Journal 

of Institutional Economics
http://journals.cambridge.org/JOI

Additional services for Journal of Institutional Economics:

Email alerts: Click here
Subscriptions: Click here
Commercial reprints: Click here
Terms of use : Click here

Rules and collective action: an institutional analysis of the 
performance of irrigation systems in Nepal
RAM C. BASTAKOTI and GANESH P. SHIVAKOTI

Journal of Institutional Economics / Volume 8 / Issue 02 / June 2012, pp 225 ­ 246
DOI: 10.1017/S1744137411000452, Published online: 19 October 2011

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1744137411000452

How to cite this article:
RAM C. BASTAKOTI and GANESH P. SHIVAKOTI (2012). Rules and collective action: an 
institutional analysis of the performance of irrigation systems in Nepal. Journal of Institutional 
Economics, 8, pp 225­246 doi:10.1017/S1744137411000452

Request Permissions : Click here

Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/JOI, IP address: 144.110.144.67 on 26 Mar 2013
Journal of Institutional Economics (2012), 8: 2, 225–246
C The JOIE Foundation 2011 doi:10.1017/S1744137411000452
First published online 19 October 2011

Rules and collective action:

an institutional analysis of the
performance of irrigation systems
in Nepal
RAM C. BASTAKOTI∗ AND GANESH P. SHIVAKOTI
School of Environment, Resources and Development, Asian Institute of Technology, PO Box 4, Klong Luang,
Pathumthani 12120, Thailand

Abstract: This paper focuses on understanding rule systems by documenting

existing rules and their development in irrigation management in Nepal. We
analyze the rule formation of a sample of irrigation systems based on the ADICO
syntax (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995; Ostrom, 2005). Farmer-managed irrigation
systems generally are autonomous in devising their own rules based on local
context considering the ideas, norms and beliefs shared within the community.
Rule formation in agency-managed irrigation systems, however, is mostly done by
external officials. Strong rule enforcement mechanisms were found in
farmer-managed systems compared with agency-managed systems. Better rule
enforcement created favorable conditions for collective action among the users
and ensured better performance of the irrigation systems. Results imply that the
formation of new rules should fully consider biophysical attributes as well as
community beliefs and ideas.

1. Introduction

Common pool resource (CPR) management can be complex and difficult to

understand. With multiple uses and users of CPRs, the quality of management
depends on coordination of the activities of multiple individuals. Garrett Hardin
(1968) cautioned that open-access CPRs would be destroyed due to the lack of
effective management strategies. He recommended that CPRs should either be
nationalized or privatized in order to overcome the tragedy. But, more than 30
years after his often-cited article in Science, scholars have noted that many CPRs
across the world did not collapse as he cautioned and continued to be managed
without being privatized or centralized (Ostrom et al., 1999).
Studies show that many users do come together for collective arrangements
and devise various alternative management options. Some users adopt various
coordinated strategies for appropriation of resource units (Ostrom et al., 1994).
Coordinated strategies are influenced by the rules used for ordering their own

∗ Email: rcbastakoti@gmail.com and bastakoti@ait.ac.th

225
226 RAM C. BASTAKOTI AND GANESH P. SHIVAKOTI

relationships, various attributes of the biophysical world, and the nature of the
community where the action arena occurs. To understand institutional issues
it is important to examine how rules emerge within a physical and community
setting to generate particular types of situations.
Management of most irrigation systems is guided by various rules at the
system level. In community-managed irrigation systems, farmers develop a
variety of rules to specify rights and responsibilities among themselves (Tang,
1992). Most importantly they enforce these rules without the involvement of
external agencies. Contexts and irrigation systems vary, and, thus, self-organized
rule configurations vary depending on a variety of local attributes of irrigation
systems (Lam, 1998).
Thomas Dietz et al. (2003) noted that maintaining a certain level of collective
action among farmers is always a challenge. Universal solutions to water
management problems do not exist. Thus, farmers’ decision-making authority
related to devising rules is crucial (Bardhan, 2000; Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Regmi,
2008). Local institutions such as water users’ organizations enable farmers to
realize possible benefits of collective action (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002; Leathes
et al., 2008). The literature on collective choice discusses rules and their effect
on collective action (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1999). Analytical approaches
have been offered to study the evolution of rules and norms (Crawford and
Ostrom, 1995; Ostrom, 2005; Ostrom and Basurto, 2011). However, the
empirical evidence examining the relevance of these theories is still limited. Thus,
in this paper, we are interested in two empirical puzzles related to irrigation
management in Nepal: (1) the relationship of governance structure with rule
formation, enforcement and rule following; and (2) the effect of rule enforcement
on irrigation system performance.
Nepal has a large irrigation sector in which rules and policies for irrigation
have changed amid economic and political changes (Shah and Singh, 2000;
National Planning Commission, 2002; Shukla, 2002). Irrigation systems are
found in diverse biophysical and community settings in the country. Traditional
farmer-managed irrigation systems are predominant mostly in the hill/foothill
areas. Most of the medium- to large-scale irrigation systems are built in Terai
and valley areas (Shah and Singh, 2000). The diverse landscape across hills
and plain areas results in varied biophysical attributes of the irrigation systems.
The location of irrigation systems varies with respect to market development,
investments and commercial opportunities. Such differences may also influence
rule formation and its use in irrigation management.
This paper addresses the above-mentioned empirical puzzles considering three
specific questions: (a) How does rule formation vary across irrigation systems
that are subject to different governance modes? (b) Is rule formation influenced by
diversity in biophysical characteristics of the irrigation system and community
attributes? (c) How do rule enforcement mechanisms affect performance and
collective action regarding irrigation performance?
 Rules and collective action 227

2. Analytical approach

Using the institutional analysis and development framework

The main focus of this paper is on understanding the rule systems in irrigation
management by examining the evolution of rules and norms, through which we
can assess institutional change (Ostrom and Basurto, 2011). Social, economic
or political changes may lead to a change in formal institutions and ultimately
result in the establishment of new rules or additional enforcement mechanisms
to achieve favorable outcomes. Some argue that institutional change follows a
logical sequence (Florensa, 2004) though describing only a fraction of the whole
process of institutional change. Sometimes the processes of institutional change
develop in a spiral-like manner (Greif, 2005). In the beginning, individuals face
the choice of whether or not to support a change in existing rules. The expected
costs and benefits associated with institutional change (change in rules) play
an important role (Livingston, 2005). Information on expected benefits from
alternative sets of rules and the costs of changing existing rules (including the
monitoring and enforcing of new ones) affect the likelihood of institutional
change (Ostrom, 1990).
Depending on the situation, institutional change may take place only at the
formal level such as by state agencies. There is a possibility that, despite a change
in formal rules, people may continue to comply with the norms that had regulated
their activities and continue with the existing situation. This depends on the level
of autonomy of actors to change the rules. Thus it is possible that changes can
remain only at the formal government level without affecting the rules at the
grass-roots level.
New institutional economics draws an important distinction between
institutional arrangements and institutional environments (Saleth and Dinar,
2000). Institutional arrangements are the immediate structure that humans
impose on their dealings with each other (North, 1990). In this paper, the
institutional environments we include are government water policies and
irrigation-related laws. In referring to institutions or institutional arrangements,
we refer to rules-in-use of water users’ associations (WUAs).
Considering the focus of the paper, we have used a revised version of the
institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework as a guiding framework
for analysis (Ostrom et al., 1994; Ostrom, 1999) (Figure 1). We start our analysis
by focusing on the rules-in-use component part of the IAD framework. We then
consider the action arena as the main unit of institutional analysis, where the
users interact with other components of the whole system, and at the end affect
the outcome (Ostrom, 2005, 2007).
In combination with the biophysical attributes of the irrigation systems and
structure of the community, changes in rules-in-use have an effect on action
arenas through direct influence on the participants and their required actions. In
irrigation management, the entire irrigation system represents the action arena,
228 RAM C. BASTAKOTI AND GANESH P. SHIVAKOTI

Figure 1. Using the institutional analysis and development framework to analyze

rule formation and its effect on the performance of irrigation systems

Action arena

Biophysical Action situation

conditions Information Considering
Resources institutional change
Incentives
Attributes of the
Evaluation
community

Participants Outcome –
Rules-in-use Information performance
Formal + informal Motivation
Resources

which defines several action situations such as the meetings to form the rules,
and the actual process of irrigation itself. In particular, the meetings act as a
common platform for farmers to discuss and change the rules based on their need
or considering the information acquired from other action situations such as the
biophysical context and nature of the community. Such interaction, together with
rules, will ultimately affect the outcome, that is, performance of the irrigation
systems.

The ADICO syntax for analyzing the rule-formation process

Institutional statements provide a basis for institutional analysis. Institutional
statements include rules, norms and shared strategies. Sue Crawford and Elinor
Ostrom (1995) developed the grammar of institutions and proposed that
all institutional statements could be coded using a syntax, which illustrates
similarities and differences between shared strategies, norms and rules. We
have adopted the modified ADICO syntax proposed by Ostrom (2005) and
her colleagues that enables us to code institutional statements using a common
syntax:

A ‘Attributes’ Defines values of participant-level variables distinguishing to whom the institutional

statement applies.
D ‘Deontic’ Refers to the three modal verbs: ‘may’ (permitted); ‘must’ (obliged); and ‘must not’
(forbidden).
I ‘Aim’ Describes particular actions or outcomes in the action situation.
C ‘Conditions’ Defines when and where an action or outcome is permissible, obligatory, or forbidden.
O ‘Or else’ Sets out the consequence for not following a rule.

Rules include all five components (ADICO), whereas norms have four
components (ADIC), and shared strategies have only three components (AIC).
The ADICO syntax provides a basis for coding all institutional statements in
 Rules and collective action 229

Table 1. The ‘Aim’ component of seven types of rule

Type of rule Basic ‘Aim’ verb Regulated component of action situation

Position Be Positions
Boundary Enter or leave Participants
Choice (allocation) Do Actions
Aggregation Jointly affect Control
Information Send or receive Information
Payoff Pay or receive Costs/benefits
Scope Occur Outcomes

Source: Adapted from Ostrom (2005).

a consistent manner, thus allowing us to analyze the change of institutional

statements over time. In order to add essential details, we append information
on how the rules are enforced to the basic ADICO syntax.
Rules operate in an action situation. An action situation is a focal unit of
analysis; people are said to be in an action situation whenever they are faced
with a set of potential actions that jointly produce outcomes. Ostrom (2005)
suggested classifying the rules into seven broad types based on the ‘Aim’ element
of rules as discussed in the ADICO syntax (Table 1).

3. Data and methods

Selection of sample irrigation systems
This paper is based on an extensive survey of 50 irrigation systems across Nepal.
Irrigation systems were selected based on three criteria – ecological region,
economic characteristics and management structure – following a series of steps.
In the first step, we selected major river basins across all regions of the country.
In the second, we focused on physical terrain – plains or hills (including upper
valleys). In each terrain type we selected a particular district as a cluster. In
the final step, irrigation systems were selected from different strata within the
identified clusters. The forms of management structure considered were farmer-
initiated systems and agency-initiated systems (including jointly managed and/or
management transferred to the users). Table 2 presents the number of sample
irrigation systems selected from different parts of Nepal.
The majority of the sampled irrigation systems (n 41) had been initiated by
and are managed by farmers. The remaining systems are agency-initiated, out of
which three are under joint management and the other six are also managed by
users at various levels.
One of the focuses of this paper is to examine the relationship of governance
structure with rule formation, enforcement and rule-following behavior. Thus,
in further discussions, we group sampled irrigation systems into two categories
based on governance structure: ‘farmer-managed irrigation systems’ (FMISs);
and ‘agency-managed irrigation systems’ (AMISs). We find some sort of
230 RAM C. BASTAKOTI AND GANESH P. SHIVAKOTI

Table 2. Number of sample irrigation systems selected from different parts of Nepal

Ecological region
River basin Development region Plain Hill and valley Total
Koshi Eastern 7 5 12
Central 0 3 3
Gandaki Central 6 3 9
Western 4 8 12
Karnali Mid-Western 3 6 9
Far-Western 2 0 2
Mahakali Far-Western 3 0 3
Total 25 25 50

farmers’ involvement in the management of agency-initiated systems as well,

especially after the adoption of participatory irrigation management policy by
the government. However, a tendency of relatively less-active participation of
farmers with lack of cooperation and coordination with related agencies is
observed in such systems (Pradhan et al., 1998; Shukla, 2002). The situation
could particularly differ in the case of rule formation as it may start from
the very beginning of the system initiation. Thus we find the two categories,
FMISs and AMISs, representing different governance modes and as comparable
groups. Many studies also indicate differences in various aspects of governance
mechanism in the case of FMISs and AMISs (Lam, 1996, 1998; Pradhan et al.,
1998; Shukla, 2002; Bhatta et al., 2005).

Data sources, collection techniques and analysis

This paper is based on primary and secondary sources of information from both
national policy level and irrigation system level. The information on national
irrigation policy/act/regulation changes was collected from secondary sources
such as policy documents and other published literature.
Information from the irrigation system level was collected from primary
sources – the sampled 50 irrigation systems. Data were collected through
interviews with officials from WUAs in the selected irrigation systems. For
interviews we used structured checklists that included eight parts: general
information; users; physical condition; water delivery situation; management
structure; institutional arrangements and rules; influencing factors and external
intervention; and water management issues and problems in the selected
irrigation systems. The rule-formation process for each sampled irrigation system
was collected considering the period starting from the initiation of the system. For
analysis purposes, we mainly used information on existing rules, rule-formation
process, rule-following behavior, enforcement mechanisms, and performance of
the irrigation systems in addition to its biophysical features.
The analysis included both qualitative and quantitative techniques.
Quantitative data are summarized using the mean, frequency, and percentage and
 Rules and collective action 231

Table 3. Biophysical attributes of the sampled irrigation systems in Nepal

Feature Minimum Maximum Mean

Age (years) 10 >200 46.0
Command area (hectares) 15 6200 501.0
Number of users (households) 28 8000 868.9
Cropping intensity at head-end (%) 130 300.0 245.5
Cropping intensity at tail-end (%) 144 300.0 238.2
Type of system Percentage
Run-off-river 98.0
Pumping (including groundwater) 2.0
Headwork
Temporary 30.0
Permanent 70.0
Canal lining
Not lined 8.0
Partially lined 88.0
Completely lined 4.0
Nature of conflict
Among farmers 62.0
Among systems 8.0
Others 22.0

are presented in tabular form. Considering the categorical nature of variables,

the Pearson χ 2 test was used to analyze the association between different interest
variables (Tables 6, 7 and 8).
A monitoring and sanctioning index (MSI) was created combining six
institutional variables (Lam, 1998). The six variables were: (1) information made
available to the farmers about water appropriation; (2) information on individual
farmer’s contribution on system maintenance; (3) penalty for rule violations; (4)
water withdrawal rights; (5) monitoring rule conformance; and (6) variations in
levels of sanctioning. We assigned a value of ‘1’ if any of these rules exist, and
a ‘0’ if the rule does not exist. Then we added up the values of all six variables
to create the MSI, the value of which ranges from 0 to 6. In the analysis, we
classified irrigation systems into two groups: systems with MSI scores of less than
4; and systems with MSI scores of at least 4. In addition, the Mann–Whitney test
was used to compare the median MSI scores. This non-parametric rank-based
test was used considering the skewed distribution of the MSI scores.

Biophysical attributes of sampled irrigation systems

The IAD framework (Figure 1) includes biophysical attributes as one of the
components. In this paper we have considered the biophysical attributes of a
system as possible factors affecting rule formation. In this section we discuss
the major biophysical attributes of the sampled irrigation systems (Table 3). The
average age of the sampled systems was 46 years. The command area and number
232 RAM C. BASTAKOTI AND GANESH P. SHIVAKOTI

of users varied largely. The average cropping intensity at the head-end of the
system was 245.5%, whereas it was slightly lower at the tail-end of the system.
The majority of the sampled irrigation systems were of run-off-the-river type.
A significant proportion of systems had temporary headwork. However, the
canals in most of the systems were partially lined. Most of them (92%) reported
some form of conflicts, conflict among farmers (62%) being the most significant.
In a later section (see ‘Application of the ADICO syntax’) we will discuss how
the biophysical attributes affect rule formation.

4. Policy and regulatory directive for irrigation management in Nepal

Our analytical approach (see ‘Using the institutional analysis and development
framework’ section) considers the institutional environment as one of the possible
factors affecting rule formation. Thus, in this section we review government
water policies and irrigation-related laws and later examine how they affect rule
formation at the irrigation system level.
In Nepal, water resources policies entered into the legal domain with the
enactment of the first comprehensive statutory law called the Civil Code (Muluki
Ain) in 1854 (Khanal, 1982). The Civil Code linked water usage rights to
land ownership and prior appropriation rights of existing irrigation systems
over newly constructed systems. Clearly defined rules on water distribution to
avoid disputes were apparent early in the history (Baral, 2001). Following an
introduction of planned development (five-year plans) in the mid 1950s, Nepal
witnessed a flurry of policy interventions in water resource sectors including
irrigation. The Irrigation Act 1961 laid the first legal framework specifically for
irrigation. This was later replaced by the Canal, Electricity and Water Resource
Act 1967 that introduced the concept of a water tax. However, it must be
mentioned that water law in Nepal consists of customary rights and statutory
laws. The past centralized system of governance primarily satisfied the interests
of ruling elites rather than those of producers, traders and consumers.
With the restoration of democracy in 1990 there has been a shift towards
community participation and private sector involvement in decision-making. The
first national irrigation regulation was devised in 1989, which was revised and
promulgated as the Irrigation Policy in 1992 that emphasized formal registration
of FMISs to the government authority. Subsequently, irrigation policy went
through further revisions, the latest being in 2003. Currently, there exist four
policies, two acts and five regulations related to the water resources of Nepal
(Table 4). Among them the acts, regulations and policies that are directly related
to irrigation development and management are the Water Resources Act 1992,
Water Resource Regulation 1993, Irrigation Regulation 2000 and Irrigation
Policy 2003 (His Majesty’s Government of Nepal, 1992, 1993, 2000, 2003).
In addition, the Tenth Five Year Development Plan of Nepal (2002–07)
awarded legal rights to WUAs and irrigation division offices to collect service
 Rules and collective action 233

Table 4. Salient features of irrigation policies in Nepal

Act or policy Salient features

The Civil Code 1853
Irrigation Act 1961
Canal, Electricity and Water
Resources Act 1967
Water Resources Act 1992
Water Resource Regulation
1993
Irrigation Regulation 1999
Irrigation Policy 2003
a. First comprehensive statutory law providing administrative
procedures and legal frameworks
b. Linked water usage rights to land ownership within canal
command area
c. Provisioned ‘prior appropriation rights’ of existing irrigation canals
over newly constructed canals
a. Laid foundation for legal framework specifically for irrigation
a. Introduced the concept of water tax and licensing
a. Specified that ownership of all water resources including irrigations
rests on the state and its use should be permitted by the state
b. Provisions for water users’ organizations (WUOs) and recognized
them as autonomous bodies with perpetual succession
c. Enabled agency-managed irrigation systems and farmer-managed
irrigation systems to sustain their irrigation systems through
cost-recovery mechanisms particularly ‘operation and maintenance
(O&M) costs’
a. Provisions for formation and registration of WUOs; information to
be furnished in WUO constitution and provisions for necessary
amendments
b. Promotion and regulation of judicious and beneficial use of water
resources and paying of water fee to the government for obtaining
permission to provide services for irrigation
c. Provisions for water resource utilization disputes
a. Prohibits other use of irrigation water in the system except
agricultural purposes
b. Provides procedures for registration, election and dissolving of
WUO executive committee
c. Sets remits of WUOs including functions, responsibilities and rights
and renewal of WUO license
d. Defines procedures for establishment of O&M fund and delineate
procedures and conditions for management transfer of irrigation
systems to local users including joint management
a. Prioritizes development of storage type of irrigation for agricultural
diversification, intensification and commercialization
b. Adds emphasis in developing institutional capacity of water users
for sustainable use of irrigation resources and enhancing
knowledge, skills and technical capabilities of human resources
c. Strengthening capabilities of WUOs and effective participation of
users in planning, construction, and management of irrigation
systems

Sources: His Majesty’s Government of Nepal, 2001; WaterAid Nepal, 2005.

fees to address the paucity of funds for operation and maintenance (National
Planning Commission, 2002). The Plan also included user-centered designs in
detail designing of irrigation projects. It was the first time that the users’ designs
have been recognized in the planning documents of the government.
234 RAM C. BASTAKOTI AND GANESH P. SHIVAKOTI

Table 5. Presence of different types of rules in the

sampled irrigations systems of Nepal

Percentage responding presence

Type of rules of the rules (n = 50)
Position 98.0
Boundary 98.0
Choice (allocation) 92.0
Aggregation 72.0
Information 70.0
Payoff 94.0
Scope 12.0

Review of the national policies related to irrigation management shows

that the focus of the government is on increased participation of users in the
management of their systems. For this, the aim is to transfer the management
authority of the government-built systems to the users. Those regulations provide
directives for: registration; election and dissolution of an executive committee;
function, responsibility and right; and renewal of the WUA. They also provide
guidelines for the establishment of an operation and maintenance (O&M) fund,
and the fixation and collection of an irrigation service fee. All these policies and
regulatory directives (the institutional environment) influence the institutional
arrangements through direct and indirect effect on the process of rule formation
at the irrigation system level. While considering the IAD framework, these macro-
policies could influence the action arena as exogenous factors.

5. Operational and collective choice level rules

The above section provides an overview of national level policies related to water
resources, particularly on irrigation management issues. These policies provide
a broader national framework for the management of irrigation systems present
in the country. In the following subsection we discuss various operational and
collective choice level rules existing at the irrigation system level.

Existence of various rules at system level

Irrigation systems are managed based on various sets of rules at operational and
collective choice levels. A variety of rules exists in the operation and management
of irrigation systems in Nepal. Table 5 illustrates the presence of seven types of
rules as responded by the sampled irrigation systems. All but one of the sampled
irrigation systems showed the presence of rules related to irrigation management.
One AMIS did not have any kind of rules. Farmers simply used the water if it
was available. Moreover, they were not at all serious about managing the canals.
Based on our field survey, we next discuss commonly observed rules under
seven categories as mentioned in Table 5.
 Rules and collective action 235

Position rules
The position rules define the set of possible positions for participants. Those using
irrigation water are assigned the position as a ‘general member’ of the system.
The irrigation systems are typically managed by water users’ committees (WUCs).
Various executive positions are assigned at the operational level with authority
to manage specific functions related to the operation and management of the
irrigation system. Typical positions include president, vice-president, secretary,
treasurer and members. Each position has specific duties, responsibilities, and the
authority associated with different positions is reflected in the level of influence
on action situations and outcomes.
In some irrigation systems, branch committees are responsible for looking
after particular branch canals. In other cases irrigation canals are divided into
various blocks, and each block committee is assigned a different position. The
aim of block and branch committees is to decentralize power and for the smooth
functioning of blocks/branches.
Another common position rule observed was the provision for hiring guards
for water rotation commonly known as ‘dhalepa’, as reported by 64% of the
sampled systems. Generally, a water guard is hired from among the water users.
However, outsiders are also hired as regular staff, especially in AMISs. On the
other hand, in FMISs, users generally rotate the monitoring position among the
users themselves, which helps to ensure better collective action.

Boundary rules
The boundary rules define eligibility to enter a position, the process determining
which eligible participants may (or must) enter the position and the process of
exit (may or must) from any position (Ostrom, 2005). In irrigation systems these
entry and exit conditions are determined through various criteria; for example,
land holding, shares and membership.
The most common boundary requirement used as a rule was land holding.
All but one system used land holding in the command area as a mandatory
requirement for being a member of the irrigation system. The common rule of
arrangement is that one is automatically eligible to be a member if his/her land
falls within the command area. In most cases the users need to pay designated
membership fees.

Choice (allocation) rules

Choice rules guide which action is required, permitted or forbidden. In
the case of irrigation systems, choice or allocation rules guide the way of
appropriating water by the farmers. The rule assigns the responsibility to the
participants holding particular positions such as water guard, monitor, or
executive committee to make sure that certain arrangements are required to
distribute the available water in a proper way. Allocation rules are especially
important if the water is scarce. If appropriate allocation rules are adopted and
236 RAM C. BASTAKOTI AND GANESH P. SHIVAKOTI

effectively enforced, they can reduce uncertainty and conflict among irrigators
in relation to water withdrawal (Tang, 1992).
For most of the sampled irrigation systems, the irrigation canal was divided
into different areas, and a fixed time slot was assigned to the particular area,
then to another, and so on. The time was fixed as a result of group discussion
among the farmers. A subcommittee is made responsible for the distribution
and monitoring of water allocation. In many cases, the rule for water allocation
within the branch was that the succeeding field gets a turn only after the preceding
field is completely wet (generally from the head-end to the tail-end). But in some
cases, for example, Khurkhuriya Irrigation System in Kailali district, the turn
starts from the tail-end to the head-end of the system.
Depending on the biophysical characteristics of the irrigation system and
community attributes, the water allocation criteria differed across the irrigation
systems. Learning through management, in some places rules were devised
considering the problem faced by users at the tail-end of the irrigation system.
In order to minimize the disadvantage of the farmers from the tail-end, some
irrigation systems, for example Kamal Khola Irrigation System in Ilam district,
included the provision of providing a distance incentive (bato kharcha) of one
to four hours to tail-end farmers.

Aggregation rules
The aggregation rules are related to decision processes that determine whether a
single participant or a group of participants can decide about any action (Ostrom,
2005). They are often related to the process of making operational rules. The
irrigation systems in Nepal mostly operate on collective decision-making, though
it differs across irrigation systems, thus requiring the involvement of multiple
participants for making decision regarding any action. A majority of the sampled
irrigation systems reported the presence of this rule. The commonly existing one
was the need for a community consensus to decide water allocation. The water
guard (monitor) is responsible for regulating the water allocation based on earlier
agreed norms. In the case of any dispute between farmers the water guard has
the right to enforce the arrangements. Better consensus was observed in FMISs
compared with AMISs.

Information rules
The information rules directly affect the level of information available to the
participants involved in an action situation. A majority of the sampled irrigation
systems reported the presence of information rules. The most common rule was
the need to keep financial transactions in a standard manner and report to the
general meeting annually, as well as being made available to the users. Similarly,
if somebody breaks a rule repeatedly, the knowledge of this rule infraction will be
made public and the farmer will be restricted from further use of the water. Other
 Rules and collective action 237

common information rules include water allocation mechanisms and schedules

for operation and maintenance of the irrigation system.

Payoff rules
Payoff rules provide provisions for rewards, burdens or sanctions being involved
in particular action situations. In a majority of the sampled irrigation systems,
provisions are such that they require labor contribution by each user for cleaning
of the canal. An example of a rule statement in an FMIS is: ‘It is mandatory for
the farmer to be present in cleaning of the main canal, but in case of branch
canal one can either go himself or send other people’. If any farmer is absent
during canal cleaning, they need to pay a fine, small at first, then a bit more, and
if they do not comply again and again, they are not allowed to use the water.
For example, Betani Irrigation System in Jhapa district reported that if the rule
is broken for the first time the farmer is fined the sum of 100 Nepalese rupees
(NRR). If the same farmer repeats the mistake then the fine is NRR 200, for
the third time the fine is NRR 500. After the fourth time, the farmer will not be
allowed to use water. The amount, however, varied across irrigation systems.
Sometimes the fine for not attending the canal cleaning is based on
corresponding land size. For example, Jhirhari Irrigation System in Siraha district
reported that if a user with up to 0.33 ha of land is absent, he/she has to pay
NRR 50/day. If a user with > 0.33 ha is absent he/she has to pay NRR 100/day.
Similarly, there is the provision of fines against water stealing, with an increase
in the amount in cases of repeated violations of the rules.

Scope rules
These rules are directly related to the outcome which must, must not or may
be affected by the result of actions taken by participants within a specific
situation. Scope rules define which outcomes are desirable from the actions
of the participants. These rules were reported by only a few of the sampled
irrigation systems. Some irrigation systems had rules restricting the use of water.
Farmers should use the water for agricultural purpose only, and in some cases a
rule restricts the crop as well. For example, in Betani Irrigation System of Jhapa
district there was a restriction on the cultivation of spring rice.
Rule formation in irrigation management
In this section we discuss two aspects of rule formation in irrigation management.
First, we examine the application of the ADICO syntax in rule formation. Then
we describe how different factors affect this process.

Application of the ADICO syntax

Various rules provide economic incentives to users and designate their
accountability and obligations. An important aspect in rule configuration is
‘how people start formulating rules and how it becomes institutionalized in their
community?’ Rules are often confused with ‘shared strategy’ and ‘norms’. Based
238 RAM C. BASTAKOTI AND GANESH P. SHIVAKOTI

on the structure of institutional elements, as discussed in the section ‘The ADICO

syntax for analyzing the rule-formation process’, we analyze the evolution of
institutional statements up to its higher level, as formal rules. It is assumed that
at the beginning the users start with some kind of no-rule situation or default
condition (Ostrom, 2005) and then add different components and ultimately
develop a rule with all the necessary components.
Based on the rule-formation process recorded from most of the sampled
irrigation systems, we observed that when people come together and start digging
a canal in an area, most often the rule formation starts immediately. Farmers
start with a shared strategy like ‘Farmers of this village will use water from this
canal’ that includes only the ‘AIC’ part of the ADICO syntax.
In the process, the farmers determine the actions that participants ‘may’, ‘must’
and ‘must not’ do. For example: ‘Farmers should contribute labor or cash in the
operation and maintenance as specified by the committee’. It becomes a norm
and includes the ‘ADIC’ part of the syntax.
Finally, the farmers also assign consequences for not following agreed norms,
for example: ‘Farmers should contribute labor or cash in the operation and
maintenance as specified by the committee, if they fail to do so they should pay a
fine’. The final form is the rule including all components of the ADICO syntax.
The above discussion shows the ADICO syntax in general is applicable to
understand how the rule-formation process starts with simple statement with
only a few components, and then the farmers add other components making it a
formal rule. Below we look at further details of application of the ADICO syntax
in rule formation.
The expected production incentives motivated the users to set the boundary
and devise water allocation mechanisms. The entry requirements and related
provisions are the sets of rules that users devise with higher priority. The bound-
ary rules started including AIC components of the ADICO syntax. A common
example of a boundary rule was: ‘Farmers having land in the command area
can use the water from a particular system’. They also add the next component
setting conditions such as ‘the new users must pay a membership fee’ and ‘the
users must contribute in repair and maintenance of the system’. In addition, rules
related to water allocation were often among the first to develop in an irrigation
system. This is a key incentive for farmers to get involved in the system.
Another set of rules evolves due to the concerns related to operation
and maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure. Owing to relatively poor
infrastructures that require regular repair and maintenance, farmers devise the
rules regarding labor contribution for the cleaning of the canal. In this case
farmers were more concerned about the rule enforcement. Thus they included
an additional component in the rule, such as imposing fines and penalties for
rule breakers. Such rules included all components of the ADICO syntax, with
inclusion of the ‘Or else’ component. Similarly, based on experience and the
context, users defined various new rules as well. Some irrigation systems needed
to restrict the cultivation of high-water-demanding crops in the dry season. Such
 Rules and collective action 239

Table 6. Degree of autonomy of water users’ associations in farmer-managed irrigation

systems (FMISs) and agency-managed irrigation systems (AMISs) of Nepal

Degree of autonomy∗∗ FMISs (n = 41) (%) AMISs (n = 9) (%)

No autonomy – 11.1
Low degree of autonomy 12.2 44.4
High degree of autonomy 87.8 44.4

∗∗ Pearson χ 2 = 10.6; degrees of freedom = 2; significant at 1%.

provisions needed to include an additional component in the rule, forbidding

certain action.
For the smooth functioning of a WUC, users devised rules specifying the
frequency and time of WUC meetings, general farmers’ meetings and other
meetings. In order to ensure the participation of users in meetings, additional
components are included in the rule as an enforcement mechanism. For example,
if members are not present for three consecutive times, their membership is
discontinued. At the same time most of the formal rules, such as regarding
collection of water fees, which were formulated based on the directive from
the irrigation divisional office, included all components of the ADICO syntax,
including the ‘Or else’ part as well.

Factors affecting rule formation

Rule formation is influenced by various endogenous and exogenous factors.
Below we discuss how different factors affect rule formation. Major factors
include: governance structure; institutional environment; and other components
as indicated in the IAD framework earlier.
The level of autonomy of a WUA is the most important factor in rule
formation. It is an important aspect of governance structure, which shows how
the difference in governance affects rule formation. It also reflects the governance
mechanisms that affect rule formation. Autonomy means the freedom of water
users to design rules for water allocation and to design collective choice-making
mechanisms. This was measured in three categories: no autonomy; low degree
of autonomy; and high degree of autonomy. The WUAs in FMISs were found
to have a higher degree of autonomy compared with AMISs even though some
AMISs are jointly managed or formal management rights have been transferred.
The Pearson χ 2 test showed a significant difference (significant at less than 1%),
with the majority of AMISs having a low degree of autonomy (Table 6). This
implies that the mode of governance affects rule formation. More interference
was reported in AMISs whereas FMISs are more autonomous. In an FMIS
users can devise rules based on their interest and necessity, and manage rules
themselves. The experienced committee members in FMISs formulate rules based
on the interest and necessity of the users. Another study also reports that a high
degree of autonomy results in better rule formation (Shivakoti and Bastakoti,
2006).
240 RAM C. BASTAKOTI AND GANESH P. SHIVAKOTI

Formal policy changes, changes in the institutional environment as an

exogenous factor affecting the action arena in the IAD framework, also affected
rule formation. FMISs had no formal written rules at the early stages of
their formation and were mainly operated based on informal arrangements
for many years. Ashutosh Shukla and Khem Raj Sharma (1997) point out
that users in FMISs are involved from the very beginning and so they are
bonded through collective efforts. Systems initially work based on social norms
and values. Negotiation and promises played an important role. Mostly such
norms were not recorded in written form (Shivakoti and Ostrom, 2002).
Local institutional arrangements were formalized after registration of the users’
committee with the government authority. Formal registration of FMISs began
after the changes in government policy during the 1990s. In Nepal, the first
national irrigation regulation was devised in 1989, which was revised and
promulgated as Irrigation Policy 1992 (refer to the ‘Policy and regulatory
directive for irrigation management in Nepal’ section). In fact, it was the first
formal irrigation policy of the country. The change in policy emphasized the
formal registration of FMISs with the government authority. The WUAs of
47 systems (out of 50 sampled irrigation systems) were registered at the time
of our fieldwork. Registration requires an executive committee with assigned
roles and responsibilities, major position rules, and the ‘Constitution of the
WUA’. The constitution should show boundary requirements, operation and
maintenance arrangements, fees, fines and penalties, and other operational level
rules. Informal norms and shared strategy, mostly not in the written form, of the
users are formalized as written rules.
Similarly, the biophysical attributes of the irrigation systems also affect the rule
formation, as depicted in the IAD framework (Figure 1). For example, especially
in the case of FMISs, the concerns regarding operation and maintenance of
the irrigation infrastructure influenced the rule-formation process. Most of the
FMISs of Nepal have relatively poor infrastructure, such as temporary headworks
and only partially lined canals (Table 3), compared with the AMISs and they also
need regular repair and maintenance. Farmers devised the rules regarding labor
contribution for the cleaning of the canal. Maintaining better infrastructure
conditions was crucial for assured water supply. Thus farmers were more
concerned about the enforcement of these rules. In addition to the need of
repair and maintenance, the biophysical condition of the irrigation system also
determines the water availability over different seasons. Thus some irrigation
systems needed to formulate rules considering the water availability as well.
In such cases, some irrigation systems restrict the cultivation of high-water-
demanding crops in the dry season. For example, the WUA of Betani Irrigation
System of Jhapa district imposed restriction in the cultivation of spring rice.
Another exogenous factor affecting rule formation was the support from
external agencies, which influenced rule formation both positively and negatively.
In the case of the irrigation systems of Sindhupalchok district, the support from
 Rules and collective action 241

external agencies has positively helped in improving the management of the

irrigation systems. But external support has not always contributed positively
for designing their local institutional arrangements. Farmers dislike some rules,
such as the provision for water fees, because it involves cash outlay. However,
they comply because it is a precondition for their irrigation systems to get agency
financial support. Such preconditions were observed in the case of some agency-
initiated and now jointly managed or management transferred systems. The
WUC must formulate rules regarding collection of water fees based on the
directive from the irrigation divisional office. If it fails to do this, the irrigation
system will not be entitled to receive funds from the government.
In general the WUC is responsible for all operational activities at irrigation
system level. The committee initiates all the necessary activities including
proposed institutional changes in the form of new rules for a particular action
situation. However, the extent of the committee’s involvement in the process is
determined by the endogenous factors related to irrigation systems, the physical
context it operates on, and the users. It is also often influenced by an external
agency, especially in the case of AMISs.

6. Rule enforcement, performance and collective action

Rules are important for regulating activities related to irrigation system operation
and management. As discussed earlier, a majority of the irrigation systems
have an array of rules devised for the management of their systems. However,
with knowledge of the existence of the rules only, we cannot guarantee that
they are followed by the users and are thus playing a significant role in
affecting performance. It is equally important to analyze the monitoring and
sanctioning arrangements present in the system. This provides the evidence for
the effectiveness of the rules (North, 1990; Lam, 1998). Thus, we added variables
in our field study to address how rules are enforced – a topic not covered by the
ADICO syntax.
In this section we look at the monitoring and sanctioning arrangements used
on the system, the level of rule following by the users, and the relationship
between rule enforcement and performance of the irrigation system. An MSI was
created combining six institutional variables (for details, please refer to the ‘Data
sources, collection techniques and analysis’ section). The MSI showed that FMISs
are far better than AMISs in monitoring and sanctioning arrangements (Table 7).
The Pearson χ 2 test showed that the difference between FMISs and AMISs
was significant (significant at less than 5%), implying that the rule enforcement
mechanisms are well institutionalized in the case of FMISs. The Mann–Whitney
test also showed that median MSI was significantly higher in FMISs (significant
at 3.5%).
In FMISs, users themselves formulate various rules regarding irrigation system
operation and management from the beginning of the system. Those rules, in
242 RAM C. BASTAKOTI AND GANESH P. SHIVAKOTI

Table 7. Monitoring and sanctioning arrangements in farmer-managed irrigation

systems (FMISs) and agency-managed irrigation systems (AMISs) of Nepal

Monitoring and sanctioning index∗ FMISs (n = 41) (%) AMISs (n = 9) (%)

With score less than 4 29.3 66.7
With score at least 4 70.7 33.3

∗ Pearson χ 2 = 4.48; degrees of freedom = 1; significant at 5%.

Table 8. Level of rule following among users in farmer-managed irrigation systems

(FMISs) and agency-managed irrigation systems (AMISs) of Nepal

Level of rule following∗∗∗ FMISs (n = 41) (%) AMISs (n = 9) (%)

Rules followed by some members but not by all 7.3 55.6
Almost all members follow the rules 92.7 44.4

∗∗∗ Pearson χ 2 = 12.77; degrees of freedom = 1; significant at 0.1%.

general, are crafted by users considering the local situation, especially in order
to fit into the existing physical infrastructure of the system and community
requirements. Local farmers formulate rules based on the ideas, norms and
understandings commonly shared in the community. In AMISs, the officials
formulate most of the rules and impose them upon the users, but the officials
are not always fully aware of the local context. This has a direct effect on the
compliance of the users to follow the existing rules.
In FMISs a majority of the users follow the rules (Table 8), whereas in AMISs
substantial levels of violations were found in more than half of the irrigation
systems. The higher the proportion of rule violators and the higher the level
of violations, the greater is the chance of less collective action. Ultimately, this
affects the smooth operation and management of irrigation systems, thereby
affecting long-term sustainability.
This rule enforcement situation affects the outcome through the effect on the
action arena as indicated in the IAD framework (Figure 1). The rule enforcement
situation in FMISs is favorable for better collective action among the users,
and thus for better performance of the system. We compared monitoring and
sanctioning arrangements, and rule-following behavior with two performance
indicators: overall physical condition (measured on a four-point scale) and short-
run technical economic efficiency (measured on a four-point scale). The results
showed that irrigation system performance is significantly related to the better
enforcement of the rules (Table 9).
The MSI score and rule-following behavior reveal that the level of rule
compliance is directly related to the likelihood of collective action in irrigation
management. Water users work together to maintain the physical condition of
the infrastructure in irrigation systems with a higher MSI score and a high level
 Rules and collective action 243

Table 9. Rule enforcement and performance of the irrigation systems

Performance Rule enforcement

Monitoring and sanctioning index With score less than 4 With score at least 4 Significance (%)
(n = 18) (n = 32)
Physical condition 2.50 2.91 1.8
Economic efficiency 2.72 3.06 1.2
Level of rule following among users Low (n = 8) High (n = 42) Significance (%)
Physical condition 2.50 2.81 17.7
Economic efficiency 2.50 3.02 0.3

Notes: Physical condition and economic efficiency are measured on a four-point scale and the value ranges
between 1 and 4. The numbers presented in the Table indicate the mean for each category.

of rule following. Higher scores are also related to better short-run technical
economic efficiency.
Moreover, for situations of a problem of rule compliance, farmers have added
supplementary enforcement mechanisms to their existing rules. In some irrigation
systems, we also found that if fines for stealing water are not paid, they are
referred to local government or even to the police station. Some scholars have
also noted the need for this additional component in rule analysis to capture the
enforcement mechanisms (Mittenzwei and Bullock, 2001; Smajgl, 2007). This is
very important in ensuring collective action.

7. Conclusion and policy implications

Our empirical study of rules used by irrigation systems in Nepal illustrates the
usefulness of the ADICO syntax (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995; Ostrom, 2005)
for examining specific rule configurations and their effect on performance. The
ADICO syntax, however, does not capture well the enforcement mechanisms
that exist in many irrigation systems of Nepal. Thus, this assessment of
the applicability of the ADICO syntax in understanding how rules affect
performance suggests the need for adding one component related to ‘enforcing
mechanisms’. This would improve the usefulness of the ADICO syntax for
understanding how rules affect collective action and performance.
In regular operation and maintenance of an irrigation system users are bonded
by various formal and informal rules. Rules crafted by water users match local
context better than those prescribed by state agencies. FMISs generally devise
their own rules based on local context and taking into account the ideas, norms
and understandings shared in the community. In contrast, the rule formulation
in AMISs is mostly done by the officials of the Irrigation Office.
The revised national irrigation policies required the formalization of rules in
FMISs while registering their system with the government authority. However,
FMISs still have a higher degree of autonomy in terms of formulating rules and
devising their institutional arrangements than AMISs. The WUAs in FMISs can
244 RAM C. BASTAKOTI AND GANESH P. SHIVAKOTI

make rules on water allocation and designing collective action mechanisms. This
was supported by strong rule enforcement mechanisms that existed in FMISs.
But in the case of AMISs, only a few have effective rule enforcement mechanisms.
In FMISs, the self-devised rules considering their local context, ideas
and understandings facilitate collective contribution in the operation and
maintenance of the irrigation systems. Thus, rule violations are rare in FMISs
compared with AMISs. The results suggest that forming new rules to manage
irrigation systems should fully consider contextual factors. Rules, which are
devised based on the particular biophysical condition of the resource with
emphasis on the local community, can result in improved collective action. The
learning from the case of FMISs in Nepal could be applicable in suggesting the
formation of water management rules in other countries as well.

Acknowledgements
This paper is part of a larger study supported by a grant from the Research Grants
Council of Hong Kong (grant no. HKU7233/03H) made to the University of Hong
Kong on the project ‘Asian Irrigation Institutions and Systems (AIIS) Dynamics study
and Database Management’. We are grateful to Professor Elinor Ostrom (Indiana
University, USA) and Dr Louis Lebel (Chiang Mai University, Thailand) for detailed
comments on the earlier version of the paper. We are thankful to the executive
members of WUAs, irrigation officials and farmers in Nepal for the information and
their support during our field survey.

References
Baral, R. R. (2001), Nepal ko Itihans, Kathmandu, Nepal: Ratna Pustak Bhandar [in Nepali
language].
Bardhan, P. (2000), ‘Irrigation and Cooperation: An Empirical Analysis of 48 Irrigation
Communities in South India’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 48(4):
847–865.
Bhatta, K. P., A. Ishida, K. Taniguchi, and R. Sharma (2005), ‘Performance of Agency-
Managed and Farmer-Managed Irrigation Systems: A Comparative Case Study at
Chitwan, Nepal’, Irrigation and Drainage Systems, 20(2–3): 177–191.
Crawford, S. and E. Ostrom (1995), ‘A Grammar of Institutions’, The American Political
Science Review, 89(3): 582–600.
Dietz, T., E. Ostrom, and P. Stern (2003), ‘The Struggle to Govern the Commons’, Science,
302(5652): 1907–1912.
Florensa, M. C. (2004), Institutional Stability and Change. A Logic Sequence for
Studying Institutional Dynamics. The Tenth Biennial Conference of the International
Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP), Oaxaca, Mexico 9–13 August
2004, http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/1823/CostejaFlorensa_
Institutional_040525_Paper220.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed October 2011).
Greif, A. (2005), Institutions, Theory and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
 Rules and collective action 245

Hardin, G. (1968), ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, Science, 162(3859): 1243–1248.

His Majesty’s Government of Nepal (1992), Water Resources Act 1992, Kathmandu, Nepal:
Legal Document Management Committee of His Majesty’s Government of Nepal [in
Nepali language].
His Majesty’s Government of Nepal (1993), Water Resources Regulation 1993, Kathmandu,
Nepal: Legal Document Management Committee of His Majesty’s Government of Nepal
[in Nepali language].
His Majesty’s Government of Nepal (2000), Irrigation Regulation 2000, Kathmandu, Nepal:
Legal Document Management Committee of His Majesty’s Government of Nepal [in
Nepali language].
His Majesty’s Government of Nepal (2003), Irrigation Policy 2003, Kathmandu, Nepal: Legal
Document Management Committee of His Majesty’s Government of Nepal.
Khanal, R. R. (1982), Muluki Ain Kehi Bibechana, Lalitpur, Nepal: Sajha Prakashan Press [in
Nepali language].
Lam, W. F. (1996), ‘Improving the Performance of Small-Scale Irrigation Systems: The Effects
of Technological Investments and Governance Structure on Irrigation Performance in
Nepal’, World Development, 24(8): 1301–1315.
Lam, W. F. (1998), Governing Irrigation Systems in Nepal: Institutions, Infrastructures, and
Collective Action, Oakland, CA: ICS Press.
Leathes, W., J. W. Knox, M. G. Kay, P. Trawick, and J. A. Rodriguez-Diaz (2008),
‘“Developing UK Farmers” Institutional Capacity to Defend their Water Rights and
Effectively Manage Limited Water Resources’, Irrigation and Drainage, 57(3): 322–
331.
Livingston, M. L. (2005), ‘Evaluating Changes in Water Institutions: Methodological Issues
at the Micro and Meso Levels’, Water Policy, 7: 21–34.
Meinzen-Dick, R., K. V. Raju, and A. Gulati (2002), ‘What Affects Organization and
Collective Action for Managing Resources? Evidence from Canal Irrigation Systems
in India’, World Development, 30(4): 649–666.
Meinzen-Dick, R. (2007), ‘Beyond Panaceas in Water Institutions’, Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences USA, 104(39): 15200–15205.
Mittenzwei, K. and D. S. Bullock (2001), Towards a Framework for Institutional Analysis,
16th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association, Lausanne, Switzerland.
National Planning Commission (2002), The Tenth Plan 2002–2007, Kathmandu, Nepal:
National Planning Commission.
North, D. C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, E. (1990), Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, E. (1999), ‘Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis
and Development Framework’, in P. A. Sabatier (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process,
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Ostrom, E. (2005), Understanding Institutional Diversity, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press.
Ostrom, E. (2007), ‘Challenges and Growth: the Development of the Interdisciplinary
Field of Institutional Analysis’, Journal of Institutional Economics, 3(3): 239–
264.
Ostrom, E. and X. Basurto (2011), ‘Crafting Analytical Tools to Study Institutional Change’,
Journal of Institutional Economics, 7(3): 317–343.
246 RAM C. BASTAKOTI AND GANESH P. SHIVAKOTI

Ostrom, E., J. Burger, C. Field, R. B. Norgaard, and D. Policansky (1999), ‘Revisiting the
Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges’, Science, 284(5412): 278–282.
Ostrom, E., R. Gardner, and J. Walker (1994), Rules, Games and Common-Pool Resources,
Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
Pradhan, P., S. Sijapati, N. Riddell, and K. C. Prasad (1998), Irrigation Service Fee in
Nepal, Kathmandu, Nepal: Department of Irrigation/Nepal and International Water
Management Institute.
Regmi, A. R. (2008), ‘Self-Governance in Farmer-Managed Irrigation Systems in Nepal’,
Journal of Developments in Sustainable Agriculture, 3(1): 20–27.
Saleth, R. M. and A. Dinar (2000), ‘Institutional Changes in Global Water Sector: Trends,
Patterns, and Implications’, Water Policy, 2: 175–199.
Shah, S. G. and G. N. Singh (2000), Irrigation Development in Nepal: Investment, Efficiency
and Institution, Winrock International Research Report Series No. 47, Kathmandu,
Nepal: Winrock International.
Shivakoti, G. P. and R. C. Bastakoti (2006), ‘The Robustness of Montane Irrigation Systems
of Thailand in a Dynamic Human–Water Resources Interface’, Journal of Institutional
Economics, 2(2): 227–247.
Shivakoti G. P. and E. Ostrom (eds.) (2002), Improving Irrigation Governance and
Management in Nepal, Oakland, CA: ICS Press.
Shukla, A. K. (2002), Policies, Processes, and Performance of Management Turnover in
Agencies Initiated Intervention, in G. P. Shivakoti and E. Ostrom (eds.), Improving
Irrigation Governance and Management in Nepal, Oakland, CA: ICS Press.
Shukla, A. K. and K. R. Sharma (1997), Participatory Irrigation Management in Nepal:
A Monograph on Evolution, Processes and Performance, Kathmandu, Nepal:
RTDB/IMD/Department of Irrigation.
Smajgl, A. (2007), ‘Modelling Evolving Rules for the Use of Common Pool Resources in an
Agent-Based Model’, Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems, 5(2): 56–80.
Tang, S. Y. (1992), Institutions and Collective Action: Self-Governance in Irrigation, San
Francisco, CA: ICS Press.
WaterAid Nepal (2005), Water Laws in Nepal: Laws Relating to Drinking Water, Sanitation,
Irrigation, Hydropower and Water Pollution, Kathmandu: WaterAid Nepal.