Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism, and the Security Dilemma: A Concise Overview.

By Malcolm Cayley
 One state’s security becoming another’s insecurity is the basic definition of a security

dilemma (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 138-139; Jervis 1978, 167, 186). It is an inability to

interpret the ambiguous offensive-defensive symbolism of weaponry and the psychological

‘Other Minds Problem’ regarding appropriate reaction (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 138-139;

Jervis 1978, 186-187). If escalation of unwanted hostility is the result, the dilemma becomes

a security paradox; while identified threats become a strategic challenge (Booth and Wheeler

2008, 139, 141). The essay provides perspectives on potentially overcoming the security

dilemma in international politics through the paradigms of realism, liberalism, and

constructivism. It argues that although there are loopholes for peace within each perspective,

the security dilemma continues to exist because of unresolvable uncertainty.

The security dilemma requires the application of three a priori logics: fatalistic

(enemies), mitigator (competitors), and transcender (friends) (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 143-

144).1 Under realism, fatalistic logic coincides with Mearsheimer’s offensive realism

(Mearsheimer 1995, 82). It views the use of brains and brawn to ensure state survival through

the maximisation of state power, thus offsetting the ambiguous symbolism of weaponry

through excess (Elman and Jensen 2008, 22-24; Glaser 2013, 19-20; Booth and Wheeler

2008, 144).2 Due to the Other Minds Problem, states assume a worst-case scenario in a self-

help environment, and hegemons buck-pass when not immediately threatened, like the

United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) did during the opening stages of the Second

World War; thereby consolidating power for survival and allowing the rest to weaken

themselves through conflict (Elman and Jensen 2008, 22-24; Glaser 2013, 19-20). Other

states, however, will generally seek to balance against a potential hegemon, leading to the

security paradox and making the strategy unfeasible (Glaser 2013, 19). Waltz’s structural

(neo) realism also aligns with fatalistic logic (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 143; Glaser 2013,

17-19; Elman and Jensen 2008, 18-20). Since state self-help behaviour is argued to be a by-
1
The three logics also represent a sliding scale of fear towards the other (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 142-143).
2
Regional hegemony, generally due to the presence of water, is usually the upper limits of a hegemonic
state’s reach.
product of the lack of an ordering principle and states are functionally homogeneous, the

crucial variable is the distribution of capabilities to gain power and ensure survival (Glaser

2013, 19; Elman and Jensen 2008, 18-20).3 States compete and balance internally and

externally for best advantage and non-competitive behaviour becomes selected out of the

system as norms become internalised, thus making competition seem natural (Glaser 2013;

Elman and Jensen 2008, 18-20).4

The security paradox of the Cold War between North American Treaty Organisation

(NATO) and Warsaw Pact states highlights the fatalistic logic of the security dilemma with

arms build ups used to off-set the other’s advantage through balancing (Glaser 2013, 18).

Perpetual competition, as Gorbachev saw in an effort of security dilemma sensibility,

provides limited opportunity to overcome the security dilemma due to the approach’s

stalemate logic (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 145). Defensive realism is understood through

mitigator logic (Booth and Wheeler 2008 143-144). Although states are viewed as rational

actors seeking security by cooperating with their main threats (other states), state type

(greedy or not) and the development and implementation of defensive technology are crucial

to the analysis (Glaser 2013, 20; Elman and Jensen 2008, 20-22). The nature of technology

and favourable terrain, the difficulty in seizing resources and projecting power across vast

distances, and the strong likelihood, as Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine and Nazi Germany

found, that other states balance against an expansionary hegemon, all increase the offensive-

defensive percentage towards defence (Elman and Jensen 2008, 20-22; Jervis 1978, 183-

186). However, without sufficient understanding of the other’s motives, cooperation is

unlikely (Glaser 2013, 20; Booth and Wheeler 2008, 143). Signalling through arms control

agreements and so forth whether the state is security seeking or greedy (pursuing territorial

expansion beyond its security needs) can potentially minimise the presence of competition

3
The lack of an ordering principle is described as a condition of anarchy.
4
Natural selection, as in the sense of Darwin’s natural selection, supports the utilitarian nature of humankind
to create the best conditions for survival.
through cooperation (Glaser 2013, 24-25). Signalling type can be drastically improved via

liberalism.

Liberalism turns realism’s pessimism inside-out (Morgan 2013, 29). Where realisms

view security through possession of power in order to ensure state survival, liberalism(s)

view institutions and material norms, like economic integration, being capable of creating

peace without an inherent security dilemma (Morgan 2013, 29; Navari 2008, 39). Liberalism

includes: commercial (douce commerce), human rights, international organisations (regimes),

and democracy (Morgan 2013; Navari 2008). It also adjusts the focus away from the state as

the referent object (Morgan 2013, 29). For instance, counter to offensive realism’s fatalistic

logic that states only seek to maximise power, at the end of the Second World War the US

used mitigator and transcender logic respectively to create liberal institutions in the form of

the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), NATO, and others (Keohane and

Martin 1995, 40; Booth and Wheeler 2008, 143-144; Morgan 2013, 30-31). The purpose of

these institutions is to ensure peace by standardising behaviour through the rule of law and

by providing information between elites and officials (Navari 2008, 46; Keohane and Martin

1995, 43). Once behaviour becomes structured by and informed through liberalism, it

arguably becomes easier for the other to accept the motives signalled and thus cooperate

(Keohane and Martin 1995, 45). Moreover, the harsh ambiguity of weaponry is smoothed

because international regimes are, like the democratic peace, transparent, and they eschew

force against others following liberal practices (Navari 2008, 40; Morgan 2013, 32-34).

Liberal democracies, however, will be unlikely to cooperate with non-democracies because

of the Other Minds Problem (Navari 2008, 40; Morgan 2013, 34-36). Constructivism, on the

other hand, views the security dilemma as socially constructed.

(Social) constructivism privilege social understandings over realism’s and

liberalism’s rational approach (Agius 2013, 88, 90; Wendt 1995, 71-72). Security is

understood as the preservation of a group’s core values and the absence of fear (Wolfers
1952, 485; McDonald 2008, 65). Conventional constructivism holds ideational structures

inform intersubjective understandings of identity. These tell states how to behave, what their

interests are, and what goals they should pursue (Agius 2013, 88-89; McDonald 2008, 66). In

this sense, the ambiguity surrounding weaponry is identity-based and informed by shared

knowledge and understandings. There is less reason for alarm if weapons are possessed by an

ally rather than an enemy; as per the amicable transcender logic security community relations

between the US and Australia, and the sour (security dilemma) fatalistic US relations with

Iran and North Korea, centred around nuclear ambitions, eventually becoming rendered as a

strategic challenge (Agius 2013, 88; McDonald 2008, 67; Booth and Wheeler 2008, 141;

Wendt 1995, 73). Wendt’s assertion “anarchy is what states make of it” translates to an

application of Gidden’s structuration theory, where the notion of anarchy’s existence as a

social structure informs actor agency, making the dynamic self-constitutive (Agius 2013, 88-

89; McDonald 2008, 69). Wendt further argues for three cultures of anarchy: Hobbesian

(enemy), Lockean (rivals), and Kantian (friends), which parallel the three security dilemma

logics (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 143-144; Agius 2013, 96-97). Critical constructivism, on

the other hand, argues identity is unstable (McDonald 2008, 66). Security dilemma threats

and actor identity delineated each other through contrasting representations via discourse that

construct us-them relationships (McDonald 2008, 66).

In conclusion, each paradigm understands the security dilemma differently through

the three logics. Although there is some chance for peace by potentially overcoming the

security dilemma within each paradigm, unresolvable uncertainty remains. Through realism,

power is the key to survival, which will always denote a struggle for power, even in

defensive realism because states cannot clearly signal type. Signalling motives, intentions,

and behaviour become clearer through liberalism, but liberals will always distrust illiberal

states. Finally, constructivists might see anarchy as what states make it; but in order to
constitute identity, an ‘us-them’ dialectic is necessary, also structuring the addition of

unresolvable uncertainty.
References

Agius, C. 2013. Social Constructivism. In Contemporary Security Studies, edited by A.

Collins 3rd ed. 88-103. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Booth, K. and N. Wheeler. 2008. Uncertainty. In Security Studies: An Introduction, edited by

P. Williams 2nd ed. 137-154. New York: Routledge.

Elman, C. and M. Jensen. 2008. Realisms. In Security Studies: An Introduction, edited by P.

Williams 2nd ed. 15-31. New York: Routledge.

Glaser, C. 2013. Realism. In Contemporary Security Studies, edited by A. Collins 3rd ed. 13-

27. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jervis, R. 1978. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics, 30(2): 167-214.

Keohane, R. and L. Martin. 1995. “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory.” International

Security, 20(1): 39-51.

McDonald, M. 2008. Constructivism. In Security Studies: An Introduction, edited by P.

Williams 2nd ed. 63-76. New York: Routledge.

Mearsheimer, J. 1995. “A Realist Reply.” International Security, 20(1): 82-93.

Morgan, P. 2013. Liberalism. In Contemporary Security Studies, edited by A. Collins 3rd ed.

28-41. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Navari, C. 2008. Liberalism. In Security Studies: An Introduction, edited by P. Williams 2nd

ed. 32-47. New York: Routledge.

Wendt, A. 1995. “Constructing International Politics.” International Security, 20(1): 71-81.

Wolfers, A, 1952. “ ‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol.” Political Science

Quarterly, 67(4): 481-502.