[77] Paulin v. Gimenez (PANDAPATAN) 8. After failing to set aside the resolution granting the MR, Sps.
aside the resolution granting the MR, Sps. Paulin and
G.R. No. 103323 | Melo, J. | Prosecution
PETITIONER: Ramon S. Paulin, Angela F. Paulin, and Jose Bacho
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Celso M. Gimenez, Hon. Mamerto Coliflores, Castro
Belme and the People of the Philippines
SUMMARY: Sps. Paulin and Bacho pulled a gun on Brgy. Capt. Castro Belme.
Castro filed a case of grave threats against Sps. Paulin and Bacho while a case of
grave threats and oral defamation was filed against Castro. MTC dismissed the
case against Sps. Paulin and Bacho but this was overturned when MTC granted
Castro’s MR. Petitioners. Petitioners now argue that there was grave abuse of
discretion because their right against double jeopardy was violated. SC held that
no since the initial decision did not deal with the innocence or guilt of Sps. Paulin
and Bacho. SC held that the MTC only merely corrected its error when it
prematurely terminated and dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the
right to complete the presentation of its evidence.
DOCTRINE: (See requisites of double jeopardy and its exceptions in ¶1-2 of
Ratio)
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its
case, its right to due process is thereby violated. Where there is a violation of basic
constitutional rights, courts are ousted of jurisdiction. Hence, the violation of the
State’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional error as the decision
rendered in disregard of the right is void for lack of jurisdiction. Where the order
of dismissal was issued at a time when the case was not ready for trial and
adjudication, the order is null and void.
FACTS:
1. Brgy. Capt. Castro Belme (“Castro”) was aboard a jeep which was overtaken
by Petitioners Dr. Ramon and Angela Paulin in their Nissan Patrol.
2. Irked, Mabuyo followed the Paulins to the back gate of Rattan Originals in
Tanke, Talisay, Cebu. He learned that the Nissan Patrol was driven by Dr.
Ramon Paulin.
3. While Castro was investigating some problems of his constituents in Kilawan
at Tanke, Cebu, Dr. Ramon and Angie Paulin allegedly pointed their guns at
Castro while Jose Bacho, a companion of Spouses Paulin, acted as back-up.
4. Castro instructed one of the barangay tanods to call the police in Talisay and
the rest to block the exit of Spouses Paulin and Bacho.
5. Sensing that they were outnumbered, Spouses Paulin put their guns down.
Station Commander P/Lt. Palcuto filed a complaint for “grave threats”
against Spouses Paulin and Bacho.
6. On Nov. 20, 1989, the station commander filed a complaint for grave threats
and oral defamation against Castro. The cases were jointly tried.
7. On June 13, 1990, MTC Talisay dismissed the case against Spouses Paulin
and Bacho. Castro filed an MR which was granted on July 3, 1990.
Bacho filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, damages, etc. with the RTC.
This was eventually dismissed. Hence, this petition.
9. Sps. Paulin and Bacho argue:
a. The decision dated June 13, 1990 dismissing the case cannot be set
aside without violating the right against double jeopardy
b. RTC’s dismissal of their petition also ignored their right against
double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
1. Was there double jeopardy. NO.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court dated December 19, 1991 AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
Double Jeopardy
1. The requisites of double jeopardy are:
a. A valid complaint or information
b. a competent court
c. the defendant had pleaded to the charge and
d. that the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent
2. Jurisprudence further provides of exceptions to the double jeopardy rule:
a. the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent of the
defendant
b. the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the
evidence or of the merits of the case and
c. the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so
that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the
guilt or innocence of the defendant.
3. For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be without the
express consent of the accused. Here, the dismissal was granted upon the
motion of the petitioners. Hence, double jeopardy did not attach.
Acquittal v. Dismissal
4. Sps. Paulin and Bucho argue that the June 13 decision of the MTC was
tantamount to an acquittal since the MTC considered the merits of the
prosecution’s evidence.
5. An acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted
because the evidence does not show that defendant’s guilt is beyond
reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that
the defendant is not guilty.
6. Dismissals terminate the proceedings, either because the court is not a court
of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or
information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc.
7. Here, there was no acquittal since there was no finding as to the guilt or double jeopardy.
innocence of the petitioners. 18. Here, the MTC did not violate double jeopardy when it set aside the order of
8. Under Section 14, Rule 110, it is stated: dismissal for the reception of further evidence by the prosecution because it
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in merely corrected its error when it prematurely terminated and dismissed the
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or case without giving the prosecution the right to complete the presentation of
information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in its evidence.
accordance with Rule 119, Sec. 11 . . . 19. It follows then that the decision of respondent regional trial court sustaining
9. In Section 11 of the same Rule, it is provided: that of the court of origin cannot be said to be tainted with grave abuse of
When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment, that a mistake has discretion.
been made in charging the proper offense, and the accused cannot be 20. The Rule on Summary Procedure was correctly applied by the public
convicted of the offense charged, or of any other offense necessarily included respondents in this case.
therein, the accused shall not be discharged, if there appears to be good cause 21. Petitioners argue that public respondents gravely abused their discretion in
to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for applying the provision prohibiting the filing of motions to dismiss and
the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper petitions for certiorari provided under the Rule on Summary Procedure. In any
information. event, petitioners insist that they filed a demurrer to evidence which is not a
10. Here, the proper charge should have been “disturbance of public performance” prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
under Art. 153 and not “grave threats” under Art. 282. 22. Demurrer to evidence due to its insufficiency presupposes that the prosecution
11. There are exceptional instances when dismissal is considered final such as had already rested its case. Hence, the motion is premature if interposed at a
when dismissal is based on demurrer on evidence or when dismissal is made time when the prosecution is still in the process of presenting its evidence as
due to the denial of the right to speedy trial. what happened in this case.
12. Here, petitioners’ motion to dismiss was premised on procedural grounds and 23. Petitioners maintain that all the prosecution’s evidence was already on record
does not involve dismissal due to demurrer or speedy trial. since the affidavits of complainant and his witnesses, in law, constituted their
13. It has been held that where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to direct testimonies and that, therefore, no other evidence could have been
prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated. Where introduced by the prosecution.
there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of 24. Submission of the affidavits to the court does not warrant the inference that
jurisdiction. Hence, the violation of the State’s right to due process raises a the prosecution had already finished presenting its evidence because the
serious jurisdictional error as the decision rendered in disregard of the right is affiants are still required to testify and affirm the contents thereof.
void for lack of jurisdiction
14. Where the order of dismissal was issued at a time when the case was not ready
for trial and adjudication, the order is null and void.
15. In People v. Bocar, this Court found that the prosecution was denied due
process as it never had the chance to offer its evidence formally in accordance
with the Rules of Court in view of the trial court’s order of dismissal.
16. The trial court was thereby ousted from its jurisdiction when it violated the
right of the prosecution to due process by aborting its right to complete the
presentation of its evidence and, therefore, the first jeopardy had not been
terminated. Hence, the remand of the case for further hearing or trial is merely
a continuation of the first jeopardy and does not expose the accused to a second
jeopardy.
17. In the subsequent case of People v. Albano, this Court reiterated its previous
ruling in the Bocar case, holding that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction
and acted with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction,
when it pre-emptively dismissed the case and as a consequence thereof,
deprived the prosecution of its right to prosecute and prove its case, thereby
its fundamental right to due process. With such violation, its orders are,
therefore, null and void and cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of