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Cristian Alonso

Mr. Blackmon / Period 3

Cold War Outline #1

IB SL History

“Analyse the origin of East-West rivalry and explain why it developed into the Cold War.”

1) Thesis: The origin of the East-West rivalry is the events that would become the underlying

causes to the Cold War. Though many of the preceding action to the Cold War took place

during the closing of the Second World War, the inception of the East-West rivalry can be

traced to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. This led to the start of what historian Isaac

Deutscher called the “Great Contest” between capitalistic and communist ideologies.

Furthermore, the outbreaks of revolution in Germany and Hungary intensified the fear felt by

wealthy capitalists outside of Russia and led to the establishment of an isolationist “cordon

sanitaire” by France and Britain. The fear of each other led the states of the US and USSR to

be fundamentally opposed economically and ideologically. The development into a Cold

War, however, was not sparked until the year 1942. It was then that Stalin begins to press

the US and Britain over opening a second front in Europe. Furthermore, the Soviets had

concerns over the US foreign policy held by Roosevelt, suspicious of the Open Door policy.

Lastly, the final collapse into the Cold War came with the Tehran Conference in November

of 1943, the “quest for security” by both the US and USSR during a period from 1944 to

1945, and the breakdown of the Grand Alliance over the course of the same years.

2) Origins of the East-West Rivalry

a) The Great Contest (1917-1918)

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i) The Bolshevik Revolution (November 1917)

(1) The establishment of the Bolshevik party in command of the Soviet Union led to

the eventual establishment of the communist ideology.

(2) This creating a differing in the dominant classes of the East and the West and

doomed both sides to eventually clash as all states with differing dominant classes

are bound to come into conflict.

ii) Initial Conflicts

(1) The collectivization efforts of the Soviet Union directly clashed with the efforts of

capitalism of the West, based on private ownership, a market economy, and

individualism.

(2) Soviet leaders Lenin and Trotsky call for revolutions in Europe, then forming the

Communist International to solidify their efforts and to stimulate and aid world

revolution. Capitalist companies and states were suspicious and fearful of this

new government.

(3) The foreign military aid given to the Russia during the Russian Civil War

between 1918 and 1921 from the US, Britain, France, and Japan, was understood

by the Bolsheviks to be a capitalist attempt to undermine their socialist efforts.

(4) Despite the victory of the Bolsheviks, the United States, among others, failed to

recognize the new government. Furthermore, President Wilson sought to

introduce a new international order that would constitute international liberal

capitalism based on a free market economy. These were stakes plunged through

the heart of socialist operations in the eyes of the Soviet state.

iii) Soviet Isolation and Limitations (1920’s)

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(1) The USSR was economically weak due to its history. The tsarist days,

involvement it WWI, the 1917 revolution, the civil war, and then the Polish

invasion all had weakened it. It also remained ideologically isolated due to the

repression of socialist uprising in other regions of Europe.

(2) The German-imposed Treaty of Brest-Litovsk deprived the USSR of vast

industrial and agricultural territories.

(3) The military efforts against the USSR were then succeeded by embargoes and

trade restriction stunting the growth of the Bolshevik economy. Lastly, the

Bolshevik government was excluded from peace settlements and diplomacy of the

1920’s.

b) Simultaneous Antagonism and Cooperation

(1) The result of the Bolshevik Revolution was a series of changing relations between

the powers, combining ideological denunciation, isolation, coexistence, and

occasional cooperation.

(2) Both participants had a long history of fear and mistrust, with the Soviet fear of

Western intentions to invade and the Western determination to protect their global

economic interests from the encroaching socialist threat.

ii) Realpolitik

(1) Realpolitik is the practice of politics and foreign diplomacy based on the realities

and strategic and material needs, ignoring political principles, ideologies, and

morals.

(2) This meant, in terms of our Cold War, that the Soviet Union, even under Lenin,

was willing to do deals with capitalist countries in order to develop its economy.
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(3) This practice later became much more marked under Stalin’s rule with the theory

of Socialism in One Country and the Comitern taking larger and larger hold over

the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

(4) In order to buy himself some time, when an alliance with capitalist states did not

arise, Stalin signed a non-aggression pact with Hitler, his class enemy.

(5) Likewise, the United States and other major constituents of Western capitalist

states were willing to work with right-wing dictatorial regimes in order to ensure

bulwarks against the possibility of a communist revolution.

(6) Particularly, Britain and France supported Pilsudski’s regime in Poland and U.S.

companies during the Spanish Civil War gave economic assistance to the semi-

fascist regime of Francisco Franco.

(7) After war broke out in Europe in 1939, and Stalin was invaded in 1941, the major

contender states, the USSR, Britain, and the US, decided to unite against the

imposing threat of Germany and form the Grand Alliance.

(8) However, Stalin’s participation in this alliance led him to believe that the West

was increasingly determined to sacrifice innumerable Russian lives while

protecting their global economic investments and interests.

iii) The Riga Axioms

(1) After Stalin’s Great Purge in the USSR, US attitude against the Soviet Union

strengthened. The US then started up a Division of Russian Affairs later

responsible for the Riga Axioms

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(2) These axioms were the views and polices of the US diplomatic experts based in

the Latvian capital Riga. They worked to discover Soviet foreign policy

objectives.

(3) Latvia was a safe haven for Russian exiles opposed to the Soviet government and

their views greatly influenced the work done by the DRA.

(4) The Riga axioms assumed real influence in 1945 when the legacy of the Russian

Revolution of 1917 began to have significant impact on international relations.

iv) Second World War Efforts

(1) At first, in the period between 1939 and 1941, US hardliners and Riga Axiomists

seemed confirmed by the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact.

(2) However, they were opposed by US ambassador to Moscow Joseph Davies. Also,

FDR was convinced that Nazi Germany was more expansionary than the USSR

and that the weakened Soviet Union could be convinced to drop ideas of world

communism.

(3) However, the rise to power or Hitler in 1933 made both sides mutually suspicious.

The USSR saw the refusal of France and Britain to join them in an anti-Nazi pact

and the Munich agreement as encouragement to attack the USSR. On the other

hand, the West saw the dismemberment of Poland and the war against Finland

with the annexations of the Baltic states as evidence of Soviet expansionism;

suspicion that remained even after the formation of the Grand Alliance.

v) The Grand Alliance

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(1) After the USSR came under attack from Germany in 1941, and the US by Japan

later the same year, the Grand Alliance was quickly formed. Hitler was seen as a

more immediate threat than Stalin.

(2) The US also began to supply the USSR militarily through the Lend-Lease

Scheme.

(3) The temporary mend to East-West relations was short-lived and new problems

quickly arose. Among those were Soviet restriction on Allied service personnel

operating on Soviet territory, and what Stalin considered inadequate Allied aid,

given that most Axis forces were committed to the East.

(4) Stalin came to suspect that the US and Britain were prepared to fight Nazism

“down to the last Russian”. He even feared a possible compromise with Hitler

followed by a joint attack against the USSR.

3) Development into the Cold War

a) The Second Front

i) Onwards from 1942, Stalin began to press the USA and Britain to open up a second

front in the Western Europe to take pressure off the Soviet Union, which was facing

the bulk of Hitler’s armies.

ii) In 1943, the US and Britain decided to invade Italy first. The repeated delays made

Stalin suspicious about his allies’ motives. In particular, he felt they were stalling on

purpose to ensure the USSR was seriously weakened.

iii) There were also Soviet concerns over Roosevelt’s foreign policy based on democracy

and economic freedom.

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iv) The USSR remained suspicious, viewing Roosevelt’s Open Door policy as being

designed to benefit more economically advanced countries and especially the USA.

b) The Tehran Conference (November 1943)

i) As the war continued, the Big Three managed to maintain the alliance when they met

at Tehran in November. There was an initial outline agreement that the Soviet Union

could restore its 1918 border with Poland, while Poland’s western border could be

moved further west at Germany’s expense. There was also an agreement that no

central European alliance would be allowed against the Soviet Union.

ii) These seemed to remove some of Stalin’s security concerns, though Churchill and

Roosevelt were not in total agreement on the issues. In June of 1944, the second from

Stalin had wanted finally opened up.

iii) The Percentages Agreement (1944)

(1) Following Tehran and the D-Day operation, Churchill and Stalin met in Moscow

on October of 1944 making the informal Percentages Agreement concerning

influence in south-eastern and eastern Europe.

c) The Quest for Security (1944-1945)

i) Before 1945, it was clear that the US was the most powerful of the Big Three. This

was heavily reinforced upon the use of the secret weapon it had harnessed against

Japan in August of 1945. Many historians attribute the decision to exclude the USSR

from this technology as a key start to the cold war, although it is heavily debated.

ii) Both parties, US and USSR, claimed that after 1945 they were both seeking security,

although each defined it in a different way. For the USSR, it meant friendly border
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states and economic reconstruction, whereas the US sough out free exchange across

the world and a vast preponderance of actual and potential power.

iii) The resultant power inferiority of the USSR weighed heavily in the minds of Stalin

and other Soviet leaders.

d) The Breakdown of the Grand Alliance (1944-1945)

i) Germany

(1) The was with Germany and Japan was ongoing when the Allies met at Yalta in

February of 1945 but World War II was nearly over as far as Europe was

concerned.

(2) The conference agreed that Germany would be divided into four zones with

outline agreement on compensation for the damage done by Nazi Germany,

particularly to the USSR.

(3) Stalin was, however, against the idea of permanently dividing Germany into two

and hoped reparations weakened Germany sufficiently to prevent any future

threats.

(4) Stalin would have opted for a united Germany over which the Soviet Union could

have had some influence although not control.

ii) Poland and Eastern Europe

(1) Poland proved more difficult than expected and it was agreed that the USSR

demands for Poland would be met.

(2) Stalin believed the Allies had accepted the Lublin provisional government for

Poland, with a few ‘London” Poles to be added.

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(3) Churchill remained deeply suspicious of Stalin’s intentions and quickly reverted

to a strong anti-communist sentiment. Roosevelt, too, began to have his doubts.

iii) Truman’s Impact

(1) With the death of Roosevelt, Truman began to take a more hardline approach

towards the Russians.

(2) Truman refused to listen to Molotov’s explanations about why the free elections

promised in Poland had not taken place.

(3) The Riga axioms now came to dominate US foreign policy.

(4) The issue of Poland: Stalin saw it as a life and death question for the USSR while

Churchill saw it as a matter of honor.

(5) Roosevelt, who had kept earlier agreements with Stalin about Eastern Europe

secret from the US public, suggested that the planned UN organization should

make decisions about these issues after the war was over.

(6) The shifts persuaded Stalin to begin taking practical measures to ensure Soviet

security interests in Eastern Europe.

iv) Economic Reconstruction

(1) Between 1941 an 1945, the USSR suffered staggering losses, whereas, the US

was the only power to emerge richer from the war.

(2) About 30 million Soviets were killed, 25 million homes destroyed, 31 thousand

factories destroyed, 84 thousand schools destroyed, 10.5 million people made into

refugees, 17 million cattle killed, and 100 thousand state farms destroyed.
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(3) At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, Truman said the US would only agree to

the Soviet Union having reparations from the eastern zone of Germany, the

agricultural and poor zone.

v) The US Atomic Bomb

(1) Roosevelt had promised Stalin to enter the war against Japan once Germany had

been defeated, but saw the A bomb as a manner of ending the war with Japan

without Soviet action.

(2) This prevented any Soviet demands in Asia.

(3) Significantly for the later development of the Cold War, the US long term global

aims increasingly conflicted with the USSR’s regional objectives.