Jurnal Diskriminasi 2

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 2003 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
2003, Vol. 84, No. 5, 944 –959 0022-3514/03/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.84.5.944
The Role of Intent and Harm in Judgments of Prejudice and Discrimination
Janet K. Swim Elizabeth D. Scott

Pennsylvania State University Eastern Connecticut State University
Gretchen B. Sechrist Bernadette Campbell

State University of New York at Buffalo Westat
Charles Stangor
University of Maryland
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Four experiments examined how an actor’s intent and the harm experienced by a target influence
judgments of prejudice and discrimination. The presence of intent increased the likelihood that partici-
pants judged an actor as prejudiced and the actor’s behavior as discriminatory. When intent was
uncertain, harm influenced judgments of the behavior, which in turn influenced judgments of the actor,
and participants were more cautious in their judgments about an actor than an actor’s behavior. Harm also
played a stronger role in targets’ than observers’ judgments. Understanding the role of intent and harm
on perceptions of prejudice can help explain variations in targets’ versus observers’, and possibly targets’
versus actors’, judgments of discrimination and prejudice.
Accusing someone of being prejudiced or implying that some- and the harm to a target may influence judgments about an actor
one’s behavior reflects prejudice are judgments that are likely to (whether the actor engaging in this behavior is prejudiced against
evoke strong emotional reactions on the part of the person being women) and about an actor’s behavior (whether differential treat-
accused. The history of egalitarian values in the United States, ment of women and men is discriminatory). When we refer to
combined with the current political climate, yields a cultural per- intent, we are referring to an actor’s desire for discrimination and
ception that prejudice is evil, and this perception makes it offen- belief or awareness that his or her behavior would result in dis-
sive to have oneself or one’s behaviors labeled as prejudiced criminatory treatment (Malle, 1999). When we refer to harm, we
(Monin & Miller, 2001). Moreover, because of the accusatory are referring to the negative consequences of an actor’s behavior to
nature of the label and because of possible disagreements among a particular woman or to women as a group. We consider discrim-
targets, actors, and observers, labeling a person as prejudiced or ination against women to be behavior that treats women less
the person’s behavior as discriminatory has important implications favorably than men and prejudice against women to be beliefs and
for interpersonal relationships. Thus, these judgments have possi- attitudes that are less favorable for women than men.
ble psychological and behavioral consequences for all involved.
There are many cognitive, motivational, and affective factors
that likely influence people’s judgments of prejudice and discrim- Influence of Intent on Judgments
ination (e.g., Crosby, 1984; Feldman Barrett & Swim, 1998; Inman
& Baron, 1996; Pinel, 1999; Sechrist, Swim, & Mark, 2003; Presence of Intent and Judgments of the Actor
Sechrist, Swim, & Stangor, 2003). In the present article we focus and Behavior
on cognitive factors that might influence these judgments by
Our argument that an actor’s intent to discriminate is important
examining how information about an actor’s intent to discriminate
to understanding judgments of prejudice is based on the centrality
of intent in the attribution literature (e.g., Gilbert, 1998; Malle,
1999). Attribution theory has typically addressed perceptions of
Janet K. Swim, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State Univer- dispositions, not attitudes or sets of beliefs such as prejudice.
sity; Elizabeth D. Scott, Department of Business Administration, Eastern However, a similar attributional process may occur for judgments
Connecticut State University; Gretchen B. Sechrist, Department of Psy- of prejudice because prejudice, like dispositions, represents an
chology, State University of New York at Buffalo; Bernadette Campbell, internal state and is likely to be assumed to direct behavior. If a
Substance Abuse Research Group, Westat, Rockville, Maryland; Charles person intends to treat women less favorably than men, then it is
Stangor, Department of Psychology, University of Maryland.
likely that people will perceive that person to be prejudiced against
Portions of this research were funded by National Science Foundation
Grant 990722-8077 to Janet K. Swim and Charles Stangor and by National
women.
Institute of Mental Health Grant F32-MH12787 to Gretchen B. Sechrist. It is also likely that an actor’s intent to discriminate will influ-
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Janet K. ence perceptions of the actor’s subsequent behavior as discrimi-
Swim, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, Univer- natory. For instance, past research indicates that accounts (justifi-
sity Park, Pennsylvania 16802. E-mail: jks4@psu.edu cations, excuses, and apologies) actors give for their behavior alter
944
INTENT AND HARM 945
people’s interpretations of the seriousness of racial and sexual harm and even seemingly benevolent acts may be considered
harassment (Hunter & McClelland, 1991; McClelland & Hunter, discriminatory if they result in harm to a target (Benokraitis &
1992). Feagin, 1986; Glick & Fiske, 1995; Jackman, 1994; Swim &
Support for the importance of intent in identification of an Campbell, 2001). Moreover, research on “unconscious” prejudice
actor’s behavior as discriminatory can be seen within the law. The indicates that nonprejudiced people may, in some cases, behave in
most often cited statement of what was required to prove a case of a prejudiced manner, even though they do not intend to do so (e.g.,
unlawful discrimination was made by the U.S. Supreme Court in Devine & Plant, 2001). Consistent with these interpretations of
the case of McDonnel Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973). In this case, current forms of prejudice, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971),
the court required that intent to discriminate be proven in order for the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that it did not matter whether
an action to be considered unlawful discrimination. Accordingly, employers intended to discriminate—the law forbade them from
this form of discrimination has been called intentional discrimi- actions that had the effect of discrimination. This definition has
nation or disparate treatment. Thus, our first hypothesis is that the become known as adverse impact or unintentional discrimination.
more an actor intends to discriminate against a target, the more Similarly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guide-
likely the actor will be judged as prejudiced and the actor’s lines inform employers that unwelcome sexual advances that have
behavior will be judged as discriminatory. the effect of interfering with work or creating a hostile environ-
ment can be considered sexual harassment regardless of the em-
Uncertainty Regarding Intent and Judgments of the Actor ployers’ intent (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion, 1993).
and Behavior
Thus, our third hypothesis is that as the amount of harm in-
Observers and targets of behaviors cannot know an actor’s creases, people will be more likely to judge an actor’s behavior as
intent with complete certainty because it represents an internal discriminatory. We expect that the effect of harm on judgments of
state in the individual and may not be expressed (Malle & Knobe, the behavior will be most evident when an actor’s intent is un-
1997b). Even if it is expressed, some observers and targets may not known or there is some doubt about expressed lack of intent. We
necessarily believe expressed lack of intent, especially when the expect this because when intent is clearly present and there is
behavior in question involves differential treatment of members of differential treatment, intent will likely influence judgments of the
different social groups. Davidson and Friedman (1998) found that actor’s behavior, as noted above, reducing the impact of harm on
Blacks were less influenced by a White manager’s excuse for judgments of the actor’s behavior.
negative treatment of a Black than were Whites, suggesting that
Blacks were more suspicious of the validity of the excuse. Harm and Judgments of the Actor
This uncertainty may have a different impact on judgments of
the actor than on judgments of the actor’s behavior, because Judgments about an actor and the actor’s behavior are likely to
people may be more cautious about their judgments of the actor be very similar when there is high intent because high intent
than their judgments of the behavior. Although there is likely a should increase judgments of the actor as prejudiced and the
perceived correspondence between judgments about an actor’s behavior as discriminatory. However, we propose that when intent
behavior and judgments about an actor’s attitudes (Jones & is unknown or uncertain, judgments about an actor will be influ-
Harris, 1967), there may be more unwillingness to assign a enced by judgments about the behavior, which, as noted above,
negative label to a person than to the person’s behavior when will be influenced by amount of harm. This is consistent with
there is some degree of uncertainty. People may be more theories of attribution that indicate that people first identify or
confident about labeling a particular behavior as discriminatory categorize an act as a particular action and then base their attribu-
than generalizing from one behavior to the character of an actor, tion of an actor’s disposition on this identification (Gilbert, 1998).
an attribute that may be presumed to have some cross- The dispositional attribution may result from an automatic char-
situational consistency. Also, being identified as prejudiced acterization of the person based on the behavior or inference about
could be considered an attribute that is difficult to disconfirm, the behavior (Gilbert, 1998; Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz,
and people may be cautious about making this type of accusa- 1996). Even if a person uses controlled processes and makes a
tion about a person (Rothbart & Park, 1986). Thus, our second correction for the uncertainty or doubt about expressed lack of
hypothesis is that when intent is unknown or when an actor intent, there may be some lingering doubt about the person that
expresses lack of intent, there will be less similarity in judg- remains, especially when there is differential treatment and harm
ments of the actor and the actor’s behavior than when intent is to the target (Gilbert, 1998). Thus, our fourth hypothesis is that
present and known. We predict that this dissimilarity will be in when intent is uncertain, the amount of harm a target experiences
the form of people being less willing to state that an actor is will influence judgments of the actor, and this relationship will be
prejudiced than that a behavior is discriminatory. mediated by judgments of the behavior. When intent is known and
indicates intent to discriminate, harm is not predicted to influence
judgments of the actor, and therefore this mediational model would
Influence of Harm on Judgments
not be supported.
Harm and Judgments of the Behavior
The Present Research
The amount of harm experienced by the target is highly likely to
influence people’s identification of a behavior as discriminatory. We conducted four experiments to test the effect of information
Research on modern forms of prejudice suggests that unintentional about intent and harm on judgments of an actor and the actor’s
946 SWIM, SCOTT, SECHRIST, CAMPBELL, AND STANGOR
behavior as prejudiced. In all the experiments, the actor is male particular incident as discriminatory and a particular target as
and the target is female. The first three experiments used scenarios. prejudiced.
The first experiment used a within-subjects design to test the The tendency for Blacks to be less influenced than Whites by
impact of information about intent on judgments about the actor excuses for negative treatment of Blacks (Davidson & Friedman,
and the actor’s behavior across four situations. Similarly, the 1998) suggests women might also be less influenced than men by
second experiment used a within-subjects design to test the impact information indicating lack of intent to discriminate against
of information about harm on these judgments across the same women. For instance, race difference in attributions of racism for
four situations. The third study used a between-subjects design and a White supervisor’s negative treatment of a Black when the
tested the impact of information about both intent and harm on treatment was constrained by circumstances can be explained by
these judgments. The fourth experiment addressed the concern that race differences in perceptions of the prevalence of racism (John-
all three previous studies presented hypothetical situations by son, Simmons, Trawalter, Ferguson, & Reed, in press). Similarly,
using a high-impact study to examine the generalizability of the women might be more likely to distrust expressed lack of intent
previous findings to an actual experience with differential treat-
than men.
ment based on gender. In this last study, we also tested whether

However, Hunter and McClelland (1991) found little difference
targets and observers use information about intent and harm dif-
in women’s and men’s tendencies to be influenced by men’s
ferently in their judgments of differential treatment, given that the
excuses, justifications, and apologies for sexual behaviors that
experience, and particularly the harm, may have more impact on
could be interpreted as sexual harassment. Plus, research on per-
targets than on observers.
As noted above, we predicted that increases in intent will ceptions of sexual harassment has revealed that gender differences
increase judgments of an actor as prejudiced and actor’s behavior in labeling such incidents are far from consistent (Frazer, Cochran,
as discriminatory. Second, although we predicted a correspon- & Olson, 1995; Gutek & O’Conner, 1995). The largest gender
dence between judgments of an actor and the actor’s behavior, we difference tends to emerge with ambiguous behaviors (e.g., star-
predicted that people may be more certain that an actor’s behavior ing, sexual remarks), ambiguous situations (e.g., unwelcome at-
is discriminatory than that an actor is prejudiced, particularly when tention by a peer), when harassment is not severe, and when the
there is no information about intent and when the actor expresses harassment represents a hostile work environment rather than
lack of intent. Third, we predicted that harm would affect judg- sexual propositions or sexual coercion (Frazer et al., 1995; Gutek
ments of the actor and the actor’s behavior when intent was & O’Conner, 1995; Rotundo, Nguyen, & Sackett, 2001). Thus,
unknown or the actor expressed lack of intent but not when intent women may be more likely than men to make a judgment of
was present and known. Fourth, we predicted that judgments of the discrimination and prejudice in ambiguous situations, such as
actor’s behavior would mediate the relationship between harm and when intent is uncertain.
judgments of an actor when intent was unknown or doubted but
not when intent was present and known.
Method
Experiment 1
Participants
We tested the first two hypotheses in our first experiment by
Fifteen female and 15 male undergraduate students in psychology
examining the impact of level of intent on judgments of discrim-
classes and in labor and industrial relations classes were recruited to
ination and prejudice. In all scenarios, participants were told that a participate in a study of perceptions of prejudice. Participants received
woman and a man were treated differently and were given an extra credit for their participation.
explanation for a male actor’s behavior that reflected the actor’s
degree of intent to discriminate. We hypothesized that greater
intent would result in participants judging the actor as prejudiced Scenarios
and the actor’s behavior as discriminatory and that when an actor
explicitly expressed intent to favor men over women, there would Four base scenarios were used to describe a potentially discriminatory
be little difference between judgments of the actor and judgments interaction between a man and a woman (see Appendix). Two of the
of the actor’s behavior. The greatest difference would emerge scenarios involved an interaction in the workplace, one took place in a
when there was an excuse but prejudice was still a possible school setting, and the fourth described an interaction between strangers.
For all scenarios, a male actor performed the potentially discriminatory
attribution. A difference might also occur in the no-intent condi-
behavior, and the behavior was directed at the woman or women in the
tion given that expressed lack of intent might be doubted.
story. Intent descriptions that followed each base scenario were explana-
We also explored whether women would be more critical of the
tions for the behavior of the man in the scenario. There was no information
actor and the actor’s behavior than men. Given that (a) our sce- about harm in any of the scenarios. We used the following guidelines for
nario involves a female target and a male actor, (b) women are constructing different types of intent. Reasons reflecting no intent were
more frequently targets of discrimination than men (Swim, Hyers, those that provided a benign explanation for the behavior of the male
Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001), (c) women are more likely than men to character. Reasons reflecting medium intent either explained the behavior
perceive that discrimination against women is more frequent as possibly due to tradition or habit, such that the male character was
(Gurin, 1985), and (d) women are more likely than men to label unaware of treating women differently, or explained that the behaviors
particular incidents as sexual harassment (Blumenthal, 1998), could be characterized by benevolent motives, such that the male character
one might predict that women would be more likely to label a was aware of the differential treatment but not aware of any harmful
INTENT AND HARM 947
consequences to the female character.1 Finally, explanations with high Experiment 2

intent were characterized by the man’s awareness of and desire for both
differential treatment and harmful consequences to the female character. We tested our third and fourth hypotheses in the second exper-
Possible scenario endings were pretested on a sample of 19 women iment by examining the impact of information about harm on
and 39 men. Pilot participants were given each of the base scenarios judgments of the actor and actor’s behavior. We used the same
followed by 8 –12 descriptions of the actors’ possible intentions. They were base scenarios as were used in Experiment 1, but instead of
asked to rate the extent to which the actor intended to be prejudiced on a information about an actor’s intent, the scenarios provided no
scale ranging from 0 (no intent) to 6 (high intent). We used the phrase information about intent and instead manipulated information
intended to be prejudiced rather than intended to discriminate because it
about the consequences of the actor’s behavior for the target(s) of
matched our dependent variables as noted below. We selected endings that
the actor’s behavior. We predicted that the more harm a target
represented the different levels of intent, and the ranking from no intent to
high intent did not differ for women and men.2 Averaging across the four
experienced, the more the actor’s behavior and the actor himself
base scenarios, the mean intent ratings for each ending selected would be judged to be prejudiced and that judgments of the actor’s
was 1.17, 2.72, and 4.33 from no intent to high intent, respectively. behavior would mediate the relationship between degree of harm
and perceptions of the actor. Additionally, pertinent to our second
hypothesis, we predicted that people would be more willing to

Procedure, Dependent Variables, and Design judge the actor’s behavior as discriminatory than the actor as
prejudiced given the lack of information about intent and the likely
Respondents were asked to read a series of scenarios and answer uncertainty that this would create.
questions about them. In a completely within-subjects design, all partici-
Because we were using the same base scenarios in Experiment 2
pants read the four base scenarios, with each scenario followed by a
as were used in Experiment 1, we predicted that we would find
different description of intent and questions about both the actor and the
actor’s behavior. All participants were asked to rate the extent to which
gender difference in judgments of prejudice. Although we did not
they judged the man in the scenario to be prejudiced against women and the find gender difference in use of information about intent in Ex-
extent to which they judged the behavior as prejudiced, in that order. We periment 1, it is possible that women and men will use information
used the word prejudice for both the actor and the actor’s behavior to make about harm differently. Women might identify more with the target
sure the only difference in ratings was whether the behavior or the actor than men both because the target is female and because women
was being rated. All ratings were completed on a scale ranging from 0 (not have more experience with sexism than men. Thus, they might
at all) to 6 (very much). The two scales were highly correlated, r(27) ⫽ .80. place more weight on the target’s experience than men would.
However, we kept them as two separate measures because we predicted
that participants’ mean responses to the two items would differ. Two
different orders of presentation of the different levels of the intent variable Method
and two different orders of the four base scenarios were included.
Participants
Thirteen female and 15 male undergraduate students in psychology
Results and Discussion classes and in labor and industrial relations classes were recruited to
participate in a study of perceptions of prejudice. Participants received
A 2 (gender of participant) ⫻ 2 (target of judgment: actor vs. extra credit for their participation.
actor’s behavior) ⫻ 3 (level of intent: none, medium, high) mixed
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures on the last Scenarios
two variables was conducted.3 Supporting our first hypothesis,
greater intent resulted in greater perceptions of prejudice, F(2, We used the same base scenarios as were used in Experiment 1. Harm
56) ⫽ 179.48, p ⬍ .01 (M ⫽ 1.32, 3.08, 5.47, SD ⫽ 1.27, 1.41, .95, descriptions that followed each scenario were consequences for the woman
from no intent to high intent, respectively). or women in the scenario (see Appendix). There was no information about
intent in these scenarios. No-harm consequences were those in which the
Supporting our second hypothesis, there was a main effect for
target of the judgment, F(1, 28) ⫽ 43.68, p ⬍ .01, which was
qualified by an interaction between level of intent and target of 1
Initially, we planned to differentiate these two types of medium intent.
attribution, F(2, 56) ⫽ 11.71, p ⬍ .01. Participants were less likely However, results in the present experiment indicated that participants did
to judge the actor (M ⫽ 1.10, SD ⫽ 1.21) than the actor’s behavior not differentiate between these two mid levels of intent. Therefore, for
(M ⫽ 1.51, SD ⫽ 1.38, p ⬍ .05) as prejudiced when there was no simplicity, analyses combine the results for these mid levels of intent.
intent and less likely to judge the actor (M ⫽ 2.70, SD ⫽ 1.40) than 2
We attempted to minimize gender differences in perceptions of intent
the actor’s behavior (M ⫽ 3.50, SD ⫽ 1.52, p ⬍ .05) as prejudiced by selecting endings that differed the least by gender. There were gender
when there was medium intent. There were no differences in differences in our pilot data for perceptions of intent for about half the
judgments of the actor (M ⫽ 5.42, SD ⫽ 1.96) and actor’s behavior endings. When gender differences emerged they were for the mid or the
(M ⫽ 5.52, SD ⫽ .95) when there was high intent. high levels of intent with women perceiving more intent than men. These
gender differences did not alter the ranking of intent and harm. These
Finally, men (M ⫽ 2.98, SD ⫽ 1.14) were less likely to judge
gender differences may account for gender differences in perceptions of
the actor and actor’s behavior as prejudiced than women prejudice—a possibility we addressed in Experiment 3.
(M ⫽ 3.59, SD ⫽ .76), F(1, 28) ⫽ 3.01, p ⫽ .09. There was no 3
We analyzed the results with scenario and scenario orders as additional
interaction between participant gender and intent, suggesting that independent variables. A few additional effects emerged. However, the pattern
this difference was not more likely to occur in ambiguous situa- of means comparing different levels of intent and comparing ratings of the
tions and that women and men used information about intent in a actor and behavior within level of intent described below was supported across
similar manner. scenarios, across women and men, and across order within scenarios.
Figure 1. Effect of harm and participant gender on judgments of the actor and the actor’s behavior (Experiment
2). MSE ⫽ .12. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around the mean. Response options were from 0
(not at all) to 6 (very much).
woman perceived no harm either to herself personally or to women in ANOVA with repeated measures on the last two variables was
general. Medium-harm occurred when the consequences were perceived to conducted.5 As predicted, greater harm resulted in greater judg-
be harmful to women as a group but not directly to the female character. ments of prejudice, F(2, 52) ⫽ 42.04, p ⬍ .01 (M ⫽ 2.38, 3.03,
Finally, high-harm was characterized by direct negative psychological,
3.53, SD ⫽ 1.36, 1.26, 1.28, from no to high harm, respectively),
physical, or economic consequences to the woman or women in the
scenario. and participants were more cautious in labeling the actor as prej-
The same pilot participants used to rate the intent levels for Experi- udiced (M ⫽ 2.82, SD ⫽ 1.26) than they were in labeling the
ment 1 rated the harm endings for Experiment 2. These participants were actor’s behavior as prejudiced (M ⫽ 3.14, SD ⫽ 1.29), F(1, 26) ⫽
given the base scenarios followed by six to seven different types of harm 9.43, p ⫽ .01. Further, consistent with findings from Experiment 1,
incurred by the female targets. They were asked to rate the degree of harm men (M ⫽ 2.40, SD ⫽ 1.18) were less likely to form a judgment
experienced by the female character(s) on a scale ranging from 0 (no harm) of prejudice than women (M ⫽ 3.65, SD ⫽ 0.97), F(1, 26) ⫽ 9.14,
to 5 (high harm). We selected endings to represent three levels of harm.
p ⫽ .004.
Averaging across the four base scenarios, the mean harm for each ending
selected was .81, 2.75, and 4.09, from no harm to high harm, respectively.4 An interaction between level of harm and target of judgment
was significant, F(2, 52) ⫽ 4.06, p ⫽ .01, which was qualified by
Procedure, Dependent Measures, and Design a three-way interaction among gender, target of judgment, and
level of harm, F(2, 52) ⫽ 4.55, p ⫽ .01. This interaction was a
Respondents were asked to read a series of scenarios depicting a poten- result of the difference in judgments of the actor and behavior only
tially discriminatory encounter between a male and a female character. In
emerging for women in the medium and high harm ( p ⫽ .01)
a completely within-subjects design, all participants read the four base
scenarios, with each scenario followed by a different description of harm.
conditions (see Figure 1). The difference between no-harm and
Following each scenario and level of harm, participants were asked to rate high-harm was greater for women’s judgments of the actor’s
the extent to which the man and the behavior were prejudiced, in that order, behavior (M ⫽ 2.98, SD ⫽ 1.20 and M ⫽ 4.64, SD ⫽ 0.92) than
on scales ranging from 0 (not at all) to 6 (very much). Again, we purpose- for men’s judgments of the actor’s behavior (M ⫽ 1.97, SD ⫽ 1.38
fully used the word prejudice for both scales to alter only the target of the
judgment. The scales were highly correlated, r(26) ⫽ .73. However, we
4
kept them as two separate measures because we predicted that mean One of the 12 endings selected had gender differences, with women
responses to the scales might differ. Two different orders of presentation of being more likely than men to perceive harm at one of the middle levels of
the different levels of harm variable and two different orders of the four harm. However, women’s and men’s ratings of this middle level of harm
base scenarios were again included. differed from both women’s and men’s ratings in the no-harm and high-
harm conditions in this scenario.
5
Results and Discussion We analyzed the results with scenario and these scenario orders as
additional independent variables. There was a main effect of scenario.
A 2 (gender of participant) ⫻ 2 (target of judgment: actor vs. However, there were no interactions with this variable or with the order of
actor’s behavior) ⫻ 3 (level of harm: none, medium, high) mixed presentation of the scenarios.
INTENT AND HARM 949
and M ⫽ 3.02, SD ⫽ 1.30). These findings suggest that women’s dicted that judgments of the behavior would mediate the relation-
judgments of the actor’s behavior were more influenced than ship between harm and judgments of the actor when intent was
men’s judgments by information about harm, and this accounts for uncertain. Although the results from Experiment 2 are consistent
the difference between women’s and men’s ratings of the actor with these hypotheses, we could not test whether harm would have
versus actor’s behavior. the same effect under conditions of high intent. Examining the
We also tested and found that judgments of the actor’s behavior impact of both intent and harm on these judgments would allow us
mediated the relationship between information about harm and to test this hypothesis more fully.
judgments about the actor. We used hierarchical linear modeling
and mediation analyses to test for the direct and indirect impact of
harm on perceptions of the extent to which the actor was preju-
diced. We included participant’s gender as a covariate in all of the Method
regressions. We used procedures outlined by Baron and Kenny
(1986) to test for mediation. First, harm predicted judgments of the Participants
actor’s behavior (G01 ⫽ .66), t(27) ⫽ 6.89, p ⬍ .001.6 Second,
harm predicted judgments of the actor (i.e., the direct path from the One hundred twenty-nine female and 102 male students were recruited
predictor to the dependent variable; G01 ⫽ .48), t(27) ⫽ 5.90, p ⬍ from introductory psychology courses and received course credit for their
.001. Third, when the judgment of the actor’s behavior was added participation. Participants were recruited for an unrelated study and were
to the last equation, harm no longer predicted judgments of the asked to complete measures for the present study after completing mea-
actor (the dependent variable). Controlling for the mediator (the sures for the other study.
actor’s behavior), we found that the indirect path (G01 ⫽ .01),
t(27) ⫽ .32, p ⫽ .75, was not significant, and judgments of the
actor’s behavior predicted judgments of the actor (G02 ⫽ .74), Design
t(27) ⫽ 9.86, p ⬍ .001. Fourth, a Sobel test of the difference
between the direct and indirect paths revealed that the two paths The design was a 2 (target of judgment: actor vs. actor’s behavior) ⫻ 3
were significantly different from each other (Z ⫽ 5.64, p ⫽ .01). (level of intent: no information, no, and high) ⫻ 3 (level of harm: no
We also tested an alternative model in which the mediator was information, no, and high) mixed design with repeated measures on the
judgments of the actor and the dependent variable was judgments target of the judgment and the remaining four variables being between
of the actor’s behavior. The alternative model was not as strongly subjects.
supported because it indicated partial mediation in that the indirect
path from harm to judgments of the actor was significant (G0 ⫽
.30), t(27) ⫽ 3.27, p ⫽ .003. Scenarios, Procedure, and Dependent Measures
For the present study, we selected the scenario in which a boss sent men
Experiment 3 but not women to a computer-training course. We used the same descrip-
Experiment 3 was designed to test whether we could replicate tions of no and high intent and no and high harm as were used in the
previous studies. We also included conditions in which there was no
the findings from Experiments 1 and 2 with a between-subjects
information about intent or harm. After reading the scenario, participants
design and with a more complex measure of judgments of an actor
were asked to rate on a 0 (not at all) to 6 (very much) scale the extent to
and an actor’s behavior. In this experiment, we manipulated in-
which the actor intended to be prejudiced against women, the extent to
formation about intent and harm, created scales to measure judg- which the behavior was harmful to the women, and then four questions
ments of the actor and actor’s behavior, and included measures of about whether the actor was prejudiced (i.e., whether the actor was prej-
perceived intent and perceived harm. We included conditions in udiced against women, was sexist, held negative stereotypes about women,
which there was no information about harm and no information and was generally fair to women—reverse scored) and four questions about
about intent. This allowed us to replicate the findings from Exper- whether the behavior was discriminatory (i.e., whether the behavior dis-
iments 1 and 2 in which participants were not given information criminated against the women, was sexist, demonstrated bias against
about harm and intent, respectively. Finally, to simplify the num- women, and was fair—reverse scored). We alternated, with odd and even
ber of conditions examined, we excluded the medium-intent and numbers, questions about the actor and about his behavior. Ratings of the
medium-harm conditions. However, lack of information about actor as prejudiced (Cronbach’s ␣ ⫽ .73) and of the behavior as discrim-
intent and harm should be similar to a manipulation of medium inatory (Cronbach’s ␣ ⫽ .92) were reliable. The two scales were highly
intent and harm in that they would both result in uncertainty about correlated, r(230) ⫽ .81, p ⬍ .001. However, as in the previous studies, we
the perpetrator’s intent and the harm experienced by the target, kept them as separate measures because we predicted differences in mean
respectively. response to these judgments.
There were two orders to the dependent variables. Questions about intent
Another purpose of Experiment 3 was to test the joint impact of
and harm always preceded questions about the actor and the actor’s
intent and harm on judgments about whether the actor was preju-
behavior. However, in one order, we asked about intent first, and in the
diced and whether the actor’s behavior was discriminatory. As
second, we asked about harm first. Additionally, although questions about
noted in the introduction of this article, we hypothesized an impact judgments about the actor and actor’s behavior were alternated, when we
of information about harm on judgments of the actor and the
actor’s behavior, with harm having the most impact on these
judgments when intent was uncertain because it was unknown or 6
The coefficients (G) from hierarchical linear modeling can be inter-
because an expressed lack of intent was doubted. We also pre- preted in the same manner as unstandardized beta weights in regression.
asked about intent first, the first question was about prejudice. When the and harm, F(2, 213) ⫽ 26.37, p ⬍ .001, that were qualified by an
first question was about harm, that question was about discrimination.7 interaction between intent and harm, F(2, 213) ⫽ 7.97, p ⬍ .001
(see Figure 2). Consistent with predictions, no-intent and high-
Results intent conditions differed from each other within all levels of harm.
Also consistent with predictions, harm did not influence judgments
Perceptions of Intent and Harm
when there was high intent but did when there was no information
Separate 2 (gender of participant) ⫻ 3 (information about harm: about intent and when there was information indicating no intent.
no harm, no information about harm, and high harm) ⫻ 3 (infor- There were a main effect for target of judgment, F(1, 213) ⫽
mation about intent: no harm, no information about harm, high 35.05, p ⬍ .001, a main effect for participant’s gender, F(1,
intent) between-subjects ANOVAs were conducted on partici- 213) ⫽ 12.06, p ⫽ .001, and an interaction between target of the
pants’ ratings of the actor’s intent and on the extent of harm to the judgment and intent, F(2, 213) ⫽ 3.04, p ⫽ .05, that were all
target. Consistent with manipulations, intent influenced percep- qualified by a three-way interaction by target of the judgment by
tions of intent, F(2, 213) ⫽108.91, p ⬍ .001, and harm influenced intent and participant gender, F(2, 213) ⫽ 2.96, p ⫽ .05 (see
perceptions of harm, F(2, 213) ⫽ 47.76, p ⬍ .001.
Figure 3). Consistent with predictions, women were less likely to

However, the results also revealed a lack of independence judge the actor as prejudiced than actor’s behavior as discrimina-
between perceived intent and perceived harm due to the effects of
tory when they were told that the actor did not intend to be
manipulated intent on perceived harm and manipulated harm on
prejudiced ( p ⫽ .07) and when they were given no information
perceived intent. Not only were there main effects of manipulated
about intent ( p ⬍ .01) but did not differentially judge the actor and
harm on perceived intent, F(2, 213) ⫽ 17.14, p ⬍ .001, and
manipulated intent on perceived harm, F(2, 213) ⫽ 52.72, p ⬍ the actor’s behavior when there was high intent ( p ⫽ .87). How-
.001, but there were interactions between the manipulated intent ever, men were less likely to judge the actor as prejudiced than the
and manipulated harm on perceived intent, F(4, 213) ⫽ 7.18, p ⬍ actor’s behavior as discriminatory in all of the conditions ( ps ⬍
.001, and perceived harm, F(4, 213) ⫽ 8.99, p ⬍ .001. Manipu- .001).
lated intent influenced perceived intent and harm within all levels Gender differences in these judgments occurred in all of the
of harm. In contrast, manipulated harm only influenced perceived conditions except for judgments of the actor’s behavior as discrim-
intent and perceived harm when there was information indicating inatory in the high-intent condition. Thus, although women and
no intent (M ⫽ .88, 2.18, 3.45, SD ⫽ 1.27, 1.52, 2.21 and men agreed about the likelihood that the behavior was discrimi-
M ⫽ 1.68, 2.30, 5.25, SD ⫽ 1.68, 1.38, 1.25, for no-harm, natory in the high-intent condition, men were more cautious about
no-information-about-harm, and high-harm and for perceived in- their judgments of the man relative to the women. Perhaps men
tent and harm, respectively) and no-information-about-intent identified more with the male actor, and this made them more
(M ⫽ 1.58, 2.61, 3.40, SD ⫽ 1.55, 1.61, 1.50 and M ⫽ 1.58, reluctant to make a general judgment about the actor on the basis
2.04, 4.33, SD ⫽ 1.33, 1.74, 1.21, for no-harm, no-information- of the actor’s intent for one particular action.
about-harm, and high-harm and for perceived intent and harm,
respectively). Manipulated harm did not influence perceived intent
7
and perceived harm when there was high intent We conducted analyses on perceptions of intent, perceptions of harm,
(M ⫽ 5.56, 4.06, 5.39, SD ⫽ .93, 1.60, 1.03 and M ⫽ 5.04, 4.36, judgments of the actor, and judgments of the actor’s behavior, including
5.25, SD ⫽ 1.45, 1.64, 1.35, for no-harm, no-information-about- order as an independent variable in addition to the independent variables of
harm, and high-harm and for perceived intent and harm, manipulated intent, manipulated harm, and participant’s gender. There
respectively). were no main effects of order or interactions with order for the analyses on
perceived harm and judgments of the actor and actor’s behavior. There was
There was also a main effect for gender, F(1, 213) ⫽ 7.46, p ⬍
one interaction between gender and order on perceived intent. When
.01, and an interaction between participant gender and intent, F(2, participants rated harm before intent, there were no gender differences in
213) ⫽ 3.32, p ⫽ .03, on perceived intent. The interaction was a perceptions of intent (M ⫽ 3.33 and 3.26 for women and men, respective-
result of women perceiving more intent than men in the no-intent ly). When participants rated intent before harm, women perceived more
condition (M ⫽ 2.47, SD ⫽ 1.99 and M ⫽ 1.44, SD ⫽ 1.67, intent than men (M ⫽ 3.72 and 2.81, respectively). Given the overall lack
respectively, p ⫽ .03) but not in the no-information-about-intent of effect of this variable and the lack of relevance for this article of the one
condition (M ⫽ 2.74, SD ⫽ 1.70 and M ⫽ 2.29, SD ⫽ 1.73, interaction that did emerge, order is not included in the results presented
respectively, p ⫽ .26) and high-intent condition (M ⫽ 5.31, SD below.
⫽ 1.20 and M ⫽ 5.22, SD ⫽ 1.31, respectively, p ⫽ .74). Yet
8
We reran these analyses first with perceived intent as a covariate and
consistent with manipulations, the no-intent and high-intent con- second with perceived harm as a covariate to test whether the effects of
ditions differed for both women and men. manipulated intent were independent of its effect on perceived harm and
whether the effects of manipulated harm were independent of its effect on
perceived harm. All the significant effects involving manipulated intent in
Judgments of the Actor and Actor’s Behavior the analyses reported here remained significant when we controlled for
perceived harm and all the significant effects involving manipulated harm
We conducted a 2 (gender of participant) ⫻ 3 (information
remained significant when we controlled for perceived intent. The one
about harm: no-harm, no-information-about-harm, high-harm) ⫻ 3 exception is that the interaction between participant gender, target of the
(information about intent: no-intent, no-information-about-intent, judgment, and intent was marginally significant when perceived harm was
high-intent) ⫻ 2 (target of judgment: actor vs. actor’s behavior) included as a covariate. The main effect for participant gender remained
mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the last variable.8 significant with intent in the analyses, although the strength of the effect
There were main effects for intent, F(2, 213) ⫽ 125.32, p ⬍ .001, was reduced.
INTENT AND HARM 951
Figure 2. Experiment 3: Effect of manipulated intent and harm on judgments. MSE ⫽ 2.72. Error bars
represent 95% confidence intervals around the mean. Response options were from 0 (not at all) to 6 (very much).
Mediation Model for mediation along with a Sobel test as outlined in Experi-
ment 2. We included gender as a covariate in these analyses.
We tested whether judgments of the behavior mediated the Also, as in Experiment 2, we tested the alternative model of
relationship between manipulated harm and judgments of the judgments of the actor mediating the relationship between ma-
actor. We used Baron and Kenny’s (1986) procedure for testing nipulated harm and judgments of the actor’s behavior. We
Figure 3. Experiment 3: Effect of gender and intent on judgments of the actor and actor’s behavior. MSE ⫽
.69. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around the mean. Response options were from 0 (not at all)
to 6 (very much).
tested these models within the manipulated levels of informa-

tion about intent.
We had predicted that the mediation model would not fit the
data when there was high intent. Supporting this prediction and as
noted in the ANOVA above, when there was high intent, manip-
ulated harm did not predict judgments of the actor (␤ ⫽ .03),
t(80) ⫽ .26, p ⫽ .80. In contrast, we predicted that judgments of
the behavior would mediate the relationship between manipulated
harm and judgments of the actor when there was no intent and no
information about intent. As illustrated in Figure 4, we found all of
the conditions recommended in Baron and Kenny’s (1986) proce-
dure were met for these two conditions. Manipulated harm pre-
dicted judgments of the behavior, t(69) ⫽ 6.45, p ⬍ .01, and
t(73) ⫽ 6.37, p ⬍ .01, for no-intent and no-information-about-
intent, respectively, and judgments of the behavior predicted judg-

ments of the actor, t(68) ⫽ 10.40, p ⬍ .01, and t(73) ⫽ 12.07, p ⬍
.01, for no-intent and no-information-about-intent, respectively.
The Sobel tests comparing the direct and indirect paths were
significant for the no-intent (Z ⫽ 5.80, p ⬍ .01), t(69) ⫽ 5.59, p ⬍
.01 versus t(68) ⫽ .69, p ⫽ .49, direct and indirect paths respec- Figure 4. Experiment 4: Standardized path coefficients for the mediation
tively, and no-information-about-intent conditions (Z ⫽ 5.37, p ⬍ models with no-intent (above arrows) and no-information-about-intent
.01), t(73) ⫽ 5.18, p ⬍ .001 versus t(72) ⫽ 0.03, p ⫽ .97, direct (below arrows). *p ⬍ .01.
and indirect paths respectively. There was also evidence of medi-
ation on the alternative model with judgments of the actor as the
mediator. However, this alternative model indicated only partial Fourth, the mediation model indicated that manipulated harm
mediation because the indirect path remained significant after affected judgments of the actor’s behavior, which then affected
controlling for the mediator for the no-intent (␤ ⫽ .20), judgments of the actor when no information about intent was
t(69) ⫽ 2.73, p ⬍ .01, and no-information-about-intent (␤ ⫽ .20), provided and when the information about the actor indicated no
t(72) ⫽ 3.14, p ⫽ .002, conditions.9 intent. The latter may be the case because people doubted the
actor’s claims of lack of intent, particularly after they interpreted
the behavior as being discriminatory. Consistent with this inter-
Discussion pretation, the presence of harm increased participants’ perceptions
of intent in the no-information-about-intent and the no-intent con-
The results from Experiment 3 replicated those from Experi- ditions. Participants may have engaged in a form of hindsight bias
ments 1 and 2 and also more fully tested hypotheses regarding the where they assumed that the actor should have foreseen the out-
effect of harm on judgments of the actor and the actor’s behavior. come and must therefore have intended the outcome to some
First, greater intent resulted in participants being more likely to extent (Mark, Reiter, Eyssell, Cohen, & Mellor, 2001).
make judgments of prejudice and discrimination. Second, partici- Finally, consistent with the previous experiments, participant’s
pants were less likely to judge the actor as prejudiced than the gender predicted judgments of the actor as prejudiced and actor’s
actor’s behavior as discriminatory. Moreover, for women, when behavior as discriminatory.
intent was unknown or uncertain, participants were less likely to
judge the actor as prejudiced than the actor’s behavior as discrim- Experiment 4
inatory and not in the high-intent condition, as predicted.
Third, attending to the joint impact of intent and harm revealed The purpose of Experiment 4 was to test the extent to which the
that intent played a stronger role in judgments of prejudice and previous findings from the scenario studies could be applied to an
discrimination than did harm, in that harm did not influence actual experience with differential treatment based on gender. The
judgments of prejudice and discrimination when intent was present scenario studies revealed that the types of specific information
but did when there was no intent or no information about intent. people have about situations in which women and men are treated
The covariate analyses (see Footnote 8) indicated that the lack of differently predict their judgments of the actor as prejudiced and
effect of manipulated harm on judgments when there was high the actor’s behavior as discriminatory. However, judgments about
intent was not a function of intent influencing perceived harm but actual situations could differ from those about hypothetical situa-
was more a function of people placing more weight on information tions. People may be more cautious when making accusations
about intent than information about harm. Thus, participants ap-
peared to assume that if high intent was known, information about 9
Given that harm influenced perceived intent, we tested and found that
lack of harm did not override the effect of intent on these judg- manipulated harm continued to predict judgments of the actor’s behavior,
ments. The impact of intent was also revealed by the finding that controlling for perceived intent when there was no information about intent
information about intent influenced judgments at all levels of and when there was information indicating no intent. Also, full mediation
harm, indicating that participants believed that intent still contrib- was supported for both the no-information-about-intent and the no-intent
uted to these judgments. conditions for both orders of the dependent variables.
INTENT AND HARM 953
about particular individuals than about hypothetical individuals. experimenter told the participants that the second experimenter had not
For instance, one explanation that has been offered for people’s arrived yet. The experimenter then asked 1 female participant and the male
tendency to deny personal discrimination more than discrimination participant if they would go to another room (Room B) to await the second
against a group is that people are more hesitant to accuse particular experimenter while the other 2 started on their task. All agreed. After the
participants settled into Room B facing a one-way mirror, the experimenter
individuals (Crosby, 1984). This could mean that participants may
asked them to watch Room A through the one-way mirror and to listen to
have a higher threshold for making claims of prejudice and dis-
the instructions given to the first 2 participants because they would be
crimination in actual situations than in hypothetical scenarios, involved in a study with similar, though not identical, instructions, and it
making these claims only in circumstances of virtual certainty. In might help them progress more efficiently through the study if they
our study, this would correspond to the condition where there is listened. A female confederate was in the room, allegedly working on
both high intent and high harm. Thus, we were interested in audio–video editing with equipment in the room. She monitored whether
whether we could replicate the findings from the scenario study in the participants talked during the study and whether they talked about the
a high-impact study in terms of (a) intent influencing judgments of treatment of the participants. Further, her mere presence was used as a
the actor and the actor’s behavior; (b) participants judging the means of discouraging the participants from talking. No talking about the
actor as less prejudiced than the behavior as discriminatory, par- study was observed during the study.
The male experimenter returned to Room A and told the female target
ticularly in circumstances where information about intent was

and the male confederate that the man was assigned to the leader position
unknown or uncertain; and (c) harm having more effect on judg-
and the woman was assigned to a follower position. The male experimenter
ments when no information about intent was provided or the actor told them that the leader’s effectiveness would be assessed by the accuracy
expresses no intent than when intent was expressed. and completeness of the woman’s performance on the task. The male
Another consideration is that actual situations have actual tar- confederate interrupted and asked why he was assigned to the position of
gets and actors and not just observers. In Experiment 4, we the leader. In the no-intent condition, the experimenter responded that the
examined whether targets and observers use information differ- decision was made before their arrival and they were each randomly
ently. We predicted that targets might be more influenced by assigned to their respective positions. In the intent-present condition, the
information about harm than observers because targets might experimenter responded, “Well you know you’re a guy and a man should
perceive the consequences of the actor’s behavior as stronger or as be in charge.” In the no-information-about-intent condition, the male
confederate did not ask a question and the experimenter did not explain the
more personally relevant (Kowalski, 2000). We were also inter-
role assignments. After this manipulation, the experimenter explained that
ested in whether the extent of differences between targets and
the male participant was to read over instructions on how to bubble in
observers would be influenced by shared group membership, certain numbers in certain places on computer scantron sheets. This task
which could increase female observers’ empathy for female was chosen because of its tedious and potentially boring nature, which is
targets. relevant for the harm manipulation. The male participant was then sup-
posed to explain the procedures to the female participant (the target). In the
Method no-harm condition, both the man and the woman were to carry out the task
independently. They did the task for 5 min. In the harm-present condition,
Participants only the female participant had to do the task for 5 min, and the male
confederate was told that because he acted as the leader in the study, he
Fifty-eight female participants took the role of a female target, and 58 would have the opportunity to finish early and receive another extra credit
female and 58 male participants took the role of observer. These students point by participating in another experiment testing video games.
were introductory psychology students participating for extra credit. Finally, both participants were told that when they were finished with
their part in the study, they would need to complete a departmental survey
Design regarding the quality of people’s experiences in departmental studies. To
reinforce the privacy of their responses and to minimize the possible
The study used a 3 (level of experimenter’s intent: no-information-about impact of concerns about public reporting (e.g., Sechrist, Swim, & Stangor,
intent, no-intent, intent present) ⫻ 2 (level of harm to female participant: 2003; Stangor, Swim, Van Allen, & Sechrist, 2002) participants were told
no-harm, harm-present) ⫻ 2 (target of judgment vs. actor’s behavior) ⫻ 3 to put their responses into an envelope marked “confidential” and to place
(perspective: female target, female observer, male observer) mixed design. the envelope in a box in another room where other participants presumably
The first two variables were between subjects. The last variable was within also placed their responses.
subject, with group as the unit of analysis. After the experimenter completed his instructions and made sure the
participants understood the task, he went to the observation room (Room
Procedure B). When the experimenter arrived in the observation room, he expressed
surprise that the other experimenter had not yet arrived. He told the 2
Two women and a man were recruited by phone for each session to participants in Room B that because the second experimenter was so late,
participate in a study on “performance in hierarchical and nonhierarchical they would not complete the experiment, but the participants would be
settings.” A male confederate also arrived at the start of each session. A given their extra credit for having arrived, and the department would still
male experimenter greeted them as they arrived and told them that he was like them to complete its survey. They were told to put their questionnaires
waiting for another experimenter to arrive. in an envelope marked “confidential” and to turn in their questionnaires in
Participants were told that the experimenters were interested in perfor- a box in another room. After participants placed their envelopes in the box,
mance in hierarchical and nonhierarchical settings. The experimenter told the female confederate who had monitored the observers’ behavior de-
them that 2 of the participants (actually 1 female participant, who became briefed them. No subjects expressed suspicion about the procedures.
the target of discrimination, and the male confederate) would be working
with him in a hierarchical setting (Room A) and that 2 would be working Dependent Measures
with the second experimenter in a nonhierarchical setting (Room B). These
latter 2 participants actually became observers to differential treatment The final questionnaire was ostensibly unrelated to the study itself. It
directed toward the first female participant and the male confederate. The consisted of a number of questions about the ethical conduct of experi-
ments in the Psychology Department and was designed to appear as if it participants tended to infer some degree of intent when there was
were being given to participants in all experiments throughout the depart- harm.
ment. Within these questions, participants were asked to rate the extent to Judgments of discrimination and prejudice. We used a 2 (level
which each participant suffered negative consequences in the study on a of experimenter’s intent: no-information-about-intent, no-intent)
scale ranging from 0 (no negative consequences) to 6 (a great deal of
⫻ 2 (level of harm to female participant: no-harm, harm-present)
negative consequences). They were then asked to complete ratings of the
⫻ 2 (target of judgment: actor and behavior) ⫻ 3 (perspective:
experimenter’s characteristics on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 6
(very much). Embedded in these ratings was a rating of whether the female target, female observer, male observer) mixed ANOVA
experimenter was prejudiced. If they had noted that the experimenter was with repeated measures on the last two factors and with group as
prejudiced, they were to indicate against which group the experimenter was the unit of analysis. These analyses revealed a main effect for
prejudiced. Women were included as one of the possibilities. Everyone harm, F(2, 72) ⫽ 24.00, p ⬍ .01, and target of judgment, F(1,
who noted that some prejudice had occurred noted that it was against 36) ⫽ 11.45, p ⫽ .002, which were qualified by an interaction
women. They then were asked to rate the extent to which the experimenter between harm and target of judgment, F(1, 36) ⫽ 8.42, p ⫽ .01.
intended to discriminate against participants on the basis of four More participants gave a rating of 1 or more for judgments of the
government-protected classes, which included gender, on a scale ranging actor and actor’s behavior when there was harm (22% and 43%,
from 0 (not at all) to 6 (very much). They were also asked to rate the extent
respectively) than when there was no harm (2% and 3%). The
to which anyone in the study had experienced discrimination on the basis
interaction was a result of fewer participants giving a rating of 1 or
of these four protected classes, on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 6
(very much). The ratings of the experimenter’s prejudice and the discrim- more in their judgments of the actor (22%) than actor’s behavior
ination were highly correlated, r(57) ⫽ .75, .87, .83, for the female target, (43%) when there was harm as compared with very few partici-
female observer, and male observer, respectively. However, as was done in pants giving a rating other than zero in their judgments of the actor
the previous experiments, we analyzed the results separately because we (M ⫽ 2%) or the actor’s behavior (3%) when there was no harm.
had predicted that there would be mean differences in these ratings. There were no pertinent effects for intent.11
Given the effect of harm on perceived intent, we tested whether
Results the previously reported effects of harm on judgments of discrim-
ination and prejudice were independent of the effect of harm on
Preliminary analyses revealed that very few participants per- perceptions of intent. We analyzed judgments of discrimination
ceived harm, perceived intent, judged the behavior as discrimina- and prejudice, controlling for perceived intent. The results re-
tory, or judged the actor (i.e., the experimenter) as prejudiced in vealed that the main effect of harm remained significant, F(1,
the conditions where participants were not given any information 33) ⫽ 5.23, p ⫽ .03, but that the main effect for target of judgment,
about intent (M ⫽ .65, .47, .68, .32, SD ⫽ .72, .74, .89, .62, F(1, 33) ⫽ 1.36, p ⫽ .25, and the interaction between target of
respectively) or the actor expressed no intent to be prejudiced judgment and harm, F(1, 33) ⫽ 1.89, p ⫽ .18, were no longer
(M ⫽ .60, .37, .38, .13, SD ⫽ .60, .69, .71, .38, respectively) significant. The adjusted means reveal that participants tended to
compared with those when the actor expressed intent (M ⫽ 1.50, be more likely to judge the behavior as discriminatory than the
3.37, 3.20, 2.18, SD ⫽ 1.58, 1.24, 1.42, 1.59, respectively). The actor as prejudiced in both the no-harm (15% and 9%, respec-
low means were a result of nearly all participants giving ratings tively) and harm-present (31% and 14%, respectively) conditions.
of 0 or 1 on these scales when there was no information about the
intent or when the actor expressed no intent. This created a lack of Presence of Intent
homogeneity across conditions. Thus, for these conditions we
dichotomized the data to represent a rating of zero versus some Perceptions of intent and harm. We used a 2 (level of harm to
other rating10 and analyzed these data separately from the data in female participant: no-harm, harm-present) ⫻ 3 (perspective: fe-
the intent-present conditions. Because the data are dichotomous, male target, female observer, male observer) mixed ANOVA with
mean responses indicate the percent of individuals who gave a repeated measures on the last factor and with group as the unit of
rating of 1 or more on the dependent measures.
10
Given that the data are dichotomous, we also analyzed the data with
No-Information-About-Intent and Information Indicating binary logistic regressions and found similar results to those presented
No-Intent below. However, because we were unable to test repeated measures within
the binary logistic regressions we present the results analyzed with a mixed
Perceptions of intent and harm. We used a 2 (level of exper- ANOVA. We used group as the unit of analysis because of the possible
imenter’s intent: no-information-about-intent, no-intent) ⫻ 2 (level interrelationship between female target, female observer, and male ob-
of harm to female participant: no-harm, harm-present) ⫻ 3 (per- server within each session of the study. However, if we use perspective as
spective: female target, female observer, male observer) mixed a between-subjects factor, the same effects emerge in the analyses. More-
ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor and with group over, the results in the mixed ANOVAs are also similar with continuous
dependent measures rather than dichotomous dependent measures. We
as the unit of analysis on perceptions of harm and perceptions of
present the results with the dichotomous data because the error variances
intent. A main effect of harm on perceptions of harm, F(1,
are more homogeneous with this method.
36) ⫽ 38.72, p ⬍ .01, revealed that more participants gave a rating 11
There was a two-way interaction between intent and perspective and
of 1 or more on perceived harm when there was harm (63%) than a three-way interaction between intent, perspective, and harm on judg-
when there was no harm (1%). A main effect of harm on percep- ments. When perceived intent was a covariate, the two-way but not the
tions of intent, F(1, 36) ⫽ 12.69, p ⫽ .01, revealed that more three-way interaction was significant. Male participants were less likely to
participants gave a rating of 1 or more on intent when there was note prejudice and discrimination in the no-information-about-intent con-
harm (33%) than when there was no harm (5%). Thus, some dition than female participants, and vice versa in the no-intent condition.
INTENT AND HARM 955
Figure 5. Experiment 4: Effect of harm and perspective on judgments. MSE ⫽ 3.44. Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals around the mean. Response options were from 0 (not at all) to 6 (very much).
analysis on perceptions of harm and perceptions of intent. The ments ( ps ⬎ .50) but did significantly affect female targets’
dependent measures were kept as continuous scales. judgments ( p ⫽ .005). For female targets, greater harm resulted in
A main effect of harm on perceptions of harm, F(1, 16) ⫽ 12.13, higher judgments of discrimination and prejudice. The greater
p ⫽ .003, was qualified by a marginal interaction between per- effect of harm on female targets than on female and male observers
spective and harm, F(2, 32) ⫽ 2.88, p ⫽ .07. Consistent with resulted in female targets’ judging more discrimination and prej-
manipulations, within each perspective, participants perceived udice in the high-harm condition. However, it is interesting to note
greater harm in the harm-present condition than in the no-harm that in the no-harm condition the female targets’ judgments re-
condition. The interaction was a result of lack of difference by vealed the lowest ratings of prejudice and discrimination and male
perspective in perceived harm within the no-harm condition (M ⫽ observers’ revealed the highest. When perceived harm is included
.44, .22, and .89, SD ⫽ 1.01, .67, 1.61) for female target, female as a covariate in these analyses, the interaction between perspec-
observer, and male observer, respectively, and differences by tive and harm is no longer significant, F(2, 26) ⫽ .33, p ⫽ .72,
perspective in the harm-present condition. Female targets suggesting that the differential use of information about harm by
(M ⫽ 2.89, SD ⫽ 1.61) and female observers (M ⫽ 2.78, SD ⫽ targets and observers is a function of differences in their assess-
.64) both perceived more harm than male observers (M ⫽ 2.11, SD ment of the amount of harm the target experienced.13
⫽ 1.90). The female targets’ and female observers’ ratings did not
differ from each other. There were no effects on perceptions of Discussion
intent.12
Judgments of discrimination and prejudice. We used a 2 (level Results in the high-impact study replicated those from the
of harm to female participant: no-harm or harm-present) ⫻ 2 scenario studies. First, the presence of intent increased judgments
(target of judgment: actor and behavior) ⫻ 3 (perspective: female of the actor’s behavior as discrimination and the actor as preju-
target, female observer, male observer) mixed ANOVA with re- diced relative to when there was no information about intent and
peated measures on the last two factors and with group as the unit when the actor expressed no intent. Second, participants were less
of analysis. The dependent measures were kept as continuous
scales. 12
Analyses of perceived intent that included all three levels of intent
A main effect for target of judgment, F(1, 16) ⫽ 18.46, p ⬍ .001
indicated that participants perceived more intent in the intent-present
(MSE ⫽ 1.63), indicated that participants were more likely to condition (M ⫽ 3.55) than when the actor expressed lack of intent (M ⫽
judge the actor’s behavior as discriminatory (M ⫽ 3.31, SD .37) and when there was no information about lack of intent (M ⫽ .47).
⫽ 1.42) than the actor as prejudiced (M ⫽ 2.15, SD ⫽ 1.59). As 13
We do not report results for the mediation analyses for this study
illustrated in Figure 5, an interaction between perspective and because of the lack of variability in data, with nearly all participants giving
harm, F(2, 32) ⫽ 6.27, p ⫽ .005 (MSE ⫽ 3.44), indicated that the the same rating of the discrimination, and especially the actor’s prejudice,
degree of harm did not influence male or female observers’ judg- in several of the conditions.
likely to judge the actor as prejudiced than the actor’s behavior as behavior, resulted in participants being less likely to judge the
discriminatory. Third, harm influenced judgments when informa- actor as prejudiced and his behavior as discriminatory than when
tion about intent was not provided or the actor expressed no intent. intent to discriminate was present.
For observers, harm did not influence judgments of discrimination However, decreased certainty about intent did not decrease these
and prejudice when the actor expressed intent. Fourth, although we two types of judgment to the same degree. When an actor’s intent
were unable to test the mediation model in this data set, the was uncertain, participants were more likely to judge the actor’s
findings suggest that people may use their judgments about the behavior as discriminatory than the actor as prejudiced. When
actor’s behavior when forming their judgments about the actor in intent clearly indicated a desire to discriminate, participants did not
these conditions. That is, harm influenced perceptions of intent differentiate between their judgments about the actor and the
when there was no information about intent and when the actor actor’s behavior. Thus, uncertainty about the actor’s intent is at
expressed no intent. least one reason why people differentiate their judgments about the
There were some interesting differences, however, between this actor and the actor’s behavior. People may have felt more com-
high-impact study and the scenario studies. First, the results were fortable making an accusation about a particular behavior than
consistent with the argument that people are more cautious in their judgments about a person that implies some degree of cross-
judgments about an actual event than about a scenario. Mean situational constancy and might be perceived to require more
responses were lower in the high-impact study than in the scenario evidence.
studies, especially when participants were not given information Future research could explore whether the differentiation be-
about intent or when the actor expressed no intent; most partici- tween judgments of the actor and the actor’s behavior are a
pants were reluctant to make any claims of discrimination or function of a conscious controlled correction process. Future re-
prejudice in these two conditions. Additionally, the difference search could also examine the implications of these two types of
between the judgments of the actor as prejudiced and the actor’s judgments for public reports of experiences with discrimination in
behavior as discriminatory occurred at all levels of intent, not just contrast to the private reporting done in the present research (cf.
when there was no information about intent expressed. These Sechrist, Swim, & Stangor, 2003; Stangor et al., 2002). People
differences between the high-impact experiment and the scenario may be aware that an accusation of discrimination implies that the
experiments were not likely a function of differences between actor is prejudiced, and their judgments about the actor may not
private beliefs and public reports, because we took great care to pass a personal threshold of certainty necessary for them to com-
assure participants that their responses were anonymous. It is more plain about the behavior (e.g., Kowalski, 1996) even if their
likely that people were more cautious in making accusations about judgments of discrimination do pass this threshold. If this is the
an actual person than about a hypothetical person. case, then they may rely on their more conservative judgments
Second, harm played a different role in targets’ than observers’ about the actor rather than their judgments about the actor’s
judgments. In the high-intent condition, harm influenced female behavior when making a decision about when to report an incident.
targets’ judgments but not female observers’ and male observers’ Additionally, given the importance of intent on judgments, future
judgments, which can be attributable to female targets perceiving research should examine when and how people assess information
more harm than the observers, especially the male observers. The about intent (Malle, 1999; Malle & Knobe, 1997a, 1997b).
greater effect of harm for female targets may have resulted from
the salience of experiencing the harm or from its greater personal Role of Harm in Judgments
relevance for targets. The effect for harm may also have been a
result of female targets experiencing more negative mood from the Consistent with the current conceptualization of prejudice and
harm, and this may have influenced judgments (Sechrist, Swim, & the legal concept of adverse impact, harm played an important role
Mark, 2003). This differential use of harm information by targets in judgments of prejudice and discrimination. This was particularly
and observers could result in disagreements in judgments of prej- true when intent was uncertain or likely doubted. Results of the
udice and discrimination between observers and targets. Interest- scenario studies indicate that judgments of the actor as prejudiced
ingly, this could result in targets judging more prejudice and were influenced by harm by way of its impact on judgments about
discrimination than observers when harm is present but less when the behavior as discriminatory. Although we were unable to test
harm is absent. This latter finding has interesting implications for this in the high-impact studies, the impact of harm on perceived
understanding conditions in which targets may be likely to mini- intent in the no-intent and no-information-about-intent conditions
mize their own experiences with discrimination relative to what were consistent with this explanation.
observers may report (Sechrist, Swim, & Stangor, 2003). Our results indicate that the extent of impact of harm on judg-
ments depends on whether one is the target or an observer. Targets
General Discussion were more influenced by the harm they experienced than observers
were influenced by the harm the target experienced in their judg-
Role of Intent in Judgments ments of prejudice and discrimination when there was intent
present. The greater reliance on harm by targets than observers
Consistent with attribution theory, knowledge of an actor’s does not show that targets were uninfluenced by intent but that
intent to discriminate played a central role in judgments of preju- they were more influenced by the harm than were observers.
dice and discrimination in these experiments. Decreased certainty As noted above, our results regarding the impact of information
as to another person’s intent to discriminate, either because infor- about both intent and harm have possible implications for under-
mation about intent was unknown, there was a benign explanation standing differences in judgments by targets and observers. This is
for the actor’s behavior, or the actor gave an excuse for the likely also true for understanding differences in judgments about
INTENT AND HARM 957
actors and targets. Harm may have less impact on actors’ than overrides the impact of harm on judgments of prejudice and
targets’ judgments for the same reason it has less impact on discrimination. However, when intent information is uncertain,
observers than targets. Yet, the results suggest other reasons for harm plays an important role by influencing judgments of the
differences between actors and targets. Judgments by targets and behavior, which in turn influence judgments of the actor. Also,
actors may be functions of the information they have available to uncertainty about intent results in participants’ being more cau-
them as well as functions of assumptions they may make about the tious in their judgments about an actor than an actor’s behavior.
information they do not have available to them. Targets may not The dual influence of intent and harm on perceptions of discrim-
express harm and harm may not even be evident until later. Actors ination and prejudice is accentuated by the fact that people per-
may also not express their intent. Targets’ greater access to the ceive intent and harm to be interrelated. Finally, understanding the
harm created by an event could result in different judgments of role of harm on perceptions of prejudice can help understanding of
discrimination and prejudice than those found by actors, who variations in targets’ versus observers’, and possibly targets’ and
would have greater access to information about the presence or actors’, judgments of discrimination and prejudice.
absence of intent. Moreover, when the information available to targets
and actors conflicts, judgments of prejudice and discrimination may
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Appendix
Base Scenarios With Intent and Harm Endings and the Mean Ratings of Intent
and Harm From the Pilot Study
1. A woman was at a gun section of a store and she was the only woman (M ⴝ 2.69) Medium: The woman wished she knew how to stop men
present. A man entered and looked her up and down and then continued to from staring at women in that way. She was
look at her. used to it, so it didn’t really bother her, but she
Intent didn’t want her daughter to have to grow up
feeling as if men treated her like an object.
(M ⴝ 0.57) No: The man thought she was someone he knew.
(M ⴝ 3.84) High: The woman felt threatened by the man’s
(M ⴝ 2.22) Mid-level 1: The man had never seen a woman in the gaze. She left the store without making her
gun section of the store and was trying to purchase and checked the rear-view mirror
figure out why she was there. every few seconds to make sure he was not
following her.
(M ⴝ 2.98) Mid-level 2: The man thought she was attractive,
could not keep his eyes off of her, and
2. A group of women and men were having lunch at work when one of the
could not stop thinking about what it
men, John, asked the other men if they would be interested in joining a
would be like to have sex with her.
basketball team.
(M ⴝ 4.14) High: The man was annoyed that women were Intent
intruding on his favorite sport and he
(M ⴝ 1.56) No: John asked the men because they worked
always did whatever he could to discour-
the same weekends he did so would be free
age them from participating.
for games and practices on the same days.
The women worked opposite weekends.
Harm
(M ⴝ 2.21) Mid-level 1: John had never played basketball with
(M ⴝ 0.71) No: The woman was flattered by the man’s gaze. women and he did not think of them
She realized that some people might be of- when he thought of people who would
fended, but she enjoyed the attention. want to play basketball.
INTENT AND HARM 959
(M ⴝ 2.74) Mid-level 2: John thought about asking the women if (M ⴝ 4.77) High: When the company later downsized the
they would be interested but he knew that women all lost their jobs because of their
in past years the basketball games got lack of knowledge about computers but the
physically rough and he did not want any men who had received training were pro-
of the women to get hurt. moted into higher paying jobs.
(M ⴝ 4.04) High: John had been told to ask both the women
and men, but he decided that women 4. A high school counselor was putting together a speech for class
would just ruin the game because they where he was supposed to inform the class about potential jobs. He
would be more interested in what color decided to tell the class about electrical engineers. He included some
the uniforms were than how they played. quotations in his speech. The quotations referred to employees as “he”
and as having wives rather than the employees as “he or she” and as
Harm having spouses.
Intent
(M ⴝ 0.64) No: The women did not feel slighted because one
of the other men had previously asked if they
(M ⴝ 1.26) No: His assistant had selected the quotations

would be interested in playing basketball.

and he didn’t have a chance to read them
(M ⴝ 1.95) Medium: The women were glad he didn’t ask them, ahead of time.
because they didn’t want their lack of inter-
est in playing basketball to be interpreted as (M ⴝ 2.64) Mid-level 1: He was so used to reading about engi-
not being “one of the guys.” However, they neers as men that he did not think about
wished that they could feel that a group of how the quotes could be perceived as
quilters would receive as much respect. excluding women.
(M ⴝ 3.59) High: Julie, one of the women at lunch, played (M ⴝ 3.17) Mid-level 2: He had never heard any of the female
basketball in college and would have liked to students express an interest in being an
have played basketball. Instead, she found engineer so he thought they would not
herself excluded from this informal network mind being excluded in the quotations.
of men.
(M ⴝ 4.50) High: He felt that it was OK to exclude women
3. A training officer selected three male employees for computer training from the topic of his lecture because they
but no female employees. should not be encouraged to think of
Intent themselves as engineers.
(M ⴝ 1.29) No: He thought that the women had already

received the training the last time it was Harm
offered.
(M ⴝ 1.12) No: The students realized that the quotations
(M ⴝ 2.51) Mid-level 1: He had picked the people who he knew the were old and ignored the implications as to
best and did not think about why he might whether women or men would be better en-
know the men better than the women. gineers.
(M ⴝ 3.26) Mid-level 2: The training officer knew that new com- (M ⴝ 3.02) Medium: Susan was not interested in engineering, but
puter operators would be required to based on the talk, she concluded that she
work nights and he didn’t think it was should apply to a university with a good
safe for women to be alone in the build- engineering school so she could find a hus-
ing at 3 a.m. band.
(M ⴝ 4.66) High: The training officer believed that women (M ⴝ 4.17) High: After hearing the quotations, Susan con-
should not be trained on anything, which cluded that she shouldn’t apply to engineer-
might put them in positions of power ing school because she could not see herself
over men. fitting in the role of engineer because she
was a woman.
Harm
(M ⴝ 0.77) No: The women had already gone to the training

and thought the training officer knew that.
(M ⴝ 3.33) Medium: The women were concerned that others in

the company would begin to think of com- Received August 16, 2001
puters as a masculine specialty because only Revision received December 10, 2002
men had received the training. Accepted December 10, 2002 䡲

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Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 2003 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

2003, Vol. 84, No. 5, 944 –959 0022-3514/03/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.84.5.944

The Role of Intent and Harm in Judgments of Prejudice and Discrimination

Janet K. Swim Elizabeth D. Scott

Gretchen B. Sechrist Bernadette Campbell

ment based on gender. In this last study, we also tested whether

consequences to the female character.1 Finally, explanations with high Experiment 2

hypothesis, we predicted that people would be more willing to

Figure 3). Consistent with predictions, women were less likely to

tested these models within the manipulated levels of informa-

intent, respectively, and judgments of the behavior predicted judg-

ticularly in circumstances where information about intent was

be accentuated, because targets will likely assume intent on the basis

(M ⴝ 1.26) No: His assistant had selected the quotations

would be interested in playing basketball.

(M ⴝ 1.29) No: He thought that the women had already

(M ⴝ 0.77) No: The women had already gone to the training

(M ⴝ 3.33) Medium: The women were concerned that others in

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