4 - Ang BAgong Bayani Vs Comelec

Supreme Court of the Philippines
412 Phil. 308

EN BANC
G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (UNDER THE ACRONYM OFW), REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS
SECRETARY-GENERAL, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
CITIZENS DRUG WATCH; MAMAMAYAN AYAW SA DROGA; GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS
LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT
FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS
ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS
CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION AND OTHERS UNDER
“ORGANIZATIONS/COALITIONS” OF OMNIBUS RESOLUTION NO. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO;
LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE’S COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO;
AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG
YUMABONG; AND OTHERS UNDER “POLITICAL PARTIES” OF OMNIBUS RESOLUTION NO. 3785.
RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. NO. 147613. JUNE 26, 2001]
BAYAN MUNA, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE’S COALITION

(NPC); LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-
NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; AND BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people
who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate
directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the
underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State’s benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream
of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now dominate district
elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and
mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 [1] issued
by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties,
organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec, “[v]erifications were made as to the status and
capacity of these parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as]
heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review of
these petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two
(2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political parties. These
numerous petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the
Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001.” [2]
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated December
22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to
participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose registrations were
denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-
list elections. Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and organizations,
but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:
“We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional representation
scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization
to directly participate in this electoral window.
“It will be noted that as defined, the ‘party-list system’ is a ‘mechanism of proportional representation’ in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.
“However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a need to keep
the number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only those who
substantially comply with the rules and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or
evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions.” [3]
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that “the names of
[some of herein respondents] be deleted from the ‘Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections’ and that said
certified list be accordingly amended.” It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents
not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter’s nominees not be proclaimed. [4] On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna
and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents.[5]
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file Comments within
three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, [6] but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001.
[7]
During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.[8]
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition [9] before
this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No.
3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, [10] the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a
non-extendible period of five days from notice.[11]
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, [12] docketed as GR No. 147613, also
challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, [13] the Court ordered the
consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to file their respective
Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It
added that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but
barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments[14] on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral
Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the parties were directed to submit their
respective Memoranda simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days. [15]
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following issues:
“1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is there no other plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
“2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
“3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to ‘marginalized and underrepresented’ sectors and
organizations.
“4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No.
3785.”[16]
The Court’s Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec which will determine, after
summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus
Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision.
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because there are other plain,
speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. [17] The Office of the Solicitor General argues that
petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for cancellation of
registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A [18]dated November 9, 2000.
[19]
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001.
Indeed, under both the Constitution[20] and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a
verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion
for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure.[21]
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of
Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. [22] The Comelec, however, did not act on that
Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there
was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioner’s action; to
this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality
because the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy.[23] It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of
other remedies, “where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of
urgency.”[24] Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it
potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this Court must
urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to “formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines, or rules.”[25]
Finally, procedural requirements “may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves
the principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is
extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.” [26]
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that “the inclusion of political parties in the party-list
system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution.” [27] For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects
to the participation of “major political parties.”[28] On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the
impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the
party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all “registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations.”[29]
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the
party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that members of the House of Representatives may “be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.”
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the
party-list system.
“Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those
registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
“Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be
represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar
bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.” [30]
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out that the
participants in the party-list system may “be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, [31]
Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao." [32] This was also clear from the following exchange between Comms.
Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople:[33]
“MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at
Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido.”
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in
order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a
seat in Congress.[34] He explained: “The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out
that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or
1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the
Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win
individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list
system.”
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for “a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x.” Section 3 expressly states that a “party” is “either a political
party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.” More to the point, the law defines “political party” as “an
organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.”
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-list
system. We quote the pertinent provision below:
“x x x x x x x x x
“For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation
in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to
participate in the party-list system.
“x x x x x x x x x”
Indubitably, therefore, political parties – even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political party -- or
any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations
must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section
5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows:
“(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission
declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give “genuine power to our people” in Congress. Hence,
when the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: “On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully,
usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature.” [35]
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like “in
accordance with law” or “as may be provided by law”; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty
objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:
“SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole,
to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full,
free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature,
and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.”
The Marginalized and Underrepresented

to Become Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-
style party-list system, which will “enable” the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation
as a whole.
The key words in this policy are “proportional representation,” “marginalized and underrepresented,” and “lack [of]
well-defined constituencies.”
“Proportional representation” here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-
list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group.
Rather, it refers to the representation of the “marginalized and underrepresented” as exemplified by the
enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, “labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.”
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented,
because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly
represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. [36] Concurrently, the
persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be “Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.”
Finally, “lack of well-defined constituenc[y]” refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like
voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate
interests identified with the “marginalized or underrepresented.”
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are “marginalized and
underrepresented” become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those
who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this
intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: “to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of
Representatives.” Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms. [37]
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are enumerated in
Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
“SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for
purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a
petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national,
regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its
constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.”
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear
intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of
statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is
ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning
of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association. [38]
The Party-List System Desecrated

by the OSG Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA No. 7941
“does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of
society.”[39] In fact, it contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 [40]of RA 7941 may
participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing the
super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmariñas Village could participate in the party-list elections. [41]
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that
the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens – specifically those belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties – to be elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion
of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear
statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the
party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by
the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG’s
position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty.
Lorna Patajo-Kapunan[42] admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar
planters could not join the party-list system as representatives of their respective sectors. [43]
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political power more
awesome than their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of
one’s constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of one’s bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in
poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted -- to give them not only
genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns
of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its
noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily,
it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past – the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor,
even those in the underground movement – to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and
participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and
desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district elections
normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of
Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled
80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent, the
OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the congressional district elections and the
party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, [44] in order to enhance the
chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the House of Representatives through the
simplest scheme possible.[45] Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have never gotten a
foothold within it -- those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the “simplest
scheme possible” to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it
-- those privileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a student dormitory
“open house,” which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the “open house” is for the
benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such special
privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is only for the “outsiders” who cannot get elected through
regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of
Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list system
would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the
intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could
not have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must
permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list system.
Refutation of the
Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored
mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source from which to ascertain
constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which
the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. [46] In other words, verba legis
still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to
extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or
Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed. [47]
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary[48] that “the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive
at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention
‘are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens
whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face.’ The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers’ understanding thereof.”
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of
the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and
implementing party-list representation, we should therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its provisions
ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2 thereof
unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was designed to “enable
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole x x x.”
The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not
even to the proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers’ deliberations merely express their individual
opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue here. Hence,
they remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the
law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed
above. The OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized and
overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution
or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. [49] Indeed, the
function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or
second-guess it.[50]
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright disqualification of the major political
parties – Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP – on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No.
4073, they have been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in the May 14, 2001
elections. It argues that because of this, they have the “advantage of getting official Comelec Election Returns,
Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x.” We note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to
the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for the purpose of determining which
parties would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of whether respondents herein
and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in the
party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because “it is a
government entity using government resources and privileges.” This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. [51] It is
not equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an opportunity to show that they
qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to participate in
and be elected under the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening

Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after summary
evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections
comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following
guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented
groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of
incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the
interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in
the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling “Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives.” In other words,
while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that
they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and
other similarly situated political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:
“JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political party must claim to
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes.”[52]
Third, in view of the objections[53] directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is
allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be
represented in the party-list system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the following
discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
“MR. OPLE. x x x
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international networks of members and
supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own political party in emulation of those
parties I had mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and philosophies from well-established religious faiths,
will that also not fall within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then certainly the Comelec
can pierce through the legal fiction.”[54]
The following discussion is also pertinent:

“MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed “EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS,” he is not, of course,
prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to represent
their group.
REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic Church, the
Protestant Church et cetera.”[55]
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that “religious denominations and sects shall not be registered.” [56] The
prohibition was explained by a member[57] of the Constitutional Commission in this wise: “[T]he prohibition is on any
religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a
candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party.” [58]
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the
grounds for disqualification as follows:
“(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the
votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.”[59]
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with
election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks
to “enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x
to become members of the House of Representatives.” A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply
with this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by,
the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens,
organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the
government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal [60] and unfair to other parties, but
also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9
of RA 7941 reads as follows:
“SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. – No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less
than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the
party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and
is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of
age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term
shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.”
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so
also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens “who belong
to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.” Surely, the interests of the youth cannot
be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To
allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be
able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that “the nominee of a party, national or
regional, is not going to represent a particular district x x x.” [61]
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: “to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole,
to become members of the House of Representatives.”
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those who have less in life should
have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the
great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced,
and even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to come out of their limbo
and seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that the
party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances
of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list
system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further
weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941 are
nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of
people empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the
makers of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct
summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines
enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list
elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have
garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is further
DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec “to refrain from proclaiming any winner”
during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported
its compliance with the foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections’ receipt thereof. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result.
Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join the dissent of J. Vicente M. Mendoza.
Ynares-Santiago, J., abroad on official business.
[1]
Signed by Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo and Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco, Rufino S. B. Javier, Ralph
C. Lantion, Mehol K. Sadain, Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason Jr.
[2]
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, p. 13; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 40.
[3]
Ibid., pp. 21-22; rollo, pp. 48-49.
[4]
Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 272-273.
[5]
Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 250-263.
[6]
Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 282-283.
[7]
See rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 223.
[8]
TSN (GR No. 147589 and 147613), May 17, 2001, p. 49.
[9]
Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 4-73.
[10]
Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 74.
[11]
Comments were filed by MAD, Bagong Bayani, The True Marcos Loyalists, the Comelec, Partido ng Masang
Pilipino, the Liberal Party, the Office of the Solicitor General, CREBA, Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, the Philippine Local
Autonomy Movement, Aksyon Demokratiko, Citizens’ Drug Watch Foundation, Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, Ang
Lakas ng OCW, and Sports and Health Foundation.
[12]
Rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 3-45.
[13]
Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 46.
These were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Comelec, the Bagong Bayani Organization,
[14]
Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, and the Philippine Local Autonomy Movement.
Memoranda were filed by Petitioners Bayan Muna and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party; and Respondents
[15]
Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, CREBA, the Bagong Bayani Organization, the Office of the Solicitor General, and
Aksyon Demokratiko. Manifestations instead of memoranda were filed by Lakas-NUCD and OCW.
[16]
See the May 17, 2001 Resolution, p. 2; rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 88.
See, e.g., the Bagong Bayani Organization’s Memorandum, pp. 3-4; Aksyon Demokratiko’s Memorandum, pp. 2-
[17]
3; and MAD’s Memorandum, pp. 3-6.
Rules and regulations governing the filing of a petition for registration, a manifestation to participate, and the
[18]
names of nominees under the party-list system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2001 national and
local elections.
[19]
OSG’s Memorandum, pp. 6-14; rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 151-159.
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, provides: “Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
[20]
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
[21]
“SECTION 1. What pleadings are not allowed. The following pleadings are not allowed:
x x x x x x x x x
d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in election offense cases;
x x x x x x x x x”
[22]
Docketed as SPA 01-113. As earlier noted, Akbayan also filed before the Comelec a similar Petition, docketed as
SPA-01-109. See Annexes 1 and 2, Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General; rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 250
et seq. and 266 et seq.
Section 1, Rule 65. See Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222, October 16, 1996; BF Corporation v. CA, 288
[23]
SCRA 267, March 27, 1998; GSIS v. Olisa, 304 SCRA 421, March 10, 1999; National Steel Corporation v. CA, GR No.
134437, January 31, 2000; Sahali v. Comelec, GR No. 134169, February 2, 2000
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 316, March 7, 1997, per Panganiban, J. See also ABS-CBN Broadcasting
[24]
Corporation v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 133486, January 28, 2000; Central Bank v. Cloribel, 44 SCRA 307,
April 11, 1972.
Salonga v. Cruz Paño, 134 SCRA 438, February 18, 1985, per Gutierrez, Jr., J. See also Tañada v. Angara, 272
[25]
SCRA 18, May 2, 1997; Guingona v. Gonzales, 219 SCRA 326, March 1, 1993.
[26]
ABS-CBN v. Comelec, GR No. 133486, January 28, 2000, per Panganiban, J.
[27]
Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 15; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 18.
[28]
Petition of Bayan Muna, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 20.
[29]
OSG Comment, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244.
[30]
Emphasis supplied. See also §§17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution.
It may be noted that when the Constitution was being drafted in the early days of the post-Marcos era, UNIDO
[31]
was the dominant political party.
[32]
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 86.
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
Infra.
Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747, February 26, 1997; Ramirez v. CA, 248 SCRA 590, September 28,
[37]
1995.
[38]
82 C.J.S. Statutes § 331.
[39]
OSG Comment, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244.
[40]
Infra.
[41]
TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 147-148.
[42]
Counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko.
[43]
TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 178-180.
[44]
Supra. See also §6, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, which reads: “A free and open party system shall be
allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article.”
[45]
Section 2 of RA 7941 states in part as follows: “x x x. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a
full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature,
and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.”
JM Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, February 18, 1970; cited in Ruben C. Agpalo,
[46]
Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., p. 311. See also Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil 259, 264 (1938).
[47]
See Agpalo, ibid., p. 313.
[48]
194 SCRA 317, February 22, 1991, per Fernan, CJ; quoting Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa 365, 3 Atl 220.
Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997. See also Santiago v. Guingona, 298 SCRA 756, November 18,
[49]
1998; Miranda v. Aguirre, 314 SCRA 603, September 16, 1999; Garcia v. HRET, 312 SCRA 353, August 12, 1999.
[50]
Veterans Federation Party et al. v. Comelec et al., GR No. 136781, October 6, 2000.
See Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 278, February 18, 1999; Inciong Jr. v. CA, 257 SCRA 578, June 26,
[51]
1996; Palomado v. NLRC, 257 SCRA 680, June 28, 1996; Heirs of the Late Teodoro Guaring Jr. v. CA, 269 SCRA
283, March 7, 1997; Sesbreño v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals, 270 SCRA 360, March 24, 1997; PCGG v.
Cojuangco Jr., 302 SCRA 217, January 27, 1999.
[52]
TSN, May 17, 2001, p. 180.
[53]
Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 16; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 19.
[54]
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 636.
[55]
[56]
§2 (5), Article IX (C).
[57]
Christian S. Monsod.
[58]
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 634
[59]
See also §11, Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A.
[60]
See §2 (4), Article IX (B) of the Constitution. See also Article 261 (o), BP 881.
The bicameral conference committee on the disagreeing provision of Senate Bill No. 1913 and House Bill No.
[61]
3040, January 31, 1994, p. 4.
SEPARATE OPINION
MENDOZA, J., dissenting:
I vote to dismiss the petitions in these cases. I will presently explain my vote, but before I do so it seems to me
necessary to state briefly the facts and the issues.
THE FACTS
Petitioner Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party (OFW for short) is the political agency of the Overseas Filipino
Workers Movement, a non-stock and non-profit organization. On the other hand, petitioner Bayan Muna is a political
party representing peasants, workers, women, the youth, and other marginalized sectors. Both were accredited by
the Commission on Elections in connection with the election for party-list representatives on May 14, 2001.
Petitioners brought these suits ¾ in G.R. No. 147589, for certiorari and, in G.R. No. 147613, for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus ¾ for the purpose of seeking the annulment of the registration of the following parties
classified as “political parties” and “organizations/coalitions” by the Commission on Elections:
Political Parties:
Partido ng Masang Pilipino (PMP),

Lakas NUCD-UMDP (LAKAS NUCD-UMDP),
Nationalist Peoples’ Coalition (NPC),
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP),
Aksyon Demokratiko (AKSYON),
Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-LABAN),
Liberal Party (LP),
Nacionalista Party (NP),
Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong
Organizations/Coalitions:
Citizens Drug Watch Foundation, Inc. (DRUG WATCH),

Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD),
Go! Go! Philippines Movement (GO, GO PHILIPPINES),
The True Marcos Loyalist (MARCOS LOYALIST),
Philippine Local Autonomy Movement, Inc. (PLAM),
Citizens Movement for Justice, Economy Environment and Peace (JEEP),
Chamber of Real Estate Builders Association (CREBA),
Sports and Health Advancement Foundation, Inc. (SHAF),
Ang Lakas ng Overseas Contract Workers (OCW),
Bagong Bayani Organization (BAGONG BAYANI),
National Federation of Sugar Planters (NFSP)
R.A. No. 7941, §5 provides that any party, organization, or coalition desiring to participate in the party-list system
must apply to the COMELEC for registration not later than 90 days before the election. On the other hand, §4 of the
same law requires that any party, organization, or coalition which is already registered with the COMELEC should
declare its intention to participate in the party-list system 90 days before the election.
In its Resolution No. 3785, dated March 26, 2001, the COMELEC passed upon the applications for registration or
manifestations of intention of several parties, organizations, and coalitions. On March 28, 2001, it issued a certified
list of parties, organizations, or coalitions entitled to participate in the May 14, 2001 elections. All in all, 148 parties,
organizations, and coalitions were accredited, including private respondents herein.
Petitioners OFW and Bayan Muna contend that the party-list system is exclusively for the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sectors of the Philippine society and that there is no way by which other sectors not so identified,
much less the major political parties, can participate in the party-list elections. Petitioner Bayan Muna in particular
calls attention to the fact that seven of the respondent political parties (PMP, Lakas NUCD-UMDP, NPC, LDP,
AKSYON, PDP-LABAN, and LP) are actually the major political parties in the country today as determined by the
COMELEC in its Resolution No. 4073, dated May 3, 2001, and charges that the rest of private respondents are
“pseudo party-list organizations” which are actually satellites of the major political parties and of big businesses.
Bayan Muna argues that the party-list system is intended to address the problem of ineffective representation of
underprivileged sectors of society and enhance direct people’s action and participation in the decision-making
process to counter-balance the territorial representation of 80% of the House of Representatives, and that to allow
participation in the party-list system of respondent political parties and parties/coalitions would be to defeat this
purpose because these parties do not represent “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors. [1] For this reason,
Bayan Muna prays that R.A. No. 7941, §11, par. 2 be declared unconstitutional on the ground that, by banning the
five major political parties from participating in the party-list system only in the May 1998 elections, it leaves them
free to participate in subsequent elections.
On the other hand, the COMELEC argues:

[B]oth the Constitution and the Party-List System Act clearly allow, and they do not prohibit, the participation of
“registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations” to participate in the party-list system, whether
or not said parties or organizations represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society. [2]
It cites the proviso of Art. VI, §5(2) of the Constitution that

For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector,
as proof that “marginalized” sectors are not entitled to permanent seats in the House of Representatives. In any
event, it is contended that petitioners’ recourse is not to this Court but to the COMELEC because whether a party,
organization, or coalition represents “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors is a question of fact, and this
Court is not a trier of facts. The COMELEC states that, as a matter of fact, petitioner Bayan Muna has pending
petitions to disqualify, based on this ground, respondents NPC, LDP, PMP, LAKAS NUCD-UMDP, LP, MAD, CREBA,
NFSP, JEEP, and BAGONG BAYANI.
THE ISSUES
The issues in these cases actually come down to the following:
(1) Whether the petitions filed in these cases should be dismissed for failure of petitioners to exhaust administrative
remedies in the COMELEC; and
(2) Whether the party-list system is exclusively for “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors of society.
We shall deal with these issues in the order they are stated.
DISCUSSION
I.
While it is true that petitioner Bayan Muna has filed petitions for the disqualification of respondents, the fact is that
when the petitions in these cases were filed on April 16 and 17, 2001, the elections were just a month away, and
there was doubt whether a resolution of the petitions for disqualifications was forthcoming. In fact, up to the time of
the elections on May 14, 2001, the cases were still unresolved. Petitioners, therefore, had no other “plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law” within the meaning of Rule 65, §§1-2 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and were justified in resorting to the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.
From another point of view, there is no need for petitioners to await formal resolution of their petitions as the
COMELEC had already indicated in press statements its stand that parties, organizations, or coalitions, whether or
not representing “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors, could participate in the election for the party-list
system — a fact confirmed by it in its comment and memorandum in these cases. There is thus no basis for insisting
that petitioners should have exhausted administrative remedies before coming to this Court.
Nor are the issues raised in these cases factual as the statement of the second issue above plainly shows. It is only if
the question whether the party-list system is limited to “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors is answered in
the affirmative will it be necessary to determine the status of respondents.
II.
At the core of the controversy in these cases is the following provision of the Constitution:
Art. VI, §5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law except the religious sector.
To carry out this provision of the Constitution, Congress enacted the Party-List System Act (R.A. No. 7941), the
pertinent provisions of which read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Party. — The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives
to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of
the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party
system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the
simplest scheme possible.
SEC. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives.—The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum
(20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation
in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to
participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of
the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
“The most important single factor in determining the intention of the people from whom the Constitution emanated
is the language in which it is expressed.”[3] The text of Art. VI, §5(1)(2) is quite clear. It provides for a party-list
system of “registered, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations,” not for sectoral representation. Only for three
consecutive terms following the ratification of the Constitution and only with respect to one-half of the seats allotted
to party-list representatives does it allow sectoral representation. Textually, Art. VI, §5(1)(2) provides no basis for
petitioners’ contention that whether it is sectoral representation or party-list system the purpose is to provide
exclusive representation for “marginalized sectors,” by which term petitioners mean the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors.
Indeed, the two systems of representation are not identical. Party-list representation is a type of proportional
representation designed to give those who otherwise cannot win a seat in the House of Representatives in district
elections a chance to win if they have sufficient strength on a nationwide basis. (In this sense, these groups are
considered “marginalized and underrepresented.”) Under the party-list system, representatives are elected from
multi-seat districts in proportion to the number of votes received in contrast to the “winner-take-all” single-seat
district in which, even if a candidate garners 49.9% of the votes, he gets no seat.
Thus, under the party-list system, a party or candidate need not come in first in order to win seats in the legislature.
On the other hand, in the “winner-take-all” single-seat district, the votes cast for a losing candidate are wasted as
only those who vote for the winner are represented. To the extent then that it assures parties or candidates a
percentage of seats in the legislature that reflects their public support, the party-list system enables marginalized
and underrepresented sectors (such as, but not limited to, the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and youth sectors) to obtain seats in the House of Representatives. Otherwise, the party-list
system does not guarantee to these sectors seats in the legislature.
This is the method of representation adopted in the Constitution as answer to the problem of underrepresentation.
In arguing that the party-list system is exclusively for the “marginalized and underrepresented sectors,” petitioner
Bayan Muna argues that the constitutional intent in adopting the party-list system must be searched for in the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
The polestar of constitutional interpretation has been stated by this Court in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary,[4] as follows:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in
order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear.
Debates in the constitutional convention “are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as
indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk,
much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental
law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face.” The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers’ understanding
thereof.
It is worth recalling the celebrated comment of Charles P. Curtis, Jr. on the role of history in constitutional exegesis:
The intention of the framers of the Constitution, even assuming we could discover what it was, when it is not
adequately expressed in the Constitution, that is to say, what they meant when they did not say it, surely that has
no binding force upon us. If we look behind or beyond what they set down in the document, prying into what else
they wrote and what they said, anything we may find is only advisory. They may sit in at our councils. There is no
reason why we should eavesdrop on theirs.[5]
Be that as it may, the Record of the Constitutional Commission speaks clearly against petitioners’ reading of Art. VI,
§5(1)(2). It shows clearly that the Constitutional Commission rejected sectoral representation in preference to
proportional representation.
As originally written, §5 of the Draft Article on the Legislative Department read:

SEC. 5. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members who shall
be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces and cities in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected from the sectors and party list. The sectoral or party list representatives shall in no case exceed
twenty percent of the entire membership of the House of Representatives.
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, provided,
however, that each city with a population of more than two hundred thousand, or each province, shall have at least
one representative.
Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards provided in this section. [6]
As petitioner Bayan Muna states, two proposals for additional representation in the House of Representatives were
submitted by the Committee on Legislative Department: one for sectoral representation, advocated by Commissioner
Villacorta, and another one for party-list system, advocated by Commissioner Monsod. The two are not the same. As
Commissioner Monsod said in explaining his proposal:
MR. MONSOD. . . .
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party list system is not synonymous
with that of the sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of
sectors and who constitute the members of the sectors. . . . In effect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly
would mean that certain sectors would have reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves who would sit
in those reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of which sector because as we will notice in Proclamation
No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals, business, military, academic,
ethnic and other similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were identified here as “sectoral representatives”
to be represented in this Commission. The problem we had in trying to approach sectoral representation in the
Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors or include other sectors. . . . Second, we had the problem of
who comprise the farmers. . . . A doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the
discretion of the person to say “I am a farmer” so he would be included in that sector.
. . . Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats for sectors. . . . This can be a regional party, a sectoral
party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he
wants the farmers’ party to be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the
day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each party or each organization — one
does not have to be a political party and register in order to participate as a party — and count the votes and from
there derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a party, organization or coalition.
....
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the same time making sure
that those who really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to have a seat in the
National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have the constituency to win a seat on a legislative
district basis. They may not be able to win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide
basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or
parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always
third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would
have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So,
that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list system. [7]
Commissioner Monsod, therefore, proposed to amend the phrase “shall be elected from the sectors and party list” in
§5 by replacing it with the following
THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR

ORGANIZATIONS.[8]
Attention should be paid to this proposal because with slight modification it later became the basis of the present
Art. VI, §5(1)(2).
The following exchange took place on the Monsod amendment:

MR. DAVIDE: Madam President, before accepting the proposed amendment, the Committee would like to get some
clarifications.
When the proponent speaks of “OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS,” is he referring to any sector which
the law may subsequently define?
MR. MONSOD: . . . . The party list system that is being advocated by this amendment is a system that opens up the
list to any regional, national or sectoral party. . . .
....
MS. AQUINO. The Committee would like to be clarified on this.
Do we understand the proponent correctly that this party list system is not necessarily synonymous to sectoral
representation?
MR. MONSOD: No, it is not necessarily synonymous, but it does include the right of sectoral parties or organizations
to register, but it is not exclusive to sectoral parties or organizations.
MS. AQUINO. And that it does not likewise reserve any institutional seat for any sector? In other words, it only
enables it to be a part of the party list if it has the capacity to do so, but it does not reserve any seat for the sectors.
MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, this is not a reserve seat system. [9]
The proposed amendment was opposed by a group headed by Commissioner Villacorta, which included
Commissioners Tadeo, Lerum, and Bernas. Lerum said:
MR. LERUM. Madam President, in view of the explanation, I am objecting to this amendment because it is possible
that the labor sector will not be represented considering that those who will vote are all the voters of the Philippines.
In other words, the representative of labor will be chosen by all the electors of the Philippines, and that is not
correct. My contention is that the sectoral representative must be selected by his own constituents, and for that
reason, I am objecting to this amendment. [10]
On the other hand, Tadeo objected on the ground that if allowed to participate in the party-list system, the major
political parties could gobble up the sectoral parties. He said:
MR. TADEO. . . . . Kapag inilagay natin ang party list, papasukin ng political parties. Mangigibabaw at kakainin din
niyan hanggang mawala ang sektor.[11]
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the
party list at mawawalang saysay din iyong sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto
ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang “reserve.” Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong
198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties. [12]
Villacorta said he was objecting to the party-list system because it would not solve the problem of ineffective
representation of the underprivileged sectors. He said:
For too long since our people attained a semblance of self-government at the start of this century, our legislators
were elected based on their promise that they would represent the little people of our land. With the exception of a
few patriotic legislators, some of whom are in our Commission today, members of the National Assemblies, the
Congresses, and the Batasans of the past did not devote themselves enough to the alleviation of the dismal
condition of our country’s poor and lower classes.
....
These realities convince us that there are no spokesmen and legislators who can best represent the poor, the
underprivileged, the marginalized than those coming from within their ranks. [13]
To Commissioner Villacorta, only reserved seats for the sectors would give them effective representation:
MR. MONSOD. My amendment merely says that it is THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL,
REGIONAL OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS.
My question is: Does the Honorable Commissioner object to this amendment?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, because it does not guarantee that the seats reserved for the party list representatives will
be reserved for the sectors.[14]
Because of the impasse, the discussion on Friday, July 25, 1986, on §5 was suspended to allow the commissioners
to come to an agreement. After one week, a compromise formula was reached by the two groups and presented to
the plenary session of the Commission on August 1, 1986. In lieu of the phrase “shall be elected from the sectors
and the party list,” it was proposed that the following be inserted in §5 of the Draft Article:
THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR
ORGANIZATIONS AS PROVIDED BY LAW. THE PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PROVIDED THAT FOR THE FIRST TWO
TERMS AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION TWENTY-FIVE OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY LIST
REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED BY SELECTION OR ELECTION, AS PROVIDED BY LAW FROM THE LABOR,
PEASANT, URBAN POOR AND YOUTH SECTORS.
However, although an agreement had apparently been reached, the advocates of sectoral representation were not
satisfied that it would be allowed only for two terms and only with respect to one-half of the seats allocated for
party-list representatives. Commissioner Aquino proposed instead the following amendment of §5:
ELECTED THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR
ORGANIZATIONS, AS PROVIDED BY LAW. THE PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. TWENTY-FIVE OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED
TO PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED BY ELECTION, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, FROM THE LABOR,
PEASANT, URBAN POOR, WOMEN AND YOUTH SECTORS
When put to vote, however, Aquino’s proposal was defeated with nineteen (19) voting in favor, and twenty-two (22)
voting against.[15]
The Commission then voted on the proposed amendment of Commissioner Monsod. With only a few minor changes,
it was approved by a vote of thirty-two (32) commissioners against none. [16] As finally worded, the amendment
reads:
SHALL BE FILLED AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION, FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR,
INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY
LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR
Thus, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show that the party-list system is not limited to the
“marginalized and underrepresented” sectors referred to by petitioners, i.e., labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, and the youth, but that it is a type of proportional representation intended to give
voice to those who may not have the necessary number to win a seat in a district but are sufficiently numerous to
give them a seat nationwide. It, therefore, misreads the debates on Art. VI, §5(1)(2) to say that “Although
Commissioners Villacorta and Monsod differed in their proposals as to the details of the party-list system, both
proponents worked within the framework that the party-list system is for the ‘marginalized’ as termed by Comm.
Villacorta and the ‘underrepresented’ as termed by Comm. Monsod, which he defined as those which are ‘always
third or fourth place in each of the districts.’” [17]
Indeed, the two proposals put forth by them are basically different, and they do not have the same basis. What the
advocates of sectoral representation wanted was permanent reserved seats for “marginalized sectors” by which they
mean the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors. Under Art. VI,
§5(2), these sectors were given only one-half of the seats in the House of Representatives and only for three terms.
On the other hand, the “third or fourth place(rs)” in district elections, for whom the party-list system was intended,
refer to those who may not win seats in the districts but nationwide may be sufficiently strong to enable them to be
represented in the House. They may include Villacorta’s “marginalized” or “underprivileged” sectors, but they are not
limited to them. There would have been no need to give the “marginalized sectors” one-half of the seats for the
party-list system for three terms if the two systems are identical.
The objections raised against the accreditation of private respondents are the same ones raised by Commissioners
Villacorta, Tadeo, and Lerum, among others, to the Monsod proposal which became the present Art. VI, §5(1)(2),
namely, that certain sectors, like labor, may not win seats in the House under the party-list system; that the big
parties might gobble up the sectoral parties; that the party-list system will not solve the problem of ineffective
representation of the “underprivileged sectors.” These objections, however, did not carry the day, as the members of
the Constitutional Commission voted 32-0 in favor of the Monsod proposal. It is noteworthy that even those who
spoke against the Monsod proposal did not vote against it. To uphold these objections now would be to overrule the
Constitutional Commission and in effect amend the Constitution.
In sum, a problem was placed before the Constitutional Commission that the existing “winner-take-all” one-seat
district system of election leaves blocks of voters underrepresented. To this problem of underrepresentation two
solutions were proposed: sectoral representation and party-list system or proportional representation. The
Constitutional Commission chose the party-list system. This Court cannot hold that the party-list system is reserved
for the labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth as petitioners contend
without changing entirely the meaning of the Constitution which in fact mandates exactly the opposite of the
reserved seats system when it provides in Art. IX,C, §6 that “A free and open party system shall be allowed to
evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article.”
Thus, neither textual nor historical consideration yields support for the view that the party-list system is designed
exclusively for labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors. As
Commissioner Ople said in supporting the Monsod proposal:
In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass organizations to seek common ground.
For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to make common
goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these parties can be transformed through the
participation of mass organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the
Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that they will be attractive to many mass
organizations. In the opposition parties to which we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass
organizations so that with their participation, the policies of such parties can be radically transformed because this
amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations and the political parties to come
together. And the party list system is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is understood that
the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of mass organizations affiliated with
them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that they have in Europe where labor organizations
and cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the Christian
Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the
leadership of those parties.[18]
With respect to the cancellation of any party registered under the party-list system, §6 of the Party-List System Act
provides:
SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint
of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the
votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.
Petitioners’ allegations that certain parties or organizations, such as private respondents MAD and Ang Buhay
Hayaang Yumabong, are disqualified under this provision are for the COMELEC to determine after due notice and
hearing. They are unfit for resolution in these proceedings.
III.
On the other hand, the majority states:

The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to
be attained. In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and
equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of
the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of
the provision being construed.
....
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of
the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. . . . Section 2 thereof
unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was designed to “enable
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole . . .”
With due respect, I think the majority misapprehends the meaning of §2 of R.A. No. 7941. The provision reads:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Party. — The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives
to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the
simplest scheme possible.
What this provision simply states is that the purpose of the party-list system is to promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives and, that to achieve this end, “a
full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives” shall be guaranteed. Contrary to what the majority claims, §2 does not
say that the party-list system is intended “to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations, and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation” to win seats in the House of Representatives. What it says is
that the policy of the law is “to promote proportional representation through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation” to win
seats in the House. For while the representation of “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors is a basic purpose
of the law, it is not its only purpose. As already explained, the aim of proportional representation is to enable those
who cannot win in the “winner-take-all” district elections a chance of winning. These groups are not necessarily
limited to the sectors mentioned in §5, i.e., labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
the elderly, the handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. These groups can
possibly include other sectors.
Indeed, how can there be a “full, free and open party system” if the election for the party list system is to be limited
to the sectors which are enumerated in §5 of the law, i.e., labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, the elderly, handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals?
After all, what is provided for is “a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations” each of which is separately defined in §3 of the law.
That the party-list system is not limited to these groups is also clear from §5 of the law:
SEC. 5. Registration. - Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for
purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a
petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national,
regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its
constitution, bylaws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.
There would be no need to provide specifically for the sectors if the party-list system is reserved for them.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the petitions in these cases should be dismissed.
[1]
Memorandum for Petitioner Bayan Muna 17-18.
[2]
Memorandum for the COMELEC 23-24.
[3]
Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. Land Registration Commission, 102 Phil. 596, 627 (1957).
[4]
194 SCRA 317, 337-338 (1991), quoting Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa. 365, 3 Atl. 220 (1886).
[5]
LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 2 (1947) (emphasis in the original).
[6]
Committee on Legislative Power, Committee Report No. 22 (emphasis added).
[7]
2 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 85-86, session of Tuesday, July 22, 1986 (emphasis added).
[8]
Id. at 252-253, session of Friday, July 25, 1986.
[9]
Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
[10]
Id. at 254, session of Friday, July 25, 1986.
[11]
Id. at 254.
[12]
Id. at 257.
[13]
Id. at 255.
[14]
Id. at 258.
[15]
Id. at 584, session of Friday, Aug. 1, 1986.
[16]
Id. at 589.
[17]
Memorandum for Petitoner Bayan Muna 13.
[18]
II RECORD 568, session of Friday, Aug. 1, 1986.
SEPARATE (DISSENTING) OPINION
VITUG, J.:
The 1987 Constitution, crafted at a time when the euphoria of the 1986 People Power had barely subsided,
recognized the vigor infused by civilian society in a cleansing political reform and focused itself on institutionalizing
civilian participation in daily governance. A cause for concern was the not-too-unlikely perpetuation of a single party
in power- a convenient contrivance for authoritarian rule. Article VI, Section 5, subsection 2, of the 1987 Charter -
THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY PER CENTUM OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDING THOSE UNDER THE PARTY LIST FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS. AFTER THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION, ONE-HALF OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE
SHALL BE FILLED, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR,
INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY
LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR. -
was the result of long-drawn deliberations and compromises.
Immediately, after the resumption of the next Congress, then president Corazon C. Aquino, exercising her transitory
appointing powers, assigned to the reserved seats in the Lower House, representatives of the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women and youth sector. The assignment was made from a selected list of
names submitted by the sectors themselves. The sectors would continue to enjoy these reserved seats for the next
three terms; thenceforth, they would have to participate in an electoral contest to secure their representation in
Congress.
Article 6, Section 5(2), however, not being self-executing, would wait for the legislature to ordain the enabling law.
Congress was to be circumscribed by the terms expressed in Article 6, Section 5(2). -First, the system should only
apply to the election of 20% of the total composition of the House of Representatives, second, it would prescribe a
mandatory proportional representation scheme, and, third, it would allow participating parties and organizations to
be represented in voter's registration boards, board of election inspectors, parties and organizations or similar
entities.
On 03 March 1995, Republic Act 7941, also known as "An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives
Through the Party- List System, and Appropriating Funds Therefor," was enacted. The enabling law laid the basis for
COMELEC Resolution No.2847, issued on July 1996, prescribing the "Rules and Regulations Governing the Elections
of the Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System." In the May 1998 first party-list elections, the
sectors were required, to test, for the first time, their political mettle in an open electoral contest with other parties,
groups and organizations under a party-list system. While the elections had a low-voter turnout, seen largely as a
result of public unawareness of an electoral innovation, the recent 2001 multi-party list elections, however, were
different. This time, a huge number of parties, groups and coalitions applied for registration with, and subsequently
obtained accreditation from, the COMELEC. Six of these groups were established political parties, namely PARTIDO
NG MASANG PILIPINO, LAKAS NUCD-UMDP, NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG
PILIPINO, AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO, LIBERAL PARTY, NACIONALISTA PARTY and PDP-LABAN.
The instant petition prays for the exclusion of these major parties on the ground that their participation does not
level the playing field for less known and less organized sectoral groups still in dire need of election logistics and
machinery. Arguing that the system is open to the underrepresented and marginalized sectors, as well as other
parties but only on the condition that the latter field sectoral candidates themselves, herein petitioner sought the
disqualification of the large major political parties and groups which do not represent any "genuine" sectoral interest.
A perusal of the novel electoral engineering, introduced by the Constitution into the electoral system, would show
the pertinent provisions to be stoically quiet on the qualifications of a party, group or coalition to participate under
the party-list system. Instead, it has opted to rely on a subsequent statutory enactment to provide for the system's
focal particulars, which now lead us to the enabling law itself. Section 2 of R.A. 7941 reads -
"The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable the Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lacked well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
Representatives, by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the
simplest scheme possible."
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987 Constitution took off
from two staunch positions - the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 percentum of the
total seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list representatives half were to be reserved to appointees from the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod
expressed the difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He was of the view that reserving seats
for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their development into full-pledged parties equipped
with electoral machinery potent enough to further the sectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on
the other hand, was apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral
contest would be like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more established political
parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this concern when it banned the first five major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives from participating in the party-list
system for the first party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections).
The advocates for permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a compromise - that the
party-list system be open only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This proposal was further whittled
down by allocating only half of the seats under the party-list system to candidates from the sectors which would
garner the required number of votes. The majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats,
and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was voted down. The only
concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three
consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which time they would be expected to gather
and solidify their electoral base and brace themselves in the multi-party electoral contest with the more veteran
political groups.
The system, designed to accommodate as many groups as possible, abhors the monopoly of representation in the
Lower House. This intent is evident in the statutory imposition of the three-seat cap, which prescribes the limit to the
number of seats that may be gained by a party or organization. [1] Votes garnered in excess of 6% of the total votes
cast do not entitle the party to more than three seats.
There is no express provision of the Constitution or in the enabling law that disallows major political parties from
participating in the party-list system and, at the same time, from fielding candidates for legislative district
representatives.
Perhaps the present controversy stems from a confusion of the actual character of the party-list system. At first
glance, it gives the impression of being a combination of proportional representation for non-traditional parties and
sectoral representation. The first, proportional representation, on one end, is intended for no other reason than to
open up the electoral process for broader participation and representation. Sectoral representation on the other,
presupposes that every underrepresented sector be represented in Congress. This impression of sectoral-based
representation stems from the provisions of Article 6, Section 5(2), of the Constitution, as well as R.A. 7941, in
enumerating specific sectors to be represented. In holding that the party list system is open only to the
underrepresented and marginalized sectors, the ponencia places much reliance on Section 5 of R.A. 7941:
"SEC. 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes
of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition
verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or
sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution,
bylaws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as
the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.
"The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
"The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was
submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election."
It would seem to me that, construed along with Section 3(d) of the statute, defining a "sectoral party," the
enumeration was intended to qualify only "sectoral parties" and not the other eligible groups (e.g., political parties,
sectoral organizations and coalitions). Neither Article 6, Section 5(2), nor R.A. 7941 intended to guarantee
representation to all sectors of society and, let alone, hand it over only to underrepresented and marginalized
sectors. The real aim, if the will of the majority of the Commissioners were to be respected, was to introduce the
concept of party-list representation.
The party-list system is limited to four groups - 1) political parties, 2) sectoral parties, 3) sectoral organizations, and
4) coalitions. A political party is an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology, or platform, principles or
policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption,
regularly nominate and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. A sectoral party
is an organized group of citizens belonging to identifiable sectors, such as those enumerated in Article 6, Section
5(2), of the 1987 Constitution, which includes the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities and
women and those added by R.A. 7941 like the fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers and
professionals. A sectoral organization is a group of citizens who share the same or similar attributes or
characteristics, employment, interests or concerns. Coalition is an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional,
sectoral parties or organizations for election purposes.
A party or organization desiring to join the party-list system is required to register with the COMELEC, together with
a list of its five nominees for party-list representatives, arranged according to the group's order of preference. In
every election for the House of Representatives, each voter casts two votes - one for the district representative of
his choice and another for the party or organization of his choice. The votes cast for the parties and organizations
are totaled nationwide. In contrast to the election of all other officials where the rule of plurality (i.e., the candidate
with the highest number of votes wins) is adopted, the number of seats under the party-list system depends on the
number of votes received in proportion to the total number of votes cast nationwide. On the basis of the number of
registered voters in the recent elections, a group under the party-list system, should get approximately half a million
votes to be entitled to one seat.
At the center stage of this controversy are the political parties themselves. Undeniably, political parties are an
important feature in both democratic and authoritarian regimes. By legitimizing the individuals and institutions that
control political power, parties add an important element of stability to a political system and also help organize the
government and electorate by recruiting candidates, conducting campaigns, encouraging partisan attachments and
generally educating the public, stimulating voter participation and providing varying degrees of policy direction to
government. The idea could also be seen as a good training and recruiting ground for potential leaders. Advocates
commend the multi-party as allowing the expression and the compromise of the many interests of a complex
society, including a range of ideological differences, conflicting political values and philosophies. Section 6 of the
1987 Constitution is explicit - "A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice
of the people."[2] The multi-party system of proportional representation broadens the composition of the House of
Representatives to accommodate sectors and organizations that do not have well-defined political constituencies and
to facilitate access to minority or small parties.
A party-list nominee is subject to basically the same qualifications applicable to legislative districts candidates, [3] with
the exception of the additional requirement that he be nominated in one list only, and provided, further, that he is
not a candidate for any elective office or has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election.
[4]
A nominee must actually belong to the sector which they purport to represent, otherwise, there can be no true
representation.[5] A nominee of the youth sector is further required to be at least 25 but not more than 30 years of
age on the day of the election.[6] Should he, however, attain the age of 30 during his term, he is allowed to continue
until the expiration thereof.[7] Once elected, party-list representatives also enjoy the same term, rights and privileges
as do district representatives, except that they are not entitled to the Country-wide Development Fund (CDF). [8]
A feature of the party-list system is that political parties, sectoral groups and organizations, coalitions and
aggrupation acquire the status of "candidates" and their nominees relegated to mere agents. Thus, if a party-list
representative dies, becomes physically incapacitated, removed from office by the party or the organization he
represents, resigns, or is disqualified during his term, his party can send another person to take his place for the
remaining period, provided the replacement is next in succession in the list of nominees submitted to the COMELEC
upon registration. Furthermore, a party-list representative who switches party affiliations during his term forfeits his
seat.[9] So, also, if a person changes his sectoral affiliation within 6 months before the election, he will not be eligible
for nomination in party-list representative under his new party or organization. [10]
The argument raised by petitioners could not be said to have been overlooked as they precisely were the same
points subjected to intense and prolonged deliberations by the members of the Constitutional Commission.
And, the polestar in the constructions of constitutions always remains --- "effect must be given to the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it."[11] The law, in its clear formulation cannot give this tribunal
the elbow-room for construction. Courts are bound to suppose that any inconveniences involved in the application of
constitutional provisions according to their plain terms and import have been considered in advance and accepted as
less intolerable than those avoided, or as compensated by countervailing advantages. [12] The ponencia itself, in ruling
as it does, may unwittingly, be crossing the limits of judicial review and treading the dangerous waters of judicial
legislation, and more importantly, of a constitutional amendment. While, the lament of herein petitioners is
understandable, the remedy lies not with this Court but with the people themselves through an amendment of their
work as and when better counsel prevails.
WHEREFORE, I regret my inability to concur with my colleagues in their judgment. I am thus constrained to vote for
the dismissal of the petitions.
[1]
Section 11(b), R.A. 7941.
[2]
Bernas, pp. 355-358.
[3]
The Constitutional qualifications for legislative districts representatives apply to party-list nominees -
Section 6, Article 6, 1987 Constitution. No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of the election, at lest twenty-five years of age, able to read
and write, and except the party-list representative, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and
a resident thereof for a period not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections.
[4]
Section 8, R.A. 7941.
[5]
Supangan, Jr. vs. Santos, 189 SCRA 56.
[6]
[7]
Ibid.
[8]
See the plenary deliberations (2nd reading) of House Bill No. 3043.
[9]
[10]
Ibid.
[11]
Whitman vs. Oxford National Bank 176 US 559, 44 L Ed 587, 20 Sct. 477.
[12]
People ex rel. Snowball vs. Pendegast, 96 Cal 289 St 126, 110 NE 485.
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4 - Ang BAgong Bayani Vs Comelec

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4 - Ang BAgong Bayani Vs Comelec

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Supreme Court of the Philippines

412 Phil. 308

[G.R. NO. 147613. JUNE 26, 2001]

BAYAN MUNA, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE’S COALITION

The Court’s Ruling

The Marginalized and Underrepresented

The Party-List System Desecrated

Guidelines for Screening

ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes.”[52]

The following discussion is also pertinent:

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, and the Philippine Local Autonomy Movement.

3; and MAD’s Memorandum, pp. 3-6.

was the dominant political party.

3040, January 31, 1994, p. 4.

MENDOZA, J., dissenting:

Partido ng Masang Pilipino (PMP),

Citizens Drug Watch Foundation, Inc. (DRUG WATCH),

On the other hand, the COMELEC argues:

It cites the proviso of Art. VI, §5(2) of the Constitution that

The issues in these cases actually come down to the following:

As originally written, §5 of the Draft Article on the Legislative Department read:

THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR

The following exchange took place on the Monsod amendment:

MS. AQUINO. The Committee would like to be clarified on this.

My question is: Does the Honorable Commissioner object to this amendment?

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

On the other hand, the majority states:

SEPARATE (DISSENTING) OPINION

was the result of long-drawn deliberations and compromises.

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