Osmeña v. Pendatun (G.R. No.

L-17144)

Facts:

Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., herein petitioner, delivered his privilege speech before the House making serious
imputations of bribery against the President of the Philippines. Because of this, a Resolution was issued authorizing the
creation of special House Committee to investigate the truth of the charges made against the President, to summon
petitioner to substantiate his charges, and in case petitioner fails to do so, to require petitioner to show cause why he
should not be punished by the House.

Petitioner then resorted to the Court seeking for the annulment of said resolution on the ground that it infringes his
constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House. Meanwhile, the Special Committee
continued with its proceeding, and after giving petitioner a chance to defend himself, found the latter guilty of seriously
disorderly behavior. A House resolution was issued and petitioner was suspended from office for 15 months.

Thereafter, respondents filed their answer challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, and
defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension.

Issue:

Whether the House Resolution violated petitioner’s constitutionally granted parliamentary immunity for speeches

Ruling: NO.

Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in Congress, the Senators or Members
of the House of Representative “shall not be questioned in any other place.” This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6,
clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to
mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of
Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that “they shall not be questioned in any other
place” than Congress.

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative
assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably necessary
that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one,
however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.” It guarantees the legislator complete
freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself
whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which
Osmeña may be discipline, We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior,
not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on
factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white for presentation
to, and adjudication by the Courts.

Accordingly, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed.

    Dante Liban, et al. v. Richard Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011

THE FACTS

Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, filed with the
Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate”  against
respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his
incumbency as Senator.

Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a
member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that  “[n]o Senator . . . may hold any other
office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.” Petitioners cited the case of Camporedondo
vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided  August 6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument that
respondent Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC
Board of Governors.

Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5,[1] held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a
government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution . The PNRC
Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government
official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run charitable
organization and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths of which are private sector individuals.  Therefore,
respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.

The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it
creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution states that “[t]he  Congress shall not,
except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are
owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.” The Court thus directed the PNRC to
incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private
corporation. The fallo  of the Decision read:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or
an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red
Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a
private corporation or grant it corporate powers.

Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved
to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second part of the Decision with
regard to the pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC Charter.

II.        THE ISSUE

Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC charter?
Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?

III.       THE RULING
[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence
thereof.]
NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it was not the very lis mota of the
case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation.
     The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body
of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case.  We have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the
issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.,  thus:

This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that a
court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is
raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its
judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be
unavoidable.

[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . . the PNRC Charter.  Instead, the Court should have
exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other ground upon which the Court could have based its
judgment.  Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even
originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under
the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence in this country.

Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971,
December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643,
respectively.  The passage of several laws relating to the PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the
constitutional proscription on the creation of private corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of
a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban. 

A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not just in terms of structure, but also in
terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State and the  international community.  There is merit in
PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui generis. It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has
remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned
or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.

[T]his Court [must] recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect the unique status of the PNRC
in consonance with its treaty obligations.  The Geneva Convention has the force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. This constitutional provision
must be reconciled and harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate the
former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any other private corporation, the Decision of July
15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC’s special status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to
assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.
  
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can neither “be classified as an
instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality” as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private
corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.

Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary
thereof . . . so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof
concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private corporation”
within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code.   [T]he sui
generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.

In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in
accordance with its commitments under international law.  This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence,
especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties.  It bears emphasizing that the
PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion of the country’s
blood requirements.  Its humanitarian work is unparalleled.  The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and
drastic manner that would not only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities
but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the international community.  The sections of the PNRC Charter that
were declared void must therefore stay.

[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision
by deleting the second sentence, to now read as follows:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or
an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.]
Osmena Vs. Pendatun, 109 Phil 863 Parliamentary Doctrine of Separation of Powers; Power of the Legislature to
discipline its Members for Disorderly Behavior

FACTS:

Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in a privilege speech delivered before the House, made the serious imputations of
bribery against the President. A special committee, composed of Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other
congressmen, was created by virtue of House Resolution No. 59, to investigate the truth of the charges against the
President. Osmeña failed to produce evidence in support of his remarks about the President. He was, by Resolution No.
175, suspended from office for a period of fifteen months for serious disorderly behaviour. Osmeña submitted to the SC
a verified petition for “declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction” against the members of
the special committee. He asked for annulment of Resolution No. 59 on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary
immunity. Several respondents challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, and defended the
power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension.
ISSUES:
What is parliamentary immunity?
Whether or not the delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct.

RULING:
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in Congress, the Senators or Members
of the House of Representative “shall not be questioned in any other place.”
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative
assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably necessary
that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one,
however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.” Such immunity has come to this country
from the practices of Parliamentary as construed and applied by the Congress of the United States. Its extent and
application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the question before us. It guarantees the legislator
complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or
any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative
body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.

2. On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which
Osmeña may be disciplined, many arguments pro and con have been advanced. We believe, however, that the House is
the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it,
but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not
be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed
the power to determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed
appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government.
The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to
interfere. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme
within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)

SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. — The principle is well established that the courts will not assume a
jurisdiction in any case amount to an interference by the judicial department with the legislature since each department
is equally independent within the power conferred upon it by the Constitution. . . . .
The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene in what are exclusively
legislative functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the power to example a member, the court will not review
its action or revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision. (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, sec. p. 902.)

Defensor Santiago Vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No 128055, April 18, 2001

Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members of Congress vis-a-vis Congress' prerogative to discipline its own members:
the former is not punitive, the latter is

FACTS:
A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a complaint for violation of Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that petitioner,
with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, approved the application for
legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her suspension
effective for 90 days.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive suspension against a Senator of the
Republic of the Philippines
RULING:

The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with
violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. xxx

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the
validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court
is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be “no ifs and buts about it.”
Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan observed:

“x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official
concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension.”

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal
mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan’s
authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.

Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis-à-vis Congress’ Prerogative to Discipline its Members

The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to
discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own
ranks under the Constitution which provides that each-
“x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall
not exceed sixty days.”

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon
determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.

xxx
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997

Facts:

A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the
rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a
violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral
conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.
The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an
interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum.
The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority
Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for
objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying
this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus,
although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee
report had by then already been declared by the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate
and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President
Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House

Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern
with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to
conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a
particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other
than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open
to question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in
the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be
concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

Casco (Phils) Chemecal Corporation Vs. Geminez, 7 SCRA 347

The enrolled bill is conclusive upon courts (over statements so entered in the Journal) [Except where the matter is
required to be entered in the journal, e.g. yeas and nays on the final reading, or on any question at request (Phil Pol Law,
by I. Cruz 2002, p. 137)]
Art VI, Sec 16 (4)

Facts:

Central Bank issued a memorandum which fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions with
exemptions to, among others, urea formaldehyde. Petitioner Casco Phil. Chem. Co. (Casco Co.) bought foreign exchange
for the importation of urea and formaldehyde and paid margin fees. Relying on said memorandum, Casco Co. sought
refund but was refused on the ground that urea and formaldehyde is not in accord to the provision “urea
formaldehyde”. Casco Co. argued however that Congress intended to exempt “urea” and “formaldehyde” claiming that
the bill approved in Congress contained the conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and “formaldehyde”. In
support, it cited the individual statements of the Members of the Congress before their respective Houses during the
consideration of the bill.

Issue:

Should “urea formaldehyde” as it was written in the final form of the memorandum (and the enrolled bill) be construed
as “urea” and “formaldehyde” as it was allegedly approved in Congress?

Held:

No. Individual statements made by Members of the House [documented in the Journal] do not necessarily reflect the
view of the House. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of a bill xxx the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

Astorga v. Villegas
G.R. No. L-23475 (April 30, 1974)

FACTS:

House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino made
substantial amendments which were approved by the Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments,
thereafter signed its approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified and attested to the bill. The
President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065. Senator Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled
copy of House Bill No. 9266 was a wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the amendments introduced by
him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and the President withdrew their signatures and denounced
RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner argued that the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive proof
of a bill’s due enactment.

ISSUE:
W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid.

HELD:

Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures therein, the court declared that the
bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law.
The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal. An importance of having a journal is that in the absence
of attestation or evidence of the bill’s due enactment, the court may resort to the journals of the Congress to verify
such. “Where the journal discloses that substantial amendment were introduced and approved and were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for signature, the court can declare that the bill has not been duly
enacted and did not become a law.”

Bondoc Vs. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792

Electoral Tribunal – non-partisan court, nonpolitical body, completely independent.

Facts:

In the 1987 elections, respondent Pineda of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was proclaimed winner over rival
petitioner Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) for the position of Representative for the 4th District of Pampanga.
Bondoc filed a protest with HRET and was proclaimed winner over Pineda after revision, reexamination and
reappreciation of the ballots. Among the members of the HRET who voted for proclamation of Bondoc was Rep.
Camasura of the LDP. Declaring Camasura to have committed a complete betrayal of loyalty to LDP, he was expelled
from the party and, upon the request of LDP, his election to the HRET was rescinded. The promulgation of Bondoc as
winner was then cancelled due to the consequent lack of the required concurrence of five members of the Tribunal.
Hence this petition.
Issue:

May the House of Representatives, at the request of a political party, change that party’s representation in the HRET?

Held:

No. The Electoral Tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court. To be able to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction,
the tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction xxx is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.
They must discharge their functions with complete xxx independence—even independence from the political party to
which they belong. Hence “disloyalty to party” and “breach of party discipline” are no valid grounds for the expulsion of
a member of the tribunal. In expelling Rep. Camasura for having cast a “conscience vote”, the House of Reps committed
a grave abuse of discretion violative of the Constitution and thus the expulsion is null and void. To sanction such
interference by the House of Reps in the work of the HRET, would reduce the it to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of
the party in power.

Abbas Vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 166 SCRA 651

Rule-making power is deemed to have necessarily flowed from the constitutional grant of exclusive power to the
Electoral Tribunals.

Facts:

In the 1987 congressional elections, petitioners filed with respondent SET an election contest against 22 senators-elect
of the LABAN coalition. All members of the legislative component of the SET at the time happened to be included in the
senators assailed. Later, petitioners filed with SET a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of all senators-members
thereof for the reason they are all interested parties (being respondents therein). SET denied the motion hence this
petition. Contending that SET committed a grave abuse of discretion, petitioners argue that considerations of public
policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought, and propose to
amend the Tribunal’s rules as to permit the contest being decided by only three Members of the Tribunal.

Issue:
Should the Senators-members be disqualified?

Held:

No. The SET must continue taking cognizance of the case with its current Senators-members. Here is a situation which
precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues without inviting the same
objections to the substitute’s competence. However, the amendment proposed would, in the context of the situation,
leave the resolution of the contest to the only 3 Members, all Justices of this Court, who would remain whose
disqualification is not sought. It is unmistakable that the “legislative component” [of the SET] cannot be totally excluded
from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contest without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the
Constitution. Thus, the proposed mass disqualification/inhibition, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Electoral
Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform. This, to the Court’s mind, is the
overriding consideration—that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to
perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no
less than the fundamental law. Litigants must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense
of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. The charge that SET gravely abused its discretion in its denial of the petition
for [mass] disqualification/inhibition must therefore fail.

Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

DOCTRINE OF SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION

FACTS:
In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor
were candidates for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas.
On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15,
1935, he took his oath of office.
On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests.
On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against Angara and praying, among other things,
that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified.
On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara
contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of
contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon
the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,

RULING:

In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature
between the National Assembly on one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may
not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the
constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is
not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law
between departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and
appropriate cases.

The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as “the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.”

The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters
pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. The express lodging of that power in the
Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a
restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution.

Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary
implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last
day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the
election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body
had actually been organized.
While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at
the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be
construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be “the sole judge of all
contests…”, to fix the time for the filing of said election protests.
The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance
of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the
resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules
of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby denied, with cost against the petitioner.

Sarmiento Vs. Mission, 156 SCRA 549

It is the clear and expressed intent of the framers of the Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the
first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, are NOT subject to confirmation by the CA.

FACTS:

 this petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law,
Petitioner Sarmiento III et al. seek to enjoin respondent Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs on the ground that Mison’s appointment as Commissioner of said Bureau is unconstitutional by reason of its not
having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (CA).

ISSUE:
Does the appointment of Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs require the confirmation of CA?

RULING:
No. It is the clear and expressed intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those
mentioned in the first sentence (the first group¹) of Section 16, Article VII, are NOT subject to confirmation by the CA. It is a rule in
statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects—as it is so in the first sentence of Sec 16, Art VII—excludes others
not enumerated. Considering the historical background that the 1935 Constitution transformed the CA into a venue of “horse-
trading” as almost all presidential appointments required the consent of the CA and that the 1973 Constitution placed the absolute
power of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature, it can be inferred that the framers of the
1987 Constitution struck “middle ground” with requiring only the first group to be confirmed by the CA. Such is also manifest in the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. In said deliberations, it was even explicit that the appointments of the heads of
bureaus be excluded from the requirement of confirmation by the CA.²

¹ Four groups of officers whom the President shall appoint (in Art VII, sec 16): (1) the heads of the exec depts., ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval capt, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution (transitional sectoral reps to Congress, regular members of the JBC, Chairman
and Commissioners of the CSC, Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, Chairman and Commissioners of the COA and
Members of the regional consultative commission), (2) all other officers of the govt whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law, (3) those whom the Pres may be authorized by law to appoint, and (4) officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone (Sarmiento III v. Mison, 156 SCRA 553)

² As to the fourth group of officers whom the President can appoint, it was held that the word “alone” in the third sentence of Sec
16, Art VII appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence. In other words, the third sentence could have merely been
stated as “in the case of lower-rank officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the
heads of various depts…” (Sarmiento III v. Mison, 156 SCRA 564)

Daza vs. Singson (1989)

FACTS:

Rep. Daza represents the Liberal Party (LP) in the Commission on Appointments (CA). When Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized, the political realignment resulted in the swelling of the number of LDP members to 159
and diminishing of that of LP to 17. The House consequently revised its representation in the CA giving Daza’s seat to
Singson as additional member from the LDP. Daza now comes to this Court to challenge his removal, arguing that the
LDP is not the permanent political party contemplated in the Constitution because it has not been registered. However,
when LDP was subsequently registered, he then contended that it must still pass the test of time to prove its
permanence.

ISSUE:
Is the replacement of Daza in the CA in accordance with the proportional representation of parties contemplated in
Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution?

RULING:
Yes. Under Daza’s theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of the seats in the House would still not be entitled
to representation in the CA as long as it was organized only recently and has not yet “aged.” LP itself would fall in such a
category. Yet no question was raised as to its right to be represented in the CA xxx by virtue of its status as the majority
party xxx. At that time it was only 4 months old. It is true that there have been, and there still are, some internal
disagreements among the members of LDP, but these are to be expected in any political organization and it surely
cannot be considered temporary because of such discord. We resolve in favor of the authority of the House of Reps to
change its representation in the CA to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances.

Tolentino Vs. Secretary of Finance (1997)

FACTS:
The present case involves motions seeking reconsideration of the Court’s decision dismissing the petitions for the declaration of
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The motions, of which there are 10 in
all, have been filed by the several petitioners.

The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI) contends that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those
granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, “even nondiscriminatory taxation of
constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional”, citing in support of the case of Murdock v. Pennsylvania.

Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Invc., (CREBA), on the other hand, asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the
obligations of contracts, (2) classifies transactions as covered or exempt without reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes
should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall “evolve a progressive system of taxation”.
Further, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP), argues that legislature was to adopt a definite policy of granting tax
exemption to cooperatives that the present Constitution embodies provisions on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT
would, therefore, be to infringe a constitutional policy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, based on the aforementioned grounds of the petitioners, the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law should be declared
unconstitutional.

RULING:
No. With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted the press a privilege, the law could take
back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. The reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not
forever waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to
the same tax burden to which other businesses have long ago been subject. The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the
law does not discriminate against the press because “even nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is
unconstitutional.” The Court was speaking in that case (Murdock v. Pennsylvania) of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is
mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. The
VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is
imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties
purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the
press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.

Anent the first contention of CREBA, it has been held in an early case that even though such taxation may affect particular contracts,
as it may increase the debt of one person and lessen the security of another, or may impose additional burdens upon one class and
release the burdens of another, still the tax must be paid unless prohibited by the Constitution, nor can it be said that it impairs the
obligation of any existing contract in its true legal sense. It is next pointed out that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such
transactions as the sale of agricultural products, food items, petroleum, and medical and veterinary services, it grants no exemption
on the sale of real property which is equally essential. The sale of food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary services, etc., which
are essential goods and services was already exempt under Section 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of the NIRC before the enactment of R.A.
No. 7716. Petitioner is in error in claiming that R.A. No. 7716 granted exemption to these transactions while subjecting those of
petitioner to the payment of the VAT. Finally, it is contended that R.A. No. 7716 also violates Art. VI, Section 28(1) which provides
that “The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation”. Nevertheless,
equality and uniformity of taxation mean that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class be taxed at the same rate.
The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. To satisfy this
requirement it is enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all persons, firms, and corporations placed in similar
situation. Furthermore, the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are regressive.
What it simply provides is that Congress shall “evolve a progressive system of taxation.” The constitutional provision has been
interpreted to mean simply that “direct taxes are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized.”
The mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system.

As regards the contention of CUP, it is worth noting that its theory amounts to saying that under the Constitution cooperatives are
exempt from taxation. Such theory is contrary to the Constitution under which only the following are exempt from taxation:
charitable institutions, churches, and parsonages, by reason of Art. VI, §28 (3), and non-stock, non-profit educational institutions by
reason of Art. XIV, §4 (3).
With all the foregoing ratiocinations, it is clear that the subject law bears no constitutional infirmities and is thus upheld.