Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Editorial Board:
Nimrod Aloni, Kibbutzim College of Education, Tel Aviv, Israel
Marvin Berkowitz, University of Missouri-St.Louis, U.S.A.
Pietro Boscolo, University of Padova, Italy
Maria Rosa Buxarrais, University of Barcelona, Spain
Helen Haste, University of Bath, U.K. / Harvard University U.S.A
Dana Moree, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic
Clark Power, University of Notre Dame, U.S.A.
Kirsi Tirri, University of Helsinki, Finland / Stanford University, U.S.A.
Joel Westheimer, University of Ottawa, Canada
William Wu, Hong Kong Baptist University, China
‘Moral Development and Citizenship Education’ is a book series that focuses on the cultural
development of our young people and the pedagogical ideas and educational arrangements
to support this development. It includes the social, political and religious domains, as well as
cognitive, emotional and action oriented content. The concept of citizenship has extended
from being a pure political judgment, to include the social and interpersonal dynamics of peo-
ple. Morality has become a multifaceted and highly diversi¿ed construct that now includes cul-
tural, developmental, situational and professional aspects. Its theoretical modelling, practical
applications and measurements have become central scienti¿c tasks. Citizenship and moral
development are connected with the identity constitution of the next generations. A caring and
supporting learning environment can help them to participate in society.
The series seeks to stimulate a dialogue between different points of view, research traditions
and cultures.
Prospective authors and editors are invited to send their book proposals to the series
editors or to peter.deliefde@sensepublishers.com
SensePublishers
For Wisdom and Awareness
www.sensepublishers.com
Education and Humanism
Linking Autonomy and Humanity
Edited by
Wiel Veugelers
University of Humanistic Studies Utrecht/
University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
SENSE PUBLISHERS
ROTTERDAM / BOSTON / TAIPEI
A C.I.P. record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by
any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written
permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose
of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work.
CONTENTS
Practicing Democracy 95
JOEL WESTHEIMER
v
vi
WIEL VEUGELERS
INTRODUCTION:
LINKING AUTONOMY AND HUMANITY
oping rationality, autonomy and knowledge about human traditions can strengthen
a persons’ agency and develop ef¿cacy in learning and in the world as a whole. The
naturalistic-romantic tradition sees learning as affective and creative and shows
that giving space to personal interest can make learning meaningful to the learner
and gives the feeling of authenticity. The existential tradition lets us realise that a
human being has to develop his own meaning system, worldview and practice and
that one has the moral obligation to live a human life and take care of humanity.
The critical-radical tradition shows that possibilities for Àourishing, learning and
living a human life are not equally distributed in the world. Individual development
is embedded in a social world of unequal social and political relations. Changing
possibilities for Àourishing and empowerment should enhance the possibilities for
learning and development for all, in particular people with less social and political
power.
At the heart of humanistic education is this tension between personal autonomy
development and social change (Veugelers, 2007). From a humanist point of view
social change is not possible without strong and critical autonomous people. Auton-
omy development without an embedding in social change is glorifying the individu-
al not humanity. Autonomy and social concern should be considered as interlinked.
Autonomy development should be embedded in social change processes (Freire,
1985). For education this means that learning is not a technical-instrumental ration-
ality but identity development in a reÀective and dialogical way in a social context;
it is morally social constructivism
Human beings have the possibility to give meaning to their lives and to create co-
herence in experiences. Making meaning gives direction and signi¿cation to ones
own life and to a personal view on life (Baumeister, 1991). The development of
moral values of people takes place through meaning giving and people can contrib-
ute to the development of norms in their neighbourhood, in groups and cultures, and
in society as a whole. Education, in the family, in civic institutions, and at school,
can contribute to young people’s meaning giving processes.
Personal meaning giving might be inspired by worldviews. Religions are world-
views, but also nonreligious views on life that are shared by many people are
worldviews. Humanism is one of these, but also the more political worldviews like
liberalism and socialism. A humanist perspective on giving meaning is based on
personal responsibility, not on insights provided by a God, and on repeatedly trying
to realize human potential (Derkx, 2002). It is an attitude of mind of striving for
humanity, for humanization. Humanism is regarded as an open worldview. There
is no ¿xed, absolute criterion for what higher humanity is, for what is beautiful
or true. The normative criterion is the never ¿nally concluded dialogue in which
everyone involved participates and where one also reÀects on the unique context of
this dialogue itself.
2
INTRODUCTION: LINKING AUTONOMY AND HUMANITY
Besides a cognitive and a moral aspect, every worldview also has motivat-
ing, inspiring or spiritual aspects. What might be called a ‘humanist spirituality’
refers to humanism as ‘art of living’ (Dohmen, 2003). It is drawing strength from
beauty, from the life stories and imaginations of people, and from the experience of
belonging. It is the experience of belonging without feeling restricted. Within hu-
manism there is much attention for the development of the Ancient Greek culture,
the Renaissance, the French Revolution and the emancipation movements of the
twentieth century (Aloni, 2002). These are examples of humanization and active
meaning giving processes of people involved.
Present-day humanism strongly focuses on personal development in relation to
others. It is this tension between personal development and advancement of hu-
manization, that is creating the opportunities for the personal development of every
world citizen, that dominates the current debate on humanization. Humanism is
about personal autonomy, moral responsibility, and about solidarity with humanity.
Human solidarity restricts autonomy and connects the individual and his environ-
ment. It is always about the dynamics between autonomy and social involvement.
These dynamics can still have a large diversity of theoretical and practical inter-
pretations. The diversity should be judged as positive, because it will contribute to
a lively communication about moral values and will prevent that the values of one
group are all too easily established as the norm for everyone. Diversity challenges
everybody to reÀect on one’s personal values (Veugelers, 2008).
The source of autonomy can easily be localized. It is, after abandoning God, fall-
ing back on oneself. Autonomy is an achievement, acquired by social movements
like the Enlightenment (Aloni, 2002). The achieved autonomy challenges people to
make their own choices, to take their own responsibility. In modern times one is
even forced to make choices, to develop personal life-politics (Giddens, 1981). The
existential approach in humanistic education too denies a predestination and argues
that man can only try to make the best of it all. There is no human script, but there
is a human responsibility to shape one’s personal life.
The concept autonomy is problematic though. Autonomy can not be created with-
out the other. From two different theoretical positions both Levinas and Vygotsky
clearly show that human development is only possible in relation to the other. Man
is per de¿nition a relational being. One relates to the other. This relation can take
very differing forms: from oppression through ignoring to a form of involvement.
Involvement can again have several qualities, from empathy through sympathy to
solidarity with certain groups. Human being actively position themselves in cul-
tural practices and discourses (Haste, 2004; Veugelers & Oser, 2008).
What are the sources of this social dimension? Biology and modern brain re-
search are assiduously searching the biological sources of involvement. Biologists
like De Waal have shown that some animals display forms of empathy (Verbeek,
3
WIEL VEUGELERS
2006). The neurosciences show us that several moral qualities can be localized in
the brain. Even with an embedding of morality in the brain, social and cultural
processes can have produced this brain source of morality. The growth of the brains
could have resulted from a long-term human training in this form of involvement
that led to its lodging in the brain. This would be similar to the development of
certain muscles by an athlete in a speci¿c sport, or populaces with certain physical
habits that became embedded in the body.
With moral human capabilities like the facilities for empathy and dialogue, still
speci¿c motives are needed for developing and strengthening these capabilities.
When subjecting to the word of a God is no longer the motive, other sources must be
found. In the humanistic tradition there has always been much attention for exam-
ples that actively shaped autonomy, like in the Bildung tradition. There is also much
attention for exemplary ¿gures who connected the development of autonomy with
social development, for instance Montaigne, Erasmus and Spinoza. Or in the eth-
ics of care of Tronto and Noddings. There is furthermore attention for people who
have resisted oppression, like Hanna Arendt, Etty Hillesum, Primo Levi and bell
hooks or people who criticised a dominant western cultural orientation like Edward
Said and Amartya Sen; or who proposed more political forms of involvement, like
Antonio Gramsci and Paulo Freire.
The broad list of moral examples shows that the social dimension of humaniza-
tion can take many forms: from a mainly affective empathic capacity to advancing
social justice and to a political struggle of solidarity with powerless people, and to
a shift in power relations. The articulated forms express different combinations of
autonomy and social involvement. Characteristic for this humanistic relation is that
one of the poles is never disconnected from the other. Autonomy without social
involvement would imply an extremely individualistic position. Social involvement
without autonomy would merely imply adaptation. The tension between autonomy
and social involvement is the core of humanism.
Education supports persons in their development. The authors brought together
in this book all address issues of developing autonomy and humanity in educa-
tional practices. All the chapters try to link theory and practice. They either make
theoretical ideas more practical or they use practical experiences and concerns to
rethink theoretical notions.
4
INTRODUCTION: LINKING AUTONOMY AND HUMANITY
The identity development of both students and teachers needs to be reÀective and
dialogical, aiming at enhancing a social situated self that supports justice-oriented
social, cultural and political change. ReÀective learning, dialogical learning and
democratic learning are at the heart of humanist education.
In Humanistic Education: From Theory to Practice Aloni brings his theoreti-
cal ideas expressed in his well know book ‘Enhancing Humanity’ (Aloni, 2002)
into practice. He stresses the importance of the professional self-image of inter-
personal trust, cultural idealism and personality. These ideals can be developed in
a humanistic school culture of security, fairness, dialogue and social involvement.
The curriculum should translate knowledge into life-literacies that allow learners
to identify the value-laden messages of issues discussed in classes and to plan their
actions with greater reason and responsibility.
The next three more theoretical chapters focus on fundamental concepts of a
humanist perspective of education. First on the personal human being, second on
Ubuntu as interconnectness of human beings, and third on democracy as a way of
living together as human beings.
In Moral Education from a Humanist Perspective Buxarrais and Esteban ana-
lyse the liberal-communitarian debate and design a moral education in postmodern
times. They propose a model that accounts for the uncertainty of the human being
as the foundation of their being human; the desire towards excellence as typical
human; reason as the guide for the critical spirit and action; and the widening of
horizons. This model asks for pedagogical conditions of presence, planning, incon-
venience, patience and individualization. Starting from theoretical work the authors
end with practical descriptions of teachers’ pedagogical acting.
In The Philosophy of Ubuntu and Education in South Africa Le Grange shows
how the concept of Ubuntu functions in public and philosophical debates in South
Africa and what the possibilities are for working with this concept in education.
Ubuntu means that each individual expression is ideally expressed in relationship
with others. Ubuntu is a concrete manifestation of the interconnectedness of human
beings. Le Grange shows how different philosophical trends balance between the
universalism of the concept and its meaning interwoven in cultural practices and
lived experiences of African peoples. It is the deconstructive/reconstructive poten-
tial of Ubuntu that might have transformative effects on education, in particular in
South Africa.
Democracy as way of living (Dewey, 1923) can be seen as a humanist way of
organizing society and social life. In the chapter Why We Are Not Democratic Yet:
The Complexity of Developing a Democratic Attitude De Groot analyses the con-
cept of democracy, in particular its psychological and social conditions. De Groot
distinguishes ¿ve dimensions. First, an elaborate understanding of democracy and
diversity, with a sensitivity to social justice issues. Second, the development of ca-
pacity with internal and external ef¿cacy. Third, the development of active relations
by commitment and connection. Fourth, the willingness to transform, openminded-
ness and doubt. Five, the ability for empathy and dialogue. Experiences, reÀection
5
WIEL VEUGELERS
and dialogue on practices and ideas should encourage this democratic citizenship
development.
The book continues with more practice oriented chapters in which authors ana-
lyse current educational practices and try to translate theoretical concepts into rec-
ommendations for a more humanistic education.
Westheimer in Practicing Democracy argues against the narrowing of the cur-
riculum by testing, pathologizing of dissent and de-professionalization of teachers.
Westheimer pleads for more democratic educational practices and for learning from
multiple perspectives and on real-world problems.
Gora describes in Signi¿cance of Humanist Education in Developing Countries
the theoretical foundations and practical work of the humanist movement in India.
In the Atheist Centre, in schools, in study camps and through media they support
freedom of speech, rationality, humanity, and the signi¿cance of atheism and hu-
manism as a positive way of life. The priority in their adult education and social
work is on liberating people, in particular women, and to empower them socially.
In Literary Humanism in Multicultural Education Schreurs follows Said (2004)
in criticizing classical Bildung for the dominance of a Christian humanist culture.
Instead he pleads for a postmodern view on Bildung in which different cultures are
valued more equally. In teaching in a multicultural class he tries to practices a liter-
ary humanism that gives voices to different perspectives.
In Teachers’ Training towards Active Involvement in the Public Domain Yogev
shows the theoretical foundations and practical work on educating students to be-
come public involved and democratic intellectuals by participation in community
life and by ethical and sociopolitical reÀection. Nurturing political literacy and ex-
perimental service learning are integrated in this teacher education programme.
Bakker explores the normative professionalism of teachers in Humanistic Teach-
ing in Practice. She presents an empirical study on the experiences of humanistic
teachers and the affective characteristics of these experiences. The teachers express
many personal valuations which inÀuence their work and they are much connected
to their work. The outcomes of the study stress the importance of the professional’s
personal meanings as a substantial part of normative professionalism.
In Forstering Humanity through Interpretive Dialogue in Teacher Communi-
ties Frydaki develops a theoretical framework for researching teachers in dialogi-
cal learning communities. She demonstrates the application of her framework in a
case-study on the inÀuence of supportive educational contexts on the moral values
and professional development of a teacher. This study highlights how teachers’ par-
ticipation in dialogical meaning making processes can generate new shared values
and value communication processes.
Leeman and Wardekker developed materials that help teachers to develop a mor-
al perspective on teaching. In The Moral Side of Education they show that nowa-
days for many teachers it is quite dif¿cult to talk about the moral sides of education
and that their thinking is fragmented. Narrative professional identity development
should therefore include moral qualities. By the use of statements and dilemmas
6
INTRODUCTION: LINKING AUTONOMY AND HUMANITY
teachers are challenged to articulate and discuss moral values. A group approach
advances reÀection, multi-perspectives and dialogue.
Coene gives in The Challenges of Multiculturalism. Educational Dilemmas for
Humanists in Flanders a historical overview of humanist education in Flanders.
Students in public schools can choose for nonconfessional ethics organized by the
freethinking humanist community. This course balances between neutrality and an
explicit humanist philosophy of life. The complexities of our contemporary multi-
cultural society asks for active pluralism. A humanist perspective, Coene argues,
should therefore include a dialogue between different religions and worldviews.
Together the chapters in the book give a broad overview of theoretical founda-
tions, concrete research, and practices in education. The book shows a diversity
that can inspire scholars and practitioners in further developing their perspectives.
Creating meaning is an essential part of all education. Focusing on the linking of
autonomy and humanity is the humanist perspective in it.
REFERENCES
Wiel Veugelers
Department of Education
University of Humanistic Studies Utrecht
Graduate School of Child Development and Education
University of Amsterdam
7
vi
WIEL VEUGELERS
Worldwide there is currently an enormous interest in values and norms and in the
role of education in this matter. This interest stems in particular from the post-
modern situation of a lack of common values and norms. The positive side of the
postmodern development is the greater autonomy individuals have in constructing
their own identity and morality. The problematic site of this postmodern develop-
ment is the uncertainty about which values are important to live and the dif¿culty
of constructing norms together. Value construction is a psychological process that
involves the personal life. Constructing norms together is a sociological process of
living together, of dealing with differences and jointly constructing social life and
society. Processes of value and norm constructions are important for the individual,
for social and cultural groups, and for society. Cultural groups articulate which
moral values are important for them and how norms can be constructed.
In this chapter we want to present a humanist perspective on these processes and
on the role education can play in developing moral values and social norms. We
will demonstrate that there are different ways of thinking about values and norms
and the associated task of education. These different ways are grounded in different
social-political and philosophical ideas. We opt for a humanist perspective with a
focus on both autonomy and social concern. We will outline the contours of a more
humanist pedagogical approach for moral and citizenship education which, more
than is currently the case, stresses the development of personal moral values and
social norms. Our work is embedded in the context of the Netherlands.1 However,
we will analyse the Dutch developments in more global perspectives.
In the public debate the terms values and norms are usually mentioned together,
although they are actually two very different concepts and individuals have a differ-
ent relationship with values then with norms. Moral values are opinions based on an
idea of what is good and bad. They refer to concepts of the ‘good life’. Moral values
are not personal preferences based on taste, but are more or less explicit and fully
developed ideas about how a person relates to his or her life and social and natural
Attention for values and norms and educational discourses and practices change
over time and are part of larger cultural struggles and social and political devel-
10
A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION
opments (Apple, 1996; Goodson, 2005). After the Second World War, values and
norms have been visible in various forms in Dutch education, educational policy,
and educational discourses. The developments in the Netherlands are part of the
developments in the Western world and of globalization worldwide.
What is special about the Dutch society is the strong denominationalism. Dutch
civic society is, and in particular has been, organised along denominationalized
lines. Protestant churches and the Catholic Church each have their own broadcast,
their own schools, and sometimes even their own leisure activities. There is also a
Jewish denomination, and in the last decades the Muslim immigrants created their
own Islamic denomination. 70% of all Dutch schools are religious schools, mainly
Protestant and Catholic schools. These schools are fully funded by the national
government. All schools have to follow the national curriculum, except for the sub-
ject of religious studies. These schools can however select their own teachers and
students.
The humanist movement has been recognised in the Netherlands, in the Fifties,
as a formal worldview. As a reaction to the Second World War a strong moral and
ethical humanist movement emerged. The humanist movement has its own social
and cultural institutions. In education it has its own university, the University of
Humanistic Studies (see e.g. Halsema & Van Houten, 2002). For primary and sec-
ondary education the humanist movement has not opted for own schools, arguing
that it was better if children of different worldviews all come together in the public
school. In public schools the parents can ask for worldview education, like humanist
worldview lessons. About 1/3 of the public schools have this humanist worldview
education.
There are also schools based on pedagogical views like Montessori, Dalton,
Steiner, etc. Often these schools favour humanist ideas and work closely together
with the University of Humanistic Studies and the organisation for humanist world-
view education (HVO). All public and political debates on values and norms in the
Netherlands are strongly inÀuenced by this denominationalism. For the different
religions, the school is a very important pedagogical environment. Many pedagogi-
cal debates circle around issues of worldviews.
What have been the developments in moral practices and discourses after the
Second World War? In the 1950s, the denominationalism in society was still iden-
ti¿ably in evidence. Established values and norms were transferred within the in-
dividual denominations, also in their educational institutions. In the rebuilding of
the Dutch nation and civic society after the German occupation, the religions and
the humanist worldview took a lead. Protestant and catholic denominations recon-
structed their institutions, in particular in education, to reinforce their moral values
and to inÀuence the norm development in society.
In the 1960s, the discussion on moral values took another turn. There was a grow-
ing awareness in the so-called ‘Sixties’ that values are personal choices and that
norms should therefore be based on consultation and dialogues with all concerned.
In this view, values are considered to be dynamic entities in constant development,
11
WIEL VEUGELERS
which could crystallize in group processes into social norms. And these norms are
continuously being questioned and reformed. Romantic views on personal develop-
ment like in humanistic psychology (Maslow, Rogers, Fromm) and in child-centred
pedagogy inÀuenced discourses on education and values and norms. In line with the
modernisation project, personal development, or personal emancipation, attained a
central focus. The modern individual abandoned social and cultural traditions and
tried to become the ‘master of his own universe’. Present reviews of the ‘Sixties’
mostly stress this personal emancipation. This is however only a partial reading of
social and cultural history.
The 1960s – actually the period from 1965 to 1975 which is generally referred
to as the ‘Sixties’ – had a broader social, cultural and political project: both the
personal and the collective emancipation had centre stage. Collective emancipation
was concerned with eliminating, or at least reducing inequality in society and creat-
ing possibilities for personal emancipation for all. Society was expected to create
through collective emancipation the conditions for everyone’s personal emancipa-
tion. In this political project, social class, gender and ethnicity should not restrict
personal emancipation – neither in the Netherlands nor in the rest of the world.
Personal emancipation and collective emancipation were linked and further democ-
ratization of society was seen as a necessary condition for human Àourishing. Much
attention was given to moral values like social justice and equality. Educational
theories of empowerment like those of Freire and Illich where inÀuential, as well
as the German political education movement of Negt and the critical ‘Bildung’ of
Von Hentig and Rolff. In the Netherlands the work of the sociologist Matthijssen,
the psychologist Deen and the pedagogue Van Gelder were signi¿cant in this eman-
cipatory educational movement.
Educational ideas and practices relating to a collective emancipation like project-
based learning, linking learning in school with learning outside school, political
education, student involvement and democratic education, provoked considerable
resistance in society. The collective emancipation function of education, which in
fact had just started to develop, came under increasing political pressure and was
marginalized in policy, theory and in practice. The formal argument was that edu-
cation should be neutral and not be politicized and education should, in line with the
discourse on personal emancipation, be child-centred. In many Western countries
like the Netherlands the political control over secondary education and vocational
education was tightened – through standards, national curricula and central assess-
ments. The paradox is that the political has been abandoned by political means that
were presented as neutral.
Education in the Eighties became, more than before in history, characterized by
a process of rationalization and by a technical-instrumental way of thinking. It was
not only education that was oriented towards collective emancipation that suffered
from this process of rationalization. All value-laden education, also religious edu-
cation, was strongly neglected in the technical discourse. Education should in this
view be considered as neutral and value-free. The traditional transfer of values – in
12
A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION
so far as it still existed in education – was also obstructed and made ‘hidden’ by the
denial of the moral nature of education. The contribution of education to identity
development was no longer content and values-oriented, but only aimed at psycho-
logical processes of control and well-being.
Personal emancipation in education was still permissible in the 1980s. Personal
emancipation was incorporated in the new spirit of the times, the rational and the
technical-instrumental with the emphasis on established knowledge and skills, and
oriented to easily measurable output. Personal development in education increas-
ingly became the individual and personal exploitation of opportunities. Values were
reduced to individual well-being and disappeared from the curriculum, especially
from the subject matter. The teacher increasingly became a knowledge manager and
a supervisor of learning processes. The moral element only came into view when
order, or the norm, was disturbed by for example bullying.
The dominance of technical rationality meant that there was little explicit atten-
tion to values in education: neither in the sense of a transfer of values, nor in the
sense of value development or construction. Attention to norms was reduced to
enforcement and therefore the imposition of values. This adapting value orientation
in education is still present to this day, especially through all manner of rules and
forms of discipline.
In the 1990s, the technical-instrumental thinking was mixed with the ‘market-
ing’ of education. The discourse on education and the organization of education
had to be more market oriented (Apple, 1996; Giroux, 2001). Students, teachers
and schools should take more responsibility for their own learning process, teach-
ing and school organization. The central concept was self-regulation, on the level
of students and teachers and on the level of the school (Bandura, 1995; Veugelers,
2004). In terms of citizenship, in educational practice and in educational policy the
developing of values was oriented to adapting and conforming to society, whereas
the one-sided orientation on autonomy led to an individualistic citizenship. Almost
no attention was given to the development of critical-democratic citizenship, ori-
ented to both autonomy and social concern. Adaptive socialization was in particular
achieved by the ‘hidden curriculum’. An explicit moral message was mostly disap-
pearing from the curriculum.
At the end of the past millennium the discourse changed. Increasing apathy – in
particular among youngsters – towards politics and civic society; violence in public
life and more calculating behaviour in all parts of society resulted in a renewed
interest in the moral task of education. These ‘moral and social crises’ were articu-
lated strongly. These crises in society were posed as educational challenges. Educa-
tion was asked to renew its pedagogical task and to compensate for its instrumental
approach. That education was invited to reinvent their moral task was an expression
of the new landscape of ideological apparatus. The socializing effects of politically
led institutions like social services and the switch from compulsory military serv-
ice to a voluntary service had diminished. In civil society, the Christian religions
had lost a major part of their members, and those who stayed on favoured a more
13
WIEL VEUGELERS
personal choice and even a personal religious ‘bricolage’. Compared with the other
ideological institutions, education was, even after decades of technical rationality,
considered to be a strong moral education institute.
Till the end of the past millennium moral education was separated from multi-
cultural education. In practice, politics and in the academic world, the moral was
not linked to cultural diversity. In multicultural education itself, all students had
to learn about the cultural activities and ideas of the different ethnic groups in the
country, in particular the nonwestern immigrants (Leeman, 2006). Teachers had
dif¿culties in realising these pedagogical goals. It was not easy for multicultural
education to go beyond just the most visible differences between cultural practices.
Learning about the more fundamental ideas underlying these cultural practices and
analysing identity development as a complex and multifaceted process was not part
of the curriculum in most schools. ‘9/11’ and other forms of terrorism and their
accompanying social, cultural and political debates have challenged multicultural
issues strongly, and contributed to a change in the discourse on moral education and
citizenship education (Veugelers, Derriks & De Kat, 2006).
In many Western countries citizenship education became in the beginning of the
21st century a formal task of education. The pedagogical function of education was
restructured in the light of these cultural challenges. In the Netherlands the aims of
citizenship education were formulated as ‘active participation and social integra-
tion’. Citizenship was not seen as a dynamic interplay of people creating society, but
as adapting to a traditional national citizenship. Moral education no longer aimed
at developing individuals but mainly focused on adapting to the traditional national
citizenship. What became the position and articulation of citizenship education in
educational policy and practice?
Nowadays the moral and social function of education is articulated by the concept
of citizenship education. In public debate, policy and academic work, citizenship is
not limited to the political level. The concept has been deepened into the social and
cultural levels, the concept has also been broadened by crossing over the national
borders and speaking of European citizenship and global citizenship. Citizenship
education has been incorporated into educational policy and practice.
Educational policy is the result of public discourses and political decision making
about education. Spring (2004), in his book How educational ideologies are shap-
ing global society, distinguishes three important educational ideologies: ‘National-
ist Education in the Age of Globalization’; ‘Schooling Workers for a Global Free
Market’ and ‘Globalizing Morality’. The nationalist educational ideology empha-
sizes the native language, the national culture, the national history, nation-building
and security. The global free market ideology emphasizes comparability and stand-
ardizing, economic and technological development, and the international competi-
tive position of countries. In subject matter the emphasis is placed on languages, on
14
A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION
What is the practice of citizenship education and what are its goals? Citizenship
as a system of rules has to do with norms, but for an active and lived citizenship
moral values are important. Moral values give the person a drive to contribute in
making norms or to accept existing norms. Moral values are important for the per-
sons involved in developing citizenship. Different perspectives on values and value
development are possible. Values may be oriented towards adaptation, personal
emancipation or a more collective emancipation (Giroux, 1989; Veugelers, 2000).
Citizenship relates not only to the formal political domain, but also to daily life.
Dewey (1923) speaks of citizenship as lifestyle. It is concerned with how a person
stands in society; the meanings of life on the personal, the interpersonal and the
sociopolitical levels.
Over the past ten years we have conducted much research into moral values in
education. Parents, teachers and students were asked whether any of a wide variety
of values should be educational objectives and whether they are practiced. We con-
sistently ¿nd three clusters of objectives:
– ‘Disciplining’, where the objectives include obedience, good manners and self
discipline;
– ‘Autonomy’, where the objectives include forming a personal opinion and learn-
ing to handle criticism;
– ‘Social concern’, where the objectives include empathy, showing respect for peo-
ple with different views, and solidarity with others.
15
WIEL VEUGELERS
These clusters of objectives have many similarities with the three fundamental
characteristics of moral behaviour identi¿ed earlier by Durkheim (1923): discipline,
attachment to or identi¿cation with the group, and autonomy. The above mentioned
clusters of educational objectives can be linked in a speci¿c way with the three
types of citizenship (see for the empirical studies Leenders, De Kat & Veugelers,
2008a; 2008b):
– The adapting citizen attaches great importance to discipline and social concern
and relatively little to autonomy;
– The individualistic citizen attaches great importance to discipline and autonomy
and relatively little to social concern;
– The critical-democratic citizen attaches great importance to autonomy and so-
cial concern and relatively little to discipline.
The individualistic and the critical democratic citizenship are two variants of an
autonomous citizenship. The individualistic type reasons more from the individu-
al, whereas the critical-democratic type reasons from an involvement with others.
A survey among teachers in Dutch secondary education showed that 53 % of the
teachers aim at a critical-democratic type of citizenship, 39 % at an adaptive type,
and 18 % at an individualizing type. In vocational education the emphasis was
slightly more on adaptation, while in pre-university educations an individualizing
type was slightly preferred (Leenders et al. 2008a).
It is remarkable that parents, teachers and students alike, indicate that the cluster
of discipline is more easily realized than the clusters of autonomy and social con-
cern. They argue that a really well founded and self-regulated autonomy is more
then just giving your opinion and is therefore a dif¿cult to realize pedagogical de-
velopmental task. The social concern is also dif¿cult to realize in particular in its
more engaged and social justice oriented forms. And youngsters have problems in
balancing autonomy and social concern, autonomy is very important for contem-
porary youngsters (Veugelers, 2008). Even if the pedagogical goals are aiming at
a critical-democratic citizenship, the practice and the effects are strongly adaptive
and individualized.
The three types of citizenship have a differing emphasis in their goals and are con-
nected with differing pedagogical and didactical practices. Methodically, the adaptive
type emphasizes the transfer of values and the regulation of behaviour; the individu-
alizing type independent learning and developing critical thinking in a neutral way,
and the critical-democratic type cooperative learning, developing critical thinking
through social inquiry and dialogue, and on questions of social concern and humanity
(Leenders & Veugelers, 2006). Westheimer and Kahne (2004) found a similar three-
split in citizenship (see also Westheimer, 2008 and Johnson & Morris, 2010). West-
heimer and Kahne identify a personally responsible citizen, a participating citizen
and a citizen who strives for social justice. These studies on differences in citizenship
show that developing citizenship is not a linear process from passive to active, but that
citizenship can have different meanings and sociopolitical orientations.
16
A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION
What do students feel about moral and citizenship education? The results are very
diverse (Veugelers, 2008). Students think that it is the teacher’s task to discipline the
students, preferable of course the other students. And students like to further develop
their autonomy through moral and citizenship education. Autonomy development is
very important for youngsters. Social involvement and developing a critical-demo-
cratic citizenship is overall less important to them. In several studies we found how-
ever that students like to broaden their horizon. Interesting is the result that students,
even more than the teachers, want to discuss politics in the classroom. Our research
also showed that students have the opinion that teachers should not interfere too
much with their identity development. In their pedagogical relations, teachers must
¿nd a balance between on the one hand providing space and keeping their distance,
and on the other hand supporting students in their identity development.
These struggles around morality, citizenship and citizenship education take place
in a changing society in which the relation of the individual to society has altered
strongly. The Enlightenment process of rationality and personal responsibility re-
sulted in the individualization of society. At ¿rst modernization was oriented to
structuring society, whereas now it is oriented to individualization (Beck, Giddens
and Lash, 1992; Bauman, 1993). Life development was considered to be linear, in
the sense of following rules. Life development is now more a question of ¿nding
rules and of reÀective judgment. Human beings can, and even must make an in-
creasing number of choices. People construct their own life-politics, they even have
to do this, and they can not escape of it!
These social and personal developments seem in line with the humanist plea for
autonomy, that people have the freedom to make choices for themselves and take re-
sponsibility for their own life. Humanist thinkers, among them Dutch philosophers
like Erasmus and Spinoza, have continuously argued for developing human capaci-
ties and the agency of living an own life. Sociological analyses of modernization
stress more the falling apart of societies and communities into individuals than the
gain of modernity and humanity to create more possibilities for living a personal
life. Sociologists focus more on the problematic aspects of modernization. A human
characteristic is that human beings can reÀect on their relationship with other hu-
man beings. An interesting question is: How can human beings people live together
in these modern conditions that are full of contradictions (Halliwell & Mousley,
2003; Said, 2004)?
Human beings themselves must increasingly organize their own lives and bring
their own order into the chaos. This begs the question of whether it is still possi-
ble to integrate highly individualized societies. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002)
reject two possibilities: First, the integration through shared values – the old way.
The dif¿culty with this is that the very diversity of cultural orientations has swept
away the foundations on which the traditional value societies formed and constantly
17
WIEL VEUGELERS
Linking the individual and the society is currently formulated by European politi-
cians in terms of integration and social cohesion. We opt for the term ‘democracy’,
which expresses more active participation and involvement of citizens and dynamic
social processes in which power relations are at stake. Following Dewey (1923) and
Freire (1985) democracy can be considered as a humanistic way of life that empha-
sizes humanising processes and creates space for giving meaning to life.
Real democracy needs citizens that are both socially involved and autonomous;
therefore we use the concept of critical-democratic citizenship. The addition of
‘critical’ expresses the dynamic process and the right to take one’s own stance.
Democracy as lifestyle relates not only to the political but also to the interpersonal
level, the daily interaction in schools, in work organizations and in the public do-
main (Touraine, 1997). Democracy is not a ¿xed state, the ¿nal stage of a social
and political process. Democracy must be repeatedly won and maintained. Society
has to be developed by means of democracy, also in the individualized modern
era. Democracy, and in particular democracy as a process, can stimulate, organize
and connect value development and norm development (see also the chapter of De
Groot). The social concern in critical-democratic citizenship can range from affec-
tive empathy to engagement and political action for social justice.
18
A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION
Democracy must not be equated with consumer behaviour, market operation and
privatization (Giroux, 2001). Therefore topics such as empowerment, power rela-
tions, ethics and giving meaning to life must be reintroduced into the public debate
and into education. Through citizenship development, education is able to equip
young people with the competencies to participate in the social and political do-
mains, but education should also attempt to make young people morally prepared
to use these competencies, that is to say, to develop social concern and humanity, to
show civic courage and critical-democratic citizenship.
Contemporary society, characterized by individualization and globalization,
continuously demands value development and the active and creative dialogical and
joint formulation of norms. A continuing democratization of society, so people on
all levels are able to participate actively, must be the fertile ground for this value de-
velopment, development of norms, and identi¿cation and engagement with norms.
The quality of the education should be assessed, according to this view, not only
in terms of individual ‘academic’ school performance of students, but also on the
contribution education makes to social justice and motivation for social change.
How can education practice these ideas? Contrary to what is often stated, educa-
tion must not ¿rst and foremost pay attention to knowledge and skills also in the
moral and cultural domain, but to the development of a personal identity – for giv-
ing meaning to life. Education should challenge students to think about values and
norms and their own moral development. Of course students should relate in this
process of reÀection to important value systems. Relevant knowledge must be trans-
ferred, but it is more important that attention is given to the moral development of
young people: to their values and social norms, their process of giving meaning to
life, and their skills for thinking about values, to communicate about them, to act
accordingly, and to reÀect on this action. These cultural processes are the heart of
education (Bruner, 1998) and are part of identity development (Goodson, Biesta,
Tedder & Adair, 2010). Often students have to experience these processes ‘hidden’,
nonreÀective and without feedback of teachers and other students.
We think it is desirable in educational practice to create more space for giv-
ing meaning to life, personal meaning construction, and the development of a per-
sonal life view, and that attention is created for the social environment and for the
processes of power and inequality that entail these dialogical processes of meaning
making. Education should challenge students to relate to the world around them and
to the ‘global world’; to learning how to assess differences and being able to deal
with and to appreciate those differences. To be constantly working with the tension
between autonomy and social concern.
Students should be given the opportunity to explore domains in the curriculum
and to further develop their values in these domains. Attention to different per-
19
WIEL VEUGELERS
Moral education
A number of issues from the moral education tradition are relevant to pedagogical
practices oriented to critical-democratic citizenship:
20
A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION
Critical pedagogy sets out to provide social relevant education and to give the par-
ticipants more control over their own lives. In the tradition of Dewey and Freire it
argues for transformative practices where both personal and collective emancipa-
tion are worked on. The work of Giroux (1983, p. 168) ¿ts best with the classical
Greek de¿nition of citizenship education, in which:
a rationality can be identi¿ed that is explicitly political, moral and visionary.
In this model, education is seen as intrinsically political, developed to educate
citizens to be intelligent and active participants in society. Furthermore, intel-
ligence is seen as a supplement to ethics, a manifestation and demonstration of
the principles of the good and just life. Its goal was to form a sound character
oriented to the permanent search for freedom.
Giroux (1983, p. 202) lists six points that are from a critical pedagogy perspective
essential to educational practice:
– Active participation,
– Critical thinking,
– Developing an individual autobiography,
– Tracing values that are woven into human existence,
– Learning about the structural and ideological forces that obstruct opportunities
for development,
– Show how to jointly make political structures that challenge the status quo.
This type of critical pedagogy must be inÀuenced by a passion and optimism that
appeals to opportunities. The concept ‘democratic education’ refers to an educa-
tional practice based on critical pedagogy. In this tradition there is a lot of attention
21
WIEL VEUGELERS
for organizing democratic processes in education and in linking school and social
action (Goodman, 1992; Apple & Beane, 1996; Parker, 2004; Veugelers & O’Hair,
2005).
Till now we have been speaking in particular about educational concepts and prac-
tices. In these sections we spoke a lot about teachers. In this part we will concentrate
on the position of teachers in relation with moral values. In all education the teacher
has a crucial position, in value embedded education this role is complex. Teachers
can work in different ways with moral values (Veugelers, 2010a). Based on a review
of the literature we distinguish the following perspectives: Value transfer, reÀective
practitioner, moral sensitivity, participation and dialogue, and moral politics. The
various perspectives have different ideas about the teaching and learning of moral
values, the kind of citizenship society needs and the very task of education. The
perspectives articulate different educational practices that assume different types of
methodology and pedagogical goals of teachers. When presenting the ¿ve perspec-
tives, we articulate what makes this approach unique.
Value transfer
This approach focuses on the transfer of moral values in education (Sockett, 1993). In
this view, morality consists of virtues, of traits that support good behaviour. Being a
good moral example, and teaching students about good moral people are important
teaching methods in this approach. Student reÀectivity is not really strengthened.
The value transfer method is part of a pedagogical vision that has well-de¿ned ideas
about the good life and about important cultural traditions. The focus is more on
getting youngsters involved in existing cultural practices rather than on challenging
them to position themselves in an open, multicultural and changing society. This
approach can be situated in a national educational system that is concerned about
its cultural heritage, or in a tradition that is based on a religious worldview that
perceives its worldview to be more static than dynamic.
ReÀective practitioner
According to many sociological analyses, modern society needs citizens who are
Àexible and reÀective. Many professions require professionalism based on what
Schön referred to as reÀection-in-action. In education this calls for a practice in
which youngsters reÀect on their behaviour, take responsibility for their actions,
and try out new behaviour in an experimental and reÀective manner. The reÀec-
tive paradigm has had considerable inÀuence on the thinking about teachers and
teacher education. In reÀective-oriented teaching, teachers are continuously chal-
lenged to inquiry their beliefs and their teaching behaviour. The emphasis in the
22
A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION
Moral sensitivity
Moral values are abstract and are normative because they say something about the
good life, about good and bad. Moral values are embedded in all narratives and
practices, but how to detect them? Following the reÀection perspective we can ask
questions about why you choose for a certain alternative. We can do it critically and
ask on which moral values the statement or behaviour is based. For moral reason-
ing and acting you must not only know cognitively that moral values are involved,
you must also have the sensitivity to feel and be aware of where moral values are at
stake. The third perspective is therefore moral sensitivity (Campbell, 2003; Tirri,
1999). Teachers should develop the awareness to detect when moral values are in-
volved. and how meaning is giving to them. This implies seeing how students posi-
tion themselves; give meaning to their experiences and the world around them, and
how they work with the values involved. Teachers should incorporate this moral
sensitivity in the art of their teaching.
23
WIEL VEUGELERS
Moral politics
We refer to the ¿fth perspective as moral politics. Morality, in this view, is seen as
embedded in a political context, and the aim of education is formulated as political
action for social change. Teachers’ work and social action are linked in this per-
spective. Beyer (1996) speaks of democratic education, Oakes and Rogers (2006)
use the concepts teaching for changing the world, and teaching for social justice.
Empowerment of people and working on structural changes that enhance humanity
and change at grassroots level are considered to be pedagogical goals. The work of
Dewey, Freire and Critical Theory and Critical Pedagogy has inÀuenced the devel-
opment of this perspective. Teachers attempt to create democratic classrooms, to in-
clude minorities’ perspectives in the curriculum, and organize participatory social
inquiry in and outside the school. Teaching is seen as social and moral engagement
and as creating a better and more just world. ReÀection and action are linked and
aimed at realizing these moral goals. Teachers are clear in their critical emancipa-
tory view, and their particular choice for schools that serve disadvantaged children.
They choose for this kind of education.
We can argue that the ¿ve perspectives all have their particular strengths depend-
ing on the goals one has with education and the corresponding teaching method.
If one wants to focus in education on character building and on making clear
which values one ¿ nds important, then the value transfer perspective is the most
useful perspective. When education is seen as very Àexible in its content, struc-
ture and teaching methods, and in which teachers are autonomous and considered
to be professionals, then a more reÀective perspective is necessary. If this kind of
education considers the development of morality as crucial and important, then
the moral sensitivity perspective is desired. If learning is seen as transforming
practices and learning by doing and dialogue, then the participation and dialogue
perspective is needed. And if this transforming practice is seen as part of a strug-
gle for social justice and democracy, then the moral politics perspective is useful.
We are aware of the fact that concrete practices will often show a unique com-
bination of elements of these perspectives. A humanist perspective embraces at
least the moral sensitivity and the participation dialogue perspectives. If a more
political social justice position is taken then the moral politics perspective can be
part of it as well.
Realising the ideas outlined in this chapter in educational practice encounter the
context and institutionalisation of education. In this section we will discuss three
very relevant topics in contemporary education that inÀuence the possibilities for a
humanist perspective on education:
– Religions and worldviews in education;
24
A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION
Education can not expel worldviews from schools. Even when there is a formal
distinction between education and worldviews like in France, worldviews are em-
bedded in educational practices and students are developing identities. How can
education pay attention to worldviews? We developed four models that may provide
a better insight in the relation of worldview and education (Veugelers, 2010b). We
call these four models:
1. Educating for a worldview;
2. Learning about different worldviews;
3. Personal development of a worldview within a tradition;
4. Personal development of a worldview within a democratic framework.
25
WIEL VEUGELERS
affairs. The school stimulates the student to critically compare various worldviews
and to participate in a dialogue on worldviews, and supports the student in his or her
development of a personal worldview.
A second issue is the relation of the moral and the political. The concept of citizen-
ship itself is continuously broadened and deepened. It is broadened in the sense that
citizenship is no longer limited to the own country, but also relates to the continent
and even to world. citizenship. From a critique on the linking of the concept of citi-
zenship to one’s own country, a more morally inspired cosmopolitan citizenship has
26
A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION
been advocated (Nussbaum, 1997). This concept is about moral values that concern
responsibility for the whole world and all its inhabitants. An open attitude towards
other people is one of its important aspects (Hansen, 2008). Recently this morally
inspired global citizenship has been criticized for its lack of attention for political
power relations (Mouffe, 2005; Thayer-Bacon, 2008; Todd, 2008). A stronger rela-
tion between the moral and the political are advocated here: moral values should be
analysed within social and political relations. Moral values get, due to power rela-
tions, different connotations. Abstract values hide contradictions in reality.
In a recent research project we studied the views of teachers with regard to global
citizenship (Veugelers, 2011). In the theoretical orientation a distinction was made
between an ‘open global citizenship’, a ‘moral global citizenship’ and a ‘social-po-
litical global citizenship’. We also formulated seven elements of global citizenship.
On the basis of the empirical part of the study (interviews with teachers), we are
able to connect these elements and forms of global citizenship.
The interviews with the teachers have shown that these distinctions are useful, and
also that the three types of global citizenship that were distinguished are connected
with different educational practices. For pedagogical reasons, teachers usually opt
for a moral global citizenship. They feel that an open global citizenship neglects its
moral dimensions. A moral global citizenship, on the contrary, does pay attention
to moral values like diversity, increasing opportunities, and taking responsibility.
27
WIEL VEUGELERS
Teachers also try to connect the global and the local, but they do not make a clear
choice for a social-political global citizenship. Teachers acknowledge though, that
global citizenship is embedded in social and political relations and that a political
stance is always implicit. But the teachers do not want to put too strong an empha-
sis on political relations because politics is a rather sensitive area in education and
because of the age of their students.
An explicit choice for social change, i.e. reducing social inequalities, is not made
by these teachers, because according to them that would mean a reversal to forms
of value transfer, even if it is in a transformative way. The social-political nature of
global citizenship is therefore at the same time present and not present in second-
ary education. Present, because moral values are always embedded in social and
political relations. Not present, because teachers are reluctant to explicitly stress
this embedment and because they do not want to impose their own opinions on the
students. Teachers try to develop a moral consciousness in their students, along
lines as involvement and appreciation of diversity.
28
A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION
In educational discourses the notion of linking school and community is very popu-
lar. The school should strengthen the contact with the local community. This is a
statement that everyone is enthusiastic about. But a one-sided social and cultural
composition of the local community is an inwardly directed contact, as opposed to
one that is oriented to the plural society. It is therefore important to make a case for
widening horizons, for acquiring new and different experiences.
Due to denominationalism, the different school types and the free school choice
there is a strong social and cultural segregation in Dutch education. The introduc-
tion of students to other social and cultural groups is however seen as an important
aspect of citizenship education. In the framework of citizenship education, schools
are explicitly asked by the Ministry of Education to bring different groups of young
people together in order to introduce them to each other, to promote their mutual
understanding and appreciation, and to further the cooperation between groups.
Two theoretical debates are relevant to this topic: ‘bonding and bridging social
capital’ of Putnam (2000) and the ‘contact hypothesis’ of Allport (1954). Putnam
(2000) points out that a person’s social capital is composed of bonding (exclusive)
and bridging (inclusive). Bonding is a social-psychological necessity for a person in
order to join and hold one’s own in a cultural group. What Putnam calls bridging,
connecting with other people, is what a society needs to function as such, to cre-
ate social cohesion. Bridging can take on various forms: being considerate, being
involved, or showing solidarity with others. In social psychology much research has
been done into the conditions under which such meetings of differing groups does
promote understanding and appreciation (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) These studies
show that this kind of learning processes are rather complex and that the results are
usually not predictable. Schuitema and Veugelers (2011) studied several projects in
which students from different social and ethnic groups meet each other. The study
shows that effects are hard to prove, but that it is important that joint activities are
undertaken during the meetings and that there is interaction at the individual level.
The contacts between students in the projects could under favourable conditions
stimulate an open attitude and awareness of one’s preconceptions about the other
groups. Most of these programmes are however very limited in time and scope and
cannot compensate for the segregation of students in different schools. Segregation
and its social and cultural effects should be a really concern in a humanist perspec-
tive on education.
29
WIEL VEUGELERS
velop a more dynamic view that links on the individual side autonomy and empow-
erment and on the social dimension humanity, care and solidarity. For citizenship
development this implies the development of a critical-democratic citizenship, with
the stimulation of humanitarian, social and democratic values. At the same time,
education must stimulate students to gain increasing control over their own process
of giving meaning to life. Autonomy development should be a process of increasing
empowerment and ef¿cacy.
We started the chapter with an outline of the developments regarding values and
norms in recent decades. We pointed in particular to the disappearance of the ex-
plicitly moral element from education, especially from the subject matter. We gave
three reasons for this: the declining inÀuence of denominationalism on the content of
education, the rejection of a more political content oriented to collective emancipation
and the dominance of a technical-instrumental rationality. We argued that the moral
element should be explicitly reintroduced into education. Not in the form of the trans-
fer of values – neither from the perspective of a collective emancipation – but through
supervising processes of giving meaning to life by students, the young people’s own
values development. Students should learn to relate to important ideological, social
and cultural traditions. They should learn to position themselves in modern society
and to learn to use moral criteria in reÀecting on their own opinions and actions.
Norms are the rules that apply in a group. These norms are continuously being
reformulated. Students should not in the ¿rst place be obliged to acquire knowl-
edge of which norms are dominant in society, but must acquire an understanding
of the development of norms and be able to try out the development of norms in the
school and in extramural learning activities organized by the school. In addition,
students should acquire insight into how norms have changed through the activities
of groups of people in the course of time. From the perspective of a critical-demo-
cratic citizenship, particular attention is desired for emancipation, democracy and
empowering humanity. Insight into and experience with the development of norms
is a better preparation for social participation in society than acquiring knowledge
of the dominant standards in society. Education of this kind demands opportunities
for a more active participation of students in school, much extramural learning, and
teacher supervision of this identity development and dealing with social norms.
All education stimulates certain values and in doing so works on the develop-
ment of morality and citizenship. The adapting type of citizenship is already en-
couraged in that students have to comply with the norms of the school. Individual-
istic citizenship is already encouraged through a meritocratic educational system
oriented to individual performance, in which an individual is personally responsible
for success or failure at school. Only the critical-democratic type of citizenship
received hardly any attention in education. Stimulating humanitarian, social and
democratic values and autonomy should be given more attention in education. The
pedagogical goal is to educate young people to have a critical, enquiring attitude,
to have the courage and the creativity to tread new paths, who wish to scrutinize all
knowledge – including their own knowledge – for the norms and underlying power
30
A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION
structures it contains, and who are alert to the relationship between autonomy and
social concern.
ReÀective learning
– Articulate one’s own interests, feelings, ethical and aesthetical concerns, mean-
ing making, and moral values
– Inquire into the own identity development and reÀect on the own learning proc-
ess
– Regulate the own learning process and taking responsibility for own autonomy
and giving meaning
31
WIEL VEUGELERS
Dialogical learning
– Communicate in an open way with other people
– Analyse and compare different perspectives
– Analyse the social, cultural and political power relations involved
Democratic learning
– Concern for others and appreciation of diversity
– Openness to jointly building agreements (developing norms)
– Stand for your own autonomy and critical thinking and action
– Involvement in enlarging humanity and in building democracy as a permanent
process
These reÀective, dialogical and democratic learning processes are at the heart of
humanistic education.
NOTE
1 Parts of this text have been published before in different articles. In particular in: Veugelers, W.
(2007). Creating critical-democratic citizenship education: empowering humanity and democracy
in Dutch education. Compare, 37(1), 105-119.
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A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION
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dents’ views on teaching. Journal of School Leadership, 12(1), 97-108.
Veugelers, W., & O’ Hair M.J. (Eds.) (2005) Network learning for educational change. Buckingham:
Open University Press.
Veugelers, W., & F.K. Oser (2003). Teaching in moral and democratic education. Bern/New York:
Peter Lang.
Veugelers, W., & Vedder, J. (2003). Teaching values. Teachers and Teaching, 9(4), 377-390.
Westheimer, J., & Kahne, J. (2004). What kind of citizen? The politics of education of democracy.
American Educational Research Journal, 41(2), 237-269.
Westheimer, J. (2008). On the relationship between political and moral engagement. In F.K. Oser & W.
Veugelers (Eds.). Getting involved. Global citizenship development and sources of moral values
(17-30). Rotterdam/Taipeh/Boston: SensePublishers.
Wiel Veugelers
Department of Education
University of Humanistic Studies Utrecht
Graduate School of Child Development and Education
University of Amsterdam
34
NIMROD ALONI
HUMANISTIC EDUCATION:
FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
Starting from the existing consensus regarding the theoretical tenets of humanistic
education, the present chapter faces the challenge of translating it into educational
practice. Based on Aristotle’s insight that the supreme test of education is in ac-
tions and results, the present chapter undertakes to bridge the gap between theory
and practice. This ‘bridge’ is deployed in four stages. The introduction presents
the current consensus regarding the essential foundations of humanistic education.
The second stage focuses on changing the professional self-image and pedagogical
presence of teachers and the challenges such a change involves. The third stage dis-
cusses the translation of the humanistic worldview into educational policy, in terms
of moral values and citizenship education. In the last stage, various educational
principles, crucial for the creation of a humanistic school culture, are presented.
INTRODUCTION
Over a period of 2,500 years, the humanistic tradition has been offering various
models of ‘humanity at its best’ (what the Romans called humanitas). In the clas-
sical discourses of the West (Judeo-Christian and Greco-Roman) as well as of the
East (Confucian and Buddhist), this ideal comprised the central virtues of wisdom,
justice, humanness, peace and harmony. More speci¿cally, we ¿nd in these tradi-
tions (in different proportion and emphasis) the qualities of broad-minded educa-
tion, reÀective thinking, noble character, good taste, amiability, benevolence, and
social responsibility. Modern humanist discourses – naturalist, liberal, existential-
ist, progressive, critical and radical – have added to the humanist ideal the following
qualities: personal autonomy and authenticity, self-actualisation, critical thinking,
creative imagination, respect for persons, empathetic caring, involved democratic
citizenship, as well as adherence to global ethics of human rights, multiculturalism,
and environmental responsibility.
Towards the end of the ¿rst decade of the 21st century, it seems that beyond dif-
ferences in emphases and formulations there is a wide agreement that humanism
consists of a cosmopolitan worldview and ethical code that posits the enhancement
of human development, well-being, and dignity as the ultimate end of all human
thought and action; namely, giving priority to the values of human dignity, equity,
growth and solidarity over any alternative set of values – religious, ideological,
In the introduction to Education under Siege, Aronowitz and Giroux (1985) write:
‘Education should be more political, while politics should be more educational.’ In
a certain sense, this may be interpreted in view of Adorno’s famous adage – ‘after
Auschwitz, one cannot write poetry anymore.’ (Adorno, 1981). These two quotes
are founded on the realization that the human race has produced such abominable
atrocities, that we may no longer live our life as if it were just a matter of daily rou-
tine. The fact that political regimes in the 20th century promised a life of power and
prosperity but, in fact, sentenced millions to death, agony, exile and misery requires
36
HUMANISTIC EDUCATION: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
37
NIMROD ALONI
sive people that can be ‘bought cheap’, rather than educated and critically minded
citizens who stand up for their rights. Such educators, said the educational psychol-
ogist Mordechai Nissan (1997), will be better quali¿ed for, will ¿nd more meaning
in, and will be more satis¿ed with their job; they will also be far more immune to
pressures and manipulations on the part of students, parents and authorities.
Besides the importance of professional wide-awakeness – moral, political
and pedagogical – as a basis for educational activism and professional backbone
(Greene, 1973), the change in educators’ self-image must also ¿nd its expression
in pedagogic presence. I mean to say that in order for teachers to have an educa-
tive effect on their students, they must adopt unique modes of being, expression,
and communication. I will explain this with the help of Martin Buber (1971), who
sheds light on three qualities, which render the teacher’s presence educative: trust,
idealism and personality. The ¿rst trait, interpersonal trust, is essential to any edu-
cational success: winning the students’ trust, making them feel that the teachers
are on their side, for them and truly concerned with their growth and well-being.
Without trust, the teacher is perceived as a stranger, as an oppressive enemy who
must be tolerated, but never listened to or truly learned from, and with time, should
the opportunity present itself, even ‘brought to account’. Conversely, when students
trust the teacher as a person – when they have faith in her honest caring and concern
for their dignity, growth and well-being – an infrastructure is being laid for good-
will and openness, empathy and mutual respect (including concern by the students
for the teachers’ own well-being), for true pedagogical dialogue and meaningful
educational work. Importantly, such trust must not be won through cheap tricks
of fraternization, Àattery, and a subservient lapse into a ‘child-centered’ approach,
marginalizing everyone else. It’s about a friendly ‘good morning’, extra-curricular
activities, caring for the student and her family, noticing changes in appearance or
mood, reading body language and facial gestures, offering help beyond strictly aca-
demic tasks – in short, authentic manifestations of basic humanity and pedagogic
caring (Aloni, 2008b)
The second trait is cultural idealism: the awareness, on the one hand, that some
good and precious things are ‘worth getting up for in the morning’, worth making
an effort to achieve and enjoy; and that, on the other hand, other things are so base,
ugly and vile that one should steer clear of them and under no circumstances come
to terms with. Whether we dub this trait ‘pedagogic Eros’ or human perfectionism,
I mean those wonderful combinations of passions and sensitivities with insights and
sensibilities, which prod man not to compromise and accept the shallow, the me-
diocre, the routine, the standard, the common and automatic, but strive for higher
standards of meaning, knowledge, morality and re¿nement. When this cultivated
passion disappears, it is very easy to lapse into vulgarity and barbarism, into an
egocentric and hedonistic attitude of total contempt for accepted norms of thinking,
talking and behaving. On the other hand, when this passion is truly felt, it sud-
denly becomes important to ¿nd out what is true, what is the best way of stating a
claim, who indeed is right, what is really beautiful, how to build a just society, and
38
HUMANISTIC EDUCATION: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
most importantly, how I take responsibility for my own life and turn it into some-
thing precious, interesting and worthy. The problem is that such cultural idealism
or ‘pedagogic Eros’ cannot be ‘triggered’ in the students by means of sober thought
or scholarly lectures. In order to make it happen, the teachers must be present for
their students as culture ‘freaks’: to share with them, in words and gestures, their
excitement, impressions, interpretations, anger, enthusiasm, joy, gladness, acts of
commission and of omission vis-à-vis cultural creations and social events. In brief,
the teachers’ excited idealistic presence may trigger such a trait in their students,
while an indifferent, Àat and uncommitted teachers’ presence might only increase
poverty of mind, alienation, and moral desolation.
The third Buberian characteristic of the educator’s presence is personality. This
means, above all, the virtue of ‘practicing what you preach.’ In his daily and public
conduct, with no special intentions or highbrow talk, the educator personi¿es the
qualities that dignify any person. Such an educator, says Buber, is most effective
educationally when not trying to educate at all: he is simply ‘there’, as a sensi-
tive, fair, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, balanced and controlled person. This
pedagogical mode of being is especially evident in times of crisis – when a student
is physically or verbally violent, facing an aggressive parent, in embarrassing mo-
ments, or when someone tries to insult or offend another. It is then that the educa-
tor’s personality comes to light, when she or he manages to steer the situation to-
wards solutions without ‘great sacri¿ces’, articulating standards of right and wrong,
but under no circumstances demeaning to the teacher or offending the dignity of
anyone involved.
It is a commonly known fact that children’s education always begins with socializa-
tion to their culture and community, and only later – upon their exposure to other
communities and acquisition of universal intellectual assets – do they adopt the
ideas and practices of general culture. In view of this fact, it seems obvious to me
why a humanistic and universally oriented education is preferable to an ethnocen-
tric and provincial education. In the ¿eld of psychology we speak of the individual’s
development from the primal or primitive phase of egocentrism through a famil-
ial, tribal, national, and religious phase of ethnocentrism to the highest phase (not
reached by everyone) of recognizing the complete and equal humanity of every per-
son. In an analogous fashion, we can speak of a trajectory leading from dogmatism
and parochial narrow-mindedness to communality in the level of universal human
achievements in science, morals, law, politics, and art. Cosmopolitan humanism
doesn’t necessarily seek to diminish or extinct local communal bonds and cultural
heritages – whether religious, socio-ideological, or political – but it does seek to
inÀuence and qualify them in the light of common standards of human dignity and
democratic culture (Nussbaum, 1998, 2002; Hansen, 2009).
39
NIMROD ALONI
The main reason for fostering cosmopolitan humanism lies in the realization
that it would be irresponsibly naïve to expect humanist and democratic virtues to
develop naturally. On the one hand, the motivation is to assist everyone in realizing
their potential and leading a sovereign life of meaning and quality; on the other
hand, we are well aware that both as individuals and as collectives, human beings
tend to perceive themselves as better, more just or deserving privileged access to
resources denied to other groups. Since such sel¿sh, ethnocentric, or even racist
attitudes usually mean offending the humanity or denying the human rights of
other groups, humanism seeks the universal application of basic norms of human
dignity and equality. The Biblical ethics is a prime example for such norms. It op-
poses egoistic and ethnocentric tendencies with the such teachings as: ‘Steer away
from falsehood and slay not one who is righteous and just… and take no bribe…
and oppress no stranger’; ‘thou shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor honour
the person of the mighty: but in righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbour. …
love thy neighbour as thyself’ (Leviticus, 19:15,18); ‘But the stranger that dwelleth
with you shall be unto you as one born among you, and thou shalt love him as
thyself; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt’ (ibid., 34); ‘Do not unto your
neighbour that which you hate’; ‘May your neighbour’s honour be as precious to
you as your own’.
Though it may certainly be objected that even those humanistic checks and bal-
ances entail some coercion over the individual, such coercion is far more limited
than any alternative imposition of religious, ideological or political contents – lim-
ited to such aspects and boundaries allowing everyone to actualise their mental
potential and enjoy equal opportunities to inÀuence the character and practices of
their social community. Naturally, those educating for universal humanism are usu-
ally disparaged by nationalist leaders or religious fanatics as betraying their unique
heritage, since they want their Àock reduced to submissive devotees of the single
truth that they cherish and represent. We are fortunate, nevertheless, in that after
millennia of religious wars, ideological violence and brutal racism, the family of
nations has ¿nally, on December 10th 1948, determined in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights that ‘without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth of other status…
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.’
The value of humanistic principles has recently received support, of all sources,
from empirical studies on the quality of life in various countries. As opposed to
the authoritarian bias of many that there is something unrewarding, ‘weakly’ or
arti¿cial about the virtues of reÀective thinking and social justice, empirical data
provided by the UN’s Human Development Index as well as by the OECD’s PISA
international achievement tests indicate clearly that it is those countries which up-
hold humanism’s idealistic virtues are also those who offer their citizens the highest
quality of life. The Scandinavian countries, for example, have been in the lead for
many years, both in standards of public welfare, health, and education services,
and in standards of individual liberties, social equity, gender equality, and political
40
HUMANISTIC EDUCATION: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
Apart from the signi¿cant change required from teachers in the areas of profession-
al awareness, pedagogic presence, and normative commitment, it is very important
to focus on some aspects of the school culture, so that this may serve as fertile
ground for promoting the objectives of a humanistic education. In the following
paragraphs, I will brieÀy discuss seven crucial aspects thereof: (1) multi-faceted
cultivation of student personality; (2) developing a social climate of security and
fairness; (3) using various types of dialogue with the students in order to reach out
to and empower them; (4) developing a community approach and social involve-
ment; (5) developing the students’ intellectual powers by means of general and lib-
eral education; (6) developing teaching techniques in which ‘the tree of knowledge’
becomes the students’ and the community’s ‘tree of life’; (7) ensuring a safe and
hospitable physical infrastructure.
41
NIMROD ALONI
– that they are worthy, important, accepted and capable – as a prerequisite for
their faith in their own ability to lead a life of quality and meaning.
(b) Foster their interest in both their human and their natural environment, in
order to cultivate their joie de vivre and personal involvement in social activi-
ties and cultural contents.
(c) Develop their emotional intelligence as well as their capacity for empathy,
moderation and self-mastery.
(d) Develop the intellectual virtues of curiosity, critical and reÀective think-
ing, sense of measure, sound judgment, creative imagination, and sensitivity
to values.
(e) Foster an autonomous standpoint of independent thought, personal ac-
countability and perseverance in dealing with intellectual issues, social pres-
sures and personal desires and urges.
(f) Cultivate an authentic, personal voice, producing its own contents and
shaping itself through an interpersonal dialogue of self-nurturing and self-
motivation.
(g) Develop the courage to be ‘imperfect’ and act also in ambiguous situations
defying simple solutions.
3. Empowering Dialogues
By this I mean unique modes of pedagogic discourse and interpersonal communica-
tion that enrich the routine instruction with elements and content that enhances and
42
HUMANISTIC EDUCATION: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
empower the students’ personality above and beyond the subject matter learned.
Educational tradition has offered empowering dialogues of various kinds. I suggest
the following typology:
(a) The Socratic dialogue which is intellectually empowering in that it does
not offer regurgitated knowledge and ready-made answers, but creates dis-
comfort concerning a given issue or dilemma and guides the student in a
process of self-discovery and critical reasoning with a constant feeling of be-
ing ‘on the way’.
(b) The Nietzschean dialogue which empowers the student’s autonomy and
authenticity by rejecting the option of mass conformity and encourages the
alternative of building the students’ selfhood based on self-de¿nition and self-
creation.
(c) The Buberian dialogue which develops a caring and empathetic sensitiv-
ity in interpersonal relationships by substituting professional and hierarchic
alienation with sincere and attentive encounters, in which both the teacher’s
and the student’s personality are completely present.
(d) The Rogersian dialogue which enhances the individual’s faith in her ability
to lead a successful life by tuning in and getting to know oneself;
(e) The Freireian dialogue which helps students from weak and oppressed so-
cial groups to free themselves of inhibitory and regressive forces through the
development of active knowledge and critical literacy and their application in
a political struggle for social justice and equal opportunities.
(f) The ecological dialogue, reinforcing empathy for one’s natural environ-
ment, so that the student’s self-awareness of the necessary conditions for
personal growth and well-being leads to caring for a thirsty tree, a drooping
stalk, a turtle helpless on its back, a beached whale, endangered and con¿ned
animals, polluted oceans and rivers, and the beauty of nature.
43
NIMROD ALONI
(d) Active citizenship intent on abolishing social injustices and ensuring the
integrity and propriety of both the public arena and the natural environment.
44
HUMANISTIC EDUCATION: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
Let me conclude now by stating again the challenge that stood at the centre of this
article: to utilize, translate, adapt, and integrate the widely agreed upon tenets of
Humanism and Humanistic Educational Theory into pedagogical elements capable
of constructing the lived reality of humanistic schools. As we have seen, humanism
has its roots in ancient traditions in both the West and the East, and out of these tra-
ditions evolved various humanistic educational philosophies – classical, romantic,
existentialist and critical. It is a pity, however, that the popularity of the values and
tenets of humanistic education has failed to be translated and put to work in the
real life of educational practice and schools characteristics. It is my hope that the
detailed portrayal of the practical aspects of humanistic education I have offered
above would contribute to overcome the so familiar challenge familiar to us from
so many spheres of life – moving from a worthy and promising theory to a desirable
and rewarding practice.
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Aloni, N. (Ed.) (2008b). Empowering Dialogues in Humanistic Education (Hebrew). Tel Aviv: Kibbutz
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Aloni, N. (2007). Enhancing humanity. Dordrecht: Springer.
Aristotle (1980). The Nicomachean ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.
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NIMROD ALONI
Buber, M. (1971). The education of character. In J.P. Strain (Ed.), Modern philosophies of education.
New York: Random House.
Davis, G.H. (1981). Technology – Humanism or Nihilism: A critical study of the philosophical basis and
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Freire, P. (1970). Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York: Seabury Press.
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Theory 38(1), 61-75.
Greene, T.M. (1940). The meaning of humanism. Princeton: Princeton: University Press.
Greene, M. (1973). Teacher as stranger: Educational philosophy for the modern age. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Greene, M. (1988). The dialectic of freedom. New York: Teachers College Press.
Gur-Zeev, I. (2007). Beyond the Modern-Postmodern Struggle in Education: Toward Counter-Educa-
tion and Enduring Improvisation. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.
Habermas, J. (1971). Knowledge and human interests. Boston: Beacon Press.
Halsema, A., & Houten, D. van (Ed.). (2002). Empowering Humanity. Utrecht: De Tijdstroom Uit-
geverij.
Hansen, D. (2009). Walking with diogenes: Cosmopolitan accents in philosophy and education. In D.
Kerdeman (Ed.) Philosophy of Education 2009 (1-13). Urbana, IL: Philosophy of Education Soci-
ety.
Held, D. (1980). Introduction to critical theory: Horkheimer to Habermas. Berkeley: University of
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Kant, I. (1966). Education. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Kurtz, P. (1988). Forbidden fruit: The ethics of humanism. New York: Prometheus.
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Noddings, N. (2002). Educating moral people: A caring alternative to character education. New York:
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Nussbaum, M. (1998). Cultivating humanity: A classical defense of reform in liberal education. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Nussbaum, M. (2002). Education for citizenship in an era of global connection. Studies in Philosophy
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Peters, R.S. (1970). Ethics and education. London: George Allen & Unwin.
Postman, N., & Weingartner, C. (1969). Teaching as a subversive activity. New York: Dell.
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Sockett, H. (1993). The moral base for teacher professionalism. New York: Teachers College Press.
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Nimrod Aloni
Institute for Educational Thought
Kibbutzim College of Education Tel Aviv
46
MARIA ROSA BUXARRAIS & FRANCISCO ESTEBAN
INTRODUCTION
Moral education is a topic that is very much present in the current social discourse.
It is one of those subjects that has always been there throughout the history of hu-
manity, as a proprium of our historical report, but above all, it is a question that we
cannot evade for the simple reason that it is essentially human. Moral education
has been, is – and most likely, will remain – a matter of debate, sometimes more
intense and in different places and different ways. It is surprising that something
so ethereal and abstract as moral and ethical values, and their potential transmis-
sion, call so much attention. We are talking about ideas that are not easy to agree
on, about learnings of little use in the sense of pro¿tability. Despite of this, ethics
and values are the best legacy that we can leave to the new generations of citizens.
Morality is a human condition, is an ontological question, the drive that impels us
to appreciate everything that happens to us, that allows us to appraise ourselves. In
short, and as Jaeger states in the ¿rst sentence of his magnum opus Paideia, our hu-
man and community development is closely related to education, and particularly,
to moral education.
Moral education has a complex structure. Its treatment can be focused on the
epistemology of values, on the psychological nature that facilitates its acquisition,
or on the pedagogy that enables its transmission, among other ¿elds. Most studies
and/or insights in each of these areas have made their own small contribution, and
they have made it possible that can we continue to study this subject in depth. The
machinery for moral education is on the go, with more pieces added every time, and
new means are started that open unknown paths to explore. Nonetheless, present
reality entails some danger, which is a sign of postmodernity: our obsession for
hurry and ef¿ciency may bury the fundamental sense of moral education under too
much pedagogical technique, strategy and theory. Moral education is a philosophi-
cal matter, and philosophy is born from the question: what is this? (Marias, 1985).
Maybe now, more than ever, we cannot stop asking ourselves, what is education in
the moral domain? It may seem that everything has been said about the matter, but
the truth is that there still is a lot to be said (Berkowitz, 1995).
Postmodernity urges us to look for answers to that question. We ¿nd ourselves
at a time really unique, a number of social, economic and cultural conditions —
unconceivable a few years ago — are taking place, and most of them, or at least the
more signi¿cant, are closely related to our subject. Most important is that we are in
the middle of a discussion on moral philosophy; we refer to the liberal-communitar-
ian debate that has posed a series of questions and answers that will determine the
development of moral education if they are not doing so already.
The goal of our work is twofold. On the one hand, and on the basis of the liber-
al-communitarian debate, we hope to outline the current epistemological situation
concerning the moral, that is to say, we hope to point out the different views about
the moral and the potential transmission of values in our time. On the other hand,
and after this conceptual review, we would like to present a proposal of moral edu-
cation from a humanist perspective that we need for present times, and in particular,
we would like to put forward the required conditions for this proposal. Of course,
this proposal is not closed or dogmatic, but open and based on the principles of
western humanism.
LIBERAL-COMMUNITARIAN DEBATE
As suggested in the introduction, in the last years liberals and communitarians have
got involved in a philosophical argument, still not ¿nished, that allows us to glimpse
the new premises from which we must build the discourses on moral education of
the century that has just started. Before describing those assumptions, we must say
that the liberal-communitarian debate strictly speaking started in the ¿eld of politi-
cal philosophy, although as we shall see, main authors of this debate admit that this
discussion also concerns moral philosophy. More than this, most of the analysed
subjects end up in moral questions. As we can presume and we shall clarify, the
impact of this discussion on moral education is critical.
Liberal-communitarian debate is by no means contemporary but rather the con-
tinuity of the classic and well-known debate between Kantian and Hegelian phi-
losophy, or, to say it plainly, between the individual and the community. However,
the discussion that we are referring to begins in 1971 with the presentation of the
book A Theory of Justice by John Rawls. From then on, the path is open to a series
of criticisms, among which those of Michael Sandel (1982), Alasdair MacIntyre
(1981; 1990), Charles Taylor (1990), and Michael Walzer (1983) stand out. These
authors and some others have been classi¿ed within the communitarianism cur-
rent, although they themselves do not agree on the label that has been set on this
way of thinking. Certainly, it is more than a current of thought strictly speaking;
they represent a series of criticisms to the liberals, a correction of liberal think-
ing in general, and of Rawlsian liberalism in particular. The number of stances is
wide, and these go beyond the strict duality between liberals and communitarians.
48
MORAL EDUCATION FROM A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE
A proof of this is that in the course of the debate, authors such as Joseph Raz (1986)
or Will Kymlicka (1989) have come to light, whose contributions are somewhere in
between the liberal and the communitarian ideas. Nowadays, we already speak of
positions like civic republicanism and liberal culturalism. In any case and for the
purpose of clarity in our presentation, we will use the quali¿ers of liberals and com-
munitarians to refer to ones and others, in spite of – we insist — their distinctive
characteristics (Mulhall & Swift, 1992).
Present reality has spurred on the debate on the moral subject. Almost four dec-
ades after the ¿rst edition of A Theory of Justice, the set of socioeconomic and cul-
tural postmodern circumstances continue to stoke the ¿re lit by John Rawls’ book
in 1971. There have been several authors, mainly sociologists that have analysed our
present situation with relation to human development, or to put it better, to human-
ism. Most of them agree on the description of a society that affects conclusively the
moral development, and reading one of the titles of their works is enough to realize
that we are immersed in a series of circumstances that are not exactly positive or
pleasing for good moral development (Lipovetsky, 1983). Having no intent to be
comprehensive, their contributions could be summarized in several assumptions.
Perhaps the sharpest of them is the one that states that we live in a society with little
participation, where citizens are being taken by an excessive individualism (Bau-
man, 1993).
Our present reality has little to do with that of few years ago when the community
project was bound to the differing personal projects of the vast majority of citizens
in the community. However, is the individual a being essentially communal, or is
he a being that has the choice to live in community? As we shall see later, the con-
cept of the individual is a critical aspect in the liberal-communitarian debate, and
very likely, some of its reasoning has been the cause of the individualism that is so
criticised today. Needless to say, the concept of the individual is very important in
the educational task in general, and in the education in values in particular. On the
other hand and closely related to our topic, those authors talked about a segmented
society, which was made up of unconnected life chapters. Postmodern life project is
not a continuous story any more with an inner sense or a purpose to achieve. New
reality is organised in such a way that it fosters the so-called corrosion of charac-
ter (Sennet, 1998). Certainly, new multicultural environments have exponentially
increased in the last years where different ways of conceiving reality and differ-
ent patterns of self-perception live together. The chance to an agreement in main
community affairs has become a true need, and for many an absolute panacea after
recent events. We refer to the armed conÀicts between several cultural groups in the
United States, and the aftermath due to the attacks in New York in 2001, Madrid in
2004, and London in 2005.
Multicultural agreement through dialogue is important, but having a clear under-
standing of what we want to agree on is even more crucial. Therefore, in our nearer
context, if a new Europe is to be built, before the willingness to undertake such an
enterprise, we should know what the meaning of Europe is, its soul, the nature of its
49
MARIA ROSA BUXARRAIS & FRANCISCO ESTEBAN
roots, and on all that, as George Steiner states, there is still a lot of work to do (Steiner,
2004). Concerning moral education, as in many other aspects of life, it is unlikely
that we will get where we want if we do not keep in mind where we come from.
We live in a time with the best available technology, with the greatest Àow of in-
formation and ideas (Castells, 1997), but it is also the most ephemeral time. Empty
discourses have grown in number, namely those of ethical and moral nature, which
have a remarkable inÀuence on moral education. There is some concern to fall in
a kind of education that creates consumers of nice wording of no meaning or intel-
lectual extent. There is this trend to educate in the good life and not in ‘the life is
good’, when in fact both ideas are radically different (Cortina, 1997; 1999). Finally,
it looks as if in the last decades our education systems have been placed in a perma-
nent crisis. Social discredit towards our educational institutions is continuous in the
last years, and reforms come one after another with the goal to change such impres-
sion. Some authors assure that the cultural and scienti¿c levels have been lowered
with the corresponding outcomes, but most allegations to the school and university
system are focused on the humanistic training, on the education in values and ethics
(Nussbaum, 1997). Schools and teachers that work in it see the moral education of
their students as a real problem and feel it as their Achilles heel in their daily work.
Families, on the other hand, no longer see schooling as a projection of their educa-
tion at home; most of them understand it as a compulsory and public add-on, and an
increasing number of families see it as a real competitor.
Having said this, we will get back to those issues that have been discussed in the
liberal-communitarian debate that will allow us to distinguish more clearly some
of the ideas that have been expressed, directly or indirectly, about moral education
in postmodern times.
Rawls liberalism (Rawls, 1971) departs from the assumption that all people are
free and equal; therefore, for this assumption to be true, we must think of justice as
being based on equality among people. In a nutshell: Rawlsian principles of justice
are those that will come up from the sort of agreement that people would reach
if they were unaware of their beliefs, individual backgrounds, social conditions,
physical aspects, etc., as suggested by Rawls, if they were absolutely ignorant about
themselves. It would be something like if we had to cut a cake without knowing
beforehand which slice goes to whom. Logically, all slices should be equal so that
no one feels hurt. Taking Rawls’ words, principles of justice as equality, place in-
dividuals in the ‘original position’. In this position, the person should disregard the
socioeconomic status he might be in, or what defects or virtues he will have after
applying such principles. This lack of knowledge is known by Rawls as the ‘veil of
ignorance’. We could say that individuals are not responsible for being born in a cer-
tain cultural background, in this or that family, for being the way they are, therefore,
it is not fair to ask for bene¿ts or advantages due to the social or personal condition.
50
MORAL EDUCATION FROM A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE
Justice as equality also requires to ignore the concept of ‘Right’ from the person, or
at least, not to consider it in the public space. The important thing is not the different
concepts of Right, but what is behind it, which is nothing else but the freedom to
choose among all of them or have the choice to change. In any case, private moral
should not interfere in the public life.
From this brief explanation of Rawlsian liberalism, a number of philosophical
subjects are inferred (Mulhall & Swift, 1992), which are part of what is commonly
known as communitarian criticism. These subjects call for needful attention in or-
der to suggest a proposal of moral education for our times.
The ¿rst subject has to do with the concept of the individual. For Rawlsian liber-
alism, the individual must be conceived as something different from his singularity,
his personal qualities, his speci¿c social condition, his particular idea of Right, and
most of all, he must have a great interest to devise and pursue different concepts of
Right. Such concepts can work in the con¿guration of fair and equitable communi-
ties, but to the communitarian eye, it is a wrong way to conceive the individual. Au-
thors such as Michael Sandel (1982) and Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) argue that the
Rawlsian ‘original position’ ignores that individuals are composed of moral aims,
values, and concepts of Right; that the relation between individual and moral aims
is essential, much stronger than what liberalism thinks. If so, may a rational being
conceive reality and its circumstances regardless of his ethical and moral ideas?
Can the individual change certain values so easily as liberalism says, or is the indi-
vidual who he is according to his values? The debate is served. For liberalism the
individual is regarded as a free, independent being, decisive for his project of life,
while for communitarianism, the person is considered according to his personal
values, which are a constituent part of his self, and to his project of life, which al-
lows us to talk of someone as an individual.
The second question refers to asocial individualism. For Rawlsian liberalism,
society is a partnership between individuals that are privately associated, whose
personal interests are de¿ned regardless of the community to which they belong. In
other words, the individual is individualised prior to his choice of aims, his identity
is set beforehand, therefore, there is always some distance between what one is and
what one values. In Kantian terms we might say that what makes us human beings
is not our aims, interests, or personal ideas, but our ability to think and act with
independence, which is just the driving force of our private and personal choices.
For communitarian authors, specially, for Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) and Charles
Taylor (1990), liberalism ignores the extent to which communities where people live
transmit their identity and values. The person is – if we can say so – parasitic of his
community, since his own concept of person has a social and community origin.
For liberalism society is a cooperation of individuals, while the community is much
more than this. This subject is critically important in the moral education, and it
underlies the sociological criticism to postmodern individualism.
The third issue refers to universalism. Rawlsian theory has a universal approach,
as it could be no other way coming from the philosophical ¿eld. The fact that the
51
MARIA ROSA BUXARRAIS & FRANCISCO ESTEBAN
52
MORAL EDUCATION FROM A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE
forms of life. They claim that the pursued forms of life are neutral and released
from any moral and ethical bet.
These ¿ve issues, although brieÀy discussed, let us hint at the importance of the
liberal-communitarian debate, and its close connection with education in values.
We feel that this is a discussion on moral philosophy, which does nothing but pose
questions to the education world. As pointed out above, an attempt has been made
to answer these questions from a sociological perspective.
The professionals in our postmodern educational institutions that work every
day with the youngest members of our communities are called to reÀect on educa-
tion, to feel sound in a liquid atmosphere (Bauman, 2007). Are the students value-
independent people and genuine main ¿gures in the choice of their projects of life,
or by contrast, are they determined by the acquisition or not of certain values?
Shall the students be raised up in the association between the individuals and in
defence of Right (bonum), Truth (verbum), and Beauty (pulchrum)? Shall moral
education strive for universal and ethical principles, or shall it focus on the singu-
larities of each cultural group, on its moral history and its rational justi¿cation?
Shall we think that the student is sovereign over himself, over his own body and
mind, or that he will be sovereign as long as he acquires the values of the commu-
nity to which he belongs? And ¿ nally, shall education be a neutral, non-aggressive
act that should not get involved in the different concepts of Right, or shall it be a
prospective act that ¿ts into certain concepts of Right and discards others?
It is not easy to answer the previous questions, the ones that remain opened after the
liberal-communitarian debate. Our goal is not to answer them, but rather to place
them in what we call a proposal for humanist moral education.
The ¿rst premise for our proposal is grounded on what in philosophy is called
humanism, a cultural and literary movement that spread in Europe in the fourteenth
and ¿fteenth centuries. Beyond the revival or resurgence of classics, and the value
of the classics themselves, we focus on the humanist ideals, those so beautifully
expressed by the young Italian scholar Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola (1956) in his
work Oratio de hominis dignitate, which represents a true praise of human dignity.
Hence, and on the base of this debate, we propose a model that takes into account
the uncertainty of the human being as the foundation for his freedom; a model
that considers the desire to excel as something typically human; that takes reason
as the guide for spirit and action; that aims for peace as the means to knowledge;
to the widening of horizons that makes knowledge into something universal; that
claims the critical spirit that takes the measure of the opinions in public debate; that
proudly fosters everything that has been achieved with talent and work, in order
words, virtuously. In short, we put our trust in the essential nature of the human
being, which is the main legacy of humanism.
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MARIA ROSA BUXARRAIS & FRANCISCO ESTEBAN
Presently, moral education deals with the presumption that behind a student there
is a contingent person. The student, as a person, is someone who lives experiences
that might not have happened to him. The student, as any human being, is someone
vulnerable in the deepest sense of this word (Castiñeira & Calsina, 2005). There are
students with more or less ability to learn certain curriculum contents, students that
come from families more or less broken, students with more or less social and affec-
tive development – all these are contingent circumstances, conditions that are real
but might not have been, or they might have been very different. As far as values
are concerned, we can think similarly, namely, behind a student with certain values
there is a person that ultimately has autonomy of choice over himself. At last, the
person ends up being contingent for a matter of choice, which is also contingent; he
resolves to engage to certain values through a voluntary personal act.
Respect for the autonomy of the student is, from a liberal perspective, the value
that must prevail in the educational task, since ignoring it implies a lack of respect
for the person, the student. Therefore, moral education must consider that every
student is distinct and singular within the diversity of distinct and singular people
he lives with, and his interests can be the same or not as those of his colleagues and
teachers.
Now, communitarian criticism helps us realize that current moral education, if
we understand it only in a liberal sense, can distort the education task. Choice of
values is not only a matter of autonomy and will, but also of knowledge and emo-
tion. It is not only a matter of choosing from a showcase of values, but to ¿nd out,
get to know and get to love them. In Maslow words: ‘The learning of content is not
an enemy of the personal development’.
In this sense it is not possible from the liberal perspective that the student re-
gards his belonging to the community as something essential to his identity. If we
consider that the student is an absolutely contingent person, and we have to respect
at last his autonomy on his choice of moral aims, that prevents the student from
explaining himself some of his basic moral experiences, his way of doing, attitudes,
self-reÀection, etc. The student, when regarded from an absolutely liberal view, will
not be able to take on the whole range of ethical learning (Martínez, Buxarrais &
Esteban, 2002) and concepts of oneself that are rooted in the knowledge of the com-
munity that he belongs to. The awareness of living in a community and the learning
of its values, albeit they have not been autonomously chosen, is not a feasible goal
in education in values, but a required ingredient of itself.
We might say that the moral education project placed in the most absolute lib-
eralism, would create a cooperation system among citizens with the goal to obtain
those bene¿ts that they can not gain by themselves, but it does not contribute to the
binding through ties that condition their personal identity (Cortina, 1997). Thus,
communitarianism provides a digression from the liberal perspective that cannot be
overlooked when we talk of moral education. Values are qualities (Frondizi, 1977)
54
MORAL EDUCATION FROM A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE
that shape personal identity; they are not contingent attributes of the self. Our per-
ception of identity cannot be separated from the fact that we are regarded as mem-
bers of a certain family, community, town, and certainly, educational institution.
From a humanist conception of moral education, we can draw two conclusions
that we should not lose sight of. On the one hand, participation in the educational
task is a way to develop personal identities while developing forms of community
with which to identify. The student needs to develop his community ontology and
learn to improve his social environment. On the other hand, the riches provided by
these historically built communities – an essential aspect of humanism, by the way
–, are riches that can unlikely be known in an individual and autonomous way. In
any case, leave them under the hands of his own free will is too risky if the goal is
to build more equitable, fair and free communities.
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MARIA ROSA BUXARRAIS & FRANCISCO ESTEBAN
better status. We feel that passing on the knowledge of the aim of the individual is
basic for moral education since it allows us to understand that the moral is rational
and objectively reasonable, and for going from particular facts to the values as ethi-
cal duties. To give an example: from this perspective moral education must teach
that we are vulnerable beings and we are called to help each other. Only this way
the reality, such as that there are lots of people that need help, develops into a moral
duty. The ethics of help has to become something objective, rational, the essence of
our human nature. Otherwise, helping the needed would be a matter of choice up to
the personal interests of every one (Buxarrais, 2006).
This teleological view of moral education takes us back to the communitarian
criticism. The community in general and the educative institution in particular must
indeed encourage the practise of ethics, the change from what one is to what one
could, and should, become. Current school practise needs to become a human ac-
tivity morally effective. The diverse education situations that students go through
must include moral goods that they have to experience. We consider that this is
important in the sense that there are values that either are learned in certain edu-
cative practises or maybe are never learned. Values such as effort, commitment,
fellowship, etc, are at the root of the educational institution, with the invaluable
contribution, of course, of the family environment. It is worth to say that taking
part in an educational practise requires the observance of its guidelines, rules, and
models. Therefore, the student must submit his likings, preferences and attitudes
to the guidelines, rules and models that give sense to such a practise. This is not
conservatism, since once entering it, not everything has to be accepted without
rational discussion.
In summary, the humanist moral education that we suggest includes the concept
of a process that guides the students towards a better self. We are not proposing a
particular point of arrival translated into moral values because we believe in the
pluralism of human existence, and the multiple moral and virtuous practises. How-
ever, what we do understand very clearly is that such point of arrival is the one that
makes the student realize what is best for him and the community, and what makes
him happier.
56
MORAL EDUCATION FROM A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE
same as education in universality, and now universality is present in the same room,
day by day in the educational task.
A liberal understanding fosters a civic coexistence and an absolute respect for
the different cultures, specially the minorities, and for this intercultural education
(Kymlicka, 1995) has been organized as a civic and harmonious exchange between
cultures that currently coexist. Some intercultural education projects have probably
been successful, however, we cannot deny that cultural problems of interaction sig-
ni¿cantly characterise the beginning of this new century.
Communitarianism reminds us again of the importance of the community in the
development of personal identities. From this standpoint, the danger exists that the
obsession with intercultural education may cause us to forget cultural education,
and a proof of this is the rise of cultural nationalisms that we are presently seeing as
claims of the own culture. We are essentially intercultural beings (Maalouf, 1998),
looking at our ancestral past is enough to appreciate this, but that does not mean
that we have to stop being cultural beings. Moral frameworks, closer or farther, and
in particular those of our moral community, are the means that guide us in certain
ethical and moral questions, and such moral frameworks, or values, exist regardless
of our ability to ¿nd our place in it. We might say that this is an important aspect
of human ontology, as it is like a map when we have to locate a street in a city.
In such a case, disregarding universal goods like liberty, equality and fraternity,
freedom not only is problematic but also ignoring one’s own stance in relation to
those values. Multicultural fellowship should not hinder the education in one’s own
cultural framework, and for as long as possible, it should harmonize the coexistence
of diverse cultural frameworks. We do not propose to enter the ‘Social Darwinian’
debate according to which there are cultures morally superior to others, or whether
the education policies of our states should be open to other cultures. We just wanted
to point out that intercultural education requires an education in one’s own culture,
that it will be dif¿cult to appreciate the distance if we do not appreciate the proxim-
ity beforehand.
Current moral education has to deal with one of the philosophical and pedagogical
predicaments that accompany us since the history of thought. Liberalism argues
that we are equal and free persons. The individual is independent, and with his
presumed ability to think, he is the only one responsible for his search of the truth.
The heteronomy, the search of values outside or through others, is an illegitimate
source of moral, since the categorical Kantian imperative source of liberalism re-
quires autonomy. The person, at last, must reach a conclusion about how to act,
even regardless of what he wants. In this sense, moral education has to support the
students’ autonomy while respecting their absolute freedom.
For the communitarian critics, however, autonomy does not de¿ne how it is that
we are subjects with values (Thiebautt, 1998). People are moral beings on the basis
57
MARIA ROSA BUXARRAIS & FRANCISCO ESTEBAN
The subject of neutrality in moral education has been another constant debate along
its history (Trilla, 1992). This subject is controversial. On the one hand, we ¿nd ar-
guments in favour of the transmission of certain values and moral habits, and on the
other hand, reasoning arises that supports a neutral education. The appearance of
a free, secular state education gave some direction, but the controversy continues,
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MORAL EDUCATION FROM A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE
as we can see from the liberal-communitarian debate. Shall the public school sup-
port a model of moral identity, or shall it keep a neutral position so that the students
become choosers of their own network of values? In any case, can education on the
moral be neutral?
Neutrality in the humanities is a concept much more complex than it may be in
the sciences, and even more if we undertake to educate in it. We can understand
neutrality as the exclusion of ideals or concepts of ‘Right’ that some have called
justi¿catory neutrality (Kymlicka, 1989). In this case, the educational institution
cannot present an education on any concept of ‘Right’, and cannot work on any
base that allows the students to pursue a speci¿c ideal of ‘Right’. The school and
certainly the education task, must exclude any moral project for it to be neutral.
Neutrality can also be restricted, which is even more contentious than the previ-
ous. In this case, we cannot bet on a concept of ‘Right’ if this means an increase
in the probability of having more students supporting it rather than others, that is
to say, no moral option can have an advantage. Finally, we could identify a com-
prehensive or consequentialist neutrality which means that all students have the
ability to pursue the idea of ‘Right’ they may choose in their lives and foster it in
their communities. Despite the signi¿cant differences among the various types
of neutralities, we can conclude that following the liberal assumptions public and
privates arenas must remain separate. The school is not the place where certain
values are transmitted to the students, even less if they come from religious or
theological options.
Communitarianism, by contrast, does support the transmission of a concept of
‘Right’, whichever that is, but it must link the values of each community. Education
in values must aspire to human perfection, or if preferred, must rely on the peda-
gogy on the human and existential perfection of the students.
Our con¿dence in a model for a humanist moral education forces us in a liberal
and perfectionist position at the same time (Raz, 1986), provided that under per-
fectionism we understand something not exclusive and under liberalism something
not sceptical. Postmodern reality needs citizens with a personal welfare, and such
welfare depends on the moral value of their aims and their life goals rather than the
mere belief in certain values. Therefore, for example, living a life of solidarity, that
is, practice solidarity is more valuable than to believe in it. In any case, you can
only believe in solidarity when you lead a life devoted to others. Individual welfare
depends on our global achievements, which are based on social forms of behaviour,
on civic attitudes. We dare say that autonomy, even in the choice of a moral project,
is valuable only if it is used to pursue the ‘Right’, understanding as such the defence
of the human dignity, the ultimate principle of humanism. Autonomy in a human-
ist sense does not exclude moral pluralism but reinforces it as long as it is a real
pluralism. Hence, moral education must allow the students to choose among several
moral options, and therefore, among several valuable options. Our bid for neutral-
ity, whichever type, is a bid for an option and a rejection of others, therefore moral
pluralism overcomes neutrality.
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MARIA ROSA BUXARRAIS & FRANCISCO ESTEBAN
The ¿rst condition we would like to refer to is the assumption of presence. Moral
education needs to openly accept that the educational task is an ethical act, that it
is per se an ethical and moral event (Bárcena & Mèlich, 2000). To educate is more
than to transmit, teach or instil; to educate is to transform and to be transformed.
We could say that the educational process, as far as the moral is concerned, is a
process of ‘quixotization’, where nobody is the same at the end as at the beginning
of his participation in it (Ortega y Gasset, 1981).
How can this condition of constant presence in moral education be accepted?
More than this, how to manage that professional teachers do not become less atten-
tive in their educational task, precisely because such a task is a moral and ethical
event? We may search for the answer to this question in the word vocation that,
surely, is signi¿cantly different from that of personal interest. Today moral edu-
cation, more than ever, needs professionals with a disposition for the educational
task, not only people with more or less interest in education, or as commonly said,
people that feel a certain regard for children. European Higher Education Aera
(EHEA) should think about this now we are in the middle of a restructuring process
at the university. We understand vocation in the sense that Max Weber (Beruf) did,
among others, and particularly for the second dimension that he gave it, namely:
the acquisition of a strong conviction that our destiny in life is to do what we think
we want to do (Weber, 1958). In this sense, a person with vocation is similar to
the craftsman that Richard Sennet presents us in his last and interesting book, the
person that has acquired ‘an enduring, basic human impulse, the desire to do a job
well for its own sake.’ (Sennet, 2008). In consequence, doing a job and commit to
it is not the same, especially if we are talking about the world of humanities, and
in particular, of education (Derrida, 2002). Undertaking a sense of teaching life,
for oneself and for the education community, committing to the education activity,
being eager to do things well just for the sake of doing it well. We think that this is
what guarantees that one will not stagger when asked for the reasons why a teacher
60
MORAL EDUCATION FROM A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE
and a group of students should meet in ‘a place called school’ (Martínez, 2001);
when he is questioned about what a teacher does nowadays that Internet, the family
or the media cannot do. A teacher with an acquired vocation is someone ¿lled with
clear and sound answers, and therefore convincing answers, that only those that live
for and because of their profession can give.
The liberal-communitarian debate makes us get the point of this condition. It is
true, as liberalism argues, that a private and a public dimension exists in the life of
peoples, and each has its goals and particular ends. However, it is also true, as com-
munitarianism states, that private life is grounded in the community; it does not start
from scratch because, like it or not, we are community beings. A teacher cannot pre-
tend to ignore the private life of his students as he should not also disregard his when
he enters the school and/or the classroom. The job of a teacher consists in entering
the sphere of his students, sure with respect, attention, and the wish to help. Entering
the life of a student to spoil, mess up, humble, and leave, is not the job of a teacher or
anybody. The teacher is the bastion of the social community, its main representative
in front of the students, as the school contents are for science and culture. The teacher
not only transmits values, deliberately or not, but also represents them unavoidably.
We may say that a teacher is a set of values, a living representation of what one can
become, and what one can achieve, maxim that by the way should be seriously taken
into account when appraising the teaching task in the social debate.
We are aware that this condition of moral education is very personal, but we re-
gard it as a sine qua non condition for the upbringing of more committed, free and
fair citizens. If humanism is the revival of the best, the rise of the person to high
ethical and moral levels, the process of humanization of the new generations of
citizens must be carried out by people who feel that their life and professional task
consist in supporting such revival.
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MARIA ROSA BUXARRAIS & FRANCISCO ESTEBAN
are worth to be learnt when the development of the abilities of the students make
it possible. This type of planning does not guarantee that the students will acquire
those values, that they will internalize them in the deepest sense of the word.
Planning in moral education consists in organizing the moral development of the
students from the lowest level onward and, why not say it, from the most important
one. As we have indicated, autonomy is conquered from the life in community,
and life in community is governed by moral habits, by the participation in social
and cultural events that require to behave in a certain way and not another. If the
virtues, now values, are human qualities, it is not wrong to think that this proves it
pedagogically necessary to plan the learning of such qualities by exercising them.
The good life is the practise of the good life, teaches Aristotle.
We do not want to ¿nish without saying that we do not support a closed plan-
ning. Moral education, as we will show in the next condition, has a certain degree
of improvisation that must be observed. What we do maintain, however, is that
between planning and improvisation we keep with the ¿rst, and that a reference to
those values that we pretend to educate on is useless if they are not considered in the
educational practise, in any school activity, how meaningless it may seem.
As we have just pointed out, we are aware that education in values involves some
moments of inconvenience, moments that have not been thought over, unexpected
situations, gestures or words. They may be pleasant, and if so, we are glad for our
success, but they can also be unpleasant, annoying, and not appropriate. We dare
say that in the last years these have increased dramatically. They are likely not a
result of postmodernity, but they are very typical of our time. A teacher in such a
situation ¿nds himself on a crossroads, where one direction appeals to him and
the other shuns him away. Taking one or the other is dif¿cult, and our suggestion
consists in moving closer to the complexity, to the student or group of students in
particular, and to the unfortunate situation in general.
Liberal thinking, applied to this type of educative moments, recommends us to
leave, or at least, take some distance except in exceptional cases, of course. The
imperative respect for the autonomy of the student and his liberty suggest that it is
best that everyone goes his way, as long as it does hinder somebody else. There is no
reason, then, to act up in front of an idea that is morally strange, to be negative about
the practise of a moral habit that you do not see the point of, or to show passive or
active contempt for the values of other colleagues or the own teacher. Nevertheless,
respect for the student cannot be shown from distance, but only from proximity.
Distant respect, if we can call it this way, is closer to laziness than to the help, and
the educational action is an act of help (Levinas, 1993). Now, a wrongly understood
attention with the mere objective of avoiding uncomfortable situations just to turn
them into false moments of peace and calm, is also a lack of respect, equal to or
greater than postponing it.
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MORAL EDUCATION FROM A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE
Our proposal for moral education must respect the condition of facing up to com-
plex situations, of facing up to those moments when the student is calling the at-
tention of his teacher, when he is asking him to exercise his responsibility in the
deepest sense of this word (Jonas, 1994). With touch, education, caution, and cour-
age, the teacher must reorientate certain behaviours, calm down certain opinions,
and certain attitudes, always when he reasonably thinks that these go against the
humanism he is trying to instil on his students.
Education in the moral domain is a rather slow process, and most of its results are
obtained in the long term. With a few honourable exceptions, ethical learning in a
short period is a bad sign, since something tells us that we enter the ¿eld of indoc-
trination and instilment. The hurry that rules postmodernity – everything should
have been done yesterday – has also overrun the educational arena in general, and
moral education in particular. This being the case, and after having some time de-
voted to moral education of his students, the teacher may have a feeling of failure if
these do not behave as expected. Educational reality is pressing hard, de¿nitely, but
moral education requires its time. Appreciating values is not easy (Cortina, 1999),
feel that it is worth to behave in a certain manner instead of another, that is better to
exercise certain attitudes and not others, that it is worth to develop certain feelings
and not others. We can ¿nd the explanation for this in the same human nature; our
instincts push us towards the easy and move us away from the dif¿cult. To all this,
we should add that moral education cannot either be in eternity, it needs its time,
no less no more than the necessary. We suspect that some values are not learned
just because we let too much time go by in their learning. Anyhow, we believe in a
moral education that is patient, with teachers involved in the time required for the
nurture of moral persons.
Finally, we would like to mention a condition that may seem obvious after all that
has been said, but that needs to be reminded as often as necessary. Something spe-
cial, real and wonderful takes place in the education in values at the school. The
teacher ¿nds himself in the middle of a group of people that are absolutely unique
and unrepeatable and, at the same time, are part of a group, maybe with different
cultural backgrounds, but from one and the same universal human group (Cortina,
1997). The teacher is surrounded by several persons with different life stories, and
his job lies in developing each and every one of them, each one his own way, his
own manner.
The liberal-communitarian debate has made us realize that each one of the stu-
dents needs to develop his authenticity, and the teacher is one of the main ¿gures
in such a development. It is maybe in individualization where the art of education
63
MARIA ROSA BUXARRAIS & FRANCISCO ESTEBAN
REFERENCES
64
MORAL EDUCATION FROM A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE
65
vi
LESLEY LE GRANGE
INTRODUCTION
Education which was a site of struggle during apartheid has become a site of trans-
formation (at least at the level of policy) in post-apartheid South Africa. Follow-
ing the democratic elections in 1994, a myriad of policies were developed (includ-
ing education ones) signalling widespread changes to the education system. The
changes are associated with challenges presented by a rapidly changing and glo-
bally interconnected world on the one hand, and on the other hand, the restoration,
rejuvenation and reimagining of traditional values that had become eroded during
the colonial and apartheid periods. One such value is that of Ubuntu, a linguistic-
philosophical construct that has gained prominence in multiple discourses (busi-
ness, education, popular, etc.) in post-apartheid South Africa. In this chapter I wish
to critically discuss the construct Ubuntu and its potential to transform education
in South Africa. I shall begin this chapter by providing a brief background of cur-
riculum policy change in South Africa post 1994 so as to trace the infusion of indig-
enous knowledge and notions as such as Ubuntu in the national curriculum.
In the immediate years following South Africa’s ¿rst democratic elections in 1994,
curriculum change was not necessarily substantive. Jansen (1999, p. 57) goes as far
as to argue that syllabus alterations which took place during this period had very
little do with the school curriculum and more concerned with an uncertain state
seeking legitimacy following the national elections. In the main, curriculum revi-
sion involved exorcising of racial content as well as outdated and inaccurate sub-
ject matter of school syllabuses. Jansen (1999, p. 57) points out that the haste with
which the South African state pursued what he terms, ‘a super¿cial cleansing of the
inherited curriculum’, needs to be understood in terms of a set of pressures faced
by a South African state in transition. Jansen (1999, pp. 64-65) points out that syl-
labus alterations immediately after South Africa’s ¿rst democratic elections might
be understood in four ways: in the context of the constitutional and bureaucratic
constraints of political transition under a Government of National Unity; as a proc-
ess that emerged in the context of weak political leadership in the then Ministry of
68
THE PHILOSOPHY OF UBUNTU AND EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
sands of years’. Furthermore, the ten values1 identi¿ed in South Africa’s Manifesto
on Values, Education and Democracy (DoE 2001) are purported to ¿nd expression
in both the GET and FET curriculum statements. One of the ten values is Ubuntu
(human dignity). Ubuntu is an African word comprising one of the core elements of
a human being. The African word for human being is umuntu which is constituted
by the following: umzimba (body, form, Àesh); umoya (breath, air, life); umphe-
fumela (shadow, spirit, soul); amandla (vitality, strength, energy); inhliziyo (heart,
centre of emotions); umqondo (head, brain, intellect), ulwimi (language, speaking)
and Ubuntu (humanness) (Le Roux, 2000, p. 43). The humanness referred to here
¿nds expression in a communal context rather than the individualism prevalent in
many Western societies (Venter 2004, p. 151). Battle (1996, p. 99) presents the con-
cept Ubuntu as a concept that originates from the Xhosa expression: umuntu ngu-
muntu ngabanye Bantu. He writes: ‘Not an easily translatable Xhosa concept, gen-
erally, this proverbial expression means that each individual’s humanity is ideally
expressed in relationship with others and, in turn, individuality is truly expressed.
Or a person depends on other persons to be a person.’ Ubuntu then, is to be aware
of one’s own being, but also of one’s duties towards one’s neighbour. According to
Venter (2004, p. 156) Ubuntu is a concrete manifestation of the interconnectedness
of human beings – it is the embodiment of (South) African culture and life style.
Evidently, African philosophical thinking generally, and Ubuntu more speci¿-
cally, are central features of post-apartheid curriculum frameworks. The inclusion
of values such as Ubuntu is intended to restore through education values that have
become eroded as a consequence of centuries of colonialism and decades of apart-
heid. Given the reference made to African philosophical thinking in the curriculum
statements I shall brieÀy outline major trends in African philosophy so as to provide
an understanding of Ubuntu.
I use the four trends that Oruka identi¿es for framing my discussion but I am aware
that these are not the only identi¿able strands in African philosophy and that Oruka
himself later expanded his four trends to six (for details see Gratton, 2003). Oruka
(2002) identi¿es the following four trends in African philosophy: ethno-philosophy,
philosophic sagacity, national-ideological philosophy and professional philosophy.
Ethno-philosophy is exempli¿ed in the work of Placide Tempels on the ontology
of the Bantu. Tempels was probably the ¿rst person to use the term ‘philosophy’
with regard to the thoughts of African people. Gratton (2003) points out that for the
ethno-philosopher, ‘philosophy is latent within the everyday actions of a people;
philosophy, as such, is also the worldviews that guide and maintain a culture’. He
notes that ethno-philosophers reproduce both the latent and the explicit philosophi-
cal doctrines in the hope of providing future African philosophers with an ‘intellec-
tual matrix’ indigenous to Africa. Ethno-philosophy has been subjected to various
criticisms. For example, Hountondjii argues that ethno-philosophy is not African,
69
LESLEY LE GRANGE
70
THE PHILOSOPHY OF UBUNTU AND EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
Wiredu, Hountondji and others have referred to themselves as the Vienna circle of
African philosophy. It is this association that universalists have with the analytic
tradition that has been a source of critique. For example, Ikuenobe (1997) refers
to the universalist position as parochial, because its uses Western analytic phi-
losophy as the yardstick by which to measure whether the other trends in African
philosophy qualify to be called ‘philosophy’. He argues that there is an array of
traditions and approaches within Western philosophy that universalists do not
account for.
In summary, the four trends in African philosophy provide a continuum with
extreme positions of a narrow particularism characteristic of ethno-philosophy at
the one end and a narrow universalism of professional philosophy on the other.
What I wish to suggest is that the four trends might also be used as a heuristic for
mapping nuanced understandings of notions such as communalism and Ubuntu. In
this chapter, however, I shall use the broad categories of particularist and univer-
salist to frame my discussion. For particularists philosophy and culture are tightly
intertwined – so much so that cultural values/expressions are perceived as com-
mensurate with philosophy. For particularists Ubuntu is not only a cultural value
but a philosophy. For universalists the notion of Ubuntu may be the object/subject
of philosophical inquiry, but cannot simply be referred to as philosophy – it has to
pass the test of rigour and systematisation.
Ubuntu like all other African cultural values have circulated primarily through
orality and tradition – its meaning is interwoven in the cultural practices and lived
experiences of African peoples. However, Ubuntu has become abstracted from its
geographical and cultural situatedness and has been taken up in several written
discourses. It is in written discourses that much of the contestation around Ubuntu
may be found. Traces of ethnophilosophy may, for example, be found in Makgoba’s
perspective on Ubuntu. He writes:
Ubuntu is unique in the following respects: it emphasizes respect for the non-
material order that exists in us and among us; it fosters man’s respect for him-
self, for others, and for the environment; it has spirituality; it has remained
non-racial; it accommodates other cultures and it is the invisible force uniting
Africans worldwide. Therefore unlike Confucian or European philosophies, it
transcends both race and culture (Makgoba quoted in Enslin & Horsthemke,
2004, p. 24).
71
LESLEY LE GRANGE
Ramphele’s perspective demonstrates that all Africans do not hold the same view
of Ubuntu - that it is not a cultural value/practice/knowing that has been preserved
and withstood all the storms of history – that the rei¿cation/objecti¿cation of Ubun-
tu might problematic. Rather, Ubuntu is a term that is open to interpretation and
contestation and, moreover, an idea that is not simply natural but rather imagined
and politically driven - that our thinking and writing about Ubuntu represents (re)
constructions or (re)imaginings of the term that cannot be separated from the socio-
politico-cultural discourses that are available to us in post-apartheid South Africa.
Discourses on Ubuntu represent in similar ways to Oruka’s philosophical sagacity
(re)constructions which might be called philosophy. The research for a unique Afri-
can difference through the invocation of notions such as Ubuntu promises to remain
illusive if the term is rei¿ed/objecti¿ed. Masolo’s (1998) caution in this regard is
worth noting:
The search for this [African] identity [through Ubuntu] and for what is authen-
tic about it is the thread that runs through Oruka’s idea of ‘The four trends in
African philosophy’, and it reveals its own contradictions in the very search
for a universal and homogeneous African difference. For, so long as the mono-
72
THE PHILOSOPHY OF UBUNTU AND EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
73
LESLEY LE GRANGE
the point: ‘Our solution cannot be escape to ‘elsewhere’. Instead, we must learn to
take responsibility for the sciences/philosophies we have now and have had in the
past, to acknowledge their limitations and Àaws as we also value their indubitable
strengths and achievements. But to do so requires a more realistic and objective
grasp of their origins and effects ‘elsewhere’ as well as in the West.’
I am also concerned about more subtle forms of colonisation as knowledge is
produced and rapidly disseminated across the globe in contemporary society. I am
particularly concerned with a danger that indigenous ways of knowing/African
philosophies might become assimilated into an imperialist archive in the light of
complex globalization processes currently prevalent. My usage of the term ‘ar-
chive’ is borrowed from Foucault (1972). Smith (1999, p. 44) points out that West-
ern knowledges, philosophies and de¿nitions of human nature form what Foucault
(1972) has referred to as a ‘cultural archive’. It could also be referred to as a ‘store-
house’ of histories, artefacts, ideas, texts and/or images, which are classi¿ed, pre-
served, arranged and represented back to the West and Nonwesterners. Although
shifts and transformations may occur within Western thinking, Smith (1999, p.
44) argues that this happens without changing the archive itself, and without the
modes of classi¿cation and systems of representation contained within it, being de-
stroyed. She holds the view that systems of classi¿cation and representation enable
different traditions or fragments of traditions to be retrieved and are formulated
in different contexts as discourses, and then played out in systems of power and
domination, with material consequences for colonised peoples. It is in the light of
this that I ¿nd the universalism of professional philosophy (Oruka’s four trends)
problematic. Professional philosophy as a strand of African philosophy uses the
same methods/philosophical strategies of Western philosophy, because the belief
is that these methods/strategies are universal rather than speci¿c to a culture/philo-
sophical tradition. What makes Oruka’s professional philosophy African is that
it focuses on African cultural values/practices and Africa’s problems. It does not
equate African cultural values with philosophy, but these become the objects of
philosophical inquiry or needs to meet the test of rigour to be called philosophy.
Though the focus of philosophical inquiry is different for the African professional
philosopher, the methods and forms of representation are not different to those of
Western philosophy. I would argue that professional African philosophy therefore
becomes not just a strand of African philosophy, as Oruka suggests, but a strand of
Western philosophy alongside analytic, continental and North American pragma-
tism – probably the reason why it has been embraced by several universities in the
United States of America. Professional African philosophy does little, if anything,
to disrupt the hegemony of the Western cultural archive and as such holds the dan-
ger of (re)producing (neo)colonialist discourses. Methods/philosophical strategies
cannot simply be separated or abstracted from social/cultural contexts, as they are
socially/culturally (re)produced/constructed Therefore it is my interest to take the
discussion beyond the particularism of ethno-philosophy and the universalism of
professional philosophy.
74
THE PHILOSOPHY OF UBUNTU AND EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
75
LESLEY LE GRANGE
CONCLUSION
As noted indigenous knowledge generally and Ubuntu more speci¿cally, have been
incorporated in South Africa’s national curriculum statements. Although Ubuntu
as a cultural value does reside among many (South) Africans and it derives from
aphorisms in different African languages (it is a linguistic phenomenon) there is
contestation concerning the concept in much of the recent writings on African
philosophy of education in South Africa (see Higgs 2003; Parker 2003; Enslin &
Horsthemke, 2004; Horsthemke 2004; Le Grange, 2004; Waghid, 2004). Moreover,
in multicultural South African classrooms teachers’ interpretations of Ubuntu and
related notions could be crucial for the project of transformation in South Africa. A
narrow interpretation (with ethnophilosophical leanings) of the concept might lead
to antagonism in classrooms and thwart critical deliberation. By this I mean that
certain groups might claim that the concept belongs to them (even though this might
contradict the meaning of the term) or hold the view that it cannot be subjected to
critical scrutiny. There is a danger of othering here – a narrow humanism that could
emerge leading to atrocities such as the spate of xenophobia experienced in South
Africa in recent times. On the other hand, if Ubuntu and related concepts are to be
subjected to the criteria of Western philosophy/knowledge for it to have legitimacy
it might simply be reconstructed in Western terms and assimilated into a Western
cultural archive, thus eroding its Africanness.
76
THE PHILOSOPHY OF UBUNTU AND EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
Guattari (2001) argues that we cannot create new ways of living by reversing
technological advancement and go back to old formulas, which were pertinent when
the planet was less densely populated and when social relations were much stronger
than they are today. And so invoking Ubuntu can’t simply mean yearning back to
how things were in the past. It also can not only be legitimated by using so-called
universal criteria as professional philosophers suggest. It is the deconstructive/re-
constructive potential of Ubuntu that might have transformative effects on education
in South Africa. The transformative potential lies in (re)imagining Ubuntu anew.
NOTES
1 The ten values in The Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy are: Democracy, social
justice and equity, non-racism and non-sexism, Ubuntu (human-dignity), an open society, account-
ability (responsibility), respect, the rule of law, reconciliation.
2 Fundamental pedagogics can be traced historically to C J Langeveld’s publication Beknopte Theo-
retische Pedagogiek in the Netherlands in 1944. The ¿ rst publication in South Africa was C K Ober-
holzer’s Inleiding in die Prinsipiële Opvoedkunde, published in 1954. In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s
Fundamental Pedagogics was a powerful doctrine in Afrikaans-medium universities. It was also
powerful in black colleges of education and in education faculties of historically black universities
that were dominated by Afrikaner lecturers. Fundamental Pedagogicians argued that the ‘scienti¿c
method’ was the only authentic method of studying education.
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Battle, M. (1996). The Ubuntu theology of Desmond Tutu. In L. Huley et al., (Eds) Archbishop Tutu:
Prophetic witness in South Africa. Cape Town: Human & Rousseau.
Bhabha, H. (1985). Signs taken for wonders: Questions of ambivalence and authority under a tree out-
side Delhi, May 1817. Critical Inquiry, 12(1): 2.
Bodunrin, P. (1984). The question of African philosophy. In R. Wright (Ed.) African philosophy: An
introduction (1-23). New York: University Press of America.
Chisholm, L et al. (2000). A South African curriculum for the twenty-¿rst century: Report of the review
Committee on Curriculum 2005. Pretoria: Department of Education.
Dei G. (2000). Rethinking the role of indigenous knowledges in the academy. International Journal of
Inclusive Education, 4(2), 111-132.
Department of Education (DoE) (2001). The Manifesto on values, education and democracy. Pretoria:
Department of Education.
Department of Education (DoE) (2003). National Curriculum Statement Grades 10 – 12 (General) Life
Sciences. Pretoria: Department of Education.
Enslin, P., & Horsthemke, K. (2004). Can Ubuntu provide a model for citizenship education in African
democracies? Proceedings of the 9th biennial conference of the International Network of Philoso-
phers of Education. Madrid: Universidad Complutense.
Foucault, M. (1972). Archaeology of knowledge. New York: Pantheon.
Gough, A. (1998). Beyond eurocentrism in science education: promises and problematics from a femi-
nist poststructuralist perspective. In W. Pinar (Ed.) Curriculum: Toward new identities. New York:
Garland Publishing Inc.
Gough, A. (1999). Pedagogies of science (in)formed by global perspectives: encouraging strong objec-
tivity in classrooms. In J. Weaver (Ed.) (Post) Modern Science (Education): Frustrations, Proposi-
tions, and Alternative Paths. New York: Peter Lang.
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LESLEY LE GRANGE
Gough, N. (1998). All around the world: science education, constructivism, and globalisation, Educa-
tion Policy, 12(5), 507-524.
Gratton, P. (2003). What’s in a name? African philosophy in the making. Philosophia Africana, 6(2),
61-80.
Guattari, F. (2001). The three ecologies. London: The Athlone Press.
Harding, S. (Ed.) (1993). The ‘racial’ economy of science: towards a democratic future. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press.
Harding, S. (1994). Is science multicultural? Challenges, resources, opportunities, uncertainties. Con-
¿guration, 2, 301-330.
Higgs, P. (2003). African philosophy and the transformation of educational discourse in South Africa.
Journal of Education, 30, 5-22.
Hortshemke, K. (2004). Knowledge, education and the limits of africanisation. Journal of Philosophy
of Education, 38(4), 571-587.
Ikuenobe, P. (1997). The parochial universalist conception of ‘philosophy’ and ‘African philosophy’.
Philosophy East & West, 47(2).
Jansen, J,D. (1999). The school curriculum since apartheid: intersections of politics and policy in the
South African transition. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 31(1), 57-67.
Jansen, J.D., & Christie, P. (Eds). (1999) Changing curriculum: Studies on outcomes-based education
in South Africa. Kenwyn: Juta & Co Ltd.
Le Grange, L. (2004). (South) African(a) philosophy of education: a reply to Higgs and Parker. Journal
of Education, 143-154.
Le Roux, J. (2000). The concept of ‘Ubuntu’: Africa’s most important contribution to multicultural
education? Multicultural Teaching, 18(2), 43-46.
Masolo, D. (1998). African philosophy and the postcolonial: some misleading abstractions about ‘iden-
tity’. In E. Chukwudi (Ed.) Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers.
Makgoba, M. (1996). In search of the ideal democratic model for SA. Sunday Times
Oberholzer, C.K. (1954). Inleiding in die prinsipiële opvoedkunde. Pretoria: Moreau & Kie.
Oruka, H. (1990). Sage philosophy. New York: E.J. Brill.
Oruka, H. (2002). Four trends in current African philosophy. In P. Coetzee & A. Roux (Eds.) Philoso-
phy from Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.
Parker, B. (2003). Back on the chain gang: some dif¿culties in developing a (South) African philosophy
of education. Journal of Education, 30, 23-40.
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Indigenous knowledge. Paper presented at the 8th International Research Seminar on Environmental
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Ramphele, M. (1995). Ubuntu doesn’t mean a friendly greeting to your greeting to your gardener. What
is does mean is another question …, Sunday Independent, 24 September, p.15.
Smith L. (1999). Decolonising methodologies: research and indigenous peoples. London: Zed Books.
Venter, E. (2004). The notion of Ubuntu and communalism in African educational discourse. Studies
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Lesley Le Grange
Faculty of Education
Stellenbosch University
78
ISOLDE DE GROOT
INTRODUCTION
How is our democracy doing? And in which ways do citizens support the demo-
cratic character of their country? In the past decade, research on democracy and
citizenship has lead to different conclusions. Some researchers claimed, based on
survey studies, that many people in western societies prefer a democratic political
system over other political systems. According to Dekker in the Netherlands for
instance, 90 percent of Dutch citizens support the democratic political system, and
70% is satis¿ed with the way our democracy works (Dekker, 2002).
This study was commented by Adriaansens (2006), who pointed to the fact stat-
ed that Dekker’s results also imply that a substantial number of citizens doesn’t
support the democratic system, and is unhappy with the way our system works.
He therefore argued for more research about the way different groups of citizens
support our democracy. Another less optimistic conclusion was drawn from the
1999 International Civic and Citizenship Education Study among young people in
sixteen democratic nations around the world. Here, researchers found that most
young people believe that it is important to live in a democratic society, but they
also concluded that a deeper understanding of what democracy entails seems to be
absent (Torney-Purta, Lehman, Oswald & Schultz, 2001).
Others researchers pressed that although many people say that they support the
democratic political system, only a few are able and willing to participate in a dem-
ocratic enlightened way (Savater, 2001; Parker, 2003b; Westheimer & Kahne, 2004;
De Winter, 2004; Veugelers, 2007;). These scholars emphasized that our society
cannot contain and develop its democratic character without us educating our chil-
dren to become democratically enlightened, and to participate in this democrati-
cally enlightened way. Parker (2003b) conceptualized democratic enlightenment as
a set of moral-cognitive knowledge, norms, values, and principles that shapes en-
gagement, related to the understanding of democracy as something yet to achieve,
and to the appreciation of the political, cultural, and racial diversity as the central
feature of democracy.
The studies outlined in the above illustrate that the outcomes of these studies are
hugely affected by the way they conceptualise democracy and citizenship. Democ-
racy was conceptualized respectively as a political system, and as both a political
system and ‘a way of life’ (Dewey, 1916). This means that people also contribute to
a just and caring environment in their daily lives.
The different conclusions on the healthiness of the Dutch democracy, and the
way Dutch citizens contribute to democracy, give rise to both theoretical and em-
pirical questions. In this article we address one theoretical question: which attitude
do young people need to develop in order to become citizens that are able and will-
ing to support democracy and further develop the democratic character of their
pluralist society?
This means we look for elements that are important for the development of a
democratic attitude in accordance with an inclusive and dynamic interpretation of
democracy, in which diversity is considered a central feature of democracy, and in
which special attention is paid to psychological and socioeconomic processes that
might inÀuence peoples’ willingness to develop into democratic citizens.
METHOD
80
WHY WE ARE NOT DEMOCRATIC YET
Normative research
The model that is presented in this chapter has been developed in the context of an
empirical study about the meaning of democratic citizenship in the lives of sixteen
year olds in Utrecht. In such investigations, it is important to pay attention to the nor-
mative dimension of the study: a de¿nition of what ‘democratic way of life’ entails,
always implies a vision on how citizens should – or should not – manifest this. Aim of
both the theoretical and the empirical study is to elicit the complexity of developing
into democratic citizens. The model therefore should not be understood as an ideal,
where young people should try to ¿t in. Instead, this study wants to gain insight in the
way these ideals are negotiated, embraced, shadowed, opposed, or left untouched.
The validity of the model is also subject of research during the empirical study:
it is investigated in order to ¿nd out if it needs further development, and to see if it
is indeed helpful in eliciting the attitude young people develop towards democracy,
diversity, and citizenship, and the issues they perceive while developing their citi-
zenship identity.
CONTEXT
Social scientists and political and educational philosophers have studied different di-
mensions of citizenship. Isin and Turner (2002) note that the concept of citizenship
evolved from ‘membership of a city or rural area’ in the eighteenth century, towards
a legal concept in the nineteenth century, stressing the rights and duties of a citizen.
81
ISOLDE DE GROOT
They want to take the concept of citizenship one step further by focusing on the
participatory aspect of citizenship and the need for people to connect to others in and
outside their own society. From this perspective, citizenship can refer to membership
of local areas, membership of several cultural groups, and membership of the human
species as a whole. This allows them to present a more inclusive concept of citizen-
ship, also referred to as cosmopolitan citizenship, that overcomes the discrepancy be-
tween citizenship rights and human rights (Benhabib, 1999; Isin & Turner, 2002; Ap-
piah, 2005; Suransky & Manschot, 2005; Sen, 2006; Parker, 2007; Hansen, 2008).
Hansen (2008) has focussed on the existential dimension of citizenship. He states
that in order to be able to connect to others in and outside their society, people need
to cherish conÀicts that emerge in ‘the space in between’: the space where you ¿nd
yourself when you have entered a situation that demands that you re-evaluate your
identity. For instance when somebody refuses to shake hands with you, claiming
that this is his way of showing respect. The experience itself makes that your frame
of references changes: it now becomes part of it, because you relate to both the ex-
perience and the person in this situation.
Ramadan’s conceptualization of citizenship combines this existential dimension
of citizenship with a political dimension. When explaining what he calls the ‘the
psychological dimension of citizenship’, Ramadan (2007) stresses that the concept
of citizenship is not only about rights and duties, but also about ‘the need to belong’:
the need to be willing to belong to the society people live in. When applied to a
country with a democratic political system, this means that citizens need to be will-
ing to be part of this system and to adopt a democratic way of life. He also stresses
that in order for people to be able and willing to belong to a society, a new concep-
tualization of citizenship is needed.
Ramadan and others refer to the current conceptualization of citizenship as white,
male, and middle-class; one that is individualistic and universalistic and blind of
the power issues involved (Taylor, 1992; Mouffe, 2005; Moodod, 2007; Ramadan,
2007; Thayer-Bacon, 2008). They state that a new conceptualisation should be de-
veloped in which multiple dimensions and facets are included. People with differ-
ent cultural, historical and social backgrounds need to be able to identify with this
conceptualization, because it enables them to feel part of the society, and to share
its language, memories, institutions, and common values. When, on the contrary,
the conceptualization of citizenship is linked to economical participation, all peo-
ple who are unable or unwilling to engage in paid labour will feel excluded. And if
the conceptualization of citizenship implies that people should adapt the dominant
customs, many people, both insiders and outsiders, will feel excluded.
Given these arguments, attention needs to be paid to possible merits of differ-
ences and dif¿culties that stem from diversity issues. Ramadan underscores that
although the re-conceptualization of citizenship is a very complex project, it is also
a necessary one. He also states that both insiders and outsiders have a responsibility
to open up to this deliberation. This responsibility stems from peoples’ existential
‘need to belong’ to the society they live in.
82
WHY WE ARE NOT DEMOCRATIC YET
Other social scientists and political and educational philosophers have tried to
develop a theory of democracy oriented towards a more inclusive concept of demo-
cratic citizenship. These researchers aim to develop a theory of democracy that
fosters diversity, and that covers both the social and the political level. This concept
was ¿rst developed by Dewey (Dewey, 1916; Biesta & Miedema, 1999). He per-
ceived democracy not only as a matter of political organization, but also as the way
in which people organize their own social lives; as ‘a democratic way of life’. Many
researchers of democratic citizenship education since then supported or further de-
veloped this theory of democracy (Young, 2000; Barber, 2003; Gutmann, 2003;
Parker, 2003b; Banks, 2004; Westheimer & Kahne, 2004; De Winter, 2004; Mouffe,
2005; Veugelers, 2007; Thayer-Bacon, 2008).
Thayer-Bacon (2008), in ‘Beyond Liberal Democracy in Schools. The Power of
Pluralism’, presents a transactional view of democracy-always-in-the-making: a
democratic theory that is intrinsically consistent with the relational and pluralist
nature of a democracy. This means that a truly democratic citizen values both de-
mocracy and diversity in a positive way.
Westheimer and Kahne (2003) and Veugelers (2007) have used a conceptualiza-
tion of democratic citizenship that matches this more elaborate conceptualization
of democracy. When evaluating citizenship education in the United States and the
Netherlands, they both came to distinguish three types of citizenship. Although
their typologies have a different focus, they both draw similar conclusions from
their research: in order for a democracy to work, society needs to raise democratic
citizens, and the majority of the schools in the United States and the Netherlands do
not teach young people how to become democratic citizens.
Westheimer and Kahne (2004) distinguish between a personal responsible, a
participatory and a social justice type of citizenship. They state that, although each
type is important to develop, a society needs the third type of citizens if it wants
to preserve its democratic character. A democracy needs its citizens to be able to
address social justice issues in a structural way, and they can only address social
justice issues when they have developed knowledge, skills and dispositions that en-
able them to address these issues in a political way.
Veugelers (2007) distinguishes an adaptive type, an autonomous type and a both
autonomous and socially involved type of citizenship. He argues that it is important
that people not just do as told, but succeed in making their own judgments, while
being conscious of the interests of others. A democratic citizen is a citizen that is
sensitive to the interests of others, and to the way these others relate to their own in-
terests. Veugelers underscores that in order for democracy to work, it is not enough
to raise autonomous thinkers. People also need to teach children to be sensitive to
the needs of the society as a whole.
Although most schools in the United States and the Netherlands have incorpo-
83
ISOLDE DE GROOT
rated citizenship into their curriculum, they often focus on knowledge, skills and
attitudes that correspond with the ¿rst type of citizens (Westheimer & Kahne, 2003;
Leenders & Veugelers, 2006). They teach children how to conform to standards,
how to behave like good neighbours, and perhaps even to organize events that are
bene¿cial to people in their environment. The knowledge, skills and attitudes nec-
essary to develop into a democratic citizen are less frequently taught.
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WHY WE ARE NOT DEMOCRATIC YET
Because this study investigates which elements are necessary for the will to become
democratic, we looked for elements that relate to the existential, moral, psychologi-
cal, and social aspects of the development of a citizenship identity. This means we
focused on elements that relate to ‘a democratic way of life’, leaving aside elements
that relate speci¿cally to an enlightened understanding and to participation in the
democratic political system. Hall, Coffney and Williamson (1999) refer to citizen-
ship-identity as the need for belonging, space and place, that is perceived by young
people while developing their identity. They argue that the development of identity
automatically relates to the development of a persons’ citizenship, because they are
two sides of the same package. We prefer to illustrate the interrelatedness of citi-
zenship and identity by referring to some questions that illuminate the existential,
moral, psychological and social aspects of a persons’ identity development: What
does a child need to develop in order to:
– feel that contributing to democracy is a necessary condition to be able to ‘exist’,
because you are ‘free’ to make your own choices and your choices are both ac-
cepted and appreciated)?
– feel responsible to treat others in a fair way?
– feel capable to participate?
– feel embedded in the society a person lives in?
– be able to develop the necessary connections?
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ISOLDE DE GROOT
preciate diversity, and are aware of the importance of agonisms for the development
of democracy (Mouffe, 2005). In order to be willing to develop on this dimension,
people need to be able to reÀect on their situatedness, the way they position them-
selves, the multiplicity of their identity, and on the interrelatedness of diversity and
democracy. They also need to be aware when democracy and diversity are at stake.
We refer to this element as moral sensitivity. Furthermore, in order to develop both
reÀection and sensitivity, people need to become empathic: they need to learn how
to look at an issue from different perspectives, and how to negotiate meanings.
Because we want to emphasize the relationship between empathy and dialogical
competencies, we discuss this element at the ¿fth dimension.
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WHY WE ARE NOT DEMOCRATIC YET
These concepts where introduced into the discourse on democratic citizen by. West-
heimer and Kahne (2003, p.54). They stated that in order to develop a democratic
attitude, people need three C’s: Capacity, Commitment and Connection. We consider
‘commitment’ and ‘connection’ as a separate dimension, because they concern people
in the environment that enable someone to develop internal and external ef¿cacy.
For Westheimer and Kahne internal ef¿cacy refers to the feeling that one is capa-
ble of changing things, and external ef¿cacy to the feeling that the government or its
institutions are receptive to one’s needs. If children for instance engage in an educa-
87
ISOLDE DE GROOT
tional project that aims to enhance equal treatment of a certain minority, but then ¿nd
that nobody is interested in their project, it will be less likely that these children will
participate in future projects or initiatives. Although this seems obvious, internal and
external ef¿cacy rarely become the subject of conversation in educational settings.
Even while students often highlight their limited ef¿cacy in conversations.
The third dimension concerns ‘active relations’. In order to develop active relations,
a person needs to be able to connect and to commit. I will refer to these elements as
connection and commitment.
‘Commitment’ here means caring for the well-being of people in a certain group.
‘Connections’ they understand as the acquaintances who enable people to come to
active participation. Putnam stresses in this regard that it is crucial for the devel-
opment of both social capital and democracy, that people participate in activities
which foster commitment with people who hold similar preferences (bonding) and
which stimulate commitment with people who hold different preferences, and who
don’t share the same cultural heritage (bonding) (Putnam, 2000, p. 22).
We expect that reÀections on these processes might help both teachers and re-
searchers to recognize the complexity of the development of a citizenship-identity,
as experienced on a daily basis by young people. Also, we believe it might help
students to address these issues and to reÀect on the origins of their current com-
mitments.
The fourth dimension is about the willingness to change. If people are unwilling
to investigate their own values, ideas, worldview and customs, and those of others,
they will not be able to help each other give meaning to societal developments in a
88
WHY WE ARE NOT DEMOCRATIC YET
way that supports the well-being of a society. Elements that need to be developed
in this dimension are the ability (or habit) to doubt, to question, and the wish to
develop, and make sense of things that do not match a person’s current worldview.
As stated earlier, while discussing Ramadan’s ideas, both people who do consider
themselves part of the dominant culture and the ones who don’t, need to develop
this attitude (Ramadan, 2007). Not in the least because there’s no such thing as
‘static groups’. Instead, people constantly negotiate between different identities, or
af¿liations, which gain or loose importance due to change of interests, temporal and
environmental circumstances (Appiah, 2005).
Elements that belong to this dimension are the ability – or the habit – to
doubt, question, and the wish to develop and reÀect on things that do not match with
your current attitude. In a way, these elements precede the development of the other
dimensions: Your interest in developing your moral sensitivity or your empathic
understanding highly depends on your willingness to develop your current attitude.
We want to add that it is equally important for society to reÀect on the attitudes of
(young) people: why is it that they rebel against some societal norms? Why is it that
they (still) hold on to others? What can we learn from their experiences? And how
do we want to cope with conÀicting norms that cause tensions in both the private
and the public life?
Empathy
89
ISOLDE DE GROOT
Dialogical competencies
CONCLUSION
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WHY WE ARE NOT DEMOCRATIC YET
91
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Isolde de Groot
Department of Education
University of Humanistic Studies Utrecht
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PRACTICING DEMOCRACY
There is an old parable about a passer-by seeing a man on his hands and knees
searching the ground on a corner under a streetlight. ‘What are you looking for?’
the passer-by asks. Hunched over on his hands and knees, the man replies ‘I’ve lost
my car keys.’ The kind passer-by immediately joins him in his search. After a few
minutes searching without success, she asks the man whether he is sure he lost the
keys there on the street corner. ‘No,’ he replies, pointing down the block, ‘I lost
them over there.’ Indignant, the woman asks ‘Then why are you looking for them
here?’ The man replies ‘Because there’s light here.’
Behind the onslaught of testing and so-called ‘accountability’ measures of the
last decade lurks the same perverse logic of the man looking for his keys. We know
what matters to most teachers, parents, school administrators, board members, and
policy-makers. But we are far less sure how to ¿nd out whether schools are success-
ful in teaching what matters. Since we have relatively primitive ways of assessing
students’ abilities to form healthy relationships, think, create, question, analyse,
and work in concert with others to improve their communities and the world, we
turn instead to where the light is: standardized measures of students’ abilities to
decode sentences and solve mathematical problems. In other words, since we can’t
measure what we care about, we start to care about what we can measure.
Of course I am not being entirely fair. Educational testing enthusiasts do have
some ways of measuring, for example, skills related to critical thinking. And the
reading comprehension tests are evolving to consider not only whether students
can understand the words and structure of a particular sentence or paragraph but
also whether they can articulate something about its meaning and implications. But
when researchers examine education policies broadly and the classroom practices
and habits that follow those policies, it is becoming increasingly clear that our edu-
cational goals and the methods used to assess educational progress are suffering
from an appalling lack of imagination.
While lively debate about educational approaches between progressive humanis-
tic educators, critical theorists, poststructuralists, ethical culturalists, and others are
widespread, educators from all these perspectives are united in their distaste for the
mechanistic, technocratic, and de-humanizing teaching and learning that now passes
for schooling in many classrooms worldwide. When I speak of practicing democracy,
therefore, I mean to invoke a discourse that draws from many theoretical traditions but
that embraces a vision of education that is clear about the need to push back against
the narrowing of the school curriculum. For example, in July 2002, the International
Humanist & Ethical Union met in Amsterdam and issued what came to be known
as the ‘Amsterdam Declaration.’ The goals of the Amsterdam Declaration include
many that are cause for debate and critique among and between many progressively-
oriented theorists – ‘humanism is ethical,’ for example, or ‘humanism is rational,’ and
so on. But I aim to focus on these two declarations from that conference: Humanism
supports democracy and human rights; The principles of democracy and human
rights can be applied to many human relationships and are not restricted to methods
of government.
When applied to schools, these declarations echo John Dewey’s vision of the demo-
cratic school. As Dewey (1966) wisely wrote more than a century ago:
The school is an institution in which the child is, for the time, to live – to be
a member of a community life in which he feels that he participates, and to
which he contributes. This fact requires such modi¿cation of existing meth-
ods as will insure that the school hours are regarded as much a part of the
day’s life as anything else, not something set apart; and the school house, as
for the time being, a home, not simply a place to go in order to learn certain
things (…) The [goal] of the institution must be such as to enable the child to
translate his powers over into terms of their social equivalencies; to see what
they mean in terms of what they are accomplishing in social life.
Many teachers, policy makers, researchers, parents, and students recognize the
largely unful¿lled promise of a kind of schooling that embraces such a democratic
way of life as one if its core principles.
For the past ¿fteen years I have been studying the effects of education initiatives such
as the U.S. No Child Left Behind Act or the various provincial testing and account-
ability policies in Canada and their impact on teachers’ ability to connect teaching
with the social, political, and economic world beyond the school. My concern stems
from what colleagues and I have found. Almost every school mission statement these
days boasts broad goals related to critical thinking, global citizenship, environmental
stewardship, and moral character. Yet beneath the rhetoric, increasingly narrow cur-
riculum goals, accountability measures, and standardized testing have reduced too
many classroom lessons to the cold, stark pursuit of information and skills without
context and without social meaning – what education philosopher Maxine Greene
calls ‘mean and repellent facts’. Maxine Greene (2006, p. 1) credits John Dewey with
reminding us that ‘facts are mean and repellent things until we use imagination to
open intellectual possibilities.’ It is not, as I will explain shortly, that facts are bad
or that they should be ignored. But democratic societies require more than citizens
who are fact-full. They require citizens who can think and act in ethically thoughtful
96
PRACTICING DEMOCRACY
ways. If we are to take education’s democratic goals seriously, then we need the kinds
of classroom practices that teach students to recognize ambiguity and conÀict in ‘fac-
tual’ content, to see human conditions and aspirations as complex and contested, and
to embrace debate and deliberation as a cornerstone of democratic societies.
There is a saying among teachers: Everybody likes to teach critical thinking, but
nobody wants a school full of critical thinkers. Current education reform indicates
that policymakers are taking this tongue-in-cheek dictum far too seriously. Al-
though provincial (and state) education rhetoric almost always touts the importance
of critical thinking, anti-bullying and other pro-social behaviours, and democratic
engagement, the policies that actually affect classroom teaching run in the other
direction. Because of a myopic focus on testing in math and literacy, it is becoming
more and more dif¿cult to make time for deep consideration of important ideas and
controversies. Students are being asked to learn to read but not to consider what’s
worth reading. They are being asked to become pro¿cient in adding numbers, but
not at thinking about what the answers add up to.
In the United States, whole subject areas – in particular those that tend to embrace
multiple perspectives and complex narratives – have been virtually eliminated from
the class schedules of many students. In the wake of No Child Left Behind legisla-
tion, seventy-one percent of U.S. school districts reported cutting back time from or
eliminating altogether subjects like social studies, the arts, and even science to make
more space for reading and math test preparation (Rentner et al. 2006). In Canada,
a retreat from in-depth problem-based learning, from science, history, and the arts,
and even from recess are evident in school boards in almost every province. There are
exception such as Prince Edward Island and Manitoba, which have, for the most part,
resisted the onslaught of over-testing. Indeed, concern over restrictions on the kind of
knowledge being taught to children is evident not only among teachers but also from
a growing number of school principals. The Canadian Principals Association (2007)
went to the unusual step of issuing a ‘statement of concern’ regarding student test-
ing and its impact on thinking and learning. School-based administrators throughout
Canada, they wrote, ‘are increasingly concerned that current policies and practices on
student testing are leading to (…) a secretive or unintended shift of priorities to focus
on a narrow range of student knowledge and literacy/numeracy skills.’
Have education policies, boards, or individual schools forbidden teachers to teach
other subject areas or to encourage students to critically examine ideas in deep and
meaningful ways? Have they forbidden students to recognize the importance of
their education in the context of the common good and their relationships to other
human beings? No. But a plain fact that every teacher, student and school principal
knows seems to elude most proponents of a test-based curriculum. As Jack Jennings
(2007), CEO of the Washington D.C.-based Center on Education Policy, notes:
What gets tested gets taught. Under No Child Left Behind [and he could be
talking about standardized testing and accountability measures in any na-
tion], there is reading and math and then there is everything else. And because
97
JOEL WESTHEIMER
there is so much riding on the reading and math included on state tests, many
schools have cut back time on other important subject areas, which means that
some students are not receiving a broad curriculum.
To the extent that a broad curriculum continues to be taught, in-depth thinking about
the curriculum as it relates to universal human concerns, in particular, has been great-
ly circumscribed. Moreover, the culture of assessment that results from standardized
testing in reading and math rapidly tends to spread to other subject areas as well. An
English teacher in an urban high school told me that even novel reading was now
prescriptive in her school’s rubric: meanings predetermined, vocabulary words prese-
lected, and essay topics predigested. An American science teacher put it this way:
‘The only part of the science curriculum now being critically analysed is evolution.’1
In many ways big and small, school practices are in danger of becoming irrelevant to
anything but the narrowest of educational goals. Engaging students in thinking about
the world beyond the bubble-form answer sheet and their role in shaping the future of
that world, is, in too many schools, an extra-curricular activity.
98
PRACTICING DEMOCRACY
If feeding hungry children in order to raise test scores chips away at our com-
mon humanity, pathologizing dissent should similarly be cause for grave concern.
Over-prescription of drugs like Ritalin (methylphenidate) to control behaviours
that were previously considered manageable through behavioural interventions is
well-documented. But far less critical analysis has been directed at the increasing
diagnosis rate for a relatively new category of illness known as conduct and op-
positional disorders. The more the curriculum is narrowed to focus on a highly
discrete set of skills, the greater the number of students who are quarantined in this
emaciated swath and who act out as a result. The latest edition of the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) includes a relatively new
psychiatric disorder called Oppositional De¿ant Disorder (ODD), de¿ning it as ‘a
pattern of negativistic, hostile and de¿ant behaviour. A child with ODD, according
to the DSM-IV, ‘often argues with adults,’ ‘actively de¿es or refuses to comply with
adult requests or rules,’ and is ‘touchy or easily annoyed by others.’ Various treat-
ments and psychiatric interventions are recommended for treating ODD including
cognitive behavioural therapy and even the prescription of powerful anti-psychotic
medications such as Risperdal (risperidone) or Zyprexa (olanzapine).
I am not a medical expert, and I do not in any way intend to disparage the dif-
¿culties children and parents might face when a child is legitimately diagnosed
with ODD. It certainly is possible that there are children who have oppositional
dif¿culties that are in need of treatment. A small but growing body of evidence,
however, indicates that ODD diagnoses have increased signi¿cantly. Moreover,
anecdotal evidence posits that those increases are largely attributable to concerns
about student behaviour raised by schools. Statistics about rates of ODD diagnoses
are remarkably hard to come by, but several exploratory studies indicate what might
be an immensely troubling trend. In 1996, the diagnosis rate for ODD in school-age
children was between 1 and 6 percent. In 2008, the National Institute for Health
notes that some studies now indicate that 10 – 15% of school-age children can be
diagnosed with ODD. Prevalence of ODD in primary-care settings (children ages
99
JOEL WESTHEIMER
2-5) has reached 17% or higher. Furthermore both Oppositional De¿ant Disorder
and Conduct Disorder are more prevalent among youths from families of low socio-
economic status (Loeber et al. 2000).
The implications of the rise in ODD diagnoses among school-age children led
Oregon educator Norm Diamond to suggest that a new as-of-yet undiagnosed dis-
ease was sweeping the nation. He coined this new disease CAD: Compliance Ac-
quiescent Disorder. Symptoms for CAD, Diamond joked, can be seen when a stu-
dent often ‘defers to authority,’ ‘reÀexively obeys rules,’ ‘believes the commercial
media,’ ‘fails to argue back,’ and ‘stays restrained when outrage is warranted.’ Like
Diamond, I wonder if we had an inventory for CAD, whether we might ¿nd a virtual
epidemic of the disease. As the technocratization and dehumanization of the cur-
riculum continues, we are increasingly at risk of fostering an entire generation of
those who – as education critic Al¿e Kohn put it – fail to be outraged by outrageous
things. Indeed, at the same time that schools eliminate opportunities for in-depth
connections between the subject matter students study and the sociopolitical world
beyond the classroom, thousands of children who show resistant behaviour, perhaps
refusing to ‘comply with adult requests or rules’ are being classi¿ed as mentally ill,
disciplined, counselled, and in some cases, medicated.
Although ideological battles over the school curriculum still exist, many teachers are
experiencing a more insidious cause for erosion of their ability to teach students about
their relationship to each other and to society. Rather than the legislative elimination
of valuable educational goals, teachers and administrators face pressure to drop many
of them to make room for test preparation. John Holt (1964) may have been the most
prescient forecaster of this phenomenon. In his classic 1964 text, How Children Fail,
he wrote that the most signi¿cant outcome of the drive for ‘so-called higher standards
in schools is that the children are too busy to think.’ Teachers have to sacri¿ce social
studies, science, arts, and in-depth analysis of topics in virtually every subject to be
able to ¿t literacy and math drills into the schedule (Knighton, 2003).
Perhaps the most common complaint I hear from both teachers and administra-
tors in this climate is that they have been stripped of their professional judgment
and ability to make decisions in the best interests of the students who populate their
classrooms and schools. De-professionalization of teachers is nothing new. Histori-
cally, since education – especially in the primary years – was a women’s profession,
teachers were bound by strict guidelines not only on what they should teach but also
how they should teach it, what they should wear, and how they were to conduct them-
selves even outside of the classroom on their own time. What is surprising today is
the newfound hypocrisy: ‘teacher professionalism’ rhetoric co-exists with top-down
edicts that strip teachers of exactly the curricular and pedagogical decision-making
authority that allow them to act as professionals. A bizarre example that is masked as
100
PRACTICING DEMOCRACY
Educators who seek to teach students to think and to interpret information – skills
and habits essential for citizens of any democratic nation – are often criticized for
having no respect for facts. They are soft, feel-good pedagogues, this kind of critique
maintains, who are more interested in process than in knowing the right answers to
questions. These tendencies are vili¿ed as un¿t for a rigorous standards-based edu-
cation. Somehow critics have become convinced that those who say they want stu-
dents to think for themselves simply do not care whether students can read, write,
or perform addition or subtraction. This is plainly nonsense. We all want students
to learn to read and write. Nobody wants student to be numerically illiterate. When
I speak to groups of educators, policy makers, politicians, or advocacy groups, I
sometimes ask whether anyone present has been recruited to join the group called
‘Teachers Against Kids Learning How to Add’ or ‘School Principals in Support of
Illiteracy.’ You should not be surprised that I have not once found anyone aware of
these or any similar groups. What I have found is countless educators and parents
who want children to know more than formulas. They want the knowledge that stu-
dents acquire to be embedded in the service of something bigger. They want their
students to develop the kinds of relationships, attitudes, dispositions, and skills nec-
essary for them to engage in democratic and community life.
Teaching students to think beyond the isolated facts and skills of the fragmented
curriculum will require reclaiming common assumptions about what thinking re-
quires. There are few educators who believe that facts are unimportant compo-
nents of a proper education. But at a time when vast databases of information are at
our ¿ngertips in seconds, facts alone represent a profoundly impoverished goal for
educational achievement. Furthermore, students tend to learn more ‘facts’ through
thoughtful participation in meaningful projects of concern, but engagement in such
projects of democratic importance is rarely driven by the acquisition of facts only.
In short, knowledge does not necessarily lead to thoughtful participation. In many
programs colleagues and I have studied that emphasize teaching about the workings
of democratic government, legislative procedures, elections, and so on, students
gained solid factual knowledge without necessarily gaining the inclination or the
conviction required to participate (Llewellyn & Westheimer, 2009). To the contrary,
101
JOEL WESTHEIMER
we found that often it worked the other way around: participation led to the quest
for knowledge. Once students gained experiences in asking dif¿cult and complex
questions about their community, their province, their country, or the world, they
sought out the facts they needed for evidence.
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PRACTICING DEMOCRACY
chapter. Although, of course, shining a spotlight in an area where one did not lose
one’s keys is not likely to uncover the missing keys, the effects are actually worse
than that. When we illuminate one area, we simultaneously darken anything outside
the circle of light. If you have ever walked at night with a Àashlight, you will recog-
nize your blindness to anything beyond the light. If the man and woman in the story
shifted their gaze from beneath the streetlight to where the keys actually lay, they
would likely be blinded (at least at ¿rst) in the newfound darkness – darker seem-
ing then if they had not been staring in the light for so long. It is the same with our
narrowly illuminated spotlight on mathematics and literacy testing. The ¿rst step to
drawing attention to the broader walk in the woods might be to soften the focus of
the light that now shines so relentlessly bright.
NOTES
1 Personal communication.
2 www.ottawaschoolbreakfastprogram.ca/faq2.asp
REFERENCES
Canadian Association of Principals (2007). Valid uses of student testing as part of authentic, compre-
hensive student assessment – A statement of concern from Canada’s school principals. March 9,
2007.
Dewey, J. (1966). Plan of organization of the university primary school. In A. Wirth, (Ed.) John Dewey
as educator: His design for work in education (297-305). New York: Wiley
Greene, M. (2006). From jagged landscapes to possibility. Journal of Educational Controversy, 1(1),
1.
Jenkins, J. (2007). Choices, changes, and challenges: Curriculum and instruction in the NCLB Era.
Washington DC: Center on Education Policy.
Knighton, B. (2003). No Child Left Behind: The impact on social studies classrooms. Social Educa-
tion, 67(5), 291.
Llewellyn, K., & Westheimer, J. (2009). Beyond facts and acts: The implications of ‘ordinary politics’
for youth political engagement. Citizenship Teaching and Learning, 5(2), 50-61.
Loeber, R., Burke, J.D., Lahey, B.B., Winters, A., & Zera, M. (2000). Oppositional de¿ant and conduct
disorder: A review of the past 10 years, part 1. Journal of American Academy of Child and Adoles-
cent Psychiatry, 39(12), 1468-84.
Rentner, D.S., Scott, C., Kober, N., Chudowsky, N., Chudowsky, V., Joftus, S., & Zabala, D. (2006)
From the capital to the classroom: Year 4 of the No Child Left Behind Act. Washington, DC: Center
on Education Policy.
Joel Westheimer
Sociology of Education
University of Ottawa
103
vi
VIKAS GORA
SEEDS OF REFORM
In the 19th Century, some of the educated Indians were harbingers of change and
social reform. They had inner urge to reform the society from outmoded customs
and traditions and religious obscurantism. In India, social reformers like Mr. Raja
Ram Mohan Roy2 championed ban on Sati3, Mr. Eswara Chandra Vidya Sagar4
stood for widow remarriages, and championed women’s education. He was an athe-
ist. In Bengal, Bombay and Madras Presidencies, social reformers like Mr. Mahat-
ma Phule5, Mr. Dhondo Keshav Karve6, Mr. Kesab Chandra Sen7, Mr. Kandukuri
Veeresalingam8 and others, highlighted the value of education in reforming the so-
ciety. Mahatma Phule started Satya Sodhak Samaj, a Free Thinkers Association,
and schools for female education. Karve who lived for 104 years, not only champi-
oned women education and also started the ¿rst Women’s University in Bombay.
Ms. Pandita Ramabai9 also played a pivotal role in women’s education. It is impor-
tant to remember that in India, the term social reformer was in vogue in the 19th
Century and the term humanist came into currency only in the 20th century. Many
of the social reformers were progressive in their outlook, championed rationalism,
fought against superstitions and blind beliefs. They were champions of education
for common people – particularly of female education. Concerned with the plight
of the poor and the downtrodden sections of society and the women, these social
reformers either started or encouraged liberal and humanist education on rational
and scienti¿c lines. Imparting education became an important ingredient of the
social reform measures.
The advent of the Colonial Rule in developing countries brought education on
Western lines. It was instrumental in awakening the nationalist and patriotic spirit
among some of the educated. It resulted in the yawning for freedom, and the agi-
tations for democratization of political process with adult suffrage, a share in the
job opportunities and secularization of institutions, without reference to caste and
religion.
In the Twentieth Century, the nationalist spirit reached to its zenith, and the politi-
cal struggles for liberation from the Colonial yoke brought tremendous awakening
among people. Some of the champions of political freedom started Nationalistic
educational Institutions. Mr. Rabindranath Tagore10, a great Humanist, who was the
¿rst in India to receive the coveted Nobel Prize in Literature, not only started Sree
Niketan, A Rural Development Institute, but also founded Santi Niketan, a premier
Educational Institution in Bengal which attracted students from all over the coun-
try. Its core principles were secular, and nationalistic and provided opportunities
for free expression of ideas in arts, humanities, endowed with nationalistic spirit.
Nobel Laureate Mr. Amartya Sen was also associated with Santi Niketan. Students
not only came from India, but also from abroad.
Education was imparted in the natural surroundings, under the shade of the
trees. Santi Niketan was nationalistic in its outlook, humanistic and full of artistic
expression, giving to the fore the innate talents of the youth. After Independence
Santi Niketan became a National University.
Similarly, the Gujarat Vidyapeeth in Ahmedabad, founded by Gandhi, Banares
Hindu University by Mr. Madan Mohan Malaviya11, Kashi Vidyapeeth and many
other institutions, and the National Colleges which sprang up in the freedom mo-
106
HUMANIST EDUCATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
ment, became Centres for secularism and national sprit. Some of the students be-
came Congress, Socialist and Communist leaders of the nation. It is important to
note that in the 20th Century, nationalism and humanism were almost synonymous
in their approaches as they stood for freedom, democracy, secularism, liberal out-
look and social equality.
Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru12 was not only a prominent nationalist leader in Gandhi’s
struggle for political freedom and was in prison for 11 years, but also was a staunch
champion of humanism, secularism, and democratic socialism. He promoted scien-
ti¿c temper and social, political as well economic equality. His progressive and na-
tionalist writings left an indelible impression on the minds of the youth. As the ¿rst
Prime Minister of India, for nearly two decades he piloted the Nation’s Constitution
with democratic, secular and secular moorings and was instrumental in developing
science and technology. It was his daughter, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi who
made the secular and humanist commitment of the Nation explicit by stating in
the Preamble to the Constitution that India is a ‘Democratic, Secular and Socialist
Republic.’ She also incorporated the Fundamental Duties of the citizens of India
stating ‘It is the Fundamental Duty of every citizen of India – to develop the scien-
ti¿c temper, humanism, spirit of inquiry, and reform.’ (Article 51-A (h)). The Con-
stitution also envisaged special provisions for the welfare of the Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes13 and Backward Classes14 for their educational, political, social
and employment opportunities through the policy of reservations. The Constitution
also envisaged the method of ‘Af¿rmation’, along with the provision for Oath in the
name of God, at all levels.
Millions of educational scholarships are provided to educate boys and girls from
the Scheduled castes, Scheduled Tribes and the other socially and economically
backward classes, coupled with the policy of reservations in the educational in-
stitutions as well as in job opportunities. Perhaps in no other developing country,
such a massive and intensive and committed effort is made to educate the hitherto
neglected sections of the society.
No doubt, still there is a lot has to be done in improving the quality of education
in the educational institutions. But India is making earnest efforts to improve the
lot of the common people by imparting education and thus bringing them into the
mainstream of society. It is a unique effort to improve its human resources and to
achieve social change through education.
HUMANISM IN INDIA
The term ‘humanism’ is a culture bound one. In Holland, Erasmus15 popularized the
term “humanism’. In Germany and in the Scandinavian countries term ‘Freethink-
ing’ is in vogue. In England “Rationalism” is in vogue. In America, ‘Secularism’
107
VIKAS GORA
Unlike in the developed countries, where the educational institutions like schools,
colleges and universities have greater freedom in framing the syllabus and hiring
the teachers, and conducting the examinations, in developing countries, in particu-
lar in India, the education is very much centralized. Even though education is a state
subject, the Union Government guides in many matters. Thus Government has a
larger say in educational institutions in matters of content, syllabus, examinations,
appointment of teachers, admission of students, fee structure, grants-in-aid, and
the over all policy. There is much more uniformity in text books and examinations
are also very much centralized. Whether Government run, or the private schools
108
HUMANIST EDUCATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
recognized by the Government, they have to follow the same procedure leaving less
scope for local planning and innovation.
In addition to this, immediately after Independence, there were a large number of
illiterate people – men and women – who were outside the education system. They
were victims of ignorance, ill health and illiteracy. Hence, atheists, rationalists and
humanists concentrated their efforts to render assistance and to create awareness
among them. Hence they went into awareness building programmes in the areas of
social reform, health, environment, child and woman rights, adult education, and
empowering the people to face natural as well as social disasters.
Their strategy was to organize short term, like one week, or even three or four
day study camps on various aspects of atheism, humanism, rationalism, human
rights and also promotion of science and scienti¿c outlook. It was focused on rights
based approach. India has the large number of non-Governmental organizations
(NGOs) in the world and they are promoting awareness, health and rendering as-
sistance in natural and social disasters.
The humanist and secular NGOs are also organizing meetings, conferences,
workshops and even sociopsychological counselling programmes. Family, health
and sex education are imparted. Free, medical and health camps have been organ-
ized. In the West, there are social security, health insurance, unemployment bene¿ts
and many other comforts. But, in the developing world, people are exposed to vicis-
situdes of nature and social and political situations. Hence the role of the NGOs is
of crucial importance in supplementing and complementing Government’s effort in
many areas of development.
Some experimental schools were started by some committed atheists and human-
ists. One such was Vasavya Vidyalaya at Atheist Centre. Vasavya is an abbrevia-
tion which stands for Vastavitakata (Reality), Sanaghadrusti (Social Outlook) and.
Vyakthitva (Development of Individual’s personality with scienti¿c and rational
outlook). It was founded by Gora (1902-1975) and Saraswathi Gora (1912-2006).
They championed atheism as a positive way of life. With their constructive and
positive approach, they placed before the society that atheism is not negative, but an
alternate way of life. Vasavya Vidyalaya was founded in 1961 and the experimen-
tal school was run for one and half decade. As it was a private run school, it gave
greater freedom to expose the young to humanism and atheism as an alternative life
stance and to promote critical thinking and free inquiry.
Vasavya Vidyalaya took steps to develop positive thinking among children and
to change the outlook of their parents and guardians. The admission in school was
non discriminatory. Half a century ago, when the school was started, caste and
religion were dominant factors. Many of the children came from rural background
where the practice of untouchability19 and caste dominated their thinking and ac-
tions. The concept of caste purity and caste pollution guided their behaviour. But
109
VIKAS GORA
once they joined Vasavya Vidyalaya which had the residential facilities, the chil-
dren had to radically reorient their behaviour, raising above the petty differences
and old habits. Slowly, but steadily, the children changed their way of thinking and
adopted secular approaches.
This unique approach inÀuenced many parents to change their children’s names
which depicted gods and angles to secular names. Similarly, the students did not ¿ll
in the caste and religion column in the application forms of the Government. The
change of name without any reference to caste and religion brought a revolutionary
change in the outlook and perception of the children and parents.
In Vasavya Vidyalaya, classes were conducted on superstitious beliefs, sex edu-
cation, magic workshops etc., were carried out to inculcate a spirit of inquiry into
the young minds. Periodic science exhibitions were also conducted in the school to
bring to the fore the talents of the students.
As many of the parents were still illiterate, adult education programmes were
organized to promote secular, scienti¿c, atheistic outlook. Child to parent literacy
programmes were carried out. The school provided counselling to parents on the
social ills such as child marriages, especially girl children, which were in vogue in
rural areas. In Vasavya Vidyalaya, there were no punishments for children. They
were gently persuaded to change their habits. The teacher was a guide and friend
of the students. It is the mutual respect and con¿dence that enabled the students
to acquire knowledge in a free and fair atmosphere. Under the inspiring guidance
of Gora, Vasavya Vidyalaya, was run on ideal lines. Mrs. Mythri, Mrs. Hemalata
Lavanam, Mr. Niyanta and Mrs. Sumathi Vijayam of Atheist Centre and a number
of teachers carried out the educational experiment.
The educational experiment yielded promising results and it was imparted to
more than 1500 students. The students developed self con¿dence, humanist outlook
and atheist approach towards life. Some of the students became social workers and
they became social change agents.
As Government rules changed with regard to examinations for matriculation20
and government expanded school network in the rural areas with incentives like
tuition waiver and other facilities, Atheist Centre decided to close down Vasavya
Vidyalaya and to concentrate on secular social work in rural areas. It also decided
to organize more number of Atheist Study Camps for adults and science camps for
children in different parts of the State. Thus the area of operation was extended to
exposing superstitions, blind beliefs and to ¿ght social evils like witchcraft and
sorcery. It also started supplementary educational programmes in rural areas, to
improve the educational standards of the poorer sections of society. The aim of
Atheist Centre was to supplement and compliment the efforts of the Government
in its educational programmes and also to organize orientation programmes for the
teachers in quality education, ecology and environment, and their role in social and
natural disasters. Atheist Centre also took up advocacy programmes to improve the
quality of education on secular and humanist lines.
110
HUMANIST EDUCATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The Atheist Study Camps covered a wide spectrum of topics, dealing with science,
scienti¿c outlook, sociology of religion, psychology, superstitions and customs that
stood in the way of the onward march of humanity. In the Atheist Study Camps, a
cross cultural understanding of the problem of the society was stressed. Much light
was thrown on the signi¿cance of atheism and humanism as a positive way of life.
Exclusive children ad women study camps were also organized by Atheist Centre.
The participants in the Atheist Study Camps came from diverse educational
backgrounds. They were in the age groups of 20 to 50 years of age. Some of them
were active atheists and social change workers in the ¿eld. The Study Camps also
helped to upgrade their skills, spirit of inquisitiveness, discovery education, and
clear some of their questions in the interactive sessions. The resource persons of the
study camps hailed from different backgrounds. University professors, social work-
ers, atheist activists, medical doctors used innovative teaching methods to facilitate
learning.
The Atheist Study Camps, seminars and conferences organized by Atheist Cen-
tre in various parts of the State for the last half a century were helpful in upgrading
the skills of the rural and social development workers and to create a new genera-
tion of social workers. They could acquire new skills and gain orientation on world
issues and local actions.
The world is moving towards a post-religious society. The religious bonds are
loosened and people are following the religious customs more out of habit. The
Atheist Study camps and other social and educational programmes organized by the
Atheist Centre, and other humanist and rationalist organizations have been helpful
in creating new awareness among people.
The educational and social change programmes organized by Atheist Centre and
its national and international conferences, received wide attention in the media. In
South India, media is progressive and supportive of atheist, rationalist, and human-
ist programmes. Thus, there was wide dissemination of information on alternative
to religious way of life. The publication of atheist and humanist literature also re-
ceived attention of the public. The exposure campaigns of godmen21 and charlatans
received good attention in the press and the media.
With the centuries of accumulated wealth, the religious institutions are involved
in tele-evangelism in the developing world. Religious institutions are sponsoring
programmes of astrologers, palmists, godmen, religious preachers and are trying
to brain-wash ordinary people to believe in miracles and absurdities. Atheists, hu-
manists and progressive minded people endear people by their exemplary personal
behaviour. Their efforts for promotion of castelessness and secularism receive posi-
tive response from people.
111
VIKAS GORA
In a democratic society every one has freedom of speech. When people develop
critical thinking, rational behaviour, no amount of religious propaganda will devi-
ate them from their path. In each generation, new challenges have to be met with
innovative ways. Education increases the capacity of the people to make proper
decisions by using their faculties of reason.
With the growth of nonreligion in the Western world, the religions are now com-
peting with one another in increasing their numerical strength in the developing
world by pouring their material and human resources to convert the people to their
religion. Politicization of religions and religionization of politics is taking place.
Atheists and humanists have to strive on many fronts with grim determination.
Constant efforts are made to undermine the secular underpinnings of these de-
veloping nations. There may be temporary gains to religions in some parts of the
world. But with the onward march of society, in this scienti¿c age, people are bound
to develop scienti¿c temper and critical thinking.
WAY AHEAD
Humanists, atheists, rationalists must make a common cause at this critical junc-
ture with all progressive minded people and to strengthen the secular ramparts we
guard. The atheist, humanist, rationalist efforts in the developing countries require
documentation and further dissemination to wider audience, so that the movement
to promote humanist and critical thinking in education will be further strengthened.
Humanist and secular education acquires crucial importance in this century.
What Buddha advised people 2500 years ago is a cardinal principle for humanist
education. He said:
Do not believe what you have heard.
Do not believe in the tradition because it is handed down many generations.
Do not believe in anything that has been spoken of many times.
Do not believe the written statements come from some old sage.
Do not believe in conjecture.
Do not believe in the authority or teachers or elders.
But after careful observation and analysis, when it agrees with reason and
It will bene¿t one and all, then accept it and live by it.
NOTES
1 The pattern of social classes in Hinduism is called the ‘caste system’. It is believed that the works
of Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Shudras are different, in harmony with the three powers
of their born nature. The works of a Brahmin (upper caste) are peace; self-harmony, austerity, and
purity; loving-forgiveness and righteousness; vision and wisdom and faith. These are the works of
a Ks.atriya: a heroic mind, inner ¿ re, constancy, resourcefulness, courage in battle, generosity and
noble leadership. Trade, agriculture and the rearing of cattle is the work of a Vaishya. And the work
of the Shudra is service.
112
HUMANIST EDUCATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
2 Raja Ram Mohan Roy (1774-1833) is considered as a pioneer in Indian Renaissance in 18th Century,
for his reforms in the abolition of Sati, Purdah System and child marriages. He formed the Brahmo
Samaj, a group of people, who had no faith in idol-worship and were against the caste restrictions.
3 Sati was a practice in which the widow was compelled to sacri¿ce herself on the funeral pyre of her
husband.
4 Eswara Chandra Vidya Sagar (1820-1890) is considered as one of the pillars of Bengal renaissance.
He continued the reform movement of Raja Ram Mohan Roy and raised concern for the abolition of
polygamy.
5 Mahatma Phule (1827-1890), was the social reformer of the 19th Century who revolted against the
unjust caste system and courageously upheld the cause of the untouchables and took up the cudgels
for the poorer peasants. He was a militant advocate of their rights
6 Dhondo Keshav Karve (1858-1962 ), was a social reformer and strove for educating the widows and
empowerment of women.
7 Keshub Chandra Sen (1838-1884), was a Bengali social reformer
8 Kandukuri Veeresalingam (1848-1919) was considered as the prophets of Modern Andhra. He
awakened Andhras out of their suffocating medieval orthodox customs and superstitions. He was
not only a reformer, but also a literary activist. He was considered the father of renaissance in And-
hra.
9 Pandita Ramabai (1858-1922) was a social reformer, a champion for the emancipation of women,
and a pioneer in education. She established the Arya Mahila Samaj in Pune and other parts of west-
ern India for the cause of women’s education.
10 Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941) was a great nationalist, highly gifted poet of Indian Renaissance.
In 1901 he founded a school at Shantiniketan, near Calcutta which later became an international
institution called Vishwa-Bharati. He was awarded Nobel Prize for literature in 1913. He relin-
quished knighthood in protest against Jallianwala Baug massacre in 1919. He was a sincere friend
of Gandhi.
11 Mr. Madan Mohan Malaviya (1861-1946), Educationist, Social reformer and nationalist. President
of Indian National Congress in 1909 & 1918. Member, Central Legislative Assembly. Founded Ba-
naras Hindu University in 1915.
12 Nehru, Jawaharlal (1889-1964) – An architect of India. Gandhi named him as his political heir. First
Prime Minister of independent India.
13 The framers of the Indian Constitution took note of the fact that certain communities in the country
were suffering from extreme social, educational and economic backwardness arising out of age-old
practice of untouchability and certain others on account of this primitive agricultural practices, lack
of infrastructure facilities and geographical isolation, and who need special consideration for safe-
guarding their interests and for their accelerated socioeconomic development. These communities
were noti¿ed as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as per provisions contained in Clause 1 of
Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution respectively.
14 Backward Classes are described as ‘socially and educationally backward classes’, and the Indian
government is enjoined to ensure their social and educational development.
15 Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamus (1466-1536), sometimes known as Desiderius Erasmus of Rot-
terdam, was a Dutch Renaissance humanist and a Catholic priest and theologian.
16 Periyar E.V. Ramasamy (1879-1973), propagated the principles of rationalism, self-respect, wom-
en’s rights and eradication of caste. He opposed the exploitation and marginalization of the non-
Brahmin indigenous Dravidian peoples. The citation awarded by the UNESCO described Periyar as
‘the prophet of the new age, the Socrates of South East Asia, father of social reform movement and
arch enemy of ignorance, superstitions, meaningless customs and base manners’.
17 M.N. Roy (1887-1954) was a Bengali Indian revolutionary, internationally known political theorist
and activist. He was a founder of the Communist Parties in Mexico and India. He later denounced
communism as exponent of the philosophy of Radical Humanism.
18 Gora (1902-1975) and Saraswathi Gora (1912-2007), world renowned atheists, social reformers and
113
VIKAS GORA
founders of the world’s ¿ rst known Atheist Centre in India. As close associates of Mahatma Gandhi
they participated in the Indian freedom struggle and were imprisoned. Gora promoted positive
atheism as a life stance and fought against untouchability. Commemorating his birth centenary and
his life contribution towards atheism and secular social work, the Government of India released a
postage stamp in 2002.
19 Untouchability is the direct product of the Indian caste system. The dalits and other lower castes are
considered as untouchables and socially, economically and politically marginalized.
20 Matriculation is the ¿ nal year in high school which ends at tenth standard/grade.
21 Godmen claim to possess paranormal powers, healing abilities and as the descendents of gods on
earth.
REFERENCES
Vikas Gora
Atheist Centre
India
114
MARTIEN SCHREURS
This chapter demonstrates how the dialogical imagination of the novel can help to
answer the question how students and teachers from different cultures can coexist
and learn together. There are two reasons why the multicultural school is chosen
as a case to demonstrate that literary humanism may offer an inspiring perspective
on the questions concerning multicultural society. The ¿rst reason is personal. My
concern with multicultural education emerged during the year I worked as a teacher
of history and civics at a so-called ‘black school’. In the Netherlands schools with
more than 70 % immigrants´ children are labelled ´black schools´. In some respects,
the multicultural school can be viewed as a mini-multicultural-society. In their daily
lives, students at that school extensively struggle with questions that arise in a mul-
ticultural society. For understandable reasons, whenever the media draw attention
to crimes committed by Moroccan boys, Moroccan students feel more addressed
than white Dutch students. The conÀict in the Middle-East has a substantial impact
on the world of students who are rooted in North-African and Arabic countries. For
many white students this conÀict is outside their direct interests. It is important to
note this, because for teachers involved in citizenship education and history educa-
tion, the students’ commitment to questions arising in a multicultural society is an
important source for dialogue. In this respect I agree with Veugelers, Derriks and
de Kat (2006, p. 235) when they write: ‘Education does not merely prepare students
for society. Rather, society is already present in the school in the form of the aca-
demic content, the students and the teachers.’
The second reason for exploring the dialogical imagination of the novel has to
deal with learning processes. Whenever human participation in a democratic socie-
ty is at stake, teachers have to search for dialogical ways of communication. In these
classroom-discussions students and teachers can engage in dialogues on questions
that are highly relevant in the students’ world. The aim of this chapter is to demon-
strate the analogy between dialogical imagination in the novelistic discourse and
communicative interaction between the teachers and students in the multicultural
classroom. In accordance with the tradition of literary humanism, by demonstrating
this analogy, we aim to contribute to the development of dialogical forms of teach-
ing that are applicable in multicultural education.
A comparison of the image of Dutch cities in the Fifties with the contemporary im-
age of these cities reveals a transformation of a predominantly white homogenous
society towards a colourful pluralistic society. This change is characteristic to all
western European countries that experienced inÀuences of decolonisation and la-
bour immigration. This mass immigration is in particular visible in the big cities.
When new groups are entering societies there are always adaptations necessary
for both newcomers and native inhabitants. The greater the cultural differences
between native people and immigrants (newcomers), the more dif¿cult processes of
collaboration, integration and acceptance of newcomers are.
Nowadays, hardly anybody complains about the immigration from the former
colonies. These people simply belong to Dutch society. In contrast, it will take a lot
of time before the Dutch people accept that the children and grandchildren of the
labour immigrants are unquestionable Dutch citizens as well. Many people echo
that the ‘New-Dutch citizens’ did not integrate. However, native Dutch citizens may
forget that at the start, in the Seventies, it was not intended to make them part of
our society: they were meant to be guests. It was expected that they would return to
their home countries the moment their labour contracts ended. When the majority
of guest workers settled in the Netherlands and when they reunited with their fami-
lies from their home countries, multicultural reality could not be denied anymore.
As a consequence, the question rose how people from different cultures can coexist
and interact.
Since 2001 this question resulted in emotional debates. In the Netherlands there
is a widespread concern about the tensions and problems in a multicultural society.
Because policy makers and politicians did not succeed in preventing high rates
of school drop-out as well as both underemployment and crime in the groups of
New-Dutch citizens, both right wing and left wing politicians express their seri-
ous concerns about the multicultural situation. The political scientist Paul Scheffer
(2000; 2007) speaks of a ‘multicultural drama’. In contemporary debate, advocates
of multicultural dialogue have lost the battle in favour of the populist politicians
claiming that the newcomers have to adapt to and comply with values and norms in
western society. On a political level, the inÀuence of this assimilation-ideology is
visible in the sharpening of rules with which newcomers have to comply in order to
become worthy citizens of the new society.
Education is an important theme in the debate on multicultural society. Ideally,
education provides an opportunity for empowerment of all pupils, white and black.
116
LITERARY HUMANISM IN MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION
But from the very moment that the pupils´ performances are graded, there is a proc-
ess of selection and exclusion at work. Children that are behind in terms of language
skills are systematically underestimated in testing. Compared to their white peers
nonwestern students run a relatively high risk of being discriminated by the system
of tests and assessments and enter in a larger amount lower levels of secondary
education.
Another cause for the widening of the gap between western and nonwestern stu-
dents is the freedom of school choice. Although as a policy this seems quite liberal,
in practice parents representing the more wealthy, white middle class tend to opt for
white schools, whereas the parents rooted in nonwestern cultures tend to send their
children to the local school which then often becomes a black school.
Local and national policy insist that citizenship education can only succeed
when students with a nonwestern background encounter western pupils. Follow-
ing this integration ideology, black and white schools have to develop into mixed
schools, characterized by a more equal distribution of students with different cul-
tures and social backgrounds. In order to stimulate this development towards mixed
schools, new educational policy was designed in Dutch cities since 2006. For exam-
ple, several local governments have prepared new entering procedures to stimulate
that, at the beginning of their school careers, both privileged and underprivileged
students are more equally distributed across the different schools. According to this
new policy, schools should mirror contemporary multicultural society as much as
possible. There should be a real encounter between students from different cultures.
In reality however it is not easy to create mixed schools because many neighbour-
hoods are segregated as well.
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MARTIEN SCHREURS
This dialogical approach of the multicultural situation contrasts with the national
policy to cope with the new multicultural confusion. Whenever the Dutch govern-
ment addresses citizenship in the multicultural context, the focus is strongly on
assimilation. The ‘New-Dutch’ will only be recognized as worthy citizens in our
society under the conditions that they speak the Dutch language, that they obey to
the Dutch law and that they acquire knowledge of the Dutch cultural traditions.
The Dutch sociologist Willem Schinkel (2007) convincingly demonstrated that the
national integration policy presupposes a more or less homogenous concept of the
Dutch culture to which the New-Dutch have to adjust. However, it is impossible to
continuously consider these immigrants as strangers or guests. We even label them
as ‘allochtonen’ (foreigners) in order to express that they are and remain distinct
form original Dutch people. But we should acknowledge that these so-called ‘al-
lochtone’ newcomers are the children and grandchildren of migrants and that they
actively participate in our western society. The multicultural society is not an ideal,
but a reality. A reality we have to reÀect on again and again in order to understand
that the change process is bilateral. ‘Autochtone’ (native) individuals or ‘the origi-
nal Dutch people’ should be willing to face the question how they might broaden
their horizon in order to get to a deeper understanding of people originating from
nonwestern cultures. It is through the confrontation with individuals from other
cultures that both western and nonwestern individuals can increase their insights
in their cultural embeddedness. This is an enriching experience that can be under-
stood in terms of Bildung.
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LITERARY HUMANISM IN MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION
119
MARTIEN SCHREURS
ation at these schools has become impossible and that the teachers and principals of
these schools should get more authority to get rid of the extremely bad behaviour:
‘Along with Devine (1996), I think we need to vastly increase regulations of youth’s
minds and bodies in our schools of urban relegation. We need to stop thinking
about this regulation of the young strictly in terms of the scary D-word – “disciplin-
ing”. Regulation can also be seen in terms of caring enough about children to offer
support and consistency – at least from 8:00 in the morning until 3:00 in the after-
noon. The administrators of our most challenged schools must also be allowed to
expel youth who, after repeated warnings, continue to demonstrate that they simply
cannot function in what are formally mainstream educational institutions’ (Paulle,
2003, p. 52).
Teaching and raising are synonymous for disciplining both individuals and
groups. For Dutch teachers, that are more used to a dialogical pedagogical style, it is
a problem to address migrants’ children that to a great extent are used to authoritar-
ian pedagogical styles. Therefore the teachers at the school in Amsterdam West ad-
vocate an authoritarian style of teaching. I was highly surprised that these teachers
developed their pedagogical styles in that authoritarian direction. They were of the
opinion that children, particularly children from nonwestern cultures, need strong
guidance and an authoritarian pedagogical style. Although they recurrently claimed
that the so-called New-Dutch should adapt to Dutch values and norms, in fact they
adapted to the imagined hierarchical Arabic culture. They apparently opted for one
homogeneous, rather authoritarian pedagogical style. Equality and homogeneity
were the parole. ‘Children are children’ was a much heard claim in this context.
In the eyes of these teachers it was impossible, if not undesirable, to get ac-
quainted with the different cultures of their students, because as one of the teachers
said: ‘These students have to live and work here in Amsterdam and not in Turkey
and Morocco’. Most teachers refused to enter in a dialogue on the tensions in the
Middle-East, because they were convinced that their students were not capable of
participating in such a dialogue. In their view, every discussion results in ¿ghts. To
a certain extent their fear was understandable because of their bitter experiences
with these discussions. For example when students brought Palestinian Flags to the
school after 9/11 and therefore brought the war into the school. My ex-colleagues
feared escalation. For this reason I understand their rejection of my claim that
screaming and shouting could be the beginning of intercultural dialogue.
From the beginning of my teaching in this school, I was engaged in a debate with
my ex-colleagues. In contrast with them I claim that such a dialogue is a necessary
condition for effective citizenship education in a multicultural context. Neverthe-
less, I acknowledge that there is some truth in what my colleagues claimed. When
compared with their western peers from a socioeconomic perspective, migrants’
children are often the underdogs. When they repeatedly claim that they feel dis-
criminated and that they feel unwelcome in our society, we need to take that seri-
ously. There is much resentment amongst the students and I sense that this is an
important cause for their antagonistic attitude towards their white teachers, whom
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LITERARY HUMANISM IN MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION
Starting point of what I call literary casuistry is the analogy between the way the
narrator shapes his dialogues with the characters in the novel, and the way in which
the teacher engages in dialogue with his students. The teacher should tell interesting
stories that encourage students to think and use their imagination. In this regard,
the teacher resembles the novels´ narrator. The novel enables us to enter the worlds
of imaginary characters and empathizing with them. Literary imagination is dia-
logical imagination. In this respect I refer to the Russian philosopher and literary
scientist Mikhail Bachtin who said: ‘The potential for such dialogue is one of the
most fundamental privileges of novelistic prose, a privilege available neither to dra-
matic nor to purely poetic genres’ (Bachtin, 1981, p. 320).
Analogous to Bachtin I make a distinction between the novelistic discourse and
the novels. The novelistic discourse creates space for exploring the encounter of
different worldviews of different communities. Speci¿c novels reÀect such encoun-
121
MARTIEN SCHREURS
ters. Authors of speci¿c novels – see for instance the novels about multicultural
situations in high schools – challenge us to look at the multicultural situation from
different perspectives. An interesting example is the novel written by the world
famous Dutch politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali (2007). The novel is entitled Adan & Eva.
The novel narrates a love story between the Moroccan pupil Adan and the Dutch
pupil Eva at a school in the south of Amsterdam where the majority of the students
are rich and white. Ali shows how both students suffer from the prejudices by both
Dutch and Moroccan parents. The gap between the different worlds is so deep that it
gets impossible for Adan and Eve to meet. At the end of the story they are moved to
other areas and other schools in order to make their connection impossible. Appar-
ently, dialogue is a necessary, but not a suf¿cient condition for Bildung. This novel
demonstrates that Bildung failed as a result of psychological barriers and social and
cultural prejudices.
Bildung emerges whenever we succeed in drawing lessons from confronting dif-
ferent perspectives. In other words, the dialogue is the process through which Bil-
dung is formed. In a previous section, I introduced an analogy between dialogical
imagination in the novel and the communicative interaction between teachers and
students in the classroom. There are similarities between different roles. The role of
the narrator is similar to the role of the teacher and the role of the reader is similar
to the role of the student. In courses on history, philosophy, religion and civics, the
teacher tells stories that show how people manage to really bring about change in
society and the world. Of course, the teacher hopes that something interesting hap-
pens in the minds of the students and that this will inÀuence their daily activities.
In order to fascinate the students, every teacher should be a good narrator. How-
ever, I strongly feel that narration is disregarded in contemporary teachers manuals
on didactics that take a social constructivist view on teaching. Layered cases that
stem from the various cultural and social worlds of the students are a basis for inter-
cultural dialogue. A novel may evoke different interpretations and in a similar way
the ambiguous layering of cases encourages plurality of opinions in the classroom.
The aim is to explore the in-betweenness of different lifestyles and discourses that
enables the development of intercultural dialogue. It is crucial that the different per-
spectives are bridged without obscuring the inherent conÀicts. Constructive contro-
versy is my ideal of postmodern Bildung.
The inference of this parole from novelistic discourse triggers questions that
reveal the paradox of dialogical imagination. For example, how would a free inter-
ference of discourses be possible when the dialogue is introduced by the author? A
similar problem is experienced by the teacher whose aim is to stimulate an intercul-
tural dialogue. Following Bachtin, I understand this problem as a tension that can be
made productive by intensifying dialogical activity. The best thing that could hap-
pen in a polyphonic classroom discussion is a dialogue through which insights are
gained that reach beyond what could have been predicted. We must cross borders,
take new roads and search for new crises to learn from.
I ¿nd it intriguing that personal development and accompanying questions on
122
LITERARY HUMANISM IN MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION
Dear colleagues,
The tensions in the world are increasing. A war is about to break out. We
have to consider the possibility that the atmosphere in the Netherlands or even
within the walls of our school is inÀuenced by the war. The aim of this letter is
to contribute to a steady living and learning climate. It is not unthinkable that
you will be confronted with rather extreme expressions related to the conÀict
in the Middle-East.
We strive for an attitude of moderation – both from students and teachers.
After all, our school is not engaged in any conÀict. In our opinion, we should
not be provoked to engage in heavy debates, dif¿cult as this may be.
There is no doubt that we maintain our policy that insulting, shouting etc. are
not appropriate within the walls of our school. Might it be that you ¿nd your-
self in such a situation with extreme expression, kindly contact the principal
and my assistants.
Of course, my students reacted in extreme ways and they called Bush a murderer
and a fascist. But that can never be a reason to avoid the discussion with the pupils.
Therefore, in contrast with the principal, I decided to consider the shouting of my
students as an impetus for a discussion that should culminate in a dialogue about the
differences, conÀicts and in-betweenness of Eastern and Western culture. For this
purpose I was inspired by the example of the Bildungsnovel or the realistic novel
of emergence (Bachtin, 1986, p. 23-25) in which diverse and conÀicting images of
the world were confronted. See Bachtin on p. 23: ‘In such novels (…) , however, hu-
man emergence is of a different nature. It is no longer man’s own private affair. He
emerges along with the world and he reÀects the historical emergence of the world
itself. He is no longer within an epoch, but on the border between two epochs, at the
transition point from one to the other.’ For me it’s the dialogical form of the novelis-
123
MARTIEN SCHREURS
tic discourse rather than the contents of the speci¿c novels that provides a paradigm
for the way in which intercultural dialogue can be shaped in multicultural educa-
tion. The contents of classroom discussions mirror the actual societal discussions.
The beginning of the war in Iraq gave rise to plenty discussion themes. The
teacher has to provide the students with relevant facts before discussions can start.
But although the teacher tries to be as objective as possible in formulating the facts
that might have caused the war in Iraq, the question immediately arises which facts
are important and which facts are less important. For example, it was a fact that
the search for weapons for mass destruction by the United Nations inspection team
was sabotaged by Iraqi authorities. Another fact is that the oil reserves in Iraq are
of extreme importance to the western world. Moreover, it can be objectively stated
that Saddam Hussein was a cruel dictator and that the Americans sincerely believed
that they brought democracy to the region. But of course, there are competitive
interests. Therefore, the search for facts is a never ending story. Yet, such a sum-
mary of facts is essential to enable the students to transcend their prejudices into
informed opinions. In that way the discussions focus on different possible perspec-
tives on the facts.
As a civic-teacher I illustrated the transcendence from facts to perspectives by
means of videotapes. The videotapes showed material that was broadcasted by
CNN and Al-Jazeera, just before the war started. Both the experts in the CNN
program and the experts in the Al-Jazeera program referred to facts to support
their arguments. The difference between the facts to which the experts at CNN
referred on the one hand and the facts to which the experts at Al-Jazeera referred
to on the other hand, were remarkable. Before I showed these tapes, I instructed
my students to carefully observe this phenomenon. It turned out that the facts did
not play a crucial role in choosing a point of view. At a closer look it proved that
the experts had images of the world. The facts had to ¿t in these images and these
images are mostly not discussable. The aim of humanistic education is to stimulate
discussions about this hidden dimensions of western and eastern worldviews. Again
I refer to the Palestinian humanist Edward Said who in his essay about humanistic
resistance writes: ‘CNN and the New York Times present information in headlines
or sound bites, which are often followed by slightly longer periods of information
whose stated purpose is to tell us what is happening “in reality”. All the choices,
exclusions, and emphases – to say nothing of the history of the subject at hand – are
invisible, dismissed as irrelevant. What I have been calling humanistic resistance
therefore needs to occur in longer forms, longer essays, longer periods of reÀection’
(Said, 2004, p. 73).
I think it is fruitful to extrapolate this humanistic mission into the ¿eld of human-
istic education. This is what I have tried to do in this classroom discussion. I tried
to start a discussion on the differences between the images brought forward by the
experts in the Al-Jazeera program and the experts in the CNN program. In this at-
tempt, I was inspired by the narrator in the novelistic discourse. There is an analogy
between a reader who is tempted by the narrator to empathize with the perspectives
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LITERARY HUMANISM IN MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION
of the characters in the novel and the students who are challenged by the teacher
to empathize with the western world view (CNN) and the eastern world view (Al-
Jazeera). I indeed challenged my students to reÀect on these different worldviews.
In this manner I want to encourage the students to learn in a way that is similar to
the learning process that is evoked by reading a novel. Similar to the reader of the
novel, the student must be challenged to engage with the perspective of ‘the enemy’.
Although the development of this empathic capacity is not a suf¿cient condition, it
is a necessary condition for the development of compassion. Compassion occurs
whenever students respectfully listen to each other and start to understand the dif-
ferent perspectives. To that end the teacher should encourage and demand that the
students carefully listen to each other. The ultimate aim of these polyphonic les-
sons is to gain an understanding of the inner motives and fears that are at the base
of viewpoints and worldviews. The human world is the common ground on which
people from different countries, cultures and classes can meet.
As I expected, in my classroom an extensive discussion about the contrast be-
tween the eastern and western worldviews emerged. Before the discussion started,
I set a ‘golden’ rule: we can shout against the world, but not against each other.
That was perfectly clear. Most students believed in Al-Jazeera’s world view. But
there also were some white students who believed in CNN’s worldview. The white
students were a minority and they were criticized by the majority. Yet, there was
no shouting against each other. The students followed the rule and the opponents
didn’t give in. They continued to argue and due to the fact that they really listened to
each other and gave each other the opportunity to speak their minds, the discussion
continued. At the end of the lesson, some students climbed on their desks and loudly
expressed their informed opinions. To me, it was a moment of hope: I had the strong
impression that intercultural dialogue was about to begin at our school.
The initiative of the teacher is the starting point. After listening to different sto-
ries about the world, we listen to the stories the students tell each other. Then the
students become narrators. Just like the narrators in the novel, the student manifests
himself as a storyteller. What matters, is the communicative interaction between
the different storytellers. It is the teacher’s task to orchestrate this polyphonic dis-
course. Therefore, the teacher should be explicit about choices expressed in the
stories of the students. Teaching is a way of reading that is inspired by the herme-
neutical way of reading that is cultivated in the humanistic tradition. Again I refer
to Edward W. Said who describes this humanistic ideal of reading in concise way:
‘And I think it is important to say that for the humanist, the act of reading is the act
therefore of ¿rst putting oneself in the position of the author, for whom writing is
a series of decisions and choices expressed in the words (Said, 2004, p. 62).’ In a
similar way I think, for the humanist teacher the act of listening is the act of putting
him/herself in the position of the student and to encourage the student to exercise
this act of listening. Then there is the possibility to transcend own perspectives and
to broaden horizons.
125
MARTIEN SCHREURS
CONCLUDING REMARK
REFERENCES
Martien Schreurs
Department of Education
University of Humanistic Studies Utrecht
126
ESTHER YOGEV
The education system has a leading moral and humanistic role to play in its
ability to reduce educational gaps and grant a fresh opportunity to members of
disadvantaged communities and help their children – the adults of the future – at-
tain a respected place in the foreseeable future. It must enlist the best of its young
people for teaching, and to this end every society holding quality democracy dear
must make every effort to advance teachers’ status and also examine in depth the
ideological objectives of teacher training that will provide appropriate solutions to
the changing needs of the society in which it acts.
Any attempt to lead a change in the Israeli education system requires a change in
educators’ professional self-de¿nition and the training that shapes them. A demand
such as this runs counter to the natural position of a professional training system,
since its role in normal times is to adapt novice teachers to the existing system. But
as we have seen, times are not normal. The crisis situation requires that teacher
training institutions work in an inevitable inner tension that is far from simple. On
the one hand they must train student teachers to function appropriately within the
existing school framework; on the other, train them (or at least some of them) for the
role of agents of change. Adopting a sociopolitical orientation in teacher training
is a daring measure, and to a certain extent a subversive one, which seeks ways of
repairing the deep crisis in which the education system ¿nds itself. Restoring so-
ciopolitical orientation to teachers constitutes empowerment of their presence and
expansion of their responsibility and involvement, both in the school and the com-
munity, and the society in which they work. It is a complex task, but it is possible on
condition that it is discussed openly in the training process and provides the future
teacher with a choice: to either conform to the school or act towards change.
Recognizing the importance of teacher training on the one hand, and the chal-
lenges currently facing it on the other, the questions which stand at the basis of the
present chapter are: what is the preferred professional identity of top-quality teach-
ers, and how will teacher training act optimally to construct it?
A further important question relates to the perception of the education system
as a locale for advancing tools of democratic citizenship, and the development of
human values of partnership in public life. The public sphere is always political,
and like political behaviour, political thinking is vital for meaningful interaction
between people. Nurturing the political identity of students at any age is a prereq-
uisite for forming the foundations of civic republicanism in them, and for the future
realization of democratic citizenship. The problem is that the education system usu-
ally avoids touching upon social and political issues and generally adopts a stance
of neutrality which is acquired at the cost of separation between social critique and
educational endeavour. Thus, the question of the legitimacy of political education
in teacher training arises in all its force.
The present chapter seeks to examine how teacher training can play an active
role in nurturing teachers with sociopolitical awareness, and in what the image of
this transformative teacher training will be. This attempt has taken shape over the
last four years at the Kibbutzim College of Education, Technology and Art at Tel-
128
TEACHERS’ TRAINING TOWARDS ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
Aviv. Founded by the Kibbutz Movement in 1939, before the establishment of the
State of Israel, this college, numbering 5,500 students, is the biggest of its kind in
Israel. It offers education tracks in all disciplines, from an early age to age 18, and
has schools for the performing arts, the arts, cinematography, and various types of
therapy.
The college’s training model is directed towards a comprehensive concept of
training teachers acting as ‘involved intellectuals’, teachers whose professional
identity leans on strong intellectual self-image, awareness of social activism and on
commitment to public activity (Yogev & Michaeli, 2009).
The chapter will describe the training model from its theoretical and applicatory
aspects, and will comprise three main parts. The ¿rst part will brieÀy present the Is-
raeli social, cultural and educational contexts in which teacher training takes place
and its effect on forming the professional identity of its graduates. It will present the
arti¿cial division that has been created between educational endeavour and social
critique of the reality of life in Israel, and will raise the need for teacher training that
nurtures a position of pedagogic activism in novice teachers.
As a basis to validate teacher training, which intensi¿es the sense of professional
capability in novice teachers, the chapter presents a theoretical outline of the charac-
teristics of the educator acting as an involved intellectual while employing the ideas
of Antonio Gramsci and the philosophical-sociological theory of Axel Honneth
Gramsci’s writings, known as the The Prison Notebooks, contain the tracing of Ital-
ian history and nationalism, as well as some ideas in Marxist theory, critical theory
and educational theory. Gramsci is renowned for his concept of cultural hegemony
as a means of maintaining the state in a capitalist society and for his ideas about the
role of the intellectuals in society. Honneth’s work focuses on social-political and
moral philosophy, especially relations of power, recognition, and respect. One of his
core arguments is for the priority of intersubjective relationships of recognition in
understanding social relations. This includes non- and mis-recognition as a basis of
social and interpersonal conÀict. For instance, grievances regarding the distribution
of goods in society are ultimately struggles for recognition.
The third part of the chapter will present the training model for involved-educators
that was developed at the Kibbutzim College of Education. This part will present the
main points of the change introduced into training in two parallel application parame-
ters: expanding the students’ experiential frameworks in the community and changes
in the academic syllabi and in campus life. Finally, the chapter presents the ¿ndings
of a selected study, which attends the assimilation process of the training policy and
examines the effect of the changes on the perceptions of the teachers’ trainees.
Teacher training and the education system work within broad social, cultural and
economic contexts and therefore any discussion of teacher training requires a basic
knowledge of these contexts. This knowledge serves as a point of departure for an
129
ESTHER YOGEV
understanding of the problem inherent in the prevailing training model and of the
proposed solution in training teachers acting as involved intellectuals.
The Israeli educational system works within a complex social context: Israeli
society lives in the reality of a prolonged regional conÀict and is also character-
ized by wide socioeconomic gaps and intercultural and religious tensions. In its
early decades Israel developed a social-democratic structure and its society en-
joyed high standards of cohesion and mutual commitment and responsibility. In
the last three decades, it has undergone comprehensive change. From a society of
solidarity, it has become individualistic and alienated. Since the end of the 1970s,
Israeli society adopted the principles of neo-liberal economics and embarked on
privatisation and decentralization processes in government and public institutions.
These processes created a socioeconomic reality of widening gaps, erosion of the
welfare state and massive growth in private spending required for health serv-
ices, education and basic subsistence (Israel, A Social Report, 2008-9). In general
terms, suspicion of public institutions in general and state-owned ones in particu-
lar become prevalent in Israeli society. Together with these processes, the Israeli
public harbours feelings of frustration, despair, and even revulsion towards any-
thing identi¿ed with politics.
These social processes are deeply inÀuenced by the global post-industrial trends
prevailing in the Western world. They include the consolidation of an exhibitionis-
tic consumer society that justi¿es hedonism and living for the moment and displays
sentiments of rejection and contempt for any aspiration towards social reform.. The
philosopher-sociologist, Christopher Lasch (1991) called this phenomenon the ‘cul-
ture of narcissism’, which in his view spawned a ‘me’ generation devoid of social
direction and compass, which spouted empty ‘freedom’ slogans and is character-
ized by detachment, boredom, violent tendencies and civil and political apathy. To-
gether with a culture of social nihilism fostered by a Àamboyant consumer culture,
global trends also led to a breach of traditional national boundaries and redrawing
them in a particular, tribal and local direction. Zygmunt Bauman (2000) termed this
phenomenon ‘glocalization’, a social division between the globally mobile and the
locally stationary: the economic, technological, educated, political and successful
elites move from one end of the world to the other while physically and mentally
detaching themselves from the speci¿c identity space of their country. On the other
hand, there is a growing stratum in local population, which due to the weakening of
the welfare state, feels abandoned and nurtures universal tribalism on the basis of
ethnicity, religion, gender, etc
Neo-liberal economic logic and radical relativistic trends in postmodernism
have also left their mark on public education. The decentralization and privatisation
processes being undergone by the Israeli education system are deepening historical
schism and establishing ‘market’ patterns in the system. I shall mention three forces
contributing to the weakening of and division in the public education system:
1. A government policy of public budget cuts, promoting decentralization and pri-
vatisation, and assimilating administrative concepts that lead schools to compete
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TEACHERS’ TRAINING TOWARDS ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
for students and resources and to focus their efforts on meeting the demands of
their ‘clients’, i.e., the students and their parents.
2. Various cultural, religious and ethnic communities, which in the name of multi-
cultural logic demand the expansion of their educational autonomy and reduction
of the central system’s authority. Evidence of the power of this force is found in
the inability of the state to consolidate a binding core curriculum, or in other
words, to condition receipt of state funds upon accepting a minimal curriculum.
3. Parents of high socioeconomic status who seek to exercise their right to better
their children’s education, and who open channels bypassing the public systems
and institutionalise private or semi-private educational frameworks.
At this point I seek to make the following argument: an education system in a demo-
cratic society plays two roles of cardinal importance – the socioeconomic role and
the sociopedagogic role. In its socioeconomic role the public education system must
consolidate the essential equality of opportunity and provide all its students with
the possibility of an education that is a gateway to the world of employment, and
an entry into modern society. A public-funded education system which operates
programs designed to provide af¿rmative preference to weak populations is likely
to reduce gaps and lessen inequality. In its pedagogic role the public education
system in a real democracy should constitute a framework for encounter between
groups from different populations, found an ideological and cultural platform, and
facilitate the nurturing of social solidarity. An education system such as this will
aspire towards dealing, on a day-to-day basis, with the dif¿culties and complexity
of maintaining a partnership within otherness in a democratic society, and educate
its students towards active citizenship and involvement in their adult life (Helsep,
1989; Mathews, 1996).
In order to accomplish its pedagogic mission, the education system cannot settle
for teachers with didactic skills and disciplinary professionalism who shut them-
selves off within the four walls of prevailing classroom instrumentalism. To achieve
this end calls for politically aware teachers who see themselves as agents of social
change and are active in the educational and community spheres. An education
system for democratic citizenship must be staffed by involved intellectual teachers.
However, training teachers as involved intellectuals requires planting the willing-
ness and ability to become enlightened, critical teachers (Aronowitz, 2008). This
approach, therefore, requires seriously addressing the intellectual and political as-
pects of the trainees.
Antonio Gramsci spoke of the need for ‘organic intellectuals.’ He thought that civil
society is the main sphere of activity of politicians and stressed that no economic
factor, decisive though it might be, can act without passing through human con-
131
ESTHER YOGEV
132
TEACHERS’ TRAINING TOWARDS ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
The mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence,
which is an exterior and momentary mover of feelings and passions, but in
active participation in practical life, as an constructor, organizer, ‘permanent
persuader’ and not just simple orator (…) from technique-as-work one pro-
ceeds to technique-as-science and to the humanistic conception of history,
without which one remains ‘specialized’ and does not become ‘directive’ (spe-
cialized and political) (Gramsci, 1971, p. 10).
The Gramscian approach offers an optimistic and practical angle for analysing so-
cial reality. Unlike Williams’s somewhat despairing approach in light of the power
of hegemony, Gramsci offers a loophole through which hegemonic consciousness
can be breached and paves a practical way for achieving it.
The idea of the ‘organic intellectual educator’ was reinforced by the epistemolog-
ical-existential elements lying at the basis of critical pedagogical perception. Like
Gramsci, leading critical pedagogy thinkers such as Paolo Freire (1970), Henry Gi-
roux (1988), Peter McLaren (1989), Ira Shor (1992) and others view the formal edu-
cation system as a clearly political locale that plays a leading role in shaping public
consciousness, whereby the hegemony can reproduce itself. In his book, Teachers
as Intellectuals: towards a Critical Pedagogy of Learning, Giroux proposes a criti-
cal concept of education in the sense of the educational praxis incumbent upon the
intellectual, as set out by Gramsci. He is looking for educators who feel responsible
for raising an involved, critical citizen with a developed sense of justice and who
care about others. Critical education should empower and reinforce the learner so
that he can decipher the language of the hegemony, identify through a critical read-
ing of reality the factors and forces inÀuencing his life, and develop for himself an
informed direction and appropriate skills that will enable him to lead his life for his
own bene¿t and that of his community (Giroux, 1988).
The dif¿culty with the prevailing critical pedagogy derives from the fact that the
‘enemy’ is not one of Àesh and blood but always the system, the ideology. But if the
other is not a living, kicking and breathing human being, there is no place for peda-
gogy (Jansen, 2009, p. 257). Classrooms and schools are full of contention. Teachers
and students possess problematic individual knowledge with educational implica-
tions, knowledge with which we must know how to heighten awareness, clarify and
133
ESTHER YOGEV
change. It is precisely the ‘knowledge in the blood’ that is in each and every class-
room that must serve as a point of departure towards a different pedagogy. The key
to social change is to be found in a speci¿c dialogue with the other.
Therefore, in the epistemological aspect teacher training will seek to strengthen
the awareness of novice teachers regarding the multiplicity of paths of knowledge,
its interpretative alternatives and the partialness of their understanding. It will nur-
ture critical reading and emphasize learning that examines how various patterns of
‘local’ and ‘of¿cial’ learning are created, and how a consciousness system is cre-
ated that blocks alternatives from challenging hegemonic rule. This critical literacy
will somewhat neutralize the attempt of the of¿cial education system to construct
a ¿ctional reality which presents itself as the only truth and blocks any desire for
change.
The ethical professional identity formed during the educators’ training process af-
fords them the ability to navigate in the social and moral space: Who am I is linked
to questions of what am I doing and how am I acting towards the other, what do
I want and what is signi¿cant for me Well known in this context are the works of
John Dewey (1916/1997), Lev Vygotsky (1978), Mikhail Bakhtin (1984), Charles
Taylor (1992) and others, which also focus attention on the interpersonal dialogue
as a practice of creating identity. According to their approaches, the students’ self-
recognition is bound up not only in their love of and esteems for signi¿cant others,
but also in recognition of the public arena, recognition that has both symbolic and
practical aspects.
The philosophical-sociological theory of Axel Honneth, who currently heads
the Frankfurt school of thought, can offer a theoretical framework for this con-
cept. Honneth (2007) asks which social conditions enable people to develop fully
and ful¿l themselves. He has formulated a social-ethical theory at the centre of
which stands ‘recognition’. His main premise is that a just society is one that
enables a person to gain recognition. A human being exists in complicated and
complex networks of ongoing relationships with others and himself, and he builds
his identity in a constant dialogue within those networks. In building a person’s
self-identity the individual’s desire to gain the respect and esteem of others is of
particular importance, as is his willingness to grant them to others out of esteem,
identi¿cation or affection, not exclusive considerations of bene¿t. Exclusion, ob-
jecti¿cation, humiliation, scorn, oppression or discrimination towards an indi-
vidual, or the group framework of which he is a member, do not enable a person to
ful¿l himself. They are liable to impair his self-esteem as someone who is loved
and cared about, as someone respected as a person and appreciated by virtue of
his deeds and contribution to society. Honneth’s theory, which the above can only
hint at several of its ideas, offers an interesting theoretical foundation for the
pedagogical aspect of a teacher training program, since its implications can be
134
TEACHERS’ TRAINING TOWARDS ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
135
ESTHER YOGEV
Based on the outlined sociopolitical vision and the epistemological and pedagogical
aspects deriving from it, a broad and comprehensive policy for teacher training was
designed at the Kibbutzim College of Education. It is important to note that this
policy seeks to create change in the entire sphere of college teacher-training, rather
than merely creating a de¿ned boutique program. A training model encompassing
all the College’s training programs and including all the students engaged in BA
studies was designed in order to implement the program on the organizational level.
A Social Involvement Unit was set up, consisting of a full-time project manager, a
professor who supports and advises on academic issues and a research team.
The wish to go beyond the classroom space and experience activities both at
school and in the community, led to alliances between the College and speci¿c
cities and neighbourhoods. These alliances were intertwined, starting from senior
management level (relations between College management and mayors), through
middle management level (relations between heads of training paths and municipal
department heads) and up to the performance level (relations between the pedagogi-
cal instructors and principals, including community centre managers). At this stage
of the program, the experience includes 3,500 students and about 100 faculty mem-
136
TEACHERS’ TRAINING TOWARDS ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
bers. The program is in its experimental phase and receives an annual government
budget in the sum $150,000, which is matched by the College.
The teacher-training model at the College translated the pedagogical vision into
two circles of implementation: (A) Including community involvement in pedagogi-
cal training as part of the regular practical experience process and establishing a
program of social involvement in non-formal organizations. (B) Expanding oppor-
tunities for the students’ active involvement in campus life.
As aforementioned, all the students at the College participate in these circles,
which are implemented in all the study tracks. I shall now present them in brief,
and then present the ¿ndings of studies that monitored the implementation of this
new policy.
One of the unique and central components of teacher training is pedagogic compe-
tence that includes the novice teacher’s practical experience in the classroom and
the attendant didactic-academic workshop. While recognizing the centrality and
importance of pedagogic instruction in the training process and based on training
approaches emphasizing reÀectivity, knowledge construction and community ex-
posure (Shulman, 1998; Hargreaves & Fullan, 2000), we sought to extend the bor-
ders of pedagogic instruction to the social and community arenas. The applicative
component for the changes undertaken in pedagogical instruction is the inclusion
of experiencing extracurricular social activity as an integral and binding part of the
College’s training program. In the course of their studies every student at the Col-
lege is obliged to work in a social organization for 60 hours, and at the same time
take part in an academic course attending that activity. The social activity gains
academic accreditation, which obliges the various tracks to restructure their sched-
ule and thus the program becomes part of the track core rather than accompanying
it. These courses serve as an arena for conceptualizing and processing practical
experiences accumulated in the social activity.
In the circle of implementing social involvement, a large proportion of the stu-
dents’ social activity, as well as the attendant academic courses, are channelled to
the socioeconomic ¿eld. In the framework of social activity the students are placed
in a variety of organizations engaged in economic-civic issues. The organizations
are selected according to various criteria, including aspects of size, scope, and abil-
ity to provide monitoring and support for students, but it is the nature of the organi-
zation’s activity that is primarily examined. In selecting the organizations emphasis
is placed on those acting towards social change, rather than organizations whose
activities are primarily providing support and welfare. Thus, for example, students
are active in organizations acting towards exercising the rights of disadvantaged
populations; organizations that mentor children and adolescents of migrant workers
and other minorities; organizations acting towards advancing workers’ rights. The
courses include familiarization with Israeli society as one of immigrants compris-
137
ESTHER YOGEV
ing diverse cultural and social groups. While studying and analysing current macro
economic data, privatisation, neo-liberalism, civil society and organized labour, the
students are exposed to the Israeli economic reality. These courses use the experi-
ences the students accumulate in the framework of their social activities, and thus
the theory and the concepts being studied are linked to experiences. In this way
experiences and feelings are conceptualized just as the theory and the concepts un-
dergo a process of personalization and are translated into ‘faces’ and ‘names’. These
courses also incorporate encounters with social activists and tours in disadvantaged
neighbourhoods and areas – which are also designed to link the studied theories to
everyday reality.
138
TEACHERS’ TRAINING TOWARDS ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
on democracy and education, which is organized and run by students under the
guidance and support of the faculty. Commencing 2009, the conference will be held
every year on the Yitzhak Rabin Memorial Day.
These examples illustrate a signi¿cant change in the College’s life culture and
its willingness to nurture its students’ genuine experience and involvement in edu-
cational and social activism, even on the academic college’s campus. These op-
portunities for involvement complement the experience and insights gathered in
lectures and practical teaching, and are a greenhouse for empowering the students
as involved intellectual leaders.
So far, the training model presented here is in its fourth year. The accompanying
research is still in its early stages. It remains to be seen whether the research ¿nd-
ings corroborate our hypothesis that the model can generate a change in the percep-
tion of the teachers’ vocation to become involved leaders in the community. The
research examines the following questions:
– Is there any change in the students’ concept of the professional teacher’s obliga-
tions between the beginning and the end of the student’s training?
– Have the teachers involved in the program undergone any changes in their con-
cept and approach?
In addition to these two questions, assessment studies of speci¿c projects are made
and their degree of success is examined in light of their goal de¿nition.
One of the researches on social activity focused on students active in a number
of organizations in the sphere of welfare and education in the Jewish-Arab city of
Ramle (Shemer-Elkayam & Eitan, 2009). The study included pre-post student ques-
tionnaires (N=44) aimed at identifying their feelings and attitudes towards social
involvement. Both questionnaires were anonymous and were matched by means of
an identity code. The extensive questionnaires included ‘inter alia’, a 28-statement
sub-questionnaire about the students’ expectations/attitudes regarding the contri-
bution of social involvement to themselves, in which they were asked to rate the
degree of contribution to themselves. Content analysis of their responses to this
sub-questionnaire yielded ¿ve categories: contribution to teaching ability and the
ability to plan and convey didactic content, contribution to personal development,
contribution to development of social consciousness and motivation to create so-
cial change. A questionnaire for lecturers in the accompanying courses included
closed and open questions about the primary objectives of the attendant course
and the degree to which they were attained, course content, division of time in the
course, general satisfaction with the course and the relationship with the pedagogi-
cal instructors. A questionnaire for the pedagogical instructors included closed and
open questions about the role of pedagogical instruction in social involvement, the
139
ESTHER YOGEV
When the students were asked about the level of contribution of their work to the
children themselves, they reported a high level of contribution (mean 4.39). This
study, too, shows that the aspect they felt was most lacking was practical support
– the students expected more operative guidance from the lecturers and instruc-
tors, including discussion of speci¿c issues arising from the ¿eld, learning work
methods, suggesting ideas for activities with the target population, and recommen-
dations on learning aids. In addition, they recommended that the instructors hold
more meetings in small groups to discuss issues and practical dif¿culties arising in
the ¿eld (Shemer-Elkayam & Eitan, 2009).
By means of the accompanying courses and the social activity, a window has
been opened for the students to worlds that had been transparent for them until
now. At the same time, the success of the program in its aspirations to nurture in
student teachers a professional pedagogical identity that is founded on a sociopoliti-
cal backbone, is still doubtful and requires constant improvement of the model and
further research.
CONCLUSION
The Kibbutzim College of Education views its principal objective as the de-
velopment and training of educators, teachers and therapists possessing a hu-
manistic approach and environmental social responsibility (…) The College
140
TEACHERS’ TRAINING TOWARDS ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
views teachers as educators involved in the community and society and holds
an ideological position mandating increased contact between academe and the
community. The College has set itself the target of heightening concern and
sensitivity in its graduates to the social and environmental reality of the State
of Israel, and positioning social involvement as an integral part of the educa-
tional and teacher training process. The objective of social involvement is to
expose students to the diverse strata of Israeli society with the aim of nurtur-
ing social solidarity and willingness for social and environmental activism.
This involvement is important for novice teachers on their road to developing
a social consciousness that will serve as a basis for their educational endeav-
our and their ability to contribute towards reforming the reality (retrieved
from the College website www.smkb.ac.il on 17.01.2010 [Hebrew]).
The training model presented above blurs the borderline between formal and non-
formal education and takes the students out of the classroom and brings them into
contact with the community and society in order to introduce democratic conduct
into the academic life of the College. This model constitutes an alternative to the
accepted learning tracks at teacher training institutions:
1. Unlike conventional teacher training, the model presented above seeks to equip
teachers with a critical approach to reality and to prepare them to act in it as
pedagogic activists.
2. The new training model, unlike conventional teacher training, views the students
as partners in the structuring of teaching and learning, in designing the curricu-
lum and in shaping campus academic life.
3. The new training model seeks to expand the pool of experiences and viewpoints
to additional circles of community and society. This broader and varied experi-
ence strengthens the novice teacher’s ability to observe the educational endeav-
our in the social and political ¿elds, which inÀuences and heightens his/her hu-
man and social sensitivity.
The evaluation studies presented in the present article are a ¿rst attempt to empiri-
cally evaluate the new teachers training programs. Much more research has to be
done. This ¿rst study, however attests to the fact that the training model, which has
been operating in the Kibbutzim College of Education for almost four years, has
taken an important step towards nurturing teachers with a social-public conscious-
ness. But presently it still has a long way to go in order to achieve its objectives.
Moreover, according to the reports of this study, the students’ sense of self-ef¿cacy
has increased immeasurably; On the other hand, the study raises the question of the
sustainability of these changes in their professional pedagogical identity.
The question is whether the insights and perceptions that have been constructed
in the students following their participation is the diverse components of the new
training model will come together to form a role perception that will survive in
a challenging education system with contradicting demands. At this stage it can
141
ESTHER YOGEV
already be stated that pre-service training policy, which is detached from the proc-
esses of entering the workforce and from continuing professional development, is
liable to be swallowed up and blurred when its graduates are assimilated into the
system with its constraints. In light of all this, coupled with continuing to nurture
and re¿ne the teacher-training policy presented here, it is also necessary to develop
continuing stages of development and professional support from the start. These
stages complement and strengthen the achievements of the training model, and, in
the complex reality of existence of Israeli society, will reinforce the activities of a
class of teachers in the education system that function as involved intellectuals in
society and the community.
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College of Education
Kibbutzim College Tel Aviv
143
vi
DIEUWERTJE BAKKER
Teaching means working with values. Educating students to become teachers re-
quires making them conscious of how values are embedded in all aspects of their
practices and how to handle these values (Bergem, 2003). Bringing this reÀexivity
into practice is not easy, especially when the level of consciousness goes further
than just ‘talking about subject matters’ and extends itself to the level of personal
involvement. At the University of Humanistic Studies (UH) in the Netherlands, a
central aspect of teacher education concerns the professional’s personal involve-
ment. One reason for this involvement is that their teachings’ subject focuses on
existential questions, moral values and ethical dilemma’s on which the humanis-
tic teachers also have their own views. Another reason is that these teachers have
explicit normative ideas about educational aims and teaching strategies which are
related to their worldviews. At the UH the term ‘normative professionalism’ is used
to emphasize these aspects of their work. The term bears resemblance to ethical
competence in teaching that refers to the teacher’s capability to analyse and solve
the ethical dilemmas with which teachers are constantly confronted during class-
room teaching (Bergem, 2003, p. 94).
Teacher education at the UH is based on the so-called reÀective paradigm
(Veugelers, 2010). The academic aim is to develop sensitivity and competencies
to deal with situations where values are colliding on the personal, occupational,
institutional and social level. However, little is known about what normative pro-
fessionalism looks like in the teaching practice and what values are involved. In
this chapter we will present an empirical study that focuses on these questions.
After describing the context of the study, the concept of normative professional-
ism is clari¿ed. In order to get a deep insight into the concept normative profes-
sionalism in the practice of humanistic teachers, a speci¿c research instrument,
the self-confrontation method, is used. This method allows for the investigation of
personal meanings and is based on the valuation theory as a conceptual framework
for researching a personal meaning system (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995).
Finally, having described theory and method, a small-scale empirical investigation
of normative professionalism in practice is presented. Special attention is paid to
the relevance of the affective aspects of the meaning system for the concept of
normative professionalism.
EDUCATIONAL CONTEXT
Before exploring the practices of humanistic teachers, the context in which these
teachers operate must be made clear. Under certain conditions, everyone in The
Netherlands can start a school grounded on a worldview, religion or pedagogical
idea. These private schools are public ¿nanced and follow the national curriculum,
and they make their own curriculum only for the area of religious, ethical or world-
view studies. The of¿cial humanist movement does not support the option of private
schools, but advocates state or public schools where children from various religious,
cultural and social backgrounds are brought together and can interact. At these
state schools, attention should be paid to all kinds of worldviews, like Christianity,
Hinduism and humanism, but also to the broad scope of ethical and existential ques-
tions with which children are confronted nowadays.
It is only since the early Eighties that teachers at secondary schools are of¿cially
quali¿ed to teach ‘ethical and worldview education’ from a non-religious or human-
istic point of view. Although there are only a few state secondary schools which
have a subject like ‘ethical and worldview education’ on the curriculum, there is a
growing number of private (religious) schools that welcome teachers with a human-
istic background to teach this subject. An important reason is the changing popula-
tion of these schools. More and more, their pupils vary in cultural backgrounds and
worldviews. Given the desirable and necessary encounter between different belief
systems and worldviews, humanistic teachers are supposed to be able to handle
these differences, because they actively promote an open attitude towards diverse
worldviews and to get involved in dialogical practices.
Still, in absolute numbers, few humanistic teachers work at secondary schools.
Some factors which make teaching ‘ethical and worldview education’ a dif¿cult job
are obvious. There is often little room in the curriculum for a subject like ‘ethical
and worldview education’; in most schools this subject is taught for just one hour a
week and the marks the pupils get for the tests do not count in grading decisions.
The teachers seldom have colleagues who teach the same subject and with whom
they can share their experiences. Above all, most humanistic teachers cannot and
will not fall back on standard programs or methods, because they have strong and
often deeply rooted opinions about pedagogical aims and ways of teaching. These
facts and opinions suggest that it is not an easy job to be a humanistic teacher, but,
of course, one can only ascertain this by doing research in this ¿eld.
NORMATIVE PROFESSIONALISM
The concept normative professionalism plays a central role in the training of human-
istic teachers at the UH. Normative professionalism refers to becoming conscious
of the differences and tensions between individual, professional, organisational and
societal values. Coping with these different values and reÀecting on their own be-
haviour are essential elements of the occupational activities of humanistic teachers.
146
HUMANISTIC TEACHING IN PRACTICE
These questions will be answered by analysing at the group level and by presenting
an individual case to give more speci¿c insight into the interaction between reÀec-
tion and emotion. An important aim of this empirical study is to get recommenda-
147
DIEUWERTJE BAKKER
tions for the teachers’ training at the UH. It will produce information about themes
which concern the teachers. Moreover, it can reveal the teachers’ innermost thoughts
and feelings, and the personal signi¿cance of their experiences. This way of looking
at teaching and teacher education is closely connected with Korthagen’s project on
the inÀuence of personal beliefs on pedagogical-didactic behaviour (Korthagen,
2004). It is also related to Schön’s ideas about the reÀective practitioner who has
a lot of knowing-in-action at his disposal (Schön, 1987). Therefore, an approach
was needed that detects the teachers’ daily experiences and reÀections, as well as
the emotional impact of these experiences. An appropriate approach for this kind
of research is the self-confrontation method of Hermans (Hermans & Hermans-
Janssen, 1995), which is based on the valuation theory. This method is sensitive to
the affective properties of experiences and has been successfully used in a variety
of research projects, for example on education by humanist parents (Bakker, 2004),
religious development (Gerritsen, 1984), value crisis (Hermans & Oles, 1996) and
professional identity (Vloet, 2007).
This explorative study concentrated on the practices of humanistic teachers in
secondary schools. Six persons were randomly selected from a list of eighteen grad-
uates who work as a teacher in ‘ethical and worldview education’. They were all
quite willing to explore their own educational practices with the self-confrontation
method. The teachers, four women and two men, had 3-10 years’ experience; their
ages varied between 25-53 years. They were told not to bother about the de¿ni-
tion of normative professionalism, due to the risk of academically correct answers
which probably had little to do with their practices. Based on earlier research, it
was assumed that a more real life picture of normative professionalism could arise
by letting the teachers reÀect on their experiences and relive them. And also, that it
would be possible to discover ‘places of strain’ by means of the self-confrontation
method.
Valuation theory is a theory of the self, developed for the study of individual experi-
ences, their ordering into a meaning system, and their development over time and
place. Central to the theory is a person who is involved in meaning construction
by reÀecting on and telling about daily experiences (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen,
1995; Hermans & Oles, 1996). This process of story telling leads to valuations
which include everything a person ¿nds to be of importance when thinking about
his or her life situation. It can include a broad range of phenomena: an exciting
experience, a dif¿cult task, a sweet memory, a special friendship. By means of a
systematic reÀection process in dialogue with oneself or another person valuations
become organized into a system.
An essential feature of the valuation theory is the assumption that each valuation
has an affective modality: a speci¿c pattern of affects. At the manifest level valua-
tions represent the more conscious elements of human experience that are speci¿c
148
HUMANISTIC TEACHING IN PRACTICE
149
DIEUWERTJE BAKKER
on a scale of 0-5 to what extent he experiences each affect in connection with that
particular valuation. The affect scores of each type are added so that each valuation
is characterised by a speci¿c affective pattern of each valuation. E.g. S=22, O=13,
P=17, N=2 for the given example. The ¿rst and second indices, S and O, express
the two basic motives; the third and fourth indices, P and O, refer to positive and
negative feelings which a person experiences in gratifying the basic motives. The
example valuation is quite ful¿lled regarding the S-motive, and accompanied with a
high feeling of well-being too. At the end the following question is presented: ‘How
do you generally feel these days as a teacher?’ The person answers this question
only by applying the affect terms to this question and does not need to formulate a
speci¿c valuation.
Based on empirical research six general types of valuation have been postu-
lated, which reÀect the organizational structure of a valuation system (Hermans &
Hermans-Jansen, 1995) Each type contains a different combination of basic mo-
tives and positive and negative affects. In the most integrated form of valuation both
basic motives, self-enhancement and contact, coexist on a high level together with
more positive than negative feelings (SO+). This kind of valuation often reÀects a
very ful¿lling and meaningful experience, in which a person feels powerful and
connected at the same time. Autonomy goes together with commitment. A valu-
ation’s type, quite opposite to this, contains a low level of both self-enhancement
and contact. Both motives are unful¿lled, which often is associated with negative
feelings (SO-). Powerlessness and isolation are typical for this kind of valuation.
This combination often has a paralysing effect on the person. It is also possible that
the S-motive and the O-motive are exclusively present, together with high positive
feelings. The form of valuation that typically represents a high degree of autonomy
and success, is called S+. Valuations of the O+ type have a lot of affect pointing to
contact and union with another and can refer to ful¿lled love. Aggression and anger
are typical of a valuation with a high S-motive and strong negative feelings (O+).
A high O-motive together with strong negative feelings is indicative for unful¿lled
love (O-). All these types are global, somewhat metaphorical descriptions and can
represent many different speci¿c experiences.
150
HUMANISTIC TEACHING IN PRACTICE
The scoring of the affect terms permits the calculation of indices which are used
for an analysis of an individual’s valuation system. It is also possible to analyse the
indices on group level. Both ways of analysis have been applied in this study. Fur-
thermore the content of the valuations in combination with the affects involved is
analysed. It presents information about the themes, worries and inspirations of the
teachers that may be associated with normative professionalism.
RESULTS
The ¿rst question raised in this study dealt with the experiences of humanistic
teachers; special attention was paid to the level on which these experiences took
place. Four experiential levels were distinguished: the personal, occupational, in-
stitutional and societal level. A professional can meet tensions between different
values and norms on each level. Those tensions can be intra- or interpersonal, and
they also can appear between the two levels (Van den Ende, 2007, p.16).
The teachers’ valuations were sorted into categories, according to the level on
which they were expressed. The categorisation of the valuations could easily be
derived from the original teachers’ narratives and required little interpretation. In
order to answer the ¿rst question, the combined valuations of the six teachers were
analysed. Together, the six teachers formulated 120 valuations, varying from 12- 25
per person, which were distributed on all levels (table 1).
Personal 37
Occupational 35
Institutional 10
Occupational-institutional 12
Societal 13
Occupational-societal 13
As can be seen in table 1, many valuations related to personal concerns. Some ex-
amples of valuations are:
– I enjoy the relationship with my pupils. I get something in return from them.
– I assume that you always have a choice: this choice is not always clear and can be
dif¿cult.
– Whether I will continue to be a teacher, depends on the success of my husbands’
newly-started enterprise.
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DIEUWERTJE BAKKER
Many valuations were connected to the occupational level in combination with the
institutional or societal level, such as:
– I am bothered by colleagues who only are looking at the marks, and who don’t
look at the pupil behind them.
– In my subject, I have to teach things children should learn from their parents,
who don’t have time for it.
– I manage fairly well to treat the ‘internet’ as a phenomenon with many sides:
beautiful and ugly, good and bad.
Nearly one third of the valuations bore upon personal situations which inÀuence the
teacher’s professional experiences. This raises questions about the interpretation of
this outcome. Is the teacher’s person that important? Would a clear distinction be-
tween private life and work be a more adequate professional attitude? What kind of
personal topics are mentioned by the teachers, and what affects are involved? In the
discussion section will be elaborated on the relatively large percentage of personal
valuations.
To answer the second question, the affective properties of all valuations were
studied, because they form a lead to tensions which may refer to ‘places of strain’.
All valuations were assigned to one of the six motives’ types: SO +, SO -, S+, S -, O+,
O -. It appeared that a substantial number of the valuations could not be assigned
to any of these types. Besides that, these valuations had certain characteristics
in common. They all had a high level of the S- and the O-motive, coupled with
a combination of rather strongly negative and positive feelings. To put it dif-
ferently: both basic motives were intensely present and frustrated at the same
time. Feelings of self-enhancement and contact were accompanied by mixed,
ambivalent feelings. Due to the number of this valuation’s type, a new category
was created: SO +/-. The distribution of the valuations to the motives’ types is
shown in table 2.
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HUMANISTIC TEACHING IN PRACTICE
Some preliminary conclusions can be drawn, bearing in mind that they come from
a very small sample. Table 2 shows that both basic motives (S and O) were present
in two thirds of all experiences. The need for self-enhancement (S) and the need
for contact (O) are entangled with each other to a great extent in the experiences of
these six teachers. The teachers appear to discriminate little between these two mo-
tives. This outcome requires further reÀection in the discussion section.
On the whole, half the experiences of these teachers were positive (SO+/+, S+,O+)
and half were negative or ambivalent (SO-/-, S-, O-, SO+/-). One can appraise this
outcome in two opposite ways: positively or negatively. But an intuitive notion is
that this 50%-50% picture should become more positive. The question is whether
this study offers any clues as to how this can be done. In the following paragraph, a
provisional answer is sought by analysing an individual case.
The next step was to differentiate the number of valuations according to levels
and basic motives’ types. Due to the small sample, the levels as mentioned in table
1, were brought back to a well-known classi¿cation, i.e., micro (personal and oc-
cupational), meso (institutional and institutional-occupational) and macro (societal
and societal-occupational) (table 3)
Table 3 Number of valuations in relation to types of basic motives and combined levels
Table 3 shows that the teachers were mostly occupied with the micro level, i.e. the
personal and occupational level. Most valuations on this level were emotionally
positive. When the teachers mentioned experiences on the meso or macro level,
their valuations most likely were emotionally very negative or strongly ambivalent.
The question is whether this outcome reveals something about normative profes-
sionalism. For normative professionalism implies facing dif¿cult situations espe-
cially with regard to differences in values: the so called ‘places of strain’. A self-
153
DIEUWERTJE BAKKER
154
HUMANISTIC TEACHING IN PRACTICE
her pupils. Her statements are really normative and under great stress, but she still
wants to ¿ght for them. In comparison, the valuations with low basic motives (SO -)
are emotionally much more negative and the struggle seems already to be lost.
Table 4. Examples of valuations of Brenda with low, mixed and high basic motives
Low basic motives: SO- Mixed basic motives SO+/- High basic motives SO+
6. I sometimes wonder 17. At meetings I ¿nd my 12. The most wonderful thing
whether I take my work too input just as important (may of my job is when pupils show
seriously (5 5 5 17) k=23 be even more important) than personal things of themselves
the teacher who says: ‘He has to me and to the others (25 23
a 3 for mathematics’ (20 13 15 25 0) k=100
16) k=48
11. I am getting tired to 21. I like to convince other 13. I feel acknowledged by
explain to others why I ¿nd people of my vision on Frank (a colleague). He says:
my subject meaningful (9 3 5 education (19 15 13 15) k=46 ‘I see your quality, I know
22) k=19 which way you want to go and
I walk with you’.
(25 24 25 1) k=96
*) The order of these scores corresponds with the indices S(elf) O(ther) P(ositive) N(egative).
155
DIEUWERTJE BAKKER
Not only the affective pattern of single valuations contains important additional in-
formation, but the affective pattern of the valuation system as a whole can lead to a
more complete picture too. In order to look more closely at the correlations between
the affective patterns of the valuations some additional idiographic analysis has
been performed (Hermans, 1988). The correlations between the affective pro¿les of
all valuations were assessed by using the product-moment correlation coef¿cient.
It appeared that there is a remarkable difference in the number of correlations of
the valuations of the high and low basic motive types (SO+, SO-) and those of the
mixed basic motives type (SO+/-). The valuations with a high or low basic motive
pattern have a mean of 13 correlations with other valuations (positive and negative),
so they have a strong generalising emotional effect. Only two of the SO+/--valuations
correlate with one other (17 and 21), one valuation (4) has a unique affective pattern
and one valuation (9) correlates with ¿ve others, which is still rather few compared
to the other two types which are correlated with many more other valuations. In
other words these four valuations are not, or scarcely integrated in the valuation
system as a whole. The meaning of this will be discussed in the next paragraph.
The next step is to look more closely to the correlations between valuation 9 and
the ¿ve other valuations. The following observations can be made (table 5). Four
out of ¿ve valuations have a SO- pattern, that is to say, they are keeping Brenda at
a position in which she feels rather hopeless and without much power. Although in
this situation the S-motive is slightly more present, especially in valuation 3 which
even has a S--pattern. The correlation with valuation 6 is remarkable too, because
that valuation regards her work as a whole. The basic motives of valuation 9 obvi-
ously are not very high and there is a tendency for both motives to get really low.
Eventually this can cause this valuation to become a SO--valuation. This possible
outcome can shed another light on the absence of correlations of the other valua-
tions with mixed basic motives. It con¿rms the special position of these types of
valuations that may have something to do with the dif¿cult situations which are part
of the teachers’ normative professionalism.
156
HUMANISTIC TEACHING IN PRACTICE
S O P N r
r is the product-moment correlation between the affective patterns of valuation 9 and other
valuations
157
DIEUWERTJE BAKKER
S O P N r
r is the product-moment correlation between the affective patterns of the valuation and valuation 2
DISCUSSION
158
HUMANISTIC TEACHING IN PRACTICE
lies behind the manifest level of self-narratives. In this study, the self-confrontation
method was used. This method enables the teachers to explore the signi¿cance of
their experiences by expressing their feelings associated with these various experi-
ences. In this way, the teachers provided the researcher with a deeper insight into
their professional narratives, and into the underlying relationships between their
valuations and the inÀuence of the basic motives. The outcomes can be used for
analysis on both an individual and a group level, as has accomplished in this study.
It turned out that the six humanistic teachers have rather many personal valua-
tions which inÀuence their work as a teacher. When these teachers reÀect on their
work they reÀect on themselves; they do not differentiate sharply between their
professional and personal life. A teacher teaches who she is, and work is an inte-
grated part of her life and meaning system. Or, as Korthagen, citing Hamachek,
put it: ‘Consciously, we teach what we know; unconsciously we teach who we are’
This outcome is important for teacher education, because the personal valuation
system should be considered in close connection to the demanded competencies
(Korthagen, 2004, p. 77)
This study also showed that the teachers feel very much connected to their work,
in spite of rather a large amount of negative and ambivalent experiences. According
to Hansen, successful teachers conceive their work not only in purely functional
terms, but they have an inner motivation for the job (Hansen 1995, p.151). This
enables them to withstand the dif¿culties of everyday school life. The outcomes of
this study stress the importance of the professional’s personal meanings as a sub-
stantial part of normative professionalism. These meanings refer to the teachers’
views of life, choices and dilemma’s in which values are involved like parenthood,
aging, partnership and the future. These views can support as well as undermine
the professional in his or her work. In fact, in this study, most personal valuations
were supportive.
The entangling of the S- and O-motive is more complicated to evaluate. Two
thirds of the teachers’ valuations are founded on both motives. This phenomenon
involves a certain risk, because it can signify a lack of differentiation in the valua-
tion system and makes the system less Àexible in accommodating to various events.
When the two motives are indiscriminately active, in extreme situations, this can
lead to unrealistic aspirations and overinvolvement, and in the end to limitlessness.
The underlying drive is to achieve the highest possible level of both self-enhance-
ment and union with the other (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995, p. 182). The
same phenomenon appeared in another study about the motivation of nurses who
worked with elderly people (Weidema, 2007). It is possible that people who work
with people have a high risk of becoming limitless, due to their involvement and
their idealism. Humanistic teachers, as other normative professionals, certainly be-
long tot this group and they should know about the risks involved.
The isolated position of valuations poses another risk, as is the case with the
mixed motive-valuations of Brenda. These valuations show a high need for self-
enhancement and for contact, together with a mixture of positive and negative feel-
159
DIEUWERTJE BAKKER
ings. In Brenda’s valuation system, these valuations are scarcely correlated with
other valuations, which is in contrast with the other valuations in her system. Ac-
cording to Hermans (1995, p.157), fragmentation could be the case. The reason for
this can be that a person wants to protect these valuations against becoming really
emotionally negative. Brenda’s valuation system certainly shows a tendency in that
direction.
But at the same time, Hermans (1995, p.161) warns against this kind of interpre-
tation: it is just an observation which can be brought to the attention of a person
when he or she feels ready for it. However, as an outcome of this study it offers a
more speci¿c lead to tracing normative professionalism in a person’s narrative. For
these kind of valuations very much look like the ‘places of strain’, which a person
would rather avoid and wants to approach at the same time.
An essential part of the self-confrontation method is to elicit the emotions un-
derlying a verbalised experience. Emotions often give new or even contrasting in-
formation, for example in Gwen’s valuation. A new light can be shed on a verbalised
experience when the person is confronted with her own emotions that are in con-
trast with the content of a valuation. It can deepen her insight or bring her closer to
a place of strain. It is even possible that she will change her valuation. So reÀection
in normative professionalism should extend itself explicitly to the affective aspects
of the experience. According to Sutton and Wheatley (2003, p. 335), researchers
must also include measures that extend beyond self-report in order to gain a more
complete picture of teachers’ emotions. Paraphrasing Westheimer (2005, p. 36),
researchers might do better to examine the underlying emotions conveyed by the
content of reÀections. In that way it is possible to discover underlying beliefs and
tensions. And that will lead to the places of strain which normative professionalism
is about.
REFERENCES
160
HUMANISTIC TEACHING IN PRACTICE
Hermans, H.J.M., & Oles, P.K. (1996). Value crisis: Affective organization of personal meanings. Jour-
nal of Research in Personality 30, 457-482.
Korthagen, F.A.J. (2004). In search of the essence of a good teacher: towards a more holistic approach
in teacher education. Teaching and Teacher Education 20, 77-97.
Schön, D.A. (1987). Educating the reÀective practitioner. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc.
Smaling, A. (2005). Aspecten van normatieve professionaliteit in beroepssituaties. (Aspects of norma-
tive professionality). Tijdschrift voor Humanistiek, 22(6), 83-89.
Sutton, R.E., & Wheatley, K.F. (2003). Teachers’ emotions and teaching: A review of the literature and
directions for future research. Educational Psychology Review 15(4), 327-358.
Veugelers, W. (2010). Moral values in teacher education. International Encyclopedia of Education. Vol.
7. (650-655). Oxford: Elsevier.
Vloet, K. (2007). Building professional identities on the platform: stories in dialogue. In J. van Swet, P.
Ponte, & B. Smit (Eds.) Postgraduate programmes as platform: a research-led approach (69-82).
Rotterdam: SensePublishers.
Weidema, F. (2007). Mijn handen aan dit bed (My hands at bedsite). Utrecht: University for Huma-
nistics.
Westheimer, J. (2005). Dogmatic dogma: there is no one-size-¿ts-all approach to schooling for democ-
racy. Our Schools/ Our Selves, 15(1), 25-40.
Wierdsma, A.F.M., & Swieringa, J. (2003). Lerend organiseren (Organisational learning). Groningen:
Wolters-Noordhoff.
Dieuwertje Bakker
Department of Education
University of Humanistic Studies Utrecht
161
vi
EVANGELIA FRYDAKI
By the 1990s, a renewed interest in the ways in which values could be re-inte-
grated in the educational process appeared again in the academic and research
world. This interest is presently revamped given the social innovations and
changes, the weakening of cohesive traditional value systems, the expansion of
the cultural continuum to which individuals are exposed today, and the plethora
of choices available in the context of a globalized society (Veugelers & Vedder,
2003). This study starts from ¿ ndings concerning values in education and, in
particular, inconsistencies between the values promoted in classroom settings
and the appropriate value communication processes (Veugelers, 2000; Frydaki,
2009). Afterwards, it lays out a framework for the development and transforma-
tion of teacher knowledge informed by theorists of teacher learning communi-
ties, and also dialogical theorists adopting the post-positivistic view of knowl-
edge as dialogical interpretation (Gadamer, 1976, 1979, 2001; Foucault, 1979,
1980; Habermas, 1984, 1987). The life story of a Greek teacher is also included
providing an example of how teacher knowledge, as it is potentially developed
and/ or transformed through interpretive dialogue in teacher communities, can
permeate teaching and value communication processes in a meaningful and de-
liberative way.
The meanings that education attributes to the concept of values have undoubt-
edly changed. Academic discourse and curricular tendencies seem to have shifted
from the value of integration into the environment to the value of the autonomy of
the individual, from the adherence to the past to critical thinking, from the disci-
pline to social rules to individual responsibility, respect of difference, tolerance and
cooperation (CIDREE, 1994; Frydaki, 2009). In other words, a new, to some extent
post-modern aspect of humanity seems to emerge.
While educational policies reconsider their orientations regarding values in edu-
cation, the sciences of education also attempt various approaches to the same is-
sue. However some relevant movements (Value Education, Moral Development and
Critical Pedagogy) do not represent integrating approaches to the ¿eld. They seem
to lack either openness (Value Education) or reÀective dialogical processes about
the existing societal values, possibly internalised by the students (Moral Develop-
ment and in a sense Critical Pedagogy) (Frydaki, 2009, pp. 115-116). On the other
hand, both of them (openness and reÀective dialogue) are needed for the develop-
ment of students’ values to be closely interwoven with the appropriate value com-
munication processes (Veugelers, 2000; Frydaki, 2009).
In parallel, research, as revealed in most studies, shows common issues, focus-
ing on inconsistencies between the very values communicated in classroom settings
and the appropriate value communication processes: most teachers do infuse values
in classrooms through a variety of ways. Some of them defend eternal humanistic
values, others are more inÀuenced either by the dominant values in the subject mat-
ter’s tradition or by their personal sociopolitical value-commitments. Particularly,
research shows an important shift from academic goals to social and community
goals, including social responsibility, cooperation, responding to the needs of oth-
ers, respect, and participation (Ennis, Ross & Chen, 1992; Ennis, 1994; Husu & Tir-
ri, 2007; Frydaki & Mamoura, 2008). On the other hand, this shift scarcely includes
a new perspective concerning value communication processes. Most teachers seem
to avoid involving themselves actively in the process of value communication by
bringing into question some values to be taught. Therefore the danger is, in par-
ticular in practice, that values are seen once more ‘as something to be transmitted
rather than as something to be communicated with students actively and dialogi-
cally involved in meaning making by taking into account their personal experience,
commitments, worldviews and understanding of themselves’ (Frydaki & Mamoura,
2008, p. 118).
It is often pointed out that teachers lack the skills required to critically reÀect on
their values, integrating them more consciously in their sociopolitical or sociocul-
tural practices, so that their students become co-players in the pedagogical game of
signi¿cation (Veugelers, 2000). This occurs speci¿cally in Greece, where the teach-
ing of values ‘is fragmentary and it more or less depends on the sensitivity of the
educator …’ (CIDREE, 1994, p. 118). A reason for this is that the whole issue of
values in education was strongly determined for many decades by the turbulent his-
tory of the Greek nation state, the need for creating or recreating its national identity,
the spiritual and moral values of Christianity, as expressed by the Greek Orthodox
Church, and the overemphasis on nation-centred values (Flouris, 1997). All values,
which could be neither negotiated nor challenged. Nowadays, many scholars call
for the ideal of an informed, active, socially responsible, open-minded and probably
universal civil citizen (Flouris, 1997; Koutselini, 1997). This kind of citizen is also
promoted by the European educational policy. Nevertheless, several Greek teach-
ers are still handling value-laden issues in a hesitant manner remaining devoted to
the ‘of¿cial’ curricular directions (Frydaki & Mamoura, 2008), contrary to their
colleagues from the Netherlands, who handle such issues by a greater variety of
strategies (Veugelers, 2000). In sum, despite the fact that the paramount values that
teaching upholds seem to alter, the value communication processes seem to oscillate
between moderate forms of inculcation and a value neutrality stance. Given all the
pre-mentioned regarding the challenging issue of value communication processes,
our focus shifts to the ways in which teachers could shape more meaningfully their
own commitments, beliefs and values, and communicate them with their students.
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FOSTERING HUMANITY THROUGH INTERPRETIVE DIALOGUE
If, as there seems, the problem lays on value communication processes, a starting
point for us is the assumption that knowledge, meaning, value-commitments as well
as humanity itself are mediated by the interactive relationships de¿ning social life.
According to Vygotsky (1978), all the previous are constructed and transformed
through collaborative activities and meaningful interactions. From a different start-
ing point, Noddings’ care theory has provided valuable insights into the construc-
tion of values such as liberty, rights and participatory democracy through dialogical
collaborative activities (Nodding, 2010). Teaching processes belong to social situ-
ations in which people act with the others, towards the others and in relation to the
others. Just as any social situation, schooling too is more oriented towards the oth-
ers rather than towards the things. Without the reinforcing response of the other, the
things, whether they represent knowledge or values, remain unactuated. Values and
humanity, just as knowledge itself, are to be developed through an active interaction
of students and teachers in meaning making. But teachers seldom have an aware-
ness of what they do in the value communication processes, since they are de¿cient
in realising and critically reÀecting on how they shape their own commitments, be-
liefs, and values (Frydaki, 2009). Thus, the teachers’ own value development needs
to be part of their entire professional learning and development.
Numerous authors (Lave & Wenger, 1991) equate teachers’ learning with the con-
cept of ‘communities of practice’ which draw upon the Schönian notion ‘knowing
in practice’; that is a dynamic process resulting from the collaborative actions of
teachers and learners together in classroom settings. But, how could teachers sup-
port the collaborative learning endeavour and value development in the classroom
settings without being themselves part of a learning community?
A community, as Bellah et al. (1985, p. 333) de¿ned it, is ‘a group of people
who are socially interdependent, who participate together in discussion and deci-
sion making, and who share certain practices that both de¿ne the community and
are nurtured by it’. Senge (1990) perceived the learning community as a site where
people expand their capacities to work in new and creative ways through work-
ing together. According to other scholars, for example Fenstermacher (1994) and
Shulman (1987), the premise for teachers’ capacities to be expanded in learning
communities is the development and transformation of their knowledge as a whole.
Teacher knowledge refers to the totality of his or her personal practical knowledge
including beliefs, values, attitudes, emotions, and resulting from formal and in-
formal educational experience. As the participation in a learning community rep-
resents primarily a new kind of educational experience, teachers are expected to
develop here their whole knowledge ¿rst and then they would develop the related
behavioural capacities.
In this line of arguing, the participation in a learning community has been con-
sidered as critical for a teacher to develop into an accomplished teacher. Shulman
165
EVANGELIA FRYDAKI
& Shulman (2004, p. 259) state: ‘An accomplished teacher is a member of a pro-
fessional community who is ready, willing, and able to teach and to learn from
his or her teaching experiences’. An additional criterion for a group of teachers to
be acknowledgeable as a learning community is the well-being of their students.
According to this criterion, ‘not all gatherings of teachers, even those in which
teachers offer each other fellowship and support constitute professional commu-
nity’ (Grossman, Wineburg, & Woolworth, 2001, p. 7). The well-being of students
is identi¿ed not only with the enhancement of their learning but with their entire
growth, enlightenment, emancipation and empowerment (Ayers, 2004). The above
arguments and criteria reveal the potential humanizing dimensions of a learning
community. ReÀecting on teacher own experiences, demonstrating to each other as
well as to their students that their humanity is honoured, fostering humanity and
freedom are expected to be main concerns in such a community.
Therefore, it has become almost a commonplace in most research that teachers
learn through working with others within the workplace by sharing experiences,
information, questions, responses and demands (Eraut, 2002; Shulman & Shulman,
2004; Kelly, 2006; Wilson & Demetriou, 2007). Research on teachers’ learning
communities usually explores features of professional development programs such
as the key components of community formation as well as the collaborative inter-
actions that occur when teachers work to examine and improve the quality of their
teaching (Grossman, Wineburg & Woolworth, 2001; Borko, 2004). What lacks is
how this sharing could be more meaningful in order to further enhance or trans-
form teachers’ knowledge, to lead them to the accomplishment, and to ensure the
well-being of their students. Under this perspective, the present study aims at dem-
onstrating that viewing the teacher learning communities as teacher ‘interpretive’
communities could highlight the humanizing and transformative potential of these
communities. Key-concepts for the notion of teachers’ ‘interpretive’ communities
to be revealed are the post-positivistic view of knowledge as dialogical interpreta-
tion as well as the concept of dialogue as a way of transforming the existing inter-
pretations and creating shared meanings. The underlying assumption is that teacher
knowledge, as it is developed through interpretive dialogue in teacher communities,
reÀects in classrooms and transforms the way teachers involve themselves in value
communication processes. Regarding the pre-mentioned, I ¿rstly attempt a con-
ceptual approach and afterwards I present capsule accounts of a Greek secondary
teacher life story related to the nature, sources and development of her personal and
professional knowledge.
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FOSTERING HUMANITY THROUGH INTERPRETIVE DIALOGUE
ity, to know that knowledge never ceases to grow, to change or to seem different as
the case may be. Hence, it has become almost a commonplace in post-positivistic
thinking that knowledge is a construction, even a convenient ¿ction, a view that has
also had some popularity in literature, history, and the arts.
Such conceptions of knowledge have been enriched through the post-modern
conception of knowledge as interpretation. Although the foundations of post-
modernity are various, they seem to share some common premises. According to
Foucault (1979, 1980), knowledge is built through the everyday practices of speech
coming from different groups of voices and opinions, which are not usually charac-
terized by continuity and coherence. Lyotard (1987), introducing the notion of lin-
guistic games, also emphasizes the multiplicity of voices, reasons, interpretations
and ways of life. The commonplace is that knowledge is not an inherent quality of
things and it cannot be achieved in an objective way. It is, rather, attributing the
meanings to the objects by multiple interpretations. Literary texts, historical narra-
tives, social theories, of¿cial texts, such as the curriculum, our lives as teachers and
the whole of human experience are not given in a direct way but must be understood
by the agency of language; moreover, they do not comprise inert and objective data
providing the opportunity of ¿xed knowledge, but rather they represent semantic
constructions which consist in the meanings attributed to them. What engenders
knowledge is the ability to communicate with the implied meanings, by exchanging
views with partners in the same game, that is, by participating in meaning mak-
ing processes by which the meanings are constantly transformed (Gadamer, 1976;
Savater, 2004). In other words, the linguistic dimension of understanding increased
by the multiplicity of voices, reasons and perspectives suggests that there is no
knowledge without regard to its interpretation which is integral to all that we do and
face. Teachers’ knowledge couldn’t be the exception to such a shifting perspective
regarding the meaning of knowledge.
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EVANGELIA FRYDAKI
1996). Dialogue seems to have a real humanizing impact on participants, who can
develop their self-discipline, personal autonomy, responsibility, and ‘being reason-
able’. Concerning this sense of dialogue and mainly its transformative potential,
two issues could be challenged: Firstly, the participants are considered as already
accomplished individuals taking part equally in power- and coercion-free commu-
nicative processes. Dialogue is considered as ‘conversation between equals’ (Bohm,
1997) and not as a process incorporating the potential of knowledge transformation.
In a second deeper level, the promoted qualities and values such as self-discipline,
personal autonomy, responsibility, even the commitment to reasonableness have a
bit narrow individualistic connotations. They seem to reÀect more the priority to an
instrumental-cognitive rationality rather than to the development and transforma-
tion of meanings via participation in meaning making processes.
Habermas is the social theorist who suggested the shift from the instrumental-
cognitive rationality into communicative rationality, which is established by the
individuals who can speak and act when they understand themselves with reference
to something. In this process of understanding, the individuals, when they act com-
municatively, make use of interpretations that are culturally transmitted and make
reference to something in the objective world, in the social world they share, and
each one can simultaneously make reference to something in its own subjective
world (Habermas, 1987). The claims each and every statement has to make as to its
own validity hold some possibility of dialogue and hence of further understanding.
For the intersubjective nature of the possible understanding to be enacted, there is
a need for ‘ideal speech situations’, a concept based on the theoretical stance that
each one is able to participate equally in power- and coercion-free communicative
processes. This competence is de¿ned by the fundamental principles of the com-
municative ethics and the rational discourse as well (Habermas, 1984, 1987). The
‘ideal speech situations’ foster both understanding and a humane collective life.
Seen in the Habermasian critical context, dialogue generates a transformative and
emancipatory knowledge rather than consensus, as the participants in communi-
cative dialogical interactions, upholding reason over power, bring to the dialogue
their preconceived and unreÀected ideas so that they reach their transformation
(Habermas, 1984).
Dialogue can be seen in a third way; in the framework of contextual herme-
neutics developed by Gadamer (1976, 1979). Gadamer attempted to interpret in a
historical manner the fore-structures of understanding which forms our openness
to the world, de¿ning them as prejudices. Prejudices are transmitted by a speci¿c
tradition and are considered as valuable starting-points in any attempt to under-
stand. If we share the prejudices of our tradition, then hermeneutics clari¿es the
context into which any act of understanding occurs. Understanding prejudices is
a process similar to understanding a person in a conversation. We open ourselves,
not only to receive the message of the other, but in a dialogical sense, to transform
our consciousness after the contact with him or her. Gadamer introduces the inter-
pretation as open-ended inquiry, and also the dialogical sense of hermeneutics. The
168
FOSTERING HUMANITY THROUGH INTERPRETIVE DIALOGUE
169
EVANGELIA FRYDAKI
THE NARRATIVE
Narrative discourse has been selected in order to illuminate the potential of teacher
knowledge transformation via teachers’ interpretive communities. The numerous
expressions used throughout literature –autobiography, biography, narrative, life
story– embody a common spirit, as they are all referring to an account of a person’s
life. ȉhe narrative mode transforms human experience into a coherent temporal
pattern wherein ‘the answers are in the stories, indeed, the answers are the stories’
(Connely & Clandinin, 1995, p. 79). Thus, stories represent an interpreted knowl-
edge, which, at the same time, needs further interpretation. The commitment to
narrative gives priority to interpretive understanding and contextual learning, be-
ing a tool through which each autobiographer can understand oneself more fully,
and each researcher can both facilitate the emergence of the former knowledge and
obtain an interpretive knowledge of another person. In other words, the autobiogra-
pher and the researcher attempt a dialogical interpretation of the former experience.
The autobiographer initiates and controls the interpretive activity with the research-
er as a facilitator (Polkinghorne, 1988; Butt & Raymond, 1989; Conle, 2000). In this
sense, narrative is itself consistent with the interpretive view of knowledge accord-
ing to which knowledge is not obtained in an objective way, but is rather produced
via participation in dialogical meaning making processes.
I will present Anna’s oral story to provide the data that are then analysed to
produce main themes. As regards what counts as ‘story’, I follow the biographical-
interpretive tradition, built on the theoretical principle that there is a whole that is
more than the sum of its parts, informing each person’s life (Wengraf, 2001). For
this meaning frame, known as ‘gestalt’, to be elicited, four principles suggested by
Hollway & Jefferson (2000) have been adapted here:
1. Use open-ended questions: ‘Tell me about your stories of doing ¿eldwork’.
2. Elicit stories: ‘Relate examples of learning in ¿eldwork that are particularly
memorable’.
3. Avoid ‘why’ questions, as they tend to promote intellectualization and can be
threatening.
4. Follow up using respondent’s ordering and phrasing ‘You said working in a dif-
ferent environment was very complicated, can you tell some more about that?
Three interviews were conducted in spring 2009 by the author of this article, who
also conducted the initial analysis of the interviews transcripts and identi¿ed
themes. Beginning in April 2009, all three meetings were audio recorded. The sec-
tions of audiotapes that were in line with the research orientation were transcribed.
These transcripts allowed the author to step back from complete participation (Mer-
riam, 1988) and make analytical observations. I searched for generating categories
based on the emerging patterns, issues, concepts and themes/subthemes, deriving
from the data, thinking of the initial conceptual framework of the study and the
‘gestalt’ as well (LeCompte & Preissle, 1993; Wengraf, 2001). I generated a list of
170
FOSTERING HUMANITY THROUGH INTERPRETIVE DIALOGUE
patterns and themes that repeatedly appeared in the transcripts, which became the
categories for analysis. The data were arranged according to each category. ‘This is
the process of systematically classifying data into some sort of schema consisting
of categories, themes, or types. The categories describe the data, but to some extent,
they also interpret the data’ (Merriam, 1988, p.140).
Simultaneously, Anna and I have comprised an interpretive community of her
own story, as I was always asking her to tell and de¿ne her story in a way that would
convey the meaning that she, as participant, would wish to be heard. From these
conversations it became obvious that the process of reconceptualizing her ideas
was a natural one, but also a process of which she was not aware until she engaged
more fully in the dialogue with me. Moreover, after the interview was transcribed,
Anna was given a copy, on which she was invited to write comments. Some of
the themes raised were carried over from one to the next interview and through
telephone conversation and e-mails, as the later were also analysed. The fact that
we both (Anna and I) interpreted the data in the same way ensured a degree of reli-
ability (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). For the reliability to be more ensured, I asked a
colleague to verify the steps I went through in arriving at data analysis and inter-
pretation (Lincoln & Cuba, 1985, pp. 108-109). He examined the data collection and
analysis procedures asking exploratory questions, in order for me to reduce possible
preconceptions, to present the ¿ndings impartially and to be guided to moderate
conclusions. Through this systematic process, general themes were collapsed into
overarching categories:
– Commitment to communities of practice
– Spontaneous engagement in communities of practice
– Orientation to students’ well-being and empowerment
– Pro¿le of interpretive dialogue (quality of listening, openness to new under-
standings, rethinking the existing value frameworks, respect of the others)
– Humanizing effects of interpretive dialogue (generation of new shared val-
ues, transformation of teacher knowledge and value communication processes,
change of power relations between the members of community and in classrooms
as well).
– Insuf¿ciency of other forms of collaborative processes (not including the col-
laborative exploration of existing value frameworks) to transform teacher knowl-
edge and value communication processes.
The data articulated on the previous categories are presented as a new story co-
constructed by both the researcher and Anna. Quotations to illustrate points are
also included.
ANNA’S STORY
Anna is a 50 year-old secondary teacher with 25 years of experience. She is the sec-
ond youngest in her family and came into world in a county town, where she lived
171
EVANGELIA FRYDAKI
until she ¿nished high school. She teaches language literacy in two classrooms in
the Second Chance School (SCSc) in Peristeri, a middle-low socioeconomic sub-
urb of Athens. The institution of SCSc was the Greek pilot speci¿cation of an EU
program for adult education, which intended to eliminate functional illiteracy and
social exclusion.
During her studies in Athens University, Anna was given the chance to become
involved in a powerful political student-movement. Anna’s personal, cultural and
political background underpins her obsession with the emancipatory role of the
teacher, mainly through her active participation in communities which offers her
a kind of personal and political reinforcement. In Anna’s professional life three
stages are distinguishable. She was appointed to her ¿rst teaching post in 1985 on a
small Greek island. After ¿ve years, she was transferred to a high school in Athens,
where she worked for ten years. Next, she asked for a new transfer to the Second
Chance School (SCSc), which began to function in Peristeri, a suburb of Athens, at
that precise year (2000) and was addressed to adult students which dropped out of
compulsory education at school age (Hondolidou, 2003; Katsarou & Tsafos, 2008).
While talking about her ¿rst years of teaching, Anna highlighted the ways
in which she experienced her participation in a collaborative setting consisting
of recently appointed secondary teachers on the island. Her colleagues were ap-
proximately of the same age, and the principal was barely older. This experience
emerges as the main theme that is integrated into her teacher knowledge. Although
the Greek school curriculum is permanently national and compulsory, including
standard numbers of hours, content and textbooks dictated by the Ministry of Edu-
cation, Anna describes how the group of her colleagues challenged the uniformity
of curriculum guidelines; how they came together of their own free will, struggled
to ¿nd a common language, and worked to develop a collective vision of a particular
kind of student development. Anna says:
We were only just eleven teachers, all recently appointed. Our meetings were
held every afternoon at the school premises. We hardly ever left school before
the nightfall.
This entire endeavour was mainly focused on the curricular constraints, speci¿cally
concerning the problems of weak learners as well as of the learners whose behav-
iour revealed an ongoing lack of engagement:
172
FOSTERING HUMANITY THROUGH INTERPRETIVE DIALOGUE
Concerning these meetings, Anna underlines that the desirable orientation was
more the meaningful interaction rather than consensus. The teachers involved held
various but convergent political views and perceptions of what it means to be a
teacher. A lot of them made a commitment to teaching toward a better world; others
just searched for more helpful teaching ways. However, all these persons, instead
of con¿ning themselves to an effortless interplay, seemed to make great efforts to
understand and interpret the voices of others. As Anna says, partners were open
to new understandings in order to create a shared world in which they may or may
not agree. The key was how teachers listened to each other. This quality of listen-
ing appeared to be based on the respect, in the sense of the acceptance of the other
person as they are. Most discussions revolved around questions such as ‘what does
it mean for you to set this goal [mandated by the curriculum] in a history lesson?’,
or ‘to what extent could an open-book literature examination support the students?’
Anna’s most illustrative words were:
Every single bit of the lessons I’ve done these years has come directly from
our discussions about what it means to be a teacher and what it means to think
about the students’ growth and well-being.
Anna considers that the quality of listening in the community and the respect of
the others obviously reÀected in classrooms, as listening became a basis for the
instructional conversation. Intense listening by the teachers affected the manner
in which students listened to the subject matter, to the teacher, and to each other.
The changed nature of dialogical conversation changed the power relations in class-
rooms: students initiated conversations on various topics they were curious about,
they were willing to share their queries and experiences, and they became involved
spontaneously in several activities transforming the every day curriculum. Teachers
and students seemed to co-create a Gadamerian version of interpretive community,
and also to acquire a kind of transformative knowledge, as this knowledge enabled
them to do new things, to be active, to be genuine and human as well.
At the second stage of her professional life, after being assigned to a high school
in Athens, Anna’s narrative emphasizes on the educational climate that has changed
signi¿cantly. It was in the 1990s, when performativity agendas, coupled with the
continuing monitoring of the ef¿ciency with which teachers are expected to im-
plement externally generated initiatives, have had adverse impacts upon teachers’
involvement in collaborative processes. Anna describes this kind of school as an
impersonal organization into which a narrow sense of professionalism gradually
emerged. Her colleagues were oriented to cover the curriculum, and maintain
control. The pedagogical meetings usually revolved around predetermined issues,
which were treated as matters of routine. Anna often returns to the following para-
dox: although the of¿cial curriculum and several textbooks appeared to become
more open or student-oriented, all the same teachers appeared to use them uncriti-
cally; although pedagogical theory connected students’ knowledge with their expe-
173
EVANGELIA FRYDAKI
rience more and more, teachers appeared to connect their own knowledge with their
own experience less and less. There was in particular a lack of experiences deriving
from teachers’ participation in dialogical meaning making processes. Anna arrived
at feeling frustrated, as she perceived her colleagues as unconcerned or at least as
oriented to a context free knowledge transmission. Although she has seldom articu-
lated as such, she was experiencing a distressing lack of meaningful interaction as
well as students’ alienation.
The of¿cialdom, the planning, the exams, all these instrumental assignments
are weighing down on us. No more meetings, no critical discussions, no co-
players, no what it means (…) How would such a framework not alienate many
of our students, speci¿cally the weak ones?
The students’ alienation was interpreted by her colleagues as disrespect. The only
discussions taking place revolved around how school could enforce discipline and
respect. Nobody seemed to be orientated towards an alternative approach, for ex-
ample bringing his/ her own prejudices or the existing value frameworks in ques-
tion. Anna was disappointed with the obvious lack of sensitivity to the students’
needs, with the prevailing traditional understanding of learning environment, with
the fact that her colleagues chose to wield authority rather than engage themselves
in a mutual quest for understanding and insight. She began to wonder to what ex-
tent her own teacher knowledge could be improved and her own teaching activities
could remain fruitful in such a framework limited on arid discussions about unim-
portant matters.
One needs co-players for playing the game differently; she needs their opin-
ions, their challenges, and their contribution.
Anna’s experiences have allowed her to better understand what was essential for
her in order to realize her teaching vision. Being aware that she had nothing good
to expect, she opted to be assigned to a new post: the Second Chance School (SCSc)
in Peristeri. The innovative character of SCSc network, supported by the scienti¿c
advisor of each school who participated in a scienti¿c committee, consisted among
other things in their collaborative orientation: teachers had to collaborate with each
other, with their scienti¿c advisor and with teachers from other schools of SCSc
network, in order to decide on teaching material and teaching/ learning processes
(Hondolidou, 2003; Katsarou & Tsafos, 2008). The framework seemed fortunate, as
teachers had to create a new curriculum, and to introduce whatever innovation they
considered helpful aiming constantly at the learners’ empowerment. Their involve-
ment in power-free communicative processes was ensured by the principles of the
program itself. However, Anna has seldom experienced the communicative proc-
esses as interpretive or transformative. Teachers were almost forced to adopt unu-
sual roles without being adequately informed and prepared. Hence, there was more
174
FOSTERING HUMANITY THROUGH INTERPRETIVE DIALOGUE
Anna began to wonder whether it was enough to share views with others without ex-
ploring and discussing the reasoning behind the views and choices; without explor-
ing and discussing who each one is. However, some teachers did involve themselves
in the communicative processes exploring and questioning their own experiences,
views and commitments through open, supportive and reÀective interactions. In
these cases, the communicative processes seemed to become meaningful, reÀect-
ing somewhat the Habermasian notion of ‘communicative ethics’. This rather vague
picture of teachers’ collaborative work seemed to have an equally vague impact on
classrooms: some learners had been activated well enough, engaging authentically
with their tasks; others remained passive, while others abandoned school.
Hence, Anna attained to develop an ‘interpretive version’ of teachers’ learning
communities arguing that teachers’ discussions constitute real meaning making
processes, when the participants make space for the voices of others to be heard;
when they bring their own value frameworks in question; when they de-stabilize
prior ideas about what is normal; when they respect the others. This kind of dis-
cussions permeate obviously classroom settings and affect value communication
processes in a meaningful way, as it has already appeared since Anna’s ¿rst years
of teaching.
Anna still works in this school. She has been trying for many years to establish
and develop her interpretive communicative culture. She attained to a certain extent
her goals into the teacher community and to a further extent into her classrooms.
The last four years none of her students abandoned school. Even if they do not
always reach the best academic achievements, they are willing to share their expe-
riences, expressing and wondering about their own value-commitments, and they
seem to develop their knowledge.
DISCUSSION
In Anna’s story we have to look beyond the teachers’ learning communities, and
focus on the entire educational context which can allow, or not, their participation
in meaning making processes. It is obvious that the most supportive educational
context was the ¿rst one, which granted teachers the time and space to engage spon-
175
EVANGELIA FRYDAKI
176
FOSTERING HUMANITY THROUGH INTERPRETIVE DIALOGUE
tive community could be, and how the participation in dialogical meaning making
processes could support the development of teachers’ knowledge reÀecting directly
on students’ well-being.
Anna’s story highlights also how teachers’ participation in dialogical meaning
making processes can generate new shared values and value communication proc-
esses, as the second are closely interwoven with the way values themselves are
produced or transformed. Shared values emerging via meaningful and participatory
meaning making processes embody the humanity itself. The actual meaning mak-
ing processes create a space for reÀection to the point that it becomes a transforma-
tive experience. This experience enables the involved persons to approach their
world in a different and more meaningful way including the voices of others. In that
case, value communication processes become necessarily meaningful, participa-
tory and humanizing. Likewise, if predetermined sets of values are to be transmit-
ted, then the value communication processes will also be predetermined and rather
unfruitful. Ensuring meaningful interactions within a supportive environment of
openness, Àexibility and trust seems to be a fool-proof way of transforming and
humanizing ¿rstly our consciousness and after that the value communication proc-
esses themselves.
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University of Athens
179
vi
YVONNE LEEMAN & WILLEM WARDEKKER
Websites of schools often feature well-sounding phrases like ‘we care for the well-
being of all pupils’ or ‘we make sure that all students can develop all their potentials’,
phrases that are open to multiple and conÀicting interpretations. Teachers have dif-
¿culty explaining how such statements translate into actual practice, but even more
striking, they often do not see such statements as having moral quality. It seems
that they do not interpret their professional identity in terms of moral issues. Read
a mainstream text on education and your attention will be taken towards cognitive
learning and effective teaching and testing. There is not much room for the cultural
and moral aspect of education and, as a consequence, for the education of teachers to
become normative professionals sensitive to the moral dimensions of schooling.
However, in one niche of the educational literature many authors have asserted
education to be an inherently moral enterprise. Both the way the system works and
the way individual educators do their work have moral implications for the personal
development and sense-making of pupils and for the way human beings live to-
gether. For instance, Van Manen (1998) points out that the whole idea of schooling
started out as a moral enterprise with nationalistic overtones, and that moral values
are intrinsically related to the aims of education as a whole and to the selection of
the content of numerous school subjects. Claxton (2001) states that the choice of
subjects to be (or not to be) treated in courses is a matter that can deeply inÀuence
students’ lives. Values are also implied in the organization of the school system.
When students are sorted over different school types on the sole basis of their intel-
lectual capacities, this contains the moral message that an ef¿cient organisation of
learning is most important, neglecting the social effects on equal opportunities for
all. The hidden curriculum, materialized in school rules such as dress codes or rules
about access to teachers outside teaching hours, the possibilities for co-operative
learning and for dialogue with and personal coaching by the teacher, has a moral
impact in itself. According to Hansen (2001) teaching is at one and the same time
and inseparably an intellectual and moral endeavour.
Teachers help bring into being environments in which intellectual and moral
growth can occur, but, as the literature has established, that process is pains-
taking, unpredictable, and emergent only over time. There remains much to
learn about this process as it unfolds at all levels of the educational system.
(Hansen, 2001, p. 855)
Such an integrated view emphasizes the fundamental complexity of the moral di-
mension of education. However, in the actual political debate in the western world
aimed at revitalizing schooling as moral, there is an emphasis on explicit moral
education in separate subjects like social skills and citizenship education and on the
measurement of the moral outcomes of these. Visibility, ‘smart’ goals, and easy-to-
follow practical guidelines for schools and teachers are the keywords here. The dis-
cussion focuses on the question whether moral education should itself be a school
subject, and if so, what form it should take (Stengel & Tom, 2006). In other words,
this discussion is about explicit moral education as a task of schools versus the
moral impact of rules, choices and actions of teachers.
Accommodating these varied ways of talking about the moral aspects of educa-
tion presupposes a rather broad de¿nition of what is meant by ‘moral’. It is certainly
broader than an intention to have students take over the values and norms of their
social environment. Stengel and Tom (2006, p. 139), for instance, employ the fol-
lowing description:
We use the moral to call forth all aspects of schooling that lend meaning to
life, that enable all involved to make sense of their lives in interaction with
others. The moral resides not only in the values and behaviour of individuals
but also in the quality of human interaction and the institutional structures
that shape the interaction. This broadened view of the moral brings at least
some elements of what might otherwise be identi¿ed as the religious, the so-
cial, the political, and even the economic under the moral umbrella.
We agree that it is necessary to see that ‘elements’ of many terrains have a moral
character or at least have moral implications. To get to grips with these elements, it
helps to differentiate between the domains that Nucci (2001) has distinguished: the
personal, the conventional, and the moral as such, which is related to the well-being
of others. According to this view, anything called moral necessarily has to do with
interpersonal relations. Without attempting to formulate a general de¿nition of the
moral ourselves, we propose to use the term in relation to education for anything
that a school system, a school, or a teacher does or fails to do, that inÀuences the per-
sonal well-being, the identity construction and the future possibilities of students,
not just their moral behaviour. This reÀects what we see as the aim of education:
helping and inducing students to build an identity that enables them to participate
as autonomous, critical and moral agents in human social activities. Only a school
in which humanity is a leading principle can contribute to creating and maintain-
ing a humane society. Our usage of ‘moral’ thus implies the daily contact between
teachers and students, but also the way the academic content is related to students’
(future) lives and the way access to that content is organized in the system.
182
THE MORAL SIDE OF EDUCATION
From the above it is clear that the relation between education and the moral do-
main is a subject for discussion among philosophers, politicians and at least some
researchers of education. It is far less so, however, among school teachers and prin-
cipals. We do not mean to say that they are uninterested in the topic, or that they
do not see thinking and talking about it as being necessary. Our experience with
teachers in the Netherlands, based on an interview study (Leeman et al., 2005) and
on training activities we organized, is that when invited to discuss the moral nature
of their work in relation to topics like the aims of education, moral or citizenship
education, or school rules, teachers generally react with enthusiasm. However, they
also frequently remark that this reÀection and discussion is something they do not
often do in the turmoil of their daily work. They would be delighted to be given
more opportunities to reÀect on such issues. Given the emphasis on accountability,
however, and the way schools are organized to be ef¿cient, such opportunities are
scarce (Ballet, Kelchtermans & Loughran, 2006).
During our interviews we found that talking about the moral sides and implica-
tions of education turned out to be quite dif¿cult for teachers and school principals
alike. Teachers tend to think in terms of a separate moral domain, an extra to the
curriculum or part of the religious education related to the religious identity of the
school. For them ‘content teaching’, ‘care for students’, and ‘moral education’ are
separate activities. Their thinking about moral matters is fragmented and not or-
ganized by a way of speaking, a discourse, that links the different elements. In our
opinion, a vocabulary organised by such a discourse ought to be part of the profes-
sional identity of every teacher (Hansen, 2001). We decided to design materials to
help teachers to develop such a moral perspective on teaching. We ¿rst explain the
background of the problem and then present the principles behind our materials
and our experiences with the material in educating teachers. In our conclusion we
reÀect on the strength of our efforts.
We see some of the causes for this lack of discussion of moral matters among teach-
ers as inherent to the (western) school system, and some as particular to the situa-
tion in the Netherlands. Recent measures taken in the western world to heighten the
ef¿ciency of school systems such as working with larger classes, combining schools
into very large organisations, and pressures to raise test scores and examination
successes, have contributed to the erosion of the moral quality of schools. Students
in large schools feel that teachers do not know them and that they are being treated
as numbers; teachers feel unable to relate to students on a human and personal level.
More importantly, however, the emphasis on ef¿ciency and effectiveness threatens
to deprofessionalize teachers (Hargreaves, 2000). Pressures from outside the school
tend to reduce teachers to a ‘pre-professional’ status and conduct. Teachers are ex-
183
YVONNE LEEMAN & WILLEM WARDEKKER
184
THE MORAL SIDE OF EDUCATION
the way a school reacts to the growing cultural and religious pluriformity of society.
However, such choices rest on patterns and ways of thinking that have been formed
in a long time practice of the formation of separate institutional identities and are
hardly thought about critically any more. In fact, the legal principle undergirding
this division in the school system, the so-called ‘freedom of education’, has effec-
tively made discussion about such matters dif¿cult and suspect, as it is seen as a
threat to this freedom.
A second element that is rather speci¿c to the school system in the Netherlands
is the strict differentiation of school types in secondary education. The effect of
sorting students, mostly on perceived intellectual capability, at the age of 12, is
that 60% of students get assigned to preparatory vocational education, and students
from lower SES strata are over-represented in this selection. Although this practice
is often defended with reference to a ‘natural’ difference between students who
like to work with their hands and those who like to think, both the practice and this
defence have clear moral implications.
There is a number of reasons why teachers and principals feel a pressing need to
think and talk about the moral sides of education. They are confronted on a daily
basis with students who only seem to care about themselves, and the diversity in
ethnic backgrounds of their students leads to a loss of the trust between teacher
and students, and between students that could once be taken for granted (Leeman,
2006). Maybe the most directly important development in the Netherlands is the
recent law that requires schools to offer some form of citizenship education. Of
course, this law is a consequence of wider changes in society, for instance the large
inÀux of immigrants that West-European countries face. As a consequence, the stu-
dent population of schools is more culturally diverse than ever. Such developments
make changes in the curriculum necessary. In many cases, these changes are kept at
a minimum, and they manifest themselves primarily in additions to the curriculum
such as a separate subject area ‘citizenship education’, lessons in debating, or ob-
ligatory community service. Although teachers often do not feel quite at ease with
such minimal measures, it seems dif¿cult for them to clarify the issues involved.
It is in this situation that we started our project to develop ways to help teachers
improve their speaking and reasoning about the moral aspects of education. Given
the problems we described, we think such improvements necessary as an effort to
‘humanize’ education. This does not only reÀect our care for the immediate well-
being of students and teachers, but also our conviction that, in the humanist tradi-
tion, the ultimate aim of education is not to equip students with technical know-how
but to help them become ‘civilized’ and autonomous human beings caring for the
well-being of others and themselves as well.
We adopted several basic principles. The ¿rst set is related to the development of
the teachers’ professional identity:
185
YVONNE LEEMAN & WILLEM WARDEKKER
– being aware of the moral aspects of education should be part of teachers’ profes-
sional identity,
– a moral language and some knowledge of moral ways to look at education are
necessary elements in the development of this awareness.
The second set of principles is related to the motivation to participate in the proce-
dures:
– the way teachers are incited to develop this awareness should be motivating for
them. It has to make personal sense, be related to and rooted in their own prac-
tice, and induce deliberation with colleagues,
– but the procedure should do more than reÀect their own ideas: it should open a
new ‘horizon of possibilities’ by asking questions and showing alternatives.
Professional identity
Our ¿rst principle is that the way teachers see the moral aspects of education is, or
has to become, part of their professional identity. We think of identity, be it personal
or professional, in terms of narratives that guide, but do not determine, action deci-
sions (Holland et al., 1998; Beijaard et al., 2004; Tappan, 2006). Human beings, at
least in western cultures, learn to organize their valuations and interpretations of
their position in the world into more or less coherent images of themselves, or rather,
given the language-based character of thinking, into stories about themselves. As
Tappan (2006) points out, such stories are not couched in the language of abstract
ideas, but ‘in the vernacular’. They are constructed out of reminiscences of the past,
of personal experiences, of projections of the future using models that are avail-
able in the culture in which one lives (e.g. a television personality, a football player,
a colleague teacher, etc.) and of interpretations of ‘ascribed’ elements of identity
(what does it mean to me to be a woman, a teacher, …) and so on. These stories are
constructed and reconstructed as interactions with other people and with situations
demand; experiences are integrated into them; new choices are made and obtain a
place. Although adolescence is the period in which young people are explicitly in-
volved in (re)constructing their identities, it is a process that begins much earlier and
goes on over the life span. This is also true of the professional identity of teachers.
One of the outcomes of the review study by Beijaard et al. (2004, p. 122) was that:
professional identity is an ongoing process of interpretation and re-interpreta-
tion of experiences, a notion that corresponds with the idea that teacher devel-
opment never stops and can best be seen as a process of lifelong learning.
Human beings, at least in our days, use such stories as an instrument, as a kind of
mirror, to ask ourselves who we are or want to be and what that means for how we
186
THE MORAL SIDE OF EDUCATION
want to act in a given situation. The answers we ¿nd in this way can always only
be a heuristic: we do not need to act in a way we see as consistent. How we really
act will depend on many factors: on the strength of our convictions about ourselves,
on the quality of the analysis of the situation, but also maybe on our mood or our
physical well-being. This is supposing that there are multiple courses of action open
to us, which is not always the case. Also, the mirror does not always give us the
same image: we have many stories about ourselves, directed at different publics,
and some of them inconsistent with each other.
Identity stories can be said to have moral qualities (Wardekker, 2004). These may
be stronger or weaker, and more or less integrated, according to the nature and the
strength of the valuations that underlie them, and to the extent to which a person has
tried to give conscious attention to the moral side of the identity stories. Of course,
in many situations we do not really ¿rst refer to a more or less elaborated story and
then use it as a mirror to make a decision. Like many other actions, in well-known
situations the process will have become automated – compare it with writing or
with riding a bicycle. We might talk here about ‘moral intuition’ or ‘moral expertise’
(Narvaez, 2006). Learning to become an expert requires training under the guidance
of others. Also, expertise is never fully unconscious: like writing, it can be made
conscious again when the automatic response does not suf¿ce: in a new situation, or
when the normal course of action is challenged. Such moments call for a restructur-
ing of our identity stories and perhaps of the underlying valuations. This restructur-
ing can be done in several ways, one of which is by systematically referring to the
abstract value concepts that we normally think of as ‘values’. Learning to do that can
be the subject of a systematic course of learning – but it will only be effective if there
is an underlying need to restructure one’s identity. Such a need occurs, for instance,
when the situation in which a person knows how to behave undergoes major changes
– which some would say is almost a de¿ning characteristic of the present world. It
is certainly true of the changes in education that teachers are confronted with (Har-
greaves, 2000). Therefore, it can rightly be said that professional identity learning is
the core process of educational change (Geijsel & Meijers, 2005).
This narrative view of identity has a double function in our efforts. On the one
hand, it implies that ‘helping students to develop an identity as civilized human
beings’ may be seen as one expression of the ¿nal aim of education. Such a for-
mulation draws attention to the moral aspects of the task of the school. On the
other hand, the theory applies equally well to the formation and the operation of
the professional identity of teachers. This theory about the way narrative profes-
sional identities guide teachers’ actions implies that asking teachers to learn to use
abstract moral concepts as developed and discussed in research and philosophy, like
justice, care, or respect, will not work in itself. Abstract theoretical concepts that
do not make personal sense to teachers cannot easily become part of their profes-
sional identities or of their daily practices. Such concepts may function afterwards
as a formal skeleton to organize and reÀect on narrative elements, but the problem
with teachers at the moment is, as we have argued, that other narratives, e.g. that of
187
YVONNE LEEMAN & WILLEM WARDEKKER
the teacher as a technician, have gained priority in their views of their own profes-
sionalism. Therefore, we suppose it is better to start with discussions based on the
way teachers talk about their concrete daily practices. In this phase, we take it for
granted that these discussions will represent moral matters in a fragmented way. In
this way we make certain that teachers’ learning is rooted in their own practices and
in the communities they work in.
Teacher motivation
Identity development is a learning process which can cause deep changes in one’s
accustomed ways of seeing, thinking and acting. Because of that, it often entails
feelings of uncertainty and fear of the unknown. If such feelings are strong, and are
not suf¿ciently balanced with a motivation to change and with a feeling of underly-
ing continuity, they will inhibit learning and lead to avoidance. The danger of that
happening is greater when one is confronted with views that are very different from
one’s own. Also, as follows from the above discussion on the narrative element in
identity, abstract texts tend to be less motivating than discussions of one’s own con-
crete work situation. For these reasons, our work with teachers started with a joint
activity which focuses on eliciting their opinions about their own teaching practice.
This is relatively easy, new, and suf¿ciently challenging that participants will be
motivated to initiate learning instead of withdrawal. At the same time, a perspec-
tive is opened for them on discussions with a further reaching character. As will
become clear, in the later steps of the procedure this principle of focusing on their
own teaching practice is emphasized.
Based on the above principles on the development of the moral aspect of the teacher
identity and on the motivation of teachers to participate in procedures to enhance
this, we devised a three-step procedure. To initiate thinking and discussions, we
planned a training activity of at least two hours in which teachers are presented
with a set of statements concerning school practice. These statements were based
on our reading of the mainstream practice-oriented literature on moral issues in
education and on our prior research with teachers and school leaders in primary
education and in the academic and vocational tracks of secondary education on
their views on and practices of moral education (Leeman et al., 2005). We chose
statements that reÀect all topics in the literature and mentioned by the teachers as
important, such as safety, interpersonal relations, involvement in social activities
in the school (like solving conÀicts and making decisions), the moral content of
education, and the relation of school with parents and others in the environment
of the school.
True to the principle of personal interest related to teachers own practice, we
thought it wise to include in these statements such topics as were represented in
188
THE MORAL SIDE OF EDUCATION
189
YVONNE LEEMAN & WILLEM WARDEKKER
The second dilemma is the priority of care, discipline, or trust in students. This
dilemma is essentially about what constitutes a good learning environment. Should
students feel accepted and cared for, should their behaviour be strictly regulated to
create a quiet atmosphere, or should the teacher give students as much responsibil-
ity for their own learning process as possible?
The third dilemma is about different aims of education expressed in forms of
citizenship. Does citizenship mean assertiveness and defending your own rights,
or caring for the community you belong to, or thinking in terms of a greater whole,
even of world citizenship; does it mean emphasizing sameness and togetherness or
embracing differences?
Participants were asked to note in which category the choices of statements they
have made fall, and, given their explanation of the dilemmas, to think about revis-
ing their choices, either individually or collectively.
As a third step in the procedure, we presented the participants with a book chap-
ter in which we as authors give our own views on these dilemmas and ask partici-
pants to confront these with their own choices and arguments. Special emphasis
is put here on the position that academic content and care for students are not two
separate areas, and that both have moral implications. The chapter elaborates the
view that the aim of education is to stimulate students to develop a view of them-
selves as autonomous, critical and moral participants in social activities – in short,
what Aloni (2007) calls humanistic education. Readers are asked to discuss our
propositions in relation to their own concerns and choices made in relation to earlier
parts of the procedure.
This chapter is part of a book (in Dutch) in which we present the three-step proce-
dure with a number of optional procedures for choosing statements, explaining and
arguing choices, and discussing these with others. The book (Leeman, Wardekker,
& Majoor 2007) may be used by schools or teacher education centres.
RESULTS
We worked with teachers from different sectors and levels of education, using all
three of the procedures or part of them, on numerous occasions. The following re-
Àects our experiences on those occasions.
General attitude
Teachers participating in the ¿rst part of the procedures were generally very satis¿ed.
It often happened that groups of teachers used much more than the allotted time for
their discussions. Teachers we spoke to afterwards told us: ‘These cards concretize a
subject that is often very vague. Now I can form a more concrete image. It is a way
to make a heavy subject discussable.’ And: ‘A good thing that there is an opportunity
to voice my opinion and that we work together to ¿nd a shared view.’
190
THE MORAL SIDE OF EDUCATION
Care
There was an overall emphasis on the caring teacher, who cares for the school results
and well-being of the individual students and for the social relations between stu-
dents in the classroom and in the school. The statement ‘No pupil can be quali¿ed as
hopeless’ proved very popular. However, its interpretations differed so much that in
the discussions, important dilemmas were raised. For instance, teachers asked how
far care for students should be extended, as care for an individual pupil can conÀict
with care for the whole group. ‘Sometimes a student needs to act in a certain way, if
only to get rid of stress. But such acting-out can be detrimental to the group process,
and I am responsible for that process as well.’ It happens too that a teacher wishes
to give more care than is possible. ‘Sometimes the situation is hopeless, but at the
same time I do not want to see that student as a hopeless case.’
In a number of cases, teachers emphasized a topic that was not represented as
such in the set of cards: enhancing the self-con¿dence of students. This topic was
especially important for teachers in special needs education and the ‘lower’ tracks
of vocational education. Their students have experienced years of disappointment
in regular education and need to learn anew who they are and what they are able
to do. However, opinions turned out to differ fundamentally on how to do this: by
accepting them, or by challenging them to use their sense of responsibility and their
own thinking power. The discovery alone that behind such statements hide different
opinions and courses of action was a revelation for many teachers.
Three aspects of the curriculum are touched upon in the card set: safety as a con-
dition of learning, the goals and content of the curriculum, and teaching proce-
dures. As to safety, teachers generally did not want to rely on technical measures
such as metal detectors or policing; they emphasized the importance of building
good relationships with their students. As important goals, teachers often chose
two aspects: learning to see and interpret the world from different points of view,
and learning to ¿ nd a balance between autonomy and social responsibility. Again,
the argumentation for and interpretation of these statements differed enormous-
ly. For instance, the ¿ rst statement was sometimes interpreted to mean looking
from different disciplinary perspectives (geographically, economically) without
any moral implications; others gave it a more culturally diverse interpretation
in terms of different ideas of ‘the good life’. This interpretation, which is con-
nected to the goal of citizenship education, did not occur often. In fact, although
citizenship education as well as student diversity are seen as important subjects,
these are nevertheless hardly thought about by teachers in terms of their moral
implications.
Virtually absent also was a reÀection on moral education in relation to the kind
of citizen the school educates. Especially, for most teachers there does not seem
191
YVONNE LEEMAN & WILLEM WARDEKKER
School context
The set of cards did not contain many statements about the school as a context for
teachers’ work, but those that were present were often chosen. These choices reÀect
a desire on the part of the teachers for a consistent approach in terms of culture
and paradigms of teaching and learning, and for more contact between colleagues
on such matters. In many cases, they feel that at present their work context does
not offer those possibilities. There was almost no reÀection on the school as an
organization with a culture that shapes the kind and quality of indirect learning in
the moral ¿eld.
DISCUSSION
192
THE MORAL SIDE OF EDUCATION
REFERENCES
Aloni, N. (2007). Enhancing humanity. The philosophical foundations of humanistic education. Dor-
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Ballet, K., Kelchtermans, G., & Loughran, J. (2006). Beyond intensi¿cation towards a scholarship of
practice: analysing changes in teachers’ work lives. Teachers and Teaching: theory and practice,
12 (2) 209 – 229.
Beijaard, D., Meijer, P.C., & Verloop, N. (2004). Reconsidering research on teachers’ professional iden-
tity. Teaching and Teacher Education, 20, 107-128.
Claxton, G. (2001). Education for the learning age: a sociocultural approach to learning to learn. In G.
Wells & G. Claxton (Eds.) Learning for life in the 21st century (21-33). Oxford: Blackwell Publish-
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Geijsel, F., & Meijers, F. (2005). Identity learning: the core process of educational change, Educational
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Hansen, D. (2001). Teaching as a moral activity. In V. Richardson (Ed.) Handbook of research on teach-
ing, 4th ed. (826-857). Washington, DC: AERA.
Hargreaves, A. (2000). Four ages of professionalism and professional learning, Teachers and Teaching:
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Holland, D., Lachicotte, W. Jr., Skinner, D., & Cain, C. (1998). Identity and agency in cultural worlds.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Leeman, Y. (2006). Teaching in ethnically diverse schools: teachers’ professionalism. European Jour-
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Leeman, Y., Wardekker, W., Blenkers, H., Uittenbogaard, B., & Valstar, J. (2005). Pedagogische kwa-
liteit, een inventariserend onderzoek in het onderwijsveld. (Pedagogical quality, an inventory).
Zwolle: CH Windesheim.
Leeman, Y., Wardekker, W., & Majoor, D. (2007). Pedagogische kwaliteit op de kaart. (Pedagogical
quality on the map). Baarn: HBUitgevers.
Leenders, H. & Veugelers, W. (2004) Waardevormend onderwijs en burgerschap. (Value inducing edu-
cation and citizenship). Pedagogiek, 24, 361-375.
Narvaez, D. (2006). Integrative ethical education. In M. Killen & J.G. Smetana (Eds.) Handbook of
Moral Development (703-732). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Nucci, L. (2001). Education in the moral domain. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Stengel, B.S., & Tom, A.R. (2006). Moral matters. Five ways to develop the moral life of schools. New
York: Teachers College Press.
Tappan, M. B. (2006). Mediated moralities: Sociocultural approaches to moral development. In M.
Killen & J.G. Smetana (Eds.) Handbook of Moral Development (351-374). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
Van Manen, M. (1998). Morele waarden en het vraagstuk van de pedagogische opdracht vanuit een
Noord-Amerikaans perspectief (Moral values and the moral character of schools from a Northern
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lerarenopleidingen (Formation and teacher education). Utrecht: SWP.
Wardekker, W. (2004) Moral education and the construction of meaning. Educational Review
56(2),183–192.
Yvonne Leeman
Windesheim University of Professional Studies Zwolle
University of Humanistic Studies Utrecht
Willem Wardekker
Windesheim University of Professional Studies Zwolle
VU University Amsterdam
193
vi
GILY COENE
Nothing could be more crucial to democracy than the education of its citi-
zens. Through primary and secondary education, young citizens form, at a
crucial age, habits of mind that will be with them all through their lives. They
learn to ask questions or not to ask them; to take what they hear at face value
or to probe more deeply; to imagine the situation of a person different from
themselves or to see a new person as a mere threat to the success of their own
projects; to think of themselves as members of a homogeneous group or as
members of a nation, and of the world, made up of many people and groups,
all of whom deserve respect and understanding. (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 387)
INTRODUCTION
Although humanism is a concept with a complex history and a wide range of pos-
sible meanings, humanists commonly agree that education is of crucial importance
to give shape to substantial values as self-development, autonomy, equality, criti-
cal thinking and democracy. More controversial however is the question how this
values or humanist methods should be implemented in education. In countries like
Belgium and the Netherlands for instance, humanist education is organized and ¿-
nanced under similar terms as education into a particular religion. Some humanists
argue that this contradicts other values, such as the freedom of religion and belief
and the principle of secularism or separation of church and state (See for example
Buitenweg, 2010). Other humanists emphasize a more pragmatic position, based on
historical and sociological arguments, and defend a strategy of ‘equal treatment’ of
religion and nonreligious philosophies by the state.
In the wake of the headscarf controversies (Coene & Longman, 2008) and other
issues that are related to the increasing presence and visibility of Muslims, debates
over secularism and the position of humanism in education have revived in Bel-
gium. Under the umbrella concept of ‘active pluralism’, the established regime
that governs state-church relations and the organization of religious and humanist
education in public schools is increasingly questioned. For instance, according to
Hendrik Pinxten (2007), former President of the Flemish Humanist Association,
196
THE CHALLENGES OF MULTICULTURALISM
existing system in terms of the need for more ‘active pluralism’ or ‘intercultural-
ism’ in order to face the challenges of multiculturalism. Although this concern is an
essential one, the proposals that are made have many dif¿culties and pitfalls and it
is highly questionable whether they are really able to realize what they aim at, i.e.
a more tolerant society.
197
GILY COENE
198
THE CHALLENGES OF MULTICULTURALISM
After more than hundred years of enduring conÀicts between a majority of Catho-
lics, who have been dominating education in Belgium from its early existence, and
a minority of contesting liberals, socialists and ‘laïques’, the Belgian government
agreed in 1958 in the so-called ‘Schools Pact’ that public schools would not only
provide instruction in religion, but also – and on an equal basis – in ‘nonconfes-
sional ethics’. The Belgian Constitution (art. 24) thus stipulates that everyone has
the right to a moral or religious education at the governments’ charge and that all
of¿cial schools5 are therefore obliged to provide a choice between instruction in the
recognized religions and nonconfessional ethics, until the end of the compulsory
school leaving age.
The ‘Schools pact’ thus created the space for the development of a moral educa-
tion that was not based on a religious belief. Although it was clear from the begin-
ning that the course predominantly served the claims of nonbelievers and freethink-
ers, no explicit reference was made to a particular nonreligious belief-system or
worldview. Rather, the course was perceived as a ‘neutral’ one, open to everyone as
199
GILY COENE
For us, who defend that moral science has a cultural historical necessity and is
a beginning scienti¿c reality; there is no doubt for a moment that the present
opposition between morality (…) and religion (…) has to be called an absurd-
ity. Ethics as a science is a course for everyone. (Apostel, 2003, p. 140)
That nonconfessional ethics was perceived as ‘scienti¿cally based’ rather than rep-
resenting a particular philosophy of life or worldview is further emphasized by the
suggestion of Apostel to establish a speci¿c course for freethinking children:
Next to this course in ethics, intended for all, another course in ‘freethinking
ideology’ should be established for nonbelievers. This would ¿nally make an end to
an obviously confused situation that leads to all kinds of discussion in which some
detect in this course an instrument of freethinking propaganda, while others, be-
cause of their extreme neutrality in ideological affairs, deny freethinking children a
source of inspiration for a real philosophy of life. (Apostel, p. 140).
Although both were freethinkers, the reservations of Apostel and Kruithof to lay
connections between nonconfessional ethics and a freethinking life stance or any
200
THE CHALLENGES OF MULTICULTURALISM
other ideology can at least partly be explained by their optimism at that time that
the ongoing process of secularization would actually make an end to the compart-
mentalization along religious lines in Belgian society and their belief in the idea
that science would eventually overcome religious and philosophical differences and
disputes. According to Lucien Deconinck, lecturer of the course ‘biology and hu-
man behaviour’ in the program and president of the Belgian Humanist Association
in 1968, the creation of the section ‘moral science’ and of the Humanist Associa-
tion was based on the same concern, i.e. the crisis of morality (De cock, 2003, p.
191-192). For Eddy Borms (2008) however, it was clear from the beginning that the
course ‘nonconfessional ethics’ was intended to serve the claims of nonbelievers
and freethinkers, and could in that respect never be called ‘neutral’.
From the nineties onwards, the organization of the course ‘nonconfessional eth-
ics’ was handed over to the organized humanist community in Flanders7 whereby it
obtained a more explicit ideological character. This went alongside with the Consti-
tutional recognition of the nonconfessional community in 1993 and implied a more
positive pro¿ling of humanism as a belief system, of the identity of freethinkers
and their societal and institutional organization. However, the idea that the course
represented an ethics for all became more controversial.
Earlier, in 1985, The State Council ruled that a child should be allowed exemp-
tion if the parent was of the opinion that none of the offered courses – including
nonconfessional ethics – was in accordance with their convictions. The exemption
regulation was later implicated by the Flemish government. Exemptions have been
predominantly asked by children of Jehovah’s Witnesses. The regulation however
does not apply in the French and German community in Belgium, where the course
nonconfessional ethics remains to be seen as suitable to all religious and philosophi-
cal beliefs (Wachtelaer, 2010).
From this and a few other similar judgments concerning the right to exemption,
Loobuyck & Franken (2009) conclude that the course ‘nonconfessional ethics’ in
Flanders cannot be considered a neutral course, but that it represents a particular
freethinking humanist ideology.
However, when Apostel and Kruithof defended the idea of a scienti¿cally based
ethics, they evidently did not mean that such an ethics could be neutral in the sense
of value-free. They rather believed that it was possible to ground a universal eth-
ics, in secular and scienti¿c terms, rather than on religious beliefs. Of course, this
is not a morally neutral position, but it is not more ‘ideological’ than for instance
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Although the idea of a scienti¿c and
philosophically based and universal ethics may seem outdated in today’s postmod-
ern and multicultural times, it was and remains a cornerstone of the identity of
the course and is translated in the basic principle of free enquiry, the necessity to
approach moral issues from an interdisciplinary perspective and a commitment to
respect universal human rights. As such, it does not matter whether a teacher is an
agnostic, an atheist, a religious humanist or someone who has not yet a particular
worldview; all that is required is that he or she is open to enquiry and critical rea-
201
GILY COENE
soning, avoids indoctrination and accepts the value of human rights and democracy
(Borms, 2009).
In ‘the declaration of attachment to the course nonconfessional ethics’ that pro-
spective teachers In Flanders have to sign, one has to agree with the nonconfession-
al character of the course and with the principle of free enquiry. What this embraces
is further explained in the deontological guidelines. The latter emphasize toler-
ance and respect for differences and others, a scienti¿c approach to value education
and the method of critical inquiry. As such, a teacher should not defend a singular
philosophical doctrine, although ‘on particular issues, and when the circumstances
seems to require it – a teacher should be able to testify – in a thoughtful way – of
his or her personal moral conviction and its foundations’ (Raad voor Inspectie Niet
Confessionele Zedenleer).
The values of the course are further exempli¿ed in the ¿ve process-goals of the
curriculum:
1. Learning to think and act freely and independently, in order to attain the highest
achievable personal autonomy
2. Learning to think ethically, which implies that pupils learn to go against indiffer-
ence and develop empathic engagement
3. Learning to see the value of humanizing society, in an effort to build a more hu-
man world
4. Learning to take responsibility for current and future generations
5. Exercising in attributing meaning as well as learning to understand that an indi-
vidual is never alone in attributing meaning to life and world [my translation]
The values and norms that are reÀected in the process goals and deontological
guidelines are clearly humanistic, although they are not grounded in a particular
metaphysical view or doctrine, nor do they refer to laïcité as a political doctrine.
Economic globalization and multicultural diversity make the call for humanist val-
ues in education all the more critical. According to the results of the ‘International
Civic and Citizenship Education Study’ (2010), Flemish fourteen year old students
score, compared to their peers in 38 other countries, very badly on ‘political’ citi-
zenship, and particularly on their attitudes towards immigrants.
Advocates of ‘active pluralism’ criticize the ‘passive pluralism’ of the Belgian
model and its inability to deal with xenophobic attitudes. Although the concept is
used in different contexts with different meanings and policy implications, it gener-
ally refers to the need of an intercultural attitude and a more active role of the gov-
ernment to facilitate, stimulate and organize initiatives to enhance interreligious
exchange and dialogue.
Although the concept remains vague, it is nevertheless a very popular one. On the
website of the Council of Flemish Of¿cial Community Education, active pluralism
202
THE CHALLENGES OF MULTICULTURALISM
is embraced and linked to ‘interculturalism’. There one can also read the following
quote from Ludo Abicht, to whom the introduction of the term is attributed:
Former state schools only combined neutrality with tolerance and passive plu-
ralism, but could not deal with a crisis. Active pluralism is what we stand for now:
we teach youngsters to approach diversity with a critical and balanced mind. Thus
multiculturalism makes way for an interculturalism, which is a pedagogic task.8
However, in the very same schools, the wearing of religious signs such as head-
scarves has been forbidden.
Hendrik Pinxten (2007, p. 208), former president of the humanist freethinking
organizations in Flanders, proposed that a course in ‘intercultural knowledge and
skills’ would be introduced in the general curriculum, in which pupils would learn
about different life stances. A similar proposal was made by Franken & Loobuyck
(2010) to introduce an inclusive pluralistic course about the recognized religions
and belief systems. Both proposals aim at introducing a general course, that tran-
scend particular religions and philosophies of life and is made compulsory for all
pupils. Although these ideas may sound attractive, many dif¿cult issues are raised.
Who will be deemed quali¿ed to teach this course? It is not possible to realize these
aims with the existing courses? Is the ideal of active pluralism or interculturalism
realized by the mere transfer of knowledge about different religions?
Many ambiguities remain about the concept of active pluralism. For Abicht
(2006, p 231) for instance, authentic pluralism implies an active interest in the other
and an ‘inter-esse’ for other belief-systems. This implies a willingness to listen and
an attitude of mutual respect that cannot merely be taken for granted, as is illus-
trated by the widespread prevalence of xenophobic attitudes in society.
Interculturalism or active pluralism requires the cultivation of certain values
and attitudes, such as tolerance based on mutual respect, equal respect for basic
freedoms, including the freedom of opinion and the respect for dissident voices.
Although it can be argued that this values are broader humanist values that are not
connected to a particular philosophy of life and should therefore be part of the gen-
eral teaching curriculum, current developments in the ¿eld of education does not
seem to leave much room for this. From this an additional argument can be drawn
to favour the continuing existence of religious instruction and humanist education
in public schools above a more strict secularism that relegates religious, ethical and
philosophical issues to the private sphere. A humanist position on this issue should
therefore not only be informed by the mere concern about the separation of church
and state and the question of neutrality, but should also attend to the question of how
other humanist values and principles within education and society in general can be
cultivated. Although the current system in which pupils can choose between differ-
ent recognized religions and nonreligious ethics has its limits, it is more desirable
than a system in which there is no humanist education at all.
203
GILY COENE
CONCLUSION
204
THE CHALLENGES OF MULTICULTURALISM
NOTES
1 For the use of convenience I translate ‘vrijzinnig’ here as ‘freethinking’, although this can lead to
some confusion with a different concept of ‘vrijdenkers’.
2 This is different from the use of the term in the Netherlands, where it refers to a liberal interpreta-
tion of a particular religion.
3 For a further discussion of what ‘neutrality’ implies, see: Verbeeck (2008)
4 The Belgian way of dealing with religious diversity is often equated with the Dutch ‘denomina-
tionalized’ model, however ‘denominations’ in the Netherlands are religiously delineated, while in
Belgium they (the Christian, Socialist and Liberal) are de¿ ned in political and ideological terms.
Different from the Netherlands, Belgium does not have a signi¿cant historical background of ‘reli-
gious’ pluralism, but has remained, like France, predominantly Catholic.
5 Governmental authority over education has become regionalized in Belgium, which allows the
three communities (The Flemish, Francophone and German-speaking Community) to develop their
own policies. In addition, education is institutionalized within different organizational frameworks
or ‘pillars’ that enjoy a large degree of autonomy: i.e. of¿cial or public education (which can be
governed at the community, provincial or municipal level) and free – mainly Catholic – education.
While of¿cial education is more prominent in the French-speaking part, the majority of schools in
Flanders are Catholic, yet fully state-subsidized.
6 The Free University of Brussels however is a freethinking university, established in the 19th century
to counter the Catholic monopoly in the educational system and to guarantee free inquiry. Today,
the University of Ghent organizes a Bachelor and Master program in Moral Sciences. The Free
University of Brussels organizes a Bachelor and Master in Philosophy and Moral Sciences, with an
option in Moral Sciences and Humanistics.
7 This is not the case in the French-speaking part of the country, in which the course is detached from
the organized freethinking community. See Wachtelaer, 2010. This exempli¿es some differences in
the interpretation of laïcité in the Flemish and French speaking part of the country.
8 http://www.opengeest.nu/wie-zijn-we/actief-pluralisme.aspx, accesed on 03/02/2011
REFERENCES
Abicht L. (2006). Actief pluralisme, Zeven stellingen (Active pluralism. Seven propositions). In E.
Brems & R. Stokx. (Eds.), Recht en minderheden. De ene diversiteit is de andere niet (221-233).
Brugge: die keure.
Apostel L. (2003). Pluralistische grondslagen van de moraalwetenschap (Pluralistic foundations of the
moral sciences). (Originally published in 1965), Rijksuniversiteit Gent), Ethiek en Maatschappij,
6(3-4), 98-144.
Bader V. (2007). Secularism or democracy? Associational governance of religious diversity. Amster-
dam: Amsterdam University Press.
205
GILY COENE
206
THE CHALLENGES OF MULTICULTURALISM
Gily Coene
Department of Philosophy & Ethics
Brussels University (VUB)
207