10/28/21, 5:22 PM Why Tamil Nadu temples may not thrive without state supervision - Times of India

Printed from

Why Tamil Nadu temples may not thrive without state

supervision
Oct 6, 2021, 08.41 AM IST

By K Ashok Vardhan Shetty

In recent years, there is mounting demand from certain quarters to “free”

Hindu temples from government supervision. This is a classic case of
forgetting the lessons of history because the British government in India
had implemented the same policy in the 19th century, with Hindu temples
suffering grievously as a result. Over the years, state temple relations
have swung from “protection” to “non-intervention” and back to
“protection”.

Hinduism as a whole never had a well-knit ecclesiastical organisation that

was able to impose controls against temple mismanagement and to
arbitrate disputes among trustees, archakas and other stakeholders.

Congratulations!

You have successfully cast your vote

Login to view result

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/why-tamil-nadu-temples-may-not-thrive-without-state-supervision/articleshowprint/86800385.cms 1/5
10/28/21, 5:22 PM Why Tamil Nadu temples may not thrive without state supervision - Times of India

Historically, the Hindu princely state stepped in to provide this ecclesiastical structure. Hindu Kings built temples, endowed
them with jewellery and large tracts of income-producing agricultural lands and regulated temple affairs. There is reference to a
“superintendent of religious institutions” in Kautilya’s ‘Arthashastra’. Even in the 20th century, Hindu rulers of princely states
such as Mysore, Travancore and Cochin maintained this tradition.

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/why-tamil-nadu-temples-may-not-thrive-without-state-supervision/articleshowprint/86800385.cms 2/5
10/28/21, 5:22 PM Why Tamil Nadu temples may not thrive without state supervision - Times of India

When the East India Company began to rule large parts of India, it continued the tradition of state supervision of temples and
endowments, and the giving of customary grants. The British collector administered temples well, organised religious festivals,
and was highly esteemed by Hindus as the “friendly guardian of their religion”. But this “promotion of idolatry” by a Christian
government was not relished by Christian missionaries and other zealots in India and England. They launched an agitation,
accusing the Company of having become a “dry nurse to Vishnu” and of promoting the prestige of Hinduism through the
efficient administration of its institutions. While renewing the East India Company’s charter in 1833, the British Parliament
imposed the condition that the Company “withdraw” from the management of Hindu temples.

Freed from government supervision, dishonest trustees embezzled temple funds, and leased or sold temple lands for a
pittance. Some trustees even claimed private ownership over the temples. There were numerous instances of sale of the
offices of trustees and archakas. Lacking financial support, temple rituals were cut back, their premises maintained poorly, and
the means of irrigation of agricultural lands neglected.

Repeated representations by Hindu leaders led to the enactment of Act 20 of 1863. It set up local area committees whose
members held office for life to exercise supervision over temples. But this measure was ineffective. Next, the British
government brought in a series of enactments (now embodied in section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1908) to make the
Civil Court the State’s central agency in temple matters. But the judicial remedy was too difficult and slow. The plaintiffs had to
be spirited enough to fight the case with their own money whereas the trustees could fight it with the temple’s money and
prolong the litigation indefinitely. The suits were rarely successful since the trustees controlled financial accounts and land
records which were the subject of the dispute.

Several private bills were moved by Hindu leaders in the Madras Legislative Council and the Imperial Legislature for restoration
of active executive supervision of Hindu temples and endowments, but they were abortive. It was only after dyarchy was
implemented in the provinces, courtesy the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919, with some of the departments headed by
Indian ministers, that the Madras Presidency was able to enact the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act of 1927. It created
a board of commissioners to supervise administration of temples and endowments, but its powers were rather limited. This law
was replaced by the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments (HR&CE) Act of 1951 which created a government
department headed by a Commissioner, with extensive powers of regulation of the secular affairs of Hindu temples and mutts.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this law in the famous Shirur Mutt case (1954), but struck down some of its
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/why-tamil-nadu-temples-may-not-thrive-without-state-supervision/articleshowprint/86800385.cms 3/5
10/28/21, 5:22 PM Why Tamil Nadu temples may not thrive without state supervision - Times of India

objectionable provisions. A new HR&CE Act of 1959 was enacted, taking into account the apex court’s objections. Many states
followed the lead of Madras (Tamil Nadu).

In March 1960, the Government of India appointed a high-level HR&CE commission headed by the statesman C P Ramaswami
Aiyer. After studying the problems of Hindu temples, mutts and endowments, the commission submitted a comprehensive
report in May 1962. One of its key findings was that in the states without HR&CE legislation (then Assam, West Bengal, Punjab
and Uttar Pradesh), the condition of temples was “deplorable” and many important public temples had become private
property. In Vindhyachal temple in Uttar Pradesh, some trustees had even alienated their rights to Muslims who engaged Hindu
agents to perform the duties. The commission’s first recommendation was that “those states where there are no enactments
governing Hindu religious endowments should undertake suitable legislation”.

Hindus often complain about the inequity in similar state control not being exercised over the places of worship and
endowments of other religions. Addressing this issue, the commission noted that the Bombay Public Trusts Act of 1950
(applicable to Maharashtra and Gujarat), and the former princely state of Hyderabad dealt with the endowments of all religions
equally. The commission recommended “bringing into operation a uniform pattern of legislation dealing with the administration
of endowments of all religions while making special provisions, after due consultation, to deal with the special problems of
individual religions”. The way forward is not to “deregulate” Hindu religious endowments, but to apply a similar yardstick to
endowments of other religions.

Critics have no alternative for what should be done if the government were to withdraw from supervision of temples. Can
public temples built and endowed by Hindu kings out of taxpayers’ money be “privatised” by entrusting them to the Hindu
community at large or to non-representative bodies?

For reasons of legitimacy, the trustees would have to be elected and represent all sections of Hindus. Which independent body
will delimit the constituencies, prepare separate electoral rolls for Hindus and conduct fair elections? Who will bear its cost?
Elections to the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabhandak Committee, which oversees Sikh gurudwaras, are conducted using state
machinery. Wouldn’t following this precedent increase dependence on the state?

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/why-tamil-nadu-temples-may-not-thrive-without-state-supervision/articleshowprint/86800385.cms 4/5
10/28/21, 5:22 PM Why Tamil Nadu temples may not thrive without state supervision - Times of India

HR&CE has been beneficial to Hindu temples. For instance, 88% of the temples in Tamil Nadu have annual income of less than
₹10,000. These temples would not be able to perform one puja a day or maintain their premises, but for government support.
This is not to deny that there has been some overreach by state governments or that there are shortcomings in the functioning
of the HR&CE departments. The way to check it is through civil society engagement and judicial action. “Nonintervention” is a
nice slogan, but it is administratively imprudent.

(The author is a retired IAS officer)

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/why-tamil-nadu-temples-may-not-thrive-without-state-supervision/articleshowprint/86800385.cms 5/5