POLITICAL TRANSLATION

STUDY PACK I

September — October 2021



Where next for global jihad?
Other Islamist insurgents are inspired by the Taliban’s triumph. The biggest danger will be in poor, unstable states
I n yemen they set off fireworks; in Somalia they handed out
sweets; in Syria they praised the Taliban for providing a “living
example” of how to “bring down a criminal regime” through ji-
had. Around the world, jihadists were elated by the fall of Kabul.
Through willpower, patience and cunning, a low-budget band of
holy warriors has vanquished America and taken charge of a me-
dium-size country. To Muslims who yearn to expel infidels and
overthrow secular states, it was evidence that God approves (see
Briefing). The ripple effects could be felt far and wide.
In the next few days President Joe Biden will have to sort out
the mess he has created at Kabul airport, where throngs are
clamouring to flee. It is a dangerous moment for his presidency
(see Asia section). In the longer term the world must deal with
the boost to jihadism from America’s humiliation. The chief risk
is not that terrorists will use Afghanistan as a base from which to
strike the West, as they did on September 11th 2001. Such attacks
are harder now, since rich countries have better security. Be-
sides, the Taliban are unlikely to tolerate big training camps for
global-minded terrorists, as they crave recognition and aid.
Granted, some feel a duty of hospitality to foreign Sunni
jihadists, and some will aid their militant cousins in Pakistan,
making that nuclear-armed state even less stable. But outside
Afghanistan, the main ripple effects will be psychological. The
Taliban’s triumph will fire up jihadists in other
countries, and spur recruits to join them. Some
who live in rich countries will be inspired to
commit acts of terrorism there. It does not take
many such attacks to sow a sense of fear or roil
domestic politics.
Even worse will be the effect in poorer,
weaker states, where jihadists aspire not mere-
ly to kill but to control territory, or at least pre-
vent the government from doing so. In places like Pakistan, Ye-
men, Syria, Nigeria, Mali, Somalia and Mozambique, they alrea-
dy do. In several other parts of Asia, Africa and the Middle East,
they threaten to. Many are asking: if our Afghan brothers can
beat a superpower, surely we can beat our own wretched rulers?
Jihadists are not all the same. Many disagree about doctrine.
Many hate and fight each other. Supporters of Islamic State de-
ride the Taliban, absurdly, as American stooges. One of the first
things the Taliban did in Kabul last week was to pull the leader of
Islamic State in South Asia out of jail and kill him.
Most jihadist groups are motivated primarily by local griev-
ances: a predatory government, an ethnic or sectarian divide, in-
fidel intruders. Yet they also tap into a global narrative. On their
phones they see daily evidence that the oppression they face at
home is part of wider pattern of persecution of Muslims, from
the gulag of Xinjiang to the hellscape of Gaza. When jihadists
anywhere succeed, they feel pride—and a call to action.
Bad government creates an opening for jihadism. When a
state is unjust, its citizens may imagine that one run by jihadists
might be better. Even if they do not take up arms, they may qui-
etly support those who do. Many rural Afghans decided that Tali-
ban justice, though harsh, was quicker and less corrupt than
government courts, and that Taliban checkpoints were less
Leaders 9
plunderous. This is one reason the Taliban’s final march to pow-
er met so little resistance. The other was psychological: they
won because when America pulled out Afghans did not want to
die fighting for a lost cause. Similar principles apply elsewhere.
Jihadists in north-eastern Nigeria are hard to beat because locals
detest the central government and army officers sell their own
men’s weapons to the guerrillas and pocket the cash.
Once jihadists win power, however, they find that their ideo-
logy makes governing hard (see our Special report on the Arab
world). Their desire to create a perfectly pious society, and ruth-
less intolerance of deviation from that ideal, make pragmatic
compromise tricky. Islamic State’s rule over a big chunk of Iraq
and Syria lasted only three years. Its habit of drowning people in
cages alienated a potentially sympathetic Sunni population. So
did its failure to foster economic activities other than looting
and kidnapping. It scared outside powers and Shia Iraqis so
much that they clubbed together to crush it.
The Taliban were also dreadful rulers when they last ran Af-
ghanistan. Much depends on whether they have learned from
their mistakes. If a group of jihadists could not only seize a
country but also run it tolerably well, jihadists everywhere
would see it as a beacon. Senior Taliban are at pains to seem
pragmatic and insist they will respect human rights. But rocky
times lie ahead. Taliban footsoldiers are already
committing atrocities. Many urban Afghans,
who have tasted the freedom to dress, work and
study as they please, even if they are female, de-
spise the new regime. Because reserves are fro-
zen in America, it is short of cash. The Afghan
economy has seized up; prices are soaring. The
Taliban have yet to unveil good ideas for reviv-
ing it. Instead they bluster that skilled Afghans
must not emigrate. Skilled Afghans may have other ideas.
One lesson of the Afghan fiasco is that what happens in far-
off failing states matters not only to the people who live there,
but also to the rest of the world. Calamity in Kabul today means
bigger refugee flows, more jihadist attacks and a greater chance
that other Islamist insurgencies will prevail. That could desta-
bilise a large number of countries, endangering both locals and
the foreigners who visit or do business there.
Another lesson is that a purely military approach to fighting
jihadism does little to make the ground less fertile for it. The
long-term solution is to build less awful, less exclusive states. If
the old Afghan government had been less corrupt and less inept
in dealing with tribal power-brokers, it might have proved more
resilient. Likewise, if northern Mozambique, southern Thai-
land, Kashmir or the vast expanses of the Sahel were more be-
nignly ruled, they might not be havens for jihadists.
Improving governance is hard, not least since many coun-
tries vulnerable to jihad are also racked by climate change. More
frequent droughts add to discontent and stir conflicts over water
and pasture. Donors can offer advice and cash, but ultimately it
is up to locals to build institutions that work. Unless existing
states provide basic services and something resembling justice,
the jihadists’ siren song will always sound seductive. 
2
 Article #
Where next for global jihad? (The Economist, August 28th 2021
Some background

1. Make sure you can explain the difference between

• Islamist vs Islamic vs Muslim
• Sunni vs Shia
2. Make sure you know how the names of these countries/ regions are pronounced in English, their
capitals, and adjectives formed from them:
• Pakistan, Y men, Syria, Nigeria, Mali, Somalia, Mozambique
• the Sahel, the Middle East
3. What is meant by:
• IS (Islamic State **запрещённая в РФinternment
The Xinjiang организация
camps, officially called vocational education and training centers (Chines
government of China, and informally called Xinjiang concentration camps, are internment camps
• the gulag of Xinjian Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and its Chinese Communist Party
• the hellscape of Gaza
кошмар

Vocabulary

1. To bring down a regime / government / a 16. To ght for a lost caus биться за безнадежное дело
leader etc.
17. Guerrillas партизаны
2. Jihadists [… оттолкнуть/настроить против население
18. To alienate population
способствовать экономическим проекта
3. To overthrow a secular state / a leader /
19. To foster economic activities
government etc. захватить светское государство
20. To seize / run a country захватить
4. To ee (e.g. to ee persecution бежать
21. To see smth as a beacon (+ e.g. a beacon of
5. A nuclear-armed state
волновой эффект/эффект домино democracy сигнал/маяк пример/образец
6. Ripple effect (e.g. to create a ripple effect
22. To seize up (e.g. The economy has seized up) глохнуть
7. To spur smb to do smt стимулировать что-то
23. To have yet to do smth еще предстоит сделать
8. To commit acts of terrorism (+ terrorist attack обнародовать хорошие идеи
24. To unveil good idea
“теракт”) / commit atrocities
25. Refugee ows потоки беженцев
9. To sow a sense of fea посеять чувство страха
повстанцы/мятежники 26. Insurgencies / insurgents
10. To roil domestic politics военный подход
сердить/раздражать
27. A purely military approach to ghting jihadism
11. An ethnic / sectarian divide межрелигиозная разобщенность
подключиться к /
стать частью 28. Tribal power-brokers вожди племен-главари
12. To tap into a global narrative
глобальной
повестки 29. A haven for jihadists рай для джихадистов
13. To face oppression / persecution столкнуться с преследованием
30. Droughts засухи
14. To take up arms взяться за оружие
31. To add to discontent усугубить недовольству
15. To pull out (= to withdraw troops, troops
withdrawal 32. To stir con icts разжигать конфликты
вывести войска
33. A siren song
 сладкая песня/ сладкие речи

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 The Economist August 28th 2021
Charlemagne Nowhere fast
The polite fiction that Turkey is a candidate for eu membership is unravelling
A ustria’s chancellor, Sebastian Kurz, may have been speak-
ing for a few other European governments earlier this summer
when he suggested that Turkey would be the most appropriate ref-
uge for Afghans escaping the Taliban. But he was not speaking for
Turkey, or for the Afghans themselves. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the
Turkish president, declared last week that Turkey would not be
“Europe’s refugee warehouse”. Most Turks agree. In a country
home to well over 4m migrants and refugees, including an esti-
mated 200,000-600,000 Afghans, resentment towards the new-
comers is mounting. But so is frustration that Turkey, formally a
candidate for membership in the eu, has become its buffer state.
For years, policy wonks used to reach for a variation of an old
Soviet joke to describe the membership talks between Turkey and
the eu: we pretend to negotiate, and they pretend to reform. To-
day, there is no use pretending. The accession process is dead. In
its place, a deal the eu struck with Mr Erdogan to keep migrants
and refugees out of Europe has taken centre stage in the relation-
ship. That agreement, too, is starting to come under strain.
The eu’s reports on Turkey’s progress towards accession once
made the front pages of the country’s newspapers. In today’s Tur-
key, the eu is a spent political force. In theory, all it needs to do to
remedy this is to say that a democratic Turkey, as opposed to the
police state Mr Erdogan has been assembling, can expect to have a
place in the eu once it cleans up its act. Turkey’s beleaguered
democrats would like to hear nothing more. Mr Erdogan would
probably like to hear nothing less.
Yet this is the one thing eu officials cannot say. Turkey is bigger
than any eu country and its people are mostly Muslim. Many
European voters regard the prospect of such a nation joining the
club with horror. So the chances are that the eu will not accept
Turkey whatever its democratic credentials. Signs of this were
present from the start of the membership talks in 2005, when
European leaders insisted on an “open-ended process”, the out-
come of which they would not guarantee.
In Mr Erdogan and his government they have found a terrific
excuse to kick the can down the road. Turkey’s leader has locked
up the Kurdish opposition, harassed the mainstream one, neu-
tered the press and the courts, and clashed with Greece, Cyprus
Europe 33
and France in the Eastern Mediterranean. As a German foreign
minister remarked a few years ago, the eu will keep Turkey out of
the club as long as Mr Erdogan is in power. The truth is that it will
probably do so no matter who is in charge.
For now, both the eu and Turkey have decided that the best
thing to do is nothing. Neither wants to break off negotiations,
and both have something to gain from the impasse. Europe does
not have to push forward a process it does not believe in, and Mr
Erdogan does not have to sign up to reforms that would weaken
his control over parts of Turkey’s economy and its institutions.
As a result, it is the deal the two sides made in 2016, after nearly
a million migrants and refugees reached Greece, that now drives
the relationship. In exchange for $6bn in assistance to Syrian refu-
gees and a vague promise of visa-free travel to Europe for Turks,
Mr Erdogan’s government has reined in smuggling networks and
taken back migrants attempting to cross the Aegean. The eu has
reason to be pleased. The number of crossings dipped to less than
10,000 last year, compared with 850,000 in 2015. Some in Europe
now propose extending the agreement’s provisions to Afghans.
Turkey has so far balked at that idea.
The deal has also changed the way the eu and Turkey do busi-
ness. European governments, especially Germany’s, are now ex-
tremely wary of rocking Mr Erdogan’s boat, says Michael Leigh, a
former eu official. The leverage the eu once had over Turkey’s
leader has gone. The bloc occasionally makes noises about human
rights, democracy and the need for a solution in Cyprus. Mr Erdo-
gan blithely ignores them.
The migration deal helped contain a populist backlash in Eu-
rope. But it has helped spark one in Turkey. Resentment of refu-
gees, made worse by an economic crisis, has occasionally turned
violent. Earlier this month a mob in Ankara, Turkey’s capital, de-
stroyed homes and shops belonging to Syrians after a Turkish
teenager died in a fight between locals and refugees. Such inci-
dents remain rare, a remarkable thing given the size of the refugee
population. But tensions are bound to mount as tens of thousands
of newcomers start to reach Turkey, this time from Afghanistan,
by way of Iran.
Getting nasty
Until recently, immigration had not been a big issue in Turkish
politics. But this too is changing. The opposition has tapped into
anti-refugee sentiment. Kemal Kilicdaroglu, head of the chp, the
largest opposition party, recently pledged to send all Syrian refu-
gees home if his party takes power. (Most Turks, including a ma-
jority of government supporters, would support this, polls say.)
Mr Erdogan, already criticised for keeping the border with Syria
open for years, is facing heat for doing too little to protect the one
with Iran. Work on a border wall is continuing. The debate is
poised to become nastier ahead of elections scheduled for 2023.
The deal with the eu is sure to come under fire.
Some Turkish diplomats suggest fixing the relationship with
the eu through seemingly technocratic manoeuvres, including an
upgrade to the bloc’s customs union with Turkey, visa liberalisa-
tion and co-operation on foreign policy. But even this seems im-
possible. Turkey does not want to make the necessary conces-
sions, including an overhaul of its draconian terrorism laws, and
the eu does not want to be seen as offering Mr Erdogan rewards. A
breakthrough may happen, but not before voters give Mr Erdogan
and his coalition the boot. Even then, eu membership will not be
on the table. Perhaps it was never there to begin with. 
4
 Article #
Nowhere fast. The polite ction that Turkey is a candidate for eu membership is unravelling
(The Economist, August 28th 2021)

Vocabulary

1. A candidate for EU membershi 15. To break off negotiations разорвать, прекратить переговоры
2. A country home to X refugee 16. Impasse тупик/бездействие/политическая интернтность

3. An estimated 600,000 Afghans приблизительно 17. Visa-free travel

4. Resentment is mounting 18.
возмущение, обида, недовольство To rein in smuggling networks обуздать контрабандистские сети

5. Accession (to the EU принятие в ЕС/вступление 19. Provisions of an agreemen положения соглашений
иметь рычаг воздействия на что-то/иметь преимущество над кем-то
6. To strike a dea добиться сделки 20. To have leverage over smth / sm
спровоцировать/содержать негативную ответную реакцию популистов
7. To take centre stag выйти на передний план 21. To spark / contain populist backlash
нарушаться/подвергаться сомнению; попасть под обстрел, вызвать резкую критику
8. To come under strain / re 22. Tensions are bound to mount (+ mounting
напряжение нарастает //обречены на - bound to
tensions is bound to win - обречен на победу
9. To make the front pages оказаться на передней полосе
преследуемые/подавляемые/отверженные подключиться к враждебным
23. To tap into anti-refugee sentiment насроениям к беженцам
10. beleaguered democrats
вступить на дорожку
гарантирует результат (как правило положительный, gar. - positive connotation) 24. Customs union таможенный союз
11. To guarantee an outcome
25. To make concessions
12. To harass opposition притеснять, преследовать оппозицию

26. Draconian laws

13. To clash with Greec
27. To be on the table 
 вопрос обсуждается
14. A foreign minister в повестке дня/предмет переговоров

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 Article #

Kamala Harris’s south-east Asia trip reveals limits of US strateg

Analysis: With little sign of big ideas or ambitious proposals, some analysts say
vice-president’s trip re ects how little the administration is investing in the regio
The Guardian, 27 Aug 2021, by Vincent N

In October 2013, as the former US president Barack Obama had to cancel his four-nation tour of
south-east Asia due to the congressional impasse at home, China’s president Xi Jinping, instead,
made the news headlines across the region
On that trip to Indonesia, Xi proposed to set up an Asian infrastructure investment bank to support
the region’s “connectivity”. He and his Indonesian counterpart, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, also
announced $32bn of trade and investment deals. Then in Malaysia, Xi and the prime minister,
Najib Razak, vowed to strengthen military ties and triple bilateral trade to $160bn by 2017
In the past eight years, China’s in uence in south-east Asia – a region with 11 countries and a
population of more than 655 million – has continued to grow. More recently, across Asia, although
China has emerged diplomatically diminished from the pandemic, Beijing is still holding ground in
its overall power, according to the Lowy Institute thinktank in Sydney.

The US v China power map in south-east Asia. Photograph: Lowy Institut

It is little surprising, therefore, this week’s visit by Joe Biden’s deputy Kamala Harris, has been
closely watched, not just in south-east Asia but also in the wider Asia region
“… Our partnerships in Singapore, in south-east Asia, and throughout the Indo-Paci c are a top
priority for the United States,” Harris declared in Singapore this week during her rst tour of the
region. “The United States is a proud part of the Indo-Paci c. And this region is critically important
to our nation’s security and prosperity.
Inevitably, Harris also took aim at China. She accused Beijing of challenging the rules-based order,
and spoke against its claims of its ownership of the vast majority of the South China Sea – a
message she reaf rmed on her subsequent trip to Vietnam
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 Beijing, meanwhile, accused Harris of attempting to drive a wedge between it and south-east Asia.
“I think it would be much more credible if the US said it was trying to maintain its hegemony and
uphold its own interests,” Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said
Harris’s rst tour of the region as the most senior Biden administration of cial this week was
signi cant. It reassured US partners that, unlike his predecessors, Joe Biden is paying close
attention to the region. After all, barely a few months ago, some analysts in the region were saying
“America has forgotten about us”, said James Crabtree, executive director of the Asia branch of the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, a thinktank
“However, judging from what’s been said by Harris on this trip, there was little sign of the kind of
big ideas and ambitious new proposals needed truly to compete with China in this part of Asia,” he
said. “The question now is: can the US really produce these?
During her visits to Singapore and Vietnam, Harris made a raft of announcements. They ranged
from expanding cybersecurity collaboration with Singapore to offering free vaccines to help
Vietnam combat Covid. In Vietnam, she also formally opened the new CDC south-east Asia
regional of ce in Hanoi, which was initiated by the Trump administration last year
These moves showed that America was willing to help when the region needed its deep expertise,
“but most deliverables were piecemeal”, said Ashley Townshend, director of foreign policy and
defence at the United States studies centre at the University of Sydney
“Harris’s signature announcement – America’s offer to host Apec in 2023 – failed to live up to
regional expectations for Washington to sketch out a trade and investment strategy for the region
and return to the CPTPP process1.
This, according to Townshend, who is also the lead author of a new report entitled Correcting the
Course: How the Biden Administration Should Compete for In uence in the Indo-Paci c, re ects
how little the administration is investing in the region itself.

Kamala Harris and Vietnam’s vice-president Vo Thi Anh Xuan pose for a photo at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi.
Photograph: Reuter

On the geopolitics side, during her speech in Singapore, Harris tried to reassure a nervous region
that the US’s deeper engagement did not mean it would force countries to choose between
Washington and Beijing. “Instead, our engagement is about advancing an optimistic vision that we
have for our participation and partnership in this region,” she said

1 see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comprehensive_and_Progressive_Agreement_for_Trans-Paci c_Partnership

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 It is a welcoming message to countries from Singapore to Thailand. Governments want the US
approach to China to be “not too hot, not too cold,” said Hoang Thi Ha, lead researcher for political
and security affairs from the Asean Studies Centre at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, in
Singapore. “They would like to see the US taking a more robust, principled response to China’s
expansionism in the South China Sea, or its bullying behaviour, but at the same time they don’t
want to see any con ict at all,” she said
But over the course of the past decade, as Chinese power grew and US commitment vacillated,
there’s also a growing sense that Washington might be unable or unwilling to match this rhetoric
with regional policy after all, said Townshend. The worry would continue to grow after Washington’s
hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan
These days, some close security partners of the US are openly questioning its capacity to maintain
a favourable regional balance of power in the Indo-Paci c. Others are wondering about its
willingness to resuscitate its role as a leading trade and investment partner in the region. “Coupled
with Washington’s patchy diplomacy, especially in south-east Asia, these uncertainties about US
regional strategy are eroding its in uence, after all,” Townshend said.
With Rebecca Ratcliffe, South-east Asia corresponden
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/aug/27/kamala-harriss-south-east-asia-trip-reveals-limits-of-us-strategy

Vocabulary:

1. a congressional impasse at hom 17. predecessor

2. China’s president Xi Jinpin 18. a thinktan
3. To make the news headlines across the 19. To expand cybersecurity collaboratio
regio 20. America was willing to help when the
4. his Indonesian counterpar region needed its deep expertis
5. To vow to strengthen military tie 21. deliverables were piecemea
6. To triple bilateral trad 22. Harris’s signature announcemen
7. to emerge diplomatically diminished from 23. America’s offer to host Apec in 202
the pandemi 24. to live up to regional expectation
8. Beijing is still holding groun 25. to sketch out a trade and investment
9. Joe Biden’s deputy Kamala Harri strategy for the regio
10. To take aim at Chin 26. Washington might be unable or unwilling to
11. To accuse Beijing of challenging the rules- match this rhetoric with regional polic
based orde 27. Washington’s hasty withdrawal from
12. claims of its ownership of the vast majority Afghanista
of the South China Se 28. To openly question the capacity to maintain
13. to drive a wedge between … a favourable regional balance of powe

14. to maintain its hegemon 29. To erode one’s in uence

15. To uphold its own interest

16. Chinese foreign ministry spokesma

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