Even these lavish sums did not satisfy the marshals' cupidity.

The worst offenders were Augereau, Soult,

Massena and Victor. Augereau once strode into an Italian pawnshop and stuffed his pockets with jewels.
When this was reported to Napoleon, he dismissed the objections cynically: 'Don't talk to me about
generals who love money. It was only that which enabled me to win the battle of Eylau. Ney wanted to
reach Elbing to procure more funds.' The result of Napoleon's refusal to discipline his marshals was
predictable. Art treasures were looted across an area stretching from Egypt to Spain and, although some
of the paintings found their way into the I ,ouvre, most were purloined for private collections. Soult
acquired pamtmgs worth one-and-a-half million francs, which he pocketed; Napoleon kept back a
wealth of choice items for Josephine; many hundreds more precious artefacts were sold at State
auctions. The plunderers habitually lied to the Emperor. In December r 8o6 General Lagrange, the
French military governor of Hesse-Darmstadt, found the treasure of the Landgrave of Hesse, who had
made the mistake of backing the Prussians. The total value of the haul, accumulated painstakingly over
the years by the notably miserly I ,andgrave, was nineteen million francs. In return for a bribe of a
million francs, I ,agrange fabricated a report that 448 only eight millions had been unearthed. The
remaining ten millions, in bonds, bills, cash vouchers and mortgage documents were then smuggled out
of the country for the exiled Landgrave's use. Napoleon put his foot down only when the personal
corruption of his acolytes put in jeopardy the Continental System. Bourrienne, as French representative
in Hamburg sold over I so,ooo authorizations for the export of illegally imported goods between August I
807 and December I 8Io, at rates of 0.25% and 0.5% the value of the merchandise. He made more than
one million francs from this scam, which meant that goods worth between sixty and I ZO millions were
exported annually. It was hardly surprising that colonial cotton, sugar and coffee continued to circulate
in Germany, Switzerland and Austria at prices lower than in Paris, even after the decrees of I8Io.
Recalled and fined for his corrupt practices, and heedless of the fact that Napoleon had already
pardoned him once for embezzlement, the wretched Bourrienne complained of the Emperor's
'ingratitude' and became a secret agent for the Bourbons. Many commentators have remarked on
Napoleon's hubris in embarking on the adventure in Spain at the very moment his Empire looked rock-
solid. Less attention has been lavished on the objective side of the picture, which shows Napoleon
launching into new and quixotic adventures at the very moment the economic, demographic and
psychological factors hitherto favouring him were undergoing a reverse. The ethos of the Grande Armee
shifted from revolutionary virtue to personal gain and advancement, producing a catastrophic decline in
morale and esprit de corps. After I 807 the once magnificent army was badly equipped, badly officered
and frequently indisciplined. It became increasingly obvious that most of the marshals were of poor
military calibre; Napoleon frequently rued the loss of the brilliant Desaix. The reservoir of men was
beginning to run dry, and after I 8o7 the proportion of battle losses was no longer so favourable to the
French. The inexperience and poor morale of conscripts after I 807 - at its simplest level a result of
having to fight in wars far from France which did not seem to involve national interests - meant the army
was not nearly so potent a weapon as in I796-I 8os; consequently manoeuvres under fire became less
plausible and therefore battle casualties greater. Above all, the factor of money began to haunt the
Emperor. An examination of Napoleon's accounts for the period I October r 8o6 to IS October I 8o8
shows a healthy state of affairs. Extraordinary taxes raised 3I r,66z,ooo francs, property taxes
79,667,000 francs and the foreclosure of coffers r 6,qz,ooo. In addition, there was the huge war
indemnity of 6oo million francs from Prussia, including the remounting of 40,ooo 449 cavalry and other
supplies. During the same period the expenditure of the Grande Armee was 2 1 2,879,335 francs. The
protracted campaigns in Prussia and Poland had therefore cost the French taxpayer nothing, but this
situation was about to change with a vengeance. At the beginning of r 8o9 Napoleon's Empire still
looked secure, but in retrospect we can see him already at the edge of a precipice. Perhaps
unconsciously Napoleon even realized this for, as if by preestablished harmony, his health began to
decline before his fortunes dipped, and this process can be dated to r 8o8. His features coarsened, his
body grew heavier, his stomach protruded, his look grew less alert and his voice less commanding. The
gastric attack at Bayonne in r 8o8 and the eczema at Vienna in May r 8o9 were pointers to a
valetudinarian future. It was almost as though the colossus began to crack in anticipation of the
unravelling of his life's work.