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CRS0010.1177/08969205211025724Critical SociologyMueller and McCollum

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Critical Sociology

A Sociological Analysis of
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DOI: 10.1177/08969205211025724
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Jason C. Mueller
University of California, Irvine, USA

John McCollum
Minot State University, USA

Abstract
The year 2019 was the year of “OK Boomer” (OKb). From The New York Times to the New Zealand
legislature, OKb emerged as a pop cultural phenomenon. For some, this phrase represents a
battle of the generations wherein Baby Boomers are fed up with the utopian demands of younger
generations, while younger generations see Baby Boomers as stubbornly conservative and out
of touch. Alternatively, some dismiss the generational warfare trope and demand we see society
for what it “really is”—one defined by class warfare. By deploying theories of politics, ideology,
and cultural change from Mark Fisher, Fredric Jameson, Slavoj Žižek, and Franco Berardi, we
offer a theoretical framework through which the emergence and proliferation of OKb can be
understood. We find OKb to be embedded within the logic of capitalist realism, where younger
generations’ cynical usage of this meme represents a muddled attempt to cognitively map within
21st century postmodernity.

Keywords
Postmodernism, Capitalist Realism, Millennials, Generation Z, Sociology of Culture, Cognitive
Mapping, Ideology, Mark Fisher

Introduction
For observers of US popular culture, 2019 was the year of OK Boomer. According to Google
Trends (2019a, 2019b), “what is a Boomer” was the fourth most searched “what is” question in the
United States during 2019. Since then, many observers tried making sense of this trend, with two
broad explanations emerging. One popular perspective views “OK Boomer” (henceforth OKb) as

Corresponding authors:
Jason C. Mueller, Department of Sociology, University of California, Irvine, 3151 Social Sciences Plaza, Irvine, CA 92617,
USA.
Email: muellej1@uci.edu

John McCollum, Department of Sociology, Minot State University, 500 University Ave. W. 202E Old Main, Minot, ND
58789, USA.
Email: john.mccollum@minotstateu.edu
2 Critical Sociology 00(0)

representative of “the end of friendly generational relations,” whereby Generation-Z [demographic

cohort born after 1997] and Millennials [demographic cohort born 1981–1996] are no longer inter-
ested in finding common ground with the Baby Boomers [demographic cohort born 1946–1964]
when discussing contemporary social issues (Lorenz, 2019; for details on generational cohorts see
Dimock, 2019).
The alternative perspective demands we look past demographic cohorts, focusing on “class
divisions rather than inventing common cultural characteristics across generations” (Sunkara,
2019). In this article, we investigate claims made by those whose arguments fall within these
camps, finding some utility in both but showing how there is a necessity to move beyond them by
offering a more comprehensive theoretical analysis of the issue. Ultimately, we locate numerous
political, economic, and ideological conditions across different spatiotemporal horizons that facili-
tated the emergence of the now inescapable declaration of “OK Boomer.” We argue this catch-
phrase represents an inchoate attempt for today’s youth to cognitively map their place in the
increasingly complex web of postmodernity and global capitalism, accompanied by the ongoing
ecological, political, and economic afflictions that give many a grim view of the future.
Our article proceeds as follows. First, we examine the generational warfare approach. This argu-
ment takes a fetishized form of analysis and tends toward absolute reification of existing genera-
tions in an analysis of their belief systems and behavioral characteristics. On the other end of the
spectrum is the avowed anti-fetishized argument, which points toward class-based struggles and
inequities as the content behind the fetish. Rather than declaring either approach as wholesale right
or wrong, we examine the constructive and weaker points made by both camps. After this, we
move beyond their limitations and answer the following question: If class antagonisms are ever-
present, and if generational ideological shifts are nothing new, why did OKb emerge at this specific
moment, and in the specific linguistic articulation of being frustrated with “Boomers?” This allows
us to investigate whether OKb is a symptom of contemporary capitalist realism, and if it might
serve as an ideological fetish deserving of sociological investigation, helping to understand the
conditions under which it emerged, and how it relates to the ways in which younger generations
relate to current politico-ideological coordinates (see Jameson, 1991, 2011; McManus, 2020;
Sbriglia, 2017; Žižek, 1989, 2012b).
We locate the conditions that birthed the OKb expression within the broader sociocultural logic
of late/postmodern capitalism (Jameson, 1991). This era is increasingly defined by an ongoing and
“slow cancellation of the future” (Berardi, 2011: 18). As such, the present moment is haunted by
specters of (real or perceived) promises for technological breakthroughs that would lead to drasti-
cally improved social conditions for the masses. However, far from actualizing these past-utopian
visions in the present, late capitalism is increasingly defined by formalized nostalgia, cultural
stagnation, economic precarity, and intensified anxiety for growing portions of the world (Berardi,
2011; Fisher, 2009; Jameson, 1998; Neilson, 2015). Some wonder if robots are stealing employ-
ment opportunities for humans (see Dahlin, 2019), while others are reaching the following conclu-
sions: “No jetpacks. Zero flying cars. Where is the future we were promised?” (Zaleski, 2019).
Under these conditions, Fredric Jameson’s (1994: xii) now famous quote, “it seems to be easier for
us today to imagine the thoroughgoing deterioration of the earth and of nature than the breakdown
of late capitalism,” may be an adequate representation of a generations’ ongoing difficulty to
develop a coherent, long-term, and viable strategy to bring about the changes they wish to see in
the world. While the condition of postmodernity may have created conditions generative for OKb,
the repeated articulation of OKb may represent a fetishistic politico-cultural phenomena, akin to an
awakening of sorts for younger generations. This awakening signals that a growing number of
people cannot accept that the prevailing ideology (i.e., that “hard work and a college degree will
bring bountiful opportunities for all”) will not lead to a life of upper-middle-class comfort, but are
Mueller and McCollum 3

struggling to understand how their specific lot in life is tied to the mechanism of global capitalism.
As a result, younger Americans struggle to form a new sociopolitical vocabulary and vision to
facilitate the change that many of them desire, with some preferring a cynical disavowal of their
current predicament.
The above questions are considered by interrogating key data points relating to issues that are
invoked by many Millennials and members of Generation-Z (henceforth referred to as Gen-Zers).
While we generally highlight the impact of OKb on younger generations in the United States, we
frequently reference key data on activity transpiring around the globe that affect Gen-Zers and
Millennials. This facilitates a better understanding of an emergent social phenomena, including the
increased ability of capital and environmental degradation to impact populations worldwide, while
also staying attuned to the growing tendency for frustration, disenchantment, and rage that younger
generations are experiencing beyond American borders.
Our analysis of OKb offers a starting point for future research on this cultural trend, and a
framework for studying the larger terrain of postmodernity and capitalist realism. Since a large
portion of our framework builds upon theoretical perspectives that are gaining traction in the
humanities and social sciences across Europe, but are less discussed within US-based sociology,
we hope to generate a cross-disciplinary and cross-continental dialogue. Given the wide-ranging
discursive and material dilemmas that the OKb slogan signifies, this should be of interest to social
scientists and theorists working in the terrain of future(s) studies (Fergnani, 2019; Mische, 2009,
2014), those studying social media and the cultural zeitgeist of the age (Krause, 2019; Watson,
2019), and the ideological, discursive, and material dimensions of political thinking and strategiz-
ing in a crisis-ridden global capitalist system (Flisfeder, 2014, 2020; Jameson, 1998; McManus,
2020; Mueller, McCollum, and Schmidt, 2020; Mueller and Schmidt, 2020; Sbriglia, 2017).

“OK Boomer” as Generational Warfare or Class Warfare?

Fetishistic Illusions and Sobering Realities
In this section, we begin with the perspectives offered by the generational warfare camp. When a
frustrated Millennial or Gen-Zer shouts “OK boomer!” at their elders, the act is akin to “a verbal
eye roll” (Spector, 2019). If one views the OKb phenomena as purely the result of heightened
generation-based antagonisms, it can be described as follows:

“Ok boomer” has become Generation Z’s endlessly retort to the problem of older people who just don’t get
it, a rallying cry for millions of fed up kids. Teenagers use it to reply to cringey YouTube videos, Donald
Trump tweets, and basically any person over 30 who says something condescending about young people—
and the issues that matter to them. (Lorenz, 2019)

For those on the receiving end of an Okb, it may represent something akin to an ageist slur, with
one radio commentator going so far as to equate it with the ageist equivalent of a racial slur
(Spector, 2019). Such a response is surely an exaggeration, but points toward a degree of genera-
tional strife that may seem difficult to overcome for some. This broad view of OKb is one which
sees it representing real generational antagonisms and “marks the end of friendly generational
relations” (Lorenz, 2019).
The idea of a certain generation having a unique ability to exert major causal influence over the
course of history has a certain popular allure. Some early American sociologists attributed differ-
ences across generations as a result of differences in socialization experiences (see Mannheim,
1952; Howe and Strauss, 1991). Howe and Strauss describe generations in terms of personas, each
of which unleashes a new era, or, to use their parlance, a “turning.” These turnings comprise
4 Critical Sociology 00(0)

smaller divisions of time between saeculae, generally the length of a long human lifespan. The four
turnings within a saeculum are high, awakening, unraveling, and a return to the next crisis. The
basic premise is that a generation born at different turnings exhibits different socialization patterns
related to its relationship to inducing or solving social crises. Despite a lack of widespread support
in academia (Giancola 2006), Howe and Strauss’ work is read and promoted by prominent political
and media figures across the political spectrum in the United States (see Hoover, 2009; Lopez,
2017). Howe and Strauss’ concepts deserve serious scrutiny. The dating of many crisis events and
their resolution are difficult to parse out in meaningful historical ways with their generational con-
cepts. Also, crises are exogenous to the author’s models, and no causal mechanisms are identified.
Altogether, this work endows generations with explanatory power beyond proven bases for collec-
tive action, including class, race, nationality, and gender, and there should be serious scrutiny on
purely generation-based theories of social change.
The present trends across generations do show a decline in wealth for Millennials and Gen-Zers
relative to previous generations at the same point in the life course. The average net worth of a 20-
to 35-year-old in 2019 decreased from that of the same age cohort in 1998. Interestingly, the same
share of wealth is greater in 2019 than 1998 for the 36–51 and 52–75 age cohorts (Mitra 2019).
This suggests that the Millennial generation is starting from a more distant “starting line” than
previous generations. A university education also cost more in real dollars now than it did for ear-
lier generations. Between 1989–90 and 2019–20, average tuition and fees tripled at public four-
year and more than doubled at public two-year and private nonprofit four-year institutions, after
adjusting for inflation (College Board 2019). In addition, Whistle (2019) reports that $497.6 billion
in loan debt was held by about 15.1 million borrowers between the ages of 25–34, a cohort associ-
ated with the Millennials. For those ages 24 and below, 8.1 million borrowers held $124 billion in
debt.
Whatever the case, younger Americans remain uniquely saddled by student debt at the start of
their working lives. None of this should be construed as solely attributable to generational effects.
The 2008 recession caused many states to slash their public education budgets (Mitchell, Leachman,
Masterson, and Waxman, 2018). At the same time, more students wanted to attend school to avoid
a weak job market, causing them to take on new debt. The post-recession trend was an outgrowth
of a general trend toward neoliberal educational policies since the 1980s. Furthermore, educational
debt pales in comparison to mortgage debt, and is relatively equal to the combination of auto loans
and credit card debt, suggesting generational differences in wealth and debt are not exclusive to
education debt (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2019).
Generation-based arguments may hold particular sway in the United States, where open
acknowledgments of class antagonisms are not typical, and half of its population identify as a part
of the “middle class” (Shenker-Osorio, 2013). If class is a crucial addition to the demography-
based argument, how do those who move the debate to the class warfare end of the spectrum view
the OKb predicament? Consider the following remark made by Sunkara (2019):

If “we” have to divide ourselves, it makes sense to look for these class divisions rather than inventing
common cultural characteristics across generations . . . Nothing is guaranteed in life—it has to be earned.
But for most, “bootstrapping” ourselves to success is an illusion. The only way we improve our lot as
workers is through collective action. That means knowing who your friends are and who your enemies are.
Here’s a hint: it’s not “boomers”—it’s that investment banker you went to high school with.

In this piece, Sunkara (2019) sees the generational warfare meme as misguided, and a product
of the ongoing “cultural dominance of upper-middle-class youth” in social media and “online cul-
ture.” Sunkara’s (2019) opinion piece offers helpful data points that unveil class-based inequities
Mueller and McCollum 5

that are shrouded in a purely generational warfare based approach, especially when he points us
towards a recent PBS report on the “retirement crisis” in America (see Frazee 2018). This report
outlines how Baby Boomers are financially hurting too, as “Nearly half of Americans nearing
retirement age (65 years old) have less than $25,000 put away, according to the Employee Benefit
Research Institute’s annual survey. One in four don’t even have $1,000 saved” (Frazee, 2018). The
broader class-war perspectives on OKb are essentially saying that, when one “focus[es] on inter-
generational strife . . . the relevance of class as a fundamental divide in American culture” is
ignored, while subsequently “obscur[ing] the vast differences in wealth and power between those
in the same age cohort” (Macleod, 2019).
Several important data points bolster the arguments of those arguing that class antagonisms are
the driver of social problems in the United States and elsewhere. Recent research on the drivers of
climate change discovered that 20 large companies around the globe “collectively contributed 480
billion tonnes of carbon dioxide and methane, chiefly from the combustion of their products,
equivalent to 35% of all fossil fuel and cement emissions worldwide since 1965” (Heede, 2019: 1).
By 2018, the degree of income inequality within the United States had ballooned to levels not seen
for the prior half century (Chappell, 2019). And, the continual restructuring of the post-Fordist
mode of capitalist production coupled with the growing precarity of labor in the United States and
elsewhere decreased job stability while having deleterious effects on individual health and well-
being (Kalleberg and Vallas, 2018).
The many points made by the authors cited above give us a window into the current state of
pop-cultural analysis and its implications for how and why people will act upon these trends in the
future. In summation, the OKb phenomenon offers us a useful entry-point into unveiling how
younger people may or may not be able to envision strategies that bring about the social change
many of them are implicitly or explicitly articulating when they direct an “OK boomer” comment
at someone. Despite their various explanatory strengths, the limitations of immediately explicating
the OKb moment with purely generational war or class war perspectives suggests we move toward
a conjunctural style of analysis to best account for the intersecting and overlapping ideological,
discursive, political, and economic factors that endow an era with its distinguishing characteristics
(Hall and Massey, 2010; see also Gallas, 2017; Mueller, 2019).
Next, we outline the theoretical framework that informs our analysis of OKb. We offer a synthe-
sis of several critical theories on politics and ideology, illustrating the utility of bringing these theo-
ries of politics, culture, and ideology to bear on issues of relevance for sociologists, but due to
disciplinary boundary-making, have been heretofore underexplored.

Broken Promises, Cancelled Futures, and the Condition of

Postmodern Capitalism
In 2009, the cultural theorist Mark Fisher published Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?
(Fisher, 2009). For Fisher, the present era was defined by capitalist realism, which represents “the
widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and economic system, but also
that it is now impossible even to imagine a coherent alternative to it” (Fisher, 2009: 2). Agreeing
with Jameson’s (1994) idea that the current era is one in which it is easier to imagine the world
coming to an end before we could envision an end to capitalism, Fisher saw capitalist realism as a
ghoulish phenomenon slowly spreading into all parts of the political and cultural landscape. It is an
entity that “presents itself as a shield protecting us from the perils posed by belief itself. The atti-
tude of ironic distance proper to postmodern capitalism is supposed to immunize us against the
6 Critical Sociology 00(0)

seductions of fanaticism. Lowering our expectations, we are told, is a small price to pay for being
protected from terror and totalitarianism” (Fisher, 2009: 5).
Borrowing a term from Jacques Derrida, Fisher (2012, 2013, 2014) found the concept of haun-
tology to be a useful heuristic for describing the current predicament. Derrida (1994) introduced
this concept to help us better contemplate temporality, place, and spectral ideas that were not yet
dead, but not quite alive either. Under capitalist realism, the present is “haunted not by the appari-
tion of the spectre of communism, but by its disappearance” (Fisher, 2014: 19). The stagnation of
cultural forms, lack of political imagination (e.g., represented in the belief that we were at the “end
of ideology”), and the emergence of widespread nostalgia for the “unfinished” past is a symptom
of a general struggle for people to envision a new, creative, and egalitarian path forward in the 21st
century. Thus, without the emergence of anything resembling a socially equitable and technologi-
cally sophisticated era that many feel they were promised decades ago, “what haunts is the spectre
of a world in which all the marvels of communicative technology could be combined with a sense
of solidarity much stronger than anything social democracy could muster” (Fisher, 2014: 26).
The impact that Žižek, Jameson, and other critics of postmodern capitalism had on Fisher is
apparent throughout his writing, and for good reason. These scholars offer us useful entry points to
understand contemporary politico-cultural trends such as OKb. In one pithy observation on the
condition of politics in the United States, Žižek (2002: 2) remarked that “[w]e feel free because we
lack the very language to articulate our unfreedom” Without the ability to articulate a condition of
(un)freedom, a population is unlikely to participate in a widespread and major event for social
change (e.g., a revolution) (Žižek, 2014, see also Badiou, 2013). Like Fisher, Žižek sees little cur-
rent potential for such an event, observing how current political activism is seemingly limited to
endless miniscule acts of “resistance” that are perfectly accounted for within the political and legal
apparatuses toward whom these demands are directed. This lack of political creativity appears even
grimmer in the face of the current era of political cynicism, where the traditional forms of criti-
quing ideology by “speaking truth to/about power” and unveiling the socio-economic and political
relations of exploitation behind the outwardly pleasant mask of democratic modes of governance
no longer work in the same fashion (Žižek, 1989, 2006, 2012a; see also Flisfeder, 2014; Jameson,
1984, 2016; Sbriglia, 2017).
All of these phenomena are the culmination of a conjunctural trend that is often identified as
postmodernity, late modernity, and late capitalism. Like Fisher and Žižek, Franco Berardi (2009,
2011) and Fredric Jameson (1984, 1991) locate this trend as having emerged sometime around the
start of the fourth quartile of the 20th century, with signs of decay and formalized nostalgia mate-
rializing in the domains of aesthetics, politics, and economics. When Berardi (2011: 18) says we
are currently witnessing and participating in “the slow cancellation of the future,” he is referring to
the collective ability to envision a continuation of the stalled march towards “progressive moder-
nity.” Under the current psychological, social, and political conditions, “the future has lost its zest
.  .  . [as it] no longer appears as a choice or collective conscious action, but is a kind of unavoidable
catastrophe that we cannot oppose in any way” (2011: 125–126). In this phase of late modernity,
we are likely to see an increase in the already existing trends toward heightened anxiety and depres-
sion, an increased inability to show empathy toward others, and an incapacity to meaningfully
connect with our peers, neighbors, and others (Berardi, 2009, 2011; Hugill and Thorburn, 2012; see
also Fisher, 2014; McManus, 2020; Neilson, 2015). Thus, despite the seemingly endless postmod-
ern, ideologically driven “suggestions” that we seek enjoyment by finding our true selves, go to the
club, and feel good, the condition is far bleaker: “secret sadness lurks behind the 21st century’s
forced smile” (Fisher, 2014: 175).
While discussing these deflated expectations of the future, Fredric Jameson’s (1984, 1988,
1991, 1998; see also Lizardo, 2009; Tally Jr., 1996) call for recognizing the ability or failure to
Mueller and McCollum 7

engage in cognitive mapping is instructive. Cognitive mapping requires prolonged and encompass-
ing contemplation of the current world scale functioning of capitalism, and its implications for
trying to change the very political-economic coordinates in which one operates. In the current era
this would require a reworking of how we locate ourselves and our horizons within the new spati-
otemporal dynamics of postmodernity, and its effects on global class formations, exploitation,
mass migration, and other phenomena. In other words, it would require a sustained effort to culti-
vate “a pedagogical political culture which seeks to endow the individual subject with some new
heightened sense of its place in the global system” (Jameson, 1984: 92). In summation, this sort of
mapping is crucial as “the incapacity to map socially is as crippling to political experience as the
analogous incapacity to map spatially is for urban experience” (Jameson, 1988: 353). Jameson first
proposed the necessity for this at the onset of what has come to be known as the postmodern era,
and the complexity of global capitalism has only increased since then, making the task especially
pertinent for those trying to make sense of [a lack of] new political imaginations in the 21st
century.
The common thread throughout the above theories is one which forces us to consider the current
political moment in its grim totality. This begs an investigation into why the frustrations of younger
generations in the United States have emerged through a phrase that, at face value, comes across as
non-political. We are presented with “OK Boomer,” rather than “OK Capitalist,” “OK Climate
Destroyer,” or some other phrase explicitly denouncing economic inequality, climate catastrophe,
and other social problems. Here, we can read Fisher’s analysis of capitalist realism as the latest
attempt to understand the evolution of postmodernity since Jameson’s diagnosis in the 1980s. As
he notes, “when Jameson first advanced his thesis about postmodernism, there were still, in name
at least, political alternatives to capitalism. What we are dealing with now, however, is a deeper, far
more pervasive, sense of exhaustion, of cultural and political sterility” (Fisher, 2009: 7; see also
Hammond, 2019). Therefore, despite the fact that the logic of neoliberal politics has been called
into question in the post-2008 era, current protestors have struggled to articulate—much less real-
ize—any substantial and universally emancipatory alternative. For these reasons, the theories out-
lined above are well suited to help make sense of the current exhaustion felt by many members of
the Gen-Z and Millennials age cohorts in the United States and elsewhere.
Having outlined a theoretically relevant framework in which OKb can be properly understood,
we can now move towards locating the how and the why of OKb. By synthesizing recent survey
data, statistical trends, and news commentary with our theoretical framework, we account for the
conditions that birthed OKb. While our framework specifically analyses OKb, it offers a general
entry point for understanding emergent effects of technologically mediated cultural trends that are
pregnant with the broader political sphere.

Has the Future Been Cancelled for Younger Generations?

Understanding the Emergence of “OK Boomer”
It is the present era of stifled political imaginaries and cancelled futures in which Gen-Zers and
Millennials are creating and spreading memes and other internet-based OKb content. Despite the
fact that OKb is “a rallying cry for millions of fed up kids,” it continues to be viewed with confu-
sion, contempt, or ambivalence (Lorenz 2019). Although this muddled articulation and reception
may in part be due to the stimulatory and technological overload that accompanies the anxieties
and fears of precarity that define this moment of capitalism (Berardi, 2011), it nonetheless repre-
sents a broader, albeit frustrated and incomplete, attempt to engage in cognitive mapping.
Rather than seeing a vibrant and limitless future ahead of themselves, Gen-Zers and Millennials
are increasingly defined by possessing a mixture of cynicism, anxiety, depression, and nihilism.
8 Critical Sociology 00(0)

Results from Deloitte’s (2019) recent survey of Millennials and Gen-Zers around the world tell the
story of this predicament.1 For example, 45% of Millennials “have absolutely no trust in political
leaders as sources of reliable and accurate information,” around 70% of Millennials “believe their
government leaders focus on their own agendas rather than their constituents’ interests, and 63
percent said leaders have no ambition beyond retaining or increasing their power” (2019: 10). In
addition, “[p]olitical leaders were cited as the group least likely—by far—to have had a positive
impact and most likely to have had a negative impact on their lives” (10). And yet, when asked
“Who has the most responsibility for improving social mobility in your country over the next five
years,” the “Government” was the top choice for respondents (9).
Building from Berardi’s (2011: 18) commentary on the “slow cancellation of the future,” Fisher
remarks that “the slow cancellation of the future has been accompanied by a deflation of expecta-
tions” (Fisher, 2014: 8). This deflation of expectations is illustrated clearly in Deloitte’s (2019)
survey of members of the Millennial and Z generations. As it documents, “fewer than a quarter (22
percent) of Millennials said they expect improvement in their countries in the next year—a drop
from 33 percent last year,” and this “trend is consistent in emerging markets (30 percent, down nine
points) and mature markets (16 percent, down eleven points)” (2019: 8). A major driver of this
malaise among respondents is produced by increased fears over climate catastrophe. The issue of
“Climate change/protecting the environment/natural disasters” was the top concern for both
Millennial and Gen-Z respondents, with issues such as “income inequality/distribution of wealth,”
“unemployment,” and “terrorism” following (Deloitte, 2019: 6).
Deloitte’s survey even introduces their “MillZ Mood Monitor,” which is intended to provide a
“snapshot of millennials’ and Gen Zs’ optimism that the world and their places in it will improve”
(2019: 22). The composite scores showed more pessimism than optimism for both men and women,
in both Gen-Z and Millennial age cohorts (23). The mean global score for the Millennials and Gen-
Zers surveyed was 39 and 40 out of 100, respectively (23). In the United States, Millennial and
Gen-Z scores were close to both of the aforementioned global averages, with US Millennials hav-
ing a score of 40—compared to the global average of 39—and Gen-Zers having a score of 41—
compared to the global average of 40 (2019: 23–25). By linking these data with Fisher and Berardi’s
insights, we gain a better understanding of how these depression expectations are articulated within
the broader conditions of postmodern capitalist realism.
Amnesty International’s [AI] (2019) Future of Humanity survey of Gen-Zer’s across nearly two
dozen countries unveiled similar frustrations and anxieties over climate change and the expecta-
tions of their respective governments. Not only was climate change most frequently referenced as
“the most important issue facing the world,”2 but 63% agreed that “governments should take the
wellbeing of their citizens more seriously than economic growth,” and 60% agreed that “human
rights must be protected, even if it has a negative impact on the economy” (AI 2019). When que-
ried on which venue would be the most effective for “initiating change regarding human rights,”
“voting in elections” was the top response—beating out protests, civil disobedience, and signing
petitions, among other options—with 70% finding it “fairly” or “very effective” (AI, 2019).
Furthermore, the second highest rank for effective generators of human rights change was “donat-
ing to a human rights charity,” with 63% finding it “fairly” or “very effective” (AI, 2019).
Altogether, these data present an image of youth who believe governments could/should be active
promoters of human rights and positive social change, while also believing that the current venues
of electoral voting and donating to charity can help achieve these goals. Thus, despite the Secretary
General of AI characterizing the results of the survey as being indicative of a “clear [message from
the young people.] We are living inside a failed system,” the vision of “voting the rascals out” and
charity-based solutions as a means of generating systemic change are substantively identical to the
Mueller and McCollum 9

current mechanisms that facilitate the functioning of the global system with which they are so
frustrated.
The situation specifically within the United States also appears grim. In a meta-commentary on
the ongoing “Millennials crisis” in the United States, Grusky et al. (2019: 3) observe that “millen-
nials have become our canaries in the coal mine, and we worry about them not only because we
care about them but also because they tell us just how toxic that coal mine is.” A main generator of
this toxic circumstance is the current era of postmodern capitalism, where it seems nearly impos-
sible to imagine an alternative to the scenarios giving so many youth their reasons for despair. For
those whose births coincide with growing up in the era of “there is no alternative,” the experience
has unique effects, as “[i]t arguably becomes a qualitatively different experience when neoliberal-
ism is experienced at full and complete dosage” (Grusky et al., 2019: 5; see also Watson, 2019).
Even if gainful employment is secured for many decades to come, a growing number of Millennials
worldwide are starting to assume that what constitutes “normal retirement age” now will no longer
apply to them, with one recent survey indicating 27% of respondents expected to work past the age
of 70, while 12% assumed that they will work until the day they die (ManpowerGroup, 2016: 5).
Besides the issues outlined earlier, other contributing stressors to younger generations include
gun violence, sexual violence, and questions of immigration/migration and deportation (American
Psychological Association, 2018; AI, 2019). In addition, recent uptick in rates of depression, sui-
cidal thoughts, and actions, and “deaths of despair” among the younger generation in the United
States—especially since 2008—has alarmed scholars and analysts (see Curtin and Heron, 2019;
Ducharme, 2019; Duggan and Li, 2019). The feelings articulated above show how Millennials and
Gen-Zers are seeing their future as one that is slowly slipping away from them, feeling over-
whelmed by numerous overlapping crises on their horizon for which their ability to strategize to
address and ameliorate seems slim. In other words, their ability to effectively cognitively map
seems more daunting than ever, and endless demands for the state to “do something” have pro-
duced negligible results. Especially noteworthy is the conclusion reached by Deloitte at the end of
their report on the current state of affairs for Gen-Zers and Millennials:

Events of the past decade have had an enormous impact on younger generations. But there’s something
about the past couple of years that is particularly distressing . . . Given the importance of millennials and
Gen Zs as both consumers and employees, the results of this year’s survey should have alarm bells ringing
in C-suites around the world. (Deloitte, 2019: 26)

What does this all amount to when discussing the emergence of OKb? With seemingly no one
rising to address the myriad current social, political, and economic issues discussed in this article,
the ability to adequately cognitively map one’s position within the current era of late capitalist real-
ism seems difficult. For cognitive mapping to be something other than political cynicism or accept-
ing lifelong precarity as inevitable, it must facilitate a person to adequately identify their current
coordinates within the web of global capitalism while simultaneously ceasing to participate in
endless acts of symbolic protests.
We argue the political and cultural conditions of postmodernity offered fertile grounds for the
emergence of OKb. Youthful proclamations of “OK Boomer” often function as a fetishistic disa-
vowal by younger generations, who see declining standards of living and are embedded within a
broader politico-cultural malaise. It is a fetishistic disavowal in the psychoanalytical sense, mean-
ing it is “a response to traumatic knowledge” on an issue of great significance (Sbriglia, 2017: 112;
see also Žižek, 1989, 2006, 2019a). Although it may not be possible [or necessary] to pinpoint one
“smoking gun” factor that made OKb become a cultural symbol of this frustration circa 2019, we
10 Critical Sociology 00(0)

believe the post-2016 US political situation—embedded within the larger web of postmodern capi-
talism—created exceptionally fertile grounds for the emergence of OKb in its particular form.
At the time of OKb’s explosion of popularity in late 2019, the president of the United States was
Donald Trump. Trump is a (capitalist) Baby Boomer, had strong support among Baby Boomers,
and many of his political positions were close to those which Gen-Zers and Millennials identify as
a “boomer mind-set” (see Hudson, 2019; Lorenz, 2019). Consider just a few of the issues that
cause heightened anxiety for Millennials and Gen-Zers: climate change, student debt, and gun
violence. While in office, Trump aggressively sought to roll back environmental regulations, with-
drew from the Paris Climate Accords, and sought new opportunities for oil and gas drilling (Kann,
2019). The Trump administration’s education policies—led by [Baby Boomer] Education Secretary
Betsy DeVos—took a hardline stance against student loan/debt forgiveness, causing one senior
official in the Department of Education to resign in frustration while proposing a massive debt-
forgiveness campaign for Americans affected by this issue (Nova, 2019). And, although the United
States recently witnessed some of the deadliest mass shootings in its country’s history along with
a multi-year trend of increased K–12 school shootings through 2019, Trump angered many gun-
control advocates by showing a sustained desire to curry favor with the National Rifle Association
(NRA), rather than implementing policies that would curtail ease-of-access to guns for Americans
(CNN, 2019; Mason and Trotta, 2018; Reidman and O’Neill, 2019). Lastly, while issues taken up
by many Gen-Zers and Millennials (e.g., policies to address the impending and potentially drastic
effects of climate change; introducing legislation for stricter gun control measures) are usually
considered terrains of contemporary liberal politics in the United States, Trump maintained an
exceptionally close connection to a cable news network that is generally considered to have a
conservative-leaning bias—Fox News (Hemmer, 2019; Higgins, 2017).
Upon considering these issues, the emergence of this “blasé but cutting .  .  . digital equivalent of
an eye roll” that serves as the “rallying cry” of younger generations, addressed toward “older peo-
ple who just don’t get it” and especially toward “Donald Trump tweets” makes more sense (Lorenz,
2019). Specifically, it makes sense that major conjunctural issues, with no visible policy-based
solutions set to ameliorate them in the short term, would manifest in a particular form. That form:
younger, cynical, exhausted, and tech-savvy generations mocking older people who experience
these phenomena in a qualitatively different fashion, and whose generational demographic can be
seen in various political and governmental outlets seemingly exacerbating said issues while derid-
ing younger Americans as being too utopian in their expectations for a better future.3
At the time of its emergence in late 2019, “the Boomer” stood as Gen-Z and Millennials’ fetish-
istic disavowal of reality itself. For those who conceptualize “the Boomer” as the embodied cause
of social ills afflicting the United States, they see them as having an undeserved ability to access
enjoyments in life that remains inaccessible to younger generations, while also holding beliefs that
are anathema to positive social change. These actions and beliefs allegedly thwart Gen-Z or
Millennials’ hopes for short term gainful employment, annulment of student debts, and/or long-
term availability of an environmentally stable social ecology in which they can live and thrive.
From this emergent politico-cultural perspective, one may retroactively posit that someone cur-
rently in possession of these “goods” or attitudes are in possession of them precisely due to the fact
that they are boomers, or, have a “boomer mindset.” In this way, the empirical and demographic,
age-specified category of Baby Boomers can altogether be skirted, while simultaneously being
invoked. For example, a younger person who is demographically a Millennial may still be labeled
a “30-year-old boomer” if they say something viewed as out of touch.4 In the most extreme form,
these approaches could conceive of the Boomer as a divider of a potentially whole society that fails
to reach its potential, due to “boomer behavior.” Here, we would witness an ideological transition
Mueller and McCollum 11

from someone saying “this Boomer did or believes in XYZ, which is bad,” to “person-A believes
in X and did YZ, therefore, they’re a Boomer.”
Even if members of the Baby Boomer demographic did produce many of the social ills with
which many in the younger generations take issue, one should not be so quick to endorse the demo-
graphic warfare trope. Rather than solely dwelling on the question: “did Boomers actually do
actions XYZ to upset Millennials and Gen-Zers,” it should be asked: why do OKb espousers seem-
ingly need to conjure the image of “the Boomer” in order to make sense of their current socio-
political predicament?5 Here, a form of ideology-critique serves us well. We find the failure to
cognitively map and strategize for emancipatory futures to be a general proclivity within postmo-
dernity and capitalist realism. As such, the ideological condition of 21st century capitalism may be
seen as a generator of things like “OK Boomer,” which can operate as a fetishistic disavowal of
traumatic political reality itself for younger generations. This traumatic knowledge is the impend-
ing ecological and economic catastrophes unfolding in the United States and elsewhere.
Far from being an ephemeral viral meme, the OKb phenomena signifies something larger in the
socio-political landscape. Unlike past popular/viral videos based on obscure video game refer-
ences, energy drinks, or the latest hijinks of movie stars or musical celebrities (see Zabiegalski,
2017), the seemingly non-political OKb has gained popularity precisely because it indirectly serves
as a litmus test for many ongoing political battles (e.g., climate change and various exorbitant
debts). Its current status as a phenomenon to be potentially commodified, or a potential mobilizing
force of the increasingly depressive and anxious younger generations of the United States also
indicates one of the defining features of capitalist realism as outlined by Mark Fisher. Fisher saw
depression, mental health, and the broader “problem of stress (and distress) in capitalist societies”
as one of the “contested zone[s]” of 21st century capitalism (Fisher, 2009: 19; see also Fisher,
2014; Frantzen, 2019). In other words, these issues still possess the potential to be articulated into
a socio-political platform that lead to an improved human condition, rather prolonged anxiety
under conditions of capitalist realism. Whether “the Boomer” will continue serving as a stand-it for
a greater set of underlying socioeconomic antagonisms remains to be seen, but the domain of ide-
ology-critique and analysis offer entry points for answering these questions in the future.

Discussion and Concluding Remarks

This analysis and theorization of “OK Boomer” offers a platform to think about the conditions
under which OKb emerged, the politico-ideological limitations it represents within a broader
moment, and the potential outcomes that follow its emergence. Once again, we turn to the writing
of Fredric Jameson. While discussing Marx and Engels’ analysis of the historical development of
capitalism, Jameson highlights how they saw the necessity “to think this development positively
and negatively all at once; to achieve, in other words, a type of thinking that would be capable of
grasping the demonstrably baleful features of capitalism along with its extraordinary and liberating
dynamism simultaneously, within a single thought, and without attenuating any of the force of
either judgement” (Jameson, 1984: 86). How might this approach facilitate a better understanding
of OKb?
From one point of view, we see postmodern capitalism immediately seeking to absorb OKb into
its fabric. Shortly after OKb started making news headlines, Fox Media was reported to be looking
into trademarking the term and making a television show based on generational warfare, while
others began selling t-shirts and other merchandise bearing the phrase (Lorenz, 2019; Picchi,
2019). Thus, Jameson’s words on postmodern capitalisms increasing ability to engulf any and all
attempts of protest or resistance are instructive when observes that “even overtly political
12 Critical Sociology 00(0)

interventions .  .  . [can be] secretly disarmed and reabsorbed by a system of which they themselves
might well be considered a part, since they can achieve no distance from it” (1984: 87).
Alternatively, OKb-espousing youth have the potential to connect their frustrations to broader
social struggles. On November 23, 2019, several hundred protestors (composed of students,
alumni, and staff) at a Harvard-Yale football game stormed the field during halftime, delaying the
resumption of the game for almost an hour. Additionally, these protestors were joined in solidarity
by some of the very football players who were participating in the game. The protestors demanded
that the universities divest from fossil fuels and holdings of debt for Puerto Rico, and several can-
didates for the 2020 US Presidential election even took to Twitter to show solidarity with these
protestors (Bogage and Knowles, 2019; Kurilla, 2019). Crucially, many of these protestors report-
edly chanted “OK Boomer” as they occupied the field (Bogage and Knowles, 2019). One moment
proves nothing, but it does illustrate a window of opportunity for movements to link their demands
in ways that don’t relegate some issues as marginal at the expense of others, while also using this
pop cultural chant to channel their political frustrations—rather than resorting to cynicism.
Specific, youth-based anxieties of these protests have the potential to be highlighted by younger
activists, as the predicament of Gen-Zers and Millennials in the years ahead—whether discussing
precarious employment, student debt rates, or climate catastrophe—has specific impacts on the
long-term development of these demographics in ways that, for purely age-based reasons, will not
impact older generations. These anxieties were often amplified during the Trump era, when these
issues were ignored or exacerbated. Social media and other spaces of technological communica-
tion can now act as carriers through which socio-political imaginaries and ideas spread in ways
seemingly unimaginable just a decade prior. This ever-changing and expanding domain is unique
to the period of late capitalism, and Millennials and Gen-Zers are now using these platforms for
activism and consciousness raising (Krause, 2019; McManus, 2020; Watson, 2019; see also,
Schradie, 2018). In addition, the ability to connect youth/demographically specific concerns—
which of course have cross cutting class, race, gender, and other dimensions—in relation to other,
ongoing demands for social change is crucial.
The potential to act through cognitively mapping within what Jameson (1998: 16) called “the
great global, multinational and decentred communicational network[s]” of postmodernity may seem
daunting but is not unimaginable. As such, we see the antagonisms of postmodernity in the face of
OKb. The chant does not axiomatically have to be defined by corporations and cable news outlets that
look to make a quick profit off of its popularity. It has an equal chance to signify—through an articu-
lation of more carefully defined demands and expectations for the future—a pop-cultural spark that
facilitated the emergence of a discussion on issues being raised by Gen-Zers and Millennials. Here
we should acknowledge Fisher’s conclusion that culture and politics are “intrinsically linked . . .
[where] [c]ulture can assist in widening the political bandwidth as much as it’s simply an expression
of the underlying political situation” (cited in Broaks, 2014; see also Watson, 2019).
Although nostalgia for the (broken) promises of the 20th century may be tempting to Gen-Zers
and Millennials, they may find more success articulating future-oriented goals. This would require
cultivating a positive, forward-looking political imaginary that endows subjects with a coherent
framework from which they could theoretically plan out the changes they wish to see, and the
pathways to achieve them. Without this effort, the outcome may be political or cultural stagna-
tion—or worse. Within the US political system, Trumpism not only represents an emergent form
of “postmodern conservatism,” but provided a convenient sense of “enjoyment” for the “resist-
ance” to Trump whose identities were often articulated through a form of glib contrarianism (e.g.,
supporting “anyone but Trump”), devoid of a coherent and forward-looking agenda for widespread
social change and equity (see McManus, 2020; Zeiher, 2020). Once again, this finding suggests
that the task of cognitive mapping is urgently needed.
Mueller and McCollum 13

By locating the case of OKb as one embedded in larger political, economic, and cultural pro-
cesses of postmodernity this article opens up future avenues for research on the significance of this
moment across a broad range of humanistic and social sciences. This includes sociology, cultural
studies, continental philosophy, psychoanalysis, and more. The world system is in flux, with the
numerous ongoing crises outlined above present nearly all living species’ with daunting chal-
lenges. In an era where it seems “the past is gone, [and] we can no longer imagine the future,”
cognitive mapping takes on a new sense of urgency (Jameson, 2016: 13). Amid the COVID-19
pandemic, the situation is especially dire. The political management of COVID-19 in the United
States has redoubled the pain by those already disproportionately exploited and oppressed within
the United States (Mueller, McCollum, and Schmidt, 2020). Furthermore, while analyzing the
hopes and futures of Gen-Zers and millennials, we face the grim reality that “social isolation and
vanished opportunities caused by Covid-19 bring a mental-health toll for those on the cusp of
careers and adulthood” (Petersen, 2020).
Moments of fluctuation not only bring potentially violent and destructive futures, but also open
the possibilities for radical new possibilities. As Mark Fisher observed, “[t]he tiniest event can tear
a hole in the grey curtain of reaction which has marked the horizons of possibility under capitalist
realism. From a situation in which nothing can happen, suddenly anything is possible again”
(Fisher, 2009: 81). One recent survey found that Gen-Zers may now be receptive to engaging in
political protest as a means of generating social change (Dugyala and Rahman, 2020). In fact,
widespread social movements for racial, environmental, and economic justice emerged and rapidly
expanded in the United States and abroad during 2020, showing signs that younger generations
have a newfound desire to generate substantive social change (Buchanan, Bui, and Patel, 2020;
Mueller, McCollum, and Schmidt, 2020; USA Today, 2020). Meanwhile, the US Department of
Defense is strategizing how to squash a hypothetical rebellion led by tech-savvy and economically
precarious Gen-Zers (Turse, 2020). Only time, cognitive mapping and widespread collective action
will determine what lies beyond the present moment of capitalist realism.

Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful for helpful comments and feedback provided by Steven Schmidt on earlier drafts of
this article. The authors would also like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive com-
ments and feedback.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD
Jason C. Mueller https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0833-5537

Notes
1. Regarding the regions and populations surveyed, Deloitte (2019: 4) reports: “The 2019 report is based
on the views of 13,416 millennials questioned across 42 countries and territories, and 3,009 Gen Zs from
10 countries.”
2. The following question was asked in two different ways, to account for “global” and “national” level
opinions: “Which, if any, of the following do you see as the most important issues” (1) “facing the
world” and (2) “facing your country.” On a list of 20+ categories, climate change came in as the highest
ranked issue facing the world and was #5 for specific country-based responses.
3. It should be noted that one initial generators of popularity for the “OK boomer” phrase was a short TikTok
video clip, showing a middle-aged-or-older man chastising younger generations for being too utopian
14 Critical Sociology 00(0)

and unrealistic, characterizing them as having “peter pan syndrome” (to watch the TikTok video see
linzrinzz, 2019).
4. The “30-year-old boomer” is a popular online meme where “older millennials who enjoy things that are
considered to be out of touch with younger millennials” are mocked (Know Your Meme, 2019).
5. Here, we can consider Žižek’s (2016) commentary on Lacan when he says: “Jacques Lacan claimed that,
even if a jealous husband’s claim about his wife—that she sleeps around with other men—is true, his
jealousy is still pathological. Why? The true question is ‘not is his jealousy well-grounded?”, but “why
does he need jealousy to maintain his self-identity?’”

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