Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Fatigue Analysis
Figure 8-1
Figure 8-3
2020 AADC2 - Chapter 8: Fatigue Analysis 12
8.2. Fatigue Approaches in History
8.2.2. De Havilland Comet 1
◼ Investigation:
◼ The wreckage of the A/C were recovered for investigation (first great underwater
recovery actions).
◼ The examination of the corpses indicated possible depressurization in flight
(ruptured lungs and skull fractures).
◼ A full scale fuselage model similar to the Comet was set up and pressurized until
rupture. Test dummies proved decompression theory.
◼ Suspicions were put into engine turbine blades. Turbines were reinforced (among
other improvements) to avoid future depressurization in case engine blows up.
◼ Even if the official investigation was still ongoing, BOAC obtained
permit to fly for DH-106 fleet of Mach the 23rd.
◼ 1954, April the 8th: flight South African Airlines – 201, operated by
BOAC (G-ALYY, 2704 airframe hours) from Rome to Cairo. A/C
exploded in flight.
◼ Entire Comet fleet lost airworthiness certificate until both
similar accidents were cleared.
Figure 8-4
2020 AADC2 - Chapter 8: Fatigue Analysis 15
8.2. Fatigue Approaches in History
8.2.2. De Havilland Comet 1
◼ Investigation (cont.):
G-ALYU test rig fuselage crack
Figure 8-5
2020 AADC2 - Chapter 8: Fatigue Analysis 16
8.2. Fatigue Approaches in History
8.2.2. De Havilland Comet 1
◼ Investigation (cont.):
Figure 8-6
Figure 8-7
Figure 8-9
Figure 8-8
Figure 8-12
2020 AADC2 - Chapter 8: Fatigue Analysis 23
8.2. Fatigue Approaches in History
8.2.4. F-111
◼ On December 22nd 1969, one year after entering into service, F-111
A1-94 experienced catastrophic failure of its left semi-wing. A 3.5[g]
pull-up manoeuvre was being performed at failure, being the load
factor less than half the design value.
◼ Investigation:
◼ It determined that the failure was initiated at a pre-existing manufacturing flaw in
the lower plate of the left semi-wing pivot (Figure 8-12).
◼ The flaw, which was of considerable size (23.4 x 5.9 [mm]), originated due to a
forging fold in the high strength steel.
◼ It went undetected though the inspections. Only limited fatigue growth occurred
in service before overload and failure.
◼ Although this accident might have been considered as a single isolated failure,
an increasing number of flaws in this program were being found.
◼ This fact, together with early and widespread cracking in the Lockheed C-5A
wing boxes, led the USAF to abandon it previous fatigue approach (Safe-life
combined with exhaustive full scale testing).
◼ F-111 program was stopped until a solution could be found.
Figure 8-13
2020 AADC2 - Chapter 8: Fatigue Analysis 25
8.2. Fatigue Approaches in History
8.2.4. F-111
◼ The F-111 program was recovered after the definition of the so-
called cold proof test, based on:
◼ The A/C basic structure was not accessible.
◼ The lack of the necessary non-destructive inspection techniques.
◼ Cold proof testing:
◼ It allows evaluation of the current structural integrity in a global manner, as well
as predicting a period of safe life until next test.
◼ The test relies on fracture mechanisms (developed during the 60’s), knowing
that, at low temperatures, materials reduce their fracture toughness.
◼ If the A/C component does not fail at low temperatures (ca. -43°C), no larger
critical crack size is expected.
◼ Results are highly reliable.
◼ These test are very expensive and they demand the A/C to be out-of-service
temporarily.
◼ Tests must be repeated several times.
◼ It causes a terrible over cost to the program, limiting the international
sales and program development.
2020 AADC2 - Chapter 8: Fatigue Analysis 26
8.2. Fatigue Approaches in History
8.2.5. Damage tolerant
◼ Lessons learnt from F-111:
◼ Structures need to be classified as inspectable and non-inspectable
in service.
◼ Inspectable structures can be qualified as Damaged tolerant (Fail-
safe or slow flaw growth) structures. The initial damage must grow
slowly and not reach critical size between inspections.
◼ Non-inspectable structures may still be qualified as Damaged
tolerant, not reaching critical size during the design service life.
Figure 8-14
2020 AADC2 - Chapter 8: Fatigue Analysis 28
8.2. Fatigue Approaches in History
8.2.6. DAN AIR 707-321C
◼ DAN AIR 707-321C air freighter was the first modified
Boeing 707 of that class:
◼ On May 1977, it lost the entire right HTP just before landing in
Lukasa international airport.
◼ The A/C entered into service in 1963 and converted to a freighter in
1976.
◼ By the time of the accident, a total of 47621 airframe flight hours
were accumulated (design life was 60000 and 20 years service) and
16723 landings.
◼ It was thus a ‘geriatric’ A/C.
Figure 8-15
2020 AADC2 - Chapter 8: Fatigue Analysis 31
8.2. Fatigue Approaches in History
8.2.7. Fatigue on aging A/C
◼ Lessons learnt from DAN AIR 707-321C:
◼ A/W authorities reconsidered the fatigue problems on aging A/C →
supplementary inspections to prevent old A/C from becoming fatigue
critical.
◼ Importance of full scale testing even for modifications:
◼ As it happened, B707-300 tail were enlarged with respect to the original design.
◼ Material change from aluminium to stainless steel for a large part of the top skin
attached to front and rear spars.
◼ This modified the stress paths within the structure and, in line with this, the
associated life estimations.
◼ However, at that time, such modifications did not require a full scale testing.
◼ Post crash fatigue full scale testing reproduced the observed service
failure.
Figure 8-17
Figure 8-16
Figure 8-18
2020 AADC2 - Chapter 8: Fatigue Analysis 34
8.2. Fatigue Approaches in History
8.2.8. B737-200 Aloha Airlines
◼ Investigation:
◼ Due to the short distance between destinations (Figure 8-18), the maximum
pressurization differential was not reached in every flight (equivalent full cycles
lower than 89680 flight cycles.
◼ The A/C was 19 years old, operating with long term access to warm, humid,
maritime air.
170Km
140Km
200Km
Figure 8-19
2020 AADC2 - Chapter 8: Fatigue Analysis 35
8.2. Fatigue Approaches in History
8.2.8. B737-200 Aloha Airlines
◼ Investigation:
◼ Finally, the NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was the
failure of the maintenance program to detect the presence of significant
disbonding and fatigue damage.
◼ It ultimately led to the failure of the lap joint at stringer S-10L and the separation
of the upper fuselage.
◼ Basic Explanation of the structural problem:
◼ Adjacent fuselage panels are longitudinally joined by overlapping the edges of
the upper and lower panels (about 3[in] overlap).
◼ On the early B737 the skins were bound together by using an adhesive and by
three rows of rivets.
◼ Fuselage pressurization loads were intended to be transferred through the
adhesive, not through the rivets.
◼ Due to manufacturing flaws, some zones has degraded adhesion, thus
susceptible the corrosion, while others were not bound at all. That led to in-
service corrosion due to moisture.
◼ Corrosion also affected to the hot bonded tear straps.
Figure 8-22
◼ The goal is always the same:
Figure 8-23
Figure 8-24
Figure 8-26
Figure 8-25
Typical 𝑆 − 𝑁 curve of a
metallic material.
The arrows indicate that
the coupon did not break
at this stress level. Results
receive a statistical post-
process, as the coupons
do present variation of
cycle number to failure at
a given stress level.
It sketches the number of cycles
that are requiered for the structure
to break under a constant cyclic Figure 8-27
loading.
Figure 8-28
Figure 8-29
◼ In a nutshell, the main parameters driving the S-N curves are:
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛
8.1 𝑆𝑚 = 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 = - Therefore it is suggested than SN curves
2 depends on the maximum and minimum
load applied during the constant cycle
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛 loading and the direction of the load
8.2 𝑆𝑎 = 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 = (compression or tenssion).
2
𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝑎 - Tension load cycles are more critical
than compression ones, it means than for
8.3 𝑅 = 8.4 𝐴 = a load value, tension will provide lower
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑆𝑚 allowed number of cycles until break than
compression loads.
Figure 8-30
2020 AADC2 - Chapter 8: Fatigue Analysis 50
8.4. Fatigue Analysis
8.4.1. Stress Life Method. High-cycle fatigue.
◼ Final fatigue failure usually involves three main phases:
Figure 8-31
◼ The number of cycles for a crack to nucleate can range from a few
to the entire life, depending on the stress level and material.
◼ The endurance of a specimen is highly sensitive, among others, to:
◼ The surface condition.
◼ The residual stress state.
◼ The presence of inclusions that act as stress concentrators.
Figure 8-33
Figure 8-34
Figure 8-35
1.
2. A previous rain flow is encountered.
◼ Repeat up to the last valley.
Figure 8-39
2020 AADC2 - Chapter 8: Fatigue Analysis 59
8.4. Fatigue Analysis
8.4.3. Fatigue Life Prediction
Fluctuating spectrum can be described as
an spectrum of amplitude of stress cycles
with different alternating stresses.
◼ Fatigue analyses start with the definition of the A/C (fleet) usage:
◼ A/C missions: short-range, long-range, training, combat…
◼ Mission phases: ground, climb, cruise, landing, low-level flight…
◼ Mission segments: take-off run, aerial delivery, steep descent…
◼ Information of similar A/C or customer needs are of prime importance.
Figure 8-41
Figure 8-40
Figure 8-44
2020 AADC2 - Chapter 8: Fatigue Analysis 67
8.5. Fatigue in Aeronautics
8.5.2. Loads Spectra
◼ Fatigue loads are calculated using a parametric
approximation: It means to calculate the loads
that aicraft will withstand during
mission profile at steady state
◼ Calculate mission profile steady state (1-g conditions). conditions.
Figure 8-45
Figure 8-46-a
2020 AADC2 - Chapter 8: Fatigue Analysis Figure 8-46-b 70
8.5. Fatigue in Aeronautics
8.5.3. Stress Spectra & Fatigue Life
◼ FEM allows translating loads to stresses for each specific
structure.
◼ A stress spectrum can be established from the loads one
(using the appropriate counting method).
Figure 8-47
2020 AADC2 - Chapter 8: Fatigue Analysis 71
8.5. Fatigue in Aeronautics
8.5.3. Stress Spectra & Fatigue Life
◼ Using the adequate S-N curves (obtained for the proper 𝑆𝑚
and 𝑆𝑎 stresses), the Fatigue Life of a component can be
established (using the convenient accumulation method).
Figure 8-48
Figure 8-50
2020 AADC2 - Chapter 8: Fatigue Analysis 74
Chapter 8: Fatigue Analysis
References
1. R. J. H. Wanhill
Milestone Case Histories in Aircraft Structural Integrity.
NLR-TP-2002-521.
2. Civil Aircraft Accident
Report of the Court of Inquiry into the Accidents to Comet.
G-ALYP; January 1954 & Comet G-ALYY; April 1954.
3. FAA Lessons Learned Homepage
http://lessonslearned.faa.gov/index.cfm
4. D. Howe
Aircraft Loading and Structural Layout.
Professional Engineering Publishing Ltd.
5. M. Chung-Yung Niu
Airframe Structural Design.
Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Company.
6. CS-25 EASA and FAR-25 Regulations.
Estimate the beam fatigue life if the load is 1kN during 90% of the time and
2kN during 10% of the time.
If the total applied cycles is n, then the cycles at 1kN are 0.9*n and the cycles at
2kN are 0.1*n.