Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Module ID: 7
Objectives:
- Introduce the concept of federalism
- Comparative overview of how constitutions around the world incorporate federalism
1. Introduction
2.1 Meaning
1
Daniel Halberstam, Federalism and the Role of the Judiciary (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel
Kelemen, and Gregory A. Caldeira (eds.) THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 142 (2008).
2
Daniel Halberstam and Mathias Reimann, Federalism and Legal Unification: Comparing Methods,
Results and Explanations Across 20 Systems MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 3 (2011).
3
Daniel Halberstam, Federalism: Theory, Policy, Law (Michael Rosenfeld and Andras Sajo) THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 577 (2012).
4
Daniel Halberstam, Federalism and the Role of the Judiciary (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel
Kelemen, and Gregory A. Caldeira (eds)), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 142
(2008).
5
Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 502 (2008).
6 Robert D. Cooter and Neil S. Siegel, Collective-Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I,
2.2 Theories
Literature and debate relating to federalism have given rise to three theories of
federalism9 –
Proponents of this theory included Dicey, Wheare and Robert Garan. According
to Wheare federalism was a system of government where power was divided
between the general and regional governments, each of which was independent
of and coordinate to the other10. However, the simplistic elements involved in
this theory have now become somewhat obsolete in the wake of wars and
economic depression (for example) on the grounds of legal formalism 11. The
term independent was also heavily criticized as it is believed that the central and
regional government cannot exist in isolation from each other and there must
necessarily be a level of dependence involved in such an arrangement. More
neutral terms, like autonomy, are better preferred my modern theorists12.
This theory seeks to explain federalism on the basis of the circumstances that
warrant its creation and is further divided into the sociological, multiple-factor
and political theories13.
7
Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 502 (2008).
8
Erwin Chemerinsky, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 4 (2008).
9
S. A. Palekar, Federalism: A Conceptual Analysis THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 304
(2006).
10
K.C. Wheare, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (4th Edn.) 33 (1963) and Douglas V. Verney, Federalism,
Federative Systems and Federations: The United States, Canada and India PUBLIUS 83 (1995).
11
S. A. Palekar, Federalism: A Conceptual Analysis THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 305
(2006).
12
William S. Livingston, FEDERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 9 (1956).
13
S. A. Palekar, Federalism: A Conceptual Analysis THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 305
(2006).
The functional theory supplements the origin theory in that it explains how and
why a federal structure prevails under changing circumstances14.
Federations can come together in two ways. The first is to become part of an existing
unified polity by means of a bargain. The second is for entities previously having
distinct jurisdictional identities to come together. The primary reason separate units
came together seems to be for defense and security –both, foreign and internal15. In
fact a classic confederation was earlier defined as a ‘unity capable of waging war’16.
Other reasons include economic benefits, trade, commerce and welfare concerns.
Though, it has been widely suggested that federalism is neither an economic nor
sociological but a political affair, in several cases, the primary motivation for
formation of federations is seen to vary17. Sometimes socio-economic factors take
precedence over political reasons. In other cases, the converse might be true18. What
is common, however, is the process involved in the formation of a federal system – an
arrangement that ultimately forms a union and a federal union at that19. The sentiment
behind the formation of a federation is a group of people consenting to common rule
without actually giving up the desire to rule themselves, the smaller states20.
The concept of ‘bargain’ has been used by scholars to describe federal arrangements.
It has further been described as a constitutional bargain – a system within which daily
politics can take place21. Federalism is a tool that aids in governance at the same time
possessing the ability to limit the authority of governments22. Ideally, this
arrangement should be flexible enough to enable efficient governance but not so
unstable that the original allotment of power and authority can shift easily in favour
either of the union or of the constituent units23.
Defining federalism has been an academic battle, with attempts being made to include
as many aspects of this system as possible. It started with expanding Wheare’s
interpretation of the American model – often considered to be the epitome of modern
federalism. What followed were scholarly debates with inputs from Livingston,
Friedrich and Elazar and an extended understanding of federalism from the original
14
S. A. Palekar, Federalism: A Conceptual Analysis THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 309
(2006).
15
Michael Burgess, COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 79 (2006).
16
M. Forsyth, UNIONS OF STATES: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONFEDERATION 160 (1981).
17
Michael Burgess, COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 78 (2006).
18
Michael Burgess, COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 81 (2006).
19
A. V. Dicey, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTION 76 (1982).
20
A. V. Dicey, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTION 77 (1982).
21
Daniel Halberstam, Federalism and the Role of the Judiciary (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel
Kelemen, and Gregory A. Caldeira (eds.) THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 143 (2008).
22
Daniel Halberstam, Federalism and the Role of the Judiciary (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel
Kelemen, and Gregory A. Caldeira (eds.) THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 143 (2008).
23
Daniel Halberstam, Federalism and the Role of the Judiciary (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel
Kelemen, and Gregory A. Caldeira (eds.) THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 143 (2008).
American model to include other arrangements like condominiums, leagues and
associated statehoods to name a few24.
However, Riker’s contribution can be said to be the most lasting one. His simple test
laid down three pre-requisites for a system to be called federal25:
(a) two levels of government governing the same citizenry and land;
(b) each level possessing a domain where it could exercise autonomy; and
(c) some form of guarantee of the abovementioned autonomy.
2.4 Types
2.4.1 Confederation
A confederation can be said to be the earliest form of federalism. In this system, the
constituent units that formed the union would hold on to the majority of the powers.
These units maintained collective control over the common union.27 A distinguishing
feature was that in a confederacy, the delegates of the constituent units formed the
common union as opposed to their citizens directly electing the members of the
common union28.
2.4.2 Federation
It is from here that the idea of federalism is derived and finds its origins in the United
States of America – following the American War of Independence - where the
Founding Fathers envisioned a political system in which smaller units of a
government would govern themselves and at the same time follow one constitutional
governance of the general government29. This central government, so to speak, would
have precedence in matters where it is granted the authority for the same and has
authority over every citizen of the constituent units. In a typical federation, the
autonomy of regional governments that make up the union is usually assured by a
24
Michael Burgess, COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 76-101 (2006)
25
William H. Riker, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 11 (1964).
26
Daniel Halberstam, Federalism and the Role of the Judiciary (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel
Kelemen, and Gregory A. Caldeira (eds.) THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 142(2008).
27
Daniel J. Elazar, International and Comparative Federalism PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLITICS
190 (1993).
28
Daniel J. Elazar, International and Comparative Federalism PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLITICS
190 (1993).
29
Daniel J. Elazar, International and Comparative Federalism PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLITICS
190 (1993).
constitution - which cannot be unilaterally altered by the central government30. Even
so, this cannot be said to be a pre-requisite of a federal government31. But there are
contesting claims that describe federations as a species of ‘federative systems’ where
a federation refers to a coordinate and not a subordinate relationship between the
centre and the states32.
Even international law has said to have an impact on the formation of the federal
structure of nations. Federalism is probably not the best term to describe the
organizational structure of supra-national bodies like the European Union or the
United Nations. The concept of subsidiarity states that the federal union plays a
30
Douglas V. Verney, Federalism, Federative Systems and Federations: The United States, Canada
and India PUBLIUS 84 (1995).
31
Daniel J. Elazar, International and Comparative Federalism PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLITICS
190 (1993).
32
Douglas V. Verney, Federalism, Federative Systems and Federations: The United States, Canada
and India PUBLIUS 84 (1995).
33
Daniel J. Elazar, International and Comparative Federalism PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLITICS
190 (1993).
34
Douglas V. Verney, Federalism, Federative Systems and Federations: The United States, Canada
and India PUBLIUS 83 (1995).
35
Louise Tillin, Unity in Diversity? Asymmetry in Indian Federalism PUBLIUS 48 (2007).
36
William Riker, Federalism (Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.) HANDBOOK OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE, 6 (1975).
37
Charles Tarlton, Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A Theoretical Speculation
JOURNAL OF POLITICS 873 (1965).
38
Mahendra P. Singh and Douglas V. Verney, Challenges to India’s Centralised Parliamentary
Federalism PUBLIUS 4 (2003).
merely supportive role.39 As ambiguous as the term is, plays an important role in this
debate as it is the most common explanation offered to suitably justify the authority
of European institutions vis-à-vis the sovereignty of the member states40. With respect
to the European Union, subsidiarity is normally understood as a ‘political’ or ‘legal’
principle that regulates the relationship between the larger community and the
member states it comprises41. However, mandatory compliance with supranational
legal instruments, such as in the case of the European Union, also promotes a type of
unification among the member states – loosely mirroring a federal system42. Even this
unification is at two levels – first it unifies the legal regimes within the European
Union and secondly, it unifies the law within the member states as often the
supranational laws are directly applicable to and possess overriding powers over the
laws of the smaller units43. A similar outcome, though on a smaller scale, is effected
by the European Court of Human Rights on the Council of Europe as well.
Unification, on a federal model or otherwise, is also possible when states participate
in international projects – like the UNIDROIT, UNCITRAL or the OECD44. But
practically speaking, unification through compliance with international law is a rare
practice.
39 Daniel Halberstam, Federal Powers and the Principle of Subsidiarity (Vikram David Amar and
Mark V. Tushnet (eds.) 34 (2009).
40
Neil MacCormick, Democracy, Subsidiarity, and Citizenship in the ‘‘European Commonwealth’’
LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 331 (1997).
41
Nicholas Aroney, Subsidiarity, Federalism and the Best Constitution: Thomas Aquinas on City,
Provice and Empire Law and Philosophy 163 (2007).
42
Daniel Halberstam and Mathias Reimann, Federalism and Legal Unification: Comparing Methods,
Results and Explanations Across 20 Systems MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 26 (2012).
43
Daniel Halberstam and Mathias Reimann, Federalism and Legal Unification: Comparing Methods,
Results and Explanations Across 20 Systems MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 26 (2012).
44
Daniel Halberstam and Mathias Reimann, Federalism and Legal Unification: Comparing Methods,
Results and Explanations Across 20 Systems MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 26 (2012).
45
Peter H. Schuck, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP 176, 178 (1998); Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship EMORY
LAW JOURNAL 1435 (1997).
46
Peter H. Schuck, Citizenship in Federal Systems American Journal of Comparative Law 199 (2000).
rights and treatment expected from the government is more often than not clearly
stated and codified. However, when it comes to ‘citizens’ of states, some
constitutions (like the American, Australian and German ones) prohibit
discrimination whereas others (like the Canadian one)47 may permit some forms of
discrimination. Another important area of concern to be discussed here is that of
immigration – whether it should be dealt with by the union as a larger question of
security or by the states into which immigration actually takes place based on more
economic and administrative interests.
5. Case Studies
The Founding Fathers described the American Constitution as ‘in strictness neither a
national nor a federal constitution; but a composition of both’48. At the time, the term
‘federal’ was understood to mean what we perceive of a ‘confederal’ today -a union
that is a confederation of sovereign states49. In the early days American federalism
concerned itself with limiting the authority of the central government and giving as
much power as was administratively possible to the constituent states50. It was only
later that these powers of the states were transferred to the centre. What distinguished
American federalism from the others is that it was conceived as an end and not a
means to an end51 – for example, a federal structure for better governance of a large
territory. It is based on federalism that the other distribution of powers takes place52.
47
Robert A. Sedlar, Constitutional Protection of Individual Rights in Canada NOTRE DAME LAW
REVIEW 1191 (1984).
48
James Madison, Federalist Rossiter (Ed.) THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 246 (1999).
49
Martin Diamond, What the Framers Meant by Federalism (Robert Goldwin (ed.), A NATION OF
STATES 25 (1974).
50
Douglas V. Verney, Federalism, Federative Systems and Federations: The United States, Canada
and India PUBLIUS 86 (1995).
51
Douglas V. Verney, Federalism, Federative Systems and Federations: The United States, Canada
and India PUBLIUS 83 (1995).
52
Douglas V. Verney, Federalism, Federative Systems and Federations: The United States, Canada
and India PUBLIUS 89 (1995).
53
A. V. Dicey, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTION 78 (1982).
54
521 US 898 (1997).
55
505 US 144 (1992).
that it normally may not appropriate the states’ powers56. This is also evident from
United States v. Lopez57, where the Supreme Court of the United States overturned a
law because it believed that the Congress had overstepped its power to control
interstate commerce. A similar approach was taken in United States v.
Morrison58where the judiciary restated its authority to regulate the seemingly
unfettered powers of the Congress to protect the federal structure envisioned in the
Constitution, even in the domain of common law crimes. Though not every
constitutional challenge to the constitutionality of a federal statute has been favorably
entertained by the judiciary, its spirit to safeguard the federal system is rather
apparent59.
5.1.2 Germany
As early as 1946, Germany saw established regional territories (Länder) with their
own governing machinery – parliamentary governments in favor of democracy and
headed by their own Prime Ministers. These Prime Ministers became instrumental in
laying down the Basic Law or Grundgesetz of the unified Germany. The Prime
Ministers were to set up a federal government – in the interest of the rights of the
constituent states and also to provide for a central government that would ensure
rights and freedoms of individuals. The proposed federation of states would be
empowered to oversee the application of federal law, govern the fiscal sharing
structure among other matters. The Basic Law, however, underwent several
amendments during the unification of Germany but contained provisions to deal with
the above. It identifies Germany as ‘a democratic and social federal state’. Germany
describes itself as a Bundesstaat or federal state but has its own peculiarities like
conferring most of the legislative power on the national government while the
constituent states have the power and responsibility to administer state and federal
laws. The Bundesrat, which represents the Länder was created as a means to give the
states adequate representation in domestic policymaking. To generalize, the
Länderpossess the authority to administer most laws unless, specifically excluded by
the Basic Law60. Fiscal matters were to be controlled by the union and the Länder -
independent of each other, where the role of the Bundesrat becomes that much more
vital61.
5.1.3 India
56
Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering THE FEDERAL
VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE US AND THE EU 1 (2001).
57
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
58
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
59
Peter J. Henning, Misguided Federalism MISSOURI LAW REVIEW 391 (2003).
60
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM: AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE UNITED STATES AND WEST
GERMANY, ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 35 (1981).
61
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM: AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE UNITED STATES AND WEST
GERMANY, ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 35 (1981).
Seldom is India considered to be completely federal; instead it is thought to be federal
in form but mostly unitary in substance.62 It is a ‘union of states’ where the state
governments derive their powers from the central government.63India’s federal
system found its origins in the Government of India Act, 1935 which provided for
British India and the then Princely States to come together and form a federal
Union.64 Many reasons contributed to the establishment of a federal structure in India
– its vast size, religious and linguistic diversity, etc. These reasons become important
in other debates such as minority rights for certain religions or demarcation of state
boundaries based on linguistic lines. India is referred to as quasi-federal for several
reasons. On the legislative front, subjects on which the government may make laws
are divided as per three lists: the Union List for the Union Parliament, the State List
for the State Legislative Assemblies and the Concurrent List which gives residual
powers to the Union (except in the exceptional case of Jammu and Kashmir where the
residual powers vest in the State Legislative Assembly)65. In spite of this clear
division, the states may enact laws only when the same are not contradictory to a law
made by the Centre. The same predominance is true in the case of the Union
Executive over the State Governments and of the Supreme Court of India over
subordinate courts. However, post-liberalisation, India’s federal structure can be
described as cooperative-cum-competitive, owing itself to regional political parties
whose agenda include consolidating interests based on economic, minority, religious
and caste rights66.
Per the Indian Constitution, the Union must protect every state against external
aggression as well as from internal disturbance67. It is interesting to note that Article
356of the Constitution virtually negates India’s federal character. It gives the Union
Executive – the President of India – the power to bring under its control a particular
state if it is satisfied that the state is unable to comply with the provisions of the
Constitution. The position before 1977 was rather rigid where this power of the
President was outside the purview of judicial review. In S.R. Bommai v. Union of
India68, the Supreme Court clarified that such a declaration of ‘President’s Rule’ was
not absolute and was subject to judicial review just as any other action of the
Executive.
India’s disposition to a strong centre is time-tested and ties in closely with the judicial
history surrounding the basic structure doctrine. Even though the Constitution
contains provisions (like Article 3) that may be used to build a case against its federal
62
S. A. Palekar, Federalism: A Conceptual Analysis THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 308
(2006).
63
National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, Report, I, 8.1.2 (2002), at
http://lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/finalreport/volume1.htm (last visited on October 20, 2014).
64
S. P. Sathe, India: From Positivism to Structuralism (Jeffrey Goldsworthy (Ed.) Interpreting
Constitutions: A Comparative Study 217 (2006).
65
Constitution of India, Seventh Schedule.
66
S. A. Palekar, Federalism: A Conceptual Analysis THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 314
(2006).
67
Constitution of India, Article 355.
68
(1994) 3 SCC 1.
structure, the Indian Constitution is basically a federal constitution – with certain
exceptions69. The federal character of the Indian Constitution is held to be one of its
basic features. In 1967, the Supreme Court of India in I.C. Golaknath& Ors.v. State
of Punjab& Ors.70 prohibited the legislature from making any such amendment to the
Constitution that would ‘take away or abridge’ the Fundamental Rights contained in
Part III of the Constitution. If made, such an amendment would be null and void. Six
years later, in Kesavananada Bharti v. State of Kerala71, the Supreme Court overruled
Golaknath and held that the Parliament was indeed competent to amend any part of
the Constitution so long as it kept in mind that the ‘basic structure of the Constitution
could not be abrogated even by a constitutional amendment’. Two years later, in a bid
to restrict the judicial review of constitutional amendments (following from
Kesavananda Bharti), the Parliament enacted the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution
which, to sum briefly, sought to turn the Parliament’s limited powers to unlimited
powers. Among other things, the amendment sought to prevent all constitutional
amendments from being examined by the judiciary, thus giving itself unfettered
power to amend the Constitution. The Supreme Court through its verdict in Minerva
Mills& Ors. v. Union of India& Ors.72, once again upheld the doctrine of basic
structure – thus ensuring that the Union Parliament would never be able to
compromise the federal structure of the Constitution. Even so, federalism seems to be
part of the basic structure largely in thought and not in action. Over the years, India’s
federal structure has been changed greatly, for example, with new states being
created. Federalism as basic structure doctrine exists, perhaps, for a situation where
an unconstitutional act by the State seeks to alter India’s federal character
altogether73.
6. Conclusion
69
Durga Das Basu, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, (13TH EDN.) 18 (2000).
70
1967 AIR 1643.
71
His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Anr., AIR 1973
SC 1461.
72
AIR 1980 SC 1789.
73
Rajeev Dhavan and Rekha Saxena, The Rewriting Of Indian Federalism: Constitutional Amendments,
Statutory Changes And The Executive Power Revisited 12 at
http://www.unifr.ch/federalismnetwork/assets/files/tpl/forum_uploads/Dhavan%20-
Rekha%20paper.pdf <Last visited on October 23, 2014>.
select situations. Although there exist different theories and several practical forms of
federalism, not a single one has been able to capture every facet of a federal structure
and is merely a combination of only a few of them.