Teaching and Teacher Education 43 (2014) 110e119

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Teaching and Teacher Education

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/tate

Understanding teacher knowledge from a Cultural Psychology

approach


Marc Clara
University of Barcelona, Department of Developmental and Educational Psychology, Passeig de la Vall d'Hebron, 171, 08035 Barcelona, Spain

h i g h l i g h t s

A theoretical discussion on the nature of teacher knowledge from Cultural Psychology.

A method for the discursive observation of teachers' situational representations.

Situational and propositional representations co-mediate teaching practice.

Implications for research and practice on teaching and teacher education.

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: In this paper we propose a Cultural Psychology approach to teacher knowledge which assumes that: 1)
Received 15 November 2013 mental representations are directly observable, and 2) the relationship between different kinds of rep-
Received in revised form resentations is co-mediational. The paper sets out such an approach, providing arguments to support
1 July 2014
these two alternative premises; outlining a methodology, based on social linguistics, for the direct
Accepted 9 July 2014
Available online 28 July 2014
observation of representations; and articulating the relationship between three types of representations:
situational representations, specific propositional representations, and general propositional represen-
tations. We discuss the implications of this approach for research and practice in teacher education.
Keywords:
Teacher knowledge
© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Vygotsky
Cultural Psychology
CHAT
Wash out
Practice shock

1. Introduction “wash-out” phenomenon, some teachers are able, thanks to sig-

For several decades and in several contexts around the world,
research on teaching and teacher education has repeatedly found
that the educational knowledge produced, taught and learnt at
universities has only a limited influence on the practice of teach-
ers. For example, Zeichner and Tabachnik (1981) have suggested,
based on Lortie's (1975) sociological work, that the knowledge
that teachers have effectively learnt at university is “washed out”
by school culture once they become teachers and begin to teach in
a school. The “wash-out” phenomenon has been pervasively found
in studies on the impact of teacher education on teacher practice
(i.e., Cochran-Smith, 2001; Grossman, 2008; Tjeerdsma &
Coleman, 2009), although some recent findings (Brouwer &
Korthagen, 2005) do indicate that a number of years after the
E-mail address: marc.clara@gmail.com.
nificant effort, to recover some of the ideas and knowledge learnt
at university, but frozen when they began to teach. The “wash-out”
phenomenon is closely related to another phenomenon that
Veenman (1984) called “the practice shock”: when new teachers
begin to teach in a school, they face so many difficulties of various
kinds that they experience a deep emotional shock. This, in turn,
leads them to abandon the ideas and knowledge learnt at uni-
versity and to assume other knowledge and ideas that enable
them to survive at school. A significant amount of research has
been conducted on the difficulties that new teachers face when
they begin to teach in school (Meijer, de Graaf, & Meirink, 2011;
Menon, 2012). What seems clear from this research is that,
despite completing teacher education programs, new teachers feel
unprepared and find the knowledge and ideas learnt at university
useless for actual practice in school.
Faced with this evidence, some scholars have focused their
research on the observation and understanding of the ways in

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tate.2014.07.002
0742-051X/© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

/ Teaching and Teacher Education 43 (2014) 110e119
M. Clara
which teachers think in their teaching practice and the kinds of
knowledge they actually use. This area of study has been
approached from a range of notably different perspectives, often
inspired by different theoretical traditions; however, a key finding
in the majority of these approaches has been the identification of at
least two different kinds of knowledge: on the one hand, knowl-
edge similar in nature to the knowledge produced and taught at the
universities, often general and easily verbalizable in the form of
propositions (e.g., A is B); and on the other, knowledge which is
holistic, specific, with a moral and emotional charge, and more
easily verbalizable in the form of metaphors. Since these two kinds
of knowledge have been observed from different theoretical ap-
proaches, this distinction has received different names and con-
ceptualizations. For example, Elbaz (1981, 1991), Clandinin (1986),
Connelly, Clandinin, and He (1997) distinguish between personal
philosophy, practical principles, rules of practice, and images. The
first three are easily verbalizable in the form of propositions, the
difference between them being their generality-specificity (in
relation to actual action). An image, in contrast, is defined as a
“coalescence of experience” (Clandinin, 1986, p. 149) in which “the
teacher's feeling, values, needs, and beliefs combine as she for-
mulates brief metaphoric statements of how teaching should be”
(Elbaz, 1981, p. 61). It is argued that “the image guides action in an
intuitive way” (Elbaz, 1981, p. 50), and it is also suggested that an
image is a way of knowing a situation: “The story reveals that Shiao
knows her situation in mixed, complex, ways. We think of her as
living with an image of tension” (Connelly et al., 1997). From this
approach, several characteristics of images are observed: “Images
may be connected to a concrete incident; have a metaphoric
quality; have an affective dimension; have a moral colouring; be
thought to exhibit complexity and be related to other images; and
may exhibit specificity in their detailed construction and in the
meaning they convey” (Clandinin, 1986, p. 33).
From a very different theoretical approach, Korthagen (2001)
distinguishes between theory, schema, and gestalt. Theory and
schema are of a propositional nature (they are easily verbalizable in
form of propositions), the difference between them being that a
theory is a more complete and better articulated conceptual system
than a schema. Gestalt, however, is something different. Referring
to a teacher called Mrs. Wilson, Korthagen (2001) observes that:
All these thoughts, feelings, values, conceptions, and so on,
together create the personal meaning of the situation for Mrs.
Wilson and lead almost automatically (i.e., with very little
conscious awareness) to her reaction, which is rooted in earlier,
similar experiences. We will be referring to this phenomenon by
stating that a certain gestalt is triggered in the teacher (i.e., a
unity of perception, internal processing and a tendency to
behave in a certain way). (… ) These gestalts are closely tied to
the concrete situations through which they are triggered. In
similar situations, these gestalts are recreated and help us to find
our place in the here-and-now” (Korthagen, 2001, p. 178e179)
Although these two approaches conceptualize their observa-
tions in very different ways, it is arguable that, in their distinctions,
they are observing the same phenomenon from different per-
spectives. This phenomenon can be stated as the differentiation of a
way of knowing which in one approach is called image, and in the
other is called gestalt. In spite of the different theoretical per-
spectives used, some observations about this kind of knowing are
common to both approaches: it is a way to know a situation, it is
holistic (a unity, a coalescence, of many different things), it is
specific (closely tied to concrete experience), it is hard to verbalize
in the form of a proposition, and it guides the teacher's action in an
intuitive way.
111
Some studies conducted outside the field of teaching have also
identified this same phenomenon and have examined it inten-
sively. For the purposes of this paper, it will be useful to consider
the research conducted on what have been called “situation
models”. These studies, rooted in cognitive linguistics, have iden-
tified these different ways of knowing by observing how people
think when they try to understand discourse. Thus, this approach
differentiates between “surface form”, “propositional text base”
and “situation model”:
When people read a text they can create three levels of repre-
sentation (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). At the lowest level is the
surface form, a verbatim representation of the words and syntax
that were used. At a higher level is the propositional text base, an
abstract representation of the idea units present in the text that
is not directly tied to a specific surface form. (… ) At the highest
level is the situation model. This is a representation of the situ-
ation to which the text refers. (Radvansky, 2005, p. 478)
The surface form and the propositional text base are easily
verbalizable in the form of propositions; this is not the case of the
situation model, which is defined as “the cognitive representation
of the events, actions, persons, and in general the situation” (van
Dijk & Kintsch, 1983, p. 11e12); it is “an integrated structure of
episodic information, collecting previous episodic information
about some situation as well as instantiated general information
from semantic memory” (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983, p. 344). Situa-
tion models are also said to be representations of specific situations,
having a personal sense and being closely linked to experience (van
Dijk & Kintsch, 1983, p. 344).
Surprisingly, these observations e made from a different theo-
retical perspective and even in a different research field e coincide
with the observations on images and gestalts in several points: the
differentiation of a kind of knowing which is not propositional,
which is a way to know a situation, which is holistic, and which is
specific and closely linked to personal experience. Then, it seems
plausible to argue that when observing situation models these
studies are observing, from a different theoretical perspective, the
same phenomenon that others have called image or gestalt. If this is
the case, some observations of situation models turn out to be
especially useful for the purposes of this paper, since these studies
have made it possible to empirically distinguish some relations
between the different things (they use the term “events”) which are
merged within the situation models (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998).
In order to refer to the way of knowing that some call “image”,
others call “gestalt”, and still others call “situation model”, this
paper will use the term “situational representations”. The reason
for proposing a different name is that the theoretical perspective
proposed in this paper for approaching this phenomenon is
different from that of those who call it image, gestalt and situation
model. The phenomenon is called “situational” because it is a way
of holistically knowing a specific situation; it is called “represen-
tation” because in Cultural Psychology (the theoretical framework
of the approach proposed in this paper) the term “representation”
is used to refer to mental phenomena of this nature, as will be
argued in the next section.
The consideration of the mutual interplay of these different
kinds of knowing opens up a promising research direction
regarding the limited impact of teacher education on teaching
practice. Actually, major efforts are currently being devoted to this
area (e.g. Cheng, Tang, & Cheng, 2012; Korthagen, 2010a, 2010b;
Orland-Barak & Yinon, 2007; Pozo, Scheuer, Mateos, & Pe rez
Echevarría, 2006). Although this research has been fairly fruitful in
some respects, it has often been grounded on two premises which,
we argue, have posed serious limitations to the potential of the
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M. Clara
approaches and findings. First, research has assumed that what we
have called situational representations are not directly observable,
that their characteristics have to be inferred from external in-
dicators because, due to their representational format, they cannot
be expressed externally as they are. Second, research has assumed a
transformational relationship between what we have called situa-
tional representations and propositional knowledge, so that this
relationship has been understood as moving from theory to prac-
tice, or from practice to theory.
The aim of this paper is to propose an approach to teacher
knowledge, within the Vygotskian Cultural Psychology tradition,
which challenges these two assumptions: We will propose that
situational representations can be directly observed in discourse
and that the relationship between situational representations and
propositional knowledge is one of co-mediation (not trans-
formation). In summary, we will propose an alternative point of
departure for the study and understanding of situational repre-
sentations and their relations to propositional knowledge in order
to open up new research directions into the problems of “washing
out” and “practice shock”.
2. A discursive approach to situational representations
2.1. The materiality of representations
Most of the current research on teacher knowledge assumes the
Cartesian-Kantian distinction between Mind and Matter. According
to this epistemological assumption, Mind has an ideal nature and is
located inside the subject, while Matter has a material nature and is
located in the environment. Psychologies within this epistemo-
logical tradition assume that knowledge is organised into mental
representations which are purely ideal, inaccessible to direct
observation or to direct expression. However, for some purposes,
the subject uses or creates external representations (for example,
words, or pictures), which are material, in order to grasp some of
the meanings represented in mental representations. Therefore,
some aspects of mental representations can be inferred by
observing the subject's use of external representations, but mental
representations cannot be directly observed (Clark, 1983; Mandler,
1983; Zhang, 1997).
This paper aims to propose an approach, within Cultural Psy-
chology, which challenges this assumption and argues that the use
of mental representations (also situational representations) can be
observed directly. Cultural Psychology is a psychological tradition
which, broadly speaking, includes the work developed around the
axis formed by Vygotsky, Leontiev, Gal'perin, Davydov, Cole, and
Engestro €m (Blunden, 2010; Cole, 1996). Of course, Vygotsky did not
use the notion of “representation” in his writings, since this notion
became widespread in psychology during the cognitive revolution
several years after his death; however, the notion was introduced
into Cultural Psychology by later scholars. Vygotsky (1987) distin-
guished between two instruments of cultural mediation: signs
(psychological instruments) and tools (technical instruments). Ac-
cording to Vygotsky, “tools” are instruments used with the function
of controlling the environment, while “signs” are instruments used
with the function of controlling human behaviour. This distinction
was later argued as problematic by scholars such as Engestro €m
(1987), Cole (1996) and Bodker and Andersen (2005), who pro-
posed that cultural mediation could be better understood by means
of the notion of artifact, as developed in the work of Wartofsky
(1979). Wartofsky argues that those artifacts directly used in the
production of the means of existence can be called primary arti-
facts; he then distinguishes between representations and primary
artifacts, and suggests that representations can be considered as
secondary artifacts:
It is, in effect, this ability to represent an action by symbolic
means which generates a distinctive class of artifacts, which we
may call representations. (… ) We may call such representations,
then, “secondary” artifacts by contrast to the primary ones”
(Wartofsky, 1979, p. 201).
According to Engestro €m (1987), Wartofsky's representations
(secondary artifacts) can be equated to Vygotsky's signs (psycho-
logical instruments):
For me, Wartofsky's secondary artifacts and Vygotsky's psycho-
logical tools are essentially the same thing. Vygotsky's intellec-
tualist bias (see Leontiev & Luria 1968, 354e355) led to a
somewhat one-sided emphasis on signs and word meanings. The
broader category of psychological tools, as well as the exciting
relations between technical and psychological tools were not
elaborated concretely by Vygotsky. (Engestro €m, 1987, p. 80)
However, the way in which a representation is understood in
Cultural Psychology is very different from the way in which this
notion is understood in psychologies based on Cartesian or Kantian
epistemologies. Cultural Psychology is built on the epistemology of
Hegel, who proposed a radically different way of seeing the re-
lations between ideality and materiality. According to him, every-
thing is at the same time material and ideal, so both Mind and
Environment are material and ideal at the same time. This
assumption leads Cultural Psychology to eliminate the distinction
between mental representations and external representations:
mental representations are material and external representations
are mental. In other words, external representations and mental
representations are the same thing (Ilyenkov, 1977), which appears
sometimes as external and sometimes as internal (Vygotsky, 1978),
although they are always material (Cole, 1996; Gal'perin, 1992;
Ilyenkov, 1977; Wartofsky, 1979). One excellent example of this
assumption is Vygotsky's well-known study of inner speech in 2e6
year-old children, where it is assumed that what it is being
observed in inner speech is thinking itself (the use of signs [rep-
resentations]), which appears in inner speech as external
(verbally), in the process of being internalized (Vygotsky, 1987).
Therefore, it must be assumed, within Cultural Psychology, that
when mental representations appear as external they are directly
observable; and this is also true for situational representations.
2.2. Metapragmatics, or the discursive emergence of situational
representations
The consideration of external representations as being the same
thing as mental representations, that is, the building blocks of
mind, is extremely important in Vygotskian psychology and his
emphasis on the “word meaning” as the unit of analysis of
consciousness1:
Is word meaning speech or is it thought? It is both at one and the
same time; it is a unit of verbal thinking. It is obvious, then, that
our method must be that of semantic analysis. Our method must
rely on the analysis of the meaningful aspect of speech; it must
be a method for studying verbal meaning. (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 47)
Thus, once it is accepted that situational representations (like
any mental representation) are directly observable and, following
the above quote from Vygotsky, that the best method for this
1
Zinchenko (1985) proposed that the Vygotskian unit of analysis is, in fact, the
word meaning in use, or in other words, the mediated action.

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M. Clara 113

observation is semantic analysis of discourse, the question remains excerpt, the student teacher asks about the educational unit that
as to how this kind of representation becomes visible and recog- the tutor is carrying out, specifically about a class observed by the
nisable by an analyst. To address this issue, we will use Silverstein's student on the subject of animals. In response, the tutor offers
(1993) concept of metapragmatics. According to pragmatists, metapragmatic discourse which denotes the situation of that class
semiosis takes place as a result of the interaction among three el- and of the educational unit. In this excerpt (1), we have segmented
ements: a sign, a referent, and a situation of interpretation. This the discourse into speech acts. The next step is to examine each
means that in any discourse e for example, a conversation e the speech act to determine whether this act entextualises a situational
interlocutor needs to use a certain situation of interpretation in representation. For this purpose, the different internal relations
order to make sense of the locutor's words. As a consequence, the between events identified by research on situation models will be
discourse itself must give some clues in order to indicate which useful (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). These relations are of time (T),
situation of interpretation must be used in order to make sense of space (S), agency (A) (events have agency), intentionality (I) (the
the discourse. This function, the denotation in discourse of the sit- direction of the agency of an event regarding other events) and
uation of interpretation, is what Silverstein calls the “meta- causation (C) (the transformation or emergence of an event is the
pragmatic function”. This function can be carried out with different consequence of the agency of another). We will call these five types
degrees of explicitness: the discourse can be devoted to entextualise of relation among events practical relations (PR). Now we can
the situation (explicitly), or can just include some indexical clues to examine the speech acts in the above excerpt and identify these
denote the situation (implicitly). The metapragmatic function can relations.
also be carried out in what Silverstein calls different calibrations.
The calibration is the temporal relationship between the occurrence
of the metapragmatic function and the occurrence of the discourse
(1)
that needs to be interpreted with the help of this function. Thus,
reflexive calibration means that the situation is denoted within the PR (events:
same discourse that is to be interpreted (for example, when a teacher & pupils)
teacher tells a pupil what she must do, and gives her some clues 99 M: And how would that go?
about the current situation to help her understand her words). By 100 L: I, well, my idea … what I'm aiming at,
contrast, reportive calibration means that the situation is denoted in let's say, is to work on …
a discursive occurrence different from the discursive occurrence to 101 M: On the human body
102 1 L: Yes … you see, it's about gradually
be interpreted by the situation denoted (for example, when later,
coming up with the characteristics of
the teacher describes to a student teacher the situation in which she living things, the idea is (the body) and
said what she said to the pupil). In general, reportive calibration living things,
implies a more explicit metapragmatic function, whereas reflexive 2 but it's clear, I think, that these children
calibration implies a more implicit metapragmatic function. can't just jump directly into living things,
3 so I think maybe we were thinking back TþSþA
Discourse with explicit metapragmatic function is called meta- a little to the animals that we had worked
pragmatic discourse, and it is in this kind of discourse where situ- on that day,
ational representations are best observed. 4 and the two questions that we asked were: þA
“What do animals do?” and “Why do we
call them animals?”
5 and, then, as you know, they get tired,
2.3. Practical relations and identification of situational 6 and, then, well, we did the drawing, þTþA
representations 7 but more than anything, more than to þI
produce a big project, it was a little bit about,
When we have a corpus of metapragmatic discourse (with well, that they kept thinking about the topic,
8 and at that point, maybe there wasn't much þC
explicit metapragmatic function) we need to identify where we can
more that could be said either
see situational representations and where we cannot. In order to do 9 because we'd exhausted the topic and they þC
so, the first decision concerns the discursive unit of analysis. were worn out.
Zinchenko (1985) further elaborated on the discursive unit of 10 Then my idea was to ask a question, having
analysis used by Vygotsky, i.e., the word meaning, and argued that rounded off the discussion about the
characteristics of animals, to ask what
Vygotsky had actually used as his unit of analysis not the word animals are,
meaning itself but the use of the word meaning in action, which 11 and to ask, how are we like them? What
Zinchenko (1985) called the mediated action. One of the main things do we do that animals do? Are we a
methodological principles of Cultural Psychology is that the unit of lot like animals? Only a little like animals?
12 Heading in that direction.
analysis must be the smallest unit which preserves the properties
of the studied phenomenon; so the unit in our case should be the
smallest discursive mediated action. According to Austin (1962)
and Searle (1969), the smallest discursive action is the speech act; Let's begin with line 102(3), where the speech act refers to two
therefore, we can assume this discursive unit of analysis as the events (teachers and pupils) which are time and space-related
starting point to observe situational representations in discourse. (they co-exist in the same specific time and space) and agency-
Let's consider a brief excerpt (1) taken from an occasion of inter- related (teachers and pupils both develop interrelated agency, by
action between a student teacher (M) and his tutor (L).2 In this remembering animals together). The speech act in line 102(4)
maintains the same timeespace relation between the same two
events (teachers and pupils), but the teacher's agency is further
2
The excerpts used in this paper are taken from data gathered in 2008, during a specified (the teacher asks, “What do animals do?” “Why do we call
three-month internship carried out by a student teacher in a school. The student them animals?”). The speech act in line 102(6) still maintains the
teacher received tutoring from an experienced teacher at the school in order to
develop an educational unit with children aged 6e7 years old. Data were audio
same timeespace relation between the two events, but the time
recorded. The tutor is called Lola (L) and the student teacher is called Martí (M). relation with the previous two speech acts changes, because 102(6)
Both names are pseudonyms. is situated in time after 102(3) and 102(4). The agency relation
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M. Clara
between the two events (as interrelated agencies) is maintained,
but the direction of the agency changes, because it is no longer
about remembering together, but about drawing together. In 102(7)
all the timeespaceeagency relations are the same as in 102(6), but
an intentional relation is introduced from the agent teachers toward
the agent pupils (to make the pupils keep thinking about animals).
In 102(8) and 102(9), all the time-space-agency-intentional re-
lations are the same as in 102(7), but now a new relation is intro-
duced between the two agencies, one of causality from the agent
pupils toward the agent teachers; thus, in 102(8) the consequence is
established e the teachers could not continue guiding the
remembering e and in 102(9) what is established is the cause e the
pupils became tired. Therefore, we can state that the speech acts in
102(3), 102(4), 102(6), 102(7), 102(8) and 102(9), taken together,
entextualise a unitary set of time-space-agency-intentional-causal
relations between two events: teachers and pupils. If this set of
relations really worked as a unity, then we could say that they
constitute the discursive materialisation of a situational represen-
tation. However, we will not yet address the issue of the unitary
working of situational representations.
Before doing that, we need to give attention to the speech acts
102(2) and 102(5), which we did not include in the set of speech
acts which entextualise the situational representation. If we
examine these two speech acts, we can see that none of the five
practical relations are found among the events. 102(2) says “but it's
clear, I think, that these children can't just jump directly into living
things”, and 102(5) says “and, then, as you know, they get tired”. To
begin with, both statements refer to only one event (the pupils), to
which agency is not attributed (the event is simply characterised).
Obviously, therefore, there are no intentional or causal relations.
Moreover, none of these speech acts situate the event in time or
space; they are general statements about the pupils, and therefore
somewhat stable, not temporally and spatially located enote that
“they get tired” is formulated in present, as a stable attribute of
those pupils. The conclusion is that these two speech acts do not
entextualise any situational representation. We will take up this
issue again in the second part of the paper.
2.4. Dynamic and synoptic entextualisations of situational
representations
In the previous section, we have argued that the speech acts in
102(3), 102(4), 102(6), 102(7), 102(8) and 102(9), taken together,
entextualised a unitary set of practical relations (time, space,
agency, intention, causation) between two events: teacher and
pupils. However, to be able to state that these speech acts entex-
tualise a situational representation we need to demonstrate in
discourse that, effectively, this set of practical relations among
events works as a holistic unity. We will be able to observe this
unitary and holistic working of situational representations thanks
to Halliday's (1993) identification of dynamic and synoptic gram-
matical modes, which is indeed very similar to Greimas's (1966)
distinction between denomination and definition.
Halliday (1993) distinguishes between two grammatical modes:
dynamic and synoptic. In the dynamic mode, events are organised
procedurally, as sequences of actions, and therefore this mode is
based on verbs. In the synoptic mode, by contrast, experience is
organised as a static thing, and therefore this mode is based on
nouns. One and the same meaning can be entextualised in both
modes. For example, if we say that “the Titanic crashed into an
iceberg and sank”, the entextualisation is in dynamic mode; if we
say “the wreck of the Titanic” we are entextualising the same
meaning in a synoptic mode. Greimas (1966) makes a similar
distinction, naming what Halliday calls synoptic entextualisation as
denomination, and what Halliday calls dynamic entextualisation as
definition.
What is really important in this linguistic phenomenon is that,
according to Halliday, when a set of events is entextualised in the
synoptic mode, the set works as a holistic unity, as one single thing:
Pairs of this kind are not synonymous. Each of the two wordings
is representing the same phenomenon, but because the proto-
typical meaning of a noun is a thing, when you construe a
process or property as a noun you objectify it: endow it with a
kind of “thinginess”. (Halliday, 1993, p. 111)
This means that if we find in discourse the synoptic entextual-
isation of a set of practical relations among events, we will be able
to determine that this set of related events works as a holistic unity,
and therefore, constitutes a situational representation. Note that, in
order to make this statement, the analyst needs to find in discourse
both modes of entextualisation for the same set of practically
related events: the dynamic and the synoptic modes. By examining
the dynamic entextualisation, the analyst can identify and study
the events and their practical relations; by examining the synoptic
entextualisation, the analyst can state that these events in practical
relation constitute a situational representation.
For example, the set of practically related events identified in
the excerpt offered in the previous section is entextualised in a
dynamic mode. However, just a few turns before that exchange, the
participants entextualise this set of events in a synoptic mode:
(2)
86 L: okay, and Wednesday is the day that we do workshops,
and you know we do it by … we divide the children into
three groups
87 M: like we did … yes, the thing about animals … I mean … right
88 L: right, we were on the thing about animals, but the idea was
sort of to move on to the human body (with support)
89 M: move on to the human body
90 L: right, that's it
99 M: And how would that go?
100 L: I, well, my idea … what I'm aiming at, let's say, is to work on …
101 M: On the human body
102 1 L: Yes … you see, it's about gradually coming up with the
characteristics of living things, the idea is (the body) and living
things,
2 but it's clear, I think, that these children can't just jump directly
into living things,
3 so I think maybe we were thinking back a little to the animals
we had worked on that day,
4 and the two questions that we asked were: “What do animals do?”
and “Why do we call them animals?”
5 and, then, as you know, they get tired,
6 and, then, well, we did the drawing,
7 but more than anything, more than to produce a big project, it was
a little bit about, well, that they kept thinking about the topic,
8 and at that point, maybe there wasn't much more that could be
said either
In the line 87, the student says, “Like we did … yes, the thing
about animals …”, and in 88 the tutor confirms, “Right, we were on
the thing about animals”. And then, in 102(1), the tutor says, “I
think maybe we were thinking back a little to the animals we had
worked on that day”, and goes on in the next lines to give details
about what happened that day. It is clear that “the thing about
animals” refers to the set of practically related events entextualised
in 102(3)e102(9); however, in 87 and 88 this set of events is put in
synoptic mode, while in 102(3)e102(9) the events are entextual-
ised in dynamic mode. The existence in the discourse of both
grammatical modes for entextualising this same set of practically

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related events allows the analyst to consider this set of events as
effectively constituting a situational representation.
3. A Cultural Psychology conceptualisation of the relation
between situational and propositional representations
3.1. Situational and propositional representations
What we have called situational representations have often
been contrasted, in general psychology, with another type of rep-
resentation, called usually propositional representations, which are
assumed to be meaning structures in which something is asserted
about an entity (Kosslyn & Pomerantz, 1977; Pylyshyn, 1973); for
example, the sentence “seven year-old children are in the concrete
operational stage of cognitive development”. They are called
“propositional” because their meaning is easily verbalizable in the
form of a proposition; they are called “representations” because of
the influence in general psychology of cognitive approaches, in
which the notion of representation is central. This paper will
maintain this denomination because the notion of representation is
also considered within Cultural Psychology (although with some
important differences in its conceptualization, as has already been
argued), and also because this denomination is quite common in
general psychology to refer to this kind of representation (some-
thing that is not the case regarding the phenomenon we have called
situational representations).
The co-existence and interplay of situational and propositional
representations in teachers' thinking is psychologically explained
by approaches based on Kantian or Cartesian epistemologies. The
explanation goes as follows. We have already mentioned that the
Kantian-Cartesian epistemologies lead psychologies to locate mind
inside the subject, as something purely ideal. Consequently, these
psychologies have assumed that the subject needs some kind of
mechanism e very often called “computation” e to transform
material (the external world) into ideal (mind) and vice versa. This
process of computation is assumed to have different stages or
levels. For example, Fodor (1983) has proposed three computa-
tional levels. The first computational level is perceptual, and
transforms external stimulus into ideal information to be processed
further. This information is then computed in the second level; the
computation in this second level is characterised by Fodor as quick,
mandatory, unconscious, and encapsulated (which means that in
the second level computation, input information is only related to
information in the second level, but information in the third level is
ignored). The output of this second level computation is then the
input of the third level computation (which is characterised as
disencapsulated, conscious, and rational). Epstein (2003) has pro-
posed something similar by distinguishing between what he calls
the experiential system (analogous to Fodor's second computa-
tional level) and the rational system (analogous to Fodor's third
computational level) as two separate computational systems. Some
researchers into teacher knowledge have proposed the existence of
computational processes similar to those proposed by Fodor and
Epstein, and have suggested that the second level computation
(experiential) works with what we have called situational repre-
sentations and the third level computation (rational) works with
what we are calling propositional representations (Korthagen,
2010a; Pozo et al., 2006). This would explain the disconnection
between propositional and situational representations, and be-
tween theory and practice, since, because of the encapsulation of
the second computational level, propositional representations of
the third level can hardly influence situational representations of
the second level.
It is from this general view that the problem of the limited in-
fluence of university-produced knowledge on teaching practice
115
becomes a problem of representational transformation: how situ-
ational representations can be transformed into propositional
representations (theorising practice) and how propositional rep-
resentations can be transformed into situational representations
(practicalising theory) (Cheng et al., 2012; Korthagen, 2010a,
2010b; Orland-Barak & Yinon, 2007; Pozo et al., 2006).
However, Cultural Psychology cannot assume the notion of
computation, since it does not assume the separation between
ideality and materiality. Therefore, the idea of different computa-
tional levels and the idea of a relationship of computational
transformation between situational and propositional representa-
tions are no longer possible within Cultural Psychology. But if all
these assumptions are denied, an alternative explanation of the co-
existence and interplay of situational and propositional represen-
tations must be offered, and this explanation must answer, at least,
the following questions: if the co-existence of different kinds of
representations (propositional vs. situational) is not explained by
different levels and structures of computation, how can this
representational heterogeneity be explained? If representations of
different kinds are not organised in the mind by hierarchical
computational levels, then how are they organised? If the relation
between propositional and situational representations is not one of
computational transformation, which kind of relation is it?
In the next section, we will propose a way to respond to these
questions from Cultural Psychology.
3.2. The representational co-mediation of teaching activity
If the co-existence of different kinds of representations (proposi-
tional vs. situational) is not explained by different levels and structures
of computation, how can this representational heterogeneity be
explained?
Two main explanations have been suggested in psychology for
the co-existence in thought of different kinds of representations
(Tulviste, 1992). The explanation given by psychologies constructed
on Kantian-Cartesian epistemologies has been that different types
of representation are different stages in representational develop-
ment. This explanation has been argued as inadequate by Cultural
Psychology scholars, since it does not adequately explain why the
different stages of representations co-exist; why the higher stage
does not replace the lower. In light of this fact, an alternative
explanation has been suggested by Tulviste (1992): different kinds
of representation are independent, and have a different genesis;
these different kinds of representations are viewed as related to
different activities in society, so that representational heterogene-
ity is explained functionally:
The reason for the heterogeneity of verbal thought is to be
sought not in chance conservation, in both society and the in-
dividual, of the “old,” “lower,” “past” stages of the social and
individual development of thought, but in the diversity of ac-
tivities prevalent in society and accomplished by the individual.
(… ) It does not mean that different types of thought function in
isolation from one another, but rather that in a real process of
problem solving, they will typically interact and occur together,
as Y.M. Lotman maintains. (Tulviste, 1992, p. 83, 87)
Following the proposal of Tulviste, we will assume that the co-
existence of different types of representations responds to func-
tional differences among psychological processes.
If representations of different kinds are not organised in the mind
by hierarchical computational levels, then how are they organised?
Leontiev (1978, 1981) proposes that, in activity, consciousness
can be analysed at three levels. First, the analyst can consider the
subject's consciousness from the viewpoint of the motive which
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gives rise to the activity e the process directed toward that motive
is called activity. However, because the subject exists in societies,
and in human societies there is a division of labour, conscious
purposes (or goals) emerge in activity, which must be differentiated
from motives. Leontiev offers the example of a primeval hunter
whose function is to frighten the animal in order to direct him to
other hunters who will kill him; in this case, the motive of the
hunter is to kill the animal, but the conscious purpose is to frighten
him. Therefore, the analyst can consider the subject's consciousness
from the viewpoint of her conscious purpose e the process directed
toward that conscious purpose is called action. However, to realise a
conscious purpose, the subject must achieve some subsumed pur-
poses: if my conscious purpose is “to eat that soup”, I need “to get
that spoon”. In this example, “getting the spoon” is a condition for
“eating the soup”. Thus, the analyst can also consider the subject's
consciousness from the viewpoint of the conditions which she has
to achieve e the process directed toward the conditions is called
operation. Note that “getting the spoon”, which is usually a condi-
tion when an adult eats soup, was once a conscious purpose, when
this adult was a very young child, and could again become a
conscious purpose, if this adult has an accident which immobilises
her fingers. Thus, the conscious purpose becomes a condition, and a
condition, in some circumstances, can again become a conscious
purpose. Leontiev proposes that in the subject's experience, what is
explicit in her consciousness is the conscious purpose, while con-
ditions and motive, although present in consciousness, remain
implicit in the subject's experience.
In Cultural Psychology, representations are mediators of human
activity. If we consider the structure of activity proposed by Leon-
tiev, this means that on a given occasion of human activity there is
one representation, explicit in the subject's consciousness, which
mediates the action (directed toward the conscious purpose). At the
same time, there is at least one other representation, this one im-
plicit, which mediates at the activity level (directed toward the
motive). And at the same time, there is one representation, also
implicit, mediating each of the operations (directed towards the
conditions) subsumed by the action. In other words, on any given
occasion of human activity, there are many representations medi-
ating at the same time e that is, co-mediating. These co-mediating
representations can be of different kinds, and all kinds of repre-
sentations can mediate at any of the three levels of activity.
Moreover, representations which mediate at implicit levels (activ-
ity and operation) can be made explicit by transforming a condition
into a conscious purpose, or a motive into a conscious purpose; and
similarly, representations which mediate at the explicit level (ac-
tion) can be made implicit by transforming the conscious purpose
into a condition, or into a motive (to learn more about this
explicitation/implicitation of representations within the Leontiev
structure of activity, see the experiments of Gal'perin [1992]).
If the relation between propositional and situational representa-
tions is not one of computational transformation, which kind of rela-
tion is it?
We propose that, within the Leontiev structure of activity, the
relationship between a propositional and a situational represen-
tation is one of co-mediation. In other words, it is a relation be-
tween two different representations which mediate two processes
that occur at the same time on a given occasion of activity. At the
same time, for example, one representation mediates the action
and the other mediates an operation; or one representation me-
diates an operation and the other mediates another operation; or
one representation mediates the activity and the other mediates
the action.
Within this rationale, we propose that two representations can
co-mediate the same occasion of activity only if there is a certain
conceptual connection between them. Although we propose that
this is true for any pair of representations, and that the nature of
this conceptual connection must be specified considering the broad
complexity of representational heterogeneity, we will focus here on
situational representations, and we will suggest a specification of
the kind of conceptual connection which permits their co-
mediation with specific propositional representations and general
propositional representations.
The illustrative example which we have already used in previous
sections will help to specify the conceptual connection between
situational and specific propositional representations:
(3)
102 1 L: Yes … you see, it's about gradually coming up with the characteristics
of living things, the idea is (the body) and living things,
2 but it's clear, I think, that these children can't just jump directly into
living things,
3 so I think maybe we were thinking back a little to the animals that we
had worked on that day,
4 and the two questions that we asked were: “What do animals do?” and
“Why do we call them animals?”
5 and, then, as you know, they get tired,
6 and, then, well, we did the drawing,
7 but more than anything, more than to produce a big project, it was a
little bit about, well, that they kept thinking about the topic,
8 and at that point, maybe there wasn't much more that could be said either
We have already said that speech acts 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 entextualise
a situational representation. We will now add that speech acts 2
and 5 entextualize propositional representations which are spe-
cific, since 1) practical relations between different events are not
found in them (as argued in Section 2.3), and 2) they talk about
those specific children, not about children in general. According to
our theoretical proposal, the interpretation of this turn should be
that in speech acts 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 the situational representation
mediates at the action level. In speech act 2, one specific proposi-
tional representation, which during the other speech acts probably
mediates implicitly at the operation level, becomes explicit, which
means that the condition at which this operation is directed has
become the conscious purpose for a brief while (in speech act 2)
and then has again become a condition (in speech act 3). During
speech act 2, the situational representation which mediated the
action in speech act 1 has become implicit, which means that the
conscious purpose at which that action was directed has become a
motive (or a condition) for the brief while that the speech act 2
lasts, and then (in speech act 3) has again become the conscious
purpose. The same dynamic is interpreted in speech act 5, when
another specific propositional representation is made explicit
during one speech act, which means that the condition at which the
operation mediated by that specific propositional representation
was directed has become the conscious purpose during one speech
act, and during that speech act, the previous conscious purpose,
which originates the process mediated by the situational repre-
sentation, becomes a motive (or a condition).
What is crucially important about this view is that it considers
that all three representations (and many others) are mediating all
the time during these 8 speech acts; what we see in discourse is the
representation that, in each speech act, mediates at the action level
(directed toward the conscious purpose), and this changes because
of the dynamism between conditions, conscious purpose and
motive during activity.
From this approach, then, we can consider the moments of
dynamism in the illustrative example, i.e., the moments when a
condition becomes a conscious purpose and the specific proposi-
tional representation becomes explicit, in order to understand how
both kinds of representation (the situational and the specific
propositional ones) are connected.

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M. Clara 117

We suggest that this connection can be explained as follows: In
order to co-mediate with a situational representation, a specific
propositional representation must have as referent (i.e., must predicate
about) one of the events practically related within the situational
representation.
For example, in the illustrative excerpt, the two events which
are practically related in the situational representation are the
pupils and the teachers. The two specific propositional represen-
tations which we can observe in the excerpt as co-mediating with
this situational representation have the pupils as referent.
In the case of general propositional representations, the
connection with situational representations seems to be slightly
different. Consider the following illustrative example, from the
same set of data as the other example used in this paper:
third representation, which is propositional and general: many
small children think that we are full of blood. Note that this rep-
resentation predicates about small children in general and not only
about the specific pupils in the class. This is the kind of proposi-
tional representation which the academy usually produces and
which universities mainly teach to students of teaching.
Our suggestion about how general propositional representations
like this can co-mediate with situational representations is as follows:
In order to co-mediate with a situational representation, a general
propositional representation must have a relation of generality to a
specific propositional representation which co-mediates with this situ-
ational representation. This means that the conceptual connection
between a general propositional representation and a situational
representation is mediated by a specific propositional representation.

(4)

PR (events: pupils,
teacher & content)

808 L: … in other words, Martí, what do you want the children to understand? TþSþI
809 M: that it's the blood that transports it … þI
810 L: the blood that transports it ¼I
811 M: yes ¼I
812 L: the oxygen doesn't go freely through the body þI
813 M: yes, exactly ¼I
814 L: that's the idea, huh? Good, then, let's see, how would you … what question þA
are you planning to ask?
815 M: really, they say it, because when the ideas come out, they say that the blood carries all the oxygen to the body, they say it in the þA
ideas, but later when they
are drawing, some don't draw it that way
816 L: okay then, we need to try and see why they’ve drawn it that way, why it doesn't match what they’re saying
817 M: sure, then, say, “You, you said that …”
818 L: Also, because now, it might also be … what's happening is that they aren't clear that the blood goes through the veins
819 M: ah, that could be why
820 L: that the blood goes through channels, we could say it goes through pipes. Maybe that's where the confusion lies
821 M: because they think that there is blood with tubes (and blood elsewhere, too)
822 1 L: (that the blood goes all over)
2 In other words, there are many small children who think we are like full of blood
823 M: well, yes
824 1 L: right, that the blood doesn't go through pipes,
2 Maybe you could ask, “Okay, so where, let's see, you say that air goes through the blood, but how does the blood go through your body? þA
How do you imagine that blood goes through our bodies?”
825 S: that's it, yes ¼A

In speech acts 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 817, and
824(2), we can consider that there is an entextualisation of a situ-
ational representation with three events: the content to be learnt,
the teacher's questions and the pupils' answers. The three events
are practically related in time, space, agency, and intention (teacher
in relation to the other two events).3
It is interesting to see how in 816 the tutor asks to change the
focus of the conversation, from the situation to one event of this
situation: the pupils' answers. By doing so, the tutor is taking a
condition and transforming it into the conscious purpose, making
its mediating representation explicit. And this representation,
made explicit in 818, 820, 822(1), is a specific propositional rep-
resentation about the pupils: the pupils think that the body is a sack
of blood and they don't know that blood circulates through the
veins. Here we see the kind of conceptual connection between
situational and specific propositional representations suggested
above: via one of the events represented in the situational repre-
sentation e in this case, the pupils. But in 822(2) there is something
different: we see a co-mediation between these two representa-
tions (the situational and the specific propositional ones) with a
3
Of course, this consideration would deserve an analysis similar to that which
we have shown regarding the other illustrative example. However, due to limita-
tions of space we will not make explicit here the analysis that justifies our saying
that these speech acts entextualise a situational representation.
For example, in our last illustrative excerpt, “small children” is the
referent of a general propositional representation, while “specific
pupils” is the referent of a specific propositional representation which
is connected to the situational representation because “specific pu-
pils” is also one of the events in practical relations within the situa-
tional representation. “Small children” and “specific pupils” have a
relation of generality, since the pupils in the class are specific in-
stances of the general category “small children”. Note, in this example,
that the connection which permits the co-mediation between the
general propositional representation (about small children in general)
and the situational representation is indirect; it is mediated by the
specific propositional representation (about the specific pupils). The
awareness of this fact seems crucial to us in order to address the
problems of “washing out” and “practice shock” in teaching.
4. Discussion
In this paper we have proposed a Cultural Psychology approach
to teacher knowledge that questions two basic premises: that
mental representations are purely ideal and therefore not directly
observable; and that the relationship between propositional rep-
resentations, situational representations, and practice is trans-
formational. Instead of taking these premises for granted, we have
suggested that mental representations are material and therefore
directly observable and that the relationship between propositional
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M. Clara
representations and situational representations is one of co-
mediation in practice. We have proposed a methodology, based
on social linguistics, for the observation of situational representa-
tions in discourse, and we have proposed a conceptualisation,
within Cultural Psychology, which suggests a co-mediational rela-
tionship between situational and propositional representations.
We have also specified some conceptual relations between situa-
tional representations, specific propositional representations, and
general propositional representations which make possible the co-
mediation of these different types of representation. More specif-
ically, we have suggested that the conceptual relation between
general propositional representations (typically, university-
produced knowledge is of this kind) and situational representa-
tions is mediated by specific propositional representations.
The approach that we are suggesting has important implications
both for research and for practice in teacher education. From the
viewpoint of research, an initial implication of importance is
methodological: representations (all kinds of representations) and
how they are used are directly observable in discourse, so that
descriptions can be very precise as to how these representations
develop, how they are learnt, how they interact with each other,
how they are formed, what their nature is, and so on. A vast field of
study opens up, if the premise of the observability of mental rep-
resentations is accepted. Another implication, more closely related
to the premise of a co-mediation relationship between represen-
tations, is about the nature of the questions to be posed. In recent
decades, for example, an important question about the problem of
representations and practice has been: how can a propositional
representation move toward a situational representation, and then
toward practice? (Bereiter, 1990; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Korthagen,
2010a; Pozo, 2001). If the transformation premise is modified to
one based on co-mediation, this unsolvable question no longer
makes sense. Adopting the alternative premise, this question could
be posed as follows: why, and under what conditions, do two (or
more) representations work together as mediators of practice?
From this perspective, it would also make no sense to look for the
direct influence of propositional representations on practice; what
should be sought, rather, is to understand the role that a proposi-
tional representation plays in the whole set of representations co-
mediating practice.
From the viewpoint of practice, too, the approach we are sug-
gesting would have serious implications. For example, many at-
tempts have tried to find ways to help students (and teachers)
move from their teaching experience toward theoretical knowl-
edge, or from theoretical knowledge toward their teaching expe-
rience. This has sometimes been called “theorising practice” and
“practicalising theory” (Korthagen, 2010a, 2010b; Orland-Barak &
Yinon, 2007; Pozo et al., 2006). However, if the two premises
suggested in this paper are accepted, it would make more sense to
focus educational assistance on 1) developing the situational rep-
resentations themselves, and 2) helping students use certain
propositional representations and certain situational representa-
tions together as mediators of specific occasions of practice. In this
regard, the suggestion that specific conceptual relations are
necessary for the co-mediation between general propositional
representations and situational representations also has important
implications for practice: It seems pointless to try to directly relate
university-produced knowledge (typically, general propositional
representations) to situational representations, since this relation
seems to be mediated by specific propositional representations;
instead, relations should be established, on the one hand, between
the specific propositional representation and the situational rep-
resentation, and on the other hand, between the specific proposi-
tional representation and the general propositional representation.
In this way, an indirect conceptual relation is established between
the situational representation and the general propositional rep-
resentation, and both can co-mediate in the activity.
The aim of this paper has been to propose a Cultural Psychology
approach to teacher knowledge which challenges two premises
that have long been taken for granted. We feel that conducting
research and practice from the premises of the observability of
representations and the co-mediation relationship between rep-
resentations can open up interesting and fruitful paths for future
approaches to the problem of the limited impact of university-
produced knowledge on teaching practice. Of course, this
approach needs much more theoretical and empirical work, but we
think that, in this paper, we have offered some ideas and methods
for how this work may begin.
Acknowledgements

This paper has been supported by the “Departament d'Educacio
i Universitats de la Generalitat de Catalunya” and the European
Social Fund (2007FI-B 01037).
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