Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Part. 2
2
Different Models of
Corporate Governance
Vietti’s Reform
CG
Traditional
Monistic Model Dualistic
Model Model
Different Models of
Corporate Governance
TRADITIONAL MODEL
Chairman
Chief Executive
Officer
Board of Directors
Shareholder Meeting
Different Models of
Corporate Governance
TRADITIONAL MODEL
management Board of Directors
or Sole Director
appoint
appoint Shareholder
Meeting
1 management Internal
+ accountant Audit
appoint
control
External
management body/Bord of
Statutary Auditors
2
External
accountant body/Supervisory
Board/ Auditing confer the appointment
firm
Traditional Model:
Shareholder Meeting
• Duties are reduced, in accordance with the principle of
exclusive administrative body responsible for the management
activities
• The Shareholders Meeting has the task of:
– Approve the Annual Accounts and Financial Statements;
– Appoint and dismiss Directors;
– Appoint the auditor and the members of the Board of
Auditors;
– Resolve the liability of directors and auditors;
– Decide on other objects entrusted to the assembly by law;
– Approve the rules governing meetings.
Traditional Model:
Board of Directors
• Directors are exclusively the company's management:
– They determine content and limits of powers;
– Assess the adequacy of organizational, administrative and
accounting structure;
– Examine the strategic and business plans;
– Assess the performance of operations on the basis of the
report of the managing bodies;
• The Directors may transfer a limited number of issues to the
relevant bodies, on the one hand; on the other hand they can be
invested with typical powers of Assembly, through the Statute;
• The Directors shall be liable for acts carried out (they can not
share the responsibility with shareholders).
Traditional Model:
Executive Bodies
DUALISTIC MODEL
Chairman
Chief Executive
Officer
Shareholder Meeting
Different Models of
Corporate Governance
DUALISTIC MODEL
Management
Management
Board
appoint
Control
External
Auditing body/Supervisory
Board/Auditing firm
Confer the appointment
Dualistic Model:
Shareholder Meeting
MONISTIC MODEL
Chairman
Chief Executive
Officer
Shareholders Meeting
Different Models of
Corporate Governance
MONISTIC MODEL
Management Board of Directors
appoint
Appointment
inside
Management Shareholders
Management Meeting
Control
Committee
Control
External
Auditing body/Supervisory
Board/Auditing firm Confer the appointment
Monistic Model:
Shareholder Meeting
• Duties are reduced, in accordance with the principle of
exclusive administrative body responsible for the
management activities;
• The Meeting has the task of:
q Approve the budget;
q Appoint and dismiss administrators;
q Appoint the auditors and the members of the External
Body;
q Resolve the liability of directors and auditors;
q Decide on other objects entrusted to the assembly from
the lodges;
q Approving the Regulation of the General Meeting.
Monistic Model:
Control Commitee
29
Focus on Board of Directors:
Composition
Types of directors:
• executive directors
• non-executive directors
• independent directors
30
Focus on Board of Directors:
Composition
Independent (outside) directors
To be effective in an advisory and oversight capacity, board members
are expected to exhibit independence, i.e. the degree to which a
director is free from conflicts of interest that might compromise the
ability to act solely in the interest of the firm (regulatory standpoint).
32
Focus on Board of Directors:
Composition
Thus, an independent director must always act in a manner independent
of management and never be conflicted by any relationship to
management (i.e., financial, familial, or social). Independence
measurements include:
• relatedness of the Director (employee, professional advisor, executive
of any affiliated company, other income from company, kinship or
social ties;
• interlocks with other Directors;
• number of Boards on which Director serves.
In conflict situations, an Independent Director shall be guided by the
principles of increasing shareholder value and an equitable approach to
the interests of all shareholder groups, encouraging the parties involved
in the decision to adhere to the same principles.
An Independent Director shall not abuse his/her position to the
detriment of the company or its shareholders or for the purpose of
gaining direct or indirect personal advantage or advantage for any other
associated person.
33
Focun on Board of Directors:
Composition
Observance of the independence requirement is the most
important aspect of the activity of an Independent Director.
• An Independent Director shall refrain from any actions that
could lead to a loss of his/her independence. Where
circumstances arise which make an Independent Director lose
his/her independence, the Independent Director must
immediately notify the shareholders, the management and the
Association accordingly.
• An Independent Director shall be prepared to provide
arguments in support of his/her position if he/she disagrees
with the majority of members of the Board of Directors, its
chairman, the president of the company, or its managing
director.
34
Focus on Board of Directors:
Composition
Shareholders should receive sufficient information to determine the
ability of Supervisory Board nominees to fulfill their duties. Some
useful items of information include:
• the identity of the candidate and the identity of the shareholder (or
the group of shareholders) that nominated the candidate;
• the age and educational background of the candidate;
• the positions held by the candidate during the past years and at the
moment of his nomination;
• the nature of the relationship the candidate has with the company;
• other Supervisory Board memberships or official positions held by
the candidate;
• The candidate’s relationship with affiliated persons of the company
and with major business partners of the company;
• Information related to the financial status of the candidate, and
other circumstances that may affect his/her the duties and
independence.
35
Focus on Board of Directors:
Compensation
36
Focus on Board of Directors:
Compensation
Internal Committees:
• Remuneration Committee
• Risk Management Committee
• Board Appointments Committee
• Auditing Committee
37
Focus on Internal Audit
Committee
The main responsibilities of the internal auditing committee are:
• to monitor the integrity of the financial statements
• to review the company’s internal financial controls, internal control and
risk management systems.
• to monitor/review the effectiveness of the internal audit function.
• to make recommendations to the board on the appointment/removal
of the external auditor
• to monitor/review the external auditor’s independence/objectivity and
the effectiveness of the audit process.
• to develop/implement policy on the engagement of the external
auditor to supply non-audit services
• to review arrangements by which staff may raise concerns about
possible improprieties (‘whistleblowing’)
38
Managerial Concentration
and Compensation
Equity ownership by managers must balance convergence or
alignment of interests versus entrenchment considerations: at lower
levels of management ownership, increased equity holdings improve
convergence of interests with shareholders, enhancing firm value,
while at higher levels it decreases the firm value, as takeovers become
more costly.
• Expropriation of minority shareholders by majority shareholders:
private benefits of control
• Link between managerial ownership and bond returns
The conflict of interest between owners and managers would be
substantially reduced if executive compensation plans more tightly
related pay to performance.
• Performance assessment based on accounting-based vs market-
based measures
• focus on short-term highs with destructive long-term consequences.
39
Focus on External Control
Mechamisms
• Institutional investors
• Proxy contests
• Disclosure
40
External Control
Mechamisms
Internal External
Board
41
Corporate Governance:
Risks and Benefits
Weak corporate governance may lead to:
• accounting risk, the risk that a company’s financial statement recognition
and related disclosures are incomplete, misleading, or materially
misstated;
• asset risk, the risk that the firm’s assets may be misappropriated by
managers or directors;
• liability risk, the risk that management will enter into excessive
obligations that destroy the value of shareholders’ equity;
• strategic policy risk, the risk that managers may enter into transactions or
incur other business risks that are self-serving and may not be in the best
long-term interest of shareholders.
While:
• companies with strong governance had greater investment performance.
• companies with strong shareholders’ rights outperformed those with
weak protections
42