Achieving Acculturation in Mergers and Acquisitions: An International Case Survey

02larsson (ds) 11/1/01 11:57 AM Page 1573
Human Relations
[0018-7267(200112)54:12]
Volume 54(12): 1573–1607: 020487
Copyright © 2001
The Tavistock Institute ®
SAGE Publications
London, Thousand Oaks CA,
New Delhi
Achieving acculturation in mergers and

acquisitions: An international case survey
Rikard Larsson and Michael Lubatkin
A B S T R AC T Various explanations have been suggested concerning the causes of

‘cultural clashes’ and prescriptions for harmoniously integrating the
beliefs and values of merging firms. Using a form of meta-analysis
known as a case survey design, which combines the ideographic rich-
ness of case studies with the statistical generalizability of larger
samples, and a sample consisting of 50 mergers and acquisitions (23
US domestic, 15 Swedish domestic and 12 Swedish cross-border),
we found that acculturation is best achieved when the buying firms
rely on social controls. That is, by participating in such activities as
introduction programs, training, cross-visits, retreats, celebrations and
similar socialization rituals, employees will create, of their own
volition, a joint organizational culture regardless of expectations of
synergies, the relative organization size and differences in nationali-
ties and cultures. A post hoc analysis of a proposed integration
control typology further suggests that social controls also indirectly
influence acculturation by acting in concert with formal integrative
efforts.
KEYWORDS acculturation international case survey mergers and

acquisitions
Editor’s note: This paper received the Carolyn Dexter Award as the Best
International Paper submitted to the 2001 Academy of Management meet-
ings.
1573
1574 Human Relations 54(12)
Acculturation in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) is the outcome of a

cooperative process whereby the beliefs, assumptions and values of two pre-
viously independent work forces form a jointly determined culture. Not sur-
prisingly, achieving acculturation represents a major post-acquisition
challenge to acquiring firms. It has been discussed in terms of person–
organization fit (O’Reilly et al., 1991), social anthropology (Cartwright &
Cooper, 1992, 1993a, 1993b; Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988), relational
demography (Jackson et al., 1991), the attraction–selection–attrition para-
digm (Schneider, 1987), social movements (David, 1977), relative standing
(Hambrick & Cannella, 1993) and national culture differences (Very et al.,
1997; Weber et al., 1996). These complementary theories help to explain why
people at the acquired unit often face considerable pressure to conform to
the values and management practices of the buyer, why these pressures tend
to be resisted and the consequences of that resistance (Haspeslagh & Jemison,
1991; Schweiger & Weber, 1989).
Often referred to as ‘cultural clash,’ resistance results in lower com-
mitment and cooperation among acquired employees (Buono et al., 1985;
Sales & Mirvis, 1984), greater turnover among acquired managers (Ham-
brick & Cannella, 1993; Lubatkin et al., 1999), a decline in shareholder value
at the buying firm (Chatterjee et al., 1992) and a deterioration in operating
performance at the acquired firm (Very et al., 1997; Weber, 1996). For
example, a Booz Hamilton (1985) survey of 200 European chief executive
officers (CEOs) found that the ability to integrate organizational cultures (i.e.
achieve acculturation) is more important to merger success than financial or
strategic factors.
Given the importance ascribed to achieving acculturation in M&As, it
is striking how little empirical evidence exists about the determinants of suc-
cessful and unsuccessful acculturation. In large part, this may be due to diffi-
culties in obtaining data from broad cross-sections of acquisition cases,
which involve personally and politically sensitive subject matter. Conse-
quently, most of what we know about acculturation as a dependent variable
comes from qualitative investigations that have relied on small samples, often
a single case study – hardly the size necessary for drawing robust general-
izations. Cartwright and Cooper’s (1992, 1993a, 1993b) studies stand out as
the exception. Using data gathered from more than 150 formal interviews
and 600 questionnaires, their field studies of four M&As (three in the UK
and one cross-national) show that pre-merger cultural attributes play the
major role in determining post-merger acculturation.
Drawing empirical generalizations from a sample of 50 M&A cases in
several countries, we treat acculturation as a dependent variable and examine
its statistical relationship with six theoretically linked determinants. We also
Larsson & Lubatkin Achieving acculturation in M&A 1575
illustrate the utility of the case survey method for overcoming some of the
empirical barriers that have thus far severely limited the sample size of
acculturation research. Because it combines in-depth case study richness
with larger sample breadth (Bullock & Tubbs, 1987; Larsson, 1993a), this
rarely used form of meta-analysis is well suited for investigating complex
organizational phenomena such as acculturation, as it captures a broad
range of relatively detailed constructs without limiting the number of
observations.
Whereas Cartwright and Cooper (1992, 1993a, 1993b) studied accul-
turation and the psychological impact on individual employees in M&As, we
examine alternative explanations to acculturation outcomes using organiz-
ational, strategic and national factors. All four of their M&A cases represent
horizontal combinations and only one involved a non-UK firm. Our sample,
ranging from horizontal to unrelated combinations, consists of two cross-
sections of domestic mergers (US acquiring US; Swedish acquiring Swedish)
and one cross-section of cross-national mergers (Swedish acquiring non-
Swedish). Cross-national mergers are particularly interesting because they
bring together two firms not only with different organizational cultures, but
also with organizational cultures that are nested in different national cultures
(Very et al., 1997; Weber et al., 1996). Cartwright and Cooper’s cases took
place during the same year (1990). Case survey methodology allows us to
sample cases over three decades, thereby enabling tests of the robustness of
the findings over time. Finally, whereas the integration period examined in
their cases ranged from six to 18 months, our sample consists of cases with
a minimum of one full year of studied integration period and an average of
more than three years.
Our findings suggest a different and more optimistic view of accul-
turation than that reported by Cartwright and Cooper. They found post-
merger acculturation to be largely predetermined by pre-merger cultural
attributes and therefore outside management’s control during the inte-
gration process; we find that achieving acculturation depends mainly upon
how the buying firm manages the informal integration process (i.e. its
reliance on ‘social controls,’ or the amount of coordination and socializa-
tion efforts expended by the buying firm). Further, this finding is robust: it
held regardless of the expectations of synergies (merger relatedness), rela-
tive organizational size and differences in nationalities and culture. Finally,
a post hoc analysis of an integration control typology suggests that social
controls also seem to also have an indirect and positive influence on accul-
turation, by acting in concert with formal integrative efforts (autonomy
removal).
Theory and hypotheses
Organizational culture represents an imperfectly shared system of inter-

related understandings that is shaped by its members’ shared history and
expectations. Most definitions of culture focus on the beliefs, assumptions
and values that members of a group share about rules of conduct, leadership
styles, administrative procedures, rituals and customs (Schein, 1985).
However defined, organizational culture is an important influence on an indi-
vidual’s commitment, satisfaction, productivity and longevity within a group
or organization (O’Reilly et al., 1991), because individuals tend to select
groups that they perceive as having values similar to their own while trying
to avoid dissimilar others (Jackson et al., 1991; Schneider, 1987). Good
person–group fit forms a psychological bond that is not easily broken.
The full power of this fit can be seen when two different cultures are
brought into close contact with each other, as typically happens when two
firms merge. In general, M&As are ‘surrounded in an aura of conquest’ in
which considerable pressure is placed on managers of the acquired firm to
break existing bonds and comply with beliefs, assumptions and values of the
buying firm (Hambrick & Cannella, 1993; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991).
Indeed, Cartwright and Cooper (1993b) note that, without exception, all the
acquisitions they studied were of this conquest type, which they labeled a
‘redesign merger’ (according to the integration typology of Napier, 1989).
Applying Frank’s (1985) theory of ‘relative standing’ to redesign mergers,
Hambrick and Cannella observed that ‘the acquired managers are placed in
a new social setting in which comparisons to their acquirers, as well as com-
parisons to their prior situation are inevitable and salient’ (1993: 736). Once
‘big fish in a small pond,’ acquired executives may feel a strong sense of alien-
ation with their new proximate group, inferior in status to the acquiring top
managers and/or unappreciated by them; they suffer from ‘superiority syn-
drome’ (Mirvis & Marks, 1992).
Not all integration efforts, however, result in conflict and tension. In
the following sections, we review six theorized determinants of acculturation,
covering both the ‘managerial’ aspects of organization and strategy (auton-
omy removal, merger relatedness and relative size) and the more
‘human–sociological’ aspects (social controls, national culture, cross-
nationality). Although by no means an exhaustive model of achieved accul-
turation, not limiting the hypotheses to either managerial or human–
sociological aspects allows us to overcome previous fragmentation between
different schools of M&A research such as strategy, finance, economics and
human resource management (cf. Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). As
Schweiger and Walsh (1990: 82) put it: ‘if an understanding of the human
resource and financial consequences of M&A activity is to improve,

researchers must begin to examine these various factors concurrently. The
under-specified fragmented approach to research in this area has only yielded
conundrums and equivocal results.’
Removal of autonomy
Hambrick and Cannella (1993) define ‘removal of autonomy’ as the degree
to which the strategy, systems and procedures associated with the manage-
ment of the acquired company are removed from their discretion. Although
prevailing theory suggests that buying firms may minimize acculturative
problems by allowing the acquired firm a high degree of autonomy (Weber
et al., 1996),1 this rarely happens, even in conglomerate acquisitions (e.g. see
Sales & Mirvis, 1984) because the motivation to acquire usually stems from
the buyer’s belief that it can utilize the acquired firm’s physical and human
capital more efficiently. Even when the firm is operationally autonomous, the
acquired top management team is likely to comply with respect to strategic
planning, financial reporting and budgeting requirements, which can lead to
considerable pressure to conform to the buyer’s management practices
(Schweiger & Weber, 1989). Acquired managers may be forced to surrender
their familiar administrative practices, negotiate decisions that previously
they had full authority to make and look to the buying firm for approval
(Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). This all serves to diminish the acquired exec-
utives’ perceptions of their relative standing. The more that autonomy is
restricted, the more likely that acquired executives will feel dominated by,
and inferior to, the acquiring executives, and therefore the more likely that
acculturative problems will be incurred (Cartwright & Cooper, 1992,
1993b). Stated formally:
Hypothesis 1: The more autonomy that is removed from the acquired
firm, the less likelihood of achieving post-acquisition acculturation, all
other things being the same.
Merger relatedness
The annals of corporate management are dotted with previous failed
attempts of closely related mergers to capitalize on economies of scale and
scope, due to what Lubatkin and Lane (1996) referred to as ‘family feuds.’
Specifically, the more the products, markets and technologies of the two busi-
nesses overlap, the greater the expectation of synergistic returns, but the
greater the potential of acculturative conflict, because synergies generally
require a high level of integration of human resources (Salter & Weinhold,
1979). Related value activities may be consolidated, people uprooted and

work groups broken apart. As Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) note, those
who are held responsible for creating economic value from the merger often
end up being the ones whose own non-economic value is destroyed. Further,
close contact can heighten sensitivities to, and intolerance for, organizational
differences. These problems should be less apparent in unrelated (non-
synergistic) mergers, because they have little need to integrate (Shrivastava,
1986). Consistent with these arguments:
Hypothesis 2: The more closely related the merging firms, the less like-
lihood of achieving post-acquisition acculturation, all other things
being the same.
Relative size
Hambrick and Cannella (1993: 740) link the size of the acquired firm rela-
tive to its buyer and the relative standing of the acquired executives: ‘A small
acquisition presents Frank’s classic case of a big fish in a small pond suddenly
becoming a very small fish in a big pond.’ Executives may feel relatively unim-
portant in the new power structure, which can result in an unwillingness to
conform to the culture of the buying firm. Small relative size may have other
adverse effects. In addition, Walter (1985) asserts that when the acquired firm
is small relative to the buyer, the human needs of the acquired firm tend to
become overlooked or trivialized by the buyer. Alienation breeds its own
source of acculturative problems. Thus:
Hypothesis 3: The smaller the acquired firm relative to the size of the
buying firm, the less the likelihood of achieving post-acquisition accul-
turation, all other things being the same.
Social controls
Merging firms not only lack the physical and mental segregation from the
‘old’ cultures that tends to be required for what Berger and Luckmann (1966)
call ‘reality alterations,’ they also lack the joint socialization mechanisms that
are built into each firm’s corporate culture (Larsson, 1990). By changing the
name of the acquired firm, as well as its formal structure, top management
team, operations and reward systems, the buying firm can try to impose its
beliefs, assumptions and values onto the acquired firm. However, Cartwright
and Cooper (1992, 1993b) note that these structural assaults represent
win/lose scenarios that are predictably resented and often resisted, for they
signal a general disregard for the legitimacy of the acquired firm’s culture. It
follows that the more the buying firm uses formal integrating mechanisms to
impose its culture onto the acquired firm, the less likely that acculturation
will be achieved. Conversely, the more the buying firm relies on social con-
trols (i.e. joint socialization or ‘shared experiences’), the greater the chance
of achieving acculturation. According to the Bartlett and Ghoshal model of
the emerging change process (1995: 485), lasting change in the organization’s
beliefs and values (i.e. its psychology or culture) is best achieved by placing
attention first on social controls (physiology) and last on formal controls
(anatomy).
Social controls are by intent non-authoritarian and informal. They
include those coordination efforts such as transition teams and task forces,
which stress cooperation, informal communication and teamwork. Whereas
formal, hierarchical controls tend to treat the acquired firm as the conquered,
social controls recognize the legitimate beliefs of the acquired firm and there-
fore treat it as a partner (Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989; Van Maanen & Schein,
1979). As such, they are the mechanism by which pre-merger realities, such
as mutually negative stereotyping, are altered (cf. Marks & Mirvis, 1986)
and a new, jointly determined reality is constructed. Thus, if acculturation is
a continually emergent phenomenon based on interaction, then social con-
trols represent the buying firm’s attempts to ensure that those interactions
take place. In the words of Buono et al. (1985):
Since subjective culture evolves over time as a product of shared experi-

ence, when attempting to merge two firms, the greater the number of
these shared experiences that can be reproduced within a period of
time, the faster a repertoire of symbols and shared meanings will
develop which the merged group of members can begin to identify and
new culture can begin to take hold.
(p. 498)
It therefore follows that:

Hypothesis 4: The less that the buying firm uses social controls, the less
likelihood of achieving post-acquisition acculturation, all other things
being the same.
Interestingly, while many have theorized a link between social controls
and acculturation, that link has not yet been empirically verified. Cartwright
and Cooper (1992, 1993b) found acculturation (which they treated as a
dependent variable) was largely predetermined by pre-merger cultural attrib-
utes. One possible explanation why they did not report any findings regard-
ing social controls may be that their sample consists largely of ‘redesign
mergers’ (i.e. those that rely primarily on formal integrative controlling
mechanisms). Alternatively, if their sample is representative of the population
of all mergers, then we can expect to find very little variance in our measure
of social controls for the simple reason that very few buying firms use them.
The independent effects of nation

Much cross-cultural literature uses national boundaries as a convenient
synonym for a culture and administrative heritage (Bartlett & Ghoshal,
1995; Lubatkin et al., 1998). Clearly this concept is somewhat atheoretical
and imprecise, as no nation is so pure that all of its members share a single
dominant viewpoint of how ‘things ought to be’ (Schein, 1985) and how
‘things ought to be done’ (Bjur & Zommorrodian, 1986). Nevertheless,
members of a nation share a common set of historical experiences and insti-
tutions that shape their administrative preferences, for example, as geogra-
phy, climate, economy, political system, racial mix, media mix, language,
educational systems and many other intangibles; the result is a unique admin-
istrative style (Calori et al., 1997) that is more clearly apparent to foreigners
than to the nationals themselves (Hofstede, 1980). Further, Laurent (1983)
found evidence that national managerial differences tend to be at least as pro-
nounced among managers working with the same multinational firm as they
are among managers working for firms from their native lands.
Consider the Swedish influence. In contrast to the US, Sweden has an
ethnically and culturally homogenous population of about eight million.
Whereas the Anglo-American heritage fosters equality, individual responsi-
bility and competition (Calori et al., 1997), Sweden emphasizes egalitarian-
ism, collective responsibility and cooperation (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1993;
Tornblom et al., 1985). This is reflected in the tight linkages known as cor-
porativism that formed years ago among the state, capital and labor and
endured until the mid-1980s (Lash & Urry, 1987; Marshall, 1996). For
example, a powerful coalition began with the Salsjobad deal in 1938, when
the two parties agreed to negotiate all future disagreements peacefully
through collective bargaining.
Also, the Swedish government has been controlled almost without
interruption for 60 years by the Social Democrats, a party founded on the
ideology of consensus decision-making and symbolized by the concept of the
‘people’s home’ (i.e. a society characterized by solidarity, respect and
responsibility). From a US perspective, it is difficult to fathom how any politi-
cal institution could retain power for over two generations without showing
signs of corruption, lost ideology and diminished societal legitimacy, but this
has not happened in Sweden. Indeed, in the most recent election, 89 percent
of all eligible voters appeared at the polling stations, resulting in yet another
win for the Social Democrats.
Sweden’s highly progressive tax structure institutionalizes its egali-

tarian beliefs by giving it one of the tightest income distributions in the
Western world. Finally, Swedish ideology is apparent by the laissez-faire
manner in which economic transactions are governed. Whereas in the US,
economic transactions are presumed to require enforced compliance based
on individual opportunism, in Sweden they are governed more by jointly
negotiated agreements (Larsson, 1993b), long-term considerations of
resource dependence (Johanson & Mattsson, 1987) and voluntary compli-
ance (Collin, 1993).
In summary, Sweden and the US appear to differ by some enduring nor-
mative characteristics. The point of presenting these differences, however, is
not to stereotype but rather to show how these differences might affect the
ability of buying firms to achieve acculturation in mergers. Nations, and more
specifically, their institutions, should affect the norms by which buying firms
manage the post-acquisition process. From a research point of view, a
nation’s many influences on achieved acculturation might be latent con-
structs, hard to specify empirically, but also hard to deny. Nevertheless, we
expect that Swedish buying firms are more likely to achieve acculturation
than American buying firms, everything else held constant, assuming that
Swedish firms represent a microcosm of Swedish society, thus reflecting its
beliefs. Similarly, we expect that Swedish firms are more likely than US firms
to govern the post-acquisition process in ways that minimize ‘cultural
clashes’ and improve the likelihood of achieving acculturation (e.g. egalitar-
ianism, collective responsibility, cooperation, jointly negotiated agreements
and voluntary compliance). In contrast, we expect that US firms are less likely
to achieve acculturation because they govern the process through individual-
istic opportunism, competition and enforced compliance.
Hypothesis 5: Swedish buying firms are more likely to achieve post-
acquisition acculturation than are US buying firms, all other things
being the same.
Cross-national mergers
Cross-national mergers are particularly interesting because they bring
together two companies with different organizational cultures, that are them-
selves nested in different national cultures. Weber et al. (1996) found that
national culture differences had a stronger positive association with post-
merger stress and negative attitudes about the merger, and a stronger nega-
tive association with actual cooperation, than did organizational culture
differentials.
It follows, therefore, that the level of achieved post-acquisition
acculturation will be higher in domestic mergers (US acquiring US, Swedish

acquiring Swedish) than in cross-national mergers (Swedish acquiring non-
Swedish), for the source of cultural differences in domestic mergers is
expected to be organizational in nature. This is not to say that it is easy for
the buying firm to achieve acculturation, for many examples exist of cultural
collisions involving domestic mergers. However, our expectation is that
cross-national mergers are more challenging, simply because the sources of
cultural differences are both organizational and national.
Hypothesis 6: Domestic mergers are more likely to achieve post-
acquisition acculturation than are cross-national mergers, all other
things being the same.
In summary, we reviewed six hypothesized determinants of accultura-
tion. While four (H2: relatedness, H3: relative size, H5: nationality and H6:
cross-nationality) are pre-integration period concepts (i.e. they are deter-
mined during the time frame at or before the date of the merger), two (H1:
autonomy removal and H4: social controls) are meaningful only in the post-
merger integration period. Finally, the dependent variable (achieved accul-
turation) refers to the amount of acculturation achieved by the end of the
integration period depicted in the case.
Methods
Mergers and acquisitions have been investigated with a number of different

research lenses (e.g. strategy, organization and human resources), resulting in
a fragmented set of insights (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999; Schweiger &
Walsh, 1990). Strategic investigations typically use existing databases and/or
questionnaires to test performance effects quantitatively through cross-
sectional surveys. However, this nomothetic research design precludes the
inclusion of organizational processes, which affect the ‘human side’ of an
M&A. In contrast, organizational and human resource investigations often
focus on these ‘softer’ processes, using longitudinal case studies to gain a
more in-depth understanding of the human side of one or a very few M&As.
Unfortunately, this ideographic design is limited in its ability to investigate
strategic and international issues, which normally require larger samples.
Even though the ideographic case design has substantial interpretive advan-
tages in addressing cultural issues, it is also limited in cross-cultural research
given the practical difficulties of multination access (e.g. site access, travel,
language, etc.).
The case survey method, which is a form of meta-analysis, offers a
means to attain the benefits of both types of research designs, should many
case studies be available (Yin & Heald, 1975). Case surveys, which allow
researchers quantitatively to pool information from a large sample of
relevant cases (Larsson, 1993a; Lucas, 1974), represent a medium-grained
methodology, for they combine the generalizability of course-grained
methods (e.g. cross-sectional analysis using large databases) with the detail
of fine-grained methodologies (e.g. individual case studies). They also repre-
sent a practical alternative to questionnaire design when addressing such sen-
sitive organizational issues as acculturation that ordinarily yield low response
rates (Ansoff et al., 1971; Datta, 1991), are subject to ex post rationaliza-
tions (Miller & Friesen, 1977, 1980) and involve complex organizational
processes (Bullock & Lawler, 1985; Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999; Mintzberg
et al., 1975). Case surveys can be particularly resource-effective for making
international in-depth comparisons between cases from different countries.
After selecting a sample of relevant cases, a coding scheme is developed to
convert qualitative case descriptions into quantified variables; multiple raters
then code each case in order to assess inter-rater reliability.
Sample
When constructing our sample, we followed Bullock and Tubbs (1987), who
recommended casting a wide net for potential cases to avoid premature exclu-
sion of studies based on arbitrary a priori judgments about their methodo-
logical rigor, publication status or age. Our search of M&A case catalogs,
reference lists, computer searchers and bibliographies yielded an initial list of
roughly 500 US and Swedish cases that took place between 1959 and 1988.
Of these, 60 were deemed to be adequate in terms of the relevance and com-
pleteness of their content after a careful screening to ensure that the case
study:
1 described a specific merger or acquisition;
2 contained at least two pages of description on strategic, organizational
and HRM issues;
3 described at least one year of post-merger integration efforts.
Ten cases were subsequently deleted during the data coding stage because of
insufficient information on key variables. The final sample of 50 cases
(described in Appendix A) consisted of 23 US domestic M&As, 15 Swedish
domestic M&As and 12 Swedish cross-national cases.
Testing for possible sampling bias using a series of t-tests to compare
our list with various listings of US and European mergers (e.g. Montgomery
& Wilson, 1986; US Federal Trade Commission, 1978) revealed no signifi-
cant differences in acquisition type, relative size and incidence of subsequent
sell-offs. Hence, we concluded that our list adequately represented the
general population of M&As that existed during the 30-year time frame of
our study, with one possible exception; six cases from our list came from the
service sector. Although this low number is insufficient to make adequate
comparisons with mergers from the manufacturing sector, recent evidence
suggests that service sector mergers are more sensitive to issues of accultur-
ation, given the fact that these firms tend to be more human asset intensive.
For example, Pablo (1994) found that issues of cultural compatibility have a
more important influence on integration design decisions in service sector
mergers than in the manufacturing sector. According to Weber (1996), per-
ceived cultural differences had a significant impact on integration of bank
M&As, but not of manufacturing M&As. Similarly, Lubatkin et al. (1999)
found that cultural compatibility is more important in explaining turnover
in service sector mergers, whereas autonomy removal is more important in
manufacturing firms. Because service sector mergers represent 12 percent of
our total sample and may contribute a degree of uncertainty to our research
design, we tested the sensitivity of our results to this possible bias.
Measures
Sixteen raters participated in the coding process, 12 of whom were the writers
of the cases and included leading M&A researchers such as F.M. Scherer and
Philip Mirvis. Other raters included two experienced M&A researchers and
two doctoral students. All but one of the M&A researchers were blind to the
research hypotheses. Thirty-seven cases were coded by three raters and at
least two non-writer raters coded all cases. The 12 case writers coded their
own cases (32 cases in total). Because of the writers’ first-hand knowledge,
we used their responses as benchmarks to validate the responses of the other
raters.
Responses to each item were scored on a 5-point coding scheme, plus
a sixth point for ‘insufficient information.’ Because some items could not be
reliably coded for all the mergers using the 5-point scale, we collapsed the
scales for those items to fewer points to maximize the amount of information
captured without making unnecessary sacrifices to reliability.
Dependent variable
We measured Achieved Acculturation as a single-item variable, defined as
the level of development of jointly shared meanings fostering cooperation
between joining firms towards the end of the studied integration period.
The score of ‘1’ on the scale indicates a very low level of acculturation
(described as continued strong cultural clashes and almost no emerged joint
organizational culture at the time marked by the end of the studied inte-
gration period of each case), whereas ‘5’ indicates the opposite.
It is interesting to note how the case survey-coding scheme is designed
differently from that used with questionnaire-based surveys. Survey designs
use coding schemes that maximize reliability, and therefore tend towards
more simplified, coarser gained schemes, even if these schemes lose infor-
mation in the process (e.g. Bullock & Tubbs, 1987). In contrast, case survey
schemes use coding schemes that maximize information, by initially using
finer grained coding schemes, coupled with post hoc empirical tests of each
scheme (Larsson, 1993a; Lucas, 1974). For example, when we found that
the 5-point scheme for any item did not capture the amount of fine-grained
information that it was intended to capture, we collapsed it to the point that
the distinctions are reliable. Further, when we found that the responses to
the original scale were skewed (e.g. 12 mergers on the acculturation items
were scored as very low and 10 mergers were scored as low, whereas only
six mergers were scored as high and only one merger as very high), we col-
lapsed the scale to a 3-point scale (1 = low, 2 = moderate, 3 = high), and
then tested the sensitivity of our results by running our statistical tests a
second time, using the uncollapsed 5-point scale. (These adjustments are
described in more detail in the section, ‘Reliability and Validity of the Data.’)
Excerpts from a few sample case write-ups help to illuminate the concept of
‘achieved acculturation’ and the kind of data that the case raters used to
score it.2
Independent variables
Autonomy Removal (H1) was measured with a 5-point scale (very low to
very high) using three items (see Appendix B for these and all other items
used in this study) regarding asymmetric change of control from one firm to
the other (typically from acquired to acquiring firm): (i) financial control (e.g.
imposed financial reporting, performance requirements and allocation of
investment decisions), (ii) administrative control (e.g. allocation of top
management positions, centralization of administrative functions and head-
quarters) and (iii) operational control (e.g. centralization of operational pro-
duction and marketing decisions). We collapsed the three items into an index
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.77). Examples abstracted from the case of Electrolux’s
acquisition of Zanussi and Montgomery Ward’s acquisition of Container
Corporation may help to illuminate the concept.3
Relatedness (H2) was measured with a 5-point scale (very low to very
high) using two items to estimate the strategic similarity of the joining firms:
(i) marketing similarity based on geographical markets, customer groups and
main industries; and (ii) production similarity based on production input,

process and product types. We collapsed the two items into an index (Cron-
bach’s alpha = 0.68).
Relative Size (H3) was estimated as the ratio of the acquired firms’
annual sales (alternatively, assets or employees) to that of the acquiring firm
at the point of legal combination. This item was originally scored with a 5-
point scale, but was collapsed for reasons of skewness into a 2-point scale,
such that ‘low Relative Size’ (coded as ‘1’) is when the acquired firm rep-
resents approximately less than 10 percent of the size of the acquiring firm
and ‘high Relative Size’ is when the acquired firm is greater than 10 percent.
Social Controls (H4) were measured with a 5-point scale (very low to
very high) and two items: (i) the coordinative efforts expended to enhance
synergy realization by adjusting the operational interaction between the
joining firms (e.g. special integrators, transition teams, management infor-
mation systems, integration plans, senior management involvement and tem-
porary personnel exchange/rotation); and (ii) the degree of socialization of
all employees in order to create a joint organizational culture through activi-
ties such as introduction programs, training and joint ‘get-togethers’ (e.g.
cross-visits, joint retreats, celebrations and other rituals). Excerpts from one
case help to illustrate the construct.4 We collapsed the two items into an index
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.74).
Nationality (H5) of the acquirer (US coded as ‘0’ and Sweden coded as
‘1’) was based on the location of the firm’s corporate headquarters prior to
the legal combination. Cross-Nationality of the M&A (H6) was classified as
domestic if the acquired firm was headquartered in the same country as the
acquirer (coded as ‘0’) and foreign if the headquarters were in different coun-
tries (coded as ‘1’). The control variable, Year, was estimated as the average
of the combination year and the last year of the studied integration period
and coded on a 5-point scale for different 5-year intervals, ranging from
before 1964 to 1980 or later.
Reliability and validity of the data

Despite their many advantages, case surveys may be subject to common
methods problems because of their reliance on subjective coding for all study
variables. Therefore, we conducted various tests of reliability and validity
where the data allowed. Three raters coded 37 cases, 32 of which involved
the case writer. We assessed inter-rater reliability for each case, excluding the
ratings from the case writers, which, given their first-hand knowledge, might
reflect a different perspective about the case. Using a pair-wise percent agree-
ment of codings across raters, we found an overall inter-rater reliability score
of 68.8 percent, where a score of at least 65 percent is deemed acceptable

(Jauch et al., 1980; Yin & Heald, 1975).
Following Lucas (1974), we used the case writers’ codings as external
benchmarks to assess the validity of the final coding provided by the non-
writers because the writers’ codings should be reasonably accurate. In
addition, there are few practical validation alternatives, as objective data at
the organizational level about post-acquisition phenomena is generally not
available. We used a dummy variable to test whether the cases that were
coded by non-authors (recorded as zero) introduced any bias relative to cases
coded by authors (recorded as one). Finding no significant difference suggests
that the interpretations of the secondary data from the non-author-coded
cases can be seen as representative of the interpretations of the primary data
from the author-coded cases.
Next, we followed Larsson (1993a) and Bullock and Tubb’s (1987)
consensus approach to eliminate coding differences among raters, which is
deemed superior to other decision rules (e.g. majority, average or expert)
because it enables the raters to meet and re-examine differences in coding.
Discussion allows new and pertinent information and perspectives not pre-
viously considered which could ultimately improve the reliability of the final
codings (e.g. the raters sometimes found it necessary jointly to determine
alternative ratings based on scales of fewer than 5 points). Raters were
allowed to question the case writers for any additional information other
than how they coded a particular item. In theory, the answers to these focused
questions should serve to enhance the validity and completeness of the final
set of codings.
We then performed several tests to establish further the validity of our
case coding, by comparing some independent variables from our question-
naire with objective data. For example, because 15 mergers from our list
involved US publicly traded firms, we compared our subjectively derived
measure of relatedness with the 4-digit SIC code-derived measure, known as
the ‘narrow spectrum’ (Lubatkin et al., 1993). The resulting Spearman corre-
lation statistic (r = .61; p < .05) suggests a high level of shared variance.
Because 10 mergers also appeared on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
‘Major Merger’ listing, we compared our relatedness measure with the FTC’s
merger classification scheme (1 = horizontal; 2 = vertical, product and market
concentric; 3 = unrelated) and again found a high level of convergence using
a Spearman test (r = .74; p < .001). We then compared our ‘relative size’
measure with the FTC’s measure for the same 10 cases and again found a
high level (90 percent) of agreement.
Finally, we performed limited validity tests on the dependent variable
(Achieved Acculturation), which we measured with a single item. First, we
assessed its statistical association with ‘Employee Resistance’, a construct

that Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) theorized and Schweiger and Weber
(1989) empirically found to be inversely associated with Achieved Accultur-
ation in M&As. Consistent with these studies, we defined this variable as the
active and passive opposition by employees against the integration process
(e.g. voice, voluntary exits, absenteeism, sabotage, etc., during the studied
integration period) and included this item in our original survey instrument.
Unfortunately, about 10 percent of the coded cases had missing data with
this item, leaving us with too small a sample size to include it as a second
dependent variable. Nevertheless, in the remaining cases, a correlation test
found that resistance and Achieved Acculturation captured a similar under-
lying concept in the expected inverse direction (r = –.62, p < .001).
Next, we tested the statistical association between Achieved Accultur-
ation and the change in the stock price of the buying firm that can be attrib-
uted to the merger, a market-based performance measure that Chatterjee et
al. (1992) theorized and found to be positively associated with culturally
similar merging firms. Following the familiar ‘event-study’ methodology, we
computed event study 5-day ‘abnormal returns’ measures (two trading days
before the day of first public announcement of the merger to two trading days
after the announcement) based on stock market data for the small number
of cases (11) in which the acquiring firm was publicly traded. Our dependent
variable (Achieved Acculturation) did a good job of explaining variance of
that stock market measure (r = .49; p < .001).
In summary, although each test of reliability and validity was limited
because of data availability, all revealed a consistent pattern of expected
results across different data sources and methods, suggesting that the case
survey methodology produces measures which can confidently be used for
hypotheses testing.
Results
Table 1 contains the means, standard deviations and Pearson correlation co-
efficients for all variables of interest. Four correlations among the indepen-
dent variables are in the .45 to .54 range, suggesting that multicollinearity
might be introduced into the parameter estimates of the regression model from
their individual and combined effects. Nevertheless, these four correlations
reveal expected patterns. Specifically, the more closely related the merging
firms, the smaller the acquired firm tends to be relative to the size of the buying
firm (r = .54), a reasonable finding in that most merger studies tend to find
that ‘unrelated’ mergers are larger than their related counterparts. This may
be because of a number of reasons, including antitrust enforcement practices

in the US during much of the time frame of this study’s sample. Not surpris-
ingly, therefore, the US mergers are more likely to be unrelated than Swedish
ones (r = .54). Related mergers also appear to be associated with higher levels
of Social Controls (r = .45), perhaps in the attempt to mitigate the likelihood
of ‘family feuds’ and unachieved acculturation. Finally and as expected given
the institutional heritage of Sweden, Swedish mergers are associated with
higher levels of Social Controls than are US mergers (r = .54).
Table 1 Descriptive statistics and Pearson's correlations
Variable Mean s.d. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Achieved Acculturation 1.75 0.69 .05 .05 .15 .40*** –.09 .00 .25+
2. Autonomy Removal 2.82 0.91 .23 .18 .21 .09 .23+ .25+
3. Merger Relatedness 6.64 2.29 .54*** .45*** .54*** .03 .28*
4. Relative Organ. Size 1.46 0.50 .34* .13 –.33* .18
5. Social Controls 4.72 1.99 .54*** .34* .32*
6. Nationality 1.54 0.50 .52*** .22
7. Cross-Nationality 0.24 0.43 .18
8. Year 4.02 1.00
+p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
Table 2 Regression analysis on Achieved Acculturation
Dependent variable Beta
Autonomy Removal (H1) –.07

Relatedness (H2) –.01
Relative Size (H3) –.01
Social Controls (H4) .61***
Nationality (H5) –.44*
Cross-Nationality (H6) .01
Year (Control) .17
Model
F-statistic 2.78**
R2 .32
N 50
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Table 2 presents the results for the OLS regression of the independent
variables on the level of achieved acculturation, while controlling for Year.
The regression model is significant (F = 2.78; p < .01) and explains a large
percentage of the variation (R2 = .32) in the dependent variable. Most of the
variance, however, is explained by two variables. Consistent with H4, the
relationship between the use of Social Control and Achieved (post-
acquisition) Acculturation is positive and highly significant (p < .000). Incon-
sistent with H5, Swedish buying firms are perceived to be less successful at
achieving acculturation than are US buying firms, in spite of the fact that the
correlation table associates them with generally higher levels of Social Con-
trols. No support was found for H1 (Autonomy Removal), H2 (Merger
Relatedness), H3 (Relative Size) and H6 (Cross-Nationality),5 nor does the
dependent variable appear sensitive to the control variable (Year).
Because problems of multicollinearity might be present in our regres-
sion model, we performed two post-hoc tests of the data. First, we ran a step-
wise analysis to allow the data to produce its own map of the key
relationships. The results were materially the same as that from OLS; i.e. the
step-wise stopped after two iterations and included in the final equation only
Social Control (p < .000) and Nation (p < .003), which by themselves
explained 29 percent of the variance in the dependent variable (F = 9.58; p
< .000). We then sub-grouped the data by the nation of the buying firm and
ran OLS and step-wise regressions on each subgroup. Each regression used
the same model as is presented in Table 2, minus, of course, the Nation
grouping variable.
The findings for Social Control appear robust across nations. With the
sub-sample of 23 ‘US-Domestic’ mergers, Social Control explains 42 percent
of the variance in Achieved Acculturation (p < .001) and is the only inde-
pendent variable significantly related to the dependent variable. Similarly,
with the sub-sample of 15 ‘Swedish-Domestic’ mergers, Social Controls
explains 46 percent of the variance in Achieved Acculturation (p < .006) and
is the only independent variable significantly related to the dependent vari-
able.
To compare the domestic and cross-national effects on Achieved Accul-
turation (H6), we sub-grouped the 27 Swedish mergers into ‘Swedish-
Domestic’ (n = 15) and ‘Swedish-Cross-National’ (n = 12). First, we per-
formed a simple t-test of mean Achieved Acculturation differences. Inconsis-
tent with (H6), we found that the average level of Achieved Acculturation
for Swedish-Domestic mergers (mean = 1.67; s.d. = .82) was not significantly
different (p < .13) from that for Swedish-Cross-National mergers (mean =
1.75; s.d. = .62). This is particularly interesting in light of Cartwright and
Cooper’s (1992, 1993b) finding about the salience of pre-combination
cultures to the ultimate attainment of acculturation, because we expected

that the pre-combination cultures of domestic mergers would be more similar
than their cross-national counterparts.
Recognizing from the tests of the previous five hypotheses that a large
percentage of the variance in Achieved Acculturation is explained by Social
Controls, we next ran a hierarchical regression to partial out the variance (R2
= .25) in the dependent variable attributed to Social Controls. Using a
zero/one dummy variable to distinguish the two sub-groups, we again found
no support for H6. Specifically, the Domestic/Cross-National dummy vari-
able explained virtually no residual variance (R2 = .003) in Achieved Accul-
turation residual variance.
We then did a limited test of a possible ‘service sector’ effect by re-
running our statistical tests on the data from the 44 manufacturing (non-
service) sector mergers. As might be expected owing to a reduced sample size
and the fact that manufacturing firms are less ‘human asset intensive;’ the
level of significance of the tests is somewhat lower. Nevertheless, results for
social controls remained strongly significant (p < .001), suggesting that the
overall results in Table 2 are robust.
Finally, recognizing the contrast between our findings and those of
Cartwright and Cooper (1992, 1993b), we did a limited exploration of pre-
merger cultural differences. Because we lacked direct measures of this pre-
merger concept, we selected three accepted proxies, Relatedness, Relative
Size and Cross-Nationality (e.g. Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Sales &
Mirvis, 1984; Very et al., 1997), reverse scoring the first two to reflect cul-
tural differences. We then partially controlled the expected imprecision of
each proxy by pooling them into a pre-merger ‘cultural difference’ index (i.e.
pooling averages away a portion of the variance in each measure that may
be extraneous to the focal concept). A Cronbach’s test reveals an alpha value
of .60, suggesting that three measures share an adequate level of internal con-
sistency. None of the correlations of this index with Social Control (r = –.08),
Achieved Acculturation (r = –.18) and Autonomy Removal (r = –.06)
approached significance at the .10 level, suggesting that core variables in our
study and therefore by inference our core findings, are not sensitive to pre-
merger cultural differences.
Post-hoc interaction test of social and formal controls

Up to this point, we investigated six hypothesized direct correlates of
Achieved Acculturation and found support only for Social Control. We will
now explore possible indirect effects from existing M&A typologies about
integrating mechanisms, such as redesign/collaborative (Cartwright &
Cooper, 1993b; Napier, 1989) and absorptive/symbiosis (Haspeslagh &

Jemison, 1991), which typically view informal (Social) controls and formal
controls (Autonomy Removal) as opposites. Buying firms that primarily use
informal controls trade off the ability directly to affect the degree and timing
of integration for acculturation, whereas those that primarily use formal con-
trols make the opposite trade-off of sacrificing some acculturation in order
directly to manage the integration process. But what of those buying firms
that use both forms of control? Might the two acting in concert impact accul-
turation differently than their direct effects? Will the negative effects of
Autonomy Removal that we hypothesized, but did not find, cancel out the
positive effects of the latter?
To explore answers to these questions, we constructed a 2 2 matrix
based on a median split (high, low) on each of the two control variables
(Figure 1). Quadrants were labeled as follows: High Autonomy
Removal/High Social (‘Dual Control’), High Autonomy Removal/Low Social
Control (‘Formal Control’), Low Autonomy Removal/High Social Control
(‘Social Control’) and Low Autonomy Removal/Low Social Control
(‘Laissez-Faire’). Note that Merger Relatedness and Relative Size are fairly
evenly distributed among all but the Laissez-faire quadrant, whose averages
are lower. Whereas the large majority (83 percent) of Swedish Cross-National
mergers are in the Dual Control quadrant, the majority of Swedish-
Domestic mergers (40 percent) are in the Social Controls quadrant and only
20 percent are in the Dual Controls quadrant. In contrast, US-Domestic
mergers tend towards either Laissez-Faire (43 percent) or Formal Controls
(30 percent). Finally, we observed that the average level of Achieved Accul-
turation seemed to differ; not surprisingly, given H1, the Formal Control
quadrant is associated with the lowest (1.3) level, but surprisingly the Dual
Control quadrant is associated with the highest (2.06) level. Accordingly, the
results suggest that the two forms of control complement each other in
achieving acculturation.
Based on this speculation, we ran a moderated regression. To simplify
the analysis, maximize degrees of freedom and test the separate and interac-
tive effects of Autonomy Removal and Social Controls, we deleted all
explanatory variables shown to be insignificant in previous runs. Thus,
regressing Nationality, Autonomy Removal and Social Controls against
Achieved Acculturation yields results comparable to Table 2. Specifically, the
model is strongly significant (F = 6.3, p < .001) and explains almost as much
variance (R = .29) as does the full model (R = .32). Both Nationality and
Social Controls are highly significant (p < .001), whereas Autonomy Removal
is not significant. We then entered into the regression model the interaction
of the two integrating control mechanisms and find that not only does the
Formal Controls Dual Controls
Total Number of Cases: 10 (20%) Total Number of Cases: 16 (32%)

US Domestic: 7 (30%) US Domestic: 3 (13%)
Swedish Domestic: 3 (20%) Swedish Domestic: 3 (20%)
High Swedish Cross-National: 0 Swedish Cross-National: 10 (83%)
Average Merger Relatedness: 7.1 Average Merger Relatedness: 7.1
Average Relative Size: 1.7 Average Relative Size: 1.4
Av. Achieved Accult.: 1.30 Av. Achieved Accult.: 2.06
Autonomy
Removal Laissez-Faire Social Controls
Total Number of Cases: 15 (30%) Total Number of Cases: 9 (18%)

US Domestic: 10 (43%) US Domestic: 3 (13%)
Swedish Domestic: 3 (20%) Swedish Domestic: 6 (40%)
Swedish Cross-National: 2 (17%) Swedish Cross-National: 0
Low Average Merger Relatedness: 5.1 Average Merger Relatedness: 7.8
Average Relative Size: 1.1 Average Relative Size: 1.8
Av. Achieved Accult.: 1.73 Av. Achieved Accult.: 1.78
Low Social Controls High
Figure 1 An integration control typology with case distribution and average achieved
acculturation
predictive power improve (F = 7.3), but the explanatory power of the model
significantly improves (R2 goes up to .39, a 34 percent increase). We are
struck by the explanatory power of this interactive model and the fact that
the interaction term has a positive relationship with Achieved Acculturation.
In addition to Social Controls having a direct effect on Achieved Accultura-
tion, it also seems to have an indirect effect by acting in concert with Auton-
omy Removal.
Based on the suggestion of one of the anonymous reviewers, we decon-

structed the Social Control index into its two original components (Coordi-
native Efforts and Degree of Socialization), because the Cronbach’s alpha
statistic for the two (.77) suggests enough internal consistency to create an
index, but also unshared variance. We took a median split of our sample on
the Formal Control variable (Autonomy Removal) and examined the
relationship between each Social Control variable and Achieved Accultura-
tion in each of the two Autonomy Removal sub-samples and found that
Coordinative Efforts appears to be driving the previously observed Formal
Control/Social Controls interaction. Specifically, in the high Autonomy
Removal sub-sample, both measures are strongly correlated with Achieved
Acculturation (.59, p < .001, for Coordinative Efforts; and .41, p < .05, for
the Degree of Socialization). However, in the low Autonomy Removal sub-
sample, Socialization is correlated with Achieved Acculturation (r = .41; p <
.05), whereas Coordinative Efforts is not (r = –.06). Put in practical terms,
Socialization is important for achieving acculturation, regardless of whether
the acquired unit is allowed to operate independently or not. However, when
an asymmetric change of financial, administrative and/or operational control
is attempted (i.e. the acquired firm is being required to relinquish its auton-
omy), Coordinative Efforts also become important.
Discussion and conclusion
Various explanations have been suggested concerning the causes of ‘cultural

clashes’ and prescriptions for harmoniously integrating the beliefs and values
of merging firms, although barriers have thus far cross-sectional investi-
gations to one empirical study. We proposed a means to overcome these
empirical barriers by using a form of meta-analysis that combines in-depth
case study richness with larger sample breadth. Our results suggest that
almost only one thing matters: involve the affected employees in such social-
ization activities as introduction programs, training, cross visits, joining
retreats, celebrations and other such socialization rituals and they are likely
to create a joint organizational culture on their own volition, as long as they
are allowed autonomy. However, if autonomy is restricted (as often is the
case when the buyer believes that it can more efficiently manage the acquired
firm’s physical and human capital and thereby attain synergies), then
additional social control mechanisms are required. These include various
informal coordination efforts such as transition teams, senior management
involvement and temporary personnel exchange/rotation.
Moreover, these joint informal interactions appear to be effective in
achieving acculturation regardless of the expectations of synergies (merger

relatedness), the relative organizational size and differences in nationalities
and culture. However, neglecting these Social Controls, disregarding the
legitimate beliefs of the acquired firm, acting like a conqueror and trying to
impose acculturation through edict, will cause resistance.
What makes these results striking is that they are suggestive of a uni-
versal administrative truth. Specifically, although Swedish acquirers seem to
use more Social Controls than US acquirers in accordance with their respec-
tive cultures, the importance of Social Controls for achieving acculturation
appears to be of almost equal importance in both sub-samples. As a rule, the
ability to generalize improves when the same relationships are noticed in
samples that are believed to be different from each other along some charac-
teristics of interest (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Manski & McFadden, 1981).
Because the two sub-samples of mergers are ‘state-based’ (as opposed to
random), given the differences noted earlier about the social and economic
institutional backgrounds of the two nations, each sub-sample is likely to
have been biased (over-represented) by a different set of values about ‘how
things ought to be’ and administrative preferences as to ‘how things ought
to be done.’ On these grounds alone, we might have expected that the deter-
minants of Achieved Acculturation would vary depending on national
context. The fact that we found the same basic set of relationships with these
two very different lists of mergers, therefore, increases our confidence that
the relationship between Social Control and Achieved Acculturation is robust
and generalizable.
Although it is popular to blame a merger’s demise on cultural differ-
ences, our research findings suggest that merging firms are not destined to
‘clash’ simply because their cultures are different or because they come from
different nations. Further, we find that Autonomy Removal is not always an
impediment to achieving acculturation and indeed, it can contribute to the
formation of a jointly determined culture, as long as it is coupled with a high
level of informal control. The practical implications are clear: to the extent
that the management of an acquiring firm is concerned about issues of
achieved acculturation, they should pay at least as much attention to infor-
mal integration processes as to various other strategic, organizational and
cultural issues that are often associated with mergers.
Acknowledgements
This study has been funded in part by the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foun-
dation. The Larsson (1989) M&A case survey database was developed with
partial funding from the Institute of Economic Research, Lund University, Arthur
Andersen & Co. Foundation (in Sweden) and the Center for Effective Organiz-
ations (at USC); and with helpful contributions from: Syd Finkelstein, Warren
Bennis, Michael Driver, Patricia Riley; the participating case authors: F.M.
Scherer, Bengt Johannisson, Ingela Petersson, Amelie Kraus, Bjorn Alarik, Sven
Modell, Dayle Altendorf-Smith, Karen Gaertner, Philip Mirvis, Lena Sturesson,
Gunilla Svensson and Ulf Lindgren; and the raters: Daniel George, Susanne
Ostlund and Gerry Ledford.
Notes
1 Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1988) refer to this mode as ‘separation,’ Napier (1989)
and Cartwright and Cooper (1993b) refer to it as ‘extension,’ whereas Haspeslagh
and Jemison (1991: 148) refer to it as ‘preservation.’
2 The following example was abstracted from the case of a 1983 acquisition by a
Swedish trucking firm, ‘B’, which we list in Appendix A. It ‘was greeted with A’s
company flag lowered to half mast . . . [followed by] a “vacuum” period with highly
suspicious and demotivated employees. The “big bang” . . . included (i) selling of
the golden egg of A . . . and (iii) giving notice to all of A’s employees with the right
to apply for their “old” jobs that generally were either relocated or with lower
salary. . . . In all, A had become a crippled, exploited second rate local trucking
company without any profitable forwarding service or long-distance traffic from
having been a high quality, reputable, profitable, growing long-distance trucking
company in just three years. Of the personnel employed at the time of the acqui-
sition, only 6 of 15 white collar and around 55 of 110 blue collar employees
remained in 1986.’ Not surprisingly, two raters scored this merger ‘low’ on
Achieved Acculturation. In another coding example, Kronanverken was created
from a merger between two previously cooperating glassworks firms in Sweden in
1975. The integration process was characterized by increased territorial thinking,
‘guerilla sales,’ deteriorating production climate, ‘administrative chock,’ conflicting
views, questioning of the competence of the others, limited information, mistrust,
criticisms and personnel reductions that largely paralyzed the joint organization on
its way to bankruptcy in 1977. As no shared cooperative culture developed and at
least some of the numerous difficulties are attributable to remaining or even increas-
ing cultural clashes, this case was also coded as having low acculturation.
In contrast, high levels of Achieved Acculturation were indicated by a strong
culture jointly emerging with little or no remaining cultural clashes. A multi-billion
dollar US consumer goods firm was created through the merger of the stable, pater-
nalistic, ‘defender’ Company A and the fast, fluid and ‘streetwise’ Company B. Three
years later, the culture was ‘described by most executives as one that emphasizes
adaptability and flexibility, melding the old ‘shoot from the hip’ culture of Company
B with the more cautious, conservative approach of Company A. High levels of
acculturation were also achieved in BRIO’s acquisition of the smaller, more flexible
and informal Alga, both Swedish toy manufacturers. Alga’s ‘strongly negative atti-
tudes towards BRIO before the integration process . . . changed so radically that
BRIO Partner four to five years later viewed Alga as “the best cooperator” and “a
wonderful company to work with”.’
3 Electrolux quickly imposed their financial reporting system and completely changed
the top management of Zanussi, bypassed ‘considerably less enthused’ Italian middle
management and reorganized the acquired production, product development and
marketing. Not surprisingly, Electrolux scored high or very high on all three items of
Autonomy Removal. In contrast, Montgomery Ward and Container Corporation
merged into the conglomerate holding company Marcor in which both companies’
autonomy was retained. They mainly merged for financial and protective (to become
too big to be taken over) purposes and had minimal operational interaction between
their unrelated merchandising and packaging businesses. ‘No basic changes in the
name, administration, or operation of Montgomery Ward and Container were antici-
pated. . . . No administrative services were performed at the Marcor level for either
Wards or Container. Both companies continued to perform their own legal, account-
ing, personnel, public relations and other staff functions independently. . . . The major
reason given for this lack of centralization was the desire to maintain the autonomy
of Wards and Container . . .’ Thus, case raters scored this merger as very low on all
Autonomy Removal items.
4 The Swedish computer consulting firm WM-data’s acquisition of the computer
system and service firm Edebe used high levels of coordinative efforts (such as an
integration project group, planning, restructuring of operations and combined
management control systems) and socialization (such as ‘joint activities in terms of
meetings and conferences as well as social activities outside work, often including
the employees’ families and fostering the new co-workers in the WM-data spirit’).
This acquisition resulted, therefore, in high Social Control, whereas Beatrice’s con-
glomerate acquisition of Harman International scored very low on both Coordina-
tive Efforts and Socialization, given Beatrice’s standard integration solution to
persistent problems in an acquisition: ‘don’t intervene operationally, sell the unit off.’
5 Re-running the statistical tests using the 5-point scaling of the dependent variable
(Achieved Acculturation), rather than the 3-point collapsed scale, yields comparable
results. The model’s statistics (F = 2.3, p < .04; R2 = .28), although significant, shows
slightly less precision than the model which used the more reliably constructed
scaling. In addition, support is again found only for H4 and H5 once again revealed
counterintuitive results.
References
Alarik, B. & Edström, A. Post-merger integration as a process of conflict resolution. In W.H.

Goldberg (Ed.), Mergers: Motives, modes, methods. Aldershot: Gower, 1983.
Allen, S.A., Lorsch, J.W. & Stanton, J. In L. Bernhoff & B. Wirsen. Svensk Apparatur-
Varme & Tryck (A). Harvard Business School Case, 9–474–167, 1974.
Altendorf, D.M. When cultures clash: A case study of the Texaco takeover of Getty Oil and
the impact of acculturation on the acquired firm. Unpublished doctoral dissertation,
University of Southern California, 1986.
Ansoff, H.I., Brandenburg, R.G., Portner, F.E. & Radosevich, R. Acquisition behavior of
U.S. manufacturing firms 1946–1965. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1971.
Bartlett, C.A. & Ghoshal, S. Managing across borders: The transnational solution. Boston,
MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1995.
Berger, P.L. & Luckmann, T. The social construction of reality. New York: Doubleday, 1966.
Bjur, W. & Zommorrodian, A. Towards indigenous theories of administration: An inter-
national perspective. International Review of Administration Science, 1986, 52,
397–420.
Booz, A. & Hamilton Inc. Diversification: A survey of European chief executives. Execu-
tive Summary, 1985. (Referenced in Cartwright, S. and Cooper, C. The role of culture
in successful organizational marriage. Academy of Management Executive, 1993, 7(20),
57–70.)
Bullock, R.J. & Lawler, E.E. Gainsharing: A few questions, and fewer answers. Human
Resource Management, 1985, 23, 23–40.
Bullock, R.J. & Tubbs, M.E. The case meta-analysis for OD. Research in Organizational
Change and Development, 1987, 1, 171–228.
Buono, A.F., Bowditch, J.L. & Lewis, J.W. When cultures collide: The anatomy of a merger.
Human Relations, 1985, 38(5), 477–500.
Calori, R., Lubatkin, M.H., Very, P. & Veiga, J.F. Modeling the origins of nationally-bound
administrative heritages: A historical institutional analysis of French and British firms.
Organization Science, 1997, 8(6), 681–96.
Campbell, D.T. & Fiske, D.W. Convergent and discriminant validation by the multi-
trait–multimethod matrix. Psychological Bulletin, 1959, 56, 81–105.
Cartwright, S. & Cooper, C.L. Mergers & acquisitions: The human factor. Oxford: But-
terworth-Heinemann, 1992.
Cartwright, S. & Cooper, C.L. The psychological impact of merger and acquisition on the
individual: A study of building society managers. Human Relations, 1993a, 46, 327–47.
Cartwright, S. & Cooper, C.L. The role of culture compatibility in successful organizational
marriage. Academy of Management Executive, 1993b, 7(2), 57–70.
Chatterjee, S., Lubatkin, M., Schweiger, D. & Weber, Y. Cultural differences and share-
holder value in related mergers: Linking equity and human capital. Strategic Manage-
ment Journal, 1992, 13, 319–34.
Collin, S.O. The brotherhood of the Swedish sphere: A third institutional form of economics
exchange. International Studies of Management and Organizations, 1993, 23(1), 69–86.
Czarniawska-Joerges, B. Swedish management. International Studies of Management and
Organization, 1993, 23(1), 13–27.
Dahlgren, G. & Witt, P. Ledning av fusionsforlopp [Management of the merger process].
Doctoral dissertation, Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden, 1988.
Datta, D. Organization fit and acquisition performance: Effects of post acquisition inte-
gration. Strategic Management Journal, 1991, 12(4), 281–98.
David, K. Epilogue: What shall we mean by changing identities? In K. David (Ed.), The
new wind: Changing identities in South Asia. In World anthropology: Proceedings of
the ninth international congress of anthropological and ethnological sciences. The
Hague: Mouton, 1977.
Deschamps, J., Barnes, L.B. & Schlesinger, L.A. Textile corporation of America. In L.A.
Schlesinger, R.G. Eccles and J.J. Gabarro (Eds), Managing behavioral in organizations:
Text, cases, readings. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983.
Frank, R.H. Choosing the right pond: Human behavior and the quest for status. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1985.
Gaertner, K.N. Colliding cultures: The implications of a merger for managers’ careers. Paper
presented at Academy of Management Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL, 1986.
Ghoshal, S. & Haspeslagh, P. Electrolux: The acquisition and integration of Zanussi.
Fontainebleu, France: INSEAD-CEDEP, 1990.
Ghoshal, S. & Nohria, N. Internal differentiation within multinational corporations. Stra-
tegic Management Journal, 1989, 10, 323–37.
Gilmore, S.C. & Austin, R.W. McCord Corporation: Historical developments to 1963;
Planning and priorities 1972. Harvard Business School Cases, 9–372–171, 9–372–251,
and Davidson Rubber Company: Historical developments to 1963. Harvard Business
School Case, 9–372–172, 1972.
Hambrick, D. & Cannella, B. Relative standing: A framework for understanding depar-
tures of acquired executives. Academy of Management Journal, 1993, 36(4), 733–62.
Haspeslagh, P. & Jemison, D. Managing acquisitions. New York: Free Press, 1991.
Hofstede, G. Culture’s consequences: International differences in work-related values.
London: Sage, 1980.
Idland, U. & Petersson, I. Offentlig sammanslagning och utlokalisering [Public merger and
relocation: Boverket viewed from a career perspective]. MBA thesis, Lund University,
Sweden, 1991.
Jackson, S.E., Brett, J.F., Sessa, V.I., Cooper, D.M., Julin, J.A. & Peyronnin, K. Some differ-
ences make a difference: Individual dissimilarity and group heterogeneity as correlates
of recruitment, promotions, and turnover. Journal of Applied Psychology, 1991 76,
675–89.
Jauch, L.R., Osborn, R.N. & Martin, T.N. Structured content analysis of cases: A com-
plementary method for organizational research. Academy of Management Review,
1980, 5, 517–25.
Johannisson, B. Den organisatoriska smältdegeln [The organizational melting-pot: Com-
petence and handicap in mergers]. Doctoral dissertation. Malmo, Sweden: Liber
Laromedel, 1980.
Johanson, J. & Mattsson, L.G. Interorganizational relations in industrial systems: A
network approach compared with the transaction-cost approach. International Studies
of Management and Organization, 1987, 17(1), 34–8.
Klintman, M. & Modell, S. Synergibeaktanden vid förvärv av tjänsteproducerande företag
[Synergy considerations in acquisitions of service firms: The cases Bilspedition/Scansped
and WM-Data/Edebe]. MBA thesis, Lund University, Sweden, 1992.
Larsson, R. Organizational integration of mergers and acquisitions: A case survey of real-
ization of synergy potentials. Doctoral dissertation, University of Southern California.
Lund, Sweden: Lund University Press, 1989.
Larsson, R. Coordination of action in mergers and acquisitions: Interpretive and systems
approaches towards synergy. Doctoral dissertation. Lund, Sweden: Lund University
Press, 1990.
Larsson, R. Case survey methodology: Quantitative analysis across patterns of case studies.
Academy of Management Journal, 1993a, 36, 1515–46.
Larsson, R. The handshake between invisible and visible hands: Towards a tripolar insti-
tutional framework. International Studies of Management and Organization, 1993b,
23(1), 87–106.
Larsson, R. & Finkelstein, S. Integrating strategic, organizational, and human resource per-
spectives on mergers and acquisitions: A case survey of synergy realization. Organiz-
ation Science, 1999, 10(1), 1–26.
Larsson, R., Petersson, I. & Kraus, A. Culture and competence in foreign acquisitions: The
SKF case. Institute of Economic Research Working Paper Series, Lund University,
Sweden, 1994.
Lash, S. & Urry, J. The end of organized capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987.
Laurent, A. The cultural diversity of western conceptions of management. International
Studies of Management and Organizations, 1983, 13(1–2), 75–96.
Lindgren, U. Foreign acquisitions: Management of the integration process. Doctoral dis-
sertation, Stockholm School of Economics. Sweden: IIB/EFI, 1982.
Lubatkin, M. & Lane, P. Psst. . . The merger mavens still have it wrong! Academy of
Management Executive, 1996, 10(1), 21–39.
Lubatkin, M., Merchant, H. & Srinivasan, N. Construct validity of some unweighted
product-count diversification measures. Strategic Management Journal, 1993, 14,
433–49.
Lubatkin, M., Schweiger, D. & Weber, Y. Top management turnover in related M&As: An
additional test of the theory of relative standing. Journal of Management, 1999, 25(1),
55–73.
Lubatkin, M., Calori, R., Very, P. & Veiga, J. Managing mergers across borders: A two
nation test of nationally bound administrative heritage. Organization Science, 1998,
9(6), 670–84.
Lucas, W.A. The case survey method: Aggregating case experience. Santa Monica, CA:
Rand Corp, 1974.
McNichols, T.J. (Ed.). Marcor, Inc.-A merger. In Policymaking and executive action. New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1983.
Manski, C. & McFadden, D. Alternative estimators and sample designs for discrete choice
analysis. In C. Manski and D. McFadden (Eds), Structural analysis of discrete data with
econometric application. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981.
Marks, M.L. & Mirvis, P.M. The merger syndrome. Psychology Today, 1986, 20(10),
36–42.
Marshall, M. The changing face of Swedish corporations: The disintegration of consensus.
Journal of Economics Issues, 1996, 30(3), 843–58.
Miller, D. & Friesen, P.H. Strategy-making in context: Ten empirical archetypes. Journal of
Management Studies, 1977, 14(3), 253–80.
Miller, D. & Friesen, P.H. Archetypes of organizational transition. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 1980, 25, 268–92.
Mintzberg, H., Raisinghani, D. & Theoret, A. The structure of ‘unstructured’ decision pro-
cesses. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1975, 21, 246–75.
Mirvis, P.H. & Marks, M.L. Managing the merger. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
1992.
Montgomery, C.A. & Wilson, V.A. Mergers that last: A predictable pattern? Strategic
Management Journal, 1986, 7, 91–6.
Nahavandi, A. & Malekzadeh A.R. Acculturation in mergers and acquisitions. Academy
of Management Review, 1988, 13(1), 79–90.
Napier, N.K. Mergers and acquisitions, human resource issues and outcomes: A review and
suggested typology. Journal of Management Studies, 1989, 26(3), 271–89.
Nyström, H. & Utterström, C. Myth, issue and ideology: Reorganization by merger among
farmer co-operatives in Sweden. In W.H. Goldberg (Ed.), Mergers: Motives, modes,
methods. Aldershot: Gower, 1983.
O’Reilly, C.A. III, Chatman, J. & Caldwell, D.F. People and organizational culture: A profile
comparison approach to assessing person–organization fit. Academy of Management
Journal, 1991, 34, 487–516.
Pablo, A.L. Determinants of acquisition integration level: A decision-making perspective.
Academy of Management Journal, 1994, 37, 803–36.
Ravenscraft, D.J. & Scherer, F.M. Mergers, sell-offs, and economic efficiency. Washington,
DC: Brookings Institution, 1987.
Sales, A.L. & Mirvis, P.H. When cultures collide: Issues in acquisition. In J. Kimberly and
R. Quinn (Eds), The challenge of managing corporate transition. Homewood, IL: Dow
Jones and Irwin, 1984.
Salter, M.S. & Weinhold, W.A. Diversification through acquisition. New York: Free Press,
1979.
Schein, E.H. Organizational culture and leadership: A dynamic view. San Francisco, CA:
Jossey Bass, 1985.
Schneider, B. The people make the place. Personnel Psychology, 1987, 40, 437–53.
Schwarz, R. & Sathe, V. Peter Strassman. Harvard Business School Case, 9–482–097, 1982.
Schweiger, D.M. & Walsh, J.P. Mergers and acquisitions: An interdisciplinary view.
Research in Personnel and Human Resource Management, 1990, 8, 41–107.
Schweiger, D.M. & Weber, Y. Strategies for managing human resources during mergers and
acquisitions: An empirical investigation. Human Resource Planning Journal, 1989,
12(2), 69–86.
Shrivastava, P. Postmerger integration. Journal of Business Strategy, 1986, 7(1), 65–76.
Sonnenfeld, J.A. & Dowd, J. Transcom, Inc. (A) & (B). Harvard Business School Cases,
9–483–071, 9–483–072, 1982.
Tornblom, K.Y., Jonssons, D. & Foa, U.G. Nationality, resources, class and preferences
among three allocation rules: Sweden and USA. International Journal of Intercultural
Relations, 1985, 9, 51–77.
US Federal Trade Commission. Large mergers and acquisitions in manufacturing and

mining: 1948–1977. Washington, DC: US Federal Trade Commission, 1978.
Van Maanen, E. & Schein, E. Towards a theory of organizational socialization. In B. Staw
and L.L. Cummings (Eds), Research in organization behavior, Vol. 1. Greenwich, CT:
JAI Press, 1979.
Very, P., Lubatkin, M., Calori, R. & Veiga, J. Relative standing and the performance of
recently acquired European firms. Strategic Management Journal, 1997, 18(8),
593–614.
Walter, G.A. Culture collisions in mergers and acquisitions. In J.P. Frost, L.F. Moore, M.R.
Louis, C.C. Lunberg and J. Martin (Eds), Organizational culture. Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage, 1985.
Weber, Y. Corporate cultural fit and performance in mergers and acquisitions. Human
Relations, 1996, 49, 1181–202.
Weber, Y., Shenkar, O. & Raveh, A. National and corporate cultural fit in mergers/acqui-
sitions: An exploratory study. Management Science, 1996, 42, 1215–27.
Yin, R.K. & Heald, K.A. Using the case survey method to analyze policy studies. Admin-
istrative Science Quarterly, 1975, 20, 371–81.
02larsson (ds)
1602
Appendix A: Case sample divided into three sub-groups
Human Relations 54(12)
11/1/01
Case Combination Integrat. Reference No. Publication
year typez period of pagesx statusy
11:57 AM
Swedish domestic M&As (15 cases)
Bilspedition – Scansped 1985 Horizo. 4+ years Klintman & Modell, 1992 65 Unpublished
Boverket (Bostadsstyrelsen.-Planverket) 1988 Vertical 2–3 years Idland & Petersson, 1991 119 Unpublished
BRIO – Alga 1982 Horizo. 4+ years Larsson, 1990 44 Doctoral dissertation
Page 1602
Casco – Nordsjö 1983 Prod. ext. 4+ years Larsson, 1990 34 Doctoral dissertation
Ericsson Information Systems 1981 Prod. ext. 1–2 years Dahlgren & Witt, 1988 439 Doctoral dissertation
Futeco Textilef 1976 Horizo. 1–2 years Alarik & Edström, 1983* 133 Doctoral dissertation
Gränges – SAPA 1976 Horizo. 3–4 years Johannisson, 1980 104 Doctoral dissertation
Kronanverken 1975 Horizo. 2–3 years Johannisson, 1980 105 Doctoral dissertation
Leisure groupf 1976 Horizo. 2–3 years Alarik & Edström, 1983* 133 Doctoral dissertation
Milk Cooperative Värmland 1967 Horizo. 4+ years Nyström & Utterström, 1983* 94 Doctoral dissertation
Navigator – Swedese 1974 Prod. ext. 4+ years Johannisson, 1980 92 Doctoral dissertation
Stansaab – Datasaab 1978 Mark. ext. 3–4 years Dahlgren & Witt, 1988 165 Doctoral dissertation
Svensk Apparatur – Värme & Tryckf 1962 Prod. ext. 4+ years Allen et al., 1974 26 Teaching
Trucking A – Bf 1982 Horizo. 3–4 years Larsson, 1990 6 Doctoral dissertation
WM Data – Edebe 1989 Vertical 2–3 years Klintman & Modell, 1992* 205 Unpublished
Swedish foreign M&As (12 cases)
A – 2f 1975–1980 ? ? Lindgren, 1982 17 Doctoral dissertation
B – 3f 1975–1980 ? ? Lindgren, 1982 17 Doctoral dissertation
B – 4f 1975–1980 ? ? Lindgren, 1982 17 Doctoral dissertation
B – 5f 1975 ? ? Lindgren, 1982 17 Doctoral dissertation
C – 6f 1975–1980 Mark. ext. ? Lindgren, 1982 17 Doctoral dissertation
02larsson (ds)
Appendix A: continued
11/1/01
11:57 AM
D – 10f 1975–1980 ? 2–3 years Lindgren, 1982 17 Doctoral dissertation
Electrolux – Zanussi 1984 Mark. ext. 4+ years Goshal & Haspeslagh, 1990* 84 Teaching
SKF – ATB 1988 Vertical 2–3 years Larsson et al., 1994* 49 Unpub.
SKF – Jacob 198X Mark. ext. 4+ years Larsson et al. 1994* 19 Unpub.
SKF – Prototyp Werke 1986 Prod. ext. 4+ years Larsson et al., 1994* 53 Unpub.
Larsson & Lubatkin
Page 1603
US domestic M&As (23 cases)
A – B (consumer goods)f 1980 Prod. ext. 3–4 years Gaertner, 1986 19 Conf. pap.
AMF – Harley Davidson 1968 Prod. ext. 4+ years Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987* 9 Res. book
Bank A – Bf 1981 Horizo. 3–4 years Buono et al., 1985* 65 Res. article
Beatrice Foods – Harman International 1977 Congl. 3–4 years Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987* 8 Res. book
Bendix – Boise Home Systems 1972 Vertical 4+ years Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987* 6 Res. book
Achieving acculturation in M&A

Bendix – Caradco 1979 Vertical 1–2 years Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987* 6 Res. book
Chromalloy – Sintercast 1959 Prod. ext. 4+ years Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987 4 Res. book
Consolidated Foods – Robert Bruce 1973 Prod. ext. 4+ years Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987 3 Res. book
GrandCo – DCf 1978 Congl. 3–4 years Sales & Mirvis, 1984* 47 Res. article
Gulf & Western – Marquette Cement 1976 Congl. 4+ years Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987* 6 Res. book
LEM – Prime Motorsf 1975 Prod. ext. 3–4 years Schwarz & Sathe, 1982 19 Teaching
LTV Corp. – Lykes Corp. 1978 Horizo. 4+ years Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987* 8 Res. book
Lykes Corp. – Youngstown 1969 Congl. 4+ years Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987* 6 Res. book
Marcor (Montgomery Ward –
Container) 1968 Congl. 1–2 years McNichols, 1983 20 Teaching
McCord – Davidsonf 1964 Prod. ext. 4+ years Gilmore & Austin, 1972* 112 Teaching
1603
02larsson (ds)
1604
Human Relations 54(12)
11/1/01
11:57 AM
Appendix A: continued

Page 1604
Pennwalt Chemical – S.S. White 1966 Congl. 4+ years Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987 6 Res. book
Philip Morris – ASR 1960 Congl. 4+ years Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987 4 Res. book
Rothborough – Transcomf 1981 Vertical 1–2 years Sonnenfeld & Dowd, 1982 14 Teaching
Texaco – Getty 1984 Horizo. 1–2 years Altendorf, 1986 214 Doctoral dissertation
Textile Corporation (3 firms) 1967 Congl. 1–2 years Deschamps et al., 1983 17 Teaching
Textron – Talon 1968 Congl. 4+ years Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987 7 Res. book
US Industries – Great Lakes Screw 1967 Congl. 4+ years Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987 4 Res. book
W.R. Grace – Letisse 1969 Congl. 4+ years Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987* 10 Res. book
Note. *additional references were used (available from authors by request); f, fictitious names; x, total number of pages were used as coding sources (if the same source included multiple
cases, the non-case-specific pages were averaged between the cases in question); y, case publications ranged from research article, research book, doctoral dissertation, conference paper
and teaching case to unpublished papers; z, according to the FTC typology of horizontal, vertical, product extension, market extension and pure conglomerate combinations.
Appendix B
M&A acculturation case survey coding scheme
Dependent variable
Achieved Acculturation (collapsed 3-point scale, from low = 1 to high = 3)
• Estimate the level of achieved acculturation (defined as the develop-

ment of jointly shared meanings fostering cooperation between the
joining firms) towards the end of the studied integration period.
Independent variables
Autonomy Removal (H1, three items, each with 5-point scales, from very
low = 1 to very high = 5)
• Estimate asymmetric change of financial control defined as unequal

reallocation of influence in financial decision-making during the
studied integration period. It can be inferred from how extensive
financial reporting and performance requirements are placed by one
firm upon the other and the degree of centralization of investment
decisions.
• Estimate asymmetric change of administrative control defined as
unequal reallocation of influence in administrative decision-making
during the studied integration period. It can be inferred from one firm
placing its people in top management positions at the other firm and
centralization of administrative functions (e.g. elimination of other
headquarters).
• Estimate asymmetric change of operational control defined as unequal
reallocation of influence in operational decision-making (mainly pro-
duction and marketing) during the studied integration period. It can be
inferred from centralization of operational decision-making from one
firm to the other.
Relatedness (H2, two items, each with 5-point scales, from very low = 1 to
very high = 5)
• Estimate the similarity of marketing operations between the joining

firms based primarily on their geography, markets, customer groups
and main industries.
• Estimate the similarity of production operations between the joining

firms based primarily on their input, process and product types.
Relative Size (H3, single item collapsed to a 2-point scale, with low [< 10
percent] = 1 and high [>10 percent] = 2)
• Estimate relative size defined as the ratio of annual sales of the acquired
firm to that of the acquiring firm in the year of (or prior to) the legal
combination (if sales are not available, use total assets; if they are also
not available, use total number of employees)
Social Controls (H4, two items, each with 5-point scales, from very low = 1
to very high = 5)
• Estimate the degree of coordinated effort expended to enhance synergy

realization by adjusting the operational interaction between the joining
firms. This can be inferred from the amount of utilization of coordi-
nation mechanisms, such as special integrators, transition teams,
management information systems, integration plans, senior manage-
ment involvement and temporary personnel exchange/rotation.
• Estimate the degree of socialization of all employees in order to create
a joint organizational culture through activities such as introduction
programs, training, joint ‘get-togethers’ (such as cross-visits and
retreats, celebrations and other rituals).
Nationality (H5, single item, US = 1, Sweden = 2)
• What was the nationality of the acquiring firm?
Cross-Nationality (H6, single item, yes [same] = 0, no [different] = 1)
• Was the nationality of the two firms the same?
Control variable
Year (single item, 5-point scale, from 1964 or earlier = 1 to 1980 or later =
5)
• Estimate average integration year defined as (calendar year of legal

combination + calendar year of the end of the studied period) divided
by 2.
Rikard Larsson, received his PhDs from Lund University, Sweden and
University of Southern California. He is Professor of Strategic Change at
School of Economics and Management, Lund University. Between 1996
and 1998 he was an elected member of the Executive Committee of the
Business Policy and Strategy Division of the Academy of Management, and
has been awarded the Swedish government’s Department of Education
prize for researchers. He has published articles on M&A, alliances and
other strategic changes, interorganizational learning, service, career and
HR management, and research methods in such journals as AMJ, AMR,
AME and OS.
[E-mail: rikard.larsson@fek.lu.se]
Michael Lubatkin, PhD from the University of Tennessee, is the

‘Thomas, John, and Bette Wolff Family Chaired Professor of Strategic
Entrepreneurship’ at the University of Connecticut and Ecole de Manage-
ment de Lyon. He was the 1997–8 elected chair of the Business Policy
and Strategy Division of the Academy of Management, and has published
over 50 papers focusing primarily on issues about M&As, corporate
diversification, international management and managerial applications of
economic theory.
[E-mail: mike@sba.uconn.edu]

Achieving Acculturation in Mergers and Acquisitions: An International Case Survey

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Achieving Acculturation in Mergers and Acquisitions: An International Case Survey

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

02larsson (ds) 11/1/01 11:57 AM Page 1573

Achieving acculturation in mergers and

A B S T R AC T Various explanations have been suggested concerning the causes of

KEYWORDS acculturation international case survey mergers and

1574 Human Relations 54(12)

Acculturation in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) is the outcome of a

Larsson & Lubatkin Achieving acculturation in M&A 1575

1576 Human Relations 54(12)

Theory and hypotheses

Organizational culture represents an imperfectly shared system of inter-

Larsson & Lubatkin Achieving acculturation in M&A 1577

resource and financial consequences of M&A activity is to improve,

1578 Human Relations 54(12)

1979). Related value activities may be consolidated, people uprooted and

Larsson & Lubatkin Achieving acculturation in M&A 1579

Since subjective culture evolves over time as a product of shared experi-

It therefore follows that:

1580 Human Relations 54(12)

The independent effects of nation

Larsson & Lubatkin Achieving acculturation in M&A 1581

Sweden’s highly progressive tax structure institutionalizes its egali-

1582 Human Relations 54(12)

acculturation will be higher in domestic mergers (US acquiring US, Swedish

Mergers and acquisitions have been investigated with a number of different

Larsson & Lubatkin Achieving acculturation in M&A 1583

1584 Human Relations 54(12)

Larsson & Lubatkin Achieving acculturation in M&A 1585

1586 Human Relations 54(12)

main industries; and (ii) production similarity based on production input,

Reliability and validity of the data

Larsson & Lubatkin Achieving acculturation in M&A 1587

of 68.8 percent, where a score of at least 65 percent is deemed acceptable

1588 Human Relations 54(12)

assessed its statistical association with ‘Employee Resistance’, a construct

Larsson & Lubatkin Achieving acculturation in M&A 1589

be because of a number of reasons, including antitrust enforcement practices

Table 1 Descriptive statistics and Pearson's correlations

Variable Mean s.d. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Table 2 Regression analysis on Achieved Acculturation

Dependent variable Beta

Autonomy Removal (H1) –.07

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

1590 Human Relations 54(12)

Larsson & Lubatkin Achieving acculturation in M&A 1591

cultures to the ultimate attainment of acculturation, because we expected

Post-hoc interaction test of social and formal controls

1592 Human Relations 54(12)

Cooper, 1993b; Napier, 1989) and absorptive/symbiosis (Haspeslagh &

Larsson & Lubatkin Achieving acculturation in M&A 1593

Formal Controls Dual Controls

Total Number of Cases: 10 (20%) Total Number of Cases: 16 (32%)

Removal Laissez-Faire Social Controls

Total Number of Cases: 15 (30%) Total Number of Cases: 9 (18%)

Low Social Controls High

1594 Human Relations 54(12)

Based on the suggestion of one of the anonymous reviewers, we decon-

Discussion and conclusion

Various explanations have been suggested concerning the causes of ‘cultural

Larsson & Lubatkin Achieving acculturation in M&A 1595

achieving acculturation regardless of the expectations of synergies (merger

1596 Human Relations 54(12)

Larsson & Lubatkin Achieving acculturation in M&A 1597

Alarik, B. & Edström, A. Post-merger integration as a process of conflict resolution. In W.H.

p < .05; p < .01; p < .001.