540184

research-article2014
CRS0010.1177/0896920514540184Critical SociologyOlsaretti

Article

Critical Sociology

Croce, Philosophy and Intellectuals:

2016, Vol. 42(3) 337­–355
© The Author(s) 2014
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DOI: 10.1177/0896920514540184
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Alessandro Olsaretti
McGill University, Canada

Abstract
There has been a recent revival of interest in Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. Within this revival,
some scholars have focused upon the question of the sources of Gramsci’s theory, particularly
with reference to linguistic sources; others have focused upon applications of Gramsci’s theory
of hegemony, particularly in conjunction with the question of the subaltern. This article seeks
to contribute to this revival by nuancing three aspects of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. Firstly,
Croce’s presumed influence over the latter is rejected in favor of a commonality of concerns
with a whole generation of Italian intellectuals, not just Croce. Secondly, it is emphasized that
philosophy played an important role in Gramsci’s theory of hegemony in that it provided the
all-important critiques of common sense and false consciousness. Lastly, it is argued that the
intellectuals’ need for a new hegemony was not just organic but included traditional intellectuals
in complex new formations.

Keywords
Croce, Gramsci, hegemony, intellectuals, linguistics, philosophy, social theory, subaltern

Introduction
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is probably the best known and also the most widely debated aspect
of his thought. One reason for these debates is that the concept of hegemony remains a complex
and controversial concept that evolved in the course of Antonio Gramsci’s prison work (Cospito,
2008), coming later to be expanded in its application. Questions are still being raised as to whether
hegemony included a measure of coercion, or whether, as an analytical category, it stood in opposi-
tion and tension to coercion (Cospito, 2004; Femia, 1987: 25, 29). Matters are complicated by
Gramsci’s occasional qualification of the term with a number of adjectives, so that we find him
discussing ‘political’, ‘social’ or ‘moral and intellectual’ hegemony (Burgio, 2008: 254, 258–61).

Corresponding author:
Alessandro Olsaretti, 4507 St. Urbain #11, Montreal, QC H2T 2V9, Canada.
Email: alessandro.olsaretti@mail.mcgill.ca
338 Critical Sociology 42(3)

It is also tempting to ascribe some of the difficulties with the concept of hegemony to the moti-
vations and character of the author. Gramsci, it has been suggested, was first and foremost a politi-
cal activist who was forced into theorizing by fascist proscription. His concern with the Leninist
concept of hegemony arose from the concrete political need for an alliance between the small
urban proletariat of northern Italy and peasant masses in the Italian south, a strategy that derived
much of its urgency from the failures of revolutionary movements in Italy and abroad even before
the rise of fascism (Ghosh, 2001). By other accounts, however, Gramsci’s own southernness and
desire to resolve the southern question hold the key to his engagement with the concept of hegem-
ony which, far from remaining chiefly a political strategy, became the ground over which Gramsci
opened up a broad discussion regarding the conditions of subordination and exclusion (Urbinati,
1998). This broadening of the discussion of political concepts is increasingly emphasized by com-
mentators who claim that, however tentatively, Gramsci was working towards a ‘general theory of
hegemony’ equally applicable to analyze proletarian and bourgeois hegemonies (Gerratana, 1997:
122; Vacca, 2008: 99) or even towards a general ‘theory of power’ (Burgio, 2008: 265).
This paper seeks to address some specific aspects of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony that have
emerged in the more recent debates in the field. It uses the complete, original Italian edition of the
Prison Notebooks edited by Valentino Gerratana to make three contributions (Gramsci, 1977).1
The first contribution, addressed in the first section below, concerns the controversial question of
Benedetto Croce’s influence over Gramsci’s formulation of the theory of hegemony. Gramsci was
not influenced by the concept of ethico-political history formulated by Croce, as is sometimes sup-
posed. Rather, he developed his theory of hegemony partly through his own critique of Croce’s role
as a hegemonic intellectual in Italy. The second contribution concerns the importance of philoso-
phy in Gramsci’s formulation of the concept of hegemony. The next two sections below address the
role of philosophy in criticizing common sense and false consciousness respectively, both of which
are indispensable in order to establish a new hegemony. The third contribution concerns the role
that intellectuals have in establishing a new hegemony. Gramsci did not believe that new social
groups needed to rely only on organic intellectuals to lay the foundations of a new hegemony. The
next three sections below each address one aspect of this question. The fourth section shows that
for Gramsci intellectuals outside France during the 19th century (and beyond) were not tied to the
economy but to the state. The vast majority of intellectual groups for Gramsci were therefore not
organic intellectuals in the sense of being directly tied to an economic class. The fifth section
shows that for Gramsci this was not an insurmountable problem. While discussing intellectuals that
had taken up the cause of the proletariat, in fact, he spoke of ‘independent’ rather than organic
intellectuals. An especially important task was the development of a group of ‘independent intel-
lectuals’ that presumably comprised both organic and traditional intellectuals. The sixth and last
section discusses means by which these groups of intellectuals established a close relationship with
the masses. The closeness to the masses of these independent intellectuals was ensured not by their
organic status but by what Gramsci called the ‘intellectuals-masses dialectic’.
Before proceeding with the argument it is necessary to locate it within specific recent debates
on Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. The first two contributions address the question of the intellec-
tual origins of this theory. In recent times this has seen a debate over the importance of Gramsci’s
interest in linguistics. In the most controversial formulation, Gramsci’s university studies in lin-
guistics, including such categories as language prestige, are said to have influenced, or even to
have been the main influence on, his later elaboration of the concept of political hegemony in the
Prison Notebooks (Lo Piparo, 1979: 135–51; 1987). More cautious formulations have emphasized
that Gramsci’s interest in linguistics is an ‘aspect’ of his theory of hegemony, one that can provide
‘linguistic enrichment’ to key concepts in Gramsci’s political theory in general (Ives, 2004b: 101–
2). Other cautionary points have also been raised. One such point is that there were other, possibly
Olsaretti 339

more important, sources of Gramsci’s interest in language than his university training. One of these
is the formulation of hegemony in relation to linguistic questions that took place in Soviet cultural
policy while Gramsci was in Russia (Brandist, 2012). Another is the notion of language as a con-
ception of the world that is ultimately derived from Humboldt via Labriola, though Gramsci added
to it the internal differentiation of the language community into a hierarchy of social groups
(Schirru, 2010: 115).
This is also a second and more serious cautionary point: the concept of hegemony formulated in
Gramsci’s prison work differed fundamentally from the concept of language prestige that he was
familiar with from his university studies. The latter emphasized horizontal geographical relations
between different areas, while the concept of hegemony relied on the notion of social stratification,
thus emphasizing vertical social relations between different social groups within a hierarchy
(Schirru, 2008: 410). And when Gramsci considered the question of rival hegemonies it was chiefly
as a rivalry ‘between the hegemonic groups, classes and states and subaltern ones’ (Boothman,
2012b: 139), rather than between civilizations or language groups. Even with these qualifications,
the argument regarding the relation between Gramsci’s interest in linguistics and his theory of
hegemony is interesting for the light it sheds upon the latter. Gramsci’s emphasis on the need to
foster spontaneous rather than normative grammars was essential to the notion of an ethical hegem-
ony built from below, a more democratic hegemony (Ives, 2004a: 19, 50), one that is complemen-
tary to Bourdieu’s theory of the ‘habitus’ (Friedman, 2009). Indeed, although ‘Gramsci was neither
a linguist nor a philosopher of language’, his discussion of linguistic issues in relation to the
national question in Italy, with its tolerant attitude towards a plurality of languages, shows that he
was much more open towards pluralism than is supposed by authors who ignore his writings on
linguistic questions (Carlucci, 2009: 34–5, 42). A third cautionary point has been raised too. It is
that Gramsci’s linguistic training was only one of many influences over his theory of hegemony
(Boothman, 2012a: 21) that included Left concepts of ‘hegemony’ and a stimulus by Machiavelli,
together with Croce’s ethico-political history, as well as his training in linguistics (Boothman,
2008). It is this last point that is addressed chiefly here, showing that it was not so much Croce’s
ethico-political history as his example as an intellectual that worked on Gramsci’s formulation.
Moreover, in emphasizing the importance of philosophy, this paper seeks to draw attention to yet
another area, besides linguistics, that was important for Gramsci’s theory of hegemony.
The third contribution, on intellectuals, adds to debates on the application and development of
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. Here it is important to distinguish between different fields of
application and development. One field has been international relations. It has been suggested that
Gramsci showed an interest in interdependence, applying both to relations among social forces
within a state and to relations between states, which became an integral part of the concept of
hegemony (Vacca, 2008: 105, 110–17). Neo-Gramscian (Bieler and Morton, 2004; Cox, 1993) and
sociological perspectives (Arrighi, 1993) in international relations have developed precisely these
‘international’ aspects of the theory of hegemony to be found in the Notebooks. Another field of
application and development has been in colonial settings, often, though not necessarily, in con-
junction with the cognate concept of the subaltern, that is, subordinate groups within a hegemonic
relationship. The most notable and best-known application of Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony
and the subaltern has been by the Subaltern Studies Group. Historiographical production about
India, for example, has been studied as an instance of dominance without hegemony (Guha, 1997).
Recently, however, there have also been a number of studies that have applied the concepts of
hegemony and the subaltern to other colonial settings, including Indochina (Wells, 2007), Australia
(Smith, 2007), Papua New Guinea (Hawksley, 2007) and Nicaragua (Reed, 2013).
It has been observed that such works, especially those associated with Subaltern Studies, did not
really engage with Gramsci’s thought, which contained a thoughtful elaboration of the concept of
340 Critical Sociology 42(3)

subalternity in relation to hegemony and civil society (Buttigieg, 1998: 55, 59). It is important to
appreciate that this suggestion in no way implies a rejection of the concept of subalternity or of the
importance of subaltern thought within Gramsci’s work. Rather, it points to the complex relation-
ship that Gramsci saw between subalternity and hegemony and civil society. Other works have
begun recovering precisely the complexities of Gramsci’s concept of the subaltern (Green, 2002),
particularly the fact that it extended beyond class to include all forms of subordination, whether by
race, gender, religion, etc. (Green, 2011). They have also drawn attention, with linguistic enrich-
ment, to how subaltern groups can produce a new hegemony. In this context, it is suggested that for
Gramsci subaltern groups could only produce a new hegemony by producing their own groups of
organic intellectuals (Adamson, 1980: 144–5; Green and Ives, 2009: 25–6). It is this point that I
particularly address here, by drawing attention to the complexities of the process of creation of a
group of independent intellectuals by the subaltern. Not only these likely include traditional as well
as organic intellectuals, but Gramsci showed a particular awareness of the structural difficulties in
creating groups of intellectuals depending on position within the system of states and vis-à-vis the
masses. In particular, intellectuals in peripheral locations were especially tied to the state rather
than to the economic structure of society.

Croce and Gramsci’s Theory of Hegemony

The controversial question of Gramsci’s intellectual debt to Croce has extended to the theory of
hegemony. Two broad arguments regarding the Crocean origins of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony
can be found in the literature. The first states that Croce’s category of ethico-political history pre-
figured Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, while the second suggests that it was Croce’s example as
an intellectual that influenced Gramsci’s theory. Both arguments will be rejected here. As far as the
first argument is concerned, some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that the Crocean
category of ethico-political history prefigured the Gramscian concept of hegemony, emphasizing
as it did the primacy, one could say the hegemony, of thought over practical life, of the thinking
elites over the impulsive masses, of ethics over politics (Cingari, 2008: 277–8). Two objections
will be raised here to this suggestion: first, that Gramsci adopted a critical stance towards Croce’s
concept of ethico-political history, which he saw as a speculative and therefore inferior version of
the Marxist theory of hegemony; second, that there were subtle but important differences between
Croce’s concept of ethico-political history and Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. It will be suggested
instead that what commonalities can be found between Croce’s work and Gramsci’s, as far as
hegemony is concerned, are general features that Gramsci shared with Italian intellectuals of his
generation or the one before.
Gramsci adopted a critical stance towards Croce’s concept of ethico-political history. There
were a number of severe limitations in the concept of ethico-political history according to Gramsci,
so his elaboration of the theory of hegemony took place in opposition to the speculative and nar-
rower category of ethico-political history as elaborated by Croce. In particular, Gramsci saw
ethico-political history as a purely speculative construction typical of Crocean neoidealism: ‘one
can observe that ethico-political history is a mechanical and arbitrary hypostasis of the moment of
hegemony, of political leadership, of consent, in the life and development [svolgimento] of the
activity of the State and of civil society’ (Q10i§7; QC: 1222). The opposition between Crocean
idealism and Marxism was not to be sought in the fact that Marxism allegedly disregarded the
cultural front, but ‘in the speculative character of Crocean idealism’ (QC: 1224).
In his engagement with ethico-political history, which Croce proposed only in the 1920s,
Gramsci was mostly concerned with showing that Marxism had already included the emphasis
upon cultural initiatives of its own accord.
Olsaretti 341

The most important problem to be addressed in this paragraph is the following: whether the philosophy of
praxis excludes ethico-political history, that is, [whether] it does not recognize the reality of a moment of
hegemony, [whether] it does not give importance to moral and cultural leadership, really judging as [mere]
‘appearances’ [all] superstructural phenomena [fatti]. We can say not only that the philosophy of praxis
does not exclude ethico-political history, but that its most recent phase of development consists precisely
in the appropriation [rivendicazione] of the moment of hegemony as an essential [component] of its
conception of the state and in the recognition of the value [valorizzazione] of cultural phenomena, of
cultural activity, of a cultural front [that is deemed to be] necessary alongside the merely economic and
merely political [fronts]. […] The philosophy of praxis will critique as unwarranted and arbitrary the
reduction of [all] history to ethico-political history, but will not exclude the latter. (QC: 1224)

The reference here to the ‘most recent phase of development’ of Marxism most likely indicates
Leninism and the cultural politics with which Gramsci was familiar from his sojourn in Russia.
Elsewhere Gramsci recognized that Croce’s work had the merit of having drawn attention to cul-
tural factors, the work of great intellectuals and, more in general, to the ‘moment of hegemony and
consent’ in historical development. But again, he stressed that Lenin had at around the same time
also revalued the cultural front and credited him with having constructed ‘the doctrine of hegem-
ony as a complement of the theory of the state as force’ (Q10i§12; QC: 1235).
Moreover, there were subtle but important differences between Gramsci’s theory of hegemony
and Croce’s ethico-political history. These differences concerned the relationship between politics
on the one hand and philosophy and knowledge on the other. Whereas in Croce’s theory it is phi-
losophy and knowledge that influence politics, in Gramsci’s theory the reverse influence is also at
work, so that politics influences philosophy and knowledge. It has long been recognized that
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony has gnoseological significance (Salamini, 1981). Because reality is
perceived – and knowledge about it is acquired – through a series of cultural and ideological lenses
that are themselves the product of historical development and ideological struggles, ‘hegemony
necessarily implies the creation of a particular structure of knowledge and a particular system of
values’ (Fontana, 1994: 140). As Gramsci put it, in a short note outlining the relationship between
the philosophy of praxis and speculative philosophies like Croce’s, ‘the philosophy of praxis con-
ceives of the reality of social relations of knowledge [rapporti umani di conoscenza] as an element
of political “hegemony”’ (Q10ii§6iv; QC: 1245).
Despite these differences between Croce’s concept of ethico-political history and Gramsci’s
theory of hegemony, as well as the more obvious differences in terminology, it can still be sug-
gested that there is a fundamental commonality of interests between Croce’s concerns and
Gramsci’s (Cingari, 2008: 272–3). However, this commonality was something that united Gramsci
with many Italian intellectuals and not just Croce. It is not so much that, as has been suggested,
Croce and Gramsci belonged to an Italian intellectual tradition privileging cultural struggle that
harked back to Vincenzo Cuoco and Machiavelli, as well as to the activities of the Catholic Church
(Jacobitti, 1984: 101, 111–25). Rather, it can be argued that Gramsci’s theory of hegemony was
prefigured in the work of many Italian theorists, including Antonio Labriola and Croce, concerned
as they were with educational and cultural matters so needed ‘to make Italians’ in post-Risorgi-
mento Italy. In particular, Labriola’s concerns are closer to Gramsci’s than Croce’s. Labriola theo-
rized more openly and explicitly than Croce the importance of concrete cultural and especially
pedagogical initiatives by the state and by intellectuals (Punzo, 2008: 27, 31, 36–8), all of which
remained largely implicit in Croce’s own career. Moreover, Labriola actively and openly argued
that socio-economic and political emancipation also involved an intellectual and moral reform by
the people and that Marxism contained within itself the seeds of this intellectual and moral reform,
a theme that was dear to Gramsci.
342 Critical Sociology 42(3)

By the second argument regarding Croce’s influence on Gramsci’s formulation of his theory of
hegemony, it was not Croce’s theory that influenced Gramsci but his example as an intellectual. It
has been suggested, in particular, that Croce’s own ascendancy over Italian culture at the beginning
of the 20th century, based upon his activities through the journal La Critica and the publisher
Laterza, provided a concrete precedent and template for Gramsci’s concept of hegemony (Jacobitti,
1980: 68). Two qualifications to this argument are in order. The first is that we should add to this
concrete example Gramsci’s own journalistic and political-party activity. Indeed, as first suggested
by Togliatti, Gramsci undertook in the isolation of prison a theoretical elaboration of his own previ-
ous political activity (Frosini, 2010: 18). The second qualification is that, as Gramsci reflected in
prison on Croce’s role as a hegemonic intellectual, a role which Gramsci had begun to analyze and
criticize already in his essay on the southern question (Gramsci, 1974), he became ever more criti-
cal of the shortcomings of Croce’s own role. In Notebook 10, on Croce, we do find Gramsci com-
menting on the great popularity that Croce had acquired at home and even abroad. But he also
specifically adds that Croce’s popularity was restricted to narrow circles and that indeed Croce
aimed to undertake the political education of the elite (Q10ii§22; QC: 1259), so that his hegemonic
role as an intellectual was restricted to elite circles. Of the more recent historical works that pro-
posed the concept of ethico-political history, Gramsci thought that they did not gain popularity
except among restricted intellectual groups (Q10ii§29; QC: 1267).
There were undoubtedly some positive aspects of Croce’s activity as a hegemonic intellectual,
though limited to elite circles. Gramsci was especially impressed by the accessibility of Croce’s
works, thanks to his capacity to present with simplicity what in other works would appear as jum-
bled and hopelessly complicated (Gramsci, 1994: 166). He also positively reviewed elements of
Croce’s popularity as an intellectual, singling out the clarity of his prose, which Gramsci compared
to Galileo’s, as well as the adherence to life of his philosophizing, that is, the fact that his philoso-
phizing responded to questions dictated by the life-needs of the groups that Croce wrote for, rather
than the abstract needs of a philosophical system (Q10i§4; QC: 1215–16). Nevertheless, because
Croce’s function as a hegemonic intellectual was restricted to elite circles, it figured largely as a
negative example of hegemony in the Prison Notebooks. To the extent that Croce exercised any
influence beyond elite circles on the mass of the urban and rural bourgeoisie, this was not a hegem-
onic influence, as it had the paradoxical effect of favoring the ascendancy of fascism, which Croce
opposed, by encouraging a passive attitude (Q10i§9; QC: 1228).

Philosophy I: The Critique of Common Sense

Philosophy played a critical role in Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, even more than language,
which has been so emphasized in recent scholarship. The relationship of philosophy to common
sense is especially important. There are two different uses of the term philosophy in Gramsci which
imply two different relationships between philosophy and hegemony. In the first use philosophy is
a conception of the world and everyone possesses a conception of the world, even the subaltern
classes through their common sense, since a rudimentary philosophy is contained in language and
common sense (Q11§12; QC: 1375). Thus common sense contains also a philosophy, and because
popular beliefs for Gramsci could have the strength of material forces of production in history,
determining the behavior of the masses, so philosophy, through common sense, indeed as common
sense, had an enormous influence on the life of the masses. It has been suggested that, historically,
this view of philosophy derived from a notion of common sense that characterized Italian culture
and ultimately originated in Vico. Philosophy was thus also especially tied to hegemony, being all
pervasive and organizing the everyday life of the masses (Jacobitti, 1983: 369–70). It is especially
important to notice that in this use of the term philosophy the hegemonies that philosophy as
Olsaretti 343

common sense helped to buttress could well be the hegemonies of dominant ideologies that had
been assimilated by subaltern classes. Philosophy in this broad sense does not inherently contain
an emancipatory potential.
Gramsci also used the term philosophy to refer to the activity of specialized philosophers. In this
second use of the term philosophy we find that philosophy and common sense are altogether dif-
ferent kinds of ideological constructs for Gramsci, with an altogether different relationship to
hegemony too. Philosophy in this sense is notable because it is the ideological construct of hegem-
onic groups, while common sense is necessarily the ideology of subaltern social groups that per-
petuates their subaltern status. This does not mean, however, that Gramsci saw no positive
contributions whatsoever from ideological constructs belonging to the popular masses. Common
sense – or, more specifically, its good, healthy core that Gramsci sometimes distinguishes by call-
ing it buon senso or ‘good sense’ – has some important positive features. This includes a tendency
towards an instinctive empiricism or direct observation of reality that was rediscovered in the 17th
and 18th centuries, as a reaction against the authority of the Bible and Aristotle (Q10ii§48i; QC:
1334–5) in natural science. Nevertheless, despite these positive features, common sense for
Gramsci was associated with difficulties in mobilization and the subordinate status of subaltern
social groups. This is in contrast to philosophy. The two are differentiated by Gramsci on the basis
of their internal coherence: philosophy is a coherent system, whereas common sense is by its very
nature amorphous and incoherent, full of diverse and possibly contrasting notions, accepted with-
out the benefit of inventory (Q11§12; QC: 1398–9, 1399–400) and often with a predominance of
notions of religious origins (QC: 1378, 1396). Gramsci’s conceptualization of common sense is
thus the very antithesis of system and can be argued to represent an innovative and particularly
useful conception of culture compared to the ones predominant in anthropology (Crehan, 2011:
275, 281). In fact Gramsci saw other cultural productions such as specialized philosophy as inher-
ently systematic.
Popular common sense – for Gramsci every class or group otherwise possesses a common
sense, meaning a diffuse body of opinions – belongs with a series of inter-related terms describing
the process of creation and diffusion of culture that includes folklore and philosophy (Liguori,
2006: 63–6, 71). In this series of inter-related terms common sense is an intermediate term between
folklore and philosophy proper. Philosophies, the coherent and articulated systems worked out by
individual philosophers or a handful of intellectuals, have left traces or sedimentations in common
sense. The latter is a shifting, active body of opinions, notions, etc. which enriches itself with
accretions from a variety of sources, including ‘scientific notions and philosophical opinions which
have entered custom [costume]’. Over time, common sense solidifies to yield folklore, the rigid
body of popular opinions of a given time and place. In this way ‘“common sense” is the folklore of
philosophy and it is always in between folklore proper (that is, as it is commonly understood) and
philosophy, science, the economics of scientists’ (Q24§4; QC: 2271). The disjointed and unreflect-
ing character of common sense has drawbacks both for its theoretical usefulness and also for its
usefulness as a tool of mass political mobilization. The common sense of the subaltern masses,
lacking the coherence of philosophy, is necessarily limited for the sake of mobilization, and it is
indeed closely associated with the subordinate status of the groups that rely only on this form of
worldview (Liguori, 2006: 76, 80). Philosophy cannot be in opposition to common sense when it
comes to mobilization, nor is there a fundamental qualitative difference between philosophy and
common sense, but there is nevertheless an important difference of degree between the two.
Philosophy, in fact, has the hallmarks of an ideological construct belonging to hegemonic
groups and pertaining to their leadership functions. Two different actions of philosophy to ensure
hegemony are possible. These arguably coincide with the two definitions of hegemony that ani-
mate Gramsci’s discussion, namely, of restricted or ‘minimal’ as opposed to expansive or ‘integral’
344 Critical Sociology 42(3)

hegemony (Femia, 1987: 46–7). In the first case, coinciding with restricted hegemony, philosophy
acts only by guaranteeing the internal ideological coherence of the hegemonic groups. Philosophical
systems act on the popular masses ‘as an external political force, as an element of the cohesive
force of leading classes, as an element therefore of subordination to an external hegemony’
(Q11§13; QC: 1396). Croce’s philosophy, which aimed to educate the elites, belonged to this cat-
egory. Perhaps for this reason too Croce’s attitude towards common sense remained ambiguous
and inconclusive (QC: 1398–9). In the second case, coinciding with expansive hegemony, philoso-
phy acts to ensure the adherence of the subaltern groups to the hegemonic project. In this case,
philosophy intervenes to ‘educate’ common sense, as it were, and make it more congruent or com-
patible with the hegemonic project. French philosophy is taken by Gramsci to be paradigmatic of
this second case:

In French philosophical culture there exist more treatments of ‘common sense’ than in other national
literatures: this is due to the more closely ‘national-popular’ character of French culture, that is, to the fact
that intellectuals tend, more than elsewhere, because of determinate traditional conditions, to draw near to
the people in order to guide them ideologically and keep them tied to the leading group […] The attitude
of French philosophical culture towards common sense can actually offer a model of hegemonic ideological
construction. (QC: 1398)

It is from French philosophical culture, rather than from Croce, that Gramsci drew the example of
a hegemonic ideological construction that sought to educate common sense.
Popular, subaltern social groups were not necessarily destined to remain in a subordinate role,
and herein lay the emancipatory potential of philosophy. Philosophy in fact could also participate
in the establishment of new hegemonies through this process of education of common sense.
Indeed it has long been noticed that for Gramsci philosophy was a key part of political education
and the latter involved addressing common sense (Adamson, 1980: 140, 149–52, 169). Philosophy
in this case participated in the establishment of a new hegemony by helping remove the subordi-
nate status of subaltern social groups precisely through its critique of common sense. Here it is
important to remind ourselves that Gramsci saw a contrast between philosophy and common sense,
the first being tied to a leadership role while the second was tied to the subordinate status of subal-
tern groups. The emancipatory potential of philosophy for ‘educating’ common sense implied pre-
cisely that the latter was to be overcome by philosophy. Thus Gramsci wrote unequivocally that
‘philosophy is the critique and the overcoming of religion and of common sense and in this sense
it coincides with “good sense” which is in contrast with common sense’ (Q11§12; QC: 1378). Note
the positive remark regarding ‘good sense’ in this passage, showing again that Gramsci did not
altogether discount the positive contribution of popular ideological constructs, in this case to the
establishment of new hegemonies.

Philosophy II: The Critique of False Consciousness

Recent scholarship has focused chiefly on the disjointed character of common sense as a source of
subjection of subaltern social groups to hegemonic one (Green and Ives, 2009). However, there are
at least the beginnings of a recovery of the importance of the elaboration of implicit philosophy,
alongside the critique of common sense, for counter-hegemonic purposes (Crehan, 2002: 108, 113,
115–19). This point is taken up here with the added emphasis upon philosophy. In fact, Gramsci
emphasized both the need for internal coherence in the worldview of a group and also the need for
coherence between its theory and practice, its explicit and implicit philosophies. Therefore the task
of philosophy traditionally understood is not only to criticize disjointed common sense but also the
Olsaretti 345

false consciousness of a group, in order to elaborate what Gramsci called ‘implicit philosophy’.
This point is only implied in Gramsci’s discussion but is nevertheless very important for under-
standing the task and status of philosophy in Gramsci’s thought. There is indeed in Gramsci the
outline of a theory of false consciousness, based upon his distinction between ‘implicit’ and
‘explicit’ philosophy, which gives pride of place to (explicit) philosophy as the moment of active
theoretical elaboration of a worldview. In fact it has been noted how Gramsci’s views on implicit
philosophy are helpful for understanding when and how a false consciousness may be detected in
the life of a group (Lukes, 2005: 6–7, 49–50). They are also helpful to explain change in the face
of relative institutional stability, because of their inherent variability and degree of in-built contra-
diction (Clemens and Cook, 1999: 449–50). Gramsci merely provided the outline of a theory of
false consciousness, since this was not his main field of inquiry. This outline is important here
exclusively for its emphasis upon philosophy and the way in which it was integrated in his theory
of hegemony.
Gramsci refers to knowledge as ‘implicit’, meaning two separate things, both of which are
strictly speaking different from the current use of the term in the expression ‘implicit knowledge’,
although Gramsci was also aware of knowledge as undocumented (and undocumentable?) know-
how in industrial and scientific practices (Q11§36; QC: 1451–3), which is close to the meaning of
‘implicit’ in the current expression. In the first sense in which Gramsci used the term, a conception
of the world that is widely accepted becomes implicit in a variety of cultural and other fields of
human endeavor. A philosophy or worldview that has become a broad cultural movement and has
come to be endorsed by large masses of people, thus generating a collective will, becomes an ideol-
ogy in a broader sense of the word – ‘a conception of reality and the world that manifests itself
implicitly in art, in law, in economic activity, in all individual and collective manifestations of life’
(Q11§12; QC: 1380, my emphasis). In the second sense, a conception of the world is implicit in
one’s activity because it is not articulated, not elaborated systematically, and thus it is still in an
embryonic stage. It is in this second sense that philosophy understood as the activity of profes-
sional philosophers is meant to elaborate what is only implicit in the activity of the masses. The
critical activity of philosophy towards common sense is thus also invoked by Gramsci in dealing
with what he calls implicit philosophy.

Working practically in the making of history one also works in [the making of] ‘implicit’ philosophy, which
will be ‘explicit’ in so far as some philosophers will elaborate it [into a] coherent [whole], raising
questions of knowledge which sooner or later will find, besides the ‘practical’ form of their solution, also
the theoretical form at the hands of specialists, after having immediately found the disingenuous form of
popular common sense at the hands of the practical agents of historical change. (Q10ii§31; QC: 1273, my
emphases)

Note the dismissive comment about the ‘disingenuous form of popular common sense’ of the solu-
tions to questions of knowledge.
The elaboration of implicit into explicit philosophy does not happen automatically. On the con-
trary, there are at least some cases in which subaltern social groups borrow a worldview from
hegemonic groups. This is effectively a false consciousness, though Gramsci does not describe it
as such. It creates a situation in which there is a contrast between explicit and implicit philosophy
in the life of a social group and this contrast is the hallmark of subaltern social groups. Gramsci is
not clear as to whether this borrowed philosophy substitutes common sense or becomes part of it.
Be that as it may, the elaboration of implicit into explicit philosophy is therefore, at least by impli-
cation, essential for counter-hegemony. The task of philosophy understood as the activity of pro-
fessional philosophers thus becomes all important.
346 Critical Sociology 42(3)

There is no [such thing as] philosophy in general: there exist different philosophies or worldviews and
[one] always makes a choice among them. How does this choice take place? Is this choice a merely
intellectual fact or [is it] a more complex [affair]? And isn’t there often a contradiction between the
intellectual fact and [some] behavioral norm? What will the real worldview be, then: the one [that is]
logically asserted as an intellectual fact, or the one that emerges from each person’s real activity, [the
one] that is implicit in [their] actions? And given that [their] actions are always political actions, can
we not say that each person’s real philosophy is entirely contained in their politics? This contrast
between thinking and acting, that is, the coexistence of two worldviews, one asserted in words, the
other coming through in their effective actions, is not always due to bad faith. Bad faith can be a
satisfactory explanation for some individual singly taken [into consideration], or even for more or less
large groups, [but] it is not a satisfying [explanation] when the contrast occurs in the life-expressions
of large masses of people: then it cannot be but the expression of deeper contrasts of historic and social
dimensions. It means that a social group that has its own worldview – albeit an embryonic one, that
manifests itself in [their] activity, and therefore only once in a while, occasionally, that is when that
group moves as an organic whole – has, for reasons of submission and intellectual subordination,
borrowed a worldview not of its own from another group, and this [worldview] it asserts in words, and
this [worldview] it believes to be following, because it does follow it in ‘normal times’, that is when
behavior is not independent or autonomous, but rather [it is] submissive and subordinate. (Q11§12;
QC: 1378–9, my emphases)

Note that the contrast between implicit and explicit philosophy distinguishes subaltern social
groups because these follow the explicit worldview that they have borrowed from other groups in
normal times.
The elaboration of an explicit philosophy is especially important because this explicit philoso-
phy influences the conduct and directs the will of individuals. It is thus essential for the foundation
of a new hegemony. An opportunity for overcoming the contradiction between explicit and implicit
philosophies in the life of a subaltern social group opens up when the contradiction is such that it
leads to an inability to act. Then the contradiction can be overcome through a struggle between
contrasting hegemonies which vie for primacy on the ideological terrain.

His theoretical consciousness can be historically in contrast with his actions [operare]. One could almost
say that he has two theoretical consciousnesses (or one contradictory consciousness), one implicit in his
actions that unites him with all those who collaborate with him in the practical transformation of reality
and a superficially explicit [consciousness expressed] in words that he has inherited from the past and
accepted without criticism. Nevertheless this consciousness [that is] expressed in words is not without
consequences: it ties [him] to a specific social group, it influences [his] moral conduct, [it] directs his will,
in a more or less energetic manner, that can reach the point where the contradictions [of his] consciousness
are such that they do not permit any activity, any decision [being taken on his part] and produces a state of
moral and political passivity. A critical self-understanding thus takes place through a struggle of political
‘hegemonies’, of contrasting directions, first in the field of ethics, then within politics, [finally] to reach a
superior development of one’s conception of reality. (QC, 1385, my emphases)

For Gramsci, the development of one’s conception of reality happens through contrasting hegemo-
nies or hegemonic principles which vie for the allegiance of individuals. There is always, Gramsci
insists, a conflict between different hegemonic, or ethico-political, principles even when, as in the
early Italian Risorgimento, the opposing side is the Bourbon king and his loyalist reaction against
modern liberal principles (Q10i§12; QC: 1236–7). For this reason too the role of philosophy under-
stood as the activity of professional philosophers is important for counter-hegemonic purposes,
because it is necessary to set up alternative directions in the field of ethics, of politics and, ulti-
mately, in the worldview available to a social group.
Olsaretti 347

Intellectuals I: Limitations of Intellectuals in Peripheral Locations

We have seen that Gramsci attached great importance to the critiques of common sense and of false
consciousness, both of which are necessary steps in overcoming subaltern status and constructing
a new hegemony. Intellectuals are the agents of these critiques and as such play a crucial role in
hegemonic projects. Organic intellectuals are particularly important, but Gramsci does not suggest
that a new hegemony can only be established by organic intellectuals. In fact, in some places and
epochs, Gramsci seems to recognize the particular difficulties associated with the creation of
organic intellectuals. In these cases, intellectuals are overly reliant on the state as they are ‘not
anchored to a strong economic group’. This observation is applicable to traditional intellectuals,
meaning intellectuals not linked directly to the economic world but defining themselves chiefly in
terms of continuity with previous intellectual groups, but also to organic intellectuals linked to new
but as yet weak economic groups. These cases are found in peripheral and semi-peripheral loca-
tions of a capitalist economy and the associated state system.2 The point emerges in the context of
a discussion by Gramsci of the reasons for the success of idealist philosophy and an absolute con-
ception of the state in periods of Restoration (Q10ii§61). It is part of the critique of Croce and of
his historiographical production, but the note ends up providing the outline for an interpretation of
European history that also sets out the peculiarities and limitations of intellectual groups in periph-
eral and semi-peripheral areas and the inevitable need to rely upon the state in these areas.
One aspect of Gramsci’s discussion of idealism in this note is worth highlighting before we
proceed to consider the main point. Contrary to the argument that Gramsci shared an Italian tradi-
tion of thinking on the state that gave it pride of place in unifying the nation, as in Gentile’s theory
of the ethical state (Bellamy and Schecter, 1993: 17, 137), this note shows Gramsci consciously
taking his distance from this tradition, while at the same time explaining the concrete social origins
of the tendency of idealist philosophies, in Italy and abroad, to see the state as all-important. This
he criticized theoretically too, for example in a brief note on the ‘identification of the individual
and the State’ put forward by the actualist philosopher Ugo Spirito, a follower of Gentile. This was
utter nonsense, Gramsci essentially said, adding that ‘it seems to me that this [confusion] is about
the absence of a clear definition of the concept of State and of the distinction within it between civil
society and political society, between dictatorship and hegemony etc.’ (Q10ii§7; QC: 1245). Thus
Gramsci took his distance from the authoritarian/dictatorial tendencies of a certain style of Italian
thought, tendencies of which he was well aware. What is especially interesting in the note on
Croce’s histories, to be addressed here (Q10ii§61), is the fact that Gramsci’s critique of intellectu-
als provided a concrete socio-historical explanation of these specific tendencies, as well as the
general success of idealist philosophy.
As for the main point, Gramsci’s discussion involves a reflection on the role of intellectuals in
peripheral and semi-peripheral areas based on the structural location of the state within the
European state system and of intellectuals vis-à-vis the state. The structural location of the state
itself plays a key role in Gramsci’s explanation. A comparison between the French state that was
born from the Revolution and the other states in continental Europe is ‘of vital importance’,
Gramsci observes. He then sketches four phases of state formation, including:

1) The revolutionary conflagration in France with the radical and violent change of social and political
relations; 2) European opposition to the French Revolution and to its diffusion by class channels [‘meati’
di classe]; 3) French war, under the Republic and Napoleon, against Europe, first not to be put down
[soffocata], then to set up a permanent French hegemony with the tendency to form a universal empire; 4)
national counter-charges against French hegemony and birth of modern European states by successive
small reformist waves, not by revolutionary conflagrations like the original French one. The ‘successive
348 Critical Sociology 42(3)

waves’ are constituted by a combination of social struggles, of interventions from above of the kind
[undertaken by] an enlightened monarchy and by national wars, with a predominance of the last two
[phenomena]. (Q10ii§61; QC: 1358)

It is in the fourth phase, with its peculiar characteristics, that idealist philosophy thrived, indissolu-
bly linked to the successive ‘reformist waves’. There is a parallel between these observations and
some observations by Gramsci on Croce. The last phase with its ‘waves’ arguably recalls Gramsci’s
interpretation of Croce, during the ‘crisis of Marxism’ at the end of the 19th century, as the leader
of European revisionism (Q10i§2). Croce’s intellectual role in fact had a very political aspect that
tended precisely to renew and keep alive ‘old political forms’ (Q10ii§59i; QC: 1353), precisely as
one would expect of intellectuals in a peripheral and semi-peripheral area.
The structural location of intellectuals vis-à-vis states in peripheral and semi-peripheral areas
explains their role in the successive ‘reformist waves’ that involve the state in these areas.

An important question connected to the preceding one concerns the role that intellectuals believe they have
had in this long process of socio-political brewing harbored by the Restoration. Classical German
philosophy is the philosophy of this period, it gives life to national liberal movements from 1848 to 1870.
A propos of this, one ought also to recall the Hegelian parallel ([drawn also by] the philosophy of praxis)
between French practice and German speculation … (on this basis of [actual] historical relations one ought
to explain the whole of modern philosophical idealism). (Q10ii§61; QC: 1359)

What is at stake for intellectuals in peripheral and semi-peripheral areas is a different relationship
to the world of production, which in these areas is mediated by the state and sees intellectual
groups playing a leading role, albeit indirectly, in economic development. Unlike the revolution
from below that occurred in France, where the classical Marxian scheme of the relationship
between productive classes and the state applies (QC: 1359–60), the successive ‘reformist waves’
are for all intents and purposes revolutions from above, or ‘passive revolutions’ made possible by
international development. Both the position of intellectuals and their views of the state are pro-
foundly affected:

when the thrust towards progress is not closely linked to local economic development that is artificially
limited and repressed, but is the reflection of an international development that sends to the periphery its
ideological currents, born on the basis of the productive development of the most advanced countries, then
the group bearing the new ideas is not the economic group, but the rank of intellectuals and the conception
of the state which is the object of propaganda changes in appearance: [the state] is conceived as something
unto itself, as a rational absolute. (QC: 1360–61, my emphasis)

The observation could well apply to the role of the state in Hegel’s own philosophy, as well as
in those variants of idealist philosophy, like Gentile’s actualism, that became fashionable under
fascist rule in Italy. What is especially interesting, however, is the suggestion that the ‘rank of intel-
lectuals’, in conjunction with the state, becomes the bearer of new economic ideas (and initiatives).
Intellectuals in the service of the state, rather than directly linked to a strong economic group capa-
ble of producing and sustaining its own groups of organic intellectuals, then acquire special promi-
nence, together with their biases.

The question can be set up thus: being the State the concrete form of a productive world and being
intellectuals the social element from which the governmental personnel is drawn, it is typical [proprio] of
the intellectual not yet strongly anchored to a strong economic group, to present the State as absolute: in
this manner the function of intellectuals is itself conceived of as absolute and preeminent, their existence
and historical dignity is abstractly rationalized. (QC: 1361, my emphases)
Olsaretti 349

Intellectuals II: A Group of Independent Intellectuals

Even when circumstances were propitious for the rise of organic intellectuals, their intellectual
production was limited by their immediate tasks and position vis-à-vis the masses. It is important
here to note, moreover, that Gramsci emphasized the complexity of the process of creation of a new
hegemony and spoke of ‘independent intellectuals’ in general, rather than just of organic or of
‘practical’ intellectuals. Indeed the production of organic intellectuals was just one part of a com-
plex process of intellectual elaboration that included the conquest and assimilation of traditional
intellectuals. In any case, the two categories – organic and traditional – were dynamic and meant
to work together as descriptions of the actual position of intellectuals in society (Olsaretti, 2014:
3–4, 6–9). His reference to ‘complex new formations’ in which independent intellectuals would be
involved suggests that they were part of groups that also comprised a mix of traditional and organic
intellectuals. Certainly, they involved high intellectuals and sophisticated theoretical elaboration.
This view is set out in a lengthy note devoted to the double revision of Marxism into idealist and
materialist variants.

It can be seen, in general, that the currents which have attempted to combine the philosophy of praxis with
idealist elements [tendenze] are for the most part [made up] of ‘pure’ intellectuals, whereas those which
constituted the orthodoxy were [made up] of intellectual personalities more markedly given to practical
activity and therefore more [closely] tied […] to the great popular masses […]. This distinction has great
importance. The ‘pure’ intellectuals, as elaborators of the more extensive ideologies of the dominant
classes, as leaders of the intellectual groups of their countries, could not avoid making use of at least some
elements of the philosophy of praxis […] to furnish new weapons to the arsenal of the social group to
which they were tied. On the other hand the orthodox tendency found itself fighting the most diffuse
ideology among popular masses, religious transcendentalism, and it thought it could overcome it only with
the crudest and most banal materialism, which itself was a not indifferent stratification of common sense,
kept alive, more than one would tend to believe, by religion itself. (Q16§9; QC: 1855)

The following discussion of the role of intellectuals in the double revision illustrates the struc-
tural and institutional considerations that informed Gramsci’s theory of intellectuals. A classic
example of the first process, involving ‘pure’ intellectuals, is Croce’s reduction of the philosophy
of praxis to an empirical canon of historical research, but there are also many unacknowledged
borrowings and combinations, in Sorel, Bergsonism and pragmatism (QC: 1856). The second pro-
cess, involving ‘practical’ intellectuals in producing the combination with materialism, is the most
interesting for Gramsci, however. Citing a point made by Luxemburg, Gramsci suggests that the
founders of the new philosophy – Marx and Engels – were considerably ahead of their time, as they
effectively set up a theoretical arsenal with anachronistic weapons that were of no use to the repre-
sentatives of the orthodox tendency (QC: 1857). The latter, as we have seen in the passage above,
faced chiefly the task to educate the masses. The point is reiterated and expanded upon by Gramsci
in a passage in which he refers to ‘independent’ rather than organic intellectuals as necessary for
the establishment of a new hegemony.

One of the historical reasons seems to be that the philosophy of praxis has had to ally itself with extraneous
tendencies in order to fight the residues of the precapitalist world among popular masses, especially on the
religious terrain. The philosophy of praxis had two tasks: to fight modern ideologies in their most refined
form, to be able to constitute its own group of independent intellectuals, and to educate the popular masses,
whose culture was medieval. This second task, which was fundamental, given the character of the new
philosophy, absorbed all the forces, not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. (QC: 1857–8, my
emphasis)
350 Critical Sociology 42(3)

The point of this passage is that the philosophy of praxis had two tasks, and focusing on the second
task alone, that of educating the masses, is not sufficient (though undoubtedly necessary) for
hegemony. Most importantly, in addressing the first task, fighting modern ideologies in their most
advanced forms, it should have been able to constitute ‘its own group of independent intellectuals’
who would have been at least in part high intellectuals involved in the highest forms of intellectual
production.
This, Gramsci goes on to explain, is an extremely difficult task that, history teaches, is only
achieved in the long run. Following a brief review of movements for intellectual and moral reform,
most notably the Reformation and the Enlightenment, Gramsci sought to explain Erasmus’ obser-
vation, cited by Croce, that wherever Luther triumphed higher studies were doomed. This was,
effectively, because of the entire concentration of new movements on the more immediate tasks of
communicating with the masses. ‘The Lutheran reform and Calvinism gave rise to a vast national-
popular movement where they spread and only in successive periods [they gave rise] to a superior
culture’ (QC: 1859). Gramsci somewhat dubiously went on to argue that the same was true for the
Enlightenment, which was ‘a great intellectual and moral reform of the French people, more com-
plete than the German Lutheran one, because it embraced also the great popular masses in the
countryside’ (QC: 1859) and it too was not accompanied by ‘an immediate flowering of high cul-
ture, other than for political science in the positive science of [legal] right’ (QC: 1859–60). So too
for the philosophy of praxis, ‘which is still going through its popular phase’ (QC: 1860).
The most difficult task in these conditions is precisely to give rise to and foster an independent
group of (high) intellectuals, since

to generate a group of independent intellectuals is not an easy thing, it demands a lengthy process, with
actions and reactions, with adherences and dissolutions and very numerous and complex new formations:
it is the conception of a subaltern social group, without historical initiative, which continuously enlarges
itself, but incoherently, and without being able to move past a certain qualitative level which is always this
side of ownership of the state, of the real exercise of hegemony on the entire society which alone permits
a certain organic equilibrium in the development of the intellectual group. (QC: 1860–61)

Yet generating a group of independent intellectuals who are still tied/allied to the new social group
and who seek to change its subaltern status is indispensable. This is the ‘political question of intel-
lectuals’, which involved the creation of a group ‘for itself’, and thus the realization of class con-
sciousness, through the intervention of intellectuals: ‘critical self-consciousness means politically
and historically the creation of an intellectual elite: a human mass does not “distinguish” itself and
does not become independent “for itself” without organizing itself (in a broad sense) and there is
no organization without intellectuals’ (Q11§12; QC: 1386).

Intellectuals III: The Intellectuals-Masses Dialectic

A class’s ‘own group of independent intellectuals’ were not just its organic intellectuals. What,
then, guarantees for Gramsci the closeness of such intellectual groups to the masses? Not the
requirement that they should be all (or even mainly) organic intellectuals – an unrealistic require-
ment. Yet for ideas to be successful in the task of counter-hegemony they must be grounded in the
lived historicity of the masses. Certainly, they must include elements of the buon senso or ‘good
sense’ of the masses, since for ideas to spread among the masses they must speak to them, as it
were. This is achieved through the dialectic or mutual influencing of intellectuals and masses. This
is set out in a lengthy introductory note in Notebook 11 in which Gramsci speaks of an ‘intellectuals-
masses dialectic’ (Q11§12; QC: 1386) that is important to explain the success of intellectual
Olsaretti 351

movements and also the closeness of intellectuals to the masses, where this closeness is achieved.
Elsewhere he discusses the interaction and mutual influence between intellectuals and masses with
reference to communication and education. Communication is made possible by culture, since:

Culture, in its various grades, unifies a greater or lesser quantity of individuals in numerous strata, more or
less in direct [espressivo] contact, who understand each other to different degrees etc. It is these socio-
historical differences and distinctions which reflect themselves in common language and produce those
‘obstacles’ and those ‘causes of error’ which the pragmatists have addressed. (Q10ii§44; QC: 1330)

Gramsci then goes on to outline his views on the ‘democratic philosopher’ in this note, including
in particular the pedagogical relationship of mutual influencing that exists in hegemonic relation-
ships ‘between intellectuals and non-intellectuals, between rulers and ruled, between elites and
followers, between vanguards and army corps’ (QC: 1331). It is through the intellectuals-masses
dialectic and the mutual influencing which it presupposes that a new culture is to be born from the
encounter between intellectuals and masses.
The intellectuals-masses dialectic is important for the masses which, as we have seen, need
intellectuals in order to become a group ‘for itself’. It is also important for the intellectuals, and this
ensures their co-operation and closeness to the masses. It is important, in particular, for the success
of intellectual groups. To Gramsci, for an intellectual movement to be truly successful a ‘historical
bloc’ between intellectuals and masses ought to be established. Philosophy ought not to be con-
ceived as the preserve of small intellectual groups devoted to the discovery of new concepts only.
The socialization of well-established concepts, their diffusion among the masses, ‘is a “philosophi-
cal” fact rather more “original” and important than the finding on the part of a philosophical
“genius” of a new truth that remains the preserve of small intellectual groups’ (Q11§12; QC: 1378,
my emphasis). Indeed for Gramsci one of the main weaknesses of modern idealism, despite its
successes in high culture, among intellectual groups themselves, had been precisely the failure to
go to the masses, the failure to create a bond between intellectuals and the masses (QC: 1381). A
philosophical movement for Gramsci was ‘truly such’ only in so far as it established a link with the
masses and became a broad-based culture, not if it limited itself to developing ‘a specialized cul-
ture for narrow intellectual groups’ (QC: 1382). The importance of going to the masses was partly
for political reasons, to guarantee a broad endorsement of the movement and its defense. It was
also partly for the social aspects of intellectual production itself, the excellence of which was guar-
anteed by a broad recruitment base (QC: 1386).
The intellectuals-masses dialectic is important for theoretical elaboration too, in that it is neces-
sary for groups of intellectuals to be able to express new developments that the masses live through
but are unable to articulate. This comes across quite strikingly in the only other note in which intel-
lectuals’ role in cultural production is discussed at some length in Notebook 11. Titled ‘Questions
of nomenclature and content’ (Q11§16), the note is concerned with explaining the continued influ-
ence of old conceptions of materialism over the reception of historical materialism, which ended
up being perceived as just a modified variant of materialism rather than a radically new philosophy
(QC: 1410). Gramsci refers to Labriola on this topic (QC: 1411), but the main concern of the note
is with language and the meaning that the term materialism has acquired over time and in different
social settings, while also tending to retain its original meaning as derived from 18th-century
philosophy.
The role of intellectuals and their position vis-à-vis both older intellectual groups and newer
social groups that are their contemporaries is crucial in Gramsci’s explanation of the endurance of
old meanings. Here the importance that Gramsci attached to language and also its inter-relationship
with social groups and social structures becomes evident: ‘No new historical situation, even if it is
352 Critical Sociology 42(3)

due to the most radical change, transforms language completely … but the content of language
should change’ (QC: 1407). This should occur through the work of intellectual groups that, how-
ever, find themselves in a double bind. On the one hand, they link up to older intellectual groups
through the usage of the ‘same nomenclature of concepts’ (QC: 1407). They thus tend to maintain
the old nomenclature, sometime for good reasons (QC: 1408). On the other hand, they are also
inevitably related to and affected by the socio-economic activities of the newest social groups. But
they do not always succeed in giving expression to these new developments, sometime clinging to
the old content as well as the old nomenclature. Here language usage is clearly related by Gramsci
to social structures, including the particular configurations and relationship between intellectual
groups and social classes.

Conclusion
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony stands at the intersection of several strands of thought in the
Prison Notebooks. Three such intersections were considered here, taking a stance on recent
contributions to the study of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. Firstly, the theory of hegemony
intersects with the critique of Croce. Gramsci did not borrow from Croce’s concept of ethico-
political history for his theory of hegemony, as recently suggested. Rather, he was influenced
by Croce’s role as a hegemonic intellectual in Italy. However, Gramsci had a largely negative
view of this role, associating it with a restricted hegemony that concerned only the elites.
Secondly, the theory of hegemony intersects with Gramsci’s reflections on philosophy and its
role in cultural production. Philosophy had a crucial role in hegemony that warranted close
study and criticism by Gramsci, even more than linguistics, so emphasized by recent contribu-
tions to the study of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. Philosophy, as a coherent and systematic
body of thought, was essential to hegemony because of the task that Gramsci assigned to it in
the critique of the disjointed and shifting character of common sense, the diffuse body of opin-
ions belonging to subaltern classes. It was also essential to hegemony because of a second task
that Gramsci assigned to it, that of critiquing the false consciousness of subaltern classes and
elaborating their ‘implicit philosophy’.
Lastly, the theory of hegemony intersects with the theory of intellectuals. As emphasized in
recent contributions, organic intellectuals undoubtedly played a crucial role in the establishment
of a new hegemony. However, Gramsci did not believe that this could only be the work of
organic intellectuals. In practice, Gramsci recognized that all intellectuals, whether organic or
traditional, had severe limitations in peripheral and semi-peripheral areas, at least at the begin-
ning of industrialization. In any case, Gramsci spoke of the task of creating ‘a group of inde-
pendent intellectuals’ that presumably included both organic and traditional intellectuals, a point
congruent with the view that the conquest of traditional intellectuals was the most important task
in creating a new hegemony. The closeness to the masses of these groups of intellectuals was
ensured not by their organic status but by that interaction between intellectuals and masses that
Gramsci called the ‘intellectuals-masses dialectic’. Far more needs to be done to recover the
nuanced and complex features of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. This article has sought to con-
tribute to this recovery by elaborating upon and qualifying three aspects of Gramsci’s theory that
have been addressed in recent research.

Funding
Research for this article was made possible by a doctoral grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada.
Olsaretti 353

Notes
1. This has been abbreviated in the text as QC, for Quaderni del Carcere. All first references to a given note
include the notebook and paragraph or note number as per the Gerratana edition used here. Thus Q11§12
means Notebook 11, note 12. The English translation of the Gerratana edition currently in preparation
by Joseph Buttigieg, uses the same numeration of notebooks and notes. However, its most recent volume
(Gramsci, 2007) stops at Notebook 8 and thus does not include the notebooks chiefly addressed here:
Notebooks 10, 11 and 16. All references are to the Gerratana edition which, through its translation by
Buttigieg, is set to become the standard version of Gramsci’s prison work.
2. I am employing here the terms capitalist (world) economy and state system as defined in Immanuel
Wallerstein’s landmark study that pioneered the paradigm of world-systems analysis (Wallerstein, 1976).
The case for integrating Gramsci’s theory of hegemony with world-systems analysis has been made by
Giovanni Arrighi (1993).

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