Int. J. Nav. Archit. Oceean Eng.

(2014) 6:236~2444
http
p://dx.doi.org/110.2478/IJNAO
OE-2013-01755
ⓒ SNAK, 2
2014 pISSN: 20092-6782, eISSSN: 2092-67900

Damaage scen
narios an
nd an onb
board su
upport sy
system
for daamaged ships

Jin Choi1, Dongkon Lee

L 1, Hee Jin Kang1, Soo--Young Kim2 and Sung-C
Chul Shin2
1
Koreaa Research Insstitute of Shipss & Ocean En
ngineering/KIOOST, Daejeonn, Korea
2
D
Department of Naval
N Architeecture & Oceaan Engineeringg, Pusan Natiional Universiity, Busan, Ko
orea

ABSTRACT T: Although a safety assessm ment of damagged ships, which considers environmentaal conditions such s as wavess
and wind, is important in both the desig gn and operaation phases of ships, in Ko orea, rules or guidelines to conduct suchh
assessments are not yet deeveloped. How wever, NATO and Europea an maritime so ocieties have developed gu uidelines for a
safety assesssment. Therefoore, it is requiired to developp rules or guiidelines for saf
afety assessmeents such as thhe Naval Shipp
Code (NSC) of NATO. Bef efore the safetty assessmentt of a damageed ship can bee performed, the available damage sce--
narios must bbe developed and the safetyy assessment ccriteria must be b established d. In this paperr, the parametters related too
damage by aaccidents are identified and d categorizedd when develop oping damage scenarios. Th The need for damage
d safetyy
assessment criteria is discuussed, and an example is prresented. In ad ddition, a concept and speccifications for the DB-basedd
supporting syystem, which isi used in the operation phaases, are prop posed.

KEY WORD DS: Ship safetty assessment;; Damage sceenarios; Collission; Groundin
ng; Damage ssafety criteria; Behavior si--
mulation.

INTRODUC
CTION
In the lastt decade, shipss have become larger and moore diversified,, however, ship p accidents, suuch as collision
ns and ground--
ings, continuee to occur regaardless of how a ship is designned, constructeed, and operateed. Therefore, damage safety y has become a
from a design and operation viewpoint. Thhe Internationaal Maritime Orrganization (IM
major issue fr MO) also requuires the use off
goal-based staandards (GBSs) to ensure saafety against m major hull dam mages. Classificcation rules, suuch as DNV anda ABS, havee
been establishhed regarding the
t extent and location
l of detterministic dammage due to colllision and grouunding (Choun ng et al., 2011)).
Chapter II-1 oof SOLAS conntains a regulatiion regarding IIMO’s probabiilistic damage stability
s require
rements (IMO, 2009).
There are some safety sttandards or codes for naval sships such as th he Naval Ship Code. This coode requires ad dequate reservee
of buoyancy and stability in i all foreseeab
ble intact and damage condiitions, and also o describes opperational and environmentall
limitations (N
NSA, 2012). Inn Korea, shipss including navvy are designeed and constru ucted in complliance with thee guidelines off
design and coonstruction baased on empiriical data, whicch guidelines do d not require damage safetty assessmentss that considerr
environmentaal conditions suuch as waves an nd wind. In paarticular, in the operation phasse, it is importaant to know whhether a ship iss
safe in case off damage in waaves. Therefore, damage safeety should be considered
c from
m the design phhase, and guideelines to assesss
damage safetyy are necessaryy.

Correspondinng author: Donggkon Lee, e-m

mail: dklee@kriiso.re.kr
This is an Opeen-Access articcle distributed under
u the termss of the Creative Commons
Attribution Noon-Commerciall License (http:///creativecomm mons.org/licensees/by-nc/3.0)
which permits unrestricted noon-commercial use, distributioon, and reprodu uction in any
medium, proviided the originaal work is propeerly cited.
Int. J. Nav. Archit. Ocean Eng. (2014) 6:236~244 237

Generally, there are two methods to ensure safety: preventing the accidents from occurring and mitigating the damage
caused by accidents. The former is only available in the operation phase, whereas the latter is available in both the operation
and design phases. Therefore, to increase the safety of damaged ships, designers focus more on damage mitigation than acci-
dent prevention. Focusing on damage mitigation requires prediction of the damage stability, the structural integrity, and the
motion analysis for damaged ships in waves (Lee et al., 2004). Furthermore, pertinent damage scenarios must be developed
prior to the damage safety assessment. However, there are insufficient data and guidelines for developing such scenarios.
Instead, damage scenarios are developed from the discussion and agreement among designers, owners, or authorities, but are
not always available.
This paper proposes a set of parameters that should be considered when developing the damage scenarios as well as the
methods for assessing damage safety.

DAMAGE SCENARIOS ON SHIPS

Definition of damage scenarios

When a ship accident occurs because of several causes, both the hull and structures are damaged. These damages cause the
ship to flood, which can lead to sinking, capsizing, or breaking up, as shown in Fig. 1.
In general, larger ships have sufficient strength to resist a considerable amount of structural failure. Even on smaller ships,
the margin of strength can typically be augmented by executing appropriate measures after the damage occurs. Therefore, some
types of structural failure can be considered minor damage compared to flooding. However, structural failure can be more
critical in the case of grounding because statistically, the damage caused by grounding has major effects on the midship region
(Zhu et al., 2002).

Initial Causes: Accidents:

Bridge Operational Error Collision
Bad Weather Condition Grounding
Fatigue and Sleeping Fire/Explosion
Battle Attack by Enemy Weapons
etc. etc.

Damage:
Loss of Structural Integrity

Loss: Expansion:
Sinking Progressive Flooding
Capsizing (by Underwater Damage)
Breaking up Structural Failure

w/ Dynamic Damage Conditions:

Ship Dimensions, Sea States, Damage Characteristics

Fig. 1 Structural links of damage scenarios.

Damages can be defined as a function-failed condition of ships caused by these accidents. Accidents can be caused by
operational errors, crew fatigue, sleeping, bad weather, or battle, and there are numerous potential accident categories. However,
statistically, collision and grounding are the most common accidents (HARDER, 2003), and attack by enemy weapons are the
most common accidents for naval ships. Therefore, in this study, damages are defined as hull damages caused by these three
accident types. The definition of damage scenarios is a limited set of conditions, which comprise the ship dimensions, sea states,
238 Int. J. Nav.
N Archit. Occean Eng. (201
14) 6:236~2444

and damage ccharacteristics,, to predict thee damage severrity and assesss the safety of the damaged sship. The damage conditionss
used to predicct the expansioon of and loss dued to damagee are composed d of a combinaation of the ship
ip dimensions, sea states, andd
damage confi figurations, succh as the locattion and extennt of a damagee hole. The sh hip dimensionss can be repreesented by thee
loading condiitions and geom metrical characcteristics, suchh as the hull, leength, breadth, draft, KG, andd compartmennt arrangement..
The sea statess refer to the wave
w conditionss of height, lenngth, and periood. Furthermoree, the angle off wave heading
g also has to bee
considered beecause it is a crritical characterristic from a shhip motional peerspective.

The accidentt parameters of

o damage scen
narios

Collision

From studdies of picturees of previous collision acciddents (considering only shipp-ship collisionns), the damag ge hole has thee
bow shape off the striking ship, as shown n in Fig. 2 (L
Lützen, 2001). Therefore, wh hen developingg the damage scenarios, thee
parameters reelated to the daamage caused by b a collision aare the geomettry of the bow of the strikingg ship and the collision
c anglee
and velocity oof both vesselss. The bow can n be separated into conventio
onal and bulboous bows. The bulbous bow can c be dividedd
into conventioonal bows andd bulbs. The baasic data used to describe thee geometry of the bulb consiist of the lengtth and vertical//
horizontal raddius of the buulb and the disstance betweenn the bulb tip and the forem most part of thhe bow, as sh hown in Fig. 3
(Lützen, 2001). The penetrration is determ mined using the
he collision ang
gle and velocitty of the strikinng ship relativ
ve to the struckk
ship (Zhang, 1999).
In other w
words, it can be
b assumed thaat the collision damage confiigurations are determined
d usiing the bow geeometry of thee
striking ship aand the penetraation condition
ns, as shown in Figs. 4 (Zhang
g, 1999) and 5.

Fig.
F 2 Picturess of side damaage by collision.
Int. J. Nav. Archit. Ocean Eng. (2014) 6:236~244 239

(top bulb, bottom bow)

Fig. 3 Geometry of bulbous bow.

Velocity of striking ship

relative to struck ship Velocity of striking ship
Struck ship

Rigid bow

Penetration

Velocity of struck ship

Fig. 4 Penetration scenario of a ship-ship collision.

Environmental
Hole Location Condition

Flooding/Structural
Collision Hole Area Analysis

Bow Geometry
Conventional Bow
Stem Angle
Breadth(Deck/Bottom)
Uppermost Deck Height
Bulbous Bow
Length of the Bulb
Vertical/Horizontal Radius of the Bulb
Distance Between the Bulb Tip to the
Foremost Part of the Bow
Penetration
Collision Angle
Velocity of the Striking Ship Relative
to the Struck Ship
Fig. 5 Parameters of the collision damage configurations.
240 Int. J. Nav. Archit. Ocean Eng. (2014) 6:236~244

Grounding

Grounding damages are described using the longitudinal location of the damage and the number of spaces affected. Accord-
ing to the statistics (Zhu et al., 2002), for more extensive damage, the distribution is as expected: most grounding incidents
cause damage around the midship and midship-to-fore region because most ships operate with a bow up trim. This observation
has significant strength implications because damage to the midship region will significantly reduce the global strength cap-
ability, which will be important when recovering from a grounding incident. The damage extents are defined as the longitudinal
damage length and width, which are determined using the ship velocity, underwater rock width/height/toughness, thickness of
the bottom plate, transverse web spacing, and failure strain, as shown in Fig. 6 and 7 (Zhu et al., 2002).

Fig. 6 Ship grounding scenario. Fig. 7 Parameters of the grounding damage configurations.

Attack by enemy weapons

For naval ships, it is necessary to consider the attack damage caused by enemy weapons in addition to collision and
grounding. At the moment, design rules for naval ships apply the criteria only to evaluate the adequate damage stability per-
formance based on the righting arm curve. The damage safety of naval ships in reference to IMO research is gaining interest
(Riola and Perez, 2009).
There are two methods to consider attack damage in naval ships. The first method is to consider the damage by threat
weapons of individual ships, such as a missile, torpedo, or mine. When a naval ship is designed, the possible damage sizes of
the explosion ellipsoid volume and pressure (weapon strength) by the threat weapons are identified and the response strategies
are developed. If these damages are considered and assessed from the design phase, it can improve the survivability. The other
method is to consider multiple simultaneous attacks by the guns of a warship (see Fig. 9), which is a major threat for smaller
naval ships that engage in an approaching battle. For instance, Fig. 8 illustrates the battle case for a medium-sized patrol boat
(approximately 150dwt). In this case, the probability of attack is higher at the bridge and guns. The damage can be expressed
using the formula of the damaged hole area per minute, and the total zonal damaged hole area can be back calculated if the
types of enemy weapons and the battle time are known. Moreover, The damage area per minute can be used to establish
combative strategies by analyzing the available battle time.
For instance, from pictures as shown in Fig. 8, total damaged area is 0.157m2 and real battle time is 25 minutes, therefore,
damaged area per minute is 0.00628m2/min. Damaged area per minute of Zone A is 0.00328m2/min according to the probability
of zonal damage, 52%. From this probability, expected zonal damaged hole area can be calculated as multiplication of the
Aattack of Zone A and the expected Tbattle.
There are only fragmentary cases to support this methodology. However, if these types of cases are collected and managed
systematically and consistently, they can provide a feasible alternative for assessing the damage safety of naval ships.

Aattack [m2/min] = Atotal / Ttotal battle (based on existing cases)

Azonal = Aattack × Tbattle
Int. J. Nav. Arrchit. Ocean Eng.
E (2014) 6:2
236~244 2411

Fig. 8 Picturees of the battlee case of a patrol boat (Wikiipedia online)).

Enviironmental
Holle Location Coondition

Floodinng/Structural
Attack H Area
Hole A
Analysis

Typpe of Threat Weapons

W
Batttle Time
Fig. 9 Parameters
P off the attack daamage configu
urations.

SAFETY AS
SSESSMENT
T OF DAMA
AGED SHIPS

Proposal of a criterion for damage safety

y assessment

As mentiooned earlier, thhe damage conffigurations useed to predict daamage severity y can be estimaated using theorretical models,,
empirical form mula, accident statistics, and experiments.
However,, there are no references or gu uidelines to asssess whether a ship is safe affter damage. Thherefore, a critterion that usess
the concept oof a polar chartt is proposed as a shown in Fiig. 10. This crriterion is onlyy applicable whhen assessing damage safetyy
from a behaviior perspectivee.
The polarr chart is plotteed by develop ping the damagge scenarios an nd quantifying g the ship motiions depending g on the wavee
heading anglees. These motiional graphs can c be expresssed as the behaavior safety arreas Aroll, Apitcch, and Aheave. The other sixx
degrees motioonal graphs caan also be plottted in the same me manner. Theese areas descrribe the damagge behavior ch haracteristics inn
waves. Finallly, the damagee safety from a behavior perrspective is assessed by com mparing the beehavior safety areas with thee
required safetty area Areq (e.g., Aroll shoulld be greater thhan Areq). How wever, there arre currently noo guidelines fo or the requiredd
safety area; thherefore, furtheer research is reequired to estabblish such guid
delines.
242 Int. J. Nav.
N Archit. Occean Eng. (201
14) 6:236~2444

Damage
e Behavior Pollar Chart

Figg. 10 Examplee of damage beehavior polar charts to assess damage saffety.

Concept of an
n onboard sup
pporting systeem for damagee safety operattion

The tradittional methodss of damage management

m arre labor intensive and time critical.
c The DDamage Contro ol (DC) officerr
must receive, filter, analyze,, and react to in
nformation froom multiple sou urces, which caan sometimes bbe contradictorry. To help thee
DC officer to make a decisiion, several DC C supporting syystems are dev veloped and proovided based oon the rapid ad dvancements off
computer-bassed systems in this area (Yvan n and Jan, 2010). These typees of supporting g systems shouuld guarantee high
h reliability,,
rapid responsse, easy usage, and simple maintenance.
m Allthough compu uter technology
y has advancedd, it is still diff
fficult to assesss
the damage ssafety using reeal-time analy ysis because off the calculatio on time, equippment reliabiliity, and lack of o engineeringg
knowledge am mong the captaain, officers, orr crews.
The existting DC systems such as th he Battle Dam mage Control System, L-3 MAPPS (BDC CS) provide information
i off
emergency sittuations and coommunication by integrationn with several ty ypes of sensors, CCTVs, largge monitors an nd so on. Thesee
integration syystems cannot work
w if the sysstems fail due tto damage. Theerefore, a pre-d defined and annalyzed supportt system basedd
on a database can be a goodd solution if it operates
o in paraallel with the ex
xisting DC sysstems, as shown
wn in Fig. 11.

Fig. 11 Co
oncept and pro
rocess of onbo
oard supporting systems.
Int. J. Nav. Arrchit. Ocean Eng.
E (2014) 6:2
236~244 2433

The first aid of the suppporting system ms is to suppoort rapid decisiion making by y presenting thhe analysis resu
ults as graphs,,
charts, and soome signals, which
w express the current sttatus of a dammaged ship and d predict the ddamage progreession. Fig. 122
provides somme examples off the graphicall results. Motioonal graphs (th he roll, pitch, and heave aree shown at leasst) provide thee
information oof the time-dom main behavior prediction, andd the colored (green/yellow/rred) signal imaages indicate th he status of thee
ship and the leevel of danger. Finally, the poolar charts provvide information on the behaavior safety deppending on thee wave headingg
angles and heelp to turn a shiip to the safer wave
w heading aangle from a beehavior perspective.

Fig. 12 Ex
xample graphiical results fro
om the damag
ge analysis.

CONCLUSIIONS

Studies onn damage safeety that aim to make ships saafer are ongoin ng; in particularr, there are maany outstanding g theories, for--
mulas, and tecchnical tools on
o this topic. Th his paper propposes factors th
hat can be used d to develop damamage scenario os for collision,,
grounding, annd attack acciddents. In addittion, a criterionn that can be used to assesss damage safetty using polar charts from a
behavior perspspective is propposed.
Damage ssafety assessm ment is not only y required in tthe design phaase but can alsso be applied iin the operatio on phase as ann
onboard suppport system. SuchS systems should guaranntee high reliaability and rap pid response aand provide in ntuitive, usefull
information too the decision makers in emeergencies. Som me graphical methods
m for desscribing the staatus of the dam
maged ship andd
the danger levvel are also prooposed.
This studyy considers thee methodologies available foor damage safeety assessment considering ennvironmental conditionsc andd
its applicationn. Future researrch on this topiic should gatheer additional daata and validatee the proposedd methodology..

ACKNOWL
LEDGEMEN
NTS

This reseaarch was supported by the in

nherent researcch projects of KRISO/KIOST under Projecct of “Developpment of basicc
technology foor alternative design
d o analysis of safety-critical performance (PES160B)”,
based on ( ““Development of technologyy
for fire and ddamage control of naval ship
ps (PGS2560)”” and the Natiional Researchh Foundation oof Korea (NRF
F/MSIP) underr
Project of GCCRC-SOP (No.. 2011-0030013).
244 Int. J. Nav. Archit. Ocean Eng. (2014) 6:236~244

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