Ranovstayo violated international law by applying its entry regulation to aprepluya.

 Ranovstayo breached Art. 43 IHR by imposing a more restrictive to international traffic than
reasonably available alternatives.
-43.1. More restrictive, than reasonable available alternative that would achieve appropriate
level of protection. (Effectiveness discutido)
-43.2. C. Is not based in WHO guidance or advice.
-42. Was discriminatory. (contradiction of measure contra estado, unfettered discretion de
iure contra individuo )
43.1. Such measures shall not be more restrictive of international traffic and not more invasive or intrusive to
persons than reasonably available alternatives that would achieve the appropriate level of health protection.
(wto maybe SPS, TBT muy dificil jalar) (art. 2 ihr)
43.2. based in scientific principles, scientific evidence, WHO guidance or advice.
43.4. Significantly interfere traffic provide rational and scientific info.
42 non discrimination, aprepluya was target before other countries.
 Ranovstayo breached international human rights by imposing a disproportionate measure.

(Art. 3 IHR principles, implementation of these Regulations shall be with full respect for
the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons.) 57 complementa con otros
intrumentos.
ICCPR 6, general comment 36.
Economic social and cultural rights, 12, general comment 14.
Siracusa Principles state that restrictions on human rights under the ICCPR must meet
standards of legality, evidence-based necessity, proportionality, and gradualism.
Specifically, limitations on rights must be, among other provisions, ‘strictly necessary’,
meaning that the limitations respond to a pressing public or social need and proportionately
pursue a legitimate aim, and are the least restrictive means required for achieving the
purpose of the limitation. Additional protections include that the restriction is provided for
and carried out in accordance with the law, that it is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory,
and that the burden of justifying a limitation upon a right lies with the state seeking to
impose the limitation.30 Specific to limitations on the basis of ‘public health’, the Siracusa
Principles note that public health can be used as a ground for limiting certain rights if the
state needs to take measures ‘aimed at preventing disease or injury or providing care for the
sick and injured’. 1.a.10.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4463097/#:~:text=The%20Siracusa
%20Principles%20state%20that,necessity%2C%20proportionality%2C%20and
%20gradualism.
No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (GC 14) is the recognition
that human rights are necessarily interdependent and that the social determinants of health
are important to the promotion of health itself; as stated in paragraph 3 “…other [human]
rights and freedoms [e.g., food, housing] address integral components of the right to
health.”1 GC 14, paragraph 16 maintains that a right to health also includes the right to
control the spread of infectious diseases via a variety of control measures, some of which
are restrictive. The use of restrictive measures during infectious disease outbreaks,
including measures like quarantine, isolation, and travel prohibitions, restrict or limit basic
human rights prescribed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, such as freedom of
movement (Article 13) and the right to peaceful assembly (Article 20), for the sake of
protecting and promoting the health of individuals and communities.
https://www.hhrjournal.org/2015/06/commentary-limiting-rights-and-freedoms-in-the-
context-of-ebola-and-other-public-health-emergencies-how-the-principle-of-reciprocity-
can-enrich-the-application-of-the-siracusa-principles/
Limitations on rights and freedoms are justified on the basis that restrictive measures are
sometimes required to protect the public’s health during emergencies, as articulated not
only in GC 14 but also in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR).3 Paragraph 28 of GC 14 notes that limitations are “…intended to protect the
rights of individuals rather than to permit the imposition of limitation by States” and that
States have the “burden of justifying such serious measures,” i.e., they must demonstrate
that restrictive measures are necessary to curb the spread of infectious diseases so as to
ultimately promote the rights and freedoms of individuals.4 Paragraph 29 of GC 14 states
that any limitations “… must be proportional, i.e., the least restrictive alternative must be
adopted…” and “…they should be of limited duration and subject to review.”5 In the
ICCPR, we find that freedom of movement (Article 12), the right to hold opinions (Article
19), the right to peaceful assembly (Article 21), and the freedom of association (Article 22)
are all subject to justified limitations in the context of public safety or emergencies,
including that of public health
Lawrence Gostin notes, what it means to legitimize limitations under the Siracusa
Principles includes being “…in accordance with the law; based on a legitimate objective;
strictly necessary in a democratic society; the least restrictive and intrusive means
available; and not arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory
Ranovstayo did not violate international law by applying its entry regulation to
aprepluya.
 Ranovstayo complied with its obligations under art. 43 IHR.
-has fulfilled its obligations under art. 43. Based in scientific evidence, notified 43.5, provided
rationale.
- it is not more restrictive. And other alternatives would not be appropriate.
- Has not discriminated.
 Has complied with international human rights.

Does it grant unfettered discretion to Respondent’s authorities? + discrimination? (de iure

no, pero de facto lo hace)
Can you base it in conjecture (respuesta es no?)
Effectiveness or efficiency: no cases in Ranovstayo (no se bajo que estandar aplicaria)
Equivalency obligation: Applicant has an equivalent measure
Pretextual measure / clean hands? (No)
Is it legal to prohibit people from merely transiting? Siracusa

Issues / subissues
Ranovstayo violated international law by applying its entry regulation to aprepluya.

Ranovstayo breached Art. 43 IHR by imposing a more restrictive measure to international

traffic than reasonably available.
Ranostayo entry regulation breached article 43 IHR More restrictive, than reasonable
available alternative that would achieve appropriate level of protection.
 -43.2. C. Is not based in WHO guidance or advice.
-42. Was discriminatory. (contradiction of measure contra estado, unfettered discretion de
iure contra individuo )

APREPLUYA
RANOVSTAYOS ENTRY REGULATION VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL LAW

Pleadings:

1. Ranovstayo breached art. 43 IHR by imposing a more restrictive than necessary

entry regulation to international traffic than reasonably available measures.

Ranovstayos entry regulation is a measure that restricts

a. Ranovstayo measure restrictis international traffic.
b. There exists alternative available measures.

1. Territorial scope (Segura Province, NBL outbreak) - alternative

measure
2. Higher cost than benefit
3. Ineffective (WHO, scientists)
4. 18 days (excessive)
b. The entry regulation contradicts scientific evidence and WHO
recommendations. 
R: Art. 43.2 IHR
1. Scientific evidence rejects travel bans - solo sirve para países isla
2. WHO non-binding recommendations 
3. Rationale behind IHR reforms (SARS and respiratory diseases) -
implemented to prevent travel bans - target and isolate the source of
the outbreak
c. The entry regulation is discriminatory 
R: Artt 3, 42 IHR
1. Based on nationality and not health (Art 1 UDHR)
2. The measure grants unfettered discretion to executing authorities
3. Applied to Aprepluya before evidence supported it (less than 50
cases)
4. Applied to Aprepluya despite Aprepluya’s measures - equivalency
 d. Obligations under Art. 43 IHR are erga omnes and therefore not subject to
bilateral performance
R: ***
2. The entry regulation, as applied to Aprepluya, violates international human rights
law (Art 12 ICCPR)
a. The restriction applied to Aprepluya is not based in law 
R: OHCHR General Comment 27 at 13
The requirements must be precise and not confer unfettered discretion to
executing authorities
The measure is open-ended
b. The entry regulation is disproportionate
R: OHCHR General Comment 27 at 13
Risk: small, eight time zones away
The risk posed by Aprepluya was small: not even 50 cases and it was
contained at Segura
Consideraciones de 1(a)
Does not allow the traveller to choose destination - indirectly bars access to
Aprepluya
c. The entry regulation is discriminatory (violates equality)
OHCHR General Comment 27 at 11; Art. 12.3 ICCPR
Freedom of movement applies equally to residents and nationals but the
measure distinguishes (General Comment at 20)
People in transit are also covered by the entry regulation
3. The entry regulation violates the non-refoulement principle
R: Art 33 1951 Refugee Convention; under customary international law it has no
exceptions
States cannot “refoule” refugees back to a country where they face danger or
persecution. The measure excludes people without possibility of claiming asylum:
violates non-refoulement 
4. Customary international law
R: ICJ North Sea Continental Shelf: State practice + opinio juris
 Widespread rejection of travel restrictions in State practice
Based on H1N1, SARS and MERS and not COVID-19 

RANOVSTAYO
THE ENTRY REGULATION IS CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
1. The entry regulation complies with Ranovstayo’s obligations under Art. 43 IHR
1. The entry regulation is based on scientific evidence and principles
Art 43.2 IHR
1. The measure in general is based on scientific evidence
2. The application of the entry regulation to Aprepluya is consistent
with this evidence
3. Aprepluya has violated its duty to transparently notify of the extent
of J-VID-18 infection in its territory (quid pro quo in the 2005 IHR
reforms since Ranovstayo can’t know the origin of infection)
(Artt 5, 6 IHR)
b. The entry regulation is the least intrusive measure to achieve Ranovstayo’s
desired level of health protection 
R: Art 43.1 IHR
A: ZERO J-VID-18 infection, not mere prevention
c. The entry regulation is not discriminatory
R: Art 43.1 IHR
Rationale to discriminate: 
R: WTO, Brazil--Retreaded Tyres AB: rationale for discrimination
a. Territorial proximity
b. Close tourism relationship and traffic
c. Lack of transparency
d. Ranovstayo can’t impede its nationals from entering - that would be impermissible.
But international law permits restricting non-nationals. 
e. All + asymptomatic people pose an unknown threat and since objective is ZERO
infection, full restriction is justified
d. Ranovstayo duly notified the measure and supplied WHO with the relevant
health rationale and scientific evidence
Artt 43.3 IHR
Compromis (expressly)
 2. The entry regulation complies with Ranovstayo’s obligations under international
human rights law
Intro policy: Art 12 ICESCR: HIGHEST ATTAINABLE level of health -
obligation on Ranovstayo. Limitation is provided by ICCPR and ICESCR
1. Art 43 IHR is lex specialis and compliance with that article presupposes
consistency with Art 12 ICCPR and 12 ICESCR
2. The entry regulation is consistent with other rights under the ICCPR
3. The entry regulation is justified under customary international law
a. State practice shows proliferation of travel bans as legitimate to combat
respiratory diseases / pandemics

COMPENSATION

https://www.ejiltalk.org/award-of-compensation-by-international-tribunals-in-inter-state-
cases-icj-decision-in-the-diallo-case/

http://www.qil-qdi.org/the-icj-and-the-compensation-for-environmental-damage-in-nicara-
gua-costa-rica-case-does-the-application-of-equitable-principles-offset-independent-
technical-expertise/

https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/articles/to-sue-or-not-to-sue/

https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article/26/2/471/423021

https://hsfnotes.com/publicinternationallaw/2018/04/13/icj-determines-first-ever-
compensation-claim-for-environmental-harm/

Nicaragua costa rica

30. The obligation to make full reparation for the damage caused by a wrongful act has
been recognized by the Court in other cases (see for example, Ahmadou Sadio Diallo
(Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2010 (II), p. 691, para. 161; Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v.
United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004 (I), p. 59, para. 119; Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 80, para. 150).
31. The Court has held that compensation may be an appropriate form of reparation,
particularly in those cases where restitution is materially impossible or unduly burdensome
(Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010
(I), pp. 103-104, para. 273). Compensation should not, however, have a punitive or
exemplary character.
In order to award compensation, the Court will ascertain whether, and to what extent, each
of the various heads of damage claimed by the Applicant can be established and whether
they are the consequence of wrongful conduct by the Respondent, by determining “whether
there is a sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus between the wrongful act . . . and the
injury suffered by the Applicant”

34. In cases of alleged environmental damage, particular issues may arise with respect to
the existence of damage and causation. The damage may be due to several concurrent
causes, or the state of science regarding the causal link between the wrongful act and the
damage may be uncertain. These are difficulties that must be addressed as and when they
arise in light of the facts of the case at hand and the evidence presented to the Court.
Ultimately, it is for the Court to decide whether there is a sufficient causal nexus between
the wrongful act and the injury suffered.

35. In respect of the valuation of damage, the Court recalls that the absence of adequate
evidence as to the extent of material damage will not, in all situations, preclude an award of
compensation for that damage. For example, in the Ahmadou Sadio Diallo case, the Court
determined the 6 CIJ1133.indb 27 29/10/18 14:12 certain activities (judgment) 27 16
amount of compensation due on the basis of equitable considerations (see Ahmadou Sadio
Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Compensation,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (I), p. 337, para. 33). A similar approach was adopted by the
Tribunal in the Trail Smelter case, which, quoting the Supreme Court of the United States
of America in Story Parchment Company v. Paterson Parchment Paper Company (United
States Reports, 1931, Vol. 282, p. 555), stated: “Where the tort itself is of such a nature as
to preclude the ascertainment of the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a
perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and
thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts. In such case, while the
damages may not be determined by mere speculation or guess, it will be enough if the
evidence show the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference,
although the result be only approximate.” (Trail Smelter case (United States, Canada), 16
April 1938 and 11 March 1941, United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards
(RIAA), Vol. III, p. 1920.)

CASE CONCERNING AHMADOU SADIO DIALLO

14.. Compensation is limited to damage actually suffered as a result of the internationally

wrongful act, and excludes damage which is indirect or remote the Court will consider
whether an injury is established. It will then “ascertain whether, and to what extent, the
injury asserted by the Applicant is the consequence of wrongful conduct by the
Respondent”, taking into account “whether there is a sufficiently direct and certain causal
nexus between the wrongful act . . . and the injury suffered by the Applicant” (Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), pp. 233-234,
para. 462). If the existence of injury and causation is established, the Court will then
determine the valuation.
15. Judgment of 30 November 2010 that, as a general rule, it is for the party which alleges a
particular fact in support of its claims to prove the existence of that fact (I.C.J. Reports
2010 (II), p. 660, para. 54 ; see also Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September
1995 (the for- mer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2011 (II), p. 668, para. 72 ; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p. 71, para. 162)

Differentiation between non material injury and material injury.

Par. 21, no requirement of evidence for non material, asses circumstances of arrest of
mr.dialio

Article 31 makes a clear connection between the obligation to make full reparation for the
injury caused, while Article 34 of the ARSIWA stipulates that ‘full reparation for the injury
caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and
satisfaction, either singly or in combination, in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter’.11 Similarly, Article 36(1) of the ARSIWA on compensation stipulates that the
responsible state ‘is under an obligation to compensate for the damage caused

Tier test SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE BHANDARI

Under this approach, formulated in Diallo, the Court must determine that: (i) a State
suffered an injury; (ii) there is a “sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus” between the
responsible State’s unlawful activities and the injured State’s injury (causation); and (iii)
the amount due in compensation

Draft articles
Contingent to finding of breach. Require attribution.
Find that state suffered an injury.
Sufficiently direct and certain casual nexus.
Amount
Policy argument that you open a can of worms where every country will ask for
compensation for additional measures.

1. Damages / compensation (entitlement)

1. Can the Court order compensation and how should it be calculated? 
2. Can compensation be ordered based on an “indirect” link? 
3. Distress / necessity / grounds for excluding wrongfulness 
4. Buscar: 
1. Nicaragua v. Costa Rica (***)
2. Damian (***)
3. Corfu Channel (1949)
2. Asylum
a. Was it regularly granted and maintained? 
i. Qualification of the offense
 ii. Imminent threat / arbitrariness
b. Is there an obligation to surrender an asylum-seeker?

Asylum
https://b-ok.lat/book/3415112/d583e1

UK.
The above evidence leads to the conclusion that the United Kingdom neither claims nor recognizes a legal
right to grant diplomatic asylum, although, on occasions, it has authorized such asylum on humanitarian
grounds

US
the evidence presented above that the United States does not admit diplomatic asylum as a right of legations
under international law, although it would authorize such an asylum for humanitarian considerations in order
to protect the fugitive from an immediate personal danger, which protection is not forthcoming at the time
from the territorial state.

Since March 2002, over 60 North Korean refugees have sought political asylum at
foreign embassies in Beijing and foreign consulates in Shenyang

2002 case of 25 North koreas storming Spanish embassy.