Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc.

VS.
Wesleyan University Philippines, Inc.
January 20, 2016

Doctrine:
The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings upon motion of the claiming party
when the defending party's answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading. For that purpose, only the pleadings
of the parties in the action are considered. It is error for the trial court to deny the motion
for judgment on the pleadings because the defending party's pleading in another case
supposedly tendered an issue of fact.

Facts:
From January 9, 2006 until February 2, 2007, the petitioner, a domestic corporation dealing
with medical equipment and supplies, delivered to and installed medical equipment and
supplies at the respondent's hospital. According to the petitioner, the respondent paid
only P67,3 57,683.23 of its total obligation of P123,901,650.00, leaving unpaid the sum of
P54,654,195.54.

However, on February 11, 2009, the petitioner and the respondent entered into an
agreement whereby the former agreed to reduce its claim to only P50,400,000.00, and
allowed the latter to pay the adjusted obligation on installment basis within 36 months.

In the letter dated May 27, 2009, the respondent notified the petitioner that its new
administration had reviewed their contracts and had found the contracts defective and
rescissible due to economic prejudice or lesion; and that it was consequently declining to
recognize the February 11, 2009 agreement because of the lack of approval by its Board of
Trustees and for having been signed by Maglaya whose term of office had expired.

On June 24, 2009, the petitioner sent a demand letter to the respondent. Due to the
respondent's failure to pay as demanded, the petitioner filed its complaint for sum of
money in the RTC.

The respondent moved to dismiss the complaint upon the following grounds, namely: (a)
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; (b) improper venue; (c) litis
pendentia; and (d) forum shopping. In support of the ground of litis pendentia, it stated
that it had earlier filed a complaint for the rescission of the four contracts and of the
February 11, 2009 agreement in the RTC in Cabanatuan City; and that the resolution of
that case would be determinative of the petitioner's action for collection.

After the RTC denied the motion to dismiss on July 19, 2009, the respondent filed its
answer. On September 28, 2011, the petitioner filed its Motion for Judgment Based on the
Pleadings, stating that the respondent had admitted the material allegations of its
complaint and thus did not tender any issue as to such allegations. The respondent
opposed the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, arguing that it had specifically
denied the material allegations in the complaint.
Judgment of the RTC
At the hearing, the court issued an Order denying the Motion for Judgment Based on the
Pleadings considering that the allegations stated on the Motion are evidentiary in nature.
The Court, instead of acting on the same, sets the case for pre-trial, considering that with
the Answer and the Reply, issues have been joined.

Judgment of the CA
On July 2, 2013, the CA promulgated its decision. Although observing that the respondent
had admitted the contracts as well as the February 11, 2009 agreement, the CA ruled that a
judgment on the pleadings would be improper because the outstanding balance due to the
petitioner remained to be an issue in the face of the allegations of the respondent in its
complaint for rescission in the RTC in Cabanatuan City.

Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in going outside of the respondent's answer by
relying on the allegations contained in the latter's complaint for rescission.

Ruling of the SC:

Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in going outside of the respondent's answer by relying on
the allegations contained in the latter's complaint for rescission. In order to resolve the
petitioner's Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, the trial court could rely only on
the answer of the respondent filed in Civil Case No. 09-122116. Under Section 1, Rule 34 of
the Rules of Court, the answer was the sole basis for ascertaining whether the complaint's
material allegations were admitted or properly denied. As such, the respondent's
averment of payment of the total of P78,401,650.00 to the petitioner made in its complaint
for rescission had no relevance to the resolution of the Motion for Judgment Based on the
Pleadings. The CA thus wrongly held that a factual issue on the total liability of the
respondent remained to be settled through trial on the merits. It should have openly
wondered why the respondent's answer in Civil Case No. 09-122116 did not allege the
supposed payment of the P78,401,650.00, if the payment was true, if only to buttress the
specific denial of its alleged liability. The omission exposed the respondent's denial of
liability as insincere.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on July 2,
2013; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, in Manila to resume its proceedings in
Civil Case No. 09-122116 entitled Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. v. Wesleyan
University-Philippines, and to forthwith act on and grant the Motion for Judgment Based
on the Pleadings by rendering the proper judgment on the pleadings; and ORDERS the
respondent to pay the costs of suit.

Curata vs Philippine Ports Authority

Case Digest GR 154211-12 June 22 2009
Facts:
EO 385 and EO 431 Series of 1990 delineated the Batangas Port Zone and placed it under
the Philippine Ports Authority for administrative jurisdiction of its proper zoning,
planning, development, and utilization. Pursuant thereto, the PPA instituted a complaint
for expropriation of 185 lots before the RTC. Owned by some 231 individuals or entities,
the 185 lots, with a total area of about 1,298,340 sqm, were intended for the development
of Phase II of the BPZ. The PPA alleged that, per evaluation of the Land Acquisition
Committee for Phase II of the BPZ project, the lots had a fair market value of P 336.83 per
sqm. Prior to the filing of the complaint, PPA offered PhP 336.40 per sqm as just
compensation, but the lot owners rejected the offer. PPA prayed to be placed in possession
upon its deposit of the amount equivalent to the assessed value for real estate taxation of
the lots in question.
After proceedings, the RTC issued a compensation order directing PPA to pay the lot
owners the amount of P 5,500 per sqm as just compensation. Upon motion, the RTC
granted the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal and issued the writ of
execution thereafter. Subsequently, the sheriff served the Notice of Garnishment to the
LBP Batangas City Branch.
Issue 1:  W/N execution pending appeal is applicable to expropriation proceedings
No. Discretionary execution of judgments pending appeal under Sec. 2(a) of Rule 39
simply does not apply to eminent domain proceedings. Since PPAs monies, facilities and
assets are government properties, they are exempt from execution whether by virtue of a
final judgment or pending appeal.
It is a universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties
either by general or special law, it may limit the claimant’s action only up to the
completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the
Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may
not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments. This is
based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be
covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public
services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the
diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by
law. (Commissioner of Public Highways vs San Diego, 1970)
Issue 2:  W/N RA 8974 is a substantial law that cannot be reapplied retroactively
Yes. The appropriate standard of just compensation inclusive of the manner of payment
thereof and the initial compensation to the lot owners is a substantive, not merely a
procedural, matter. This is because the right of the owner to receive just compensation
prior to acquisition of possession by the State of the property is a proprietary right. RA
8974, which specifically prescribes the new standards in determining the amount of just
compensation in expropriation cases relating to national government infrastructure
projects, as well as the payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance
of a writ of possession, is a substantive law.
Further, there is nothing in RA No. 8974 which expressly provides that it should have
retroactive effect. Neither is retroactivity necessarily implied from RA No. 8974 or in any
of its provisions.  Hence, it cannot be applied retroactively in relation to this case.

FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 166944, August 18, 2014, JUANITO

MAGSINO, PETITIONER, VS. ELENA DE OCAMPO AND RAMON
GUICO, RESPONDENTS
The Facts:
In a case for ejectment filed by Juanito, the MTC decided against him and dismissed his
case, hence he appealed to the RTC which however, affirmed the MTC judgment.  Thus,
Juanito filed a petition for review under Rule 42 to assail the RTC ruling.  The CA,
however dismissed the case for the following reasons:
The petition is not accompanied by copies of the pleadings and other material portions as
would support the allegations of the petition, such as:
1) Copy of the complaint filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Taytay, Rizal, Answer,
and Motion to Dismiss;
2) Copies of the appeal memoranda filed by the parties.
Juan filed his motion for reconsideration.  In it, he argued that the MTC and RTC decisions
were sufficient for the CA to review the case without resort to the records because the
issues presented were issues of law; should the CA have really desired to inform itself
more, all that it needed to do was simply to order the elevation of the records; and that
“all rules of procedure should bow to the greater imperative of doing substantial justice.”. 
His motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, he elevated his case to the Supreme
Court via petition for review on certiorari.
The Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case for failure to comply with the
provisions of Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling:
Ruling of the Court
The decisive question is whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for review
on the ground that the petitioner did not comply with Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
Section 2. Form and contents. – The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with
the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall
(a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the lower courts or
judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates
showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters
involved, the issues raised, the specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly
committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the
allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true
copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk
of court of the Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the
pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the
petition.
xxxx
As earlier mentioned, the CA issued the first assailed resolution dismissing the petition for
review because the petitioner did not attach to his petition the complaint, the answer, and
the motion to dismiss, all filed in the MTC; and the copies of the parties’ memoranda on
appeal presented in the RTC. Such dismissal was pursuant to Section 3, Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. – The failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and
other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of
and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof.
The appeal of the petitioner absolutely lacks merit.
We begin by reminding the petitioner that the right to appeal is not a natural right and is
not part of due process, but merely a statutory privilege to be exercised only in accordance
with the law. Being the party who sought to appeal, he must comply with the
requirements of the relevant rules; otherwise, he would lose the statutory right to
appeal.1  It cannot be over-emphasized, indeed, that the procedures regulating appeals as
laid down in the Rules of Court must be followed because strict compliance with them
was indispensable for the orderly and speedy disposition of justice.2 
Whether or not the dismissal of the petition for review was warranted depended on
whether or not there remained sufficient materials in the records to still enable the CA to
act on the appeal despite the omissions.
In Galvez v. Court of Appeals3, a case that involved the dismissal of a petition for
certiorari to assail an unfavorable ruling brought about by the failure to attach copies of all
pleadings submitted and other material portions of the record in the trial court (like the
complaint, answer and position paper) as would support the allegations of the petition,
the Court recognized three guideposts for the CA to consider in determining whether or
not the rules of procedures should be relaxed, as follows:
First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition.
Only those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is
whether the document in question will support the material allegations in the petition,
whether said document will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to
convince the court to give due course to the petition.
Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be
appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also (sic) found in another document
already attached to the petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are
summarized in a questioned judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the
judgment is attached.
Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given
due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later
submitted the documents required, or that it will serve the higher interest of justice that
the case be decided on the merits.
The guideposts, which equally apply to a petition for review filed in the CA under Rule
42, reflect that the significant determinant of the sufficiency of the attached documents is
whether the accompanying documents support the allegations of the petition.4 
Did the petitioner follow the guideposts recognized in Galvez?
Under the first guidepost recognized in Galvez, only the relevant pleadings and parts of
the case records needed to be attached to the petition for review. Hence, not every
pleading or document filed or submitted in the lower courts had to be attached to the
petition. The test of relevancy is whether the document in question would support the
material allegations of the petition. Accordingly, we turn to what were omitted by the
petitioner.
The first omitted document was the complaint in Civil Case No. 4141. Being the initiatory
pleading, the complaint included all the material facts and dates necessary to support the
petitioner’s cause of action for forcible entry, specifically: (1) his prior physical possession
of the property; (2) his being deprived of the physical possession either by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; and (3) his filing of the action within one year
from the time he or his representative learned of the deprivation of physical possession of
the land or building.5 The direct relevance of the complaint in the appeal could neither be
denied nor diminished, for only from its allegations could the true nature of the action as
one for forcible entry and, consequently, whether the trial court or another court had
jurisdiction over the action be fully determined. Such determination was indifferent to the
defenses set up by the defendants in their answer or other responsive pleadings.6 
The next omitted pleading was the answer of the respondents. As with the complaint, the
answer was relevant in the appeal in the CA, for the respondents as the defendants had set
forth their defenses therein. The omission of the answer from the petition deprived the CA
of the means to know the factual averments of the complaint that were admitted and those
that were denied.
The third omitted document was the motion to dismiss. Although the motion to dismiss
would appear to be less relevant in view of the filing of the answer by the respondents, the
CA could have had good reasons for noting its omission as a ground to dismiss the
petition for review.
The memoranda on appeal the parties respectively filed in the RTC were the fourth kind
of omitted documents. In respect of the petitioner, his memorandum, which was due to be
filed within 15 days from the filing of his notice of appeal as required by Section 7, Rule 40
of the Rules of Court,7  would have specified and supported the errors he imputed to the
MTC. Such filing in the RTC could not be dispensed with, for the RTC would consider
only the errors specifically assigned and argued in his memorandum, except errors
affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as plain and clerical errors.8  If the
memorandum was not filed, the appeal could be dismissed. 9  Unless his memorandum
was part of his petition for review, therefore, the CA would likely find his appeal
frivolous, or even consider it dismissible pursuant to Section 3, Rule 42, supra. On their
part, the respondents were required to file their own memorandum on appeal within a
similar period of 15 days from receipt of the petitioner’s memorandum of appeal. For the
petitioner to omit the respondents’ memorandum from his petition for review was
inherently unfair because they had therein submitted matters precisely to sustain the
judgment of the MTC in their favor. Indeed, the memoranda on appeal of the parties were
relevant in the proper consideration and resolution of the merits of the appeal of the
petitioner.
Based on the foregoing considerations, the petitioner entirely bypassed the first guidepost
recognized in Galvez.
The second guidepost – which stipulates that a document, although relevant to the
petition for review, need not be appended if it is shown that its contents could be found in
or could be drawn from another document already attached to the petition – refers to a
process whereby the CA derives the contents of the omitted relevant document from
another attached to the petition for review filed in the CA.
A perusal of the records indicates that the documents actually attached to the petition for
review were limited to the following, namely: (1) illegible certified xerox copy of the May
5, 2003 judgment of the MTC in Civil Case No. 4141 (Annex 1);10  (2) duplicate original
copy of the September 17, 2003 order issued by the RTC in SP Civil Case No. 03-266
affirming the judgment of the MTC (Annex 2);11 (3) certified xerox copy of the November
6, 2003 order of the RTC denying the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner (Annex
3);12 and (4) original copy of the September 30, 2003 motion for reconsideration filed by
the petitioner in the RTC (Annex 4).13 
The petitioner posited in his motion for reconsideration that the copy of the MTC decision
was a sufficient basis to resolve the issues he was raising in his petition for review.14 
Even with the copy of the MTC judgment being actually attached to the petition for
review, however, the second guidepost could not be complied with because the copy was
hopelessly illegible. Moreover, the MTC judgment did not contain the statement of the
issues relied upon by the petitioner in his appeal in the CA, for such statement was made
only in his memorandum on appeal.
It is worth mentioning that pursuant to the third guidepost recognized in Galvez the
petitioner could still have submitted the omitted documents at the time he filed his motion
for reconsideration vis-à-vis the first assailed resolution of the CA. Yet, he did not do so.
Instead, he boldly proposed in his motion for reconsideration15 vis-à-vis the first assailed
resolution that the CA should have bowed to the “greater imperative of doing substantial
justice” by not hampering the appeal “sticking unflaggingly to such rules,” to wit:
If this Honorable Court would really want to inform itself more, it is submitted that all
that it has to do is to order the elevation of all the records to it. The Rules of Court, and for
that matter all rules of procedure should bow to the greater imperative of doing
substantial justice. Rather, routinely applying a rule of procedure when the same is not
necessary in order to arrive at an intelligent resolution of the issues, it is submitted, would
hamper or repress rather than promote the search for truth.
xxxx
It may be cliché, but it is still true today as when it first found its way into the human
mind, that when technical rules of procedure already serve to hamper justice they must be
left to the dustbin of the legally forgettable, and at the cost of setting them aside, should
unobtrusively pursue the ends of justice and the search for truth.
xxxx
Now must this Honorable Court sacrifice the law for technical rules of procedure? Must it
countenance mediocrity, nay, ignorance, by sticking unflaggingly to such rules? Can this
honorable Court afford to pass up the rare opportunity to decide a constitutional issue
with right of a party to due process of law on the line?
xxxx
ONCE AGAIN, we ask: Is it necessary for this Honorable Court to still pursue those
pleadings when the issues confronting them are legal issues which even lesser legal
intellects can resolve?
This Honorable Court is respectfully reminded the law is made for man, not man for the
law.16 
We cannot agree with the petitioner’s arrogant but unworthy proposition. The CA was
only just in denying his motion for reconsideration through the second assailed resolution
on the following terms, viz:
A careful perusal of the said provision would reveal that the documents or annexes
therein mentioned are required to be appended to the petition and the mandatory
character of such requirement may be inferred from Section 3 of Ruled 42 x x x.
The petitioner’s further argument that it is the Court which should get all the records from
the court a quo if it really wants to be more informed of the issues, is not well-taken.
Precisely, the annexes mentioned in Section 2(d) of Rule 42 are required to be appended to
the petition in order to enable this Court to determine even without consulting the record
if the petition is patently without merit or the issues raised therein are too insubstantial to
require consideration, in which case the petition should be dismissed outright, or whether
there is a need to require the respondent to comment on the petition. In short, the mere
fact that a petition for review is filed does not call for the elevation of the record, which
means that until this Court finds that the elevation of the record is necessary, such record
should remain with the trial court during the pendency of the appeal in accordance with
Section 2 of Rule 39, let alone the fact that in ejectment cases the decision of the RTC is
immediately executory pursuant to Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. Thus, more often than not, this Court has resolved petitions for review under
Rule 42 without unnecessary movement of the original record of the case which could
entail not only undue delay but also the possibility of the record being lost in transit.
The petitioner urged us to rely on the documents and pleadings he appended in his
petition which merely consisted of the MTC Judgment, the assailed RTC Order, the
Motion for Reconsideration, and the questioned Order dated November 6, 2003 denying
his Motion for Reconsideration. None of the aforementioned documents set out the factual
milieu of his claims.
Instead of manifesting that he would submit the additional documentary evidence, the
petitioner remained obstinate in his stand not to submit the additional pleadings and
other material portions of the record. He maintained that what he has submitted based on
his discretion, are all that are necessary to support his allegations in his petition. As we
have already mentioned, the accompanying documents were insufficient to support the
petition. Also, the petitioner could have easily ended his debacle by merely attaching the
supplemental documents in his Motion for Reconsideration. Instead, the petitioner
stubbornly chose to insist that this Court direct the elevation of the records of the case if
we deem that the relevant documents were not appended to the petition.
xxxx
It is not disputed that it is petitioner who knows best what pleadings or material portions
of the record of the case would support the allegations in the petition. The petitioner’s
discretion in choosing the documents to be attached to the petition is however not
unbridled. The Court has the duty to check the exercise of this discretion, to see to it that
the submission of supporting documents is not merely perfunctory. The practical aspect of
this duty is to enable us to determine at the earliest possible time the existence of prima
facie merit in the petition. Moreover, Section 3 of Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that if petitioner fails to comply with the submission of “documents which
should accompany the petition”, it “shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.”
In this case, the insufficiency of the supporting documents coupled with the unjustified
refusal of the petitioner to even attempt to substantially comply with the attachment
requirement justified the dismissal of his petition.17 
The petitioner is further reminded that any “resort to a liberal application or suspension of
the application of procedural rules, must remain as the exception to the well-settled
principle that rules must be complied with for the orderly administration of justice.”18  It
cannot be otherwise for him, for, as the Court aptly put it in Republic v. Kenrick
Development Corporation:19 
Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as mere
technicalities have their own valid d’ etre in the orderly administration of justice. To
summarily brush them aside may result in arbitrariness and injustice.20 
The Court’s pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals21  is relevant:
Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and
litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some
instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never
intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The
liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and
under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the
prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most
persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
prescribed procedure.22 
The rules were instituted to be faithfully complied with,23  and allowing them to be
ignored or lightly dismissed to suit the convenience of a party like the petitioner was
impermissible.24  Such rules, often derided as merely technical, are to be relaxed only in
the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving. Their liberal construction in
exceptional situations should then rest on a showing of justifiable reasons and of at least a
reasonable attempt at compliance with them.25  We have repeatedly emphasized this
standard. In Bergonia v. Court of Appeals, (4th Division),26  for instance, we declared:
The petitioners’ plea for the application of the principles of substantial justice in their
favor deserves scant consideration. The petitioners should be reminded that technical
rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving. While
the petitioners adverted to several jurisprudential rulings of this Court which set aside
procedural rules, it is noted that there were underlying considerations in those cases
which warranted a disregard of procedural technicalities to favor substantial justice. Here,
there exists no such consideration.
The petitioners ought to be reminded that the bare invocation of “the interest of
substantial justice” is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to
suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply
because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive
rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive
of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate
with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
Nor should the rules of procedure be held to be for the benefit of only one side of the
litigation, for they have been instituted for the sake of all.27 
The petitioner did not deserve the liberal application of the rules of procedure that he was
seeking. Indeed, the dismissal of his petition for review was in full accord with the
following pronouncement upon a similar provision in the Rules of Court made in Atillo v.
Bombay,28  as follows:
The mandatory tenor of Section 2(d), Rule 42 with respect to the requirement of attaching
clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both
lower courts is discernible and well settled. In this case, the mandatory or directory nature
of the requirement with respect to the attachment of pleadings and other material portions
of the record is put in question.
The phrase “of the pleadings and other material portions of the record” in Section 2(d),
Rule 42 is followed by the phrase “as would support the allegations of the petition” clearly
contemplates the exercise of discretion on the part of the petitioner in the selection of
documents that are deemed to be relevant to the petition. xxx. The crucial issue to consider
then is whether or not the documents accompanying the petition before the CA
sufficiently supported the allegations therein.29  (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the
resolutions the Court of Appeals promulgated on January 8, 2004 and January 28, 2005 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 81103; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Serafin Tijam, et al. vs. Magdaleno Sibonghanoy, et al. G.R. No. L-21603. April 15, 1968
TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY (23 SCRA 29)
FACTS: Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from Sibongahanoy. Defendants
filed a counter bond with Manila

Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a writ of
execution was issued against the defendant. Defendants moved for writ of execution
against surety which was granted. Surety moved to quash the writ but was denied,
appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction.
CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a
month before the filing of the petition for recovery. Act placed original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of
interest. CA set aside its earlier decision and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive
jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue.

ISSUE: WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu
for the first time upon appeal.YES

RATIO: SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea
after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question
of lack of jurisdiction for the first time - A party may be estopped or barred from raising a
question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or
estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is
failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier - Furthermore, it has
also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the
court -"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting
the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

: Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists that the lower court should have granted
its motion to quash the writ of execution because the same was issued without the
summary hearing - Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal
manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure
by which a question is resolved "with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in
preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is
essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an
opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which
follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties - In the case at bar, the surety had been
notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when the same would be
submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when the
motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period of
four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without
filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was
deprived of its day in court.

The orders appealed from are affirmed.

THE FILING OF A MOTION TO DISMISS IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONSIDERED

VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE OR INVOCATION OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE
COURT

A special appearance before the court––challenging its jurisdiction over the person
through a motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes other grounds––is not tantamount
to estoppel or a waiver by the movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his person; and
such is not constitutive of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court (La Naval
Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 103200, August 31, 1994, 236 SCRA 78).
In other words, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have
appeared voluntarily before the court. What the rule on voluntary appearance means is
that the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification, in which
case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to
improper service of summons. (GARCIA V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 170122,
October 12, 2009).

In Edna Lhuillier vs. British Airways, the Supreme Court clarified that the special
appearance of the counsel of respondent in filing the Motion to Dismiss and other
pleadings before the trial court cannot be deemed to be voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the said trial court. The High Court disagreed with the contention of the
petitioner and ruled that there was no voluntary appearance before the trial court that
could constitute estoppel or a waiver of respondent’s objection to jurisdiction over its
person.

“Jurisdictio est potestas de publico introducta cum necessitate juris dicendi” means
jurisdiction is a power introduced for the public good, on account of the necessity of
dispensing justice. (50 C.J.S. 1089). (EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER vs. BRITISH AIRWAYS,
G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010, DEL CASTILLO, J.).

PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, represented by GOV. ISAGANI S.

AMATONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE
ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.

Which government agency has jurisdiction over a complaint for illegal collection of power
bills by an electric cooperative? Petitioner submits that jurisdiction is vested with the
Energy Regulatory Board or the regular trial courts, while respondents position is that
jurisdiction lies with the National Electrification Administration.

What is before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the
Court of Appeals,[1] that reversed the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Zamboanga del
Norte denying petitioners motion for dismissal of the complaint.[2]

On July 8, 1991, petitioner Province of Zamboanga del Norte (represented by Gov. Isagani
S. Amatong) filed with the Regional Trial Court, Zamboanga del Norte a complaint
against Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative (ZANECO) for Illegal Collection Of
Power Bills And Preliminary Injunction With Restraining Order.[3]

Petitioner in its complaint alleged that as per electric bills issued by ZANECO for the
month of May 1991, respondent increased the Fuel Compensating Charge (FCC) by P0.29
and Interim Adjustment by P0.02, or a total of P 0.31. This amount is added to the basic
charge of P 1.90 per kilowatt.

By June 1991, ZANECO increased the FCC once more to P1.39 instead of only P0.29. The
Interim Adjustment also increased to P0.06 instead of only P 0.02.

Petitioner claimed that the increase was arbitrary and illegal, and that the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) did not sanction the collections.
As a result, the electric bills of the consumers almost doubled in amount.

Further, petitioner alleged that ZANECO cannot increase the bills since the power rate
increase from the National Power Corporation (NPC) of P0.17 per kilowatt hour was not
implemented yet due to a restraining order issued by the Supreme Court.[4]

On July 22, 1991, ZANECO filed its answer to the complaint. It assailed the jurisdiction of
the trial court over the subject of the case.[5]

On July 26, 1991, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction[6] ordering
respondent to desist from imposing, charging, billing and collecting the FCC and other
additional charges upon its end-users in Zamboanga del Norte and the cities of Dipolog
and Dapitan. The court also ordered respondent to refrain from cutting off the electric
lines of those who refused to pay the questioned charges, pending determination of the
litigation.

On October 8, 1991, respondent ZANECO filed with the trial court a motion requesting the
court to set for hearing the affirmative defenses set in its answer, asking for the dismissal
of the case.

On March 27, 1992, respondent filed with the trial court a third-party complaint[7] against
the National Power Corporation (NPC) praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or a restraining order. On the same date, the trial court issued an order
restraining respondent to refrain from disconnecting its electric service on March 28, 1992
or any other date, effective until recalled.[8] Respondent ZANECO alleged that despite
NPCs knowledge of the restraining order against the collection of the FCC, which
later[9]became known as Incremental Cost Charge (ICC), NPC sent a demand letter[10]
with notice of disconnection of electric service if ZANECO did not pay the FCC/ICC bills
and extra-hydro rates.

On April 14, 1992, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
against NPC.[11]

On March 28, 1992, the trial court denied respondent ZANECOs motion to dismiss.[12]
The court ruled that (1) the nullity of the charges imposed are matters not capable of
pecuniary estimation and thus fall within the jurisdiction of the regional trial court; and (2)
it is futile to file a complaint with the National Electrification Administration (NEA) or the
NPC considering that charges imposed by respondent emanated from these agencies.[13]

On April 18, 1992, respondent ZANECO filed with the trial court a motion for
reconsideration of the order dated March 28, 1992.[14]

On October 9, 1992 the trial court denied ZANECOs motion for reconsideration.[15]

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, on November 16, 1992, the Court of Appeals issued a
temporary restraining order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, let a temporary restraining order be issued enjoining public respondent, its
agents and representative from proceeding with the case and from enforcing all the
questioned orders until further notice from this Court.
In addition, private respondent is hereby given five (5) days from notice to show cause
why no writ of preliminary injunction should be issued for the purpose.[16]

On January 28, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision reversing that of the trial
court. The decretal portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED, the order dated March 28,
1992 and October 9, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE and the respondent Court ordered to
DISMISS the complaint.

SO ORDERED. [17]

Hence, this petition.[18]

Petitioner assails the imposition of the FCC and Incremental Costs Charge (ICC) as void,
illegal, and unconstitutional for lack of notice, hearing and consultation of the parties
affected, and without prior authority from the Energy Regulatory Board. Petitioner finally
prays that the case be remanded to the trial court for trial on the merits.[19]

Petitioner rationalized that the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) has jurisdiction by virtue
of Executive Order 172, Section 3 (a) in that ERB is empowered to fix and regulate the
prices of petroleum products. It argued that diesel fuel is embraced within the term
petroleum products. Since the Fuel Compensation Charge was imposed to compensate the
cost of diesel fuel, then such imposition must be approved by the ERB.[20]

We disagree.

The real issue is not the compensation of the cost of diesel fuel used to feed the generating
set in Mindanao.[21] Precisely, the complaint was for Illegal Collection of Power Bills.[22]

Since the complaint is one questioning the increase in the power rates, the proper body to
investigate the case is the NEA.

The regulation and fixing of power rates to be charged by electric cooperatives remain
within the jurisdiction of the National Electrification Administration,[23] despite the
enactment of Executive Order No. 172,[24] creating the Energy Regulatory Board.[25] The
issue raised in the complaint is the legality of the imposition of the FCC or ICC. Despite
the fact that diesel fuel was used to run its machinery, the fact is that respondent charged
its consumers to compensate for the increase in the price of fuel. Petitioner did not
question the price of diesel fuel. Rather, it questioned the charges passed on to its end
users as a result of increase in the price of fuel. And the body with the technical expertise
to determine whether or not the charges are legal is the NEA.

Electric cooperatives, such as the respondent, are vested under Presidential Decree No.
269[26]with the power to fix, maintain, implement and collect rates, fees, rents, tolls, and
other charges and terms and conditions for service. However, the NEA requires that such
must be in furtherance of the purposes and in conformity with the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 269.[27]
NEA, in the exercise of its power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives and
other borrowers, supervised or controlled entities, is empowered to issue orders, rules and
regulations. It may also, motu proprio or upon petition of third parties, conduct
investigations, referenda and other similar actions in all matters, affecting electric
cooperatives and other borrower, or supervised or controlled entities.[28]

Thus, a party questioning the rates imposed by an electric cooperative may file a
complaint with the NEA as it is empowered to conduct hearings and investigations and
issue such orders on the rates that may be charged.[29] Consequently, the case does not
fall within the jurisdiction of the ERB.

In case a party feels aggrieved by any order, ruling or decision of the NEA, he may file a
petition for review before the Court of Appeals.[30]

Petitioner next maintains that the case qualifies as an exception to the rule on exhaustion
of administrative remedies, basing its argument on the unconstitutionality and
arbitrariness of the imposition of the charges.

We are not persuaded.

The Court in a long line of cases has held that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative
processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter
that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted first before the
courts power of judicial review can be sought. The premature resort to the court is fatal to
ones cause of action.[31] Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case
may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.[32]

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without its practical and legal
reasons. Indeed, resort to administrative remedies entails lesser expenses and provides for
speedier disposition of controversies. Our courts of justice for reason of comity and
convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has
been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency every
opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case.[33]

True, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies has certain exceptions as

embodied in various cases. This doctrine is a relative one and is flexible depending on the
peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. It is
disregarded: (1) when there is a violation of due process;[34] (2) when the issue involved is
purely a legal question;[35] (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal and
amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction;[36] (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned;[37] (5) when there is irreparable injury;[38] (6) when the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bears the
implied and assumed approval of the latter;[39] (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable;[40] (8) when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim;[41] (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings;[42] (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention;
[43] and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant;[44] (12) when no
administrative review is provided by law;[45] (13) where the rule of qualified political
agency applies;[46] and (14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
has been rendered moot.[47]

Petitioner fails to show that the instant case falls under any of the exceptions. Mere
allegation of arbitrariness will not suffice to vest in the trial court the power that has been
specifically granted by law to special government agencies.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence.[48]

We have held that while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious
problems caused by unbridled exploitation of our resources, the judiciary will stand clear.
A long line of cases establishes the basic rule that the court will not interfere in matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such
agencies.[49]

In fact, a party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed
administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion
before seeking judicial intervention.[50] The underlying principle of the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that when the
administrative body, or grievance machinery, is afforded a chance to pass upon the
matter, it will decide the same correctly.[51]

The premature invocation of the jurisdiction of the trial court warrants the dismissal of the
case.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM in toto the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
29361, promulgated on January 28, 1993 setting aside the trial courts orders dated March
28, 1992 and October 9, 1992, in Civil Case No. 4386 and ordering the trial court to dismiss
the complaint.

Sun Insurance v Asuncion Digest

G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989

Facts:
Petitioner Sun Insurance (or SIOL) files a complaint for the annulment of a decision on the
consignation of fire insurance policy. Subsequently, the Private Respondent (PR) files a
complaint for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment in a civil case against SIOL. In addition, PR also claims for damages, attorney’s
fees, litigation costs, etc., however, the prayer did not state the amount of damages sought
although from the body of the complaint it can be inferred to be in amount of P 50 million.
Hence, PR originally paid only PhP 210.00 in docket fees.The complaint underwent a
number of amendments to make way for subsequent re-assessments of the amount of
damages sought as well as the corresponding docket fees. The respondent demonstrated
his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.
Issue: Did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case even if private respondent did not
pay the correct or sufficient docket fees?

YES.
It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglamentary period. Same rule goes for permissive counterclaims, third
party claims and similar pleadings.

In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR to defraud the government
of the docket fee due not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of
the second amended complaint. However, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is
called for considering that, unlike in Manchester, the private respondent demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.

Where a trial court acquires jurisdiction in like manner, but subsequently, the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce
said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
Surviving Heirs of Bautista vs. Lindo
G.R. No. 208232, March 10, 2014

Facts: Bautista inherited a free-patent land. A few years later, he subdivided the property
and sold it to several vendees, including herein respondents.

Three years after the sale, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against respondents
before the RTC, anchoring his cause of action on Section 119 of C.A. 141, which reads:

SECTION 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead
provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or
legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.

Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, Bautista died and was substituted by
petitioner Epifania.

Respondents Francisco and Welhilmina Lindo later entered into a compromise agreement
with petitioners, whereby they agreed to cede to Epifania a 3,230 square-meter portion of
the property as well as to waive, abandon, surrender, and withdraw all claims and
counterclaims against each other. The compromise was approved by the RTC.

Other respondents, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the complaint in question since the property which Bautista seeks to
repurchase is below the PhP20,000 jurisdictional ceiling (total selling price is only P16,500).
Note: B.P. 129 grants jurisdiction to the RTCs over civil actions involving title to or
possession of real property or interest therein where the assessed value is more than
PhP20,000.

Ruling of the RTC – against petitioner

The trial court granted the Motion to Dismiss finding that Bautista failed to allege in his
complaint that the value of the subject property exceeds P20,000. What was only stated
therein was that the total and full refund of the purchase price of the property is
PhP16,500. This omission was considered by the RTC as fatal to the case considering that
in real actions, jurisdictional amount is determinative of whether it is the municipal trial
court or the RTC that has jurisdiction over the case.

Issue: WON the RTC erred in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Ruling: Yes, the Court finds that the instant cause of action to repurchase the land is one
for specific performance and is therefore incapable of pecuniary estimation. Thus, the RTC
has jurisdiction.

Reconveyance of the subject property is only incidental to the main action (which is to
repurchase)

At first blush, it appears that the action filed by Bautista involves title to or possession of
the lots he sold to respondents. Since the total selling price is less than P20,000, then the
MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over the case. This proposition is incorrect for the re-
acquisition of the lots by Bautista or the present petitioners, is incidental to and an
offshoot of the exercise of the right by the latter to redeem said lots pursuant to Sec. 119 of
CA 141. The reconveyance of the title to petitioners is solely dependent on the exercise of
such right to repurchase the lots in question and is not the principal or main relief or
remedy sought. Thus, the action of petitioners (to repurchase) is, in reality, incapable of
pecuniary estimation, and the reconveyance of the lot is merely the outcome of the
performance of the obligation to return the property conformably to the express provision
of CA 141.

Respondents actively participated in the proceedings and are therefore estopped

Even if we treat the present action as one involving title to real property or an interest
therein which falls under the jurisdiction of the first level court under Sec. 33 of BP 129, as
the total selling price is only PhP16,000 way below the PhP20,000 ceiling, still, the
postulation of respondents that MTC has jurisdiction will not hold water. This is because
respondents have actually participated in the proceedings before the RTC and
aggressively defended their position, and by virtue of which they are already barred to
question the jurisdiction of the RTC following the principle of jurisdiction by estoppel.

In Heirs of Jose Fernando v. De Belen, it was held that the party raising defenses to the
complaint, actively participating in the proceedings by filing pleadings, presenting his
evidence, and invoking its authority by asking for an affirmative relief is deemed
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the court.
Here, we note that aside from the belated filing of the motion to dismiss — it having been
filed nine (9) years from the filing of the complaint — respondents actively participated in
the proceedings through the following acts:

1. By filing their Answer and Opposition to the Prayer for Injunction 19 dated
September 29, 1994 whereby they even interposed counterclaims, specifically: PhP501,000
for unpaid survey accounts, PhP100,000 each as litigation expenses, PhP200,000 and
PhP3,000 per daily appearance by way of attorney's fees, PhP500,000 as moral damages,
PhP100,000 by way of exemplary damages, and costs of suit;

2. By participating in Pre-trial;

3. By moving for the postponement of their presentation of evidence;

4. By presenting their witness; and

5. By submitting the compromise agreement for approval.

Having fully participated in all stages of the case, and even invoking the RTC's authority
by asking for affirmative reliefs, respondents can no longer assail the jurisdiction of the
said trial court. Simply put, considering the extent of their participation in the case, they
are, as they should be, considered estopped from raising lack of jurisdiction as a ground
for the dismissal of the action.
SPOUSES CLAUDIO AND CARMENCITA TRAYVILLA vs.
BERNARDO SEJAS AND JUVY PAGLINAWAN, REPRESENTED BY JESSIE
PAGLINAWAN
G.R. No. 204970, February 01, 2016

Facts: Petitioner-spouses Trayvilla instituted before the RTC against respondent Sejas a
Complaint for specific performance and damages, claiming among others that Sejas
fraudulently sold to them a 434 sq meter land for P6,000 evidenced by a private
handwritten document.

In an Amended Complaint, this time for specific performance, reconveyance, and

damages, petitioners impleaded respondent Paglinawan as additional defendant, claiming
that Sejas subsequently sold the subject property to her and was issued a TCT. Petitioners
pray that Sejas be ordered to execute a final deed of sale in their favor; that Paglinawan's
TCT be canceled and the property be reconveyed to them; and that they be awarded
P50,000.00 in moral damages.

However, the additional docket fees for the moral damages prayed for in the Amended
Complaint were not paid. Likewise, for the additional causes of action, no docket fees
were charged and paid.

Respondents moved for dismissal of the case, claiming lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter and prescription. The RTC denied the motion.

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that petitioners' case was not for
specific performance but was in reality a real action or one involving title to and
possession of real property, in which case the value of the property should be alleged in
the complaint in order that the proper filing fee may be computed and paid; that since the
value of the land was not alleged in the Amended Complaint, the proper filing fee was not
paid, and for this reason the case should be dismissed;

Ruling of the RTC – in favor of petitioners

RTC denied the motion, stating that petitioners' case is not a real action but indeed one for
specific performance and thus one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Dom: being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation, there is no longer a need for
petitioners to allege in the Amended Complaint the assessed value of the property for the
proper filing fees to be paid.
Ruling of the CA – reversed the RTC ruling

The CA ruled that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the civil case.

Consistent with Section 1, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that the
prescribed fees shall be paid in full "upon the filing of the pleading or other application
which initiates an action or proceeding", the well-entrenched rule is to the effect that a
court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed filing and
docket fees.

While it may appear that the suit filed is one for specific performance, hence an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation, a closer look at the allegations and reliefs prayed for in
the Complaint shows that private respondents were not merely seeking the execution of
the deed of sale in their favor. They were also asking the lower court earnestly to cancel
the TCT issued to petitioner Paglinawan through fraudulent means and have the same
reconveyed to them. Their cause of action clearly springs from their right as purchaser of
the subject land. Under these circumstances, the suit before the RTC is a real action.

Dom: being a real action, there is now a need for petitioners to allege in their Amended
Complaint the assessed value of the property for purposes of determining the amount to
be paid as filing fees. Absent of this allegation divests the RTC of its jurisdiction since the
proper filing fees cannot be paid.

In Gochan v. Gochan, the Court ruled that although the caption of the complaint filed by
therein respondents with the RTC was denominated as one for 'specific performance and
damages,' the relief sought was the conveyance or transfer of real property. Consequently,
the basis for determining the correct docket fees shall be the assessed value of the
property, or the estimated value thereof as alleged in the complaint. But since respondents
failed to allege in their complaint the value of the real properties, the Court found that the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the same for non-payment of the correct docket fees.

Issue: Was the CA correct in ruling against petitioners?

Ruling: Yes. As correctly ruled by the CA, while petitioners' Amended Complaint was
denominated as one mainly for specific performance, they additionally prayed for
reconveyance of the property, as well as the cancellation of Paglinawan's TCT. In other
words, petitioners' aim in filing the case was to secure their claimed ownership and title to
the subject property, which qualifies their case as a real action.

Since the case is a real action made so by the Amended Complaint later filed, petitioners
should have observed the requirement under A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC relative to declaring the
fair market value of the property as stated in the current tax declaration or zonal valuation
of the BIR. Since no such allegation was made in the Amended Complaint, then the value
of the subject property as stated in the handwritten document sued upon and restated in
the Amended Complaint should be the basis for determining jurisdiction and the amount
of docket fees to be paid. Under applicable rules,

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;

In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of
lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such
property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.

However, the CA failed to consider that in determining jurisdiction, it could rely on the
declaration made in the Amended Complaint that the property is valued at P6,000.00. The
handwritten document sued upon and the pleadings indicate that the property was
purchased by petitioners for the price of P6,000.00. For purposes of filing the civil case
against respondents, this amount should be the stated value of the property in the absence
of a current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the BIR.

Since the value of the subject property as stated in the Amended Complaint is just
P6,000.00, then the RTC did not have jurisdiction over petitioners' case in the first instance;
it should have dismissed the case. But it did not. In continuing to take cognizance of the
case, the trial court clearly committed grave abuse of discretion.

At first blush, it appears that the action filed by Bautista involves title to or possession of
the lots he sold to respondents. Since the total selling price is less than P20,000, then the
MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over the case. This proposition is incorrect for the re-
acquisition of the lots by Bautista or the present petitioners, is incidental to and an
offshoot of the exercise of the right by the latter to redeem said lots pursuant to Sec. 119 of
CA 141. The reconveyance of the title to petitioners is solely dependent on the exercise of
such right to repurchase the lots in question and is not the principal or main relief or
remedy sought. Thus, the action of petitioners (to repurchase) is, in reality, incapable of
pecuniary estimation, and the reconveyance of the lot is merely the outcome of the
performance of the obligation to return the property conformably to the express provision
of CA 141.

Respondents actively participated in the proceedings and are therefore estopped

Even if we treat the present action as one involving title to real property or an interest
therein which falls under the jurisdiction of the first level court under Sec. 33 of BP 129, as
the total selling price is only PhP16,000 way below the PhP20,000 ceiling, still, the
postulation of respondents that MTC has jurisdiction will not hold water. This is because
respondents have actually participated in the proceedings before the RTC and
aggressively defended their position, and by virtue of which they are already barred to
question the jurisdiction of the RTC following the principle of jurisdiction by estoppel.

In Heirs of Jose Fernando v. De Belen, it was held that the party raising defenses to the
complaint, actively participating in the proceedings by filing pleadings, presenting his
evidence, and invoking its authority by asking for an affirmative relief is deemed
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the court.

Here, we note that aside from the belated filing of the motion to dismiss — it having been
filed nine (9) years from the filing of the complaint — respondents actively participated in
the proceedings through the following acts:

1. By filing their Answer and Opposition to the Prayer for Injunction 19 dated
September 29, 1994 whereby they even interposed counterclaims, specifically: PhP501,000
for unpaid survey accounts, PhP100,000 each as litigation expenses, PhP200,000 and
PhP3,000 per daily appearance by way of attorney's fees, PhP500,000 as moral damages,
PhP100,000 by way of exemplary damages, and costs of suit;

2. By participating in Pre-trial;

3. By moving for the postponement of their presentation of evidence;

4. By presenting their witness; and

5. By submitting the compromise agreement for approval.

Having fully participated in all stages of the case, and even invoking the RTC's authority
by asking for affirmative reliefs, respondents can no longer assail the jurisdiction of the
said trial court. Simply put, considering the extent of their participation in the case, they
are, as they should be, considered estopped from raising lack of jurisdiction as a ground
for the dismissal of the action.
Penta Pacific vs. Ley Construction
G.R. No. 161589 November 24, 2014

Facts:The petitioner owned the 25th floor of the Pacific Star Building with an area of
1,068.67 square meters. The respondent leased 444.03 square meters of the premises
(subject property) through the petitioner's authorized agent, CPMI. In 1997, the
respondent expressed the intention to purchase the entire 1,068.67 square meters. The
parties executed a contract to sell, denominated as a reservation agreement, in which they
set the purchase price at US$3,420,540.00. 20% down payment and the 80% balance was to
be paid in 13 installments.

After paying US$538,735.00, the respondent stopped paying the stipulated monthly
amortizations.
In its letter in 1999, the petitioner's counsel wrote to the respondent requesting the latter to
vacate the subject premises for its continued refusal/failure to pay the balance of the
agreed-upon purchase price.

For respondent’s failure to comply, the petitioner filed the complaint for ejectment in the
MeTC with the demands to pay and vacate.

MeTC Ruling – in favor of petitioner

MeTC found that the respondent's lawful possession of the property had been by virtue of
the contract of lease, but had become unlawful when the respondent had failed to comply
with its obligation to pay the monthly rentals for the subject property; and that, in any
event, the reservation agreement proved that the petitioner had held the better right to
possess the subject property as the owner thereof.

RTC Ruling and CA – reversed MeTC’s ruling

The RTC rendered its judgment nullifying the MeTC's decision on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, holding that the appropriate action was either accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria over which the MeTC had no jurisdiction.

Dom: If the action was for unlawful detainer, MTC has jurisdiction; If the action was for
accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, RTC has jurisdiction.

Issue: WON the MTC had jurisdiction/WON the case calls for one of unlawful detainer

Ruling: Yes, the MTC had jurisdiction since this is a case of unlawful detainer.

For the action to come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, the complaint
must allege that: (a) the defendant originally had lawful possession of the property, either
by virtue of a contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (b) the defendant's possession of the
property eventually became illegal or unlawful upon notice by the plaintiff to the
defendant of the expiration or the termination of the defendant's right of possession; (c)
the defendant thereafter remained in possession of the property and thereby deprived the
plaintiff the enjoyment thereof; and (d) the plaintiff instituted the action within one year
from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession.

The complaint herein sufficiently alleged all the foregoing requisites for unlawful detainer,
to wit:

3. On January 31, 1997, the defendant and the plaintiff's authorized agent, CPMI,
entered into a Contract of Lease whereby the latter leased from the former a portion of the
25th Floor of the PSB.

4. On March 19, 1997, the defendant decided to purchase from the plaintiff the 25th
Floor of the PSB by virtue of a Reservation Agreement of the same date.

5. However, on August 1997, the defendant started to default in its amortization

payments on the above-mentioned purchase.
10. the plaintiff formally made a notarial cancellation of the aforementioned purchase
and demanded that defendant peacefully vacate the PROPERTY.

11. However, despite such demand, the defendant has failed and/or refused and
continues to refuse and fail to peacefully vacate the PROPERTY.

As earlier shown, the final letter of the petitioner's counsel demanded that the respondent
vacate the subject property. After the demand went unheeded, the petitioner initiated this
suit in the MeTC on July 9, 1999, well within the one-year period from the date of the last
demand.

The aforequoted allegations of the complaint made out a case of unlawful detainer,
vesting the MeTC with exclusive original jurisdiction over the complaint.

The jurisdiction of the MeTC was not ousted by the fact that what was ultimately proved
as to how entry by the respondent had been made or when the dispossession had started
might have departed from that alleged in the complaint. As earlier stated, jurisdiction over
the subject matter was determined from the allegations of the complaint, which clearly set
forth a cause of action for unlawful detainer.

A defendant's claim of possession de jure or his averment of ownership does not render
the ejectment suit either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The suit remains an
accion interdictal, a summary proceeding that can proceed independently of any claim of
ownership. Even when the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership is to be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession.

Spouses Tuazon v. Tuazon

G.R. No. 191432, September 02, 2015

FACTS: This case arose from a complaint for recovery of possession and damages filed by
respondents Vicente Tuazon and John Tuazon against petitioner spouses Francisco and
Ruth Tuazon. The respondents alleged in their complaint that they are the absolute
owners of a 2-hectare land located in Camarines Sur, covered by an OCT. They acquired
the land by way of deed of absolute sale from its original owner, the late Rosa Tuazon,
Vicente’s mother. They further alleged that after the sale, Francisco Tuazon filed with RTC
of Naga City a complaint for reconveyance of property against Vicente on the ground that
their mother ceded to him 1 hectare of the subject property. They alleged that the
complaint was dismissed, and the validity of the sale between Vicente and Rosa was
upheld. Respondents averred that despite finality of decision and repeated demands,
petitioners refused to turn over its possession.

Petitioners, in their answer with counterclaim, pleaded tenancy as defense. They alleged
that before the purchase of the property, Rosa instituted Ruth as tenant of the land. Ruth
claimed that she and Rosa had a sharing agreement, ¼ of produce goes to Ruth and ¾
goes to Rosa, and that she regularly delivered the share of Rosa until her demise, and that
even after that, she continued to deliver Rosa’s share to one of her sons, Alex Tuazon, the
alleged de facto administrator. She contended that despite the change of ownership, she
enjoys security of tenure under the Agricultural Land Reform Code. Hence, petitioners
prayed that the case be dismissed on the ground that it is not the trial court that has
jurisdiction but the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

Trial court ruled that the case involves an agrarian dispute which is under the jurisdiction
of the DARAB. Thus, it dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
MR was denied, hence they filed an appeal with CA. CA reversed the trial court ruling
and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. CA held that tenancy was
not proved by petitioners.

ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

RULING: YES, requisites for tenancy dispute were not met, thus making it fall within
jurisdiction of the RTC.

To determine where a case involves a tenancy dispute, the following requisites must be
present: 1. The parties are the landowner and tenant; 2. The subject matter is agri land; 3.
Consent between the parties; 4. Purpose is for agri production; 5. There is personal
cultivation by the tenant; 6. There is sharing of harvests between parties. Not all of these
requisites are present in the case.

First requisite is lacking, since both parties claimed ownership over the land. Petitioner
Ruth alleged that she was the legal owner and possessor of the entire subject property.
Petitioner also failed to prove that Rosa, the original owner of the land, installed Ruth as
the agricultural tenant on the landholding.

The last requisite was also not met since petitioner failed to prove that Ruth shared the
produce of the subject land with Rosa from 1987-1991. Alex himself also admitted during
his testimony that he was not authorized by his mother to be administrator of the
property.

Since not all of the requisites to prove a tenancy dispute were present, the Regional Trial
Court of Naga City had jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Cabrera v. Clarin
G.R. No. 215640, November 28, 2016

FACTS: This petition originated from a complaint for accion publiciana with damages
filed before the RTC by Cabrera against respondent Arnel Clarin and wife, Milagros
Barrios and husband, Aurora Serafin and husband, and Bonifacio Moreno and wife.
Cabrera alleged that he is the lawful and registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land
located in Bulacan, with a total area of 60,000 sqm covered by a TCT. He was in actual
physical possession of the land until he discovered the encroachment of respondents
sometime in December 2005. By means of stealth, strategy, and fraud, respondents
usurped and occupied portions of said property. He made numerous written and oral
demands to vacate, but respondents refused to heed. They also failed to amicably settle in
a barangay conciliation.

In their motion to dismiss, respondents claimed that the complainant failed to state the
assessed value of the property which is needed in determining the correct amount of
docket fees to be paid. Also, Cabrera did not fulfill an essential condition prior to the filing
of the complaint which was submission of a government approved survey plan to prove
the encroachment. Cabrera anchors his claim of ownership in the certificate of title
registered in his and his father Ciriaco Cabrera’s name. Cabrera did not aver that it was
his portion of property that respondents have intruded as there was no proof of partition
of the property since his father who was an American citizen died in the USA.

RTC denied respondents motion and directed them to file an answer. The RTC ruled that
the case is a plenary action of accion publiciana which falls under their jurisdiction, citing
the case of Aguilon v. Bohol. Respondents filed to file answer thus they were declared in
default. Cabrera presented evidence ex parte.

RTC ruled in favor of Cabrera. Respondents appealed to CA, which reversed the RTC
decision. CA denied Cabrera’s MR.

ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction to hear the case despite the failure to alleged the
assessed value of the subject property.

Ruling: NO jurisdiction.

Under BP 129, which amended RA 7691, the jurisdiction of the court to try and hear civil
actions involving property depend upon the assessed value of said property. Accordingly,
the jurisdictional element is the assessed value of the property.

A perusal of the complaint shows that Cabrera failed to state the assessed value of the
disputed land. Nowhere in the complaint can it be found that the assessed value of the
subject property was ever mentioned. On its face, there is no showing that the RTC has
jurisdiction exclusive of the MTC. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed
value of the property, it cannot be readily determined that the court has jurisdiction over
the subject matter.

The Court held in this case that jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,
even on appeal the same is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the
court to take cognizance of and to render judgement on the action. The only exception to
this rule is when a party is barred by laches.
SAMSODEN PANGCATAN, Petitioner, v. ALEXANDRO "DODONG" MAGHUYOP
AND BELINDO BANKIAO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 194412, November 16, 2016

ALEXANDRO "DODONG" MAGHUYOP AND BELINDO BANKIAO, Petitioners, v.

SAMSODEN PANGCATAN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 194566, November 16, 2016
PANGCATAN VS MAGHUYOP AND BANKIAO (GR 194412) – this is an appeal brought
by Pangcatan praying that the CA decision be reversed at set aside. CA annulled the RTC
in Marawi City decision wherein it declared that the latter improperly allowed the filing of
his suit on the basis of his being an indigent litigant despite not having received evidence
of his indigency. Nevertheless, CA remanded the case and required the RTC to hear and
resolve Pangcatan’s Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File Case as Pauper Litigant.

MAGHUYOP AND BANKIAO, VS PANGCATAN (GR 194566) – appeal brought by the

defendants in the above mentioned case to reverse the remand of the case to the RTC on
the ground that such remand is a deviation from the rulings of the Court to the effect that
the courts would acquire jurisdiction over cases only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fees.

FACTS:

Pangcatan figured in an accident. He hired the passenger van owned by Maghuyop and
driven by Bankiao to transport himself and the goods he had purchased from Pagadian
City to his store in Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur. In the police report, the dump truck
of Engr. Garcia driven by Densing bumped the rear of the van, causing Pangcatan to lose
consciousness, fracture his right leg, and lose all his goods. He alleged that because of his
injury, he could bever sell again or engage in any other business; and that his medical bills
totaled to P500,000. On Sept. 2002, he filed his complaint as well as his Ex Parte Motion for
Leave to File Case as Pauper Litigant. The motion was granted by RTC under the
condition that the filing fees would constitute a first lien on any monetary judgment in his
favor.

Instead of answering, Maghuyop and Bankiao moved to dismiss the complaint on several
grounds, among other, that Pangcatan, a well-known businessman and resident of
Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur, was not an indigent litigant, hence not qualified to be
represented by the PAO. This was dismissed. They were declared in default coz they did
not subsequently filed their answer. Then, Pangacatan presented evidence ex parte. Later,
they submitted their Comment and Opposition to Pangcata’s Formal Offer of Evidence
with Motion to Strike Out All Pleadings filed by the Plaintiff, alleging that Pangcatan was
not an indigent litigant, and that RTC did not acquire jurisdiction because of the non-
payment of the required docket fees.

However, said motion was denied. Then, RTC dismissed the complaint against Engr.
Garcia and Densing coz they entered a compromise with Pangcatan. Then, Maghuyop and
Bankiao were ordered to pay Pangcatan several amounts representing damages.

Maghuyop and Bankiao appealed to the CA, which promulgated the above-mentioned
assailed decision. (RTC decision annulled nya remanded for the Motion as Pauper Litigant
to be heard). Hence, the petitions.

ISSUES:

RAISED BY PANGCATAN: that he is exempted from payment of docket fees pursuant to

TA 9406 and OCA Circular 121-2007, under which clients of the PAO were exempt from
the payment of docket and other incidental fees by reason of his indigence.

RAISED BY MAGHUYOP AND BANKIAO: not an indigent litigant because his estimated
daily earnings had amounted to P400, he did not submit the necessary affidavit stating
that (1) his gross income did not exceed double the amount of the monthly minimum
wage; and (2) he did not own real property with fair market value of more than P300k.

BOTTOMLINE: Did CA err in setting aside the RTC judgment and remanding the case for
the determination of the Motion as Pauper Litigant by Pangcatan?

RULING: 194412 GRANTED (PANGCATAN), 194566 DENIED

GENERAL RULE: When an action is filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied by
the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees (Sec. 1, Rule 141 ROC). If the complaint
is filed but the prescribed fees are not paid at the time of filing, the courts acquire
jurisdiction ONLY upon the full payment of such fees within a reasonable time as the
courts may grant, barring prescription.

EXC: INDIGENT LITIGANTS

Sec. 11, Art. 3 of the Consti: Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.

 This exception can only be extended to NATURAL PARTY LITIGANTS

 Juridical persons, even if they worked for indigent and underprivileged people,
CANNOT take refuge coz the Consti has explicitly premised the free access clause on a
person’s poverty, A CONDITION THAT ONLY A NATURAL PERSON CAN SUFFER.

 Procedure for application (Algura vs LGU of City of Naga) – courts shall scrutinize
the affidavits and supporting documents of the applicant to determine whether his
application complies with the requirements in SEC 19, RULE 141 ROC:

o (SALARY) Gross income and that of his immediate family do not exceed an amount
double the monthly minimum wage of an employee

o (PROPERTY) Does not own real property with a fair market value of more than
P300,000.

 If both requirements are present – automatically granted as indigent litigant

 And said grant is a matter of right

If one or both of the requirements are not met, then a HEARING must be set (SEC 21,
RULE 3) to enable the applicant to prove that he has no money or property sufficient and
available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.

Adverse party may present countervailing evidence.

If court determines after hearing that the applicant is not indigent, then proper docket
and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected.

IN THIS CASE: CA erred in annulling the setting aside the RTC judgment based solely on
the non-payment of the filing fees. If the RTC had incorrectly granted Pangcatan's Ex Parte
Motion for Leave to File Case as Pauper Litigant, the grant was not jurisdictional but an
error of judgment on its part as the trial court. RTC Considered Pangcatan as indigent by
reason of his P400 daily income.

Payment of the filing fees vests jurisdiction upon the trial court over the claim in the
complaint. But for the CA to annul the judgment based SOLELY on such non-payment
was NOT RIGHT considering that said non-payment was not attributable alone to
Pangcatan – due to RTC’s error.

CA as well disregarded the fact that from the start, Pangcatan has already been
represented by the PAO – (his motion as Pauper Litigant under the condition that legal
fees are subject to lien upon favorable monetary judgment). So, pursuant to Sec. 16-D of
Admin Code – he is exempted from payment as a client of the PAO office.

Such exemption by virtue of Republic Act No. 9406 was recognized by the Court
Administrator through OCA Circular No. 67-2007, 28 but the clients of the PAO remained
required to submit relevant documentation to comply with the conditions prescribed by
Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Later on, the Court Administrator removed the
conditions prescribed under OCA Circular No. 67-2007 by issuing Circular No. 121-2007.
Since then until the present, all clients of the PAO have been exempt from the payment of
docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action in court whether as an original
proceeding or on appeal.

GOING BACK: Although the exemption of clients of the PAO is not yet a matter of law at
the time Pangcatan filed his civil case, still, it can be applied retrospectively to his case. To
remand to the RTC for factual determination of whether he is an indigent litigant is
superfluous.

Pangcatan's decision was granted.

LASALA VS NFA
G.R. No. 171582, August 19, 2015

FACTS:

Lasala (owns PSF Security Agency), provided security guard services to NFA. Then later,
his employees deployed at NFA filed a complaint with the NLRC alleging underpayment
of wages and nonpayment of other monetary benefits. The latter won, and Lasala and
NFA were judged solidarily liable for the monetary awards.

NFA then filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and an application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Lasala, claiming it had no liability. As
a response, Lasala answered with a counterclaim, praying for amounts for damages.
Initially, the writ was granted but latter nullified. Then NFA’s complaint was later
dismissed for failure of the lawyer deputized by the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel to present NFA’s evidence due to his repeated hearing absences. Then, Atty
Cahucom replaced the previous lawyer. However, Atty. Cahucom, did not exert any effort
to counter Lasala’s testimony in the latter’s counter claim, and simply waived his right to
cross-examine. Hence, the counterclaim was granted.

NFA was not aware of the adverse decision coz Cahucom did not inform it. Losing its
chance to appeal, it filed a petition for relief from judgment grounded on excusable
negligence. But this was denied.

Later, then NFA Administrator Arthur Yap instructed the legal audit of all NFA cases. It
was discovered that both Attys’ Mendoza and Cahucom grossly mishandled this case,
hence causing a huge amount of liability to the NFA, P52M.

On appeal, the CA pointed out that no docket fee is required in Lasala’s counterclaim coz
it is compulsory in nature. However, it annulled the RTC decision saying that the latter
lacked jurisdiction coz no concrete and convincing evidence supported its decision to
grant Lasala’s counterclaim.

ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over Lasala’s counterclaim for nonpayment of
docket fees.

RULING: NO JURISDICTION BECAUSE COUNTERCLAIM IS PERMISSIVE, NOT

COMPULSORY, HENCE DOCKET FEES SHOULD BE PAID

A COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM is any claim for money or other relief that a

defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out
of, or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the plaintiff's complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that it is within the
jurisdiction of the court, does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties
over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred if not set up in the
answer to the complaint in the same case.

TESTS to determine if a counterclaim is COMPULSORY:

1) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely
the same?

2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claims, absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule?

3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim as well as
the defendant's counterclaim?

4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?

 Positive answer to all four – COMPULSORY; otherwise –

PERMISSIVE
IN THIS CASE: Lasala's counterclaim for wage adjustment against the NFA is not a
compulsory but a permissive counterclaim.

The cause of action for this counterclaim already existed even before the filing of the
NFA's complaint against Lasala. Thus, it did not arise out of, nor is it necessarily
connected with, the NFA's complaint for sum of money and prayer for preliminary
attachment. Because it is not an incident of the NFA's claim, it can be filed as a separate
case against the NFA, unless already extinguished.

Under this situation, Lasala's nonpayment of docket fee for his permissive counterclaim
prevented the trial court from acquiring jurisdiction over it. The court may allow payment
of such fee but only within a reasonable time and in no case beyond the prescriptive
period for the filing of the permissive counterclaim.

Prescriptive period – 10 years coz it was based on the parties’ security service contract.

Accrual of action – 1989, when the contract with NFA was executed.

Since no docket fee was paid even after the lapse of 10 years, then NO JURISDICTION.

PETITION DENIED.
Tan vs Cinco
G.R. No. 213054, June 15, 2016

Facts: Respondents extended a loan to the husband of petitioner in the amount of 500,000.
The husband defaulted in paying the loan and after demand he proposed to pay it by way
of assigning his stocks in a corporation in favor of respondents. The assignement however
did not take place and the husband disappeared and so respondents filed a case in RTC
Makati where it eventually resulted in a writ of execution leading up to an auction sale.

Petitioner sought the quashal of the writ contending that the subject properties include the
family home and certain conjugal properties before the RTC Paranaque. RTC Paranaque
initially dismissed the case on the basis of res judicata because of the ruling in RTC
Makati. But after a motion for reconsideration by petitioner, RTC Paranaque eventually
nullified the auction sale and final deeds of sale in favor of respondents.

Respondents then elevated the case contending that RTC Paranaque cannot nullify the
orders of RTC Makati since they are co-equal courts.

Issue: Whether or not RTC Paranaque can nullify the orders of RTC Makati being a co-
equal court.

Ruling: No, the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or
judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice:
no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of
concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The
rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires
jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment,
to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents,
and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in
connection with this judgment.

In this case, the Court finds that the Parañaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial
stability when it took cognizance of Teresita's nullification case despite the fact that the
collection case from which it emanated falls within the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC.
Verily, the nullification case ought to have been dismissed at the outset for lack of
jurisdiction, as the Parañaque RTC is bereft of authority to nullify the levy and sale of the
subject property that was legitimately ordered by the Makati RTC, a coordinate and co-
equal court.
Thus, Teresita's nullification case filed before the Parañaque RTC was improper and in
glaring violation of the doctrine of judicial stability. The judgment rendered by the Makati
RTC in the collection case, as well as the execution thereof, and all other incidents arising
therefrom, may not be interfered with by the Parañaque RTC, a court of concurrent
jurisdiction, for the simple reason that the power to open, modify, or vacate the said
judgment or order is not only possessed but is restricted to the court in which the
judgment or order is rendered or issued.
Estipona v. Lobrigo
G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017
Facts: Estipona was charged for possession of shabu. Subsequently, petitioner filed a
motion to allow the accused to enter into a plea bargaining agreement for the court to
allow him to withdraw his plea of not guilty and to let him enter a plea of guilty for
violation of Sec. 12, Art II of RA 9165 for possession of equipment, apparatus and
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs which has a lower penalty of rehabilitation in view of
his being a first time offender and minimal quantity of drugs in his possession. The
accused challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea
bargaining in any violations of the law. Accused contended among others that it violated
the rule-making power of the Supreme Court Sec. 5 (5) , Art. VIII of the constitution, the
intent of the law (rehabilitation of the offender), and principle of separation of powers
among the co-equal branches of the government. Respondent Judge, however, did not act
upon the issue of the constitutionality of the challenged provision on the view that it is not
for the lower courts to decide upon the constitutionality of the said law.

Issue: WON Sec. 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for encroaching upon the rule-making
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate Rules of Procedure.

Ruling: The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure is now within
the exclusive domain of the Supreme Court by virtue of Sec. 5 (5) Art. VIII. The main
purpose of such provision is to maintain independence of the judiciary from other
branches of the government. Jurisprudence provides that actions taken by the congress
which in effect alter, modify, or repeal the rules of court promulgated by the Supreme
Court should be considered unconstitutional. Since the act of the congress in enacting such
provision violates the rule-making power of the Supreme Court in providing rules of
procedure, the same should be declared unconstitutional.

"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional

rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,

shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court."

Guillermo v Phil. Information Agency

G.R. No. 223751 March 15, 2017
FACTS:

On December 10, 2010, Miguel "Lucky" Guillermo (Guillermo) and AV Manila Creative
Production, Co. (AV Manila) filed a Complaint for a sum of money and damages before
the Regional Trial Court against Philippine Information Agency and Department of Public
Works and Highways.

Guillermo and AV Manila alleged that in the last few months of the Administration of
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, then Acting Secretary of the Department of
Public Works and Highways Victor Domingo (Acting Secretary Domingo), consulted and
discussed with Guillermo and AV Manila the urgent need for an advocacy campaign. The
purpose of the Campaign was to counteract the public's negative perception of the
performance of the outgoing Arroyo Administration.

After meetings with Acting Secretary Domingo and some preliminary work, Guillermo
and AV Manila formally submitted in a letter-proposal dated February 26, 2010 the
concept of "Joyride," a documentary film showcasing milestones of the Arroyo
Administration. Acting Secretary Domingo signed a marginal note on the letter-proposal,
which read, "OK, proceed!"

Petitioner presented to respondent Department of Public Works and Highways the total
consideration for the services to be rendered and for the deliverable items (i.e., DVD
copies of the video, "Joyride" Coffee Table Book and Comics) committed to be delivered
which amounted to P25,000,000.00.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that,

after proper proceedings, judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to jointly and
severally:

1. Pay the plaintiffs the amount of PESOS: TWENTY-FIVE MILLION

(Php25,000,000.00) to cover plaintiffs' services and the delivered items which were
received and used by the defendants as above-mentioned;

2. Pay the plaintiff Guillermo an amount of not less than PESOS: ONE
HUNDRED

THOUSAND (P100,000.00) as and by way of moral damages;

3. Pay the plaintiffs an amount of not less than PESOS: ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P100,000.00) as and by way of exemplary or corrective damages;

4. Pay the plaintiffs an amount of not less than PESOS: ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P100,000.00) as and by way of attorney's fees and litigation expenses; and
5. Pay the cost of the suit.

The Office of the Solicitor General moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a
cause of action and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

RTC AND CA ruled against petitioners.

ISSUE:

WON the Complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

RULING:

YES, failed to state cause of action. To support the foregoing prayer, the Complaint
attempted to lay down the elements of a contract between the petitioners on one hand,
and respondents on the other. Thus, it alleged a series of communications, meetings, and
memoranda, all tending to show that petitioners agreed to complete and deliver the
"Joyride" project, and that respondents agreed to pay P25,000,000.00 as consideration.
(Note: existence of contract is immaterial because the complaint failed to state the twin-
requirement for the execution of government contracts).
[Complaint fails to sufficiently state a cause of action]

A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3)
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A CAUSE OF ACTION, namely:

(a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises
or is created;

(b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and

(c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which
the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.

It is well to point out that the plaintiff's cause of action should not merely be "stated" but,
importantly, the statement thereof should be "sufficient." This is why the elementary test
in a motion to dismiss on such ground is whether or not the complaint alleges facts which
if true would justify the relief demanded. As a corollary, it has been held that only
ultimate facts and not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts are considered for purposes of
applying the test.

[Twin-requirement for the execution of government contracts – the existence of

appropriation and the attachment of the certification]

Assuming that the Complaint's factual allegations are true, they are not sufficient to
establish that the Regional Trial Court could grant its prayer.
In Philippine National Railways v. Kanlaon Construction Enterprises Co., Inc., this Court
has held that contracts that do not comply with the foregoing requirements are void:

Thus, the Administrative Code of 1987 expressly prohibits the entering into contracts
involving the expenditure of public funds unless two prior requirements are satisfied.
First, there must be an appropriation law authorizing the expenditure required in the
contract. Second, there must be attached to the contract a certification by the proper
accounting official and auditor that funds have been appropriated by law and such funds
are available. Failure to comply with any of these two requirements renders the contract
void.

The Complaint, however, completely ignored the foregoing requisites for the validity of
contracts involving expenditure of public funds.

[Recourse of petitioners]

Under the Administrative Code, officers who enter into contracts contrary to Sections 46
and 47 of Book V, Title I, Subtitle B, Chapter 8 of the Administrative Code are liable to the
government or to the other contracting party for damages:

Thus, assuming petitioners are able to prove a contract was entered into, they may go after
the officers who entered into said contract and hold them personally liable.

Pacaña-Contreras v Rovilla Water Supply, Inc.

G.R. No. 168979 December 2, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioners Rebecca Pacaña-Contreras and Rosalie Pacaña, children of Lourdes Teves

Pacaña and Luciano Pacaña, filed the present case against Rovila Inc., Earl, Lilia, Dalla and
Marisa for accounting and damages. The petitioners claimed that their family has long
been known in the community to be engaged in the water supply business; they operated
the "Rovila Water Supply" from their family residence and were engaged in the
distribution of water to customers in Cebu City.

The petitioners alleged that Lilia was a former trusted employee in the family business
who hid business records and burned and ransacked the family files.

Upon inquiry with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the

petitioners claimed that Rovila Inc. was surreptitiously formed with the respondents as
the majority stockholders. The respondents did so by conspiring with one another and
forming the respondent corporation to takeover and illegally usurp the family business'
registered name.

The petitioners filed the complaint in their own names although Rosalie was authorized
by Lourdes through a sworn declaration and special power of attorney (SPA). The
respondents filed a first motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction
over an intra-corporate controversy.
On September 26, 2000, Lourdes died and the petitioners amended their complaint, with
leave of court, on October 2, 2000 to reflect this development. They still attached to their
amended complaint the sworn declaration with SPA, but the caption of the amended
complaint remained the same. On October 10, 2000, Luciano also died. The respondents
filed their Answer on November 16, 2000. The petitioners' sister, Lagrimas Pacaña-
Gonzales, filed a motion for leave to intervene and her answer-in-intervention was
granted by the trial court. At the subsequent pre-trial, the respondents manifested to the
RTC that a substitution of the parties was necessary in light of the deaths of Lourdes and
Luciano. They further stated that they would seek the dismissal of the complaint because
the petitioners are not the real parties in interest to prosecute the case. (Note: this is the
only time when respondent filed its motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state
cause of action)

RTC: denied the respondents' motion to dismiss. a motion to dismiss

CA: reversed RTC

ISSUE:

1. WON the motion to dismissed filed by respondents are deemed to have waived for
failure to file it timely

2. WON the non-inclusion of both the spouses Pacaña (indispensable parties) were
not impleaded as parties-plaintiffs is ground for dismissal.

RULING:

1. Yes. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a motion to dismiss based
on the grounds invoked by the respondents may be waived if not raised in a motion to
dismiss or alleged in their answer.

[FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION vs LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION]

In the case of Macaslang v. Zamora, 56 the Court noted that the incorrect appreciation by
both the RTC and the CA of the distinction between the dismissal of an action, based on
"failure to state a cause of action" and "lack of cause of action," prevented it from properly
deciding the case, and we quote:

Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are really different from each
other. On the one hand, failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the
pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. On the other
hand, lack of cause [of] action refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the
cause of action alleged in the pleading. Justice Regalado, a recognized commentator on
remedial law, has explained the distinction:
. . . What is contemplated, therefore, is a failure to state a cause of action which is provided
in Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16. This is a matter of insufficiency of
the pleading. Sec. 5 of Rule 10, which was also included as the last mode for raising the
issue to the court, refers to the situation where the evidence does not prove a cause of
action. This is, therefore, a matter of insufficiency of evidence. Failure to state a cause of
action is different from failure to prove a cause of action. The remedy in the first is to
move for dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the second is to demur to the
evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been eliminated in this section. The
procedure would consequently be to require the pleading to state a cause of action, by
timely objection to its deficiency; or, at the trial, to file a demurrer to evidence, if such
motion is warranted. [italics supplied]

Based on this discussion, the Court cannot uphold the dismissal of the present case based
on the grounds invoked by the respondents which they have waived for failure to invoke
them within the period prescribed by the Rules. The Court cannot also dismiss the case
based on "lack of cause of action" as this would require at least a preponderance of
evidence which is yet to be appreciated by the trial court.

2. Not a ground for dismissal, it is a curative. Sps Pacaña are indispensable however,
since they passed away, all the heirs are now the indispensable party thus, except
petitioners are ordered to be impleaded as party.

[Real party in interest vs Indispensable party vs Necessary party]

At this juncture, a distinction between a real party in interest and an indispensable party is
in order. In Carandang v. Heirs of de Guzman, et al., 57 the Court clarified these two
concepts and held that "[a] real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. On the
other hand, an indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action, in contrast to a necessary party, which is one who is
not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded
as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim
subject of the action. . . . If a suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in
interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause
of action. However, the dismissal on this ground entails an examination of whether the
parties presently pleaded are interested in the outcome of the litigation, and not whether
all persons interested in such outcome are actually pleaded. The latter query is relevant in
discussions concerning indispensable and necessary parties, but not in discussions
concerning real parties in interest. Both indispensable and necessary parties are
considered as real parties in interest, since both classes of parties stand to be benefited or
injured by the judgment of the suit."

[Effect of Inclusion or Non-inclusion of an Indispensable Party]

[OLD - dismiss]Due to the non-inclusion of indispensable parties, the Court dismissed the
case in Lucman v. Malawi, et al. and Go v. Distinction Properties Development
Construction, Inc., while in Casals, et al. v. Tayud Golf and Country Club et al., the Court
annulled the judgment which was rendered without the inclusion of the indispensable
parties.

[OLD - curative]However, in the cases of Quilatan, et al. v. Heirs of Quilatan, et al. and
Lagunilla, et al. v. Monis, et al., the Court remanded the case to the RTC for the
impleading of indispensable parties. On the other hand, inLotte Phil. Co., Inc. v. Dela
Cruz, PepsiCo, Inc. v. Emerald Pizza, and Valdez-Tallorin, v. Heirs of Tarona, et al., the
Court directly ordered that the indispensable parties be impleaded.

[NEW – Curative] Mindful of the differing views of the Court as regards the legal effects
of the non-inclusion of indispensable parties, the Court clarified in Republic of the
Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, et al., that the failure to implead indispensable parties is a
curable error and the foreign origin of our present rules on indispensable parties
permitted this corrective measure. The rule on joinder of indispensable parties is founded
on equity. And the spirit of the law is reflected in Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. It prohibits the dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or
misjoinder of parties and allows the amendment of the complaint at any stage of the
proceedings, through motion or on order of the court on its own initiative.

[PRESENT CASE]

With these discussions as premises, the Court is of the view that the proper remedy in the
present case is to implead the indispensable parties especially when their non-inclusion is
merely a technical defect. To do so would serve proper administration of justice and
prevent further delay and multiplicity of suits. Pursuant to Section 9, Rule 3 of the

Rules of Court, parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its
own initiative at any stage of the action. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable
party despite the order of the court, then the court may dismiss the complaint for the
plaintiff's failure to comply with a lawful court order. The operative act that would lead to
the dismissal of the case would be the refusal to comply with the directive of the court for
the joinder of an indispensable party to the case.

Obviously, in the present case, the deceased Pacañas can no longer be included in the
complaint as indispensable parties because of their death during the pendency of the case.
Upon their death, however, their ownership and rights over their properties were
transmitted to their heirs, including herein petitioners, pursuant to Article 774 in relation
with Article 777 of the Civil Code.In Orbeta, et al. v. Sendiong, the Court acknowledged
that the heirs, whose hereditary rights are to be affected by the case, are deemed
indispensable parties who should have been impleaded by the trial court.

Therefore, to obviate further delay in the proceedings of the present case and given the
Court's authority to order the inclusion of an indispensable party at any stage of the
proceedings, the heirs of the spouses Pacaña, except the petitioners who are already
parties to the case and Lagrimas Pacaña-Gonzalez who intervened in the case, are hereby
ordered impleaded as parties-plaintiffs.

PNB vs. Rivera

G.R. No. 189577, April 20, 2016

Facts: Spouses Rivera executed a real estate mortgage in favor of PNB to secure the
payment of the loans. The mortgage was eventually foreclosed and the land was sold to
Sosito at public auction.

Spouses Rivera filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale with Damages alleging that the
Spouses Rivera did not receive the notice of the auction sale as it was sent to the wrong
address; and had the Spouses been informed of the auction sale, they would have
informed Sosito that they had already paid their obligation to PNB.

PNB filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that the Spouses Rivera had no cause of action
since Act No. 3135 does not require personal notice to the mortgagor in case of auction
sale and the Spouses Rivera failed to attach the official receipts to show their substantial
payments of the amortizations.

Ruling of the RTC – in favor of PNB

“the same failed to state a cause of action. There being a proper notice to plaintiffs of the
auction sale of their mortgaged property, defendants had not violated any rights of
plaintiffs from which a cause of action had arisen.”

Ruling of the CA – reversed; remanded to the case back to RTC

“allegations in the Complaint sufficiently made out a cause of action against PNB.”

Issue: WON there is failure to state a cause of action

Ruling: No, there was cause of action.

Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action distinguished

Lack of cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action.
Dismissal due to lack of cause of

action may be raised any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of
stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff. It is a proper ground for a

demurrer to evidence.

In this case, the RTC could not have dismissed the Complaint due to lack of cause of
action for as stated above, such ground may only be raised after the plaintiff has
completed the presentation of his evidence.
If the allegations of the complaint do not state the concurrence of the above elements, the
complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action which is the proper remedy under Section 1 (g) of Rule 16 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:

Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following
grounds:

xxx xxx xxx

(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;

Dom: Lack of cause of action – may be raised only after presentation of evidence; Failure
to state a cause of action – may be raised only before filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading.

In the present case, since PNB contested that there was lack of cause of action, the SC ruled
that the RTC could not have dismissed the case simply because there has been no
presentation of evidence, yet. To reiterate, lack of cause of action, as a ground, may only
be raised after the presentation of evidence.

Spouses Rivera sufficiently stated a cause of action

“By filing a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a cause of
action, defendant-appellee PNB hypothetically admits the material allegations in the
complaint:

*long list of allegations made by PNB (basically admitting that they sent the notice to the
wrong address)

The foregoing allegations of non-receipt by plaintiffs-appellants of any notice of the

auction sale and their full payment of their obligation to defendant-appellee PNB are
hypothetically admitted by the latter and sufficiently make out a cause of action against
defendants-appellees. Whether said allegations are true or not are inconsequential to a
determination of the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint.”
Gemina vs. Eugenio
G.R. No. 215802, October 19, 2016

Facts: Spouses Eugenio were the registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of 5,299
square meters. The subject property was sold by a certain Francisco to respondent Spouses
Mariano.

The petitioners (alleged heirs of Eugenio), represented by Candido, Jr., filed a complaint
for annulment of the sale before the RTC. They alleged that they were the legal heirs of the
deceased Spouses Eugenio, who were the registered owners of the subject property. They
further averred that the vendors sold the subject property without the consent of all the
legal heirs, thus, the contract of sale was null and void.
Ruling of the RTC and CA

Dismissed the complaint on the ground that the petitioners were not the real parties in
interest and that Spouses Mariano are buyers in good faith. It noted that from the
allegations in the complaint, the right that the petitioners sought to protect or enforce was
that of an heir. Thus, it held that there was a need to establish their status as heirs in a
special proceeding for that purpose before they could institute an ordinary civil action to
enforce their rights in the subject property and to have legal personality to seek the nullity
of the instruments which affected their rights in the said property.

Issue: WON the RTC properly dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action

Ruling: No, RTC improperly dismissed the complaint.

Failure to state a cause of action is different from failure to prove a cause of action. The
remedy in the first is to move for dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the
second is to demur to the evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been
eliminated in this section. The procedure would consequently be to require the pleading to
state a cause of action, by timely objection to its deficiency; or, at the trial, to file a
demurrer to evidence, if such motion is warranted.

As the rule now stands, the neglect to invoke the ground of failure to state a cause of
action in a motion to dismiss or in the answer would result in its waiver. The reason for
the deletion is that failure to state a cause of action may be cured under Section 5, Rule 10
of the Rules of Court:

Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. — When

issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the
parties they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these
issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues
made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so
with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial
justice will be subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the
amendment to be made.

In this case, the ground of failure to state a cause of action was indeed waived because the
respondents did not raise the same in a motion to dismiss or in their answer. The RTC
continued to try the case and even attempted to determine if the petitioners were the
lawful heirs of Spouses Eugenio. After examining the records, the Court is of the view that
it is better to first resolve the issue of heirship in a separate proceeding.

Dom: I think that there is failure to state a cause of action because petitioners, the alleged
heirs, are yet to prove their “heirship” through a special proceeding. However,
respondents never questioned this in their motion to dismiss or answer, so the court ruled
that it is waived.
The ground for dismissal being that the petitioners are not the real parties-in-interest, it
was premature on the part of the RTC and the CA to declare that the respondents are
buyers in good faith. Hence, this judgment is without prejudice to the filing of an action
for annulment of instrument and/or reconveyance of property against the proper parties
after a determination of the lawful heirs of Spouses Eugenio in a separate proceeding.

UNICAPITAL, INC. v. CONSING

G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285 September 11, 2013

FACTS: In 1997, Consing, Jr., an investment banker, and his mother, Cecilia Dela, obtained
an P18m loan from Unicapital. The said loan was secured by Promissory Notes and a Real
Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land located at Imus, Cavite, registered in the name of
Dela Cruz. PBI entered into a joint venture agreement with Unicapital, through its real
estate development arm, URI. In view of the foregoing, the loan and mortgage over the
subject property was later on modified into an Option to Buy Real Property and, after
further negotiations, Dela Cruz decided to sell the same to Unicapital and PBI.

Eventually, Unicapital, through URI, purchased one-half of the subject property while PBI
bought the remaining. However, even before URI and PBI were able to have the titles
transferred to their names, Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu informed Unicapital that
they are the lawful owners of the subject property and that Dela Cruz's title was a mere
forgery. PBI conducted further investigations which revealed that Dela Cruz's title was
actually of dubious origin. PBI and Unicapital sought the return of the purchase price they
had paid for the subject property.

The Proceedings Antecedent to G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285

On May 3, 1999, Consing, Jr. filed a complaint, denominated as a Complex Action for
Declaratory Relief and later amended to Complex Action for Injunctive Relief before the
RTC-Pasig City against Unicapital, URI, PBI, Martirez, PBI General Manager Mariano
Martinez (Martinez), Dela Cruz, docketed as SCA No. 1759. In his complaint, Consing, Jr.
claimed that the incessant demands/recovery efforts made upon him by Unicapital and
PBI to return to them the purchase price they had paid for the subject property constituted
harassment and oppression. Likewise, Consing, Jr. added that Unicapital and PBI's
representatives were "speaking of him in a manner that was inappropriate and libelous,".
He prayed that Unicapital, URI, and PBI pay him actual and consequential damages in the
amount of P2m, moral damages of at least P1m exemplary damages.

For their part, Unicapital, et al. filed separate Motions to Dismiss Consing, Jr.'s complaint
on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. In the same vein, they maintained that
the RTC-Pasig City had no jurisdiction over their supposed violations of the Corporation
Code and Revised Securities Act, which, should have been supposedly lodged with the
Securities and Exchange Commission.

RTC-Pasig City denied the abovementioned motions to dismiss, holding that Consing, Jr.'s
complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for tort and damages pursuant to Article 19
of the Civil Code. CA affirmed and it furthermore noted that Consing, Jr. does not seek to
recover his claims against any particular provision of the corporation code or the securities
act but against the actions of Unicapital and PBI, et al.; hence, Consing, Jr.'s complaint was
principally one for damages over which the RTC has jurisdiction, and, in turn, there lies
no misjoinder of causes of action.

The Proceedings Antecedent to G.R. No. 192073

On the other hand, on August 4, 1999, Unicapital filed a complaint for sum of money with
damages against Consing, Jr. and Dela Cruz before the RTC-Makati City, docketed as Civil
Case No. 99-1418, seeking to recover the amount of P42,195,397.16, representing the value
of their indebtedness.

For his part, Consing, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 99-1418 which was,
however, denied by the RTC-Makati City. Thereafter, he filed a Motion for Consolidation
of Civil Case No. 99-1418 with his own initiated SCA No. 1759 (iyang complaint against
UNICAPITAL and others) pending before the RTC-Pasig City.

RTC-Makati City dismissed Consing, Jr.'s motion for consolidation and, in so doing, ruled
that the cases sought to be consolidated had no identity of rights or causes of action and
the reliefs sought for by Consing, Jr. from the RTC-Pasig City will not bar Unicapital from
pursuing its money claims against him. CA affirmed.

ISSUES: (a) in G.R. Nos. 175277 and 175285, whether or not the CA erred in upholding the
RTC-Pasig City's denial of Unicapital’s motion to dismiss; and (b) in G.R. No. 192073,
whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC-Makati City's denial of Consing, Jr.'s
motion for consolidation.

RULING: BOTH RULINGS IN THE TWO CASES WERE AFFIRMED.

A. Propriety of the denial of Unicapital, et al.'s motion to dismiss and ancillary issues.

A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another. It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the
allegations in the complaint. In this relation, a complaint is said to sufficiently assert a
cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff
would be entitled to the relief prayed for.

In this case, the Court finds that Consing, Jr.'s complaint in SCA No. 1759 properly states a
cause of action since the allegations therein sufficiently bear out a case for damages under
Articles 19 and 26 of the Civil Code.

So as to obviate any confusion on the matter, the Court equally finds that the causes of
action in SCA No. 1759 were not — as Unicapital, et al. claim — misjoined even if
Consing, Jr. averred that Unicapital and PBI, et al. violated certain provisions of the
Corporation Law and the Revised Securities Act. (So, di siya misjoinder)

The rule is that a party's failure to observe the following conditions under Section 5, Rule 2
of the Rules results in a misjoinder of causes of action:

SEC. 5. Joinder of causes of action. — A party may in one pleading assert, in the
alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing
party, subject to the following conditions: xxx
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different
venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided
one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies
therein;

A careful perusal of his complaint discloses that Consing, Jr. did not seek to hold
Unicapital and PBI, et al. liable for any specific violation of the Corporation Code or the
Revised Securities Act. Rather, he merely sought damages for Unicapital and PBI, et al.'s
alleged acts of making him sign numerous documents and their use of the same against
him. In this respect, Consing, Jr. actually advances an injunction and damages case which
properly falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC-Pasig City. Therefore, there was no
violation of Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules, particularly, paragraph (c) thereof. Besides, even
on the assumption that there was a misjoinder of causes of action, still, such defect should
not result in the dismissal of Consing, Jr.'s complaint. Section 6, Rule 2 of the Rules
explicitly states that a "misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an
action" and that "a misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative
of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately."

In fine, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the CA in sustaining the RTC-
Pasig City's denial of Unicapital, et al.'s motion to dismiss. As such, the petitions in G.R.
Nos. 175277 and 175285 must be denied.

B. Propriety of the denial of Consing, Jr.'s motion for consolidation.

The crux of G.R. No. 192073 is the propriety of the RTC-Makati City's denial of Consing,
Jr.'s motion for the consolidation of the Pasig case, i.e., SCA No. 1759, and the Makati case,
i.e., Civil Case No. 99-1418.

It is hornbook principle that when or two or more cases involve the same parties and
affect closely related subject matters, the same must be consolidated and jointly tried, in
order to serve the best interest of the parties and to settle the issues between them
promptly, thus, resulting in a speedy and inexpensive determination of cases. In addition,
consolidation serves the purpose of avoiding the possibility of conflicting decisions
rendered by the courts in two or more cases, which otherwise could be disposed of in a
single suit. The governing rule is Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules.

In the present case, the Court observes that the subject cases, i.e., SCA No. 1759 and Civil
Case No. 99-1418, although involving the same parties and proceeding from a similar
factual milieu, should remain unconsolidated since they proceed from different sources of
obligations and, hence, would not yield conflicting dispositions. SCA No. 1759 is an
injunction and damages case based on the Civil Code provisions on abuse of right and
defamation, while Civil Case No. 99-1418 is a collection and damages suit based on
actionable documents, i.e., the subject promissory notes. In particular, SCA No. 1759 deals
with whether or not Unicapital and PBI, et al. abused the manner in which they demanded
payment from Consing, Jr., while Civil Case No. 99-1418 deals with whether or not
Unicapital may demand payment from Consing, Jr. based on the subject promissory notes.
Clearly, a resolution in one case would have no practical effect as the core issues and
reliefs sought in each case are separate and distinct from the other.
 EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT VS CAMERON GRANVILLE
G.R. No. 204700 November 24, 2014

FACTS: Petitioner Eagleridge Development Corporation (EDC) had a couple of

obligations to Export and Industry Bank (EIB). Ang amount sa obligation is P10, 232, 998.
February 2006, EIB filed a collection suit against EDC and its sureties.

On August 2006, EIB transferred EDC’s obligations via DEED OF ASSIGNMENT to

Cameron Corp., which is in pursuant to their Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement (LSPA)
and their Deed of Absolute Sale.

In 2012, petitioner filed a motion for Production/Inspection of the LSPA being referred to
in such Deed of Assignment. (See Sec 1 Rule 27 about Motion for production/inspection –
in which a party may ask the court to order the party to produce such documents which
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter upon good cause).

Respondents opposed since there was no “good cause” since the LSPA is irrelevant daw to
the case at hand. Petitioners countered on the ground that they need to know how much is
the price paid by Cameron since they want to invoke the provision under Art 1634 of the
Civil Code. (Art 1634 - When a credit or other incorporeal right in litigation is sold, the
debtor shall have a right to extinguish it by reimbursing the assignee for the price the
latter paid therefore, plus judicial costs and interest)

The law provides that EDC, the debtor, can extinguish the obligation by paying the “price
paid” by Cameron. And they want to but they don’t know the price. And the “price” was
written in the LSPA (which the respondents don’t want to give).

So to make the long story short, in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court, it ordered
Respondents to show the LSPA but, still, respondents didn’t give up.

In their motion for recon in the SC, aside from contending that the LSPA was confidential,
one of the arguments of the respondents was this:

Invoking ARTICLE 1634 (on the right of the debtor to extinguish the obligation by paying
the price paid by the assignee) presupposes a VALID DEED OF ASSIGNMENT. However,
on the other hand, they also noted that the petitioners also raised in their defence the
INVALIDITY of the deed of assignment as evidenced by their motions in the trial court.

HENCE, Respondent said that: petitioners cannot claim the validity and invalidity of the
deed of assignment at the same time.

ISSUE: May the petitioner raise both seemingly contradicting defenses?

RULING: YES. The invocation by petitioners of Article 1634, which presupposes the
validity of the deed of assignment orthe transfer of the EIB credit to respondent, even if it
would run counter to their defense on the invalidity of the deed of assignment, is proper
and sanctioned by Rule 8, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 2. Alternative causes of action or defenses. — A party may set forth two or more
statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one causeof
action or defense or in separate causes of action or defenses. When two or more statements
are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently would be sufficient,
the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative
statements. (Emphasis supplied)

FCD PAWNSHOP VS UNION BANK

G.R. No. 207914 January 18, 2017
FACTS:

Petitioners Fortunato and Franklin owners or FCD, entrusted their original OCT of their
land to Atty. Dionisio. Later, it was discovered that said title was used by Sunyang Mining
Corp. as collateral from Union Bank to obtain a 20M loan. So, Fortunato and Frankin filed
a case (1st) for the annulment of the mortgage. It was extrajudicially foreclosed by UBP.
Then, another case (2nd) was filed for the annulment of the foreclosure sale. UBP
answered by claiming that the 2nd case violates forum shopping.

RTC ruled that since the mortgage case was still pending when the extrajudicial
foreclosure case was filed, forum shopping was violated because both cases involves the
same property and the outcome of the validity of the foreclosure essentially affects the
mortgage case. Motion for Recon was denied.

On appeal, the CA upheld the decision of the RTC. Essentially, the resolution of the
Annulment of Foreclosure sale is dependent upon the validity of the Annulment of the
Mortgage case. Thus, both cases are substantially founded on the same transactions, same
essential facts and circumstances. The injunctive relief sough against the foreclosure is
premised on the alleged nullity of the mortgage due to its fraudulent and irregular
execution and registration. Recon was also denied.

ISSUE:

WON rule against forum shopping was violated.

RULING: DENIED

There is forum shopping 'when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially
the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court.

3 Ways in COMMITTING Forum Shopping:

1) Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer,
the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis
pendentia)
2) Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the
previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata)

3) Bling multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers
(splitting causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or
res judicata)

CAUSE OF ACTION defined: (common element in the 3 ways)

The act or omission by which a party violates the right of another.

The well-entrenched rule:

is that 'a party cannot, by varying the form of action, or adopting a different method of
presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of
action shall not be twice litigated.'

IN THIS CASE:

Clearly, the rule against forum shopping was violated. In the event that in the pending
annulment of mortgage case, the lower court should nullify the Sunyang mortgage, then
subsequent proceedings based thereon, including the foreclosure sale, shall also be
nullified.

While the main relief sought in the Annulment Case (nullification of the mortgage of
Sunyang) is different from the main relief sought in the Injunction Case (nullification of
the extrajudicial foreclosure and annulment of certificate of sale), the CAUSE OF ACTION
which serves as the basis for the said reliefs REMAINS THE SAME – the alleged nullity of
the mortgage.

Thus, what is involved here is the third way of committing forum shopping, i.e., filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers.

MAGALLANES V PALMER ASIA INC

G.R. No. 205179 July 18, 2014

FACTS:

Magallanes was employed by Andres International Product which manufactures fire

extinguishers. Magallanes had 3 prospective buyers, who all issued checks payable to
Andrews. These, however bounced. To obtain his accrued commissions, and upon Angel
Palmiery (Andrew’s president), Magallanes signed Sales Invoices covering the fire
extinguishers that were intended to be sold to the prospective buyers, and he also issued 5
checks covering the price of the items. But upon presentment to the bank, his checks
bounced.
In 1995, Andrews and Palmer Asia entered into an agreement where all the former’s
business was going to be handled by Palmer. Andrews ceased to be operational as Palmer
took over its business to appeal to a bigger and sophisticated market. Palmiery filed in
behalf of Andrews. (Take note nga si Palmer Asia na ni take over sa business)

Later on, since Andrew’s demand for payment of the bounced checks were unheeded,
Magallanes was charged with several counts of BP 22 violation.

As response, Magallanes alleged in an Omnibus Motion to Disqualify Private Prosecutor

and to Strike Out Testimony of Angel Palmiery that it should have been Palmer which
instituted the case because the assets and credits of Andrews were transferred to Palmer.
(in short, si Palmer Asia ang REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST)

As counter response, Palmer claimed that Andrews was only operating under the Banner
of Palmer Asia.

MeTC denied the motion filed by Magallanes. It nevertheless acquitted him, but held him
civilly liable.

On a Partial Appeal to RTC, the court declared that Magallanes was not civilly liable for
the value of the checks because the Andrews has not fully established the existence of his
debt.

On appeal to CA by Palmer, it ruled against Magallanes. It held that Magallanes issued the
checks for a consideration because he derived pecuniary benefit from it.

ISSUE:

Who is the real party-in-interest? ANDREWS

RULING: PETITION GRANTED.

Under our procedural rules, "a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof
that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause
of action."

SEC 2, RULE 3, ROC:

Parties in interest. — A real party in interest is the party who stands to be bene9ted or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party in interest.

2 REQUIREMENTS OF SEC 2 RULE 3: (Goco v CA)

1. To institute an action, the plaintiff must be the real party in interest

2. The action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party.

 INTEREST – material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved.

WHEN PARTIES WHO ARE NOT REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST MAY BE INCLUDED
IN A SUIT: (SEC 3, RULE 3, ROC)

Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. — Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or

defended by a representative or someone acting in a 9duciary capacity, the bene9ciary
shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest.
A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or
administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own
name and for the bene9t of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining
the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.

IN THIS CASE:

Palmer and Andrews are two separate and distinct entities. The bum checks were payable
to Andrews, not to Palmer. When Magallanes was found liable by the MeTC, payment
was to be made to Andrews and NOT to Palmer.

In addition, Palmer was only first mentioned in an Entry of Appearance filed by its
counsel, likewise the counsel of Andrews. Although Andrews relinquished its control of
its business to Palmer, it was never dissolved and thus remained existing. It is clear that
the real party-in-interest is Andrews.

Supposedly, procedural rules forbids parties to change the theory of the case on appeal.
Rationale for this rule is because it violates basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.

But SC nevertheless attributed this mistake of Magallanes to the confusing testimony of

Palmiery.

CA decision set aside and RTC decision acquitting Magallanes is reinstated.

Philippine Veterans Bank vs Spouses Sabado

GR No. 224204 August 30, 2017

Facts: Hauls Talk Project Managers, Inc. (HTPMI) entered into a contract to sell with
respondent spouses concerning a real estate property which was agreed to be paid
instalments. The contract contained a forfeiture clause to the effect that failure to pay any
amount within the stipulated period would result in forfeiture of the down payment and
any payments already made in favor of HTPMI and that the contract will be cancelled.

HTPMI assigned its credit right to petitioner bank.

Upon failure to pay an instalment due, and by virtue of the contractual stipulation,
petitioner then sent a notice of cancellation of the contract to respondent with a demand
that respondent vacate the property. Respondent did not comply which prompted
petitioner to file an unlawful detainer case against it.
Respondent interposed the defense that petitioner is not a real party in interest in the case
since HTPMI still had ownership over the land and as such HTPMI should have been
impleaded for being an indispensable party.

Issue: Whether or not HTPMI is an indispensable party.

Ruling : No, because petitioner was empowered by the deed of assignment of the rights to
collect payments from respondents, and in the event of the latter's default, to cancel or
rescind the Contract to Sell, and resultantly, recover actual possession over the subject
property.

Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court mandates that all indispensable parties should be
joined in a suit, viz.:

SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. —Parties in interest without whom

no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants.

Case law defnes an indispensable party as "one whose interest will be affected by the
court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be
had. The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so
inextricably intertwined with the other parties' that his legal presence as a party to the
proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the
dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable." "Thus,
the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present.

A person is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or

subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not
necessarily be directly or injuriouslyaffected by a decree which does complete justice
between them.

Under the Deed of Assignment, HTPMI assigned its rights — save for the right of
ownership — to petitioner under the Contract to Sell:

1) RIGHTS UNDER THE CONTRACTS TO SELL. By this assignment, the ASSIGNEE

hereby acquires all rights of the ASSIGNOR under the Contracts to Sell and under the law,
including the right to endorse any and all terms and conditions of the Contracts to Sell and
the right to collect the amounts due thereunder from the purchaser of the Property. The
ASSIGNOR for this purpose hereby names, constitutes and appoints the ASSIGNEE [as
its] attorney-in fact to execute any act and deed necessary in the exercise of all these rights.
Notwithstanding the assignment of the Contracts to Sell and the Receivables thereunder to
the ASSIGNEE, the legal title to the Property and obligations of the ASSIGNOR under the
Contracts to Sell, including the obligation to complete the development of the property
and the warranties of a builder under the law, shall remain the ASSIGNOR's. x x x. 34
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
An indispensable party is one who has an interest in the subject matter of the controversy
which is inseparable from the interest of the other parties, and that a final adjudication
cannot be made without affecting such interest. Here, the only issue in the instant
unlawful detainer suit is who between the litigating parties has the better right to possess
de facto the subject property. Thus, HTPMI's interest in the subject property, as one
holding legal title thereto, is completely separable from petitioner's rights under the
Contract to Sell, which include the cancellation or rescission of such contract and
resultantly, the recovery of actual possession of the subject property by virtue of this case.

Caravan Travels and Tours International Inc. vs Abejar

G.R. No. 170631 February 10, 2016

FACTS: On July 13, 2000, Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was walking along the west-bound
lane of Sampaguita Street, Parañaque City.

A Mitsubishi L-300 van was travelling along the east-bound lane, opposite Reyes. To
avoid an incoming vehicle, the van swerved to its left and hit Reyes. Alex Espinosa
(Espinosa), a witness to the accident, went to her aid and loaded her in the back of the van.

Espinosa told the driver of the van, Bautista, to bring Reyes to the hospital. Instead of
doing so, Bautista appeared to have left the van parked inside a nearby subdivision with
Reyes still in the van. Fortunately for Reyes, an unidentified civilian came to help and
drove Reyes to the hospital.

Upon investigation, it was found that the registered owner of the van was Caravan.
Caravan is a corporation engaged in the business of organizing travels and tours. Bautista
was Caravan's employee assigned to drive the van as its service driver.

Caravan shouldered the hospitalization expenses of Reyes but despite medical attendance,
Reyes died. Respondent Abejar, Reyes' paternal aunt and the person who raised her filed
before the RTC a complaint for damages against Bautista and Caravan. In her Complaint,
Abejar alleged that Bautista was an employee of Caravan and that Caravan is the
registered owner of the van that hit Reyes.

After trial the RTC found that Bautista was grossly negligent in driving the vehicle. It
awarded damages in favor of Abejar. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision hence the
case at bar.

Petitioner’s Argument: Caravan argues that Abejar has no personality to bring this suit
because she is not a real party in interest. According to Caravan, Abejar does not exercise
legal or substitute parental authority. She is also not the judicially appointed guardian of
the deceased. She is also not "the executor or administrator of the estate of the deceased."
According to Caravan, only the victim herself or her heirs can enforce an action based on
culpa aquiliana.
ISSUE: WON Abejar is a real party in interest who may bring an action for damages
against petitioner Caravan

RULING: YES. Having exercised substitute parental authority, respondent suffered actual
loss and is, thus, a real party in interest in this case.

In her Complaint, respondent made allegations that would sustain her action for damages:
that she exercised substitute parental authority over Reyes; that Reyes' death was caused
by the negligence of petitioner and its driver; and that Reyes' death caused her damage.

Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines a real party in interest:

Parties in Interest. — A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party in interest.

“To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be
prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be
enforced.” Respondent's capacity to file a complaint against petitioner stems from her
having exercised substitute parental authority over Reyes.

Article 233 of the Family Code provides for the extent of authority of persons exercising
substitute parental authority, that is, the same as those of actual parents:

Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority
over the person of the child as the parents.

As Reyes' custodian, respondent exercised the full extent of the statutorily recognized
rights and duties of a

parent. Consistent with Article 220 of the Family Code, respondent supported Reyes'
education and provided for her personal needs.

First, respondent suffered actual personal loss. With her affinity for Reyes, it stands to
reason that when Reyes died, respondent suffered the same anguish that a natural parent
would have felt upon the loss of one's child. It is for this injury that respondent seeks to be
indemnified.

Second, respondent is capacitated to do what Reyes' actual parents would have been
capacitated to do. Inasmuch as persons exercising substitute parental authority have the
full range of competencies of a child's actual parents, nothing

prevents persons exercising substitute parental authority from similarly possessing the
right to be indemnified for their ward's death.

Resident Marine Mammals

vs
 DOE Secretary Reyes
G.R. No. 180771 April 21, 2015

Facts: Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine
Mammals" in the petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean
species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They are joined by
Gloria Estenzo Ramos (Ramos) and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-Osorio) as their legal
guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as "the Stewards") who seek the
protection of the aforementioned marine species.

On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into
a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract with JAPEX. This contract involved
geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. Later, DOE and JAPEX executd
another contract named SC-46 for the exploration, development, and production of
petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore
the Tañon Strait.

JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Tañon Strait. JAPEX also committed
to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project. Since the well was
to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Tañon
Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to comply with the
Environmental Impact Assessment requirements

On March 6, 2007, the DENR granted an ECC to the Dept of Energy (DOE) and JAPEX for
the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. Months later, on November 16,
2007, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well.

It was in view of the foregoing state of affairs that petitioners applied to this Court for
redress, via two separate petitions wherein they commonly seek that respondents be
enjoined from implementing SC-46 for, among others, violation of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioners' Allegations: Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards aver that a
study made after the seismic survey showed that the fish catch was reduced drastically.
They attribute this "reduced fish catch" to the destruction of the "fish aggregating device"
or "artificial reef."

Respondent’s Allegations: It contended, among others, that petitioners Resident Marine

Mammals and Stewards have no legal standing to file the present petition.

Petitioner’s counter-argument: The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards,

"claim" that they have the legal standing to file this action since they stand to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in this suit. Citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. they also assert their
right to sue for the faithful performance of international and municipal environmental
laws created in their favor and for their benefit.

In opposition, public respondents argue that the Resident Marine Mammals have no
standing because Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires parties to an action to be
either natural or juridical persons.

Issue: WON petitioners have standing to file the action.

Ruling: YES. They have legal standing to file the action. Recently, the Court passed the
landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which allow for a "citizen suit,"
and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our
environmental laws:

SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under
environmental laws. Xxx

Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the Annotations to the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, commented: Citizen suit. Xxx This provision
liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing environmental laws and collapses the
traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards
of nature.

Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure
"may be retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage and will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure."

In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing
has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature,
to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards
are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named
cetacean species.

The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be
possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are
therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.

Juana Complex vs. Fil-Estate

G.R. No. 152272; G. R. No. 152397 March 5, 2012

Facts: Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc. (JCHA), together with individual
residents of Juana Complex I and other neighboring subdivisions (collectively as JCHA, et
al.), instituted a class suit representing the regular commuters and motorists of Juana
Complex I and neighboring subdivisions who were deprived of the use of La Paz Road,
against Fil-Estate, et al.

JCHA, et al., were regular commuters and motorists who used the entry and exit toll gates
of South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) by passing through La Paz Road; that they had been
using La Paz Road for more than ten (10) years; that sometime later, Fil-estate excavated,
broke and deliberately ruined La Paz Road so JCHA, et al., would not be able to pass
through the said road.
Fil-Estate, et al., filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause
of action and that it was improperly filed as a class suit.

Ruling of the RTC and CA

The complaint was properly filed as a class suit as it was shown that the case was of
common interest and that the individuals sought to be represented were so numerous that
it was impractical to include all of them as parties. Case remanded to RTC.

Issues: WON the complaint has been properly filed as a class suit.

Ruling: Yes.

Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows:

Sec. 12. Class suit. — When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or
general interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties,
a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as
to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any
party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest.

The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of
controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected
are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties
bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can
fully protect the interests of all concerned.

In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La
Paz Road. As succinctly stated by the CA:

The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation of the La Paz Road, is
initially shown to be of common or general interest to many persons. The records reveal
that numerous individuals have filed manifestations with the lower court, conveying their
intention to join private respondents in the suit and claiming that they are similarly
situated with private respondents for they were also prejudiced by the acts of petitioners
in closing and excavating the La Paz Road. Moreover, the individuals sought to be
represented by private respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to
join them all as parties and be named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint. These
individuals claim to be residents of various barangays in Biñan, Laguna and other
barangays in San Pedro, Laguna.

Sulpicio Lines v. Napoleon Sesante

G.R. No. 172682, July 27, 2016

Moral damages are meant to enable the injured party to obtain the means, diversions or
amusements in order to alleviate the moral suffering. Exemplary damages are designed to
permit the courts to reshape behavior that is socially deleterious in its consequence by
creating negative incentives or deterrents against such behavior.

FACTS: September 18 1998, the M/V Princess of the Orient, a passenger vessel owned by
petitioner, sank near Fortune Island in Batangas. Of the 388 recorded passengers, 150 were
lost. Napoleon Sesante, then a member of PNP and a lawyer, was one of the passengers
who survived the sinking. He sued petitioner for breach of contract and damages.

Sesante alleged in his complaint that the boat left the port of Manila while Manila was
experiencing stormy weather causing strong winds and big waves to rock the boat back
and forth, and that eventually it sunk, but he managed to stay afloat and was washed
ashore to Cavite and Batangas, and that he had been traumatized, and he lost a lot of his
important documents and precious belongings, and that petitioners had committed bad
faith in allowing the vessel to still sail despite the storm.

In its defense, the petitioner insisted the seaworthiness of the M/V Princess of the Orient
due to its having been cleared to sail from the Port of Manila by the proper authorities,
and that the sinking had been caused by force majeure and that they had not been
negligent since the crew made preparations to abandon vessel.

RTC favored the respondent, awarding him damages. Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to
the CA. Pending appeal, Sesante passed away, and was substituted by his heirs. The CA
affirmed the RTC ruling but lowered the amount of damages and held that despite the
seaworthiness of the boat, they still remained civilly liable for being negligent.

ISSUE: WON a complaint for breach of contract and damages survives the death of the
plaintiff.

RULING: An action for breach of contract of carriage survives the death of the plaintiff.

The petitioner urges that Sesante's complaint for damages was purely personal and cannot
be transferred to his heirs upon his death. Hence, the complaint should be dismissed
because the death of the plaintiff abates a personal action.

The petitioner's urging is unwarranted.

Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court lays down the proper procedure in the event of the
death of a litigant, viz.:

Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. — Whenever a party to a pending action dies,
and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the
court within thirty

6. days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his
legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be
a ground for disciplinary action.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
Substitution by the heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. It
protects the right of due process belonging to any party, that in the event of death the
deceased litigant continues to be protected and properly represented in the suit through
the duly appointed legal representative of his estate.

The application of the rule on substitution depends on whether or not the action survives
the death of the litigant. Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court enumerates the following
actions that survive the death of a party, namely: (1) recovery of real or personal property,
or an interest from the estate; (2) enforcement of liens on the estate; and (3) recovery of
damages for an injury to person or property. On the one hand, Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court lists the actions abated by death as including: (1) claims for funeral
expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2) judgments for money; and (3)
all claims for money against the deceased, arising from contract, express or implied.

A contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty, neglect or

malfeasance of the carrier's employees and gives ground for an action for damages.
Sesante's claim against the petitioner involved his personal injury caused by the breach of
the contract of carriage. Pursuant to the aforecited rules, the complaint survived his death,
and could be continued by his heirs following the rule on substitution.

MACASAET, vs. CO
G.R. No. 156759 June 5, 2013

FACTS: On July 3, 2000, respondent, a retired police officer assigned at the Western Police
District in Manila, sued AbanteTonite, a daily tabloid of general circulation; its Publisher
Allen A. Macasaet, et al(petitioners), claiming damages because of an allegedly libelous
article that petitioners published in the June 6, 2000 issue of AbanteTonite. The suit which
in due course issued summons to be served on each defendant, including AbanteTonite.

RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the stated address to effect the personal service of
the summons on the defendants. But his efforts to personally serve each defendant in the
address were futile because the defendants were then out of the office and unavailable. He
returned in the afternoon of that day to make a second attempt at serving the summons,
but he was informed that petitioners were still out of the office. He decided to resort to
substituted service of the summons, and explained why in his sheriff's return.

On October 3, 2000, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint through counsel's
special appearance in their behalf, alleging lack of jurisdiction over their persons because
of the invalid and ineffectual substituted service of summons. They contended that the
sheriff had made no prior attempt to serve the summons personally on each of them in
accordance with Section 6 and Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. They further
moved to drop AbanteTonite as a defendant by virtue of its being neither a natural nor a
juridical person that could be impleaded as a party in a civil action.

RTC in favor of respondent. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners were acquired.
RULING: YES, JURISDICTION WAS ACQUIRED.

The significance of the proper service of the summons on the defendant in an action in
personam cannot be overemphasized. The service of the summons fulfills two
fundamental objectives, namely: (a) to vest in the court jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant; and (b) to afford to the defendant the opportunity to be heard on the claim
brought against him. As to the former, when jurisdiction in personam is not acquired in a
civil action through the proper service of the summons or upon a valid waiver of such
proper service, the ensuing trial and judgment are void. As to the latter, the essence of due
process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence the
defendant may have in support of his defense. With the proper service of the summons
being intended to afford to him the opportunity to be heard on the claim against him, he
may also waive the process. In other words, compliance with the rules regarding the
service of the summons is as much an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction.

Under the Rules of Court, the service of the summons should firstly be effected on the
defendant himself whenever practicable. Such personal service consists either in handing
a copy of the summons to the defendant in person, or, if the defendant refuses to receive
and sign for it, in tendering it to him. The rule on personal service is to be rigidly enforced
in order to ensure the realization of the two fundamental objectives earlier mentioned. If,
for justifiable reasons, the defendant cannot be served in person within a reasonable time,
the service of the summons may then be effected either (a) by leaving a copy of the
summons at his residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copy at his office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof. The latter mode of service is known as substituted
service because the service of the summons on the defendant is made through his
substitute. Only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time
may substituted service be resorted to.

There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the summons upon each
of petitioners in person at their office address, the first in the morning of September 18,
2000 and the second in the afternoon of the same date. Each attempt failed because
Macasaet and Quijano were "always out and not available" and the other petitioners were
"always roving outside and gathering news." After Medina learned from those present in
the office address on his second attempt that there was no likelihood of any of petitioners
going to the office during the business hours of that or any other day, he concluded that
further attempts to serve them in person within a reasonable time would be futile. The
circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. He was not expected or required as the
serving officer to effect personal service by all means and at all times, considering that he
was expressly authorized to resort to substituted service should he be unable to effect the
personal service within a reasonable time. In that regard, what was a reasonable time was
dependent on the circumstances obtaining. While we are strict in insisting on personal
service on the defendant, we donot cling to such strictness should the circumstances
already justify substituted service instead. It is the spirit of the procedural rules, not their
letter, that governs.

In reality, petitioners' insistence on personal service by the serving officer was

demonstrably superfluous. They had actually received the summonses served through
their substitutes, as borne out by their filing of several pleadings in the RTC, including an
answer with compulsory counterclaim ad cautelam and a pre-trial brief ad cautelam. They
had also availed themselves of the modes of discovery available under the Rules of Court.
Such acts evinced their voluntary appearance in the action.

Yu v Yu
G.R. No. 200072, June 20, 2016

FACTS: Petitioner Philip Yu and respondent Viveca Lim Yu were married on November
18, 1984. They had 4 children and maintained their conjugal home at Horizon
Condominium, Pasig, Metro Manila.

In 1993, however, Viveca left the conjugal home with their four children and filed a
Petition for Legal Separation against Philip before the RTC of Pasig City for repeated
physical violence, sexual abuse, etc.

Philip denied the accusations against him. He narrated that his marriage to Viveca was
arranged according to the Chinese tradition and that it was much later when he
discovered Viveca's excessively jealous, cynical, and insecure behaviour. He countered
that since she abandoned the family home, taking their four children away, she was not
entitled to support.

Thus, Philip prayed in his Counterclaim for the declaration of nullity of their marriage due
to Viveca's psychological incapacity, rendering her incapable of complying with her
marital obligations. RTC of Pasig City rendered a Decision dismissing the Petition for
Legal Separation in the following wise:

“From the facts obtaining in this case, the Court finds that the parties are in pari delicto
warranting a denial of this petition xxx the same becomes moot with the declaration of
nullity of the marriage of the parties, on the ground of the psychological incapacity of
petitioner, Viveca Yu, pursuant to the Decision of RTC of Balayan, Batangas, which
attained its finality.” (So apparently, naay decision sa RTC of Batangas nga nag nullify sa
ilang marriage)

Claiming to be completely unaware of the proceedings before the RTC of Balayan,

Batangas, nullifying her marriage with Philip on the ground of her psychological
incapacity, Viveca filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment.

According to Viveca, jurisdiction over her person did not properly vest since she was not
duly served with Summons. She alleged that she was deprived of her right to due process
when Philip fraudulently declared that her address upon which she may be duly
summoned was still at their conjugal home, when he clearly knew that she had long left
said address for the United States of America.

RULING OF THE CA: The Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage affecting the
personal status of private respondent is in the nature of an action in rem. With this
premise in mind, it is beyond cavil that the court a quo was justified in resorting to
Summons by publication.
The court a quo validly acquired jurisdiction to hear and decide the case given that as
adumbrated, in a proceeding in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res.

Contention ni Husband: Philip questions the CA’s judgment of setting aside the decision
of the Batangas RTC despite its own finding that said court validly acquired jurisdiction
when Summons was duly served on Viveca by publication.

ISSUE: WON the CA correctly annulled the decision of the RTC.

RULING: Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in

exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Section 2, Rule
47 of the Rules provides that judgments may be annulled only on grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process.

Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party
outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting
fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party;
prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.

In the present case, We find that Viveca was completely prevented from participating in
the Declaration of Nullity case because of the fraudulent scheme employed by Philip
insofar as the service of summons is concerned.

Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him.
Through its service, the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. As a rule, Philippine
courts cannot try any case against a defendant who does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he
voluntarily appears in court.

Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, however, enumerates the actions in remor quasi
in rem when Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because they
have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident
defendant is not essential. (Awa lang section 15 ROC kay taas na kayo)

Thus, under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in
the country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: (1)
when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or
the subject of which is property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or
claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists,
wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the
Philippines; or (4) when the property of the defendant has been attached within the
Philippines.

In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any of three
modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication
and sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by registered mail to the
defendant's last known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the
judge may consider sufficient.
In the present case, it is undisputed that when Philip filed the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, an action which affects his personal status, Viveca was already
residing in the United States of America. Thus, extraterritorial service of summons is the
proper mode by which summons may be served on Viveca, a non-resident defendant who
is not found in the Philippines.

The Court finds that the service of summons on their conjugal home address cannot be
deemed compliant with the requirements of the rules and is even tantamount to deception
warranting the annulment of the Batangas court's judgment.

It is clear, therefore, that because of the service of summons at the erroneous address,
Viveca was effectively prevented from participating in the proceedings thereon.
Annulment of judgment of the Batangas RTC is proper.

BPI v Hontanosas
G.R. No. 157163 June 25, 2014

FACTS: Respondents had obtained a loan from the petitioner, and had executed
promissory notes binding themselves, jointly and severally, to pay the sum borrowed; that
as security for the payment of the loan, they had constituted real estate mortgages on
several parcels of land in favor of the petitioner; and that they had been made to sign a
continuing surety agreement and a chattel mortgage on their Mitsubishi Pajero.

It appears that the respondents' obligation to the petitioner had reached P17,983,191.49,
but they had only been able to pay P13 Million because they had been adversely affected
by the economic turmoil in Asia in 1997. The petitioner required them to issue postdated
checks to cover the loan under threat of foreclosing on the mortgages.

Thus, Respondents Spouses Silverio and Zosima Borbon, Spouses Xerxes and Erlinda
Facultad, and XM Facultad and Development Corporation commenced Civil Case No.
CEB-26468 to seek the declaration of the nullity of the promissory notes, real estate and
chattel mortgages and continuing surety agreement they had executed in favor of the
petitioner. The Respondents filed the case in RTC in Cebu City, where respondent XM
Facultad and Development Corporation, a principal plaintiff, had its address.

Petitioner seek to dismiss the case claiming that such is a real action, the case must be filed
where the property is located.

ISSUE:

WON venue was properly laid.

RULING:

Yes. It is personal action and thus, venue is where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in
the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff.
[RE: Real action or Personal action]

Based on the aforequoted allegations of the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-26468, the
respondents seek the nullification of the promissory notes, continuing surety agreement,
checks and mortgage agreements for being executed against their will and vitiated by
irregularities, not the recovery of the possession or title to the properties burdened by the
mortgages. There was no allegation that the possession of the properties under the
mortgages had already been transferred to the petitioner in the meantime.

In the Pascual case, relied upon by petitioner, the contract of sale of the fishpond was
assailed as fictitious for lack of consideration. We held that there being no contract to
begin with, there is nothing to annul. Hence, we deemed the action for annulment of the
said fictitious contract therein as one constituting a real action for the recovery of the
fishpond subject thereof.

We cannot, however, apply the foregoing doctrine to the instant case. Note that in Pascual,
title to and possession of the subject fishpond had already passed to the vendee. There
was, therefore, a need to recover the said fishpond. But in the instant case, ownership of
the parcels of land subject of the questioned real estate mortgage was never transferred to
petitioner, but remained with TOPROS. Thus, no real action for the recovery of real
property is involved. This being the case, TOPROS' action for annulment of the contracts
of loan and real estate mortgage remains a personal action.

The Court of Appeals finds that Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. provides the
proper precedent in this case. In Hernandez, appellants contended that the action of the
Hernandez spouses for the cancellation of the mortgage on their lots was a real action
affecting title to real property, which should have been filed in the place where the
mortgaged lots were situated. Rule 4, Section 2 (a), of the then Rules of Court,was applied,
to wit:

SEC. 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance. — (a) Real actions. — Actions affecting title to, or
for recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage
on, real property, shall be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any
part thereof lies.

The Court pointed out in the Hernandez case that with respect to mortgage, the rule on
real actions only mention an action for foreclosure of a real
estate mortgage. It does not include an action for the cancellation of
a real estate mortgage. Exclusio unios est inclusio

alterius. The latter thus falls under the catch-all provision on personal actions under
paragraph (b) of the above-cited section, to wit:

SEC. 2. (b) Personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any
of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

In the same vein, the action for annulment of a real estate mortgage in the present case
must fall under Section 2 of Rule 4, to wit:
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any
of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he
may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

Thus, Pasig City, where the parties reside, is the proper venue of the action to nullify the
subject loan and real estate mortgage contracts.

Briones vs. CA
G.R. No. 204444, January 14, 2015

Facts: Briones alleged that he is the owner of a property which was foreclosed and which a
writ of possession had been issued in favor of Cash Asia.

Briones discovered that: (a) he purportedly executed a promissory note, loan agreement,
and deed of real estate mortgage covering the subject property in favor of Cash Asia in
order to obtain a loan; and (b) since the said loan was left unpaid, Cash Asia proceeded to
foreclose his property.

Briones filed this instant complaint for Nullity of Mortgage Contract, Promissory Note,
Loan Agreement, Foreclosure of Mortgage, Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title,
and Damages against Cash Asia before the RTC Manila. Also, Briones claims that his
signatures in the contracts were forged since he could not have had signed any contracts
since he was living abroad.

Cash Asia filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Cash Asia pointed
out the venue stipulation in the subject contracts stating that "all legal actions arising out
of this notice in connection with the Real Estate Mortgage subject hereof shall only be
brought in or submitted to the jurisdiction of the proper court of Makati City. [restrictive
stipulation on venue]" Briones's complaint should be dismissed for having been filed in
the City of Manila.

Issues: WON Briones should file the complaint in Makati City and not in Manila City

Ruling:

No. Briones is not bound by the restrictive stipulation on venue since Briones assails the
validity of the subject contracts.

The general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which has jurisdiction over
the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the
venue of personal actions is the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the
defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As an exception, jurisprudence in Legaspi
v. Republic instructs that the parties, thru a written instrument, may either introduce
another venue where actions arising from such instrument may be filed, or restrict the
filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue, viz.:

“The parties, however, are not precluded from agreeing in writing on an exclusive venue,
as qualified by Section 4 of the same rule. Written stipulations as to venue may be
restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely
permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also
in the places fixed by law. As in

any other agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties
respecting the matter.

As regards restrictive stipulations on venue,

jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown that such stipulation is exclusive. In the
absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as "exclusively," "waiving for this purpose
any other venue," "shall only" preceding the designation of venue, "to the exclusion of the
other courts," or words of similar import, the stipulation

should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue

to the specified

place.”

In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject contracts is indeed restrictive in
nature, considering that it effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to
the courts of Makati City. However, it must be emphasized that Briones's complaint
directly assails the validity of the subject contracts, claiming forgery in their execution.
Given this circumstance, Briones cannot be expected to comply with the aforesaid venue
stipulation, as his compliance therewith would mean an implicit recognition of their
validity. Hence, pursuant to the general rules on venue, Briones properly filed his
complaint before a court in the City of Manila where the subject property is located.

Dom: Simply put, restrictive stipulations on venue can be ignored if a party assails the
validity of the contract containing that stipulation. Reason is - if that party is bound by the
restrictive stipulation and he complies the same, it would mean that he recognizes the
validity of the contract. (Makes it contradicting since the party filed the complaint to
question the validity).

Spouses Sy. V. Wesmont Bank

G.R. No. 201074, October 19, 2016

Facts: Respondent bank filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against petitioner
and that such was evidenced by a promissory note. Petitioner denied obtaining loan from
respondent by contending that they were able to obtain a loan from a different person
named Chua and that their application for loan from respondent bank was denied. The
trial court rendered a judgment against petitioner on the ground that petitioners were not
able to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the document
and as such, it was deemed admitted.

Issue: WON petitioners were able to sufficiently denied the genuineness and due
execution of the document?

Ruling: Yes. Under Rule 8, it provides

Sec. 8. How to contest such documents. — When an action or defense is founded upon a
written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the
preceding Section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed
admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth
what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the
adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an
order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.

Thus to deny the genuineness and due execution of the document the following requisites
must concur:

1. There must be a specific denial in the responsive pleading of the adverse party

2. The said pleading must be under oath

3. The adverse party must set forth what he claims to be the facts.

Failure to comply with such would make the document admitted.

The purpose of which is to enable the adverse party to know beforehand whether he will
have to meet the issue of genuineness or due execution of the document during trial. In
several cases, the court has held that notwithstanding the failure of the parties to file a
responsive pleading specifically denying the genuineness and due execution of the
document, compliance can still be made because parties stated in their pleading facts that
would show denial of the existence of such documents.

Although Section 8 of Rule 8 provides for a precise method in denying the genuineness
and due execution of an actionable document and the dire consequences of its non-
compliance, it must not be applied with absolute rigidity. What should guide judicial
action is the principle that a party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish
the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor, or
property on technicalities.

In the case at bar, although the pleading of the petitioners did not specifically deny the
genuineness and due execution of the said document, a reading of their pleading as a
whole would show a denial of the existence of such document. Moreover, petitioners were
able to set forth what they claim to be facts which is a crucial element under Section 8 Rule
8.

petitioners asserted throughout the entire proceedings that the loans they applied from
Westmont were disapproved, and that they never received the loan proceeds from the
bank. Stated differently, they insisted that the promissory notes and disclosure statement
attached to the complaint were false and different from the documents they had signed.
These significant and consistent denials by petitioners sufficiently informed Westmont
beforehand that it would have to meet the issue of genuineness or due execution of the
actionable documents during trial.

Fuji TVN vs. Espiritu

G.R. No. 204944-45 December 3, 2014

Facts: Arlene was engaged by Fuji Television Network, Inc.

("Fuji") as a news correspondent/producer.

When Arlene was diagnosed with lung cancer, she and Fuji signed a non-renewal contract
where it was stipulated that her contract would no longer be renewed.

The day after Arlene signed the non-renewal contract, she filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with the NLRC. She alleged that she was forced to sign the nonrenewal contract
when Fuji came to know of her illness and that Fuji withheld her salaries and other
benefits when she refused to sign.

NLRC ruled against Arlene for she was not an employee of Fuji. The CA, however, ruled
held that Arlene was a regular employee.

Aggrieved, Fuji filed this petition for review but Arlene filed a manifestation stating that
this court may not take jurisdiction over the case since:

(1) Fuji failed to authorize Corazon to sign the verification; and

(2) Fuji failed to authorize Shuji Yano and Jin Eto to sign the certification of non-forum
shopping.

In its comment, Fuji alleges that Corazon was authorized to sign the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping because Mr. Shuji Yano was empowered under the
secretary’s certificate to delegate his authority to sign the necessary pleadings, including
the verification and certification against forum shopping.

On the other hand, Arlene points out that the authority given to Mr. Shuji Yano and Mr.
Jin Eto in the secretary’s certificate is only for the petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. Fuji did not attach any board resolution authorizing Corazon or any other person
to file a petition for review on certiorari with this court. Shuji Yano and Jin Eto could not
re-delegate the power that was delegated to them. In addition, the special power of
attorney executed by Shuji Yano in favor of Corazon indicated that she was empowered to
sign on behalf of Shuji Yano, and not on behalf of Fuji.

Ruling:

Effects of non-compliance of verification and non-compliance of certification against non-

forum shopping, distinguished.
General Rule:

The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such

requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading, the non-compliance of
which (that is, verification) does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The
court may order the correction of the pleading if the verification is lacking or act on the
pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict
compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may
thereby be served.

On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable
by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit the required
documents that should accompany the petition, including the certification against forum
shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to
certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which
are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of
the corporation.

Exceptions:

In Loyola v. Court of Appeals, petitioner submitted the required certification one day after
filing his electoral protest. This court considered the subsequent filing as substantial
compliance since the purpose of filing the certification is to curtail forum shopping.

In LDP Marketing, Inc. v. Monter, Ma. Lourdes Dela Peña signed the verification and
certification against forum shopping but failed to attach the board resolution indicating
her authority to sign. The court deemed the belated submission as substantial compliance
since LDP Marketing complied with the requirement; what it failed to do was to attach
proof of Dela Peña’s authority to sign.

In Havtor Management Phils., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, and General
Milling Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission involved petitions that were
dismissed for failure to attach any document showing that the signatory on the
verification and certification against forum-shopping was authorized. In both cases, the
secretary’s certificate was attached to the motion for reconsideration. This court
considered the subsequent submission of proof indicating authority to sign as substantial
compliance.

There was substantial compliance by Fuji. Shuji Yano and Jin Eto, and Corazon were all
authorized;

Preamble: Fuji attached a secretary’s certificate, authorizing Shuji Yano and Jin Eto to
represent and sign for and on behalf of Fuji. Likewise attached to the petition is the special
power of attorney executed by Shuji Yano, authorizing Corazon to sign on his behalf. Shuji
Yano executed a special power of attorney appointing Corazon as his attorney-in-fact.

Question: WON Shujia Yano and Jin Erto were authorized to sign the certification against
non-forum shopping in this petition to review?
Answer: Yes.

A review of the secretary’s certificate shows that Shuji Yano and Jin Eto are authorized to
represent Fuji "in any other proceeding that may necessarily arise therefrom."

Considering that the subsequent proceeding that may arise from the petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals is the filing of a petition for review with this court, Fuji
substantially complied with the procedural requirement.

Question: WON Corazon was authorized to sign the verification of the pleading?

Answer: Yes.

The secretary’s certificate does not state that Shuji Yano is prohibited from appointing a
substitute. In fact, he is empowered to do acts that will aid in the resolution of this case.

In Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. CIR, this court has recognized that there are
instances when officials or employees of a corporation can sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping without a board resolution. The rationale applied in
the foregoing case is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the
corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping, being ‘in a
position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition.
Corazon’s affidavit states that she is the "office manager and resident interpreter of the
Manila Bureau of Fuji Television Network, Inc." and that she has "held the position for the
last twenty-three years."

As the office manager for 23 years, Corazon can be considered as having knowledge of all
matters in Fuji’s Manila Bureau Office and is in a position to verify "the truthfulness and
the correctness of the allegations in the Petition."

Thus, Fuji substantially complied with the requirements of verification and certification
against forum shopping.

ANG VS CHINATRUST
G.R. No. 200693, April 18, 2016

FACTS: This is a collection case ($458,614.84) filed by Chinatrust Banking Corporation vs.
Nation Petroleum Corporation and the Angs (daghan ni nga Angs, including si Ricky
Ang).

The Branch Clerk issued summonses indicating the address of the corporation and the
Angs (both in Ayala Avenue). The process server executed an Officer’s return reporting
that:

1.) As to Ricky Ang, he acknowledged receipt thereof, but refused to sign in the original
copy of the summons

2.) As to the NPC, it was served through their Corporate Secretary but was received by
Ms. Charlotte Magpayo, the Administrative Assistant/mere property supply custodian
3.) As to the other Angs, despite diligent efforts to find them, wa daw na-serve, hence
substituted service was made by leaving their respective court processes at their office or
regular place of business through the same Ms. Charlotte Magpayo

CONTENTIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS: They filed motion to dismiss since RTC failed
to acquire jurisdiction since the service is improper. RTC: Denied the Motion to Dismiss.
CA: Dismissed the case against NPC since Magpayo was merely a property custodian and
the list of corporate officers authorized to receive summons for a corporation is exclusive.
However, the CA upheld the process server's resort to substituted service with respect to
the individual defendant since the process server exerted efforts to personally serve the
summons.

ISSUE: Whether or not the summonses were properly served?

RULING: Partly granted. It was properly served only to Ricky Ang.

In an action strictly in personam, summons shall be served personally on the defendant

whenever practicable. 29 Personal service is made by personally handing a copy of the
summons to the defendant or by tendering it to him if he refuses to receive and sign for it.

While personal service is the preferred method of serving summons, the Rules of Court
are also mindful that this is sometimes impracticable or even impossible. Thus, Rule 14
also allows the sheriff (or other proper court officer) to resort to substituted service.

In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 33 we dissected Rule 14, Section 8 and distilled the
following elements of a valid substituted service:

First, the party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must establish the impossibility
of prompt personal service. The sheriff must have made several attempts to personally
serve the summons within a reasonable period of one month. And by "several attempts,"
the sheriff is expected to have tried at least thrice on at least two different dates. 35
Second, the sheriff must describe the efforts he took and the circumstances behind the
failure of his attempts. Nevertheless, the sheriff's failure to make such a disclosure in the
return does not conclusively prove that the service is invalid. The plaintiff may still
establish the impossibility of service during the hearing. Further, if there is a defect in the
service of summons that is apparent on the face of the return, the trial court must
immediately determine whether the defect is real or not. 38 If the defect is real, the court is
obliged to issue new summonses and cause their service on the defendants.

Third, if substituted service is made at the defendant's house or residence, the sheriff must
leave a copy of the summons with a person of "suitable age and discretion residing
therein." 39 This refers to a person who has reached the age of full legal capacity and has
sufficient discernment to comprehend the importance of a summons and his duty to
deliver it immediately to the defendant.

Finally, if substituted service is made at the defendant's office or regular place of business,
the sheriff must instead leave a copy of the summons with a "competent person in charge
thereof." This refers to the person managing the office or the business of the defendant,
such as the president or the manager.
IN THE CASE AT BAR, The process server only made two attempts at Nation's office and
both attempts were made on the same date. He did not even attempt to serve the
defendants at their homes. This only shows a half-hearted attempt that hardly satisfies the
diligence and best efforts required from a serving officer.

Moreover, even assuming that Chinatrust were able to establish the impossibility of
personal service, the substituted service through Charlotte Magpayo was invalid. A
"competent person in charge" refers to one managing the office or the business, such as the
president, manager, or the officer-in-charge. However, with respect to petitioner Ricky
Ang, we sustain the lower courts' conclusion that he was personally served summons.
Hence, dismissed tanan except as to Ricky. But naluoy ang SC, hence dismissed without
prejudice to refiling the case against the petitioners.

EXPRESS PADALA (ITALIA) S.P.A., now BDO REMITTANCE (ITALIA) S.P.A.,

petitioner, vs. HELEN M. OCAMPO, respondent.
G.R. No. 202505; September 6, 2017

FACTS:

BDO Remittance, a corp with principal office in Italy, hired Ocampo as a remittance
processor. She was dismissed for misappropriating the sum of 24,035 Euro. So colpaint
was filed by BDO before the Court of Turin, Italy. Ocampo pleaded guilty. Turin Court
convicted and sentenced her to suffer imprisonment of 6 months and a penalty of 300
euro, but granted her the benefit of suspension of the enforcement of sentence on account
of her guilty plea. (Turin Court Decision)

Later, BDO filed a petition for recognition of foreign judgment with the RTC of
Mandaluyong City. Sheriff attempted to personaly serve the summons on Ocampo in her
address in San Bernardo Village, Darasa, Tanauan, Batangas. However, since the address
was incomplete, the sheriff sought the help of barangay oAcials, who pointed him to the
house belonging to Ocampo's father, Nicasio Ocampo. Victor P. Macahia (Macahia), uncle
of Ocampo and present occupant, informed the sheriff that Ocampo and her family were
already in Italy, and that he was only a caretaker of the house. The sheriff then proceeded
to serve the summons upon Macahia. 9 After Ocampo failed to file an answer, BDO
Remittance filed a motion to declare Ocampo in default. The RTC granted the motion and
allowed BDO Remittance to present evidence ex parte.

The RTC recognized the Turin Court decision. Ocampo’s mother received a copy of the
decision and forwarded it to Ocampo. Later, after acquiring a counsel, filed 65 with the
CA and argued that RTC acted in grave abuse in recognizing the Turin Decision.

CA set aside the RTC decision. It opined that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
Ocampo because summons was improperly served. It held that since Ocampo's
whereabouts were unknown, summons should have been served in accordance with
Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The sheriff however, erroneously
effected the substituted service of summons under Section 7 of Rule
14. Reconsideration was likewise denied, hence the petition.
ISSUE:

Whether service of summons was validly effected upon respondent, who lives in Italy,
through substituted service.

RULING: PETITION DENIED

GEN RULE: summons must be served personally on the defendant. Section 6, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court

For justifiable reasons, however, other modes of serving summons may be resorted to.
When the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time after efforts to
locate him have failed, the rules allow summons to be served by substituted service.
Substituted service is effected by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or by
leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof.

When the defendant's whereabouts are unknown, the rules allow service of summons by
publication. As an exception to the preferred mode of service, service of summons by
publication may only be resorted to when the whereabouts of the defendant are not only
unknown, but cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. The diligence requirement means
that there must be prior resort to personal service under Section 7 and substituted service
under Section 8, and proof that these modes were ineffective before summons by
publication may be allowed. This mode also requires the plaintiff to file a written motion
for leave of court to effect service of summons by publication, supported by affidavit of
the plaintiff or some person on his behalf, setting forth the grounds for the application.

SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS:

Presupposes that the place where the summons is being served is the defendant's current
residence or office/regular place of business. Thus, where the defendant neither resides
nor holds office in the address stated in the summons, substituted service cannot be
resorted to.

How effected?

1) By leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's dwelling house or residence

with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or

2) By leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular

place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

TN: Dwelling house or residence refer to the time of service, hence it is not sufficient to
leave the copy at defendant’s former house, residence, abode.
TN: Office of Regular place of business refer to the office or place of business of defendant
at the time of service. IN THIS CASE:

It was clear from the sheriff’s report that Ocampo no longer resides in San Bernardo
Village, Darasa, Tanauan, Batangas, as she and her family were already in Italy. Even BDO
admitted that Ocampo’s whereabouts in Italy are no longer certain. This, we note, is the
reason why in alleging the two addresses of Ocampo, one in Italy and one in the
Philippines, BDO Remittance used the phrase "last known [address]" instead of the usual
"resident of." Not being a resident of the address where the summons was served, the
substituted service of summons is ineffective. Accordingly, the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Ocampo.

Modes of service of summons must be strictly followed in order that the court may
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The purpose of this is to afford the
defendant an opportunity to be heard on the claim against him. BDO Remittance is not
totally without recourse, as the rules allow summons by publication and extraterritorial
service. Unlike substituted service, however, these are extraordinary modes which require
leave of court.

As a rule, if a defendant has not been validly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction
over his person, and a judgment rendered against him is void. Since the RTC never
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Ocampo, the judgment rendered by the court
could not be considered binding upon her.

Tung Ho Steel Enterprises vs Ting Guan

G.R. No. 182153 April 7, 2014

Facts: Respondent Ting Guan(seller) is a domestic corporation who entered into a contract
of sale with petitioner Tung Ho(buyer) who is a foreign corporation for some metal scrap
iron and steel. Upon respondent’s failure to deliver the full quantity under the contract,
petitioner filed a request for arbitration before the International Court of Arbitration in
Singapore wherein the ruling was in favor of petitioner and respondent was ordered to
pay damages.

Because respondent refused to comply with the ruling, petitioner filed before the RTC
Makati a case for the enforcement of the arbitral award upon which personal service of
summons was issued to Ms. Tejero who was alleged to be the corporate secretary of
respondent. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue but
RTC denied such motion to dismiss. Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration
this time arguing that Ms. Tejero was not its corporate secretary and thus, jurisdiction was
not acquired by the court due to improper service of summons. But RTC likewise denied
such motion for reconsideration ruling that Ms. Tejero had already voluntarily appeared
in court when it raised other arguments apart from lack of jurisdiction in its motion to
dismiss.

Respondent appealed to CA wherein it ruled that jurisdiction over the person of

respondent was not acquired due to fact that petitioner failed to prove that Tejero was the
corporate secretary of respondent. BOTH petitioner and respondent filed separate motions
for reconsideration wherein petitioner insisted that there was proper service of summons
and respondent sought to modify the ruling.

Subsequent to the filling of MR, respondent went to SC to question the CA’s ruling in GR
No. 176110 which was dismissed by SC and SC remanded the case to RTC which ruled
that Tejero was not the corporate secretary. (mi.ad2 si respondent sa SC bisag pending pa
ang MR ni petitioner sa CA). CA then dismissed the MR of petitioner for lack of merit
which prompted petitioner to go to SC which is now the present petition GR No. 182153.

Petitioner argued that there was proper service of summons since Tejero is presumed to be
regularly performing its official duties when it issued the returns of service of summons
while respondent argued res judicata since RTC already ruled with finality that Tejero was
not the corporate secretary. Issue: WON res judicata applies.

WON there was proper service of summons.

Held: No, res judicata does not apply.

Yes, there was proper service of summons.

Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive on the rights of the parties or their privies in all later
suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit. For res judicata to apply, the
final judgment must be on the merits of the case which means that the court has
unequivocally determined the parties' rights and obligations with respect to the causes of
action and the subject matter of the case. Our disposition in G.R. No. 176110 only dwelt on
technical or collateral aspects of the case, and not on its merits. Specifcally, we did not rule
on whether Tung Ho may enforce the foreign arbitral award against Ting Guan in that
case.

The CA was not ousted of its jurisdiction with the promulgation of G.R. No. 176110. The
court's jurisdiction, once attached, cannot be ousted until it finally disposes of the case.
When a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its
jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the case is retained. Tung Ho's timely
filing of a motion for reconsideration before the CA and of a Rule 45 petition before this
Court prevented the July 5, 2006 CA decision from attaining finality. For this Court to
deny Tung Ho's petition would result in an anomalous situation where a party litigant is
penalized and deprived of his fair opportunity to appeal the case by faithfully complying
with the Rules of Court.

Nonetheless, we see no reason to disturb the lower courts' finding that Tejero was not a
corporate secretary and, therefore, was not the proper person to receive the summons
under Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. This Court is not a trier of facts; we cannot
re-examine, review or re-evaluate the evidence and the factual review made by the lower
courts. In the absence of compelling reasons, we will not deviate from the rule that factual
findings of the lower courts are final and binding on this Court.
However, we cannot agree with the legal conclusion that the appellate court reached,
given the established facts. To our mind, Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the trial
court in view of the procedural recourse that it took before that court. Its voluntary
appearance is equivalent to service of summons.

As a basic principle, courts look with disfavor on piecemeal arguments in motions filed by
the parties. Under the omnibus motion rule, a motion attacking a pleading, order,
judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available. The purpose of this
rule is to obviate multiplicity of motions and to discourage dilatory motions and
pleadings. Party litigants should not be allowed to reiterate identical motions, speculating
on the possible change of opinion of the courts or of the judges thereof. The trial court's
denial of the motion to dismiss is not a license for the defendant to file a Rule 65 petition
before the CA. An order denying a motion to dismiss cannot be the subject of a petition for
certiorari as the defendant still has an adequate remedy before the trial court

— i.e., to file an answer and to subsequently appeal the case if he loses the case. As
exceptions, the defendant may avail of a petition for certiorari if the ground raised in the
motion to dismiss is lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or over the
subject matter.

We cannot allow and simply passively look at Ting Guan's blatant disregard of the rules of
procedure in the present case. The Rules of Court only allows the filling of a motion to
dismiss once. Ting Guan's filling of successive motions to dismiss , under the guise of
"supplemental motion to dismiss" or "motion for reconsideration", is not only improper
but also dilatory. Ting Guan's belated reliance on the improper service of summons was a
mere afterthought, if not a bad faith ploy to avoid the foreign arbitral award's enforcement
which is still at its preliminary stage after the lapse of almost a decade since the fllling of
the complaint.

Furthermore, Ting Guan's failure to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction over its person in
the first motion to dismiss is fatal to its cause. Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the
RTC when it filed a motion to dismiss and a "supplemental motion to dismiss" without
raising the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over its person. In Anunciacion v. Bocanegra , we
categorically stated that the defendant should raise the affirmative defense of lack of
jurisdiction over his person in the very first motion to dismiss. Failure to raise the issue of
improper service of summons in the first motion to dismiss is a waiver of this defense and
cannot be belatedly raised in succeeding motions and pleadings.

Even assuming that Ting Guan did not voluntarily appear before the RTC, the CA should
have ordered the RTC to issue an alias summons instead. In Lingner & Fisher GMBH vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, we enunciated the policy that the courts should not dismiss
a case simply because there was an improper service of summons. The lower courts
should be cautious in haphazardly dismissing complaints on this ground alone
considering that the trial court can cure this defect and order the issuance of alias
summons on the proper person in the interest of substantial justice and to expedite the
proceedings.
 Nation Petroleum V. RCBC
G.R. No. 183370, August 17, 2015

Facts: Respondent filed a civil case from damages arising from estafa in relation to
violation of the Trust Receipts Law. Respondent’s prayer for writ of preliminary
attachment was granted. Thereafter, Sheriff Leodel N. Roxas served upon the petitioner a
copy of the summons, complaint, application for attachment, respondent’s affidavit and
bond, and the order and writ of attachment. The said documents were served to Claudia
Abante (defendant’s liaison officer) as per instruction of the defendant Melinda Ang
(defendant corporation’s corporate Secretary). Copies were also served to the petitioner’s
address but they refused to acknowledge receipt. Petitioner now contends that the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioner corporation for non compliance of Sect. 11,
Rule 14 which enumerates the people to be served of summons if the defendant is a
corporation and that the court did not also acquire jurisdiction over individual defendants
by resorting to substituted service of summons despite the absence of earnest effort on the
part of the sheriff to personally serve summons.

Issues:

1. WON there was a valid service of summons to defendant corporation?

2. WON there was a valid service of summons to the persons of the individual
defendants?

Ruling: 1. Yes. There was valid service of summons Summons is a writ by which the
defendant is notified of the action brought against him or her. Its purpose is two-fold: to
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and to notify the defendant that an
action has been commenced so that he may be given an opportunity to be heard on the
claim against him.

“[C]ompliance with the rules regarding the service

of summons is as much an issue of due process as of jurisdiction. The essence of due

process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence
one may have in support of his defense. It is elementary that before a person can be
deprived of his property, he should first be informed of the claim against him and the
theory on which such claim is premised.

Service of summons on domestic corporation, partnership or other juridical entity is

governed by Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules, which states:

SECTION 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a
juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.

2. No. There was no valid service of summons to the individual defendants

Section 7, in relation to Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules, provides for substituted service of
summons: Section 6. Service in person on defendant. – Whenever practicable, the
summons shall be served by handling a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he
refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.

Section 7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected

(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of
suitable age

and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

The said provisions should not be construed as alternative modes of service of summons.
Substituted service is only resorted when personal service cannot be made and after
stringent and formal substantive requirements have been complied with. Substituted
service cannot be made just by mere convenience. Sheriffs upon relying on substituted
service must show facts and circumstances that would justify failure on his part to give
personal service of summons within a reasonable time and after several attempts.

Reasonable time as defined by jurisprudence,7 days for the plaintiff or 15-30 days for the
sheriff. Several attempts as defined by jurisprudence
Atleast 3 times preferably at different dates. Evidently, sheriff failed to comply with this.
Person of suitable age and discretion then residing there in

as defined as jurisprudence,
Discretion" is defined as "the ability to make decisions which

represent a responsible choice and for which an

understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be

presupposed". Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such

person must know how to read and understand English to

comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the

need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant

at the earliest possible time for the person to take

appropriate action.

In the case at bar, although the househelpers to which the

substituted service was given were of the legal age, there was
no proof of any showing that these persons are able to

understand the import of the service handed to them. Clearly, from the foregoing, sheriff
failed to justify his resort of substituted services.
On the other hand, the court still acquired jurisdiction over
the individual defendants when they asked for affirmative
reliefs from the court namely:
1. Discharge of the writ of attachment

2. Denial of the motion to declare them in default

3. Filing of comment/opposition

4. Denial of respondent’s motion to strike off from the records

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY DPWH, Petitioners,

vs.
ORTIGAS AND COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Respondent.
RULE 41 and 50 (2)

FACTS:
Respondent, Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership, is the owner of a parcel of land in
Pasig City. Upon the request of DPWH, respondent segregated its property and reserved a
portion of it for the road widening of Ortigas Avenue which was completed in 1999. Out
of the1,445 square meters allotment, only 396 square meters was utilized so respondent
subdivided it into two and filed with the RTC of Pasig a petition for authority to sell to the
government the portion used for the project.
It was set into hearing but despite due notice to the public, no one appeared to oppose
respondent in the hearing so it was able to establish the judicial facts of the case and was
allowed to present evidence ex parte. Finding merit, the RTC issued an order on June 11,
2011, authorizing the sale of the lot to Republic of the Philippines, petitioner herein.
Later on June 27, 2011, petitioner, represented by the SG, filed an opposition, alleging that
respondent’s property can only be conveyed by way of donation to the government, citing
Dec. 50 of PD. 1529, also known as the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the CA arguing that the RTC erred in granting
respondent the authority to sell its property to the government because the lot can only be
conveyed by donation to the government. However, the CA dismissed it on the ground
that an order or judgment denying a motion for reconsideration in not appealable.
The republic later filed an MR pointing out that Rule 37, Sec. 9 contemplates as non-
appealable only those orders which are not yet final. In this case, the order was already
final. Despite this, the CA also denied it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It noted that
even if the order denying the motion for reconsideration was appealable, the appeal was
still dismissible for lack of jurisdiction because petitioner raised only a question of law.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in denying petitioner’s appeal based on technicalities.

RULING:
No. The court ruled that appeals from RTC to CA under Rule 41 must raise both questions
of fact and law. Sec. 2 of Rule 50 also provides that appeals taken from RTC to the CA
raising only pure questions of law are not reviewable by the CA. The appeal shall also not
be transferred to the appropriate court. Instead, it shall be dismissed outright.
Appeals from the decisions of the RTC, raising purely questions of law must be taken to
the SC on a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.An appeal by
notice of appeal from the decision of the RTC to CA is proper only if the appellant raises
questions of facts or both questions of fact and law.
The sole issue raised by the petitioner to the CA is whether respondent should be
conveyed to it only by donation, in accordance with Sec. 50 of PD No. 1529. This question
involves the interpretation and application of the provision. It does not require the CA to
examine the truth or falsity of facts presented neither does it invite a review of the
evidence. The issue raised, therefore, is purely of law, The proper mode of appeal is
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 45. Hence, the CA did not err in dismissing the
appeal on this ground.

G.R. No. 151898, March 14, 2014

RICARDO RIZAL, ET AL, Petitioners,
vs.
LEONCIA NAREDO, et. al, Respondent.
RULE 44 Sec. 13(a)

FACTS:
Petitioners herein commenced a civil case against respondents involving the accretion of
two (2) hectares of land in Calamba. The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the
petitioners and ordered the respondents to vacate the land and pay P500.00 a year from
1943 as reasonable rent for their occupancy. This ruling was upheld by both the appellate
court and Supreme Court.
To satisfy the money judgment, the provincial sheriff levied lots no. 252 and 269 together
with a house erected on Lot 252, which is owned by the legal heirs of Gervacia Cantillano
to which several third party claims were filed, including herein respondent. Petitioners
acquired the lot and the respondent now questions the execution for they believe that it
must be exempt from execution. Although the CFI ordered that the petitioners be placed
in possession of the subject land, it did not evict Leoncia Naredo.
The parties then entered into a compromise agreement whereby 3/5 belongs to the
petitioners and 2/5 to the defendants. Ten years after, they assailed the validity of the
compromise agreement claiming that forgery took place. The Regional Trial Court
dismissed the case on the ground of prescription.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition should be dismissed on the ground of prescription and failure
to pay docket fees

RULING:
Yes. Failure to observe the requirements under Section 13(a), Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of
Court and to pay the correct docket fees is fatal to the appeal. Observance in the
requirements under Sec. 13 (a) Rule 44 is very important because although the Court may
be lenient in somes instances on formal defects of pleadings filed, it could not close its eyes
when a litigant continuously ignores technical rules, to point of wanton disregard of the
rationale behind those rules. It is design for the proper and prompt disposition of cases
begore the CA. Also, non-payment of docket fees does not vest jurisdiction in the trial
court.
Likewise, the action is dismissible for res judicata and lack of cause of action. The partition
of Lot No. 252 was the result of the approved Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No.
36-C, which was immediately final and executory. Absent any showing that said
Compromise Agreement was vitiated by fraud, mistake or duress, the court cannot set
aside a judgment based on compromise. It is axiomatic that a compromise agreement once
approved by the court settles the rights of the parties and has the force of res judicata. It
cannot be disturbed except on the ground of vice of consent or forgery.
The court, thus, sustain the respondents' affirmative defenses of res judicata and lack of
cause of action, and uphold the appellate and trial courts' rejection of the petitioners'
ostensible attempt to revive the already stale judgment in Civil Case No. 36-C through an
entirely new action for partition..

SPOUSES MARIO AND JULIA CAMPOS, Petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RULE 52 (8)

FACTS:
On Nov. 17, 2003, petitioners applied for the registration of a 6, 904 sq. meter parcel of
land bought from Roberto Laigo, as evidence by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the
parties on July 26, 1990.
The Republic filed an opposition to the petitioner’s application but was later dismissed by
MTC due to the Republic’s failure to present testimonial or documentary evidence to
substantiate its grounds for objection.
The MTC rendered a decision granting the petitioners’ application for registration based
on the evidences presented.
The Republic appealed to the CA on the ground that MTC erred in granting the
application because of the discrepancies in the area of the subject land as applied for and
indicated in the tax declaration and parties’ deed of sale. It appeared that, in the tax
declarations, the subject land was sometimes described as “swampy” and, in others,
“sandy”.
The CA granted the motion and reversed and set aside the MTC’s decision and dismissed
the petitioners’ application for registration of title. It rules that the evidences of the
petitioners failed to prove the nature and duration of their possession and that of their
predecessors-in-interest and that they failed to prove that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession of the lot since June 1945 or
earlier.
Furthermore, it failed to establish when the subject land became alienable despite DENR-
CENRO La Union certification dated Jan 1987. It was inadequate to prove that the subject
land was classified as alienable and disposable on said date. The CA lastly noted that the
discrepancies of the land indicated in the tax declaration has put doubt in the lot’s identity
and thus, insufficient identification of the land claimed in absolute ownership by the
applicant cannot ripen into ownership.
Hence, this petition. The petitioner argued that the CA erred in ruling on non-issues and
on established and undisputed facts that were not raised by the Republic as errors in its
appeal. IT argues that the sole issues raised by the Republic were the discrepancies on the
subject land which the petitioners already addressed in their appeal brief before the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petitioner’s application for registration of title.
RULING:
The court ruled in the negative. It addressed the procedural issue raised by the petitioners.
It held that Sec. 8 of Rule 52 expressly provides that:
“No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of
the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered unless stated in
the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and
properly argued in the brief, save ad the court pass upon plain errors and clerical error.”
The general rule that an assignment of error is essential to appellate review and only those
errors assigned will be considered applied in the absence of certain exceptional
circumstances.
As exceptions to the rule, the Court has considered grounds not raised or assigned as
errors in instances where: 1) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over
the matter; 2) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain and clerical
errors within the contemplation of the law; 3) matters not assigned as errors on appeal ,
whose consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of
the case or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; 4)
matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are
matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to
raise or which the lower court ignored; 5) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are
closely related to the assigned error/s; and 6) matters not assigned as errors on appeal.
Whose determination is necessary to rule on the question/s properly assigned as errors.
The court ruled that the present case falls into the exceptions. They find no error by the
CA in resolving the issue on the nature and duration of the petitioner’s possession and on
the alienable character of the subject land. The issues were apparently not raised by the
Republic in its appeal before the CA, but are crucial in determining whether the
petitioners have registrable title over the subject land.
Furthermore, in applying for registration of title under Sec 14 (1) of PD 1529, the person
applying must prove; 1) that the land sought to be registeres forms part of the disposable
and alienable lands of the public domain, and 2) that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under bona fide claim of
ownership since June 1945 or earlier.
Hence, petition DENIED.

G.R. No. 190680 - September 13, 2012

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS and AYALA LAND, INC.

Subject of this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the Resolution
dated October 30, 2009 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) en bane in CTA EB No. 402,
which dismissed herein petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue's (CIR) petition for
relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS:
In 2005, private respondent Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) filed with the CTA a petition for
review to question the CIR’s assessment against it for deficiency value-added tax for the
calendar year 2003. Before the tax court, the CIR and ALI filed their Joint Stipulation of
Facts and Issues, which was cited in the present petition to read in part:
Petitioner (herein private respondent) is primarily engaged in the sale and/or lease of real
properties and, among others, likewise owns and operates theatres or cinemas.
Petitioner received respondent’s (herein petitioner) Final Assessment Notice dated 29
October 2004 whereby respondent was assessing petitioner alleged deficiency 10% value
added tax on its alleged income from cinema operations for the taxable year 2003 in the
aggregate amount of One Hundred Three Million Three Hundred Forty-Six Thousand Six
Hundred Ninety-One and 40/100 Pesos (P 103,346,691.40) inclusive of 20% interest.
On 10 December 2004, petitioner filed its protest with the office of respondent contesting
the factual and legal bases of the VAT assessment.
On 28 April 2005, petitioner received respondent’s 25 April 2005 Decision denying
petitioner’s protest, with a notation that the same constitutes respondent’s Final Decision
on the matter.
Petitioner received on 23 November 2004, respondent’s 19 November 2004 Letter of
Authority for the examination of ALL INTERNAL REVENUE TAXES of petitioner from 1
January 2003 to 31 December 2003.
In order to protect its right, petitioner filed the Petition for Review pursuant to Section 228
of the Tax Code.
Proceedings ensued. On April 11, 2008, the CTA Second Division rendered its Decision
granting ALI’s petition for review. The assessment against ALI for deficiency VAT in the
amount of P 103,346,691.40 for the calendar year 2003 was ordered cancelled and set aside.
The CIR’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file an appeal to the
CTA en banc.
On February 12, 2009, the CTA en banc rendered its Decision affirming the decision of the
CTA Second Division. Feeling aggrieved, the CIR filed a motion for reconsideration, but
this was denied by the CTA en banc in its Resolution dated March 25, 2009.
The CIR claims that neither he nor his statutory counsel, the Office of the Solicitor General,
received a copy of the CTA en banc’s resolution denying his motion for reconsideration. It
then came as a surprise to him when he received on June 17, 2009 a copy of the CTA en
banc’s Resolution dated June 10, 2009 which provided that the CTA Decision dated
February 12, 2009 had become final and executory. The CIR then filed on July 2, 2009 a
Manifestation with the Motion to Reconsider Resolution Ordering Entry of Judgment,
questioning the CTA’s entry of judgment and seeking the following reliefs: (1) for the CTA
to withdraw its resolution ordering the issuance of entry of judgment; (2) for the CTA to
resolve the CIR’s motion for reconsideration filed on March 4, 2009; and (3) should there
be an existing resolution of the motion for reconsideration, for the CTA to serve a copy
thereof upon the CIR and his counsel. The petitioner explained in his manifestation:
On 17 June 2009, he received Resolution dated 10 June 2009 holding that in the absence of
an appeal, the Honorable Court’s Decision dated 12 February 2009 has become final and
executory.
Thus, the Honorable Court ordered the issuance of an Entry of Judgment in this case.
Respondent respectfully manifests that on 4 March 2009, he filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Honorable Court’s Decision dated 12 February 2009, the same
decision which the Honorable Court has now deemed to be final and executory.
Further, a check with his records reveals that there is no Resolution which has been issued
by the Honorable Court denying his Motion for Reconsideration. To double check, on
three occasions he has inquired from his counsel the Office of the Solicitor General, on
whether he has received any Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration. Respondent
was informed that there was none.
Finally, he checked with the Honorable Court and was informed that there is a Resolution
dated 25 March 2009. In short, while petitioner and his counsel were of the mind that the
Motion for Reconsideration still had to be resolved, it appears that it already was.
However, it is respectfully manifested that petitioner and his counsel have not received
the said Resolution and thus, such failure has prevented petitioner from filing the
necessary Petition for Review before the Honorable Supreme Court. Such petition would
have barred the Decision dated 12 February 2009 from attaining finality and eventual
entry in the Book of Judgments’.
On July 29, 2009, the CTA en banc issued its Resolution denying the motion. It reasoned
that per its records, the CIR and OSG had received on March 27, 2009 and March 30, 2009,
respectively, a copy of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. The CIR
received its copy of said Resolution dated July 29, 2009 on August 3, 2009.
The CIR then filed on October 2, 2009 with the CTA en banc a petition for relief asking that
the entry of judgment in the case be recalled, and for the CIR and OSG to be served with
copies of the Resolution dated March 25, 2009. To show the timeliness of the petition for
relief, the CIR claimed that he knew of the Resolution dated March 25, 2009 only on
August 3, 2009, when he received a copy of the Resolution dated July 29, 2009. He then
claimed that the sixty (60)-day period for the filing of the petition for relief should be
reckoned from August 3, 2009, giving him until October 2, 2009 to file it. Further, CIR’s
counsel Atty. Felix Paul R. Velasco III (Atty. Velasco) tried to explain the CIR’s and OSG’s
alleged failure to receive the CTA’s Resolution dated March 25, 2009, notwithstanding the
CTA’s records showing the contrary, by alleging in his Affidavit of Merit attached to the
petition for relief that:
14. I noted that, as stated by the Honorable CTA in its 29 July 2009 Resolution, there were
rubber stamps of both petitioner and the OSG signifying receipt of the resolution. But
given the fact that both petitioner and the OSG did not have copies of this Resolution, the
only logical explanation is that the front notice page was indeed correct and stamped by
both offices but the received enclosed order of the Honorable Court probably contained a
different one. This error has happened to petitioner in other cases but these were
subsequently and timely noticed and no detrimental effects occurred.9
On October 30, 2009, the CTA en banc dismissed the petition for relief for having been
filed out time, via the assailed resolution which reads in part:
The Supreme Court has ruled that "a party filing a petition for relief from judgment must
strictly comply with two reglementary periods; first, the petition must be filed within sixty
(60) days from knowledge of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside; and
second, within a fixed period of six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order or
other proceeding. Strict compliance with these periods is required because a petition for
relief from judgment is a final act of liberality on the part of the State, which remedy
cannot be allowed to erode any further the fundamental principle that a judgment, order
or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in order to put at last an end to
litigation."
In this case, petitioner seeks relief from judgment of the Court En Banc’s Resolution dated
March 25, 2009. Records show that petitioner learned of the Resolution dated March 25,
2009 when he received on June 17, 2009, the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated June
10, 2009 ordering the Entry of Judgment. This was in fact stated in petitioner’s
"Manifestation with Motion to Reconsider Resolution Ordering Entry of Judgment" which
petitioner filed on July 2, 2009. Hence, the 60 days should be counted from June 17, 2009
and the 60th day fell on August 16, 2009 which was a Sunday. Hence, the last day for the
filing of the petition for relief was on August 17, 2009. Even if the 60-day period is counted
from petitioner’s receipt of the Entry of Judgment on July 1, 2009, with the 60th day falling
on August 30, 2009, the petition for relief filed on October 2, 2009 will still be filed beyond
the 60-day period.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration with the CTA en banc, the CIR filed the
present petition for certiorari. The CIR argues that his 60-day period under Rule 38 should
have been counted from August 3, 2009, when he received a copy of the Resolution dated
July 29, 2009 and claimed to have first learned about the Resolution dated March 25, 2009
denying his motion for reconsideration.11
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CTA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in ruling that the petition for relief of the CIR was filed beyond the 60-day
reglementary period under Rule 38.

HELD:
At the outset, this Court holds that a dismissal of the petition is warranted in view of the
petitioner’s failure to file before the CTA en banc a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed resolution. The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine
qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for
the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of
the legal and factual circumstances of the case. The rationale of the rule rests upon the
presumption that the court or administrative body which issued the assailed order or
resolution may amend the same, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error. The
"plain speedy, and adequate remedy" referred to in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is a motion for reconsideration of the questioned order or resolution. While the rule is not
absolute and admits of settled exceptions, none of the exceptions attend the present
petition.
Even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, the petition is dismissible. In resolving the
substantive issue, it is crucial to determine the date when the petitioner learned of the
CTA en banc’s Resolution dated March 25, 2009, as Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. – A petition provided for in either
of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not
more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such
proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the
petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
By the CIR’s own evidence and admissions, particularly in the narration of facts in the
petition for relief, the OSG’s letter and the affidavit of merit attached thereto, it is evident
that both the CIR and the OSG had known of the CTA’s Resolution dated March 25, 2009
long before August 3, 2009. Granting that we give credence to the CIR’s argument that he
could not have known of the Resolution dated March 25, 2009 by his receipt on June 17,
2009 of the Resolution dated June 10, 2009, the CIR’s petition for relief was still filed out of
time.
The CIR’s claim that it was only on August 3, 2009 that he learned of the CTA’s denial of
his motion for reconsideration is belied by records showing that as of June 22, 2009, he
already knew of such fact. The information was relayed by the CTA to the CIR, when the
latter inquired from the court about the status of the case and the court’s action on his
motion for reconsideration. It was precisely because of such knowledge that he filed on
July 2, 2009 the manifestation and motion pertaining to the CTA’s order of entry of
judgment. Pertinent portions of his petition for relief read:
On 17 June 2009, he received a Resolution of the Honorable Court dated 10 June 2009
ordering the issuance of the Entry of Judgment in the present case.
Petitioner’s handling counsel was surprised that the above emphasized decision dated 12
February 2009 had become final considering that he had filed a timely Motion for
Reconsideration on 4 March 2009.
Investigating further, he called the Honorable Court and was informed that his Motion for
Reconsideration filed by registered mail on 4 March 2009 was received by the Honorable
Court on 11 March 2009. He was also informed that the last document on file there was a
Resolution dated 25 March 2009. He then searched his records and found no such
Resolution. Petitioner then tried to confirm the same from petitioner’s official counsel, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) through the assigned Solicitor, Atty. Bernardo C.
Villar. He was then informed that, same as handling counsel, the latter was also waiting
for the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration filed on 4 March 2009 and likewise,
did not receive any copy of any resolution for that matter. The OSG then formalized this
information through a letter dated 24 June 2009.
In the letter dated June 24, 2009 attached to the petition for relief as Annex "A", State
Solicitor Bernardo C. Villar mentioned that on June 22, 2009, he and Atty. Velasco had
discussed the CTA’s prior issuance of a resolution denying their motion for
reconsideration, thus:
This pertains to the CTA Notice of Resolution dated June 10, 2009 (directing entry of
judgment), a copy of which was received by the OSG on June 17, 2009, and further to our
telephone discussion on Monday, June 22, 2009.
As we have discussed, the OSG has not previously received any resolution on the motion
for reconsideration which you filed with the CTA. However, you pointed out that CTA
records tend to show that there had been such a resolution and that BIR was already
notified of the same sometime in March 2009.
The CIR then can no longer validly dispute that he had known of the CTA’s Resolution
dated March 25, 2009 on June 22, 2009. Even as we reckon the 60-day period under Section
3, Rule 38 from said date, the petitioner only had until August 21, 2009 within which to file
a petition for relief. Since August 21, 2009, a Friday, was a non-working holiday, the
petitioner should have filed the petition at the latest on August 24, 2009. The CIR’s filing
with the CTA of the petition for relief on October 2, 2009 then did not conform to the 60-
day requirement.
Furthermore, as far as we are concerned, there is doubt in the propriety of filing a petition
for relief at this time. Please note that from your receipt on June 17, 2009 of the entry of
judgment, you filed a "Manifestation and Motion to Reconsider Resolution Ordering Entry
of Judgment" dated July 1, 2009 instead of a petition for relief. In the meantime, the 60
days period (from actual knowledge) under Section 3, Rule 38 within which to file the
edition for relief continued to run and has expired already.
Given the foregoing, this Court finds no cogent reason to grant petitioner's plea for the
issuance of a writ of certiorari. An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as
committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same is performed in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment, which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
vi1iual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility. There was no such grave abuse of discretion in this case because the
CIR's petition for relief was indeed filed out of time.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED.
 G.R. No. 140473 - January 28, 2003
MELBA MONCAL ENRIQUEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and VICTORINA TIGLE,

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 20, 1999, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 50360, affirming the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City,
Branch 31, in Civil Case No. 12044. In its order dated October 6, 1998, the RTC dismissed
herein petitioner's appeal from the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)
of Bayawan-Basay, Negros Oriental in Civil Case No. 1062 for ejectment, and denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration in its order dated October 30, 1998. Petitioner also
assails the resolution of the appellate court dated September 24, 1999, denying her motion
for reconsideration.
FACTS:
On February 29, 1996, herein respondent Victorina Tigle filed an action for unlawful
detainer against herein petitioner Melba Moncal Enriquez before the MCTC of Bayawan-
Basay, Negros Oriental. Tigle's complaint that on December 14, 1994, she bought a parcel
of located at Tinego, Bayawan, Negros Oriental from Engracia Macaraya. Prior to the sale,
Enriquez was staying at said lot by mere tolerance of Macaraya. Enriquez was given an
option to buy said lot but she refused to exercise it. After the sale, Tigle then made
demands on Enriquez to vacate the property, but Enriquez adamantly refused.
In her Answer with Counterclaim filed before the MCTC, Enriquez averred that the
subject property is owned in common by the heirs of Felix Moncal and any sale by
Macaraya (one of the heirs of Felix Moncal) could only refer to Macaraya's undivided 1/7
share of the lot. Since said 1/7 share of Macaraya is still unidentified, the same cannot be a
subject of ejectment pursuant to Article 434 of the Civil Code.
Enriquez seasonably appealed to the RTC of Dumaguete City. In its order of February 16,
1998, the RTC directed respective counsel for the parties to "submit within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of this order their respective memoranda and/or briefs. The RTC stated that
upon expiration of the period to submit memoranda, it "shall decide the case on the basis
of the entire record of the proceedings in the court of origin and/or such brief(s) as may
have been filed.
The counsel for Enriquez failed to comply with the order to submit a memorandum. On
October 6, 1998, the RTC issued the following order:
For failure of defendant-appellant to file and submit a memorandum within the
reglementary period as required by Rule 40, Section 7 her appeal is dismissed.
Upon finality of this order, the Clerk of Court is hereby directed to remand the records of
this case to the lower court for execution of judgment.
Enriquez then moved for reconsideration, manifesting that she was adopting her position
paper in the MCTC as her memorandum.
On October 30, 1998, the RTC denied Enriquez's motion on the ground that "the record
does not show of such manifestation.
Enriquez then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, The appellate court found the
primary issue to be procedural in character, namely: the correctness of the order of the
RTC dismissing herein petitioner's appeal for failure to file her memorandum on appeal.
CA dismissed the petitiom.
The appellate court held that "under Section 7, Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
(the filing of a memorandum) is a mandatory obligation on the part of the appellant, such
that, the failure to do so warrants a concomitant dismissal of the appeal.
Enriquez moved for reconsideration of the appellate court's decision, but this was denied
by the Court of Appeals
ISSUE:
Whether Court of Appeals commit a reversible error in sustaining the order of the RTC
which dismissed petitioner's appeal for failure to file memorandum on appeal?
HELD:
Petitioner faults the appellate court with grave error of law when it failed to rule that the
RTC should have decided her appeal before it in accordance with Rule 40, Section 7 (c) of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. She avers that the appellate court erred when it did not
rule that the RTC should have decided the case, based on the record of the MCTC
proceedings, instead of sustaining the order to dismiss for failure to file memorandum.
Private respondent counters that an appellant's failure to file the memorandum required
under Rule 40, Section 7, compelled the RTC to dismiss the case. She points out that an
appealed case cannot be decided on the merits without an appellant's memorandum, as
the assignment of errors by the appellant is vital to the decision of the case. This is
different from the situation where it is the appellee who fails to file his memorandum, as
in this instance, the RTC may decide the case based on the records of the proceedings in
the court of origin and the appellant's memorandum. Moreover, the failure to file a
memorandum by the appellant manifests lack of interest to pursue her appeal.
Rule 40, Section 7 (b) provides that, "it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a
memorandum" and failure to do so "shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal." The use
of the word "shall" in a statute or rule expresses what is mandatory and compulsory.
Further, the Rule imposes upon an appellant the "duty" to submit his memorandum. A
duty is a "legal or moral obligation, mandatory act, responsibility, charge, requirement,
trust, chore, function, commission, debt, liability, assignment, role, pledge, dictate, office,
(and) engagement. Thus, under the express mandate of said Rule, the appellant is duty-
bound to submit his memorandum on appeal. Such submission is not a matter of
discretion on his part. His failure to comply with this mandate or to perform said duty
will compel the RTC to dismiss his appeal.
In rules of procedure, an act which is jurisdictional, or of the essence of the proceedings, or
is prescribed for the protection or benefit of the party affected is mandatory. As private
respondent points out, in appeals from inferior courts to the RTC, the appellant's brief is
mandatory for the assignment of errors is vital to the decision of the appeal on the merits.
This is because on appeal only errors specifically assigned and properly argued in the
brief or memorandum will be considered, except those affecting jurisdiction over the
subject matter as well as plain and clerical errors. Otherwise stated, an appellate court has
no power to resolve an unassigned error, which does not affect the court's jurisdiction
over the subject matter, save for a plain or clerical error.
It is true that the Rules should be interpreted so as to give litigants ample opportunity to
prove their respective claims and that a possible denial of substantial justice due to legal
technicalities should be avoided. But it is equally true that an appeal being a purely
statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in
the Rules of Court. In other words, he who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must play
by the rules. This the petitioner failed to do when she did not submit her memorandum of
appeal ias required by Rule 40, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. That she lost
her case is not the trial court's fault but her own.
In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error of law when it
upheld (a) the order of the RTC dismissing herein petitioner's appeal in Civil Case No.
12044, and (b) its order denying reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the assailed decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 170618- November 20, 2013

FAR EASTERN SURETY AND INSURANCE CO. INC., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. (petitioner) assails in this Rule 45 petition for
review on certiorari1 the Order2 dated October 4, 2005, the Judgment of Forfeiture3 dated
October 6, 2005, and the Orders dated October 25, 2005,4 November 14, 20055 and
November 22, 2005,6 all issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 64, Tarlac City
in Criminal Case No. 12408, entitled "The People of the Philippines v. Celo Tuazon."
The petitioner claims that it should not be held liable for a bail bond that it did not issue.
FACTS:
The petition traces its roots to the personal bail bond, for the provisional release of Celo
Tuazon (accused) which was filed before the RTC in Criminal Case No. 12408. The
personal bail bond was under the signatures of Paul J. Malvar and Teodorico S.
Evangelista as the petitioner’s authorized signatories. On January 23, 2004, the RTC
approved the bail bond.
On August 16, 2004, the Supreme Court issued A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC requiring all bonding
companies to accredit all their authorized agents with the courts. The petitioner applied
for its Certification of Accreditation and Authority to transact surety business with the
courts and accordingly designated Samuel A. Baui as its authorized representative in
Tarlac Province.
Subsequently, the accused failed to appear in the scheduled hearing, prompting the RTC
to issue an order requiring the petitioner to produce the body of the accused and to
explain why no judgment shall be rendered against the bond.
Samuel, who was then the petitioner’s designated representative, filed a Motion for
Extension of Time7 to comply with the RTC’s order. He likewise sought the petitioner’s
assistance for the use of its resources and agents outside Tarlac City because of the
difficulty of arresting the accused.
Sometime thereafter, the petitioner allegedly verified from its register that it neither
authorized nor sanctioned the issuance of a bail bond, and on this basis, it filed with the
RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Cancel Fake/Falsified Bail Bond. The petitioner alleged that
the signature of Teodorico in the bail bond had been forged; it also alleged that Paul was
not an authorized signatory; his name was not listed in the Secretary’s Certificate
submitted to the Court. In support of its motion, it attached copies of the Personal Bail
Bond, its Corporate Secretary’s Certificate, and the Special Power of Attorney in favor of
Medy S. Patricio, and prayed to be relieved from any liability under the bail bond.
The RTC denied the petitioner’s motion on the ground that the petitioner had indirectly
acknowledged the bond’s validity when it filed a motion for extension of time with the
trial court. The RTC subsequently issued a Judgment of Forfeiture for P200,000.00 against
the petitioner. The petitioner sought reconsideration of the judgment, but the RTC denied
the motion.
On October 25, 2005, the RTC issued another order, this time directing the issuance of a
writ of execution. The petitioner responded by filing an omnibus motion to hold in
abeyance or quash the writ, but the RTC similarly denied this motion. The petitioner
thereafter filed this Rule 45 petition to assail the Orders dated October 4, 2005, October 25,
2005, November 14, 2005 and November 22, 2005, and the Judgment of Forfeiture dated
October 6, 2005, all of them issued by the RTC.
The petitioner principally argues that the RTC erred in ruling that the petitioner indirectly
acknowledged the falsified bond’s validity when it filed a motion for extension of time to
respond to the lower court’s order of August 2, 2005. It also disclaims liability under the
bond based on the absence of the name of Paul in the Secretary’s Certificate of authorized
signatories, and based on the alleged forgery of Teodorico’s signature. It lastly argues that
the RTC failed to observe the mandate of A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC when it did not verify the
signatures’ authenticity and confirm the petitioner’s authorized signatories in the
Secretary’s Certificate before approving the bond.
The respondent People of the Philippines, for its part, maintains that the petitioner is
already estopped from questioning the bail bond’s authenticity. It likewise contends that
the petitioner used the wrong mode of review; the proper remedy is a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. It lastly
argues that the case involves factual issues that are beyond the scope of a Rule 45 petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in its ruling?
HELD:
We deny the petition as we cannot rule on it without the established or undisputed facts
on which to base our rulings of law on the presented issues. In short, the petitioner used
the wrong mode of appeal, rendering us unable to proceed even if we would want to.
We note that the petitioner directly comes to this Court via a Rule 45 petition, in relation
with Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules), on alleged pure questions of law.
Under Rule 41 of the Rules, an appeal from the RTC’s decision may be undertaken in three
(3) ways, depending on the nature of the attendant circumstances of the case, namely: (1)
an ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) in cases decided by the RTC in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) a petition for review to the CA in cases decided by
the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) a petition for review on
certiorari directly filed with the Court where only questions of law are raised or involved.
The first mode of appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules is available on questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and of law. The second mode of appeal, governed by Rule 42 of
the Rules, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and
of law. The third mode of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is filed with the
Court only on questions of law.8 It is only where pure questions of law are raised or
involved can an appeal be brought to the Court via a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, its resolution must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants, but must
rely solely on what the law provides on the given set of facts. If the facts are disputed or if
the issues require an examination of the evidence, the question posed is one of fact. The
test, therefore, is not the appellation given to a question by the party raising it, but
whether the appellate court can resolve the issue without examining or evaluating the
evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.
An examination of the present petition shows that the facts are disputed. The issues of the
authenticity and of the validity of the bail bond’s signatures and the authority of its
signatories had never been resolved. When the petitioner questioned the RTC’s ruling, it
was, in fact, raising the issues of falsity and of forgery of the signatures in the bail bond,
which questions are purely of fact. To quote the pertinent portion of the RTC’s order:
When the case was called, a representative of the bonding company by the person of a
certain Samuel Baui appeared. However, there is already a motion by said bonding
company thru Samuel Baui to give the bonding company 60 days extension but which the
Court granted shortened to 30 days. The expiration of the 30-day period is supposed to be
today but, however, the Court was confronted with the motion by the bonding company
alleging that the bond posted by the bonding company was falsified. The Court is of the
opinion that by the motion for extension of time within which to produce the body of the
accused, the bonding company indirectly acknowledged the validity of the bond posted
by the said bonding company. Wherefore, the motion of the bonding company dated
October 3, 2005 that it be relieved from liability is hereby DENIED.
This ruling, by its clear terms, did not pass upon the falsity or forgery of the bail bond’s
signatures. Nothing in the order resolved the question of whether Teodorico’s signature
had been forged. Neither was there any finding on the validity of the bail bond, nor any
definitive ruling on the effects of the unauthorized signature of Paul. Missing as well was
any mention of the circumstances that led to the RTC’s approval of the bond. We need all
these factual bases to make a ruling on what and how the law should be applied.
We additionally note that a bail bond is required to be in a public document, i.e., a duly
notarized document. As a notarized document, it has the presumption of regularity in its
favor, which presumption can only be contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing
and more than merely preponderant; otherwise, the regularity of the document should be
upheld.
Likewise notable is the settled rule that forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved
by clear, positive and convincing evidence. The burden of proof lies in the party alleging
forgery.
All these legal realities tell us that we can rule only on the issue of liability, even assuming
this to be a purely legal issue, if the matter of forgery and falsification has already been
settled. In other words, a finding of forgery (or absence of forgery) is necessary. At the
moment, the questions of whether the petitioner’s evidence is sufficient and convincing to
prove the forgery of Teodorico’s signature and whether the evidence is more than merely
preponderant to overcome the presumption of validity and the regularity of the notarized
bail bond are unsettled factual matters that the assailed ruling did not squarely rule upon,
and which this Court cannot now resolve via a Rule 45 petition. Simply put, the resolution
of these matters is outside this Court’s authority to act upon.
We stress that in reviews on certiorari the Court addresses only the questions of law. It is
not our function to analyze or weigh the evidence (which tasks belong to the trial court as
the trier of facts and to the appellate court as the reviewer of facts). We are confined to the
review of errors of law that may have been committed in the judgment under review.16
It is axiomatic that a question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth
or falsity of the alleged facts.
In the instant case, petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari raising mixed
questions of fact and law. She impugns the decision of the RTC dismissing her complaint
for failure to prosecute. In the instant case, petitioner brought this petition for review on
certiorari raising mixed questions of fact and law. She impugns the decision of the RTC
dismissing her complaint for failure to prosecute. The resolution of the propriety of
dismissal entails a review of the factual circumstances that led the trial court to decide in
such manner. On the other hand, petitioner also questions the lower courts’ denial of her
motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was filed out of time. There is indeed a
question as to what and how the law should be applied. Therefore, petitioner should have
brought this case to the Court of Appeals via the first mode of appeal under the aegis of
Rule 41. Section 4 of Circular No. 2-90, in effect at the time of the antecedents, provides
that an appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong
mode or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. This rule is now incorporated in Section
5, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Moreover, the filing of the case directly with this Court runs afoul of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the
Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained
in the lower tribunals. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial
tradition. Thus, a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision involving both
questions of fact and law must first be brought before the Court of Appeals. As a final
point, while we note the irregular procedure adopted by the RTC when it rendered a
decision based on implications, we nevertheless hold that the proper remedy to question
this irregularity is not through a Rule 45 petition. If indeed there is merit to the claim that
the signatures had been forged or that the signatory was unauthorized, or that the R TC
failed to observe the mandate of A.M. No. 04-7 -02-SC, the proper recourse to question the
RTC s ruling on the motion to cancel the bond should have been a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65, not through the process and medium the petitioner took.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition. Costs against Far
Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.