sense of personal guilt for the
suffering in the world, of obligation to save humanity in the face of the victim
AT: HR Bad—Co-Option
Case outweighs their co-optation args – human rights belong fundamentally
to the jailed dissident, all other arguments about the effects of human rights
pale against their importance in struggles for global emancipation.
Douzinas 0 (Costas Douzinas, Professor of Law and Head of the School of Law at Birkbeck College, University of London,
2000, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century, p. 144-45)
All this does not mean that human rights treaties and declarations are devoid of value. At this point in the development of international
law, their value is mainly symbolic. Human rights are violated inside the state, the nation, the community, the
group. Similarly, the struggle to uphold them belongs to the dissidents, the victims, those whose identity is
denied or denigrated, the oppositions groups, all those who are the targets of repression and domination. Only people on the
ground and local action can improve human rights; outsiders, including human rights organisations, can
help by supporting them. From this perspective, international conventions are of use to human
rights activists, by offering a standard for criticising their governments. When a state has adopted a
particular set of rights, it will be harder, although by no means impossible, for its government, to deny committing obvious abuses.
Similarly, external monitoring and reporting may raise awareness about a state’s violations and the shaming that accompanies
exposure may lead to improvements. But the successes of monitoring are limited and the adverse effects of publicity are intangible
and take long in coming. When Greece was forced to leave the Council of Europe in 1969, after the European Commission of Human
Rights found that every article of the Convention was violated by the colonels, the response of the dictators was characteristic. They
stated with great fanfare that the European Council and Commission were a conspiracy of homosexuals and communists against
hellenic values and dramatically increased repression. Similarly, while Pinochet’s Chile and the South Africa of apartheid were
repeatedly condemned by UN human rights bodies and the General Assembly, the regimes attacked ‘meddling foreigners’ and
survived for decades. Nigel Rodley, the United Nations special rapporteur on torture since 1993, saw the uses of his task as follows:
The information gets to families that someone outside is investigating or appealing to the government. Occasionally the prisoner
learns of this too. And I feel that somehow the drip, drip of external demands that a government do something or stop things like
torture will have an effect. It’s not the UN that can change things directly. It’s groups in the country itself. International monitoring
gives these forces, both nongovernmental and within government, some support.71 If the victims of repression become recognised in
the eyes of the international community as actors, the value of international human rights will increase for those who matter. The
tradition of human rights, from the classical invention of nature against convention to contemporary struggles for political
liberation and human dignity against state law, has always expressed the perspective of the future or the
“not yet”. Human rights have become the cry of the oppressed , the exploited, the dispossessed, a kind
of imaginary or exceptional law for those who have nothing else to fall back on . In this sense,
human rights are not the product of legislation but precisely its opposite. They set limit to
“force, declared laws and ‘founded’ rights (regardless of who has, or demands, or usurps the prerogative to found
them authoritatively)”.72 Human rights, as the principle of hope, work in the gap between ideal nature and law, or real people and
universal abstractions. The
promise of a future in which, in Marx’s memorable phrase, people are not
“degraded, enslaved, abandoned, or despised” does not belong to governments and lawyers. It
certainly does not belong to international organisations and diplomats. It does not even belong to the abstract human being of the
declarations and conventions or of the traditional humanist philosophy, including the Kantian subject which, for Derrida, is “still too
fraternal, subliminally virile, familial, ethnic, national etc”.73 The energy
necessary for the protection, horizontal
proliferation and vertical expansion of human
rights comes from below, from those whose lives have
been blighted by oppression or exploitation and who have not been offered or have not
accepted the blandishments that accompany political apathy. In the meantime, we can leave the United
Nations and their diplomats to their standard setting and their lunches and return to the state or the community, the only territory
where human rights are violated or protected.
AT: HR Bad—Eurocentric
Human rights in our aff aren’t Eurocentric
Spivak 4 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities and presently the director of the Center
for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, 2004, “Righting Wrong.” The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 103, No.
2/3, p. 525-26)
Nevertheless, it
is still disingenuous to call human rights Eurocentric, not only because, in the
global South, the domestic human rights workers are, by and large, the descendants of the colonial
subject, often culturally positioned against Eurocentrism, but also because, internationally,
the role of the new diasporic is strong, and the diasporic in the metropolis stands for
"diversity," "against Eurocentrism." Thus the work of righting wrongs is shared above a class line that to some
extent and unevenly cuts across race and the North-South divide.8 I say "to some extent and unevenly" because, to be located in the
Euro-U.S. still makes a difference. In the UN itself, "the main human rights monitoring function [has been] allocated to the OSCE
[Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe]."9 The presuppositions of Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink's book also make this
clear. The subtitle—"International Norms and Domestic Change"—is telling. The authors' idea of the motor of human rights is
"pressure" on the state "from above"—international—and "from below"—domestic. (It is useful for this locationist privilege that most
NGOs of the global South survive on Northern aid.) Here is a typical example, as it happens about the Philippines: " 'Human
rights' have gained prescriptive status independent of political interests . . . . [We] doubt that
habitualization or institutionalization at the state level have proceeded sufficiently to render pressure from societal actors futile."10
AT: “Never Make Decisions”/“Using the Law = Decisionism”
Unconditional hospitality and incalculable justice are forever separated from
finite, calculative actions like engagement with China or affirmations of
human rights, yet the gap that separates them means that neither can exist
without the other. Our argument is that while calculation is a necessary part
of any decision, our responsibility must be founded on an act of
incalculability that MUST win out over the endless contingent objections that
can always prevent a decision. We must use human rights law to affirm a
responsibility that perpetually exceeds it.
Derrida 5 (Jacques Derrida, Directeur d’Etudes at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, 2005, Rogues:
Two Essays On Reason, p. 148-151)
How shall I present my concluding propositions in as brief and economic a fashion as possible? To the value of this unforeseeable im-
possibility I would associate the value of incalculable and exceptional singularity. I appeal here again to good sense itself, to common
sense, that most widely shared thing in the world. A calculable event, one that falls, like a case, like the object of some knowledge,
under the generality of a law, norm, determinative judgment, or technoscience, and thus of a power-knowledge and a knowledge-
power, is not, at least in this measure, an event. Without the absolute singularity of the incalculable and the exceptional, no thing and
no one, nothing other and thus nothing, arrives or happens. I say “no thing and no one” so as to return to a thought of the event that
awakens or is awakened before distinguishing or conjoining the “what” and the “who.” It is a matter of thinking reason, of thinking
the coming of its future, of its to-come, and of its becoming, as the experience of what and who comes, of what happens or who
arrives—obviously as other, as the absolute exception or singularity of an alterity that is not reappropriable by the ipseity of a
sovereign power and a calculable knowledge. 1. The
unconditionality of the incalculable allows or gives the
event to be thought. It gives or lends itself to thought as the advent or coming of the other in
experiences for which I will name just a few metonymic figures. My recourse to the lexicon of unconditionality has proven
useful to me because tradition and translation (anhypotheton, unbedingt, inconditionnel) facilitate its intelligibility, indeed its
pedagogy. But I am not sure that an elaboration to come will not impose another term, one that has been freed to a greater extent from
these traditional semantic implications, which in fact differ from one language to the next: anhypotheton, unbedingt inconditionnel—
these are nor exactly the same thing. Another language will perhaps one day help us to say better what still remains to be said about
these metonymic figures of the unconditional. But whatever this other language may be, this word or this trope, it will have to inherit
or retain the memory of that which, in the unconditionality of reason, relates each singularity to the universalizable. It
will have
to require or postulate a universal beyond all relativism, culturalism, ethnocentrism, and especially
nationalism, beyond what I propose naming, to refer to all the modern risks that these relativisms make reason run, irratic-
nationalism or irratio-nation-state-ism—-—spell them as you will. Among the figures of unconditionality without
sovereignty I have had occasion to privilege in recent years, there would be, for example, that of an
unconditional hospitality that exposes itself without limit to the coming of the other, beyond
rights and laws, beyond a hospitality conditioned by the right of asylum, by the right to immigration,
by citizenship, and even by the right to universal hospitality, which still remains, for Kant, for example, under the authority of a
political or cosmopolitical law.12 Only an unconditional hospitality can give meaning and practical rationality to a concept of
hospitality. Unconditional
hospitality exceeds juridical, political, or economic calculation. But
no thing and no one happens or arrives without it. Another example would be the unconditionality of the gift or
of forgiveness. I have tried to show elsewhere exactly where the unconditionality required by the purity of such concepts leads us. A
gift without calculable exchange, a gift worthy of this name, would nor even appear as such to the donor or donee without the risk of
reconstituting, through phenomenality and thus through its phenomenology, a circle of economic reappropriation that would just as
soon annul its event. Similarly, forgiveness can be given to the other or come from the other only beyond calculation, beyond
apologies, amnesia, or amnesty, beyond acquittal or prescription, even beyond any asking for forgiveness, and thus beyond any
transformative repentance, which is most often the stipulated condition for forgiveness, at least in what is most predominant in the
tradition of the Abrahamic religions. In the open series of these examples, we
have to think together two figures of
rationality that, on either side of a limit, at once call for and exceed one another. The incalculable
unconditionality of hospitality, of the gift or of forgiveness, exceeds the calculation of conditions, just
as justice exceeds law, the juridical, and the political. Justice can never be reduced to law, to
calculative reason, to lawful distribution, to the norms and rules that condition law, as evidenced by its history and its ongoing
transformations, by its recourse to coercive force, its recourse to a power or might that , as Kant
showed with the greatest rigor, is inscribed and justified in the purest concept of law or right . For “strict
right,” says Kant, implies the faculty or the possibility of a reciprocal use of coercion (wechselseitigen Zwanges), and thus of force, of
a reason of the strongest following universal, and thus rational, laws, in accordance with the freedom of each.13 To grant this
heterogeneity of justice to law, it is not enough to distinguish, as Heidegger did, dike from the legality of Roman jus; it is also
necessary, as I tried to indicate in Specters of Marx, to question the Heideggerian interpretation of dike as harmony or as gathering—
indeed, ultimately, as logos.’4 The
interruption of a certain unbinding opens the free space of the
relationship to the incalculable singularity of the other. It is there that jus tice exceeds law
but at the same time motivates the movement, history, and becoming of juridical rationality,
indeed the relationship between law and reason, as well as everything that, in modernity, will have linked the history of law to the
history of critical reason. The
heterogeneity between justice and law does nor exclude but , on the
contrary, calls
for their inseparability: there can be no justice without an appeal to juridical
determinations and to the force of law; and there can be no becoming, no transformation, history, or
perfectibility of law without an appeal to a justice that will nonetheless always exceed it. To think
together both this heterogeneity and this inseparability is to recognize, and so bear witness to, an autodelimitation that divides reason
and that is not without relation to a certain autoimmunity. What is called reason, from one language to another, is thus found on both
sides. According to a transaction that is each time novel, each time without precedent, reason goes through and goes between, on the
one side, the reasoned exigency of calculation or conditionality and, on the other, the intransigent, nonnegotiable exigency of
unconditional incalculability. This
intractable exigency wins out [a raison de] and must win out over
everything. On both sides, then, whether it is a question of singularity or universality, and each time both at once,
both calculation and the incalculable are necessary. This responsibility of reason, this experience that consists in
keeping within reason [a raison garder], in being responsible for a reason of which we are the heirs, could be situated with only the
greatest difficulty. Indeed I would situate it precisely within this greatest of difficulties or, rather, in truth, within the autoimmune
aporia of this impossible transaction between the conditional and the unconditional, calculation and the incalculable. A transaction
without any rule given in advance, without any absolute assurance. For there is no absolutely reliable prophylaxis
against the autoimmune. By definition. An always perilous transaction must thus invent, each time, in
a singular situation, its own law and norm, that is, a maxim that welcomes each time the event to come. There can be
responsibility and decision, if there are any, only at this price. If I had to attribute a meaning, the most difficult,
least mediocre, least moderate meaning, to this well-worn, indeed long-discredited, word reasonable, I would say that what is
“reasonable” is the reasoned and considered wager of a transaction between these two apparently
irreconcilable exigencies of reason, between calculation and the incalculable . For example,
between human rights, such as the history of a certain number of juridical performatives has determined and enriched them
from one declaration to the next over the course of the last two centuries, and the exigency of an unconditional
justice to which these performatives will always be inade quate, open to their perfectibility
(which is more and something other than a regulative Idea) and exposed to a rational deconstruction that will
endlessly question their limits and presuppositions, the interests and cal culations that order
their deployment, and their concepts—beginning with the concepts of law and of duty, and especially the concept of
the human, the history of the concept of the human, of what is proper to humankind, to the human as zoon logon ekhon or animal
rationale. It
is rational, for example, at the very moment of endorsing, developing, perfecting, and determining
human rights, to continue to interrogate in a deconstructive fashion all the limits we
thought pertained to life, the being of life and the life of being (and this is almost the entire history of philosophy), between
the living and the dead, the living present and its spectral others, but also between that living being called “human” and the one called
“animal.” Although I cannot demonstrate this here, I believe—and the stakes are becoming more and more urgent—that none of the
conventionally accepted limits between the so-called human living being and the so-called animal one, none of the oppositions, none
of the supposedly linear and indivisible boundaries, resist a rational deconstruction—whether we are talking about language, culture,
social symbolic networks, technicity or work, even the relationship to death and to mourning, and even the prohibition against or
avoidance of incest—so many “capacities” of which the “animal” (a general singular noun ) is said so dogmatically to be bereft,
impoverished.
An ethic of incalculable justice REQUIRES legal calculation – and in the face
of the dying Other, we MUST respond affirmatively, even if no response can
ever be adequate.
We die alone. And so immediately death appears as the limit of community, as the limit of our being with others. Between
us, between the one who lives and the other who dies, there is an insurmountable difference, an insurpassable distance: one
cannot alleviate the other’s suffering, one cannot die in the other’s place . In the face of
death, therefore, and in the face of the other who is dying, what can one do? What can one say? In this article, I
want to address these questions in the context of a critique of universality and neutrality that continues to problematize the foundation
of human rights. Theother is different and the reference to what could only ever be a purportedly common
foundation for human rights could only ever reduce that difference . It could only ever violate the other.
But while this violence has continued to inform their problematization, human rights
remain; although they remain unaccounted for except in the anachronistic terms of a dogmatic and somewhat defunct calculation;
as ‘a totalizing grand narrative’ and perhaps ‘the last remaining one’ (Alves, 2000: 500).1 Is it possible, then, to argue that this
remainder, these
remains of human rights, are ‘founded’ upon something other than a naïve
faith in our commonality and in the prospect of its representation?2 As inevitably particular or partial, language, it has
been argued, is ‘a violence we do to things’ (see Foucault, 1972, 1981). For relativism as well as for postmodernism – taken here at,
and indeed to, their most extreme – human rights have been implicated in this violence and accordingly in a totalization that,
excluding the singularity of the other, has been associated with modernity and identified with the Holocaust.3 The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights presents itself as a response to ‘barbarous acts that have outraged the conscience of mankind’.4 But, I
will argue, human rights are not exhausted by the assumption that, as the Holocaust was opposed to modern culture and civilization, so
they can be opposed to it. As something other than a straightforward reassertion of the virtues of classification or codification and the
values of language or of law,5 human
rights, I will argue, are ‘founded’ not upon the adequacy of their
response to the Holocaust but rather upon the acknowledgment of this impossibility. It is, therefore, this
assumption of totalization that I want to dispute: ‘one will appeal to human rights, one cries out “never again” and that’s it It is taken
care of’ (Lyotard, 1990: 26). What follows will not pursue this argument through a reading of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, although this possibility will never be far away. Rather, the focus of my discussion is provided by Amnesty International as,
under the authority of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, they seek to elicit a response to its violation.6 With this focus, but
keeping the Holocaust in mind throughout, I
want to pose the problem of responding to human rights’
violations in somewhat broader terms: as that of responding to another who is suffering or who is
dying. In this situation, the other’s singularity is ‘presented’ at the very point of its irreducibility:
in the impossibility of suffering in the other’s place or of sharing in his or her death . And in this
situation, my sole focus will be upon the argument that as there can be no adequate response to the other’s suffering one should not
respond at all. In the face of death and in the face of the other who is dying one could never find
the right words to say. And so one should keep silent. As it attests to the impossibility of any adequate
response to the other’s dying or suffering, I want provisionally – but only provisionally – to affirm the justice of this silence. The
problem, however, is how this silence can be kept; how, that is, it can attest or ‘bear witness’ to anything. For how
can silence be? How can it be silence without also silencing ‘itself’ – as silence? 7 In which case how could
one hear it? Or crucially for my argument here how could one tell the difference between this silence and that not speaking or not
responding which, not attesting to anything, would be the least just, and would in fact be the absence of silence as well as language?
Silence is subject to the paradox of its so-called self-refutation, a paradox that pertains to relativism as well as to these formulations:
‘language is a violence we do to things’; ‘we die alone’.8 The word silence, for example, is not silent. But this is symptomatic: silence
cannot be (‘itself’) outside of or apart from its expression in a language that at the same time could only ever fail to express it. If
silence is to ‘be’, if it is to be ‘heard’, then it must be spoken. Or if it could be said that there is
silence then it must have already been spoken. More precisely, and with a specificity that I will come to, silence
must be – or it must have been – written; for ‘there is no silence if not written’ (Blanchot, 1986: 8). In order to ‘be’, therefore,
silence requires language. It requires a language in which, precisely, the difference between its presence and its absence is
made. One cannot not speak or respond or decide without, as Jacques Derrida (2002a) puts it, ‘forming the worst complicities’ (p.
258). And what will be elicited here is how a demand to speak, or to write, is presented by Amnesty International as
arising out of the impossibility of being able to respond adequately to, for example, the Holocaust.
Fundamentally, I will argue, and subject to the fact that there can be no silence outside of or apart from language, this demand may be
understood as a demand for silence. As, moreover, the principle according to which I want to try and elicit another ‘foundation’ of
human rights, this demand may also be understood in relativist terms. For relativism too must express ‘itself’ in order to ‘be’. But,
again, while this expression could only ever be inadequate, this inadequacy is its very condition; the condition of its ‘being’ as
‘relativism’. Correlatively, therefore, it
is in this affirmation of its so-called self-refutation that what will
be outlined here might be regarded, paradoxically, as a relativist idea of human rights. For
this idea – of a singular and singularly impossible justice – I will rely throughout upon what has been called Derrida’s ‘linguistic, if
not literary’ approach to law (Beardsworth, 1996: 99). According to this approach, law like language is an economy.9
But it is because such an economy cannot comprise a closed and calculable structure that
neither language nor law can be simply characterized as violent. Pursuing the ethical
implications of what he calls the ‘deconstructibility’ of this structure, Derrida (2002a) calls into
question the opposition between law – as ‘the element of calculation’ (p. 244) – and justice – as
‘incalculable’ (p. 244). Justice is a ‘gift’ that is inassimilable to the law of exchange. But consistent with the fact that law is
deconstructible, the incalculability of justice does not support a rejection of law or a refusal to
calculate or to decide. What Derrida calls the force of law must be understood accordingly: as naming not only law’s
violence but also what might be called its vitality. Law is not just. But justice demands law because, as
incalculable, it cannot be discerned apart from the ‘effort’ or the force of calculation. As
silence demands language in order to ‘be’ so, in an argument explicitly dictated by ‘the memory of the final
solution’, an argument in which this event – what Derrida (2002a) calls ‘the worst’ – intervenes at the most crucial point (p. 298),
Derrida maintains that ‘incalculable justice commands calculation’ (p. 257). Or, as he remarks elsewhere, in a
different tone but evoking a similar demand: ‘How can one be included in another’s death? How can one not be?’ (Derrida, 1995: 46).
In the face of death and disaster one must say something. But as this obligation is ‘founded’
upon the impossibility of any adequate response, its responsibility or responsiveness is traced to this
inadequacy; to the deconstructibility of a decision or determination that could never be determined or decisive enough.10 The task
here, therefore, is to deconstruct human rights in order to elicit not merely their lack of closure but, after Paul
Celan (1986), their lack of composure. Or, after Derrida – and according to his linguistic, if not literary approach to law – the task here
is to elicit what I am calling the
silent ‘foundation’ of human rights in a responsibility, a responsiveness,
which derives from the fact that human rights are and have to be made (up) because they
are not given. If in the face of death and disaster language is not composed then , again, what this
means is that language is not simply a violence we do to things. It too suffers . And it is in this
suffering that I will now try and account for what remains of human rights.
AT: DA
Impact Calc
Your decision calculus must default to the primacy of the Other over the self
and the necessity of basing ethical decisions on proximity to the Other. Their
disads are a rationalization of the Other’s suffering which justifies all
violence.
Meister 5 (Robert Meister, Professor of Politics at UC-Santa Cruz, 2005, "Never Again": The
Ethics of the Neighbor and the Logic of Genocide. Postmodern Culture, Vol. 15, No. 2)
The primacy of ethics over politics implicitly presupposes, however, specific limitations on the field of ethics itself. Viewed broadly,
the raw material of ethics concerns languages and bodies in the sense that these are what matter from the ethical perspective when
considering questions of agency and choice.2 Ethical discussion of languages (and cultural systems that resemble languages) are now
commonly expected to focus on the problem of difference, and to prefer a baseline cultural relativism to the culturally imperialist
danger of false universals. In
ethical discussion of bodies--and especially bodies that suffer--the greater
danger is now widely seen to be false relativism (Lévinas, "Useless Suffering" 99). A principled resistance to
moral relativism when it comes to the suffering of bodies is, thus, the specific ethical view that underlies
the present-day politics of human rights. For proponents of this politics, the suffering body is the ultimate wellspring of
moral value, the response to bodily suffering the ultimate test of moral responsibility. "The supreme ordeal of the will is not death, but
suffering," said the French philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas, who took the primacy of ethics to its extreme by putting it ahead, even,
of ontology and God (the world itself and its Creator) (Totality and Infinity 239). He argued that the
suffering of
another is always "useless," always unjustified, and that attempting to rationalize "the
neighbor's pain is certainly the source of all immorality "("Useless Suffering" 98-9). Lévinas is not here
referring primarily to the growing medicalization of humanitarian invention, although he does regard analgesia as a paradigmatically
ethical response to physical pain (see Kennedy and Rieff). His point is that my ethical responsibility, which merely begins
with first aid, does not arise from any previous relationship between sufferer and provider , or from
a political history consisting of prior vows or crimes, but from "a past irreducible to a hypothetical present
that it once was . . . . [and] without the remembered present of any past commitment"("Diachrony and Representation" 170). Our
responsibility to alleviate suffering comes before the past in the sense in which ethics can be
said to come before politics. The priority of ethics arises "from the fear of occupying
someone's place in the Da of my Dasein": "My . . . 'place in the sun,'" he says, "my home--have they not been a
usurpation of places which belong to the others already oppressed or . . . expelled by me into a third world" ("From the One to the
Other" 144-5). Lévinas's point is that in
ethics, unlike politics, we do not ask who came first and what
we have already done to (or for) each other. The distinctively ethical question is rather one
of proximity--we are already here and so is the other, cheek-by-jowl with us in the same place. The
neighbor is the figure of the other toward whom our only relationship is that of proximity .
For Lévinas, the global movement to give ethics primacy over politics must be accompanied,
within ethics, by the effort to give primacy to the ethics of the neighbor --the local over the global. In
this way, the global primacy of ethics crystallizes around our horror of the inhuman act (the
"gross" violation of human rights) rather than, for example, around the international distribution of wealth
or the effects of global climate change.
You should vote affirmative in a moment that forsakes attempts to control

and master knowledge for the interests of the state or capitalism –
responsibility demands a decision that seems irrational from within orthodox
decisionmaking calculi
Derrida 5 (Jacques Derrida, Directeur d’Etudes at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences
Sociales in Paris, 2005, Rogues: Two Essays On Reason, p. 144-45)
To think this and to say this is not to go against reason. To be worried about an ideocracy or a teleologism that tends
to annul or neutralize the eventfulness of the event, and that does so precisely to immunize itself against it, is not to go against reason.
It is in fact the only chance to think, rationally, something like a future [venir] and a becoming [devenir] of reason. It
is also, let us
not forget, that
which should free not only thought but scientific research from the control or
conditioning to which it is subjected by all sorts of political, military, technoeconomic, and capitalist
powers or institutions (for example, in the appropriation through patents of biogenetic discoveries). The same goes
for “state” control of knowledge, sometimes, to cite just one example, in the distinguished and respectable form of so-
called ethics committees. For just as no power (whether political, juridical, religious, ideological, or economic) will ever be able to
justify through reason the control or limitation of scientific research, of a research for the truth, of a critical or deconstructive
questioning, and thus of a rational and unconditional research in the order of knowledge and of thought, so also (or reciprocally), no
knowledge as such, no theoretical reason, if you will, will ever be able to found a responsibility or a
decision in any kind of a sustained manner, like a cause that would produce an effect, like a
raison d’etre or a sufficient reason that would provide an account of what follows from it. It is necessary to know, to be
sure, to know that knowledge is indispensable; we need to have knowledge , the best and most
comprehensive available, in order to make a decision or take responsibility. But the moment and structure of the “il
faut,” of the “it is necessary,” just like the responsible decision, are and must remain hetero geneous to
knowledge. An absolute interruption must separate them, one that can always be judged
“mad,” for otherwise the engagement of a responsibility would be reducible to the
application and deployment of a program, perhaps even a program under the refined form of
teleological norms, values, rules, indeed duties, that is to say, debts to be acquitted or reappropriated,
and thus annulled in a circle that is still implicitly economic. That is why what I say here,
I’m well aware, involves a serious risk.
The aim of calculation must not be to manage decisions where the future is
unknowable and based on mere conjecture – rather, our use of calculation
must incorporate the incalculable, openness, and non-knowability.
Sociales in Paris, 2001, A Taste for the Secret, p. 12-14)
Ferraris: You have often spoken of strategies (in ‘The Ends of Man’ [in Margins of Philosophy] you even speak of ‘pan strategique’
[strategic wager], d la Pascal), as if there were a polemos. Derrida: Of course, if there is polemos, and irreducible polemos, this
cannot, in the final analysis, be accounted for by a taste for war, and still less for polemics. There is polemos when a field is
determined as a field of battle because there is no metalanguage, no locus of truth outside the field, no absolute and ahistorical
overhang; and this absence of overhang — in other words, the radical historicity of the field — makes the field necessarily subject to
multiplicity and heterogeneity. As a result, those who are inscribed in this field are necessarily inscribed in a polemos, even if they
have no special taste for war. There is a strategic destiny, destined to stratagem by the question raised over the truth of the field. To be
sure, speaking of strategy means taking into account an irreducible ‘now’. But taking the singularity
of this ‘now’ into account does not force us to renounce what we said earlier about disjunction and the untimely. There is a
‘now’ of the untimely; there is a singularity which is that of this disjunction of the present .
Formalizing very quickly, I would say, as I have often done in recent years, that the dissociation that imposes itself is a dissociation
between the singularity of the ‘now’ and that of the present. There is ‘now’ without present; there is singularity of the here and now,
even though presence, and self-presence, is dislocated. There are instances of dislocation that are singular, irreplaceable. It is here that
the question of what is commonly called ‘biography’ comes into play: singular existence, even if it is given over to non-self-presence,
dislocation, and the non-reappropriation of a present, is for all that no less singular. And so we have to take into account this
singularity of the untimely, of non-self-contemporaneity. But precisely because there are none but singular contexts, I shall insist on
the question of wager and strategy. If
a strategy were guaranteed in and of itself, if its calculation were
sure, there would be no strategy at all. Strategy always implies a wager — that is, a certain way
of giving ourselves over to not-knowing, to the incalculable. We calculate because there is
something incalculable. We calculate where we do not know, where we can make no
determination. Thus, a strategic wager always consists in making a decision, or rather in
giving ourselves over to the decision — paradoxically, in making decisions we cannot justify from
start to finish. The decision to wager is what it is precisely because we do not know whether ,
at the end of the day, the
pan strategique will prove to be the right one , the best one possible. If this were
known from the start, there would be no wager, and there would be no strategy. There is a strategic wager
because the context is not absolutely determinable: there is a con text, but one cannot analyse it
exhaustively; the context is open because ‘it comes’ [ca vient], because there is something to come [ii y a de l’avenir]. We
have to accept the concept of a non-saturable context, and take into account both the context itself and its open
structure, its non-closure, if we are to make decisions and engage in a wager — or give as a pledge —
without knowing, without being sure that it will pay off, that it will be a winner, etc. And this combination of exacerbated
responsibility and the acceptance of a part of shadow, of irresponsibility, means that the concern for non-systematic coherence I spoke
of at the very beginning leads us to bet on a future [un avenir] that would at best reinforce incoherence.
AT: Util
Util’s inevitable failure to account for incommensurable alterity MUST be
questioned before any responsible decision can be made.
Smith 97 (Nick Smith, Professor of Philosophy at the University of New Hampshire,
Spring/Summer 1997, Incommensurability and Alterity in Contemporary Jurisprudence. Buffalo
Law Review, 45 Buffalo L. Rev. 503, p. 504-09)
Numerous jurisprudential books and articles have recently appeared on the topic of value incommensurability. n1 Authored by several
prominent legal philosophers of the 1990s, the incommensurability
discourse deliberates on the following issue:
How can we, or should we, assess value within a pluralistic community composed of institutions and
individuals who possess incommensurable systems of valuation? How can we decide on the value of
something such as clean air, a fetus, a professional reputation, or a body part if members of the community have different
interpretations and understandings of not only how much that thing is worth, but also of how it should be appropriately and
respectfully valued? If an injury is suffered to one's reproductive capabilities, for example, how should a court determine a remedy
that will both compensate for such a loss and honor the belief that the human body should not be equated with a cash value? Or, in
another example, how should a legislature or administrative agency mediate between animal rights advocates, steadfast in their belief
that animals should live free from torture, and a research lab that performs experimental surgeries on live animals? For a problem of
incommensurable valuation to arise, the following three conditions must exist: (1) a belief is held regarding the value of something
(the right of animals to be free from torture); (2) this belief comes into conflict or is incompatible with another belief regarding the
value of that thing (the right to sacrifice animals in furtherance of promising medical research); and (3) a choice must be made
between the competing beliefs. Also, incommensurability can occur in two forms: (1) intersubjectively, such as between one party
who believes people should have freedom to contract for sexual services and another party who believes prostitution should be
outlawed because it degrades the value of sexual relations; and (2) intrasubjectively, such as in a decision between leaving your
toddlers with a day care provider so that you can pursue a fulfilling career, on the one hand, and placing your professional life on hold
Incommensurability theorists hope to debunk both
to spend all of your time with your children, on the other.
utilitarian and law and economics methods of valuation that deny the existence of genuinely
incommensurable values and assert that all things are universally quantifiable , fungible, or
transferable and therefore believe that there exists one comprehensive scale of valuation , such as money,
utility, or good, against which all decisions can be evaluated. n2 Legal incommensurability theorists level their
critique against such monistic analytic frameworks by demonstrating the variety of ways "in which economic analysis of law, and
most forms of utilitarianism as well, miss important commitments of a well-functioning legal system." n3 Generally speaking,
incommensurability theorists believe that human
valuation flows from particular institutional or
personal beliefs about what each actor considers and interprets to be meaningful and important, and thus value cannot be
reduced to a single quantifiable calculus that would be appropriate in all circumstances. Thus, incommensurability
theorists assert that it is crucial for us to evaluate certain goods, such as love, profit, talent, or friendship according to separate scales
and within distinct "spheres," n4 in Michael Walzer's terms, so as to properly understand the nature of that good as qualitatively
distinct from other goods. In Margaret Jane Radin's words, a belief in the incommensurability of values "means that there is no scale
along which all values can be arrayed in order so that for any value or package of values we can say definitively that it has more or
less value than some other." n5 Simultaneous to the emergence of value incommensurability in legal theory, the disciplines of
Philosophy, Comparative Literature, and various brands of Critical Theory have developed an interest in a different breed of
incommensurability as articulated in the thought of the late Emmanuel Levinas. n6 Described as a Lithuanian Jewish Talmudic
scholar, a World War II concentration camp survivor, n7 a student of Husserl and Heidegger, and one of the originators of
deconstruction, Levinas meditates on what he names "alterity" or the quality of being "Other ." n8 What
does it mean to recognize something or someone as genuinely "other" and therefore entirely different from all things to which it might
be compared? Levinas' philosophy navigates the difficulty of defining the terms "alterity" and "Other," and much of the intrigue and
originality of his thought lies in the peculiarity of these notions to traditional discourse. Levinas brings us to realize that we
as
Western thinkers cannot understand the quality of otherness, and for him this inability to
accommodate otherness bespeaks a grave ethical shortcoming that must be confronted in
order to engage in responsible interpersonal relationships. Therefore if you do not immediately understand the
meaning of the term "other," or if you have difficulty coming to a provisional definition of alterity, you should be comforted that you
share this problem with Plato, Hegel, Heidegger, and quite probably every thinker in the history of the Western world. Our very
inability to understand alterity is precisely Levinas' preoccupation. Whereas value incommensurability exists between personal or
cultural systems of valuation where belief systems clash, such as when a judge or legislator is confronted with a choice between siding
with one person who believes that an unborn fetus has an inherent right to be born or another who believes that a woman has an
inherent right to reproductive autonomy, Levinas describes the intersubjective incommensurability between the "I" and the
"Other"--"Me" and "You." For Levinas, incommensurability occurs when I use my structures of thought
to think about You, who are the Other and entirely different from me. For Levinas, incommensurability, and
our inability to respond properly to it, is a grave ethical problem, and I hope to provide an adequate explanation
of his project in order to offer meaningful contrast and comparison between it and value incommensurability. Currently, virtually no
conversation between the two emerging fields of study exists, and in this comment I hope to begin the introductions. One reason
Levinas has not been extensively discussed in legal scholarship might be his difficult and esoteric style that does not lend itself well to
exegesis, and therefore one of my primary goals in this comment is to render Levinas' thought as simply and clearly as possible so that
the reader can come to the rewarding, and often beautiful, insights that he offers. n9 Although many faithful Levinas scholars might
cringe at the attempt to render his work complicitous to political tenets, since such a project risks subordinating the ethical and
deconstructive nature of his project to a sterile set of axioms, I believe that his work, as well as that of other promulgators of
deconstruction, can add a meaningful dimension to legal and political theory. Value incommensurability theory and Levinasian
deconstruction can be linked on two levels. First, both schools reject Platonic metaphysics that assume the existence of a unified
"science" of universal value and ethics. Second, these recognitions of incommensurability lead both movements to embrace anti-
authoritarian forms of politics. I hope Levinas scholars will be interested in value incommensurability as a possible alternative to the
political impotency that results from Levinas' ethical theory. Value incommensurability theorists will find Levinas adds ethical force
to their political deliberations. Understood in conjunction, the two intellectual movements come together in what I would like to call
the "deconstructive ethos," and it is my contention that this deconstructive ethos can be translated into a set of positive democratic
commitments. I hope this comment will persuade both schools to investigate, utilize, and welcome their trans-Atlantic counterparts. I
will begin by situating the current conversation of legal incommensurability within the Anglo-American philosophical tradition. As I
introduce the cluster of concepts and opinions that have gathered under the rubric of legal incommensurability theory I will mention
several different authors, and I will ally with and embrace the central tenets of this school of thought and its critique of monistic forms
of valuation. After the principles of legal incommensurability have been unpacked, I will attempt to bridge the seemingly
untraversable distance between American legal theory and French deconstructive theory. I will sketch an overview of Levinas' project
as a whole, and in order to do this I will discuss a dialogue that took place between Levinas and the other major figure of
deconstruction, Jacques Derrida. This examination of Levinas and Derrida will help us get at exactly what is at stake for
deconstruction, ethically and politically, and we will see how the unusual and circuitous style of deconstruction makes its point. After
laying out deconstruction's ethical dimension, I will explain the difficulties of transposing this ethics onto politics. I will then compare
Levinas' intersubjective incommensurability to the incommensurability of valuation described by legal theorists. Once the contrasts
and comparisons are drawn, I hope the two schools of thought will come into focus as similarly rejecting both the attempt to formulate
a single metric that would level and homogenize incommensurable and plural valuation, and the aspiration of Western thought to deny
the "otherness" of the Other. Levinas and legal incommensurability theorists share the belief that the projects
to
commensurate value and alterity are misguided and violent since such attempts to totalize
humans and their desires will always be, and always should be, ruptured by the irreducibility of
humankind. Both Levinas and the thinkers of legal incommensurability dwell within the delicate and interminable attempt to
welcome, respect, and co-exist with alterity while maintaining the necessary structures and constraints of a democratic order. In
summary, the argument and purpose of this comment will be to cross-pollinate value incommensurability theory and Levinasian
deconstruction so as to begin to develop a social and legal theory that (1) is motivated by an ethical commitment to the irreducibility
of human subjects, institutions, and goods and (2) negotiates between those incommensurable subjects and values through democratic
procedural mechanisms. This hybridization of the two schools of thought will provide ethical grounding for legal incommensurability
theorists, and political grounding for Levinasian critical theory.
Their ethical calculus obliterates the unique singularity of the Other in the
interest of pure utilitarianism – this makes authoritarianism and extinction
inevitable.
Nussbaum believes that this Platonic ethical science, and its offspring in certain proposals in ethics and economic theory,
could actually lead, if followed and lived with severity and rigor, to the end of life as we know it. Here the
parallels to Levinas are most arresting. First, other people in the world will appear radically
different for those looking through the lens of commensurating ethical science as compared
to those committed to incommensurability. For the Platonist, "a body, a person, will seem to be nothing but a pure
container or location for a certain quantity of value," since to understand another person as anything more would be to raise
"motivational complications that this scheme wishes to avoid." n151 For Levinas this
total conflation of others into
qualitative clones denies them any particularity or difference from me or each other, and the Other is thus
stripped bare of any semblance of independent identity. This imprisonment of the Other within imperialistic
cognitive categories is exactly the type of extermination of alterity that Levinas so passionately denounces and calls us
to resist. As we have seen, the entirety of Levinas' work searches for a way to respect difference in order to maintain an ethical
relationship with the other, while Plato and other commensurability theorists think that the best way to make ethical and evaluative
decisions is to distill everything to varying amounts of the same essential element, be it a mathematical equation, a sunny day, or the
person across from you. Indeed, it is no accident that Nussbaum locates and abhors the most extreme version of commensurability in
Plato, for it is he who Levinas charges with initiating the philosophical impulse to control. Second, and still more insidious from a
Levinasian perspective, Plato calls for us to reduce Others in this way for our own mental hygiene, so that we are not bothered with
the troubling complexities of relating to the "strangeness" of others. For Plato this violent commensurating of others frees us up from
the agitating nature of alterity, and therefore "it is mindless not to take the step . . . to homogeneity because this step is so helpful to
the personality, relaxing tensions that have become difficult to bear." n152 Thus for Plato, my relation with the other should be
guided by that which is easiest for me, simplifies my life, and saves me from the headaches of incommensurability. Levinas and
Derrida could not disagree more wholeheartedly with this outlook, since deconstruction hopes to heighten our confusion,
undecidability, and the tension we experience in ethical and political decisionmaking, for in Derrida's words, "there can be no moral or
political responsibility without this trail and this passage by way of the undecidable." n153 For deconstruction, apprehension causes us
to feel the gravity of our ethical situations, and the very distress we feel in the face of an ethical decision is central to responsible
relations. As I have noted, for Levinas "morality begins when freedom, instead of being justified by itself, feels itself to be arbitrary
and violent." n154 Levinasian ethics calls me to be accountable for and to resist my egocentrism, and I should be preoccupied with
these responsibilities. Whereas Plato wants to "relax" our ethical deliberation, Levinas wants us to be deeply troubled by and
concerned with the difficulties presented to us by the Other. In the name of certainty, conformity, and strength of will, Plato seeks to
suppress genuine difference, and for Nussbaum and other incommensurability theorists, such "evasiveness is not progress." n155
Instead, such
a systematic obliteration of alterity for the sake of uniformity invites
authoritarianism. Just as Plato believes that an ethical science of commensurability would transform our character and
actions, incommensurability theorists believe that the recognition of the inability to respect alterity will similarly revolutionize our
ethical and political behavior. As I have already laid out the types of ethical responsibilities and personal reformations that Levinas
believes are triggered by alterity, the conclusion of this note will bring into focus some legal and political strategies that supplement
deconstruction and incommensurability theory.
Their arguments rely on a form of decision making that empties ethics from
politics. The search for the most rational and realist methods of avoiding
things like wars make it so that contingent political concerns can always be
used to justify inaction in the face of alterity and thus annihilation. It is an a-
priori obligation to interrupt the purely political with the ethical – you must
vote aff even in the face of their disads.
In the previous parts, I attempted to "make use of Levinas' ethical philosophy by deploying deconstructive commitments within a
conversation about identity politics. n123 The heart of Levinas' work resists politics and system building, however, and therefore I run
a great risk of misappropriating Levinas' doctrines. For Levinas, ethics
stands in opposition to politics. He writes,
"the art of foreseeing war and winning it by every means--politics--is henceforth enjoined as
the very exercise of reason. Politics is opposed to morality, as philosophy to naivete." n124 Politics unavoidably
attempts to master alterity by conflating it with the self and organizing and codifying the
infinite with its instrumental strategies. In Levinas' words, "what meaning can community take on without reducing
difference?" n125 Does every form of politics deny alterity, or can we rather recognize this infinite danger in order to respond more
ethically to the dilemma that the Other presents us with? Would it be possible to accommodate alterity politically, or is this to have
already incorporated it into the technology of the same? In answering these questions, Levinas concludes that we will never be
politics is the
successful in designing a politics that would solve the aporia of incommensurability. Critchley writes,
primacy of the synoptic, panoramic vision of society, wherein a disinterested political agent views society as a
whole. For Levinas, such panoramic vision, not only that of the philosopher but also that of the political theorist, is the
greatest danger, because it loses sight of ethical difference -- that is, of my particular relation to obligations
toward the Other. n126 In fact, here we should notice just how little normative guidance Levinas actually offers us. For him, the
ethical impulse of saying, of speaking, takes such precedence over the words spoken that he cannot differentiate between the content
of any assertion, for example between "I love you, and I want to help you," and "I hate you, and I want to kill you." In a somewhat
alarming passage he writes, The other is maintained and confirmed in his heterogeneity as soon as one calls upon him, be it only to
say to him that one cannot speak to him, to classify him as sick, to announce to him his death sentence; at the same time as grasped,
wounded, outraged, he is "respected." n127 Apparently any conversation with the other is preferable to silence, and although this
imperative that we address the other initiates all ethical responsibility, it can offer little substantive guidance. Levinas provides a sort
of communication-based procedural politics, in that he places a premium on intersubjective conversation, yet he cannot regulate the
content of those conversations. Despite the fact that any political maneuver will fall short of Levinas' ethical expectations, this does
not mean that we should not insist on interminable negotiation with alterity in the political arena. Levinas claims that the
political/ethical aporia is analogous to his notions of saying and said. He believes "that the saying must bear a said is a necessity of the
same order as that which imposes a society with laws, institutions and social relations." n128 There
must be positive
political formation, like the content of the said that inevitably is spoken, but these concrete political axioms
must always be problematized by the ethical in the same way that the said is ruptured and interrogated by the
saying. The problem has been formulated by Levinas and Derrida to forever tantalize us and deny the possibility of reaching ethical or
political finality. Derrida, who more eagerly than Levinas pursues the political difficulties presented by alterity, understands this
negotiating to be the task of deconstruction, and he writes, "deconstructive practices are also and first of all political and institutional
practices." n129 Derrida further writes that "deconstruction should not be separable from this political institutional problematic
and should seek a new investigation of responsibility, an investigation that questions the codes inherited from
ethics and politics. This means that while too political for some, it
will seem paralyzing to those who only
recognize politics by the most familiar road signs." n130 For Derrida, the ethical imperative is also
a political imperative and deconstruction is, at every turn, a political practice. Derrida attempts to justify these claims in his
essay, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority.' n131 Without deconstruction, Derrida asserts, law becomes confused
with justice. Justice
is infinite, beyond rationality, and undecidable, while law is calculable and
immediate. Deconstruction unmasks the equivocation of law and justice. As Drucilla Cornell explains, "only once we
accept the uncrossable divide between law and justice" do we understand how
deconstruction produces the "undecidability which can be used to expose any legal system's
process of self-legitimation as myth . . . which leaves us . . . with an inescapable responsibility for violence, precisely
because violence cannot be fully rationalized and therefore justified in advance." n132 For deconstruction it
is the very
undecidability, the very aporia of justice, which leaves us with ultimate responsibility . Again
Cornell explains, "Derrida's text leaves us with the infinite responsibility undecidability imposes on us. Undecidability in no way
alleviates responsibility. The opposite is the case." n133 With his usual clarity, Richard Bernstein agrees with Cornell's reading of
Derrida. He explains that "the danger with any political code is that it can become rigidified or reified--a
set of unquestioned formulas that we rely on to direct our actions . . . No code can close the gap or
diminish the undecidability that confronts us in making an ethical-political decision or choice." n134 Deconstruction
problematizes political statements in order to bring to the foreground the dangers of
codification. Every law should be questionable, and deconstruction engages in these interrogations. The
deconstructive inquiry produces a heightened level of scrutiny that reveals normative assumptions to be
contingent historical constructions that do not possess universal validity . This impossibility of
justice refers to the impossibility of a coercion or mending of law and justice, but not to the
impossibility of drafting and endorsing meaningful laws. Adam Thurswell states the sought after effect: The
judge is called both to act according to justice--to "be just"--and to acknowledge that her act can never be truly just, since it is always
limited by the actuality of her own understandings and context. Thus, the responsibility which Cornell calls upon the judge to exercise
is abstract, since it does not require the judge to endorse any particular substantive outcomes or norms. It does not operate on the level
of the substance or specific rules of law, because to do so would be to stay within the legal system itself at the level of law, not justice.
Instead, this responsibility reminds the judge of the ethical weight of her task. n135 [*543] Such critical self-awareness is
indispensable to deconstruction, since, as Derrida writes, "there
can be no moral or political responsibility
without this trial and this passage by way of the undecidable."
Aff T/DA
A negative ballot is not a vote for peace – the idea that we should deny ethics
and violations of human rights in the interest of the greater good is an order
founded on violence waged against alterity – all of their impacts are inevitable
in this framework.
Trifonas 2 (Peter Pericles Trifonas, Professor at the Center for Social Justice and Cultural
Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, 2002, Ethics,
Institutions, and the Right to Philosophy, p. 77-78)
Violence—and its threat to the security of human Dasein—is the catalyst that allows nature “to aid reason and thereby put philosophy
into operation through (a travers) the society of nations.”71 For Derrida, this is a troubling but understandable sublating (relever) of
the antitheses holding together the diffuse logic of the global cosmopolitical community. On the one hand, peace
achieved
through the danger of violence is not really a peace made at all. It is a provisional state of
human entropy with respect to the appeasement of the tensions of difference and the
possible eruption of transgressions and aggressions against subjective alterity; it depends on the ethico-
philosophical essence of the cosmopolitical covenant of being. The condition of peace represents the satiating
of an impulse to nullify the difference of difference . On the other hand, a peace compelled by the dark side of
the human spirit is perhaps the only possible and natural peace that could be rendered effective or legislated, when no other decision
or action is acceptable, viable, or defensible given the alternative of violence. This of course begs the question of the constitutive force
of community—whatever that IDEAL may entail as an affective identification of a subjective sense of belonging, a being-at-home-in-
the-world WITH OTHERS—and the responsibility of its opening-up of the Self unto the difference of the Other. When these two
states or conditions of existence, peace (community) and violence (war), are placed in direct
opposition to each other, the ethical choice is clearly delineated by the power of a humanistic appeal to
a universal and hence moral will denying the propriety of any transgression of subjectivity
at all costs, even if this means suppressing human rights and freedoms for “the greater good.”
Community, then, is a matter of instilling and practicing a homogeneous concept of culture, a general
culture whose model of a collective intersubjectivity acts as a unified resistance to the threat of
alterity. The promoting of common points of recognition and identification within the ideologico-
philosophical consciousness of its constituents, in order to defy or suppress the propensity for violence
against the threat of difference—or at the very least to quell the performativity of the desire to do so—establishes the
psychic and figural ground for the foundations of friendship and belonging. Following the determinative ethics of
these rules of consensus in the name of community and commonality (and also of communication)
reduces the Other to the Same and minimizes the potential of a subjective resistance to the inclusion of contrariety
within a closed system of shared associations. This illusion of unity masks the radical violence of alterity
and softens the risk of its provisional acceptance by replacing the shock of its reality with the comforting image
of a single, harmonious group, a majority without difference. They is Us. The correlation of subjectivity relieves the discord of
diversity because one has to inhere and adhere to the fundamental agreements of a consensual state of abstract universalism in order to
be part of the general (yet specific) culture of a community. I am We. An
ethical and philosophical contrition of
sorts must be achieved in this case by the subject, to ensure a “responsible re sponse” that is
itself a coming to peace of the Self with the avowable laws of a community and its effacing
of difference.
AT: Try or Die Bad
Reverse the burden of proof—DAs begin from the presumption that they
start at 100% risk instead of being built up by zero risk—try or die distorts
risk calculus
Cohn 13 (Nate – politics writer for the NY Times, past CEDA finalist from Whitman, “Improving the Norms and Practices of
Policy Debate,” in CEDA Debate forums, 11-24-13, http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?action=printpage;topic=5416.0)
The fact that policy

debate is wildly out of touch—the fact that we are “a bunch of white folks talking
about nuclear war”—is a damning indictment of nearly every coach in this activity . It’s a serious
indictment of the successful policy debate coaches, who have been content to continue a
pedagogically unsound game, so long as they keep winning. It’s a serious indictment of policy debate’s
discontents who chose to disengage. That’s not to say there hasn’t been any effort to challenge modern policy debate on its own terms
—just that they’ve mainly come from the middle of the bracket and weren’t very successful, focusing on morality arguments and
various “predictions bad” claims to outweigh. Judges were receptive to the sentiment that disads were
unrealistic, but negative claims to specificity always triumphed over generic epistemological
questions or arguments about why “predictions fail.” The affirmative rarely introduced substantive responses to the
disadvantage, rarely read impact defense. All considered, the negative generally won a significant risk that the plan
resulted in nuclear war. Once that was true, it was basically impossible to win that some moral
obligation outweighed the (dare I say?) obligation to avoid a meaningful risk of extinction. There were
other problems. Many of the small affirmatives were unstrategic—teams rarely had solvency deficits to generic counterplans. It was
already basically impossible to win that some morality argument outweighed extinction; it
was totally untenable to win
that a moral obligation outweighed a meaningful risk of extinction ; it made even less sense if the
counterplan solved most of the morality argument. The combined effect was devastating: As these debates are currently argued
and judged, I suspect that the negative would win my ballot more than 95 percent of the time in a debate between two teams of equal
ability. But even if a “soft left” team did better—especially by making solvency deficits and responding to the specifics of the
disadvantage—I still think they would struggle. They could compete at the highest levels, but, in most debates, judges would still
assess a small, but meaningful risk of a large scale conflict, including nuclear war and extinction. The
risk would be small,
but the “magnitude” of the impact would often be enough to outweigh a higher probability , smaller
impact. Or put differently: policy debate still wouldn’t be replicating a real world policy
assessment, teams reading small affirmatives would still be at a real disadvantage with respect to reality. . Why? Oddly, this is
the unreasonable result of a reasonable part of debate : the burden of refutation or rejoinder, the
responsibility of debaters to “beat” arguments. If I introduce an argument, it starts out at 100
percent—you then have to disprove it. That sounds like a pretty good idea in principle, right? Well, I think so too. But
it’s really tough to refute something down to “zero” percent—a team would need to completely
and totally refute an argument. That’s obviously tough to do, especially since the other team is usually going to have some
decent arguments and pretty good cards defending each component of their disadvantage—even the ridiculous parts. So one of the
most fundamental assumptions about debate all but ensures a meaningful risk of nearly any
argument—even extremely low-probability, high magnitude impacts, sufficient to outweigh
systemic impacts. There’s another even more subtle element of debate practice at play. Traditionally, the 2AC might
introduce 8 or 9 cards against a disadvantage, like “non-unique, no-link, no-impact,” and then go for one and two. Yet in
reality, disadvantages are underpinned by dozens or perhaps hundreds of discrete assumptions,
each of which could be contested. By the end of the 2AR, only a handful are under scrutiny; the majority of
the disadvantage is conceded, and it’s tough to bring the one or two scrutinized components down
to “zero.” And then there’s a bad understanding of probability. If the affirmative questions four or five
elements of the disadvantage, but the negative was still “clearly ahead” on all five elements, most judges would assess that the
negative was “clearly ahead” on the disadvantage. In reality, the risk of the disadvantage has been reduced considerably. If
there
was, say, an 80 percent chance that immigration reform would pass , an 80 percent chance that political
capital was key, an 80 percent chance that the plan drained a sufficient amount of capital, an 80 percent chance that
immigration reform was necessary to prevent another recession, and an 80 percent chance that another recession would cause a
nuclear war (lol), then there’s a 32 percent chance that the disadvantage caused nuclear war . I think these
issues can be overcome. First, I think teamscan deal with the “burden of refutation” by focusing on the
“burden of proof,” which allows a team to mitigate an argument before directly contradicting its
content. Here’s how I’d look at it: modern policy debate has assumed that arguments start out at “100
percent” until directly refuted. But few, if any, arguments are supported by evidence consistent with
“100 percent.” Most cards don’t make definitive claims. Even when they do, they’re not supported by
definitive evidence—and any reasonable person should assume there’s at least some uncertainty on matters other than few true
facts, like 2+2=4. Take Georgetown’s immigration uniqueness evidence from Harvard. It says there “may be a window”
for immigration. So, based on the negative’s evidence, what are the odds that immigration reform
will pass? Far less than 50 percent, if you ask me. That’s not always true for every card in the 1NC, but sometimes
it’s even worse—like the impact card, which is usually a long string of “coulds.” If you apply this very basic
level of analysis to each element of a disadvantage , and correctly explain math
(.4*.4*.4*.4*.4=.01024), the risk of the disadvantage starts at a very low level , even before
the affirmative offers a direct response. Debaters should also argue that the negative hasn’t
introduced any evidence at all to defend a long list of unmentioned elements in the “internal link
chain.” The absence of evidence to defend the argument that, say, “recession causes
depression,” may not eliminate the disadvantage, but it does raise uncertainty —and it doesn’t
take too many additional sources of uncertainty to reduce the probability of the disadvantage to
effectively zero—sort of the static, background noise of prediction. Now, I do think it would be nice if a good
debate team would actually do the work—talk about what the cards say, talk about the unmentioned steps—but I think debaters
can make these observations at a meta-level (your evidence isn’t certain, lots of undefended elements) and
successfully reduce the risk of a nuclear war or extinction to something indistinguishable
from zero. It would not be a factor in my decision. Based on my conversations with other policy judges, it may be possible to pull
it off with even less work. They might be willing to summarily disregard “absurd” arguments, like politics disadvantages, on the
grounds that it’s patently unrealistic, that we know the typical burden of rejoinder yields unrealistic scenarios, and that judges should
assess debates in ways that produce realistic assessments. I don’t think this is too different from elements of Jonah Feldman’s old
philosophy, where he basically said “when I assessed 40 percent last year, it’s 10 percent now.” Honestly, I was surprised that the few
judges I talked to were so amenable to this argument. For me, just saying “it’s absurd, and you know it” wouldn’t be enough against
an argument in which the other team invested considerable time. The more developed argument about accurate risk assessment would
be more convincing, but I still think it would be vulnerable to a typical defense of the burden of rejoinder. To be blunt: I want debaters
to learn why a disadvantage is absurd, not just make assertions that conform to their preexisting notions of what’s realistic and what’s
not. And perhaps more importantly for this discussion, I could not coach a team to rely exclusively on this argument—I’m not
convinced that enough judges are willing to discount a disadvantage on “it’s absurd.” Nonetheless, I think this is a useful “frame” that
should preface a following, more robust explanation of why the risk of the disadvantage is basically zero—even before a substantive
response is offered. There are other, broad genres of argument that can contest the substance of the negative’s argument. There are
serious methodological indictments of the various forms of knowledge production, from journalistic reporting to think tanks to
quantitative social science. Many of our most strongly worded cards come from people giving opinions,
for which they offer very little data or evidence . And even when “qualified” people are giving
predictions, there’s a great case to be extremely skeptical without real evidence backing it up.
The world is a complicated place, predictions are hard, and most people are wrong. And again, this is
before contesting the substance of the negative’s argument( )—if deemed necessary. So, in my view, the low probability
scenario is waiting to be eliminated from debate, basically as soon as a capable team tries to
do it. That would open to the door to all of the arguments, previously excluded, de facto, by the prevalence of nuclear war impacts.
It’s been tough to talk about racism or gender violence, since modest measures to mitigate these impacts have a difficult time
outweighing a nuclear war. It’s been tough to discuss ethical policy making, since it’s hard to argue that any commitment to
philosophical or ethical purity should apply in the face of an existential risk. It’s been tough to introduce unconventional forms of
evidence, since they can’t really address the probability of nuclear war. Yes, the affirmative would still need to debate counterplans.
Sometimes, I get the impression that’s a point of controversy, too. Quite frankly, I think counterplans are good. I don’t think the
negative should only be forced to exclusively debate about harms. There’s no way we can have a fair topic about, say, prison reform,
if the negative can only defend the status quo. That’s especially true if you don’t want to debate the political cost of the action—
which, in many instances, is the reason why the government hasn’t made obvious policy changes. Yet at the same time, I think it’s
probably time
to retire a few genres of generic counterplans. I think it’s time to retire the “alternative actor”
counterplan, which isn’t a logical response to the affirmative. I also think it’s time to require that teams read
evidence at a comprehensible speed. Comprehensible in front of me would still be “fast” by non-debater standards, but it would make
debate far more accessible, it would solve the apparently rampant issue of card clipping, and, well, I don’t really know why it wasn’t
required in the first place. I still think judges should call for cards, but they should call cards for additional scrutiny, not to make up for
the fact that they never understood the content in the first place. Top policy judges and coaches should consider leading on this issues
by writing and endorsing a pact establishing norms for clarity. The standard should be simple: the relevant warrant and argument in
the card should be on your flow. There are certainly other problematic norms that I haven’t addressed. I’d love to hear others comment
on specific norms and practices that they find problematic.
AT: Ptx/Internal Ptx
The temporality of DAs aren’t neutral, entrenches violence
Brown 5 (Wendy, professor of political science at UC-Berkeley, “Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics”,
http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s8079.html)
Despite the variation in their political significance, these three political episodes feature a common conservative and moralizing
rejection of critique as untimely. "It is not the time," declare the workers in the political trenches to the critics, a retort that
invokes time in the triple sense of (1) the timing relevant to successful political campaigns, (2) the
constrained or dark political times we feel ourselves to be in, and (3) appropriateness, mannerliness, or civility--
timeliness as temperateness about when, how, and where one raises certain issues or mentions certain problems.4 The first sense is
concerned with strategy and efficiency in reaching a defined political end, the second speaks to holding back the dark, and the third
invokes maturity and propriety against infantilism or indecorousness. Critique is taken to be at best irrelevant, at worst damaging, to
the value represented by each. The rebuff of critical theory as untimely provides the core matter of the affirmative case for it.
Critical theory is essential in dark times not for the sake of sustaining utopian hopes, making flamboyant interventions, or
staging irreverent protests, but rather to contest the very senses of time invoked to declare critique untimely. If
the charge of untimeliness inevitably also fixes time, then disrupting this fixity is crucial to keeping the times from closing in on us. It
is a way of reclaiming the present from the conservative hold on it that is borne by the charge of untimeliness.
To insist on the value of untimely political critique is not, then, to refuse the problem of time or timing in politics but rather
to contest settled accounts of what time it is, what the times are, and what political tempo and temporality we
should hew to in political life. Untimeliness deployed as an effective intellectual and political strategy, far from being a gesture
of indifference to time, is a bid to reset time. Intellectual and political strategies of successful untimeliness therefore depend on a close
engagement with time in every sense of the word. They are concerned with timing and tempo. They involve efforts to grasp the times
by thinking against the times. They attempt, as Nietzsche put it, to "overcome the present" by puncturing the present's "overvaluation
of itself,"5 an overcoming whose aim is to breathe new possibility into the age. If our times are dark, what could be more important?
AT: Xi DA—Xi PC really High
Xi has plenty of PC now
Matt Sheehan, 9-20- 2015, What You Need To Know About China’s Strongman Presiden,
Huffington Post, Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/chinese-president- xi-
jinping_us_55fed862e4b08820d918ff14 July 16 //DDI – CS
Xi has quickly emerged as maybe the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong.
China’s previous leaders largely shunned the spotlight, portraying themselves as part of a group
ruling by consensus. Xi has instead built a huge personal brand by employing strongman tactics
at home and abroad. In China, Xi has consolidated enormous personal power through a
blistering crackdown on both corrupt officials and civil society activists. The prosecution of
powerful officials (many who happen to be Xi’s political rivals) and the detention of civil rights
lawyers have shocked China-watchers in their audacity and depth. Some scholars argue that the
twin crackdowns reveal Xi’s vision for China’s future: not a liberal, electoral democracy, but an
efficient authoritarian state with a strong leader at the helm. Abroad, Xi has asserted China’s
contentious territorial claims by building artificial islands in the South China Sea. Over the
objection of the United States and its allies, China has managed to build airstrips and outposts
in waters also claimed by the Philippines and Vietnam. Xi has also expanded Chinese
influence in Southeast and Central Asia by founding new international organizations and
pledging huge money for infrastructure investments abroad. Those stances have built
popularity and political capital that Xi may spend on broad-ranging economic and
environmental reforms. In 2013 the Chinese leadership announced its intention to kick-start
sputtering economic reforms, shrinking the role of the state by giving market forces a “decisive
role” in the economy.¶ Those reforms are meant to power the Chinese economy through a
tough transition: away from traditional sources of growth (cheap exports and heavy
industry) and toward a new economy built on services, consumption and innovation.¶ That’s
a monumental task, and so far the record on reform is mixed. Early progress was made on thorny
issues of restructuring local government debt and wrenching the Chinese economy away from
high-polluting industries such as steel and cement.¶ Sudden drops in Chinese coal consumption
also laid the groundwork for last fall’s landmark climate change agreement with the U.S.¶ But
this summer, the government fumbled on several fronts. When a politically expedient stock
market bubble began to burst, the leadership pumped in money in a desperate attempt to keep the
party going. That move and a sudden devaluation of the RMB fueled speculation that Xi may
sacrifice deep reform in hopes of propping up short-term growth. These changes in style hint at a
profound shift in the nature of Chinese politics. Even as he plays to the public gallery, Mr Xi is
tightening his grip on power among the elite. He has added a new layer of authority at the
top, taken command of numerous committees, and now personally supervises overall
government reform, finance, the overhaul of the armed forces and cyber-security. Always
small, the number of decision- makers is shrinking further, says Odd Arne Westad of the London
School of Economics. Under Mr Xi, membership of the Politburo’s Standing Committee, the
party’s key decision-making body, has been cut from nine to seven, back where it stood a
decade ago.¶ Notably removed from the seven is anyone exclusively responsible for domestic
security. That is now Mr Xi’s fief. He does not want anyone to threaten his power in the way
his predecessor, Hu Jintao, was overshadowed by Zhou Yongkang, a member of the Standing
Committee who was in charge of the entire law-enforcement apparatus, from the police and secret
police to the judiciary. Mr Xi is trying to eliminate all vestiges of Mr Zhou’s influence. Mr Zhou,
who retired when Mr Xi took over, is now being investigated for corruption—the highest-ranking
official to be targeted for such an offence since the party came to power in 1949. Dozens of
people who worked closely with Mr Zhou have been rounded up. Mr Xi has discarded an
unwritten party rule that former and serving members of the Standing Committee are immune
from prosecution.¶ Mr Xi’s change in political style was clear from the moment in November
2012 when he walked before live cameras into a room in the Great Hall of the People to greet the
country as its new leader. He smiled at the throng of journalists and then apologised for keeping
them waiting, a humility previously unheard of. He literally loomed large. At 1.80 metres (almost
6 feet), Mr Xi stands out as the tallest leader since Mao—a point well-noted by a height-obsessed
nation.
Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is popular, which provides him with PC to do

many risky things
Blackwell and Campbell 16 (Robert D. Blackwill and Kurt M. Campbell, two experienced
practitioners and long-time observers of American foreign policy), “Xi Jinping on the Global
Stage” Council on Foreign Relations // DDI - CS
Xi has likewise targeted the military and reversed the growing autonomy of the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA). His arrest of Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xu
Caihou for selling promotions suggests that dozens of generals who purchased their ranks are at
risk of imprisonment.9 In addition to intimidating military elites, Xi has created an atmosphere of
uncertainty by questioning the PLA’s operational readiness while pointing to a variety of looming
foreign threats, which together justify reform and the party’s guiding hand.10 Finally, Xi has
stressed on dozens of occasions that the PLA must remain an armed wing of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP). This was most apparent in his decision to call a meeting of hundreds of
generals and military officials in Gutian County, the historic site where Mao Zedong rst declared
that the military must always be loyal to the party.11 Together, Xi’s e orts send an unmistakable
signal to the PLA that compliance is expected and resistance punished. Xi’s arrest of senior
offcials is risky, and is sustained in no small part by public opinion supportive of the
anticorruption campaign and of Xi more broadly. Unlike recent Chinese leaders, Xi appears
to have an intuitive grasp of public sentiment and has sustained a nascent cult of personality
around his image as a brash and assertive strongman, reportedly telling Russian President
Vladimir Putin in 2013, “We are similar in character.”12 This image is buttressed by a relentless
propaganda campaign waged through traditional and social media that por- trays Xi as an
incorruptible and self-sacri cial “mix of everyman and superman.”13 That e ort has been
successful in making public opinion a pillar of Xi’s power, with a Harvard study nding that Xi
had a higher approval rating domestically than any other world leader in 2014.1
Xi’s PC is very high now

ChengLi, 01-2015, “China’s Domestic Dynamics: Implications for India and the United States”,
Brookings Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/20-china- domestic-
dynamics-us- india-implications- li // DDI – CS
Within two years, Xi’s administration purged about 60 ministerial-, provincial- and senior
military-level leaders on corruption charges, including ten members of the newly-formed 18th
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In 2013 alone the authorities handled
172,000 corruption cases and investigated 182,000 officials –– the highest annual number of
cases in 30 years.¶ In an even bolder move Xi purged three heavyweight politicians: former
police czar Zhou Yongkang, who controlled the security and law enforcement apparatus for
ten years; former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xu Caihou, who was
in charge of military personnel affairs for a decade; and Ling Jihua, who was head of the
General Office of the CCP Central Committee and oversaw all of the activities and document
flow of the top leadership during the era of President Hu Jintao. These moves to clean up
corruption in the party leadership have greatly bolstered public confidence and support for
Xi.¶ Equally significant is the consolidation of Xi’s personal power: he holds the top position in
many leading central groups, including important areas such as foreign affairs, financial
and economic work, cyber security and information technology, and military reforms.
Altogether, Xi occupies a total of 11 top posts in the country’s most powerful leadership
bodies.
AT: No Xi PC
Xi’s controversial actions are draining his PC
Hari Sreenivasan, 3-31-2016, American broadcast journalist, “Signs of growing discontent for
Xi Jinping in China," http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/signs-of-growing-discontent-for-xi-
jinping-in-china/ July 16 // DDI - CS
But Xi’sbiggest challenge may be back home, where there are signs of growing discontent.
Partly, it’s economic, a stock crash, sliding currency values and the weakest economic
growth in a quarter-century. Outwardly, at least, Xi’s government has remained upbeat. LI KEQIANG, Premier, China
(through interpreter): We are fully confident of China’s long-term economic growth. The economy will not suffer a hard landing.
HARI SREENIVASAN: But Xi has also raised hackles with his crackdown on dissent. Last month, he
visited state media organizations, warning that absolute loyalty to the party is their highest
priority. That drew criticism from real estate magnate Ren Zhiqiang, among others, and his social media accounts were suspended.
This month, a government-run Web site posted a letter calling for Xi’s resignation. It was signed “Loyal Communist Party Members.”
Soon after, a number of people, including well-known columnist Jia Jia, went missing, apparently as part of an investigation into the
letter’s origin. Protesters in Hong Kong demanded to know his whereabouts. LEUNG KWOK-HUNG, Hong Kong Lawmaker: I think
Xi Jinping stressed that China should be and will be ruled by law. But what happened in China after he is in power, he
threatened, he arrests, and kidnapped all kinds of activists from different part of civic
society. Journalists, lawyer, social worker are all in — on his target.
Concentration of power and economic slowdown leaves Xi vulnerable to

internal politics
Blackwell and Campbell 16 (Robert D. Blackwill and Kurt M. Campbell, two experienced
practitioners and long-time observers of American foreign policy, February 2016, “Xi Jinping on
the Global Stage”) July 16 // DDI - CS
But the authors also argue that this same con-
centration of power is a double-edged sword, one that leaves
President Xi exposed and potentially vulnerable to internal political challenge . The vulnerability
comes from several sources, but none is more critical than a slowing economy. The trajectory of the Chinese economy is the subject
of active debate among outside experts, but there is consensus that China is experiencing a substantial slowdown
and will not be able to regain the high rates of growth that characterized the last several
decades. The report suggests the possibility of greater political repression at home if there are signs the economic
slowdown is triggering political instability. But the authors go on to note that Xi may as well be
tempted to turn to foreign policy to redirect domestic attention away from a lagging
economy, in the process burnishing his nationalist credentials. They anticipate continued Chinese pressure on neighbors in the East
and South China Seas and are skeptical China will use the leverage it has over North Korea or assume more than a limited role in
global governance. They do, however, expect China to continue to engage in selective institution building. Overall, they foresee a
Chinese foreign policy that is assertive, coordinated, and diversi ed, one that constitutes a sig- ni cant challenge to U.S. interests
AT: Elections
China policy not key, despite voter fears and political rhetoric – and - Link is
inevitable anyway – trump doesn’t need plan to do it -
He, 16 --- He Yafei is former vice minister of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State
Council, and former vice minister at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China US Focus,
“U.S. Election and Its Impact on China”, 1/25, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/u-s-
election-and-its-impact-on-china/
Here comes China, whose economic growth and military modernization in recent years represents, to American people, a world that
undergoes rapid changes and evolves to a multipolar one where the US is no longer being able to call shot on everything. The
resentment against globalization is on the rise. Overall strategic retrenchment and an emphatic shift to focus more on China are taking
place simultaneously. “Scapegoating” China is inevitable. “China has taken jobs away from American workers”.
“China is manipulating its currency to gain advantage in trade”. “China is being aggressive in the South China Sea and trying to drive
the US out of the Western Pacific”. The list of complaints can go on and on. It doesn’t matter whether those
accusations and complaints are true or not to American politicians and voters as long as they
have “election value”. For instance, the renminbi has appreciated against the US dollar to the tune of 30% since 2008, but
voices are still strong in America calling for the RMB to appreciate further. We all know from experience that China-
bashing is common and “cost-free” in US elections. This time around is no different. What is
different is that while without agreeing to the concept of “G2”, there is a broad recognition that the US and China are the two major
powers in today’s world. It is no hyperbole to say that nothing gets done without close cooperation between the two nations, be it
climate change, energy security, non-proliferation of WMD, etc. In this connection the US election does have an impact on China and
US-China relations as noted by Robert Manning, who said the US-China relationship enters “dangerous waters” in 2016. What can be
done to counteract the negative spillover from the US election this year? On the one hand, there need to be more cooperative actions
from both sides to reinforce the relationship. Climate change is one, cooperation in the Middle East is another. To quicken the pace of
negotiation on BIT is definitely useful with emphasis on shortening the “negative list”. The US-China relationship is simply too
important for both nations not to make extra efforts in election years to make it stronger in the face of increased headwind. On the
other hand, we ought to stay calm and ready to meet any possible frictions and challenges in close coordination and consultation to
minimize damage to the bilateral relations. We have to understand that “China-bashing” is more words than
actions. Any new administration once in the White House will be more realistic and down-to-earth in its China policy as determined
by shared interests of both nations worldwide. In reality, China has not been the key issue in the election so
far despite some rhetoric by candidates from both parties. To prioritize the issues that voters
care about most, the threat posed by terrorist organizations such as IS ranks at the top of the list.
Next comes illegal immigration because as of now there are between 12 million to 20 million illegals residing in the US
depending on how you estimate them. Further down the list is tax policy. As is often quoted, “There are two
things certain in life. One is death and the other is taxes”. Another concern that comes before
China is the dangerous situation in the Middle East. So you can see clearly that China figures
rather low on this “worry list” in the minds of American voters.
Clinton isn’t tied to the plan AND the GOP can’t spin against her
Golan 15 (Shahar, Henry M. Jackson School of Int’l Studies at University of Washington –
Chaired by Sorenson - Director Center for Korea Studies, Building a Pragmatic Coalition in
American Politics, Rethinking United States Military Bases in East Asia, University of
Washington, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Task Force - Winter 2015,
https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/33275/Task%20Force
%20E%202015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)
As a recent Washington Post op-ed bluntly pointed out, “If Hillary Clinton wants the nomination — and there’s no indication to the
contrary — she can have it” (Robinson, 2015, n.p.). Hillary’s
nomination will make it very difficult for the
Republican Party to attack the Democrats for going soft on China by spinning the rethink of the military bases
to seem that way. The former First Lady’s reputation in foreign policy circles is difficult to challenge.
She recently distanced herself from Obama’s foreign policy generally, from Asia policy
specifically, and is perceived as a foreign policy hawk . In the New York Times review of her book Hard Choices,
Michiko Kakutani (2014) stated that “Mrs. Clinton’s views are perceived as often more hawkish than Mr. Obama’s” (n.p.). Another
book review in The Guardian also articulated opinions attuned with the New York Times article and public perception, stating “she
comes across as consistently hawkish, pushing Obama to take stronger action” (Runicman, 2014, n.p.). Many in the defense
establishment including former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates have praised Clinton for her diplomatic skills. Her
experience
in foreign relations and her perception as a foreign policy hawk will challenge Republicans as they
look ahead towards the upcoming presidential elections. Accusations of a foreign policy rethink favoring soft
policies on the PRC and the DPRK will most likely fall flat for the Republican Party against
this seasoned diplomat.
China policy won’t affect the election – other foreign policy is more
important, GOP won’t challenge Clinton on China
Moreshead 15 (Colin Moreshead is a freelance writer living and working in Tokyo. His
research focuses primarily on East Asian trade relations and exchange rate policy. “Will China-
Bashing Subside in 2016?” Nov 03, 2015. http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/will-
china-bashing-subside-in-2016/)
That isn’t to say, however, that things won’t heat up in the general election. In
advance of the 2008 election, then-Senator
Barack Obama was relatively mum on Chinese issues as a primary candidate. By during his third
debate with Republican nominee John McCain, Obama made three separate mentions of China to his
opponent’s two, focusing on the growing trade deficit. At the third 2012 debate between Obama and Romney,
China was mentioned no fewer than 32 times, this time as an adversary in need of a trade rules refresher course. The
coming general election will almost certainly diverge from this pattern because of the footing
Democrats find themselves on near the end of the Obama presidency. If Hillary Clinton secures the
Democratic nomination as projected, the Republican challenger will be faced with a seasoned
veteran of recent Chinese diplomacy. As an architect and executor of the Obama administration’s
“pivot to Asia,” Clinton has the bona fides necessary to head off most foreign policy attacks.
Republicans will likely push her on Iran, Russia, ISIS and Libya, carefully avoiding East Asian
policy discussions. China’s striking absence from charged campaign rhetoric this year can be
partially attributed to a decrease in perceived threat to America as Chinese economic growth
slows and stock markets tumble. However, diplomatic victories shared by the Obama and Xi administrations should not
be overlooked. Most notably, the two presidents have reached agreements on the issues of climate change and cyber-attacks within the
past year, ushering in an era of cooperation between the two countries on a range of issues. The remainder of election season could
play out any number of ways, but it appears a safe bet that Beijing will be spared the vitriol it witnessed in recent American political
contests. Whether
the result of a cooling Chinese economy or meaningful advances in the bilateral
relationship under presidents Obama and Xi, China policy will likely make fewer appearances on
the campaign trail during the next year than it did at any time over the past decade. Rather than to take
this as an indication of apathy, Beijing should celebrate this development as a sign that American politicians are finally ready to leave
diplomacy to the diplomats. If true, the next American president has the chance to hit the ground running with his or her Chinese
counterpart, and that would constitute a real victory.
Foreign policy doesn’t affect elections

Saunders 16 (Elizabeth N. Saunders is an assistant professor of political science and
international affairs at George Washington University, and for 2015-2016, a Stanton Nuclear
Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. She is the author of “Leaders at War: How
Presidents Shape Military Interventions” (Cornell University Press, 2011). “Will foreign policy
be a major issue in the 2016 election? Here’s what we know.” January 26.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/01/26/will-foreign-policy-be-a-
major-issue-in-the-2016-election-heres-what-we-know/)
Does foreign policy affect how voters decide who to vote for and who gets elected? The
consensus is that foreign policy
generally has little effect on elections, as Brendan Nyhan pointed out after the Paris attacks (see also Dan Drezner here
and here). Of course, foreign policy can matter in elections. But it’s hard for a politician to sway large
numbers of voters based on foreign affairs. Why? Some issues are simply not salient enough: on
trade, for example, research by Alexandra Guisinger found that voters did not hold their senators accountable for
votes on the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Another challenge is that a candidate must be
able to draw a significant contrast with the other party. That may mean taking a popular position that the
opposition cannot easily match (as Lynn Vavreck comments). Consider Vietnam and the 1968 election. Benjamin Page
and Richard Brody found that despite the apparently high salience of the war, most individuals’ votes were not based on Vietnam —
because therewas little difference between the public positions taken by Hubert Humphrey and Richard
Nixon. That’s potentially true in 2016 as well. The most likely Democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton, has
taken more hawkish foreign policy positions than many recent Democratic candidates,
presumably bringing her positions closer to the more traditionally hawkish Republican side.
Basing a vote on foreign policy can be difficult because candidates often have an incentive to be
vague, as Humphrey and Nixon were in 1968. In 2015 and 2016, the Republican candidates have been long on talk of “toughness”
but short on specifics. This can build broad primary support, but isn’t likely to produce sharply contrasting positions between the
parties. Foreign policy also cannot be completely separated from other views. If you value
toughness on other issues like crime or immigration, you are more likely to also value aggressive
foreign policy. Events like the Paris or San Bernadino attacks may provide a filter through which voters channel their views,
rather than changing those views. Page and Brody found that voters tended to pick a favored candidate and then
project their desired position on the war onto that candidate.
Foreign policy won’t matter – empirically voters care more about domestic
issues
Clark 16 (Lesley, McClatchy News Service. 6/2. “Clinton pillories Trump’s foreign policy, but
history says it won’t help.” http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-
government/article81238337.html)
Presidential contenders often tout their foreign policy credentials. But that may matter little to
voters. In a speech Thursday, Hillary Clinton mocked and pilloried Donald Trump and charged that the real estate
magnate is a dangerous threat who can’t be trusted with nuclear weapons. But history shows that in the past 40 years,
the candidate with the robust foreign-policy portfolio often has lost to the one with the arguably
thinner international résumé. In San Diego, the former secretary of state unleashed a torrent of criticism against Trump,
calling his ideas a “series of bizarre rants, personal feuds and outright lies.” She declared him “temperamentally unfit to hold an office
that requires knowledge, stability and immense responsibility.” And she
warned that his election “would set back
our standing in the world more than anything in recent memory.” She accused him of picking fights with U.S.
allies while praising dictators and of basing his foreign policy credentials on his experience running the Miss Universe pageant in
Russia. “Imagine him deciding whether to send your spouses or children into battle,” she said. “Imagine if he had not just his Twitter
account at his disposal when he’s angry, but America’s entire arsenal.” But consider history: Gerald Ford had served more than
two decades in the House of Representatives, had been vice president and then president – all giving him considerable
experience in foreign policy and national security. “Foreign policy and defense policy are difficult and complex issues,”
Ford said at one debate. “We can debate methods; we can debate one decision or another. But there are two things which cannot be
debated – experience and results.” Yet he was defeated in 1976 by Jimmy Carter, a relatively unknown former one-term
governor of Georgia with no international experience. Or Carter himself, who ran for re-election four years
later with plenty of foreign policy experience . “I'm a much wiser and more experienced man than I was when I
debated four years ago,” he said when he faced Ronald Reagan, a former governor of California. Voters didn’t think much
of his experience, though. Carter lost. George H.W. Bush, who served in the House, as envoy to China, director of the CIA and
then vice president, proved an exception in 1988, when he defeated Massachusetts Gov. Michael Dukakis, who had little international
experience. Four years later, however, Bush had won the Gulf War and presided over the end of the Cold
War. And he couldn’t conceal his scorn for the lack of experience in Arkansas Gov. Bill Clinton and his
running mate, Sen. Al Gore of Tennessee. “My dog Millie knows more about foreign affairs than these two bozos,” Bush said at a
campaign rally in Michigan. Bush lost. One reason for the losses: voters’ interests lie elsewhere. “Generally, foreign
policy experience has not been that important because people are more preoccupied by domestic
issues,” said David Schultz, a political science professor at Hamline University in Minnesota who has studied the trend. “It’s much
more checkbook, pocketbook, than foreign policy.” The decline of the significance of foreign policy experience
dates to the end of the Cold War, Schultz said. There have been wars and conflicts since then, but “not with the same
perception of intensity,” he said. In 2000, Gore, who’d traveled the world in his two terms as Clinton’s vice president, ran for the top
job. “Foreign policy is no game,” Gore said in his announcement speech. “The world today is complex and volatile in the extreme –
more than it has ever been. You deserve a leader who has been tested in it – who knows how to protect America, and secure peace and
freedom.” But while he did win the popular vote, he lost the Electoral College and the election to George W. Bush, then the governor
of Texas with no experience in foreign relations or national security. And in 2008, Sen. John McCain of Arizona, a former prisoner
of war and longtime member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, was by far the more experienced candidate.
“I’ve been involved . . . in virtually every major national-security challenge we’ve faced in the last 20-some years,” McCain said in a
September 2008 debate. “There are some advantages to experience, and knowledge, and judgment. And I honestly don’t believe that
Sen. Obama has the knowledge or experience and has made the wrong judgments in a number of areas.” He was defeated by
Barack Obama, then a first-term senator.
AT: K
Perm—Derrida Aff
We must not abandon human rights in the name of their criticism – rather,
the human rights corpus can be continually interrogated and revised
Sociales in Paris, and Professor of Philosophy, French and Comparative Literature at the
University of California, Irvine, 2003, Philosophy in a Time of Terror, p. 132-33)
Borradori: We have spoken about tolerance, hospitality, and cosmopolitanism. How do you see the problem of human rights? What is
the relationship between the notion of right and that of hospitality? A right presupposes someone who avails him- or herself of that
right in relationship to another, that is, more precisely, in a social context, in an organized community. If the concept of state, which is
the concept of a juridically organized community, is no longer the last word of the political, how are you going to maintain the idea of
human rights? Derrida: Actually, it
is today more and more often in the name of human rights and their universality
that the sovereign authority of the state is called into question, that international courts of
justice are established, that heads of state or military leaders are judged after having been removed from the judicial
institutions of their own state. The concept of a crime against humanity or of a war crime no longer falls under the authority of
national judicial institutions and sovereign states. At least in principle. You know about the enormous problems we are now facing in
this regard. We must (il faut) more than ever stand on the side of human rights. We need (il faut)
human rights. We are in need of them and they are in need, for there is always a lack , a
shortfall, a falling short, an insufficiency; human rights are never sufficient. Which alone suffices to
remind us that they are not natural. They have a history—one that is recent, complex, and unfinished. From the
French Revolution and the first Declarations right up through the declaration following World War II, human rights have been
continually enriched, refined, clarified, and defined (women’s rights, children’s rights, the right to work, rights to education, human
rights beyond “human rights and citizens’ rights,” and so on). To
take this historicity and this perfectibility into
account in an affirmative way we must never prohibit the most radical question ing possible of
all the concepts at work here: the humanity of man (the “proper of man” or of the human, which raises the
whole question of nonhuman living beings, as well as the question of the history of recent juridical concepts or
performatives such as a “crime against humanity”), and then the very concept of rights or of law (droit), and even the concept of
history. For justice does not end with law.29 Nor even with duties (devoirs), which, in a still wholly paradoxical way,
“must,” “should” go beyond obligation and debt. I tried to show elsewhere that any pure ethics must begin beyond law, duty, and debt.
Beyond law, that’s easy to understand. Beyond duty, that’s almost unthinkable. Recall what Kant says: a moral action must be
accomplished not only “according to duty (pflichtmassig)” but “from duty (eigentlich aus Pflicht),” “out of pure duty (aus reiner
Pflicht).” Once we have followed Kant this far, as we no doubt ought to do, a leap is still required. If I act out of pure duty, because I
must do so, because I owe it, because there is a debt I must repay, then two limits come to taint any pure ethicity or pure morality. On
the one hand, I subordinate my action to a knowledge (I am supposed to know what this pure duty is in the name of which I must act).
Yet an action that simply obeys knowledge is but a calculable consequence, the deployment of a norm or program. It does not engage
any decision or any responsibility worthy of these names. On the other hand, by acting out of pure duty, I acquit myself of a debt and
thus complete the economic circle of an exchange; I do not exceed in any way the totalization or reappropriation that something like a
gift, hospitality, or the event itself should exceed. We
must thus be dutiful beyond duty, we must go beyond
law, tolerance, conditional hospitality, economy, and so on. But to go beyond does not mean to discredit that
which we exceed. Whence the difficulty of a responsible transaction between two orders or, rather, between order and its
beyond. Whence all these aporias, and the inevitability of an autoimmunitary risk.
The plan begins a chain of equivalence with universal potential – human

rights claims inspire proliferation of further demands, extending human
rights claims to previously-excluded elements of society
Human rights struggles are symbolic and political: their immediate battleground is the
meaning of words, such as difference, equality or similarity and freedom, but, if successful, they have
ontological consequences, they change radically the constitution of the legal subject and affect
peoples’ lives. The imaginative
use of rhetorical and, specifically, metaphorical and metonymical
transfers of meaning, furthers the campaign. Metaphor operates when a new group has
established in law and fact its claims to equality and difference and has appropriated the
symbolic value of the “floating signifier”. It then becomes itself the “ground” group for further
proliferation of right-claims and for novel assertions of similarity and difference. After the recognition of a general right
to equality for gays and lesbians,56 for example, more concrete rights will be claimed: equal age of consent to sexual intercourse, the
right of gay and lesbian couples to marry, to adopt children and to enjoy the same tax and social benefits as heterosexuals etc. The
rhetorical operation of metonymy, on the other hand, allows the transfer of the presumed dignity
of human nature to entities which, although not strictly analogous to people, are contiguous or in some
other way related to them. The rights of the environment, of animals or the putative rights of the foetus
are examples of such “metonymical” rights. It should be added that for the Western philosophical tradition,
animality has been consistently opposed to humanity and the claims to animal liberation or rights cannot be based on any ontological
similarity.57 But the
rhetorical character of rights discourse allows the crossing of one of the
greatest metaphysical divides and permits what is “proper” to humans to be claimed for
animals or the inanimate. The common aim of human rights campaigns is to link the float -
ing and symbolic signifier to a particular signified, to arrest its constitutive indeterminacy and to achieve
the — partial — bonding of human nature with a regional conception of humanity which
will bestow upon the latter the symbolic value of the core concept , turning it into a valid instance of
human nature. In doing so, characteristics of humanity, like equality and freedom, are transferred to the group that achieves
recognition. But at the same time, this
partial linking gives content to the empty signifier and makes
concrete the abstract and formal claims to equality and freedom. Every successful fixing of
a partial signified to the floating signifier works therefore in two ways: it endows the new claim or
claimants with the symbolic dignity of human nature and right but , secondly, it arrests
temporarily the flight of meaning by filling abstract right with empirical determinations
and historical predicates.
Their knee-jerk rejection of the plan relies on a totalizing binary that makes
ethics impossible – only the perm solves.
Trifonas 2 (Peter Pericles Trifonas, Professor at the Center for Social Justice and Cultural
Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, 2002, Ethics,
Institutions, and the Right to Philosophy, p. 73)
A critique—coming down on one side or the other—of its efficacy is not at all useful, but a
misleading endeavor seeking an ethical refuge in the evaluative power of a binary form of
metaphysical reasoning that pits “the good” against “the bad,” “essentialism” against “antiessentialism,”
“Eurocentrism” against “anti-Eurocentrism,” and so on. The endwork of a critical task that freely places
blame or adjudicates value for the sake of a castigation or rejection of worth is per formed
too quickly and easily. Its decisions are rendered by and appeal to the dictates of a
universalist conception of “reason” and its demotic (and not at all democratic) corollary of “common sense” to
construct the ideologico-conceptual grounds of what is “good” and what is “bad.” The judgmental edifice of its
either/or rationale presumes a lack of interpretative complexity, a plainness of truth that is
totally transparent and obvious to everyone, a clear-cut and unarguable judgment made with no room to fathom
the possibility of opposition or exemption to the rule of law. One life-world. One reality. One Truth. The metaphysical
value of this ethic of perception and its monological model of representation determines the
nonoppositional grounds of truth. Conditional and definitive limits thereby demarcate the freedom of what it is
possible to know, think, and say without offending the much guarded sensibilities of “reason” and “good taste”—however their values
might be constructed and articulated—as the ideals of commonly held responses to cultural institutions and practices. Difference
is abdicated in favor of a community of shared interpretative responsibility and the
unethical hegemony of its “majority rules” attitude that bids one to erect barriers against diversity, “to see and
talk about things only as they are or could be.” For the priority of clarity as an ethical prerequisite of a “responsible response” is,
without a doubt, everything when the analytical imperative is nothing but an exercise of choosing sides. There is a more productive
approach, nevertheless, that would open up the possibility of reaffirming the utility and necessity of UNESCO as a cosmopolitical
institution by recontextualizing the conditions of its founding to the “new situation”53 of the present day, without having to tear down
the conceptual frame of its material structures in order to set up something else that would reproduce and multiply the faults of the
original. What would this involve? Deconstruction, of course
AT: Law/Sovereignty Bad
We should employ state sovereignty when the specificity of a situation
demands it
University of California, Irvine, 2004, For What Tomorrow? A Dialogue With Elisabeth
Roudinesco, p. 91-92)
J.D.: A moment ago you spoke of regicide as the necessity of an exception, in sum. Well, yes, one can refer provisionally to Carl
Schmitt (whatever one may think of him, his arguments are always useful for problematizing the “political” or the “juridical”; I
examined this question in Politics of Friendship). He says in effect that a sovereign is defined by his capacity to decide the exception.
Sovereign is he who effectively decides the exception. The revolutionaries decided that at that moment that it was necessary to
suspend justice and—in order to establish the law [droit] and to give the Revolution its rights—to suspend the rule of law [l’Etat de
droit]. Schmitt also gives this definition of sovereignty: to have the right to suspend the law, or the rule of law, the constitutional state.
Without this category of exception, we cannot understand the concept of sovereignty. Today, the great question is indeed,
everywhere, that of sovereignty. Omnipresent in our discourses and in our axioms, under its own name or another, literally or
figuratively, this concept has a theological origin: the true sovereign is God. The concept of this authority or of this power was
transferred to the monarch, said to have a “divine right.” Sovereignty was then delegated to the people, in the form of democracy, or to
the nation, with the same theological attributes as those attributed to the king and to God. Today,
wherever the word
“sovereignty” is spoken, this heritage remains undeniable, whatever internal differentiation one may
recognize in it. How do we deal with this? Here we return to the question of heritage with which we began. It is
necessary to deconstruct the concept of sovereignty, never to forget its theological filiation and to be ready to
call this filiation into question wherever we discern its effects. This supposes an inflexible critique of the logic
of the state and of the nation-state. And yet—hence the enormous responsibility of the
citizen and of the heir in general, in certain situations—the state, in its actual form, can resist certain forces
that I consider the most threatening. What I here call “responsibility” is what dictates the decision to
be sometimes for the sovereign state and sometimes against it, for its deconstruction
(“theoretical and practical,” as one used to say) according to the singularity of the contexts and the
stakes. There is no relativism in this, no renunciation of the injunction to “think” and to
deconstruct the heritage. This aporia is in truth the very condition of decision and
responsibility—if there is any. I am thinking for example of the incoherent but organized coalition of
international capitalist forces that, in the name of neoliberalism or the market,31 are taking hold
of the world in conditions such as the “state” form; this is what can still resist the most. For the moment. But it is
necessary to reinvent the conditions of resistance. Once again, I would say that according to the situations, I am an
antisovereignist or a sovereignist—and I vindicate the right to be antisovereignist at certain
times and a sovereignist at others. No one can make me respond to this question as though it
were a matter of pressing a button on some old-fashioned machine. There are cases in
which I would support a logic of the state, but I ask to examine each situation before
making any statement. It is also necessary to recognize that by requiring someone to be not
unconditionally sovereignist but rather soyvereignist only under certain conditions, one is
already calling into question the principle of sovereignty. Deconstruction begins there . It
demands a difficult dissociation, almost impossible but indispensable, between unconditionality (justice without power) and
sovereignty (right, power, or potency). Deconstruction is on the side of unconditionaliry, even when it seems impossible, and not
sovereignty, even when it seems possible.
Human rights are a critical starting point for critiquing sovereignty
University of California, Irvine, 2003, Philosophy in a Time of Terror, p. 132-33)
Borradori: We have spoken about tolerance, hospitality, and cosmopolitanism. How do you see the problem of human rights? What is
the relationship between the notion of right and that of hospitality? A right presupposes someone who avails him- or herself of that
right in relationship to another, that is, more precisely, in a social context, in an organized community. If the concept of state, which is
the concept of a juridically organized community, is no longer the last word of the political, how are you going to maintain the idea of
human rights? Derrida: Actually, it
is today more and more often in the name of human rights and their universality
that the sovereign authority of the state is called into question, that international courts of
justice are established, that heads of state or military leaders are judged after having been removed from the judicial
institutions of their own state. The concept of a crime against humanity or of a war crime no longer falls under the authority of
national judicial institutions and sovereign states. At least in principle. You know about the enormous problems we are now facing in
this regard. We must (il faut) more than ever stand on the side of human rights. We need (il faut)
human rights. We are in need of them and they are in need, for there is always a lack , a
shortfall, a falling short, an insufficiency; human rights are never sufficient. Which alone suffices to
remind us that they are not natural. They have a history—one that is recent, complex, and unfinished. From the
French Revolution and the first Declarations right up through the declaration following World War II, human rights have been
continually enriched, refined, clarified, and defined (women’s rights, children’s rights, the right to work, rights to education, human
rights beyond “human rights and citizens’ rights,” and so on). To
take this historicity and this perfectibility into
account in an affirmative way we must never prohibit the most radical question ing possible of
all the concepts at work here: the humanity of man (the “proper of man” or of the human, which raises the whole question of
nonhuman living beings, as well as the question of the history of recent juridical concepts or performatives such as a “crime against
humanity”), and then the very concept of rights or of law (droit), and even the concept of history. For justice does not end
with law.29 Nor even with duties (devoirs), which, in a still wholly paradoxical way, “must,” “should” go beyond obligation and
debt. I tried to show elsewhere that any pure ethics must begin beyond law, duty, and debt. Beyond law, that’s
easy to understand. Beyond duty, that’s almost unthinkable. Recall what Kant says: a moral action must be accomplished not only
“according to duty (pflichtmassig)” but “from duty (eigentlich aus Pflicht),” “out of pure duty (aus reiner Pflicht).” Once we have
followed Kant this far, as we no doubt ought to do, a leap is still required. If I act out of pure duty, because I must do so, because I
owe it, because there is a debt I must repay, then two limits come to taint any pure ethicity or pure morality. On the one hand, I
subordinate my action to a knowledge (I am supposed to know what this pure duty is in the name of which I must act). Yet an action
that simply obeys knowledge is but a calculable consequence, the deployment of a norm or program. It does not engage any decision
or any responsibility worthy of these names. On the other hand, by acting out of pure duty, I acquit myself of a debt and thus complete
the economic circle of an exchange; I do not exceed in any way the totalization or reappropriation that something like a gift, hos-
pitality, or the event itself should exceed. We must thus be dutiful beyond duty, we must go beyond law,
tolerance, conditional hospitality, economy, and so on. But to go beyond does not mean to discredit that
which we exceed. Whence the difficulty of a responsible transaction between two orders or, rather, between order and its
beyond. Whence all these aporias, and the inevitability of an autoimmunitary risk.
Purging law can’t solve – it relies on a false opposition between legal violence
and non-violent resistance – kills ethics
Thomson 5 (Alex Thomson, lecturer in English at the University of Glasgow, 2005,
Deconstruction and Democracy, p. 171-73)
What Derrida proposes is not the end of revolution, however, but an extension and revision of the concept: What I am saying is
anything but conservative and anti-revolutionary. For beyond Benjamin’s explicit purpose I shall propose the interpretation according
to which the
very violence of the foundation or position of law must envelop the violence of
conservation and cannot break with it. It belongs to the structure of fundamental violence that it calls for the
repetition of itself and founds what ought to be conserved, conservable, promised to heritage and tradition, to be shared. [FoL 38 / 93
—4] Benjamin’s opposition of a ‘law-making’ to a ‘law-conserving’ violence depends on the revolutionary situation — his example is
the general strike —in which a new founding of the law is at stake [FoL 34—5 / 84—5]. However, for Derrida, we cannot know
whether or not we are in the middle of a law-founding moment; precisely because such a moment can never be said to be ‘present’.
The event and the effects of a decision can only be revealed in retrospect: ‘those who say “our time”, while thinking “our present in
light of a future anterior present do not know very well, by definition, what they are saying’. Instead, as I have shown in relation to the
decision, for Derrida ‘the whole history of law’ is that of its continual refoundation and reformulation: but crucially, ‘This moment
always takes place and never takes place in a presence’ [FoL 36 / 89]. Like
the decision, which calls for its own
reaffirmation, for another decision, but which becomes law as soon as it has been done, so the violent foundation of
the law calls for confirmation and conservation which is also violence . On the one hand, the violence
of the suspension of all laws, on the other hand the violent suspension of that suspension in the rule of law: ‘Deconstruction is also the
idea of— and the idea adopted by necessity of — this difirantielle contamination’ [FoL 39 / 95]. Politics
is the mixture of
these two forms of decision, two forms of violence which cannot be opposed in the manner Benjamin
wishes (rigorously) or in terms of Greek and Judaic origins. This suggests a complete revision of the concept of revolution. By
analogy with Schmitt, we might say that the moment of revolution or of violent overthrow is the possibility of a pure and present
politicization. The danger of such an analysis is that it will tend to a glorification of violence for its own sake. But for Derrida there
can be no question of such a politics. His own overturning of the logic of the revolutionary could in some ways be considered more
radical, if it didn’t subvert the traditional concept of the ‘radical’ as well. Instead of the moment of revolution becoming the defining
moment of the political, every moment, every decision is to be considered revolutionary. The
revolutionary moment of the exception, the suspension of all rules, can no longer be imagined to be something that
could or would take place, and therefore no longer something to call for or aim at. Revolutionary politicization can no
longer be thought of as something that could be made present , it is not of the order of possibility. Instead
the revolutionary is the order of the perhaps. But this ‘perhaps’ is not found in the exceptional moment, but makes an exception of
every moment and every decision. If
there is a politics of Derrida’s work it lies here, in his insistence on the
revolutionary act of interpretation, of foundation of the law, of negotiation and calculation .
This is where we must work most patiently to show that his messianism without messiah, which he is at pains to distinguish from that
of Benjamin, is a messianism without content, without expectation of any thing coming: no revolution, no God, nothing.7 But by
relocating the messianic to the structure of event-hood itself, to the everyday negotiation
with the law, with responsibility and duty, Derrida radicalizes the possibility of thinking
politically. If the political is the moment of absolute uncertainty, but such uncertainty that we do not know where it is to be found,
then the political is both the most common and the least common experience. The possibility of change, of something else
happening, of justice, of more equal distribution of wealth or power is witnessed to and attested to by every
event; although this possibility is indissociable from the threat of less justice, less equality, less democracy. The challenge of
deconstruction is to find ways of thinking and acting which are adequate to this not-
knowing, to the radical condition of the perhaps. Alexander Garcia Duttmann suggests to Derrida that this is the case: ‘on the one
hand, we could be talking in the name of reformism, because each decision calls for another
one. We face an ongoing process of reform after reform after reform. But at the same time we could radicalise
that thought into something like a permanent revolution.’ Derrida confirms his proposal, echoing the
passage from ‘Psyche: Inventions of the Other’ with which I concluded my introduction: ‘When I referred a moment ago to
messianicity without messianism, I was describing a revolutionary experience. ..... But when I insisted on the fact that we must
nevertheless prepare the revolution, it was because we must not simply be open to whatever comes. The revolution, however
unpredictable it may be, can and must be prepared for in the most cautious slow and labourious [sic] way.’8 Such a thought of
depoliticization will always be open to two accusations. The first is that it is too theological, too messianic, too abstract, or not
concrete enough. Yet clearly from Derrida’s point of view, any theory which presumes to label, identify or name a present politics, a
determinate concept of the political, is being more messianic, in seeking to make some particular future arrive, to make something in
particular happen. The other potential accusation would be that this is not radical at all, since it is not radical according to traditional
political paths and codes. Certainly, if the degree of radicality of a theory were to be measured in term of the incomprehension and
misunderstanding that have accrued to it then we would quite easily be able to prove that Derrida’s revolutionary politics is more
radical than traditional concepts of revolution. As Geoffrey Bennington comments: ‘the
need to compromise,
negotiate, with the most concrete detail of current arrange ments of right: this is what
defines deconstruction as radically political’.9 Deconstruction is an affirmation of what
happens, and of the revolutionary reinvention at work in every political decision, and so
clearly cannot be simply opposed to politics as it already exists . As I argued in the discussion of radical
democracy in Chapter 3, this means thinking politics within the state as much as against the state ;
and as I emphasized in Chapter 6, deconstruction demands an intensive engagement with the law, both
within and beyond the state.
AT: Alt Solves HR
Their alternative can’t access our ethic and they won’t win a link – it’s
impossible for human rights to be appropriated by hegemonic forces like the
right, and global emancipation is impossible without reference to the human-
rights vocabulary.
Cheah 0 (Pheng Cheah, associate professor of English at Northwestern University and private
attorney, 2000, Transnational Asia-Pacific: Gender, Culture, and the Public Sphere, p. 33-35)
As we have seen, Hegel’s critique that Kant’s idea of a world confederation of states remains a mere ought-to-be culminates in his
own argument that the political morality of the state constitutes an “ought” that already “is,” a sphere in which normativity and
actuality are reconciled and historical contingency is transcended. In this sphere of normative facticity, justice is immanent to the
present. Contra Hegel, Derrida suggests that it is unjust to regard justice as being exhausted by or reduced to present historical deter-
minations. This is because justice
must remain fundamentally open to un predictable future
circumstances: “The deconstruction of all presumption of a determinant certitude of a present justice itself operates on an
infinite ‘idea of justice,’ . . . [which] seems to me to be irreducible in its affirmative character, in its demand of gift. . . without
economic circularity, without calculation and without rules, without reason and without rationality.”59 But, unlike Kant’s idea of
cosmopolitan right, this
infinite idea of justice is not a projected ideal form that bears no effective
relation to present actuality. Justice is not a transcendent exteriority that can only function as an ideal horizon. It
demands an immediate intervention into and transformation of the present : “I would hesitate to
assimilate too quickly this ‘idea of justice’ to a regulative idea (in the Kantian sense) . . . or to other horizons of the same type... (. . .
eschato-teleology of the neo-Hegelian, Marxist or post-Marxist type). ... As its Greek name suggests, a horizon is both the opening
and the limit that defines an infinite progress or period of waiting. But justice,
however unpresentable it may be,
doesn’t wait. It is that which must not wait. “60 In other words, to be just, justice must not be
either simply immanent or transcendent to the historical present . Paradoxically, justice must be
immanent and transcendent at the same time. To be just, justice must give itself to the historical present and, in
the same instance, withdraw itself or be effaced from the present. Thus, justice must give itself in its own violation,
contaminate itself by appearing in the present. ‘What is important here is that Derrida argues that the source of
infinite justice or normativity—its condition of possibility—can only be the absolute surprise or chance of the event that reopens and
keeps history going. Justice ought not to be exhausted by rational action in the present. But at the same time, it must have an
effect on the present through rational action. This persistent , sheer possibility of the transformation of
historical actuality must therefore issue from a contingency original to and constitutive of historical actuality, namely, the historicity
of history. Normative reason is born in an unconditional response to this original contingency, but since historicity is constitutive of
finite reason, reason cannot cognitively master, eradicate, or transcend it. The “historicity” or “finitude” of reason thus refers to
reason’s constitutive inscription within a shifting field of historical forces that it cannot control or transcend. But at the same time,
this moving base also holds the ineradicable promise of ethical transformation because it exceeds
and cannot be captured by the hegemonic forces of any given historical present . In this sense,
normativity is both unconditional and coextensive with historicity, which is precisely why normativity cannot be reduced to existing
norms or their historical conditions.6’ Justice remains, is yet, to come, a venir, it has an, it is a venir, the very dimension of events
irreducibly to come.... Perhaps it is for this reason that justice, insofar as it is not only a juridical or political concept, opens
up
for l’avenir thetransformation, the recasting or refounding of law and politics . “Perhaps,” one must
always say perhaps for justice. There is . . . no justice except to the degree that some event is possible
which, as event, exceeds calculation, rules, programs, anticipations and so forth. Justice as the experience of absolute
alterity is unpresentable, but it is the chance of the event and the condition of history. No doubt an unrecognizable history.., for those
who believe they know what they’re talking about when they use this word, whether it’s a matter of social, ideological, political,
juridical or some other history.62 This
is precisely the structure of justice-in-violation that characterizes
the unconditional but contaminated normativity of human rights in their ineluctable historicity, for as
we have seen, human rights are double-edged but absolutely necessary weapons that are given
to the disfranchised by the global force relations in which they find themselves mired at a given
historical conjuncture. On the one hand, we should be able to account for the historical conditions that determine and impose limits on
any invocation of human rights so that we can calculate the effectiveness of human rights claims in a given situation. On the other
hand, because they are in history, these contextual conditions are subject to radical
mutability. A mutation in historical conditions will cause a corresponding change in the
effectiveness of human rights. At the same time, the contaminated normativity of human rights
can be a factor in bringing about and inflecting a mutation in historical conditions . This
normativity in historical contingency is not a historicist relativism that reduces normativity to a ruse of hegemonic power. First,
conjunctures have an immense stability. Second, no
collective institutional actor can predict when and how
a given conjuncture will mutate. Thus, although some actors maybe invested with hegemony
by the existing state of affairs, no single actor can be said to have exhaustive mastery over it .
AT: Cap K
Every invocation of human rights inherently contains an anti-capitalist
demand
It was Marx’s “refusal to think in political terms that prevented him” from recognising this
new type of democratic politics.55 When human rights become the ultimate reference of
politics, all established right and justice are open to question and challenge . While in monarchical
societies the person of the king united sovereignty and justice or power and knowledge and guaranteed the unity of society, in
democratic societies the place of power becomes “empty”. The social space can no longer be symbolised by any one body or concept,
in other words, no foundation or other unitary principle can safeguard the polity’s integrity or homogeneity. As a result, the old
concept of unitary right, emanating from God or king, and radiating sun-like through the body politic, becomes fragmented: a
multiplicity of rights develop, resisting the attempts of all power, “religious or mythical, monarchical or popular” to take hold of them.
a human rights polity goes much
Thus, while the rule of law implies the possibility of opposing right to power,
further: it tests and accepts rights that have not yet been established, its logic extends into
areas of activity the state cannot entirely master and its limits remain open to further
contestation and expansion. “From the legal recognition of strikes or trade unions, to rights relative to work or to social
security, there has developed on the basis of the rights of man a whole history that transgressed the boundaries within which the state
claimed to define itself, a history that remains open”.56 What opposes the principle of human rights is the — psychoanalytically
explained — desire of people for unity and security, their craving for the principle of the One, for a new unitary historical actor, be it
nation, class or party, or a new foundational principle or law which will breathe consistency and coherence into the dismembered body
of the social and the fragmented and heterogeneous struggles for human rights. Similarly, the Marxist philosopher, Etienne Balibar,
has argued that the French Revolution turned the pre-modern subject into the modern citizen, replaced monarchical with popular
sovereignty and opened a political space for argument and critique based on citizen equality as a pre-requisite of freedom.57 Balibar,
like Lefort, criticises Marx for placing too much emphasis on the separation between public and private and between citizen and man
and misunderstanding, as a result, the political novelty of the French Declaration: rather than separating, it identified man and citizen,
it brought together for the first time freedom and equality and created a universal right to political participation. Balibar argues that
while equality and freedom are not the same, the conditions for their successful application
and expansion are identical. The proof is negative: under no conditions is equality
suppressed while freedom survives and vice versa. Capitalism denies equality and destroys
freedom, as evidenced in infant mortality, the shortened life expectation and the ruined lives of the Western underclass and the
poor in the south. Communism denied political rights and ended up with a society of huge disparities amongst citizens and almost
feudal privileges for the party cadre and state officials. “There are no examples of restrictions or suppressions of freedoms without
The equation of equality and
social inequalities, nor of inequalities without restrictions or suppressions of freedoms”.58
freedom, their indissoluble link, means that all rights—claims are politicised: they express a
demand for an extension of the meaning of citizenship or for a further expansion of freedom and
equality and inscribe indeterminacy or “negative universality” at the heart of the polity: In this
indefinite opening come to be inscribed — and attempts to do this can be seen beginning with
the revolutionary period — the rights-claims of salaried workers or dependants, as well as
those of women or slaves, and later of the colonised. Such a right would later be formulated as
follows: the emancipation of the oppressed can only be their own work, which emphasises its
immediately ethical signification.59 The task of humanity is self-emancipation through
collective political action. This means, logically, that there can be no liberty without equality, ontologically, that the main
characteristic of human beings is their collective construction of individual freedom and, politically, that emancipation cannot be a gift
but must be achieved in community and common action with others. “The humanity of man is identified not with a given or an
essence, be it natural or supra—natural, but with a practice and a task: the task of self-emancipation from every domination and
Human rights are the legal title and
subjection by means of a collective and universal access to politics”.60
institutional guarantee of the indeterminate. For Balibar, the subjection to social superiors, God or king, which
characterised the pre-modern world came to an end with the identification of subject and citizen in the French Revolution. But, in his
attempt to redeem human rights for radical politics, Balibar exaggerates the egalitarian effects of the French Revolution and its
Declaration. It is true that the democratic politics of modernity established a public space in which political equality could help
minimise the real inequalities of the private sphere. This is the equality of citizenship created through the exercise by citizens of
identical political freedoms. But the citizenry remained severely restricted in its composition by racial, ethnic, legal and gender exclu-
sions for more than a century, and citizenship still follows often arbitrary territorial boundaries, as the collapse of Yugoslavia clearly
showed. The hoped for extension of political rights to the whole population and their expansion into social economic and cultural
rights can be explained, from Balibar’s perspective, as the transfer of the logic of equal political freedom to areas previously
considered as part of the private or social domain with its “acceptable” inequalities. The fight for workers and union rights, for
example, politicised the place of work and, when successful, expanded citizenship by making inequalities and differences in treatment
at the workplace as illegitimate as the denial of the right to vote or of free expression in the public domain.6’
Neg
Auto-Immunity Answers
The aff can’t solve- the interpretative, proliferative power of the media is
what caused the autoimmune response towards Muslims in the west and
Uyghurs in the East. Dialog doesn’t stop Fox news.
Mitchell 2007 (W. J. T, Professor of English and Art History at the University of Chicago.
“Picturing Terror: Derrida’s Autoimmunity”, Critical Inquiry 33, Winter 2007,
[http://users.clas.ufl.edu/burt/Critical%20Inquiry%20late%20derrida%20/Mitchell
%20autoimmunity%20terror%20Derrida.pdf], DOA 7/16/16, DDI HRM)
Unfortunately, what Marshall McLuhan called the “central nervous system” of the social body,18 what Derrida
calls the “technoeconomic power of the media ” (PTT, p. 108), has been traumatized by an image—the
spectacle, the word, above all the number as enigmatic name: 9/11. This image, the spectacle of destruction of the
Twin Towers, has been cloned repeatedly in the collective global nervous system .19 The
mediatizing of the event was, in fact, its whole point, as Derrida writes: What would “September 11”
have been without television? . . . Maximum media coverage was in the common interest of the
perpetrators of “September 11,” the terrorists, and those who, in the name of the victims, wanted to declare “war on
terrorism.” . . . More than the destruction of the Twin Towers or the attack on the Pentagon, more than the killing of thousands of
people, the real “terror” consisted of and, in fact, began by exposing and exploiting . . . the image of this terror
by the target itself. [PTT, p. 108] In short, the attack was not immediately on the immune system but on the nervous system.
And it was carried out by a fabricated, produced image, an impression or spectacle staged for the world’s cameras by
the terrorists, exploited by a political faction to declare an indefinite state of emergency , of exemption—
that is, immunity—from all the normal niceties of civil liberties and international law, not to mention from all
the legitimate, well established institutions of its own immune and nervous systems in the form of its own intelligence services, those
diplomatic and military experts and scholars who actually know something about the nature of the threat. What has been called a
“faith-based foreign policy” was the perfect twin of the spectre of a faith-based terror. One fanatic deserves, begets another, and Uncle
Sam is cloned as Uncle Osama.20 Serious medical research into human cloning is banned by a faith-based science policy at one with
the faith based foreign policy that clones terror by declaring a war on it.
The aff’s attempt to break from sovereignty is futile, two reasons- first,
speaking of sovereignty only justifies its existence and drives it to an
autoimmune response. Second, democracy is always tied to sovereignty,
meaning they can never escape autoimmunity or access a democracy to come.
NAAS 2006 (Michael, professor of philosophy at DePaul University. “’ONE NATION . . .
INDIVISIBLE’: JACQUES DERRIDA ON THE AUTOIMMUNITY OF DEMOCRACY AND
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOD” 11/13/06, Research in Phenomenology,
[http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/156916406779165818], DOA
7/16/16, DDI HRM)
It is in this context of a deconstruction of democracy and of the autos— and deconstruction has never been anything but a
deconstruction of the autos—that we must try to understand Derrida’s recent emphasis on autoimmunity and his more general claims
about the autoimmunity of sovereignty itself. How is it thatsovereignty immunizes or tries always to immunize
itself against the other, that is, against time, space, and language? Derrida writes early on in Rogues: In its very
institution, and in the instant proper to it, the act of sovereignty must and can, by force, put an end in a single,
indivisible stroke to the endless discussion. This act is an event, as silent as it is instantaneous, without
any thickness of time, even if it seems to come by way of a shared language and even a performative language that it just as
soon exceeds. (R, 10) Derrida agrees with thinkers of sovereignty from Plato and Bodin to Carl Schmitt who argue that
sovereignty is essentially indivisible and unspeakable . In its essence without essence, sovereignty must be
unshareable, untransferrable, undeferrable, and silent, or it “is” not at all. Sovereignty can thus never be parceled out or
distributed in space, deferred or spread out over time, or submitted to the temporality and spatiality of language. As soon as
sovereignty tries to extend its empire in space, to maintain itself over time, to protect itself by justifying and providing
reasons for itself, it opens itself up to law and to language, to the counter-sovereignty of the other, and so begins to undo
itself, to compromise or autoimmunize itself. That is the aporetic—indeed the autoimmune—essence of
sovereignty. Derrida writes: Sovereignty neither gives nor gives itself the time; it does not take time. Here is where the cruel
autoimmunity with which sovereignty is affected begins, the autoimmunity with which sovereignty at once
sovereignly affects and cruelly infects itself. Autoimmunity is always, in the same time without duration, cruelty itself, the
autoinfection of all autoaffection. It is not some particular thing that is affected in autoimmunity but the self, the ipse, the autos that
finds itself infected. As soon as it needs heteronomy, the event, time and the other. (R, 109) Time, space, language, and the other: this
is the fourfold over which sovereignty in its essence, in its unspeakable, unavowable, unapparent, essence, has no authority.
Sovereignty “goes without saying,” and that is at once its supreme power and the source of its autoimmune vulnerability, the reason
why even supreme sovereignty dare not speak its name.10 To confer sense or meaning on sovereignty, to justify it, to
find a reason for it, is already to compromise its deciding exceptionality,
to subject it to rules, to a code of law, to some
general law, to concepts. [It is] . . . to compromise its immunity. This happens as soon as one speaks of it in
order to give it or find it some sense or meaning. But since this happens all the time, pure sovereignty does
not exist; it is always in the process of positing itself by refuting itself, by denying or disavowing itself;
it is always in the process of autoimmunizing itself, of betraying itself by betraying the
democracy that nonetheless can never do without it. (R, 101)
There is no better version of harmony- attempting to improve harmony

through critique is a method that has already been tried and failed. The
sending-off of the other is inevitable.
Nordin 15 (Astrid H.M. Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University. “Futures beyond ‘the
West’? Autoimmunity in China’s harmonious world”, 1/4/15,
[http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/73948/2/Futures_beyond_the_West_Final_Author_version_as_accepted.01.04.2015.pdf], DOA
7/13/16, DDI HRM)
The autoimmune Chinese system is not only a process by which harmony attacks a part of itself.
This renvoi, moreover, consists in a deferral or referral to the other: as the undeniable, and I underscore
undeniable, experience of the alterity of the other, of heterogeneity, of the singular, the not- ‐same, the different, the dissymmetric, the
heteronomous.129 By undeniable, here, Derrida also means that it is only deniable. The only way that it
is possible to protect meaning is through a sending-‐off (renvoi) by way of denial. Harmony, like
democracy, is what it is only by deferring itself and differing from itself. Although it strives to self-‐
perfection through self-‐critique, harmony can never achieve the indivisibility that it claims as its prerequisite. To the extent
that it tries to do so, it must also enforce its law with force (disharmony). In this sense, it is
impossible.
Alt Cause
The United States and China needs to adopt accommodative language policy
towards the Uyghurs Autonomous Region to solve
Dywer 05 (Arienne M. Dwyer, a professor of Linguistic Anthropology in the Department of
Anthropology at the University of Kansas, where she also serves as co-director of the KU
Institute for Digital Research in the Humanities. “The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity,
Language Policy, and Political Discourse”
http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/10125/3504/1/PS015.pdf
This study explores Chinese language policy and language use in Inner Asia, as well as the relation of language policy to the politics
of Uyghur identity. Language is central to ethnic identity, and official language policies are often overlooked as critical factors in
conflict over ethnic nationalism. In Chinese Inner Asia, any solution to ethnic conflict will include real linguistic and cultural
autonomy for major ethnic groups. Language policy has been at the heart of Chinese nation building.
Shortly after the inception of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), language policy in China’s border regions was responsive to local
conditions and arguably one of the more flexible in the world. In the last 15 years, however, although China’s
official
language policy has remained constant, its covert language policy has become increasingly reactive, and tied to
geopolitical considerations. This trend has been particularly salient in the Xinjian g Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR), where multilingualism and cultural pluralism have been progressively
curtailed in favor of a monolingual, monocultural model, and a concomitant rise of an
oppositional modern Uyghur identity. This study traces the evolution of the PRC government’s minorities-language
policy by evaluating two principal actors (the PRC and the Uyghurs) as well as two peripheral collective actors (first, the newly
independent Central Asian republics, and second, North America and Europe). The peripheral groups are relevant to how the PRC has
implemented and refined its language policy in border regions. Recent policy shifts in neighboring Central Asian republics (with their
Turkic-speaking populations) serve as valuable comparisons with how China has handled its minority-language cases. In contrast,
North America and Europe were not relevant for Chinese minority policy until September 2001. But since 9/11, skillful Chinese
government media rhetoric has drawn these countries—especially the United States—unwittingly into
China’s domestic minority-nationalism issues. The PRC’s original language policy in its border
regions, which was integrationist but not assimilative, was well founded and generally well received by both
party officials and by the national minorities themselves. Such a pluralistic policy, which arguably supported
both national stability and local ethnic groups, stood out positively in comparison with Soviet policies of the time. Yet beginning in
the mid-1980s, Beijing
began to shift from cultural accommodation towards an overt policy of
assimilation. This shift only served to reinforce both Uyghur nationalism and small separatist
movements, with potential to undermine the territorial integrity of the PRC and the Chinese effort to
build a modern Chinese nation. This policy shift has been counterproductive. Supporting the maintenance of Uyghur language and
identity is not antithetical to the Chinese goal of nation building. In fact, it would ultimately support that goal. In addition to the PRC’s
overt language policy, including language education and standardization, its covert policy of minority acculturation and assimilation
has become more prominent, as reflected in its recent use of discourse characterizing Uyghur nationalist movements as terrorist .
The
United States, through its so-called “war on terror[ism],” allowed itself to be misled by post-9/11 Chinese
media reports on the relationship between the Uyghurs and Islamic militants. In so doing, the
United States has conflated Uyghur nationalism with “terrorism,” thus justifying U.S.-Chinese
government collaboration in the Chinese Communist Party’s project to suppress its own
minorities. Chinese media rhetoric describing Uyghur nationalists before and after 2001 shows a clearly demarcated shift from
“separatists” to “Islamic terrorists” as it named over fifty Uyghur “terrorist groups.” Most Western media, which previously had paid
little attention to western China, have followed suit, equating these fringe separatist groups with terrorists. Unfortunately, all
eight
to 10 million Uyghurs have become guilty by association: Washington’s recognition of just one of
these separatist groups as officially terrorist has created a climate of mistrust in government and
the public against the Uyghurs as a whole. Both Beijing and Washington are about to lose crucial political
opportunities in this far-flung territory. Beijing’s new hard-line stance, which restricts even language and culture, has galled the many
moderate Xinjiang citizens who once grudgingly accepted Chinese political restrictions as a price of regional economic development.
The PRC government still has an opportunity to win back these people with a more pluralistic
cultural policy that emphasizes support for Uyghur and other policy-relevant minority languages
and that eases other cultural restrictions, particularly on religion. Without such a policy shift, as
Beijing well knows, Xinjiang could become China’s Kashmir. Yet if current PRC policy stays on course, any
change is likely to be even more restrictive, since the government considers its cultural accommodation of the 1980s and 1990s to be a
cause of unrest, rather than a solution to it. The
United States, for its part, must make clear to Beijing that current
U.S. political imperatives will not distract U.S. policy from supporting human rights, including
cultural rights. The Uyghurs have been among the most pro-American citizens in China. They also happen to be Muslims. If the
United States wants international partners in fighting terrorism, it should cultivate a cooperative partnership with China, including the
Uyghurs. If the Xinjiang region is to be involved in an initiative against international terrorism, then the
United States can
urge China and its allies to cultivate the Uyghurs—with their knowledge of the language and
cultures of Central Asia—as partners rather than as opponents. As Washington has begun to realize, its anti-
Uyghur policies, even those targeted only at violent fringe groups, have already generated negative sentiment in Xinjiang towards the
United States. Policies perceived as antiUyghur or anti-Muslim could well radicalize previously apolitical Uyghurs, pushing them into
militant or radical Islamic groups. This negotiation between state policies and ethnoreligious identity occurs within the matrix of
language. While the PRC’s official policy remains pluralistic, its unofficial policy has become increasingly assimilative. Such an
apparent paradox is readily interpretable if we understand it as the simultaneous implementation of overt and covert policy. In a shift
in media discourse from Uyghur separatists to Muslim terrorists, a covert language policy is being applied for international political
This manipulation of discourse about the Uyghurs is directly related to China’s overall
ends.
cultural policy towards its minorities. This study evaluates the theory and implementation of PRC language policy in
Inner Asia. Uyghur is situated within a hierarchy of languages within Xinjiang, where it has become a supra-regional language but is
clearly subordinate to the national Chinese language. Modernizing a language requires government and societal support for
maintaining and diversifying the domains in which a language is used. I examine successes and failures of language policy
implementation. Education is closely tied to both overt and covert language policy, and language education policy in Xinjiang reflects
the assimilationist trend. Scholastic publishing, school choice, languages of instruction, and language instruction all entail
sociopolitical policy decisions that have largely been made in view of economic and political stability, with Chinese materials and
instruction rapidly gaining the upper hand. I examine issues in the instruction and use of Uyghur and other native languages, Standard
Chinese, and English. Uyghur nationalists, whose reinvigorated sentiment is an unintended result of China’s minorities policy, have
been distrustful of and dismayed at China’s apparent intentions for development of the region, which appears to bring yet more
monoculturalism in the form of Han favoritism and cultural assimilation. The
Uyghur response to language policy
thus bears directly on China’s overarching concern of regional stability. I propose policy adjustments that
China and the United States might consider to mitigate these effects.
Alt cause to Uighur violence- Chinese pressure forces Pakistan into action
against Uighurs.
Haider 2005
(Ziad Haider, Special Representative for Commercial and Business Affairs and Bureau of
Economic and Business Affairs, “Sino-Pakistan Relations and Xinjiang’s Uighurs: Politics,
Trade, and Islam along the Karakoram Highway”, Asian Survey Vol XLV No. 4, July/August
2005, [http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/XINJIANG.pdf], DOA 7/16/16,
DDI HRM)
China considers Xinjiang indispensable because of its abundant natural resources and strategic location vis-à-vis Central and South
Asia.3 Yet, maintaining and consolidating control over its “wild west” has been a historic and pressing concern for Beijing. Instability
in Xinjiang arises from the Uighurs’ sense of spiritual, cultural, and political alienation, as a Muslim people of Turkic origin, from the
officially atheist, Han Chinese-dominated People’s Republic of China. With their religious and ethnonational identity inextricably
linked, the Uighur resistance to Beijing’s domination is partly captured in a “Muslim versus non-Muslim” framework that is of great
interest to this analysis in light of the dynamic political nature of Islam today and the threat of Islamic radicalism. The
clash of
China’s policies with local sentiments favoring greater autonomy and separatism resulted in open
conflict in Xinjiang through the 1990s, with over 200 incidents, 162 deaths, and more than 440
persons injured, according to Chinese official estimates. Beijing’s primary concern over the highway has been how it facilitates
the spread of Islamic ideology into Xinjiang and the movement of radical Uighur militants. Many of these militants were
enrolled in Pakistani madrassas (religious schools) during the 1980s and are veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War and
Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. A separate concern is that the highway has served as a
conduit for an extensive illicit drug trade that has led to spiraling HIV/AIDS rates in northwestern China because of shared use of
contaminated needles among injection drug users. In response, Beijing has curtailed border trade, lodged strong
protests with the Pakistani government, and even closed the highway for brief periods. While Islamabad has
historically adopted a tolerant attitude toward the Uighur presence in Pakistan and never espoused their separatist cause, it has
taken increasingly stern measures since the late 1990s to assuage China’s fears. These have
included closing Uighur settlements in Pakistan, arresting and deporting Uighurs, and killing alleged
Uighur terrorists.
Says No
China will not tolerate any efforts to reduce their current security efforts –
Uyghurs are considered a constant threat to China
Davis 8 (Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, 2008, “Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in
Xinjiang, China”, Asian Affairs: An American Review, 35:1, 15-30, DOI:
10.3200/AAFS.35.1.15-30)
There are mixed policy assessments in Xinjiang regarding the Uyghurs.25 Zhang
Xiuming, deputy secretary of the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and a Han
Chinese, implied that separatism and terrorism in Xinjiang are connected issues when he said, “We
need to take the initiative and go on the offensive, crack down on gangs as soon as they
surface and strike the first blow. We must absolutely not permit the three vicious forces to
build organizations, have ringleaders, control weapons and develop an atmosphere. We
need to destroy them one by one as we discover them and absolutely not allow them to build
up momentum.” Conversely, the chair of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region government and a Uyghur Chinese, Ismael
Tiliwaldi, implied something quite different when he said, “In Xinjiang, not one incident of explosion or assassination took place in
the last few years. . . . Last year Xinjiang’s public security situation was very good.”26 The
central government and the
provincial authorities broadly fall on the side of avoiding becoming a victim of terrorist or separatist
activities when it comes to the question of whether China is victimizing the Uyghur minority or
whether China is a victim of Uyghur militants. Following the mass protests and violent riots of April 1990 in Baren
township, there were further Uyghur demonstrations and disturbances in various cities, including Yining, Khotan, and
Aksu in the mid- 1990s. This was followed by the Chinese government response: the initiation of a
“strike hard” campaign against crime throughout China in 1996 which made Uyghurs and separatists in
Xinjiang a key target. After the forceful suppression of an Uyghur demonstration in the city of Yining in February 1997,
there were several days of serious unrest. A renewed national “strike hard” campaign against crime was initiated in April 2001 and has
never formally been brought to a close. Several levels of police conspicuously patrolled the Uyghur sections of Urumqi daily in 2007;
Han Chinese police officers patrolled the streets in a six-man formation wearing black uniforms and black flack jackets, armed with
batons and side arms. China’s official statement on “East Turkestan terrorists,” published in January 2002, listed several groups
allegedly responsible for violence, including the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the East Turkistan Liberation
Organization (ETLO), the Islamic Reformist Party “Shock Brigade,” the East Turkestan Islamic Party, the East Turkestan Opposition
Party, the East Turkestan Islamic Party of Allah, the Uyghur Liberation Organization (ULO), the Islamic Holy Warriors, and the East
Turkestan International Committee.27 There is not always clarity in the way these groups are officially labeled, nor do these groups
seem to stay static. For instance, in 1997, the Uyghurstan Liberation Front and the United National Revolutionary Front of East
Turkestan (UNRF) overcame their differences and joined together in a jihad in Xinjiang. The UNRF, fearing Uyghurs who agreed
with China, announced it had assassinated an imam of the mosque in Kashgar in 1996 because of his pro-China views.28 When China
destroyed an Islamist camp in Xinjiang in January 2007, killing eighteen terrorists and capturing seventeen others, police
spokeswoman Ba Yan said the training camp was run by ETIM.29 Some of the issues between Uyghurs and the
Chinese government, however, are unrelated to separatist issues. In another recent incident, hundreds of
Uyghurs protested outside government offices over plans to push them off their farmlands to build a
dam, according to a Chinese police official and Radio Free Asia. Police arrested at least sixteen protesters in Xinjiang’s
Yili County, the site of clashes between security forces and Uyghurs in 1997. The June 2004 protests began outside the offices of a
reservoir and hydropower station planned for the local Tekas River, according to U.S.-based Radio Free Asia. Authorities planned to
move about 18,000 farmers, forestry workers, and herders to make way for the reservoir, but protesters said they had been paid only
880 yuan (about $100) of the 38,000 yuan ($4,600) promised to them, the station said, citing anonymous witnesses. An officer at
Tekas County police headquarters confirmed the June 11, 2004, protest, saying, “The protest was big. People don’t want to move
because they aren’t satisfied with the amount of compensation for resettlement.”30
China is afraid of allowing outside forces to influence Xinjiang – intervention

leads to political instability
10.3200/AAFS.35.1.15-30)
The scenario most worrisome to the Chinese would be the Uyghur Muslim movement in Xinjiang
externally joining with international Muslim movements throughout Asia and the Middle East, bringing an
influx of Islamic extremism and a desire to challenge the central government . The Chinese also fear the Uyghur
movement could internally radicalize other minorities, whether the ethnic Tibetans or the Muslim Hui. Beijing is currently
successfully managing the separatist movements in China, but the possibility of increased
difficulty is linked partly to elements outside Chinese control , such as political instability or
increased Islamic extremism in neighboring Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. Chinese policies and
reactions, however, will largely determine the progress of separatist movements in China. If “strike hard” campaigns are seen to
discriminate against nonviolent Uyghurs and if the perception that economic development in Xinjiang aids Han Chinese at the expense
of Uyghurs, the separatist movements will be fueled. The whole region has concerns about growing Uyghur violence. Central Asian
countries, especially those with sizable Uyghur minorities, already worry about Uyghur violence and agitation. Many of the regional
governments, especially secular authoritarian governments in South Asia and Central Asia, are worried about the contagion of
increasing Muslim radicalization. The
governments of Southeast Asia are also worried about growing
radical networks and training camps, but they also fear the idea of a fragmenting China. Political
instability in China would impact all of Asia.
US doesn’t have the diplomatic pull to do the plan – current US-China

relationship extremely constrained
10.3200/AAFS.35.1.15-30)
The existing scope of the Uyghur Muslim separatist movement in China remains weak and under
reasonable control, so this is not a top issue for the United States. Although Beijing has decided to cast this
ethnic separatist movement in light of new global perceptions following September 11, 2001, the Uyghur issue, both inside China and
in neighboring countries, predates the war on terrorism. Although this is a genuine ethnic separatist movement with at least some ties
to global Muslim networks, it is not supported by any of the immediate neighboring countries’ governments and is unlikely to erupt
into a major concern in the near term. The
United States is quite constrained in its policy on this issue .
The United States must work with China on issues of geostrategic importance, so it cannot
risk relations with China, especially because the Uyghurs who use violence have formed
associations with groups that are categorized as terrorist organizations . The United States’
best option is to continue to encourage China to use the rule of law and to respect human rights.
The primary concern for the United States has been and should remain human rights abuses.55 The U.S.-led war on terrorism has
caused some international human rights organizations to speculate that this new international environment will lead to an increase in
human rights abuses globally. Many of the human rights groups that watch Xinjiang, especially the Chinese “strike hard” campaigns,
fear that China is using the war on terror to disregard the Uyghurs’ human rights. Not only are human rights abuses abhorrent in and
of themselves but the Chinese worsen the problem by targeting and antagonizing nonviolent Uyghurs. A focus on human rights is
consistent with the U.S. decision to cite one Uyghur militant group as a terrorist organization, specifically when a third-party
government asserted that the ETIM was targeting both civilians and an American embassy, but not to label other Uyghur organizations
as terrorists. There are a few issues with the Uyghur detainees held at Guantanamo, according to a 2007 Congressional Research
Service Report, with some Uyghurs being released and other Uyghurs being held indefinitely.56 The
United States should
neither absolutely agree to other countries’ allegations of who is a terrorist nor ignore the growing
linkages between extremist organizations that train and arm militants.
Economic interests and political agendas make China unlikely to cede the US
power in Xinjiang
Chung 2 (Chien-Peng Chung, Assistant Professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic
Studies in Singapore., 8-1-2002, "China's 'War on Terror': September 11 and Uighur Separatism,"
Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-war-terror-september-11-uighur-
separatism/p4765)
Despite the separatists' efforts, China
is unlikely to relinquish control of the province. With 18 million people,
Xinjiang produces one-third of China's cotton, and explorations in the Tarim Basin have revealed
the country's largest oil and gas reserves. The region borders Mongolia, Russia, several Central
Asian republics, Pakistan, and India, making it a useful springboard for projecting Chinese
influence abroad. And Beijing realizes that acquiescing to Uighur demands will only embolden
separatists in Tibet and Taiwan. The government has also invested a great deal in the region. As
part of a grand scheme to develop China's western areas, Beijing plans to spend more than 100 billion yuan ($12 billion) on 70 major
projects in Xinjiang over the next five years, mostly to improve infrastructure. The government has recently completed a railway
linking the remote western city of Kashgar to the rest of Xinjiang. And the regime is considering proposals for using foreign
investment to build oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia across the Taklimakan Desert.
Policy Bad—Doesn’t Work with Deconstruction
State policy is incompatible with deconstruction
McQuillan 8 (Martin, Professor of Literary Theory and Cultural Analysis and Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Social
Sciences at Kingston University, Derrida and Policy: Is Deconstruction Really a Social Science? Derrida Today, p 120-122)
‘Policy’ is one of those obscure words of the modern political lexicon; nothing could be more vague or less well
understood than this term, which of course means that it is invoked ubiquitously without reflection. The basic assumption of
policy, as an idea, is the logo-rhetorical illusion par excellence that theory translates (and is translate-able in
principle) into practice. Policy then becomes law, as if the transmission of the law were itself a
straightforward and transparent thing. One might laugh at such a naïve, ‘un-deconstructed’ notion, if it were not for the fact
that this is how the world is run. The comedian Ken Dodd says of Freud’s formulation of laughter as a release of psychic energy: ‘the
problem with Freud is that he never played the Glasgow Empire.’ Equally, the problem with the deconstruction of policy might be that
the White House has yet to open itself to a policy of deconstruction. I want to ask in this essay, what would such a policy or set of
policies look like, if they were imaginable? This is not to suggest that, after his death, the writing of Derrida might give rise to a set of
‘practical’ political policies, as the texts of Marx and Lenin were ‘read’ as the biblical revelation of an onto-theo-politics. Rather, it is
to accept Roland Barthes’ caution that one cannot simply exclude oneself from the discourse of stupidity. ‘I don’t mean that one can’t
be innocent of it’, he told Jean-Jacques Brochier in 1975, ‘that would be bad faith, but one can’t be innocent of it simply . . . In any
case, stupidity’s mode of being is triumph. One can do nothing against stupidity. One can only internalize it, take a small homeopathic
dose of it – but not too much’ (Barthes 1985, 224). Think of this then as a hypothesis, what analytic philosophy would call a thought
experiment. It is certainly not a bid for interpretative rights to the text of Derrida or the political futures of deconstruction, whatever
such a word continues to mean. I am also reminded here of another caution, that of Edward Said who had little time for what he called
‘travelling theory’ (Said 1994, 389 and Said 1991, 226–47), whereby specialization as a mode of professionalisation within
the academy comes to serve the interests of policy makers. His complaint is against the professional production of specialists on
the ‘Orient’ who sell their expertise to the government and media while having their appearance in the government or media affirm
their expertise. While the very idea of ‘policy’ no doubt marks an important, and not easily dismissed, transformation in the arena of
calls out for deconstruction. That is a deconstruction of its very
competency of both party politicians and academics, it
premises as the dialectical-complex and unholy alliance
between the techno-scientific, global economy and the
technocratic university of specialisation in relation to a mediatic space, which presents one through the
explanation of the other in terms of pragmatism, expediency, compromise or ‘realism’. Here I am talking about a certain
culture that we call politics, the properly political (the discourse of parties and politicians in governmental power across the world). As
Derrida points out in Specters of Marx, in this culture ‘virtually everywhere Western models prevail’ (Derrida 1994, 52). This culture
has always been bound to the culture of tele-technology, to mediation and representation. However, today, this
relation is
accelerated in an unprecedented fashion according to the rhythm of so-called ‘communications’ as the ‘selective and
hierarchized production of “information”’ (Derrida 1994, 52) and its auto-immunised interpretation. The
academic discourse of the technocratic university is welded to this apparatus in an indissociable way. It is almost impossible to watch
a news programme without the appearance of an academic witness who provides the most banal and unscholarly of comments to
justify or exemplify the content of a news item. Whole news items are nothing more than the appearance of academics to promote
their ‘research findings’ or latest reports; entire university research strategies are written around the stated desire for such appearances.
Which university does not now have a press office? In my institution at least half of the Faculties of the university (those that can
afford them) have contracts with media consultants who are employed to write ‘accessible’ accounts of research activities with a view
to placing stories in the media or promoting individuals to the level of media figure, talking head or guru. There is no point at which it
is thought that academic research (another obscure term which we will need to tackle on another day) is inimical to this form of
reductionism or that certain forms of thought might be allergic to passing through a media culture in this way. At any rate the idea of
policy is related, in no doubt complex and over-determined, ways to this mutation in the channels which run between the academic
and public spaces, which have more or less neutralised the notion of the public intellectual (another term we might caution against
today given its historical relation to closely policed questions of propriety, gender, race and sexuality).
Aff is a double turn—Refusal to provide a concrete political proposal that

decides the undecidable in advance is precisely the point
McQuillan 9 (Martin McQuillan, Professor of Literary Theory and Cultural Analysis and Dean of the Faculty of Arts and
Social Sciences at Kingston University, London, where he is also Co-Director of The London Graduate School, “Infinite Preface” in
Deconstruction After 9/11, Routledge pub. 2009)
Saving the world has to be reinvented every day. In the absence of any programmable response to the situations of the contemporary public space and out
of respect for the singularity and alterity of the new day that arrives tomorrow, each time we respond in vigilance to what calls for
thought and action we must reimagine that answer anew as a creative act of an unconditional rationality. That is to say, a poetic-
performative, rational response which takes account of the incalculable and the impossible within these situations in order to account for it and reckon
with it, suspending (in a reasoned way) all conditions (conventional, presuppositional, hypothetical, theoretical) to that work of analysis. We call this
the
Enlightenment-without conditions, following Jacques Derrida, deconstruction. While Derrida is sadly no longer with us to assist in this work,
multiple shocks, ruptures and absurdities of the world today bear witness to the urgent need , now more than ever, for
deconstruction and its interminable more-than-critical alertness and judicious patient rationalism. This is not a book that proposes answers to the
problems of the world, or at least it does not offer any repeatable and imitable answers (as much as some of us would like such things). It is not a book
that documents injustice or gives voice to righteous indignation (although perhaps it should). Nor is it a book which seeks to extract from the writings of
Jacques Derrida a vocabulary, method or system to be applied to events in the public domain. Rather, if it is indeed a book, it is several things. Firstly, it
is comprised of a series of articulations of what I felt must-be-said, over a period of some six years, roughly from the publication of Politics of
Friends/vip and the impeachment of Bill Clinton to the ongoing occupation of Iraq and the publication in English translation of Derrida's Rogues. A
number of essays in this book then respond to a particular urge to write during this time, which could not be resisted (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Palestine,
Seattle, Iraq). Other essays clear the ground for the thinking which the troubles of these place names solicit. Secondly, given that these essays span a run
of publications of late texts by Derrida, this book is also a sustained exegesis and mobilisation of the content of those texts. It treats a number of terms to
be found in later Derrida: the quasi-transcendental, hospitality, democracy, undecidability, justice, the law, spectres, tele-technology, sovereignty, and the
religious, among others. However, the aim of such encounters with the text of Derrida is never simply to explicate these concepts (although this often
happens). Rather, it is always to put such ideas to work in an ongoing deconstruction of historicity as it unfolds before us as ‘politics'. This term itself
must be turned over and scrutinised again and again if it is to retain an affiliation to the sort of critical rationality that is required to
exercise leverage on the conceptual and non-conceptual orders which coalesce today to configure the conditions
of injustice, exploitation and subordination in the world. While, professional politicians of every hue call for "ã new kind of politics', this
invocation inevitably reveals itself as a depoliticising gesture conjured up to the benefit of a set of clear and familiar political interests. A new kind of
politics would be one which not only distrusted such gestures but really, truly and seriously, set out the task of questioning what
has been thought and done under the name of politics (and indeed the "ñew'). This questioning would be without conditions, including the questioning
of all the conditionalities of politics and political philosophy, such as the dialectic, decision and judgement. In this way, "˜politics' itself (themselves) the
arena of the political and political culture, could not be assumed to be a selfevident or normalising thing. A new kind of politics may have to forgo a
traditional reliance on the very idea of politics as it has been inherited, just as it must treat soberly that inheritance and the work of paleonymy that the
word and concept "˜politics' requires. In so far as this book attempts with varying degrees of success to carry out this work in relation to the encounter
between deconstruction and the exemplary, I am particularly concerned to interrogate the traditional binary division between theory and practice Derrida:
the quasi-transcendental, hospitality, democracy, undecidability, justice, the law, spectres, tele-technology, sovereignty, and the religious, among others.
However, the aim of such encounters with the text of Derrida is never simply to explicate these concepts (although this often happens). Rather, it is
always to put such ideas to work in an ongoing deconstruction of historicity as it unfolds before us as "˜politics'. This term itself must be turned over and
scrutinised again and again if it is to retain an affiliation to the sort of critical rationality that is required to exercise leverage on the conceptual and non-
conceptual orders which coalesce today to configure the conditions of injustice, exploitation and subordination in the world. While, professional
politicians of every hue call for "ã new kind of politics', this invocation inevitably reveals itself as a depoliticising gesture conjured up to the benefit of a
set of clear and familiar political interests. A new kind of politics would be one which not only distrusted such gestures but really, truly and seriously, set
out the task of questioning what has been thought and done under the name of politics (and indeed the "ñew'). This questioning would be without
conditions, including the questioning of all the conditionalities of politics and political philosophy, such as the dialectic, decision and judgement. In this
way, "˜politics' itself (themselves) the arena of the political and political culture, could not be assumed to be a selfevident or normalising thing. A new
kind of politics may have to forgo a traditional reliance on the very idea of politics as it has been inherited, just as it must treat soberly that inheritance
and the work of paleonymy that the word and concept "˜politics' requires. In so far as this book attempts with varying degrees of success to carry out this
work in relation to the encounter between deconstruction and the exemplarv. I am particularlv concerned in the political sphere. In the preface to Totality
and Infinity, Levinas offers the eyebrow-raising formulation: "˜The traditional opposition between theory and practice will disappear before the
metaphysical transcendence by which a relation with the absolutely other, or truth, is established, and of which ethics is the royal road'. There are many
reasons why I am constitutionally unable to adopt this sentence without considerable reservation. These reasons could fill another book and I will not
elaborate my suspicion of the term "˜ethics' and queries regarding the protocols of Levinasian thinking here. However, he is correct, I think, in proposing
the dissolution of the determining and determined binary between theory and practice as a consequence of an encounter with the unconditionality of the
absolutely other. In the examples that concern me in this book, from Palestine to Cyprus, something always remains to be thought and it is this
incalculability which links practical reason to the theoretical reason it subordinates. In thinking through this excess, a practical and theoretical
unconditionality which makes politics itself possible (i.e. refuses it closure and gives it a future), an intervention takes place (a
textual activism) which produces the movement, history and becoming of a necessary political analysis which links the political to critical thought today,
in a way that is neither passive nor active but the
response to the continued arrival of an unstoppable and unknowable
otherness. It is for this reason that this book cannot be a collection of "solutions” or guide to predictable future
action. Instead it can only be exemplary in its treatment of the exemplary. Kant is wrong to imagine that examples are the wheel-chairs upon which
weak philosophical systems lean to support woolly argument. The exemplary is the very point at which philosophy has to risk its metaphysical
transcendence against the non-philosophy that cuts across it and gives rise to it as thought. Always, and without exception, where philosophy is
concerned, the encounter with the example leads to a trembling in the axiomatics, thematics and theoretics of the systematicity of philosophy as the
system attempts to appropriate and dismiss simultaneously the challenge of the example to philosophy's universal ambition. Deconstruction, least we
forget, is more than philosophy. It is never a system nor a metalanguage; it does not travel by the routes of traditional "˜disciplinary' philosophy, even if it
is respectful of that journey. On the contrary, deconstruction (unlike philosophy) reads. It reads the singular, the unique and the irreducible. Such reading
qua reading does not generalize from the exemplary but accepts the challenge of the exemplary to thought as an articulation of the troubling otherness
which presents itself as an arrival in reading. Reading in this sense has very little to do with the quiet spaces of university libraries (although thinking
does occasionally happen in such places). Rather, this reading as an interminable, unconditional critical liveliness to the world around us, its histories and
its futures. It is what some people used to feel confident enough to call politics. Thirdly, this book is as much about Paul de Man as it is about jacques
Derrida. The reader may very well detect a series of interpretative gestures which can be traced back to a mobilisation of the practice of de Man's
"˜linguistics of literariness' in the direction of the political. It has long been my contention, and this can be easily demonstrated by reference to a series of
very specific moments in the text, that the de Manian corpus represents a profound engagement with the problems of totalitarianism and if treated with
readerly diligence will offer an enormously enabling set of strategies for political thought. I do this explicitly in relation to readings of Rousseau and
Marx but it is everywhere here, like a rash. It is an involuntary itch beneath the surface of my writing, which displays itself as a symptom again and again
in each turn of an argument. In this sense, and fourthly, this book far from being a work of theory and academic criticism at all is in fact a volume of
autobiography. I hope that its arguments and responses are suitably complex to avoid association with the dandy philosophers and so-called public
intellectuals who speak with the authority of academics in the media without the rigorous reflection or complication that the title of "ãcademic' requires.
It is not enough that the response of the scholar, as a scholar, be deeply felt; it must also be deeply thought. It will be a matter for readers to decide
whether the contents of this book meet this requirement. However, in so far as these essays map an analytical engagement over a number of years they
recount the story of time spent in textual activism and as a narrative it will no doubt be marked by contradiction and re-evaluation as would be the right of
any personal history. Fifthly, a number of the political examples discussed in this book are not arbitrary but are linked by a clear concern with the
political as an event of war, whether this is a policing action in the name of international law, the explicit invasion and occupation of a sovereign state or
Western democracy's war on its own citizens. Perhaps, autobiographically speaking, writing at such times will have been a way of exceeding the politics
of indignation by insisting on an unconditional critical response at a moment when it seemed most needed even as critical thought will have been the one
thing sovereign power would like most to ignore. These essays are, of course, not simply accounts of political events. They are all oblique encounters
with the event through the textual tradition or cultural milieu, which explore the porous boundaries and conceptual interconnections between textual
fields, refusing the negation of the melancholic, unreflective division between material and Hgural, theory and practice, philosophy and policy. If a
certain history of contemporary global unrest as war runs through these essays like a red thread it is not out of an unconditional pacifism but rather out of
a wish to account for rationally the use of violence as politics. As Levinas notes in the preface to Totality and Infinity: Violence does not consist
so much in injuring and annihilating persons as in interrupting their continuity, making
them play roles in which they no
longer recognize themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance, making them carry
out actions that will destroy every possibility for action. Not only modern war but every war employs arms that turn against those who wield them. It
establishes an order from which no one can keep his distance; nothing henceforth is exterior. V(/ar does not manifest exteriority and the other as other; it
destroys the identity of the same. One could quote at length from Levinas's magnificent philosophical poem, which no preface can ignore. The
contemporary "˜virtual' war (not that virtual if you happen to be on the wrong end of shock and awe) is no different. These events call for commentary
because no distance can be established between the critical thinker and what, if they happen to be a Western citizen, is done in their name. This is an
autobiographical book because no doubt my own identity is at stake in understanding the events of the global political. One should not be so bone-headed
as to imagine that this assault on identity is equivalent to the violence done to persons in the zone of conflict but they are economically linked, as the
somnambulance of certain western policy and opinion makers during the so-called war on terror demonstrates. The stupefaction and mystihcation of
domestic thought is inseparable from the military violence which is only one aspect of this worldwide struggle. Thus, critical reason and deconstruction
are more important now than ever and this textual activism will be affiliated in unpredictable ways, without determinable presence, to the material
processes of the political. This is not just a call for students and teachers to look lively and to resist the war on reading (critical vigilance) waged from the
ideological bunkers of our age. That would be patronising and self-aggrandising, as if no one else had ever thought through the events which surround
them. Rather, it is to call attention to what may be unique today in the transformations that are being wrought under the opaque name of globalization,
namely that the world today is a world at war: military, economic, ecological, ideological, religious war. This world war has its metonymic symptoms
such as the conflict in Iraq or the attacks of 9/11, but it has been ongoing for some time now as the possibility of permanent war between the followers of
the book, what Derrida calls the Abrahamic tradition (Christianity, judaism, Islam). It is both a war for the rights of hegemony over the legacy of the book
(the meek as yet have not inherited the earth) and a war for the defence of imperial privilege. As such it is a war that the Empire will, finally, one day
lose, if not to the combatants of this war itself. It is not the purpose of this volume to document the inconsistencies and complications of what is after all
not a unitary experience (there would be much to say here concerning China and India for example and internal divisions between so-called "õld' and
"ñew' Europe) nor will I submit to the temptation to offer predictions. Rather, let me close this opening salvo by taking up Derrida's suggestion that this
world war is also the end of war, as a concept. None of the examples on offer in this book are examples of war in the classic sense between nation-states
(the United States is not at war with Iraq or Afghanistan in an international sense) nor are they any longer (in the case of Cyprus or Palestine) partisan
struggles for the foundation of sovereign states, although traces of such a paradigm live on in unrigorous ways. Rather, what is at stake here is a new kind
of violence, one able to mobilise the phantom of war as a projection of a rationalization or justification of appropriative behaviour, even where the
behaviour is neither rational nor justified. This "˜world war', invisible to the half-closed eye, is being waged in the virtual structures of trading rooms and
oil exchanges, the permutations and mutations of global ideology and the ideology of the global itself, in the newsrooms of a worldwide media, through
the mechanics of global governance and international law, and in the migration and dissemination of people and ideas all across the globe. If this is the
"˜global political' of my textual activism, war today is only the violent extension of this contest for privilege as a means of securing short-term victory.
Like crude oil, it cannot last. We are entering an unpredictable age and await what or who comes. If, according to a certain formulation, the nineteenth
century was the European century and the twentieth century was the American century, perhaps, the twenty-first century will be the century of the other.
HR Bad—Eurocentric
Human rights rely on a Eurocentric narrative that obliterates cultural
specificity from the constitution of the subject
Langlois 4 (Anthony Langlois, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Flinders
University, July 2004, The narrative metaphysics of human rights. Global Society, Vol. 18, No. 3,
p. 253-255)
The liberal response, which henceforth takes the place of Christianity as the main
philosophical narrative for the human rights story, consisted in identifying an alternative
metaphysics of the self to that which had heretofore ruled the day. The theological metaphysic of
the human as a creation—a creature—of the divine, designed to be fulfilled when obeying natural
law, was a metaphysic which could no longer claim universal intellectual or popular precedence.
The doctrines of political and philosophical liberalism which emerged out of the apparent
intellectual supersession of Christianity by a secularising modernity suggested an alternative
understanding of the human which—like (and derived from) its theological antecedent—had
the philosophically elegant virtue of universality.37 It was a conception of the human which
could be applied to all people everywhere, and which should be so applied, despite dissent and
resistance. The particular philosophical anthropology assumed by liberalism provides the
rationale for later elaborations of human rights as rights which inhere in the person, which
are inalienable, inviolable, universal; rights which we cannot choose to adopt nor from which
we can be voluntarily parted. These are rights which we have, not because of positive law, communal practice, social or
religious tradition. These are rights we have because they explicate the essence of what it means to be human.38 This vision of the
human—this philosophical anthropology—is one where the individual self is pre-eminent and basic. The self is conceptualised at the
most foundational level as a willing self. Our capacity to will, to act, to choose, is our most important capacity. For social
arrangements this means that the freedom to will, to act, to choose, becomes the overriding value, to the point where our freedom
restricts that of others (here, J.S. Mill’s harm principle). We can see the application of this conception of the self quite clearly in the
history and development of rights discourse. It has been only in recent decades that the focus of rights discourse has moved away from
clearing a space in which the individual may will, choose and act, unhindered by state (and later, societal) pressures. Even with recent
communitarian developments which acknowledge the constitution of the individual by society and that rights are primarily a social
relation not an individual ambit claim, rights discourse is still largely about enabling the individual (albeit now the group formed
individual) to will, choose and act—now more explicitly protected against not just state and society but against particular structural
(group-oriented) aspects of society.39 Despite these communitarian amendments to the liberal individualist philosophical
the liberal narrative posits an
anthropology which grounds rights discourse, it nonetheless remains the case that
essential human subject in which rights adhere. This subject is the transcendental self, or
the essential self.40 It is the self which is the core of all human persons, despite the accretion
of culture, religion, society, politics and philosophy through the self ’s existence. And this is
critical to the applicability of human rights to all human persons despite these accretions,
accretions which lead to claims for social behaviour which are not mirrored by human rights.
Culture, religion, society, politics, philosophy—these are all seen (in Timothy O’Connell’s
felicitous metaphor41) as layers of an onion which can be peeled away, uncovered, until the
essential self is attained—the rights-bearing, autonomously willing, liberal subject. The difficulty
is that there is nothing at the centre of an onion. The centre of the onion is nothing more than the
end of layers of onion flesh. So, too, with the transcendental self. Perhaps the most immediate
way of seeing this is to recognise that the narrative of the transcendental self is itself formed
of layers of culture, religion, society, politics and philosophy.42 It is no more, no less, than a
concatenation of these ‘‘layers of onion flesh’’. Indeed, take away philosophy (in particular
Descartes and Kant) from the transcendental self, and it is not clear that we have one. Take
away religion, and it is no longer clear why the supposed self should have any normative value
whatsoever. Take away society, and the transcendental self loses all the preconditions it needs in
order to be conceptualised as transcendental. Critiques abound, and here is not the place to pursue
them in detail.43 Suffice it to say, however, that the view that we can point to something
essential about our humanity as the key substance to which our supposed human rights
inhere or adhere is a view (particularly after Wittgenstein44) which is no longer able to carry
the weight of its convictions. There is no denying the centrality of this view to the history of the
rights discourse. However, there is also no denying the need to go beyond the myth of the
transcendental self in order to gain what it is which that myth was understood to provide: a
sufficient basis for talk of universal human rights. Particularism in the guise of
universalism is not a sufficient basis for human rights; ultimately this sleight of hand serves
only to undermine the possibilities of a successful human rights talk through
disillusionment.45
HR Bad—Redemptive Politics Bad
The politics of human rights seek to redeem both the human from its
suffering form and the state from its association with evil – results in infinite
paralysis
Schiff 3 (Jacob Schiff, Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago, 2003,
Politics Against Redemption: Rereading Levinas for Critical International Theory. online:
http://ptw.uchicago.edu/schiff03.pdf)
What has gone wrong here? I believe that this dismal response to genocide reflects an insistence upon redemptive
politics;
upon politics that seek to purify us and deliver us from that which we hate, fear and resent , of that
which shames us and makes us feel dirty, evil, wrong , or bad. Such politics seek perfect peace, justice,
order, virtue, and the like, but they are ultimately self-defeating. In this case, the aspiration that gives voice
to our “Never again ”, that spurs us to rid the world of genocide forever, imposes upon us an absolute,
infinite responsibility that paralyzes us into inaction--and so genocide continues. The lessons of history amply
demonstrate the ongoing frustration to which redemptive politics seem condemned. Given these lessons, the persistence of redemptive
language and logic in some of our political claims--like those concerning genocide--deserves attention.3 We are unlikely ever to
escape the trap of redemptive politics altogether--to suggest that we could, would reinforce its logic. But we
can work harder
to articulate political claims in ways that resist redemptive temptations, ways that reflect
the urgency of combating cruelty and injustice whenever we confront them, but that resist
the intolerable burden of an elusive future in which we will be forever rid of them . We should, I
will suggest, urge not “Never again ” but, rather, “Not this time ” Emmanuel Levinas provides an argument for and an example of
such articulations. Levinas is often regarded as the theorist of responsibility. Accordingly, a number of scholars frustrated by the state
of normative IR theory have turned to him in search of ethical resources for world politics (see, e.g., Campbell, 1999; Dillon, 1995,
1999; Franke, 2000; Molloy, 1999, 2000; Neumann, 1996, 1999; Shapiro, 1999; Warner, 1996).4 Some of Levinas’ interlocutors
(notably Campbell, Shapiro, and Neumann) ascribe to Levinas a redemptive vision of politics. This vision may--or may not--be theirs,
but it is not his. This misunderstanding prevents them from appreciating Levinas’ sober--and more promising--account of a
politics that calls redemptive aspirations into question . The trouble began with a radio interview in which Levinas
participated in 1982, following the massacre of hundreds of Arabs inside Palestinian camps at Sabra and Chatila at the apparent behest
of the Israeli Defence Forces during Israel’s war with Lebanon (in Hand, 1989: 289-97; see, e.g., Fisk, 2001). According to Campbell,
Shapiro, and Neumann, Levinas’ strong support for Israel and his faith in the state as such led him to betray his own claims about
responsibility and justice, and to pay insufficient attention to competing historical narratives. These charges are misplaced insofar as
they rest on a misunderstanding of Levinas’ account of politics as a redemptive one, and upon a conflation of Levinas’ ethics with his
politics. In Levinas’ defense, I will argue that he offers a very different account of politics, one that counsels
us
against seeking redemption without either justifying inaction or urging resignation in the
face of cruelty and injustice. At times, Levinas’ position highlights the difference between
framing political claims in redemptive and non-redemptive terms, and suggests the merits
of the latter.
Redemptive politics turns case – the lure of redemption ensures that politics
backslides into a flight from responsibility
While they work in contradictory ways, these aspects of redemptive politics may be
mutually reinforcing: The desire for purity and deliverance reflected in our political claims
contributes to our flight from responsibility; and our flight from responsibility , by leaving so
much undone, maintains the urgency of those redemptive aspirations . In the end, genocide remains a
persistent feature of world politics. Perhaps it is time for us to “believe the unbelievable” (in Powers, 2002: 33). Perhaps
redemption through politics is a dangerously seductive illusion. Perhaps we need politics that
resist our redemptive aspirations, and ways of articulating claims that reflect that
resistance.
The logic of redemptive politics underlies genocidal campaigns

But to leave matters here is misleading, because Levinas cautions against “the idyllic messianism of
universal pardon”, reminding us that [people]“[men] are not only the victims of injustice; they
are also the perpetrators” (p. 91-2). Because we are perpetrators, universal pardon is out of the
question, and he [sic] Levinas derides those who pine for justice “[a]s though they were
innocent” (p. 91). In fact, for Levinas, the coming of the Messiah depends upon humanity first being shrouded in darkness (p. 93).
Furthermore, he suggests that redemption is always a fragile possibility at best: “To speak of Redemption in a world that remains
without justice is to forget that the soul is not the demand for immortality but the impossibility of assassinating, and that consequently
the spirit is the proper concern of a just society” (1997b:101). Levinas ties redemption to the attainment of
(perfect?) justice in this world, and this produces a dilemma : We can’t speak of redemption in
an unjust world, but the spirit-- the object of redemption--is the “proper concern” only of
the “just society”. Given that we do live in an unjust world-- or at least a world of imperfect justice-- is
redemption in a sense impossible? I think that this might be so for Levinas, but I will defer my reasons for thinking so
until later on. Levinas’ account of redemption, mediated by his conversation with the Rabbis and Samuel, suggests that ideals of
purity and deliverance are not confined to religious or theological matters, but often penetrate political
conversations, and this is why I call politics that are animated by such ideals “redemptive politics”. Redemptive politics
work in the service of projects that most people would probably recognize as “good ”--for
instance, in calls to end all war (UNOPI, 1965; Lipsky, 1971), genocide, hunger, poverty, homelessness, drug use, racism, and violent
crime. But
redemptive politics also work in the service of projects that most people would
probably recognize as “bad”. For instance, redemptive politics seem to underpin genocide. During
the Rwandan genocide, Hutu extremists referred to Tutsis as inyenzi, or cockroaches, as pests that needed to be exterminated (Prunier,
1995). Similarly, Nazi ideology portrayed Jews as dirty, a plague infesting German stock. These depictions tied genocidal campaigns
to the achievement and maintenance of purity for a given identity, whether Rwandan or German.6 Furthermore, many scholars have
characterized genocidal projects in redemptive terms. Leo Kuper, for instance, has highlighted scape-goating in genocides (1981: 43).
In times of social and economic turmoil--say, Germany in the 1930s--it is easy to blame prominent minority groups for social
economic, and political ills. That which we cannot abide--military defeat, economic depression and so on—we may cast off by
locating responsibility for our condition elsewhere.7 Ronald Aronson (1982:144) has characterized genocide as “a kind of ultimate
denial of reality: a madness of those in power who are impotent to use that power effectively to change reality, and who, lost in visions
of omnipotence, instead seek to destroy it”. Finally, Robert Jay Lifton has argued that genocide
involves “a perception
of collective illness, a vision of cure, and a series of motivation s, experiences, and requirements
of perpetrators in their quest for that cure” (Lifton 1986, p. 467; in Fein, 1993, p.46). Scape-goating,
denial of reality, and metaphors of illness and cure all call up drives to purification that are
symptomatic of redemptive politics.
Derrida Bad
Derrida admits that a pursuit toward pure hospitality will, IN ALL
INSTANCES, fail. The world is violent, human nature steers towards
selfishness, and the consequent power structures sustaining injustices are
needed to extend hospitality in the first place.
Foster 7 [Jason, Graduate (M.Div.) of Reformed Theological Seminary, Oviedo, Florida,
“Hospitality: The Apostle John, Jacques Derrida, and Us”
(http://thirdmill.org/newfiles/jas_foster/jas_foster.hospitality.pdf) ]
Derrida is aware that such a radical take on hospitality carries certain risks with it. He is
quite frank in saying that the result of this kind of hospitality might be “terrible because the
newcomer may be a good person, or may be the devil." 30 But to Derrida, it does not matter who it is. Pure
hospitality is completely unconditional and has no limits whatsoever. The door is always open; the lock is always unlocked. Pure
hospitality is extended and given without any prior knowledge of who we are extending it to. 31 This is what Derrida means by the
"other;" receiving and embracing newcomers we truly know nothing about at all. 32 For Derrida, no question or inquiry we might
make to a potential guest is virtuous because such questions are merely impure attempts to classify the person into our own
predetermined categories of being. 33 The Mediterranean/Johannine idea of testing (and its modern counterpart – sizing people up)
is clearly frowned upon by Derrida. Pure hospitality is the unconditional "hospitality of visitation" which introduces radical surprise
into hospitality. This stands in contrast to actual hospitality's "hospitality of invitation," which makes hospitality a gated and
conditional product of our own self-centered preferences, and is extended only on our own terms. 34 Derrida believes the actual
hospitality of our day is violent in forcing restrictive conformity through enforcing conditions upon those to whom it is extended. In
effect, Derrida believes the structure of barriers and restrictions we adopt as the masters of our space when we extend actual
hospitality to others renders these "others" as strangers and refugees. 35 For Derrida, our actual hospitality rests upon behavioral
conditions and prerequisites that tacitly advocate limits on the extent to which we're willing to be trespassed by our guests. This
makes our hospitality inhospitable. Derrida mostly tends to blame Kant's "universal hospitality" 36 for this problem that carried with
it accepted standards of conduct, and time limits on its extension. 37 Because Derrida's messianic future is
indeterminate and beyond the horizon of expectation, pure hospitality, as such, is impossible to
achieve and he acknowledges this. His pure hospitality is an eschatological ideal that can
never be realized in a violent world. 38 Derrida sees the world as thoroughly violent, with
violence interwoven into all aspects of society and impossible to avoid. Derrida believes all
human hospitality is tainted by narcissism that leads to some degree of insincerity when we
extend hospitality to others. When we give, we are always selfishly looking for something
in return, 39 whether it be a tangible gift or an intangible feeling of selfcongratulation for being liked and appreciated by our
guests. For Derrida, hospitality is always an economy of exchange, and gift-giving is never purely
altruistic. 40 Thus, pure hospitality is unachievable in Derrida's vision. He longs for a
messianic future that he believes will never materialize. His deconstruction of hospitality
is so thorough that it leaves us nowhere, at least in my view. The very nature of actual hospitality
assumes and perpetuates a structure of inequality between host and guest that of itself must
be eliminated if we are to have true and pure hospitality . 41 Lest anyone think this is simply an issue between
individuals, Derrida believes the ramifications are thoroughly global in nature and speak to the reality that "[h]ospitality is culture
itself…ethics is hospitality; ethics is so thoroughly coextensive with the experience of hospitality." 42 But because
this
"power structure" is the basis for hospitality in the first place and depends on it for its very
existence, it is impossible to rid ourselves of it, even though the breaking down of this structure
of inequality and barriers is the goal of pure hospitality . As with the step of testing, Derrida clearly resists the
well defined roles and behavioral expectations of host and guest that are intrinsic in the Mediterranean process of hospitality that is
Without ownership and control, there is no longer the
an understood reality of the Johannine corpus.
possibility of hosting anyone under any real circumstance. The impossibility of pure
hospitality is demonstrated each time we extend actual hospitality. The possible highlights
the impossible, and actually increases the chasm between the two. This chasm between
Derrida's pure hospitality and our actual hospitality is unconquerable, and he knows it . 44
It is little wonder then, that his interpreter, John Caputo, describes Derrida as a man of "prayer and tears." 45
Unconditional hospitality leaves us unable to cope with the radically hostile

Other – their strategy is ultimately one of fear – true recognition of alterity
necessarily must understand its inaccessibility.
Naida Zukić 9, 11-xx, assistant professor in BMCC’s Department of Speech, Communications and Theater Arts, “My
Neighbor’s Face and Similar Vulgarities,” http://liminalities.net/5-4/neighbor.pdf
Derrida’s examination of unconditionalhospitality belongs to a discourse demanding that hospitality be

extended—without anticipation, prejudice, or identification—to an unexpected visitor, foreigner,
guest, immigrant, or stranger. This absolute openness to the newcomer on the principles of the heart, however,
involves ethical risks and limitations inherent in the neighbor. Žižek locates the neighbor in its
violent brutality over against Freud’s traumatic intruder (a thing that hystericizes us and disturbs the balance of
our way of life). The presupposition to be resisted here, Žižek warns, is the ethical gentrification of the
neighbor, “the reduction of the radically ambiguous monstrosity of the Neighbor-Thing into an
Other as the abyssal point from which the call of ethical responsibility emanates” (“Neighbors” 163).
That one must be radical in offering hospitality to the other stems from Derrida’s belief in overcoming violence and exclusion via pure
openness and unconditional hospitality toward the Other. I am opposed to this Derridean notion of ethical
hospitality. Crucial here, however, is an ideological shift from a neighbor in the simple sense, to the neighbor in its radical
otherness. The neighbor in its radical otherness disturbs; the neighbor “remains an inert,
impenetrable, enigmatic presence that hystericizes” (Žižek, “Neighbors” 140-1). Therefore, my meditation on the
figure of the neighbor is a corrective move against unconditional hospitality that accentuates the limitation of
ethical universality. This logic is implied in the critique of Derrida’s “opening without horizon,” and contextualized in
representations of the Bosnian genocide in Peter Maass’s Love Thy Neighbor. 1 Ethnic cleansing, neighbor-on-
neighbor violence, and dehumanization of the Other read as the portrayal of humankind at its
worst. Complicating Derrida’s notion of ethical hospitality are narratives of mass atrocities
within which lurks the neighbor—the unfathomable abyss, the radical otherness in all its intensity
and inaccessibility. Against the Ethics of Unconditional Hospitality An act of hospitality can only be poetic. – Derrida2
Stories orbiting the questions of ethics, violence, and the Bosnian war have faded from our public consciousness. Today, Bosnian
political developments and survivors’ accounts of the atrocities receive occasional press coverage, largely through reporting about war
crimes trials at The Hague (i.e., Slobodan Milošević and Radovan Karadžić’s trials for war crimes during the wars in Kosovo, Bosnia,
and Croatia). At the most basic level such questions about war and religious conflict highlight a revived sense of urgency within the
context of ethics and violence. Furthermore, breakdowns of economic and familial structures, systemic
violence, and human rights violations reflect a distinct scene shift that characterizes modern wars;
a politico/ideological move from inter to intra-national conflict. Chaos, violence, and death that
ensued in Bosnia in 1992 add to the complexity of intra-national conflicts, and more specifically highlight the atrociously
orchestrated neighbor-to-neighbor violence. These systemic implementations of violence are never ahistorical or
abstract, but always already part of concrete intersubjective, political, and ideological contexts within which they are mobilized. It is
in this light that I revisit Derrida’s notion of ethical hospitality—the ideology that teaches us not to objectify
the Other—and the vulgarity of Slobodan Milošević and Radovan Karadžić, the traumatic intruders,
the neighbors. Derrida’s incalculable hospitality, the opening without horizon of expectation to the newcomer
whoever that may be, is an aporia at best and an impossible demand at worst. Conditional hospitality is
inscribed in the very possibility of unconditional hospitality and the opening to the “absolute
arrivant,” the foreigner. He elaborates upon this newcomer who is not even a guest, who: surprises the host—who
is not yet a host or an inviting power—enough to call into question, to the point of annihilating or rendering
indeterminate, all the distinctive signs of a prior identity, beginning with the very border that
delineated a legitimate home and assured lineage, names and language, nations, families and
genealogies. The absolute arrivant does not yet have a name or an identity. (Aporias 34) It is precisely Derrida’s
unconditional hospitality which remains conditioned by the histories, languages, and “the conditional laws of the right to hospitality,”
imposed on the newcomer (On Cosmopolitanism 22). The possibility of impossible hospitality is therefore, purely
theoretical and conceptual; conditioned by political inequalities, economic exploitation, injustice, war,
homophobia, xenophobia, racism, and so on. Accordingly, the absolute arrivant without a name or
identity, the foreigner, can always violate and extinguish these laws of hospitality. Within the unconditional
hospitality to otherness, inscribed in the element of the foreigner are the unpredictable violent “visitations” that
demonstrate the limit to incalculable hospitality. Although unconditional hospitality and exposure
to the other requires the suspension of all discrimination, there is always a possibility that the
foreigner will be the enemy of the host. Because such possibility exists, unconditional hospitality remains merely
conceptual; it is impossible to require that the host not decide who does or does not enter the house. Unconditional hospitality is,
therefore, a self-contradictory concept; it deconstructs itself precisely by being put into practice (“Hospitality” 8). Unconditional
hospitality requires a host to open the door to a foreigner who might bring harm. This aporia of
hospitality is necessarily political. The laws of political (conditional and exclusive) hospitality refer to the cultural and ideological
structures, which preexist the subject, and interrogate the event of the contact with the other, the foreigner, the stranger. The
premise of unconditional hospitality, however, is that the neighbor, someone whom I know from
within, cannot be my enemy. Nevertheless, gross violations of hospitality, including massive
atrocities and human rights abuses are occurring not between strangers, but between neighbors.3
The neighbor is one such figure of the Other toward whom my relationship is that of familiarity,
common language, and proximity. Underlying Derrida’s unconditional hospitality is fear of the
Other—the fear of the unfathomable abyss of radical otherness that transgresses,
compromises, and disturbs from within. The neighbor. Fear Thy Neighbor What’s the moral difference between
slitting a man’s throat or slicing off his balls? – Maass 51 To recognize the Other is thus not primarily or
ultimately to recognize the Other in a certain well-defined capacity (“I recognize you
as...rational, good, lovable”), but to recognize you in the abyss of your very impenetrability
and opacity. – Žižek, “Neighbors” 138-9
Unconditional hospitality is impossible – it inevitably totalizes the Other and

denies the choice to Others who don’t want to be interacted with.
Leung and Stone 9 (Gilbert Leung1 and Matthew Stone2, 4-1-2009, Birkbeck, University of London1, London
Metropolitan University2, “Otherwise than Hospitality: A Disputation on the Relation of Ethics to Law and Politics,”
http://repository.essex.ac.uk/4465/1/Otherwise_than_Hospitality.pdf)
Although ethically it is unconditional, one

cannot say that at the political level hospitality is always the right
choice, because one cannot be hospitable to all. Indeed, Levinas was acutely aware of the harsh reality of politics. In a
notorious radio interview, when asked whether the Palestinian is, for the Israeli, the deserving other par excellence, he said the
following: [I]f your neighbour attacks another neighbour or treats him unjustly, what can you do? Then
alterity takes on another character, in alterity we can find an enemy , or at least then we are faced with the
problem of knowing who is right and who is wrong, who is just and who is unjust. There are people who are wrong.
(Levinas 1989, 294). Whilst at the heart of humanity is an originary ethics, a subjective welcoming of the other person, this
does not negate the necessity of politics in all its coldness and brutality. The issue , then, at the core of
this critique, is Derrida’s pursuance of hospitality at this political level. Does this not over-simplify
the political problematic, revealing a questionable assumption that all people desire (political)
hospitality, and that the latter is the most appropriate political strategy? Is there a situation in which the
ethical demand requires a non-hospitable response at the level of politics? The decline of the nation state
and the contemporary prevalence of ‘refugees of every kind, immigrants with or without citizenship, exiled or forced from their
homes, whether with or without papers’ heighten Derrida’s interest in hospitality, and helps to justify his preoccupation (Derrida 1999,
71). But this is to characterise the other in a particular way: migratory; stateless and, crucially, seeking a home. Within the context of
refugee politics, this is clearly appropriate. But against
a generalisation of the category of the other, we pose an
alternative exemplar: the other that does not desire hospitality. This alterity is embodied by the person
who wants to resist political inclusion. Whilst such an other would necessarily still provoke the
unconditional hospitality of originary ethics, it is clear that it is no longer appropriate in their case to
promote hospitality at the political level. As David Gauthier has emphasised, a politics of hospitality would
presume a universal fraternity, a kinship and co-belonging. And, as he notes, surely the absolute other would be
beyond fraternity itself. In this case, then, there can be only two alternatives when hospitality becomes
the dominant political imperative: Either one can remain outside the community, or one can seek to
become assimilated into it. In the former instance, the Other remains outside the community’s warm embrace. In the latter, the
Other is absorbed into the community, and its otherness is eliminated. In both cases, the Other is totalized. (Gauthier
2007, 178). In other words, the other is either given hospitality that it does not desire, and is therefore
assimilated into a fraternity to which it does not belong, or it is left out, which presumably undermines hospitality
as a locus for politics. In either case, hospitality reveals its own violence (and we must stress again that by
violence we mean ontological violence: the failure of ethics as the reduction of absolute otherness to the
language of the same, to whatever extent ). The critique being made of Derrida here is perhaps one of emphasis. He was
undoubtedly aware, as the last section has observed, of the inherent hostility of hospitality. But with this in mind, we ask why he
championed it as a political strategy, as well as a mere descriptive account of an originary ethics. When one shifts attention away from
the refugee and toward the other who does not desire inclusion, the violence of hospitality is rendered inescapably visible. And to
welcome, in this scene, demonstrates a different type of violence, for the failure of hospitality is not that one is not hospitable enough
but, paradoxically, that one has been hospitable at all. To
welcome, and indeed to say anything, to engage the
other in dialogue, is to say too much, to reduce alterity to the sameness of language. This is a
violence that cannot be answered fully with the idea of forgiveness, because here forgiveness itself
reveals a similar violence: the aspiration to dialogue, and a demand for interaction with an other
that prefers to be left alone. Whilst we are told that it is necessary to impose limits, would Derrida go so far to say that
conditional hospitality is not merely a requirement to maintain limits and order, but also offers
the possibility of judging whether the other wants hospitality in the first place ? Whilst he was clearly
aware that the scene of forgiveness and hospitality contains its own violence and impossibility, it could be suggested that, in some
cases, these are the wrong goals, even as aporias. Forgiveness seeks a bond, a touch, a linguistic recognition
and, ultimately, the redemption of the wrong-doer. Might we suggest that in certain situations, such as the
quiet provocation of the other that resists inclusion, one cannot honestly seek redemption, but must simply aspire to
an impossible and guilty silence
Util/Impact Framing
Util good—maximizes lives and equality
Cummisky 96 (David, professor of philosophy at Bates College, Kantian Consequentialism, pg. 145)
We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract “social entity.” It is
not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive “overall social good.” Instead, the question is whether some
persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that to use a person in this
way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.” But why is
this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the
cost if we act, we fail to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will
bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional
value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that “rational
If one truly
nature exists as an end in itself” (GMM 429). Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct.
believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves
maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible (chapter 5). In order to avoid
this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even
most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale. But we have seen that
Kant’s normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a
refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is
based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally
promoting these two tiers of value? If I sacrifice some for the sake for others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny
the unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may have “dignity, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth”
that transcends any market value ( GMM 436)., but persons also have a fundamental equality that dictates that some must sometimes
give way for the sake of others (chapter 5 and 7). The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force
If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, the
another to bear some cost in order to benefit others.
equal consideration suggests that one may have to sacrifice some to save many.
Util doesn’t preclude compassion—it minimizes violence

Williams 5 (Michael C., Professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa,The
Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, p. 165-167)
Yet it is my claim that the willful Realist tradition does not lack an understanding of the contingency of practice or a
vision of responsibility to otherness.On the contrary, its strategy of objectification is precisely an attempt to
bring together a responsibility to otherness and a responsibility to act within a willfully liberal vision. The construction of a realm of
objectivity and calculation is not just a consequence of a need to act - the framing of an epistemic context for successful calculation. It
is a form of responsibility to otherness, an attempt to allow for diversity and irreconcilability precisely by – at
least initially – reducing the self and the other to a structure of material calculation in order to allow a
structure of mutual intelligibility, mediation, and stability. It is, in short, a strategy of limitation: a willful attempt to
construct a subject and a social world limited – both epistemically and politically – in the name of a politics of
toleration: a liberal strategy that John Gray has recently characterized as one of modus Vivendi. If this is the case, then the
deconstructive move that gains some of tits weight by contrasting itself to a non- or apolitical objectivism must engage with the more
complex contrast to a sceptical Realist tradition that is itself a constructed, ethical practice. This issue becomes even more acute if one
considers Iver Neumann’s incisive questions concerning postmodern constructions of identity, action, and responsibility. As Neumann
points out, the insight that identities are inescapably contingent and relationally constructed, and even the
claim that identities
are inescapably indebted to otherness, do not in themselves provide a foundation for practice ,
particularly in situations where identities are ‘sedimented’ and conflictually defined. In these cases, deconstruction alone will not
suffice unless it can demonstrate a capacity to counter in practice (and not just in philosophic practice) the essentialist dynamics it
confronts. Here, a responsibility to act must go beyond deconstruction to consider viable alternatives and counter-
practices.
“Structural violence” and “everyday war” can’t explain high magnitude
impacts
Boulding 77 (Kenneth, Faculty – U. Colorado Boulder, Former Pres. American Economic Association, Society for General
Systems Research, and American Association for the Advancement of Science, Journal of Peace Research, “Twelve Friendly Quarrels
with Johan Galtung”, 14:1, JSTOR)
Finally, we come to the great Galtung metaphors of 'structural violence' 'and 'positive peace' . They are metaphors
rather than models, and for that very reason are suspect. Metaphors always imply models and metaphors have much more
persuasive power than models do, for models tend to be the preserve of the specialist. But when a metaphor implies a bad model it
can be very dangerous, for it is both persuasive and wrong. The metaphor of structural violence I would argue falls right into this
category. The metaphor is that poverty, deprivation, ill health, low expectations of life, a condition in which more than half the
human race lives, is 'like' a thug beating up the victim and 'taking his money away from him in the street, or it is 'like' a conqueror
stealing the land of the people and reducing them to slavery. The implication is that poverty and its associated ills are the fault of the
thug or the conqueror and the solution is to do away with thugs and conquerors. While there is some truth in the metaphor, in the
Violence, whether of the streets and the home, or of the guerilla, of the police, or of
modern world at least there is not very much.
the armed forces, is
a very different phenomenon from poverty. The processes which create and
sustain poverty are not at all like the processes which create and sustain violence , although like
everything else in 'the world, everything is somewhat related to everything else. There is a very real problem of the structures
which lead to violence, but unfortunately Galitung's metaphor of structural violence as he has used it has diverted attention from
this problem. Violence in the behavioral sense, that is, somebody actually doing damage to somebody else and trying to make them
worse off, is a 'threshold' phenomenon, rather like the boiling over of a pot. The temperature under a pot can rise for a long time
without its boiling over, but at some 'threshold boiling over will take place. The study of the structures which un- derlie violence are a
very important and much neglected part of peace research and indeed of social science in general. Thresh- old phenomena like
violence are difficult to study because they represent 'breaks' in the systenm rather than uniformities. Violence, whether between
persons or organizations, occurs when the 'strain' on a system is too great for its 'strength'. The metaphor here is that violence is like
what happens when we break a piece of chalk. Strength and strain, however, especially in social systems, are so interwoven
historically that it is very difficult to separate them. The diminution of violence involves two possible strategies, or a mixture of the
two; one is Ithe increase in the strength of the system, 'the other is the diminution of the strain. The strength of systems involves
habit, culture, taboos, and sanctions, all these 'things which enable a system to stand lincreasing strain without breaking down into
violence. The strains on the system 'are largely dynamic in character, such as arms races, mutually stimulated hostility, changes in
relative economic position or political power, which are often hard to identify. Conflicts of interest 'are only part 'of the strain on a
system, and not always the most important part. It is very hard for people ito know their interests, and misperceptions of 'interest
take place mainly through the dynamic processes, not through the structural ones. It is only perceptions of interest which affect
people's behavior, not the 'real' interests, whatever these may be, and the gap between percep- ti'on and reality can be very large and
resistant to change. However, what Galitung calls structural violence (which has been defined 'by one un- kind commenltator as
anything that Galitung doesn't like) was originally defined as any unnecessarily low expectation of life, on that assumption that
anybody who dies before the allotted span has been killed, however unintentionally and unknowingly, by somebody else. The
concept has been expanded to include all 'the problems of poverty, desti- tution, deprivation, and misery. These are enormously real
and are a very high priority for research and action, but they belong to systems which are only peripherally related to 'the structures
whi'ch produce violence. This is not to say that the cultures of violence and the cultures of poverty are not sometimes related, though
not all poverty cultures are cultures of violence, and certainly not all cultures of violence are poverty
cultures. But the dynamics of poverty and the success or failure to rise out of it are of a complexity far beyond
anything which the metaphor of structural violence can offer. While the metaphor of structural
violence performed a service in calling attention to a problem, it may have done a disservice in preventing us from
finding the answer.
DA Impact Calc Cards
High magnitude impacts should come first despite low probability
Sandberg, Matheny, and Cirkovic 8—Anders Sandberg, James Martin Research Fellow at the Future of
Humanity Institute at Oxford University, postdoctoral research assistant for the EU Enhance project; Jason G. Matheny, PhD
candidate in Health Policy and Management at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, special consultant to the Center for
Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center and co-founder of New Harvest, and Milan M. Ćirković, senior research
associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade, assistant professor of physics at the University of Novi Sad in Serbia and
Montenegro; “How Can We Reduce the Risk of Human Extinction” http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-
the-risk-of-human-extinction
The facts are sobering. More than 99.9 percent of species that have ever existed on Earth have gone
extinct. Over the long run, it seems likely that humanity will meet the same fate . In less than a billion years, the
increased intensity of the Sun will initiate a wet greenhouse effect, even without any human interference, making Earth inhospitable to
life. A couple of billion years later Earth will be destroyed, when it's engulfed by our Sun as it expands into a red-giant star. If we
colonize space, we could survive longer than our planet, but as mammalian species survive, on average, only two million years, we
should consider ourselves very lucky if we make it to one billion. Humanity
could be extinguished as early as this
century by succumbing to natural hazards, such as an extinction-level asteroid or comet impact,
supervolcanic eruption, global methane-hydrate release, or nearby supernova or gamma-ray burst .
(Perhaps the most probable of these hazards, supervolcanism, was discovered only in the last 25 years, suggesting that other natural
hazards may remain unrecognized.) Fortunately the probability of any one of these events killing off our
species is very low--less than one in 100 million per year, given what we know about their past frequency.
But as improbable as these events are, measures to reduce their probability can still be
worthwhile. For instance, investments in asteroid detection and deflection technologies cost less, per life saved, than most
investments in medicine. While an extinction-level asteroid impact is very unlikely, its improbability is
outweighed by its potential death toll. The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present
larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons
in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a
resulting nuclear winter. We may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic
biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction -level pandemics. The
knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons.
And unlike other weapons, pathogens are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive. Pathogens
have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of
susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or
unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human
extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate
rivaling Moore's Law. Farther out in time are technologies that remain theoretical but might be developed this century. Molecular
nanotechnology could allow the creation of self-replicating machines capable of destroying the
ecosystem. And advances in neuroscience and computation might enable improvements in
cognition that accelerate the invention of new weapons . A survey at the Oxford conference found that concerns
about human extinction were dominated by fears that new technologies would be misused. These emerging threats are especially
challenging as they could become dangerous more quickly than past technologies, outpacing society's ability to control them. As H.G.
Wells noted, "Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe." Such remote risks may
seem academic in a world plagued by immediate problems, such as global poverty, HIV, and
climate change. But as intimidating as these problems are, they do not threaten human existence.
In discussing the risk of nuclear winter, Carl Sagan emphasized the astronomical toll of human extinction: A nuclear war
imperils all of our descendants, for as long as there will be humans. Even if the population remains static, with an average
lifetime of the order of 100 years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species (roughly ten million
years), we are talking about some 500 trillion people yet to come. By this criterion, the
stakes are one million times
greater for extinction than for the more modest nuclear wars that kill "only" hundreds of millions
of people. There are many other possible measures of the potential loss--including culture and science, the evolutionary history of
the planet, and the significance of the lives of all of our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants. Extinction is the
undoing of the human enterprise. There is a discontinuity between risks that threaten 10 percent or even 99 percent of humanity and
those that threaten 100 percent. For
disasters killing less than all humanity, there is a good chance that the
species could recover. If we value future human generations, then reducing extinction risks
should dominate our considerations. Fortunately, most measures to reduce these risks also improve global security
against a range of lesser catastrophes, and thus deserve support regardless of how much one worries about extinction. These measures
include: Removing nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert and further reducing their numbers; Placing safeguards on gene synthesis
equipment to prevent synthesis of select pathogens; Improving our ability to respond to infectious diseases, including rapid disease
surveillance, diagnosis, and control, as well as accelerated drug development; Funding research on asteroid detection and deflection,
"hot spot" eruptions, methane hydrate deposits, and other catastrophic natural hazards; Monitoring developments in key disruptive
technologies, such as nanotechnology and computational neuroscience, and developing international policies to reduce the risk of
catastrophic accidents.
Low risk is still a risk—evaluating magnitude doesn’t rig the game

Sunstein 7 (Cass R. Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. Clerked for Justice Thurgood Marshall of the
U.S. Supreme Court; "Worst-Case Scenarios" Harvard University Press 2007 pg.138-9) //MG
A Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle, of the modest kind just sketched, raises several questions. The
most obvious is whether a low-probability risk of catastrophe might not deserve more attention than higher-probability risks, even
when the expected value appears to be equal. The reason is that the loss of 200 million people may be more than 1,000 times worse
than the loss of 2,000 people. Pause over the real-world meaning of a loss of 200 million people in the
United States. The nation would find it extremely hard to recover. Private and public institutions
would be damaged for a long time, perhaps forever. What kind of government would emerge? What would its
economy look like? Future generations would inevitably suffer. The effect of a catastrophe greatly outruns a
simple multiplication of a certain number of lives lost. The overall "cost" of losing two-thirds of
the American population is far more than 100,000 times the cost of losing 2,000 people. The same
point holds when the numbers are smaller. Following the collapse of a dam that left 120 people
dead and 4,000 homeless in Buffalo Creek, Virginia, psychiatric researchers continued to find significant
psychological and sociological changes two years after the disaster occurred. Survivors still suffered a loss of direction
and energy, along with other disabling character changes .41 One evaluator attributed this "Buffalo Creek
Syndrome" specifically to "the loss of traditional bonds of kinship and neighborliness."42 Genuine catastrophes,
involving tens of thousands or millions of deaths, would magnify that loss to an unimaginable
degree. A detailed literature on the "social amplification of risk" explores the secondary social losses that greatly outrun the initial
effects of given events.43 The harm done by the attacks of 9/11, for instance, far exceeded the deaths on
that day, horrendous as those were. One telling example: Many people switched, in the aftermath of the attack, to driving
long distances rather than flying, and the switch produced almost as many highway deaths as the attacks themselves, simply because
driving is more dangerous than flying.44 The attacks had huge effects on other behaviors of individuals,
businesses, and governments, resulting in costs of hundreds of billions of dollars, along with
continuing fear, anxiety, and many thousands of additional deaths from the Afghanistan and Iraq
wars. We might therefore identify a second version of the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle, also attuned to expected
value but emphasizing some features of catastrophic risk that might otherwise be neglected: Regulators should consider
the expected value of catastrophic risks, even when the worst-case scenario is highly unlikely. In
assessing expected value, regulators should consider the distinctive features of catastrophic harm,
including the "social amplification” of such harm. Regulators should choose cost-effective measures
to reduce those risks and should attempt to compare the expected value of the risk with the expected value of precautionary
measures.
Political Geography Link—HR
Human rights in U.S.-China relations is a biopolitical transaction. The plan
creates an economy of bodies between the U.S. and China – engagement
causes select modifications in China’s policy, which necessitates that China
jail more dissenters to replenish the national stock. It is critical to investigate
how both governments secretly benefit from the trade of bodies as illicit
commodities in international biopolitics.
Chow 2 (Rey Chow, Professor of the Humanities at Brown, 2002, The Protestant Ethnic and the
Spirit of Capitalism, p. 19-22)
Ever since the Tiananmen Massacre of June 4, 1989, the issue of human rights has remained in the forefront of China’s relations with
the West. There
are, of course, multiple dimensions to the definition of “human rights,” but when
evoked in relation to China by the Western media, the phrase is invariably meant as a
reminder of what China is lacking, such as democracy and freedom of speech for its live citizens and basic humane
respect for its political prisoners, whose body organs are reportedly being harvested in a massive, lucrative underground international
trade. Indeed, Western,
especially U.S., journalism has in recent years identified human rights as the
way to make any mainland Chinese story newsworthy , and any slight displeasure at China is enough to
instigate yet another round of wrathful accounts about how utterly barbaric this country still remains. When being rebuffed by Chinese
authorities on one occasion during Bill Clinton’s historic visit to the People’s Republic in the summer of 1998, one American
journalist, for instance, vowed to “do the human rights story every day.” 1 In
the reports that regularly come to the
attention of the U.S. public about the arrest, imprisonment, and maltreatment of political dissidents, about the
Chinese government’s connivance at and participation in the trading of body parts from executed
prisoners, and about the continued prohibition of public discussions of democracy in what has
become a thriving capitalist economy in the PRC, one thing looms large with remarkable consistency: the fraught
relationship between what seems to be a universal issue (human rights) and the specifics of
a local, particular culture (China). The argument often put forth by the Chinese government in its own defense is that
human rights in China cannot be the same as human rights in the West. Accordingly, whereas the West asserts its
moral claims on the basis of a universalist rhetoric traceable to the European Enlightenment, China is
reduced to a reactive position from which it must and can speak only in terms of its own
cultural and local specifics, in terms of its own historical differences. This typical discursive scenario
amounts to a division of cultural labor on the international scene; it is one that hardly needs
to be elaborated but badly needs to be challenged. Instead of viewing one party, the West, as
the holder of some absolute, uncompromisable value and the other, China, as a stubborn,
wayward resister to all that is reasonable, it would perhaps be more productive, in light of
Foucault’s notion of biopower, to view the West and China as collaborative partners in an
ongoing series of biopolitical transactions in global late capitalism, transactions whereby
human rights, or, more precisely, humans as such, are the commodity par excellence. In exiling
its political dissidents in single file, while others continue to be arrested and imprisoned,2
the mainland Chinese government is, de facto, setting itself up as a business enterprise that
deals in politicized human persons as precious commodities, the release of which, as the
logic of commodification goes, is systematically regulated —by the rules of demand and
supply and by the continued presence of an interested buyer. It is as if , in order to honor its part in the
business relationship, China must act in good faith by constantly maintaining a supply of the goods
being demanded by the West. As some prisoners are traded off, others need be caught and
put away in order to replenish the national stockpile, so that transactions can proceed
periodically to the satisfaction of the trading parties concerned. Scandalous though this may sound, the point
is that human rights can no longer be understood purely on humanitarian grounds but rather
must also be seen as an inherent part—entirely brutal yet also entirely logical—of
transnational corporatism, under which anything, including human beings or parts of human
beings, can become exchangeable for its negotiated equivalent val ue.3 By releasing its political
prisoners—who can be seen as a kind of national product—in a regulated manner, the
Chinese authorities accomplish the pragmatic goal of forcing Western nations to soften
their rhetoric against China and thus of receiving more trading privileges and opportunities
over time. It is important to emphasize that the Chinese are not the only ones to benefit from such
releases. Western companies, which eye the Chinese market with candid rapacity but are often inconvenienced by the
moral embarrassment of conducting business with a totalitarian regime, also stand to gain substantially from the
Chinese government’s calculated moves. In other words, the “humane” release of famous
dissidents arises, in practice, from the same cold-blooded logic of economic trans actions as what
only appears to be its opposite, namely, the egregious, abusive trading of organs from
slaughtered Chinese prisoners. The two kinds of trades form a diversified but cohesive
globalized financial order: when dead, humans are exchanged in the form of replaceable
body parts; when still alive, they are exchanged whole—body and soul—for lucrative long-term
trading arrangements that benefit the entire nation. The ostensible trade in nonhuman
commodities between China and the West—the clothes, toys, industrial equipment, household accessories, and
their like—is concurrently facilitated by this other, unmentionable trade in humans as
commodities.
Human rights ensnare the subject in state power

p. 246-47)
One of the reasons for this is the form of international organisation which structures the modern world. Despite the increasingly global
and interconnected nature of human existence, we continue to live in a world divided into states.11 In the vast majority of cases,
international human rights law is operationalised at the level of the individual through the
positive law of the state in which the individual resides . Thus, the implementation of human rights in
Australia depends on the domestic human rights law of the Australian state. In order for an Australian citizen to ‘‘have’’ human rights
in any realised sense, the content of Australian domestic law, the positive law of the Australian state, must be aligned with
international human rights law. As we observed above, however, this international human rights law is also
positive law. It too must be aligned with something beyond itself ; it must have some justification for its
claims.12 It is with this need for positive law—whether domestic or international—to be aligned with
something beyond itself, something which gives it content and authority, that we encounter the difficulties
with conceptualising the ontology of human rights. The principal problem with a positivistic ontology for
human rights is that by turning human rights into an instrument of state power, and by cutting it
off from any of the traditional metaphysical groundings for human rights, it takes from the
doctrine that capacity with which it has always traditionally been identified: the capacity to act as a form of moral
criticism against state power, a form of moral criticism that is effective and persuasive because it appeals to
something above and beyond the self-claimed prerogatives of the state , a prerogative to which human
rights are assimilated under the legal positivist approach. The belief that in some sense human rights exist beyond positive law has
been an essential mainstay and motivation for the critique of inadequate positive law protections of freedoms and privileges
considered due to the human person. Without
this—and crucially—humans are reduced to being the subjects
of positivistic reductions and relative state power. A positivistic account of human rights
can serve the traditional function of the human rights doctrine only for as long as the state
or states in question are ruled by benign governments. These—such as some liberal democratic governments
—may indeed be prepared to put their modes and methods of governance under the scrutiny and redress of strong human rights
instruments. For less benign governments, however, human rights instruments will be ignored,
manipulated, reinterpreted, and ultimately worn as an ornament to the impunity of state
power.
Neolib Link—HR
Human rights rhetoric is neoliberal—turns case
Bové 2 (Paul A. Bové, Professor of English at the University of Pittsburgh, 2002, “Rights
Discourse in the Age of U.S./China Trade.” New Literary History No. 33, p. 173-174)
Within globalization, that is, the expansion of the capital market to cover the entire planet,
the discourse of rights not only has been instrumentalized especially by the U.S. state but
also carries, as it were, before it the entire neoliberal order of trade and state power. Politics
based on this discourse of rights commits itself to the forms of neoliberal statism of the U.S.
type. For many people such a politics has progressive value as a basis for struggle against either
predatory capital or authoritarian regimes. Indeed, it seems congruent with another aspect of globalization, namely the weakening of
the state system in the face of new forms of non-state power, new forms of communication, and forms of finance outside state control.
As Jameson suggests, and not alone, such
an understanding, in part, means little less than that
globalization functions as a mask for the expansion of the U.S. state at the expense of other
states made subservient or junior partners. In other words, in such a regime, an appeal to rights
either against state power or against the power of transnationals effectively reenforces a
neoliberal state regime.9 In other words, such a commitment rests on an error: a failure to realize the
necessary role played by neoliberal state regimes enabling and working in concert with the
very forces of globalization effectively inducing the abuses against which rights discourse
often is invoked. Rights discourse, in other words, is an attempt at a therapy from within the
structure of the disease itself. We can see how some of this relation plays itself out by looking at two interesting
documents from the U.S. government, the first a speech given by President Clinton in defense of normal trade between the U.S. and
China; the second, the U.S. State Department’s declarations of principles in its annual review of rights in countries other than the U.S.
Several important facts appear: first, that it should not be taken as a given that “rights discourse” provides the basis of an acceptable
politics of liberty; second, that recent political events show that state intellectuals who advocate rights often do so in collaboration
with and on the basis of neoliberal interests and conceptions of the subject; third, that the U.S., developing the institutions and values
of transnationalism, “naturally” promotes talk of human rights and urges the development of institutions to enable or defend them;
fourth, that the existence of such institutions requires a particular understanding of the status of knowledge; fifth, that Michel
Foucault’s advice not to attach one’s politics to rights discourse points out an alternative to that position most loudly and influentially
represented in the Atlantic world by the German neoliberal, Jürgen Habermas, and the American patriot, Richard Rorty.10
Human rights norms are an attempt to fix a universalized Western notion of

the subject across the globe in order for neoliberal capitalism to produce a
world of willing subjects
Asad 3 (Talal Asad, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology at the Graduate Center of the City
University of New York, 2003, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, p. 151-
53)
Who—in a world of nation-states—has the authority to interpret and the power to promote
the conditions that facilitate human rights, and “the human” they sustain? At a meeting two
years ago the U.S. Trade Representative negotiating China’s entry into the World Trade
Organization casually observed in response to a journalist’s question that “democratic political
reform and greater adherence to human rights are certainly en couraged by an opening to
the West and Western norms.”36 A direct connection is thus made between a free trade,
human rights, and “Western norms.” What might these norms be when viewed as styles of
life relating to specific kinds of subjectivity? In a recent article on American global power, Ignacio Ramonet, chief
editor of Le Monde Diplomatique, recounts the scale of U.S. military, diplomatic, economic, and technological hegemony, and then
goes on to ask why—given the liberal democratic ideology of equality and autonomy— there isn’t more criticism of it? I quote his
elegant answer in full: “No doubt because US hegemony also embraces culture and ideology. It has long been the home of many fine,
respected intellectuals and creative artists, rightly admired by everybody. Its mastery extends to the symbolic level, lending it what
Max Weber calls charismatic domination. The US has taken control of vocabulary, concepts and meaning in many fields. We have to
formulate the problems it invents in the words it offers. It provides the codes to decipher enigmas it created. It has set up many re-
search centers and think-tanks just for this, employing thousands of analysts and experts. These eminent bodies produce reports on
legal, social and economic issues with a perspective that supports the ideal of the free market, the world of business and the global
Wielding the might of
economy. Their lavishly funded work attracts media attention and is broadcast the world over.....
information and technology, the US establishes, with the passive complicity of the people it
dominates, affable oppression or delightful despotism. And this is the more effective because the culture
industries it controls capture our imagination. The US uses its know-how to people our dreams with media heroes, Trojan horses sent
to invade our brains. Only 1% of the films shown in the US are foreign productions, while Hollywood floods the world. Close behind
come television series, cartoons, videos and comics, fashion, urban development and food. The faithful gather to worship the new
icons in malls—temples to the glory of consumption. All over the world these centers promote the same way of life, in a world of
All this
logos, stars, songs, idols, brands, gadgets, posters and celebrations (like the extraordinary spread of Halloween in France).
is accompanied by the seductive rhetoric of freedom of choice and consumer liberty, backed by
obsessive, omnipresent advertising (annual advertising expenditure in the US exceeds $200bn) that has as much to do with symbols as
with goods. Marketing has become so sophisticated that it aims to sell not just a brand name or social sign, but an identity. It’s all
based on the principle that having is being. . .. The American empire has mastered symbols and seduction. Offering unlimited leisure
and endless distraction, its hypnotic charm enters our minds and instils ideas that were not ours. America does not seek our submission
by force, but by incantation. It has no need to issue orders, for we have given our consent. There is no need for threats, as it wins
because of our thirst for pleasure.”37 I do not present this statement as decisive evidence of what is going on in the world. Its interest
by having “to formulate the problems [America] invents in the
lies in the explanation it offers of how,
words [America] offers,” global society adapts to a stronger, more modern language—in
which the equal right to pleasure can be articulated as America’s project of secular
redemption.38 Ramonet’s recognition that the desire to do as one In an essay on flexible capitalism at the close of the twentieth
century, Richard Sennett has argued that the highly unstable conditions of work in America are making a
coherent narrative of the self—and therefore the realization of “character”—increasingly
difficult.42 It is possible (although this is not Sennett’s argument) that this new stage in the growing anxiety
about the private self is not unconnected to the increasing insistence on the redemptive
quality of human rights at a global level. When the secularist ideological order separating
public politics from private belief is seen to crumble, the new terrain is occupied by a
discourse of human rights that can be taken as either sacred or profane . Canovan’s appeal to myth to
defend the liberal project of human rights (see Chapter 1), King’s appeal to universal brotherhood and human dignity under God, the
U.S. government’s global project to free both belief and property , and Nussbaum’s cel-
ebration of the capabilities of the sovereign human are all variations of this discourse.
K comes first
Epistemological and ontological questions about human rights must be asked
and engaged with first if human rights are to have any political efficacy.
p. 260-261)
This, then, is a call for direct engagement with all the deep metaphysical questions when
theorists attempt to articulate the ontology of human rights. It is not enough to claim that
human rights are social practices embedded in our global way of life —undoubtedly true though this
is60—nor that rights signify nothing more than modes of rights talk. Rights that are nothing more than talk, and practices which have
no virtue other than that they are what we presently do, have no persuasive power.61 The
ontology of human rights
must reach beyond these to a vision of human being which is able to garner authority and force
in human affairs. There is great opportunity here, in this post-modern, post-liberal and postsecular global moment. If
human rights are not to become intellectually passe´ once again, mere political tools to be
manipulated at whim, theorists must be prepared to forge a new case for human rights based on engaging the
big metaphysical questions with philosophical rigour and a legitimate faith in a high anthropology. This engagement is
needed to articulate our reasons for supposing there are grounds for a high human anthropology, an anthropology which may provide
hope to challenge the pathological and nihilistic anti-human doctrines which otherwise structure the human realm.
NGO CP
Uyghur NGOs abroad solve
University, “The Securitization of the Uyghur Question and Its Challenges” p25- 26)
Finally, it is necessary to open a channel for communication between Uyghurs in XUAR and the
State in order to voice the problems and meet the demands of Uyghurs. Such a channel would allow for the creation of a platform
for dialogue that would lead to finding a peaceful solution . At this point in time, communication
channels that should exist between the Uyghur people and the State of China are fully blocked. Moreover, the serious
problem of mutual trust is undeniable, as it presently appears impossible for the Beijing administration to rebuild
confidence in relations with Uyghurs in the short-term. The fates of people who make straightforward
criticisms and suggestions about opening policies implemented in both XUAR and the rest of China have already created
an auto-censorship mechanism amongst Uyghurs. Thus, it currently seems unrealistic to expect an effective result
from direct interaction between the State and Uyghurs. In addition to this, previous mistreatment of Uyghur opinion
leaders does not create a positive picture. The fate of Uyghur economy professor Tohti in Beijing, who was very well
integrated with the Chinese society, is a warning for all intellectuals who might otherwise make positive contributions to the issue in
XUAR. The detention of Ilham Tohti, his indictment on charges of separatism and cooperation with terrorist organizations,
and his sentence of life in prison after writing articles that argue that the problems in XUAR cannot be reduced to terrorism, have
seriously damaged relations between Uyghur intellectuals and Chinese government. Considering the
difficulty of dialogue with Uyghurs in the region and their lack of political representation, Uyghur organizations active
abroad and human rights organizations can be the key actors in helping to overcome the crisis of confidence
between the Uyghur people and the Chinese administration and should serve as a starting point for dialogue to
address Uyghur demands. In order to develop a channel of interaction with the Uyghur people, it is critical for the State of
China to engage with organizations representing the Uyghurs. The international community and interested countries should work,
either directly or indirectly, with the NGOs to have their role and contributions acknowledged by China so that a mutual trust between
the parties can begin to form. The resolution process can only begin after the Chinese administration takes these steps and this will be
possible through the efforts of sympathetic Chinese citizens, interested groups, and courageous politicians and bureaucrats. As
previously mentioned, although every group that takes part in this conflict plays an important role, the greatest responsibility rests
with the Beijing administration which should confront the problem and begin to discuss its source. If China does not take these steps,
Uyghurs will continue to suffer under repressive policies, and the cycle of violence will turn into
an ethnic gangrene in XUAR. Although Uyghurs will be the party most affected by such violence, the Chinese
administration, an aspiring candidate for power on the international stage, will also pay a heavy price. As long as China
regards minority communities living in the country as a threat, it will be very hard for the country
to project any power. Furthermore, the “Chinese Dream,” which is a personal interest of Xi Jingping, and the soft power that
China has been trying to mirror for so long, will not be achieved by an administration that pressures and persecutes its own
community and citizens. No one will benefit from a reality in which people flee China and seek shelter in other countries while the
Chinese government tries to bring them back by exerting diplomatic and military efforts. Unless a harmony of social
texture, as the complementary of economic power, is reached, China will be destined to remain a fragmented
society; and the artificial the images of harmony China tries to portray will stand out in every incident that occurs in XUAR. At this
juncture, positive steps towards the Uyghur problem will lead to a win-win situation and create an
opportunity for China to fix her damaged international image. To waste this opportunity by intensifying the
policies that China has tried and failed before will mean a strategic blunder for a global power. If China continues to spend her energy
to deny the problem rather than to acknowledge and settle it, the problem will only endure.

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Uyghur Affs—BAM Lab

BAM lab—cards in the policy version and the K version may be

Russian aggression risks miscalc and WW3

Norms and institution-based cooperation is independently key to manage

Current US strategy of containing China fails; engagement with

Hegemonic decline of the US creates instability and mistrust, increasing

Central Asian conflict draws in great powers and goes nuclear

it is not only the great powers: US,

The nature of the threat has changed—as infrastructure develops, further

Chinese economic collapse leads to war - miscalculation and lash out

Expanding bilateral human rights engagement offers redress to Uyghur

Hegemonic decline of the US creates instability and mistrust, increasing risk

Adapting to China’s “new normal” of lowered GDP growth

Chinese economic collapse goes global

Uyghurs can’t handle the issue without intervention—China cracks down

Other HR violations tank

gives the West—if it so chooses—the best possible

him. After all, we’ve got his money.

EU intervention solves Central Asian instability

The new EU Strategy on Central Asia is a strong sign of the

Regional forums solve

Chinese economy resilient

Alt causes subsume

Status quo bilateral dialogue is insufficient—Uyghurs are increasingly

This narrative of threat construction criminalizes Uyghur dissent for the

Auto-immunity is an existential threat—it’s on another level from all other

In the face of sovereign auto-immunity, it is more important than ever to

However, this traditionally Eurocentric logic of autoimmunity is itself

Autoimmunity means harmony is always at conflict with itself. It is

Chinese government’s concern over Xingjiang uncovers Islamicphobia

Islamicphobia rhetoric now target Uyghur in the so-called “deveiling effort”

Chinese government uses “Project Beauty” as propaganda to erase the

Government propagandas like “Project Beauty” and “Five-Steps method”

Uyghur women are subject to extrajudicial threat of arrest, fines, and

Their speech doesn’t begin from a perspective of infinite responsibility, which

You should vote affirmative in a moment that forsakes attempts to control

The fact that policy

Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is popular, which provides him with PC to do

Xi’s PC is very high now

Concentration of power and economic slowdown leaves Xi vulnerable to

Foreign policy doesn’t affect elections

The plan begins a chain of equivalence with universal potential – human

There is no better version of harmony- attempting to improve harmony

China is afraid of allowing outside forces to influence Xinjiang – intervention

US doesn’t have the diplomatic pull to do the plan – current US-China

Aff is a double turn—Refusal to provide a concrete political proposal that

The logic of redemptive politics underlies genocidal campaigns

Unconditional hospitality leaves us unable to cope with the radically hostile

Derrida’s examination of unconditionalhospitality belongs to a discourse demanding that hospitality be

Unconditional hospitality is impossible – it inevitably totalizes the Other and

Although ethically it is unconditional, one

Util doesn’t preclude compassion—it minimizes violence

Low risk is still a risk—evaluating magnitude doesn’t rig the game

Human rights ensnare the subject in state power

Human rights norms are an attempt to fix a universalized Western notion of

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