Diocese of Charleston Lawsuit

ELECTRONICALLY FILED - 2021 Nov 03 8:59 AM - HORRY - COMMON PLEAS - CASE#2021CP2607327
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ) IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

)
COUNTY OF HORRY ) FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
John Doe, )
) C.A. No.: 21-CP-26-
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
) SUMMONS
The Diocese of Charleston, a Corporation ) (Jury Trial Demanded)
Sole, and The Bishop of the Diocese of )
Charleston, in his Official Capacity, )
)
Defendants. )
__________________________________ )
YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to Answer the Complaint in this action,
a copy of which is herewith served upon you, and to serve a copy of your Answer to said Complaint
on the subscriber at her Office at 137 Professional Ln., Suite B, Pawleys Island, South Carolina,
within thirty (30) days from the service hereof, exclusive of the date of such service; and if you
fail to Answer the Complaint within the time aforesaid, judgment by default will be rendered
against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint.
MCGOWAN, HOOD & FELDER, LLC
s/ Anna S. Magann
S. Randall Hood (S.C. Bar No.: 65360)
1539 Health Care Drive
Rock Hill, South Carolina 29732
(803) 327-7800
(803) 324-1483 Facsimile
rhood@mcgowanhood.com
Anna S. Magann (S.C. Bar No.: 74837)

137 Professional Ln. Suite B
Pawleys Island, South Carolina 29585
(843) 833-8082
(843) 822-8092 Facsimile
amagann@mcgowanhood.com
Pawleys Island, South Carolina

November 3, 2021
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ) IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
)
COUNTY OF HORRY ) FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
John Doe, )
) C.A. No.: 21-CP-26-
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
) COMPLAINT
The Diocese of Charleston, a Corporation ) (Jury Trial Demanded)
Sole, and The Bishop of the Diocese of )
Charleston, in his Official Capacity, )
)
Defendants. )
__________________________________ )
Plaintiff, John Doe, complaining of Defendants, respectfully shows unto the Court and
alleges as follows:
SUMMARY
1. This case stems from the Catholic Church’s continued failure to police their priests.
2. Plaintiff was a minor child and altar boy serving under Father Robert Kelly at St.
Andrew’s Catholic Church (hereinafter, “St. Andrews”) in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina in the
early 1990s.
3. Father Kelly started grooming Plaintiff to engage in a sexual relationship when
Plaintiff was a young altar boy at St. Andrews.
4. The Diocese of Charleston was either aware, or should have been aware, of various
illicit and improper sexual relationships which Father Kelly maintained before coming to or during
his time at the Charleston Diocese.
5. Father Kelly died in 2004.
6. All Defendants abused Plaintiff’s trust and innocence and caused him many types
of injuries and damages, including severe pain, suffering, and mental anguish.
2
PARTIES
Plaintiff
7. Plaintiff is filing this complaint anonymously under the pseudonym John Doe
(hereinafter “Doe” or “John Doe”).
8. John Doe (hereinafter, “Doe,” “John Doe,” or “Plaintiff”) is a citizen and resident
of Horry, South Carolina.
9. The subject matter of the lawsuit could bring embarrassment and publicity to the
Plaintiff and/or his family.
10. Plaintiff is vulnerable to the harms of disclosure.
11. The allegations are concerning what happened to John Doe when he was a minor
child.
12. Plaintiff risks humiliation and embarrassment due to the publication of the intimate
material and proceeding with a pseudonym brings some comfort. If the ability to proceed with a
pseudonym is not allowed, Plaintiff will experience further harm as a result of exercising his legal
rights.
13. Identification poses a risk of retaliation of mental or physical harm.
14. If Plaintiff is forced to disclose his true identity, that disclosure will amplify the
injury that is at issue in this litigation.
15. The public interest in the disclosure of Plaintiff’s identiy is minimal.
16. Once Defendants are served and retain counsel, Plaintiff’s identity will be revealed
to Defendants in a confidential manner.
17. Defendant is not prejudiced by allowing Plaintiff to proceed anonymously, or any
prejudice will be mitigated by the confidential disclosure of the actual identity.
18. There will be no furtherance of justice by requiring the public identity of Plaintiff.
3
19. Plaintiff attended churches operated by the Diocese of Charleston in Myrtle Beach,
South Carolina.
20. While attending the Catholic church in Myrtle Beach (that is owned, operated, and
maintained by the Diocese of Charleston, and overseen by the Bishop), Plaintiff attended and
participated in mass and served as an altar boy – all sponsored and operated by the Diocese of
Charleston.
Defendant
21. Defendant The Diocese of Charleston, a Corporation Sole (hereinafter referred to
as “Diocese”), and/or its predecessors, is and was at all times material hereto a corporation
organized under the laws of the State of South Carolina, having its principal place of business in
Charleston, South Carolina.
22. The Diocese is the corporate entity through which the religious and other affairs of
the Roman Catholic Church in South Carolina are conducted.
23. The Diocese, and its agents and employees were, and continue to be, responsible
for the selection and assignment of clergy, the supervision of clergy, the supervision of lay
employee activities, the exercise of authority over the various members of its denomination, and
the maintenance and well-being of its members, spiritual and otherwise.
24. The Bishop of the Diocese of Charleston (hereinafter referred to as “Bishop”) is
sued in his official capacity. The Bishop is ultimately responsible for priests and others employed
by the Diocese. Bishop is the successor in interest to his predecessors in their official position.
CONTROL AND DUTIES APPLICABLE TO DEFENDANTS
25. Diocese and Bishop have the right or power to direct and control the way their
employees and/or agents operate within the Diocese.
26. Diocese and Bishop have the right or power to direct and control the way their
employees and/or agents hire, retain, supervise, and train staff under their employment or agency.
4
27. Diocese and Bishop have non-delegable duties to provide priests with adequate
knowledge and training to be able to prevent abuse, grooming, harassment and sexual abuse of
minor children within the Diocese.
28. Kelly’s inappropriate sexual grooming of Doe began in the early 1990s and
originated from interactions he had with Doe during his service as altar boy.
29. The type of illicit relationship between priest and minor child is well known in the
Catholic Church
30. Before the events underlying this case took place, employees and/or agents of
Diocese and Bishop knew its vulnerable population of minor children altar boys would be subject
to abuse if reasonable policies and procedures were not created and implemented in the hiring,
supervision, training, and employment of priests.
31. Before the events underlying this case took place, employees and/or agents of
Diocese and Bishop knew its vulnerable population of altar boys could be subject to criminal
sexual abuse by pedophile priests within its Diocese employment.
32. Knowing this information and the harm that sexual abuse of a young boy by a
pedophile priest could cause, the Diocese and Bishop continued to allow pedophiles within their
organization to have unfettered access to minor children.
33. The Diocese and Bishop were complicit in facilitating a hunting field for young
boys by pedophile priests which caused horrific damage to countless children, including the
Plaintiff.
34. The Diocese of Charleston recognizes that “[s]sexual misconduct or abuse of a
minor includes sexual molestation or sexual exploitation of a minor and other behavior by which
an adult uses a minor as an object of sexual gratification. Consequently, any act or attempt to
commit any act of incest, rape or a sexual offense in any degree, sodomy or any unnatural or
perverted sexual practice, lewd or indecent acts or proposals, including indecent touching or
5
fondling, exploitation or permitting, encouraging, assisting or aiding a minor to participate in such
acts, constitutes sexual misconduct or abuse of a minor. Sexual misconduct or abuse of a minor
includes conduct or interaction with a minor that is external and an objectively grave violation of
the Sixth Commandment. Such conduct does not need to be an act of intercourse involving force,
physical contact or a discernable, harmful outcome.” Policy Concerning Allegations of Sexual
Misconduct or Abuse of a Minor by Church Personnel (2012).
35. Despite this knowledge, and despite knowing some priests had a propensity and the
means to sexually harass, groom, and abuse parishioners, Diocese and Bishop employed and
continued to employ such priests within the Diocese, including Kelly.
36. The Diocese allowed predatory priests to have unsupervised access to young boys,
which created the opportunity for some priests to groom and sexually abuse young boys.
37. At all times relevant hereto, all employees and/or agents of Diocese and Bishop
(with respect to the facts alleged herein) acted within the scope of their employment and/or agency
while interacting with Plaintiff and/or being aware of interactions between Kelly and Plaintiff.
38. The Catholic Church, the Diocese and the Bishop have a duty to reasonably
investigate, hire, train and supervise Priests, including Kelly, since the Priests have unsupervised
access to minor children.
39. The negligent, grossly negligent, reckless, willful, or wanton acts, omissions, and
liability of Defendants includes that of their agents, principals, employees, and/or servants, both
directly and vicariously, pursuant to principals of non-delegable duty, corporate liability, apparent
authority, agency, ostensible agency, and/or respondeat superior.
VENUE AND JURISDICTION
40. There is no diversity of citizenship of parties, thus this case is appropriate in the
court of Common Pleas.
6
41. There are two defendants in this action with separate residences or locations of
churches.
42. The Plaintiff’s grooming and sexual abuse occurred at St. Andrew’s Catholic
Church in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina.
43. The two defendants have the capacity to being sued in Horry County, South
Carolina and many of the witnesses concerning this case will originate from the Horry County
area.
44. South Carolina Code § 15-7-30 states in part that “(B) In cases not provided for in
Sections 15-7-10, 15-7-20, or 15-78-100, the action must be tried in the county where it properly
may be brought and tried against the defendant according to the provisions of this section. If there
is more than one defendant, the action may be tried in any county where the action properly
may be maintained against one of the defendants pursuant to this section.”
45. There are two defendants in this action; one of the defendants has a church in Myrtle
Beach, South Carolina where inappropriate conduct by Kelly occurred (subject to In Rem
Jurisdiction), and thus this case may be properly maintained against the Defendants in Horry
County, South Carolina.
DAMAGES ALLEGATIONS AS TO DEFENDANTS
46. Diocese claims to be a charitable entity which would subject it to charitable
immunity caps.
47. The Charitable Immunity Act references the South Carolina Tort Claims act as the
predicate statutory authority for the number of caps to be imposed by any person or entity against
a CIA entity.
48. In relevant part, regarding limitations of liability under the South Carolina Tort
Claims Act, S.C. Code Ann. Section 15-78-120, provides as follows:
7
(a) For any action or claim for damages brought under the provisions of this chapter,
the liability shall not exceed the following limits:
(1) Except as provided in Section 15-78-120(a)(3), no person shall recover in

any action or claim brought hereunder a sum exceeding three hundred
thousand dollars because of loss arising from a single occurrence regardless
of the number of agencies or political subdivisions involved.
(2) Except as provided in Section 15-78-120(a)(4), the total sum recovered
hereunder arising out of a single occurrence shall not exceed six hundred
thousand dollars regardless of the number of agencies or political
subdivisions or claims or actions involved.
(3) No person may recover in any action or claim brought hereunder against
any governmental entity and caused by the tort of any licensed physician or
dentist, employed by a governmental entity and acting within the scope of
his profession, a sum exceeding one million two hundred thousand dollars
because of loss arising from a single occurrence regardless of the number
of agencies or political subdivisions involved.
49. Under S.C. Code Ann. Section 15-78-30: “Occurrence” is defined as “an unfolding
sequence of events which proximately flow from a single act of negligence.”
50. Each act of negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, and/or willful and wanton
conduct by any person employed by or an agent of the Diocese is an act or occurrence in regard to
the South Carolina Tort Claims Act.
51. There are multiple breaches of duties owed to Plaintiff in this case and upon
information and belief, each breach (or occurrence) can be stacked to create a number of different
“caps” (depending on what a jury ultimately decides).
52. Plaintiff identified multiple breaches of duties by Defendant Diocese and Bishop
and its agents and/or employees some of which are known and some of which are unknown.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS APPLICABLE TO THIS ACTION
53. Defendant Diocese operates churches throughout South Carolina and holds certain
assets including schools, rectories, churches, and other properties real and personal throughout
South Carolina and possibly elsewhere.
54. One such property is St. Andrew’s Catholic Church (hereinafter “St. Andrews”),
which is located in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina.
8
55. Father Kelly was a priest at St. Andrew’s from 1990 – 1994.
56. In particular, Defendants and current Bishop (including all predecessor Bishops)
owed minor aged altar boys, including Plaintiff, a great degree of care because they were under-
age, a vulnerable person and subject to abuse by pedophile priests if not supervised properly.
57. At all times material to the incidents alleged in this Complaint, Kelly was assigned
as a priest to St. Andrew’s by the Diocese and Bishop and at all times remained under their direct
supervision, employ, and control.
58. Kelly was employed by Diocese and Bishop as a priest, leader, advisor, counselor,
and was in a position of authority over Plaintiff at St. Andrew’s.
59. Diocese, Bishop, and Kelly encouraged Plaintiff and other parishioners to trust and
send children to church unsupervised to volunteer for the congregation in various capacities,
including as altar boys.
60. As altar boys, young boys (usually in the upper elementary school grades) would
serve the congregation by ringing the altar bell, bringing up the gifts of the congregation, bringing
up the Bible, and serving in other capacities.
61. Serving as altar boy required volunteers to arrive early to church to prepare for their
responsibilities for the service.
62. Altar boys presented to the Priest Sacristy of the church to dress for service.
63. This type of interaction between Priest and parishioner created a scenario where a
predatory pedophile Priest could take advantage of a young child and cultivate or groom them for
the priest’s sick sexual proclivities.
GROOMING
64. Grooming is the process by which a potential offender draws a victim into a sexual
relationship and maintains that relationship in secrecy.
65. The shrouding of the relationship is an essential feature of grooming.

9
66. There are multiple stages that occur during the grooming process.
67. The grooming offender works to separate the victim from peers, typically by
engendering in the victim a sense that they are special and giving a kind of love to the victim that
they need.
68. Grooming is facilitated by an imbalance of power in a relationship.
69. In the case of a Priest, it includes altar boys who were minor children and serving
as volunteers for the church.
70. The offender targets a victim by sizing up the victim’s vulnerability among
intersections of inequality including, but not limited to, gender and disability.
71. Different law enforcement officers and academics have proposed models of the
“stages” of grooming.
72. Since there are a variety of these models, it is best to think of the grooming by
offenders as a gradual, calculated process that ensnares victims into a world in which they
ultimately become a participant of the sexual abuse.
73. Kelly has likely groomed other parishioners.
74. His prey was the Catholic Church’s altar boys.
75. Diocese, Bishop, and Kelly are supposed to prevent the type of conduct that was
perpetrated and engaged in by Kelly.
76. Diocese, Bishop, and Kelly had a duty to promote an environment free of sexual
harassment, grooming, and abuse.
PRIEST AND PARISHIONER IMBALANCE OF POWER PROMOTES AND

FACILITATES GROOMING AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF PARISHIONERS
77. Priests wield enormous influence over altar boys’ lives.
10
78. As people across the country came forward to share their stories about sexual
misconduct by predatory priests, the relationship between Priest and parishioner, including minor
children who worked as altar boys, has emerged as one of the ripest for abuse.
79. Priests possess the power to intimidate and abuse altar boys.
80. Altar boys undertake a relationship with their priest where the goal is to learn and
grow their faith and this imbalance of power exposes them to risk when the priest sees the
relationship as an opportunity to promote their own sick sexual proclivities.
81. By virtue of their roles, priests engage in a range of behaviors that exercise power
over altar boys.
82. Diocese, Bishop, and Kelly were cognizant of the power differential between
Priest/Parishioner and altar boys, and they were supposed to refrain from misuse of their power.
83. Whenever possible, priests and the Catholic Church should take steps to eliminate
any unnecessary negative effects of the power differential.
84. A priest/parishioner or altar boys relationship calls for vigilance on the part of the
Diocese and Bishop because such relationship presents an increased potential for inappropriate
and exploitative outcomes, particularly considering the power imbalances that exist.
85. There is no situation where it is appropriate for a priest to sexually exploit, harass,
groom, or abuse a child, including the Plaintiff.
86. Plaintiff, as a devout member of the Roman Catholic Church, attended and actively
participated in activities designed for parishioners at St. Andrew’s, including volunteering as an
altar boy.
87. Plaintiff was a young boy being raised in a Catholic household within walking
distance of the church.
88. Plaintiff attended the earliest services at the church on Sunday mornings and
volunteered at these services.

11
89. He was the only altar boy serving at the early service and was the only person in
the Priest’s Sacristy before church started.
90. As he began to spend more time with Father Kelly, Father Kelly began to take steps
which made Plaintiff uncomfortable.
91. At first, he would make inappropriate contact with the Plaintiff, leaving hands in
his mouth for too long after administering communion.
92. Each instance of inappropriate conduct, including any act of grooming or abuse is
an occurrence for the purposes of caps in this case.
93. Each day that Father Kelly was allowed to remain in a position of a Priest with
access to minor altar boys after it was known or should have been known he was a danger, is an
occurrence.
94. Each time that the Bishop spoke to or interacted with Father Kelly and did not
terminate his position with the church to protect minor children is an occurrence.
95. There are likely tens of occurrences in this case.
96. Plaintiff was a young boy and had no idea that kissing, touching and fondling by a
Priest was not common behavior.
97. He now understands that this was the first step in the process of Kelly grooming
and later sexually exploiting him.
98. At some point during Plaintiff’s service in the church, Kelly’s behavior continued
from inappropriate grooming to explicit sexual misconduct.
99. Plaintiff now recalls multiple instances of oral sex in the Priest’s Sacristy before
church as a young boy.
100. Kelly used his position as a priest to use the time alone with altar boys to groom
them and engage in criminal sexual behavior.
12
101. Plaintiff also recalls stains on the gowns, resembling semen stains, and the smell of
the gowns at one point caused him to vomit during the service.
102. Upon information and belief, this has happened to other altar boys who served at
the church around the same time as the Plaintiff.
103. The Diocese and Bishop had a duty and responsibility to protect Plaintiff from an
abusive and exploitive Priest.
104. Based on the priest/parishioner relationship, as cultivated by Kelly, and encouraged
by the Diocese and the Bishop, Plaintiff admired, trusted, revered, and respected Kelly as a holy
man, authority figure, advisor, role model, and counselor.
105. As a result, Plaintiff and his parents entrusted his personal safety to Kelly.
106. Because Plaintiff was so young at the time of these acts, he did not understand that
these behaviors were inappropriate, especially from someone in a position of power such as Kelly.
107. Because of the trauma involved in these events, Plaintiff repressed these memories
and had no active recollection of them for many years.
108. The accrual of the causes of action for Plaintiff began at the time that the Plaintiff
began to recover his repressed memories of sadistic and abusive acts by Kelly.
109. In January of 2021, Plaintiff had several events occur in his personal life that caused
him to start reflecting on his past.
110. In these recollections, he started to have vivid flashbacks of the abuse by Kelly and
realized that he too had been one of the many victims of a predatory priest in the Catholic church.
111. Plaintiff has no control over how these memories come back to him or when. He
has started seeing a therapist to deal with coping mechanisms, but he becomes physically nauseated
as he remembers these encounters.
13
112. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendants Diocese and Bishop knew, or
should have known, that Kelly had sexual propensities towards minor children in the parish and
was prone to groom and exploit minor boys for his own sexual desires.
113. Furthermore, Defendants Diocese and Bishop knew or should have known that
Kelly was grooming, sexually harassing, and sexually abusing young male parishioners, including
the Plaintiff.
114. Nevertheless, Defendants Diocese and Bishop failed to warn Plaintiff and/or other
parishioners of the danger posed by Kelly, failed to protect Plaintiff on Diocese premises, and
failed in the exercise many of the duties it undertook.
115. Moreover, Diocese, Bishop, and Kelly hid Kelly’s conduct.
116. In fact, concealment of Kelly’s conduct (and sexually abusive priests in general)
has been the hallmark and policy of the Diocese and the Catholic Church.
117. For many years up to and including the present, Defendants Diocese, Bishop, and
the Catholic Church had knowledge that employees, agents, and officials of the Diocese were
sexually preying on minor children.
118. Defendants took part in a cover up of such reprehensible activity.
119. In 1962, the Holy See (the Vatican), which dictates policy and procedure for the
entire church and the Bishops, issued an INSTRUCTION entitled “On the Manner of Proceeding
in Cases of Solicitation.”
120. This INSTRUCTION was intended to reach all patriarchs, archbishops, superiors,
and diocesan ordinaries (bishops). At the top of this INSTRUCTION, it states that the document
is “to be diligently stored in the secret archives of the Curia as strictly confidential. Nor is it to be
published nor added to with any commentaries.”
121. The INSTRUCTION contains explicit instructions as to how bishops and church
leaders are to proceed in cases where victims are enticed to engage in sexual conduct.
14
122. It mentions that church officials could transfer offending priests to different
assignments.
123. Pursuant to the dictates of the INSTRUCTION, at all points in the process of
handling sex abuse cases, the matters are to be kept secret and concealed.
124. If church leaders find, in their own investigation, that the allegations lack
foundation, they are mandated to destroy all the documents.
125. If, however, the allegations are found to have foundation the bishop and church
leaders were required to keep the pertinent documents locked in secret archives.
126. Often, rather than compensating abuse victims and ridding themselves of abusive
priests and/or agents, the Diocese would fund mental health or medical treatment of the abusing
priests and/or agents.
127. Other times, the Diocese would simply pay the abusing priest to take a sabbatical
or to otherwise go on “leave.”
128. The Diocese, pursuant to the mandate from the Holy See, would keep secret, and
conceal the truth of the matter from parishioners, including Plaintiff, the public, and law
enforcement officials.
129. When payments were made to victims of sexual abuse, these payments were also,
pursuant to mandates from the Holy See, kept secret, and concealed from parishioners, including
Plaintiff, the public and law enforcement officials.
130. Under Catholic doctrine, “good” Catholics are required to follow the mandates of
the Holy See such as the dictates of the INSTRUCTION or face a potential afterlife of damnation.
131. Diocese, Bishop and their agents and employees, including Kelly using various
relationships of priest, advisor, counselor, and positions of authority over Plaintiff, (which they
cultivated), reinforced this belief.
15
132. In a 2001 apology, John Paul II called sexual abuse within the Church “a profound
contradiction of the teaching and witness of Jesus Christ.”
133. Pope Benedict XVI apologized, met with victims, and spoke of his “shame” at the
evil of abuse, calling for perpetrators to be brought to justice, and denouncing mishandling by
church authorities.
134. In 2018, referring to a particular case in Chile, Pope Francis accused victims of
fabricating allegations, but by April, was apologizing for his “tragic error” and by August, was
expressing “shame and sorrow” for the tragic history.
135. He convened a four-day summit meeting with the participation of the presidents of
all the episcopal conferences of the world, which was held in Vatican City from February 21-24,
2019, to discuss preventing sexual abuse by Catholic Church clergy.
136. In December 2019, Pope Francis made sweeping changes that allow for greater
transparency.
137. In June 2021, a team of U.N. special rapporteurs for the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights have criticized the Vatican referring to persistent allegations that
the Catholic Church had obstructed and failed to cooperate with domestic judicial proceedings, to
prevent accountability for abusers and compensation for victims.
138. As a result of Defendants’ actions and/or inactions, Kelly was allowed, and did,
prey upon young boys, including Plaintiff, by engaging in prohibited sexual grooming,
exploitation, abuse, and harassment.
139. Plaintiff suffered harm and injury because of Defendants’ actions and/or inactions.
FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Negligence/Recklessness/Willful and Wanton Conduct)
140. Plaintiff reiterates and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 128 as though set forth herein
verbatim and further alleges:
16
141. Defendants are Catholic Church entities or individuals who contributed to the
grooming, harassment, exploitation, and abuse suffered by Plaintiff.
142. This special relationship created duties not to harm Plaintiff.
143. Defendants breached different duties owed to Plaintiff in a negligent, grossly
negligent, reckless, willful, and wanton manner in committing one or more of the following acts
of omission or commission, any or all of which were breaches of the duties owed to Plaintiff:
a. As one unfolding sequence of events which proximately flow from a single

act of negligence, Defendant failed to ensure Plaintiff was not exposed to a
predatory Priest.
b. As an additional unfolding sequence of events which proximately flow from

a separate, single act of negligence, Defendant failed to protect Plaintiff
from Father Kelly.
c. As yet an additional unfolding sequence of events which proximately flow

from a separate, single act of negligence, Defendant's employees failed to
supervise Father Kelly.
d. As yet an additional unfolding sequence of events which proximately flow

from a separate, single act of negligence, Defendants breached a duty in
allowing Kelly unfettered access to young boys;
e. As yet an additional unfolding sequence of events which proximately flow

allowing Defendant Kelly grooming, harassing, exploiting, and abusing
Plaintiff in a sexual manner;
f. As yet an additional unfolding sequence of events which proximately flow

from a separate, single act of negligence, Defendants breached a duty in In
negligently misrepresenting to Plaintiff that Kelly’s behavior was normal;
g. As yet an additional unfolding sequence of events which proximately flow

from a separate, single act of negligence, Defendants breached a duty in In
failing to ensure Plaintiff was safe while in Defendant Kelly’s presence;
h. As yet an additional unfolding sequence of events which proximately flow

Failing to monitor Kelly while on premises of St. Andrews;
i. As yet an additional unfolding sequence of events which proximately flow

failing to properly investigate Kelly’s background through a proper
17
background check to determine his proclivities toward sexual conduct with
minors such as Plaintiff, and to oversee him and his activities with children;
j. As yet an additional unfolding sequence of events which proximately flow

failing to address Kelly’s past conduct either at the time the Defendants first
became involved with him, or after receiving any type of complaint;
k. As yet an additional unfolding sequence of events which proximately flow

ignoring Kelly’s known predilections toward sexually grooming, harassing,
exploiting, and abusing minor boys, when it was known, or the Defendants
should have known of those predilections;
l. As yet an additional unfolding sequence of events which proximately flow

failing to shield Plaintiff from dangerous conditions, situations, and
individuals including predators such as Kelly;
m. As yet an additional unfolding sequence of events which proximately flow

failing to warn Plaintiff about Kelly’s sexual proclivities;
n. As yet an additional unfolding sequence of events which proximately flow

failing to supervise Kelly in a manner to eliminate his chances to sexually
groom, harass, exploit, or abuse young boys, including the Plaintiff;
o. As yet an additional unfolding sequence of events which proximately flow

failing to take steps to report to civil and criminal authorities a priest, agent,
and/or employee, who sexually grooms, harasses, exploits, or abuses a
child;
p. As yet an additional unfolding sequence of events which proximately flow

failure to exercise due care for the safety and well-being of Plaintiff and
others similarly situated; and
q. In such other particulars as will be discovered through discovery undertaken

pursuant to the S.C. Rules of Civil Procedure.
144. As a direct and proximate result of the negligent, grossly negligent, reckless,
willful, and wanton behavior of Defendants (and/or their employees/agents), Plaintiff was injured
18
and suffered damages. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Defendants for actual damages in
an amount to be determined by a jury at the trial of this action.
FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Reckless/Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress)
146. Defendants recklessly inflicted severe emotional distress on Plaintiff by virtue of
their actions with him and it was certain or substantially certain that such distress would result
from Defendants’ conduct.
147. Defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous as to exceed all possible bounds
of decency and is intolerable in a civilized community.
148. Defendants’ actions caused Plaintiff emotional distress.
149. The emotional distress suffered by Plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable person
could be expected to endure it and the distress it causes, includes, but is not limited to, medical
problems, emotional issues, mental anguish, and behaviors that are capable of objective diagnosis.
150. As a direct and proximate result of the intentional and/or reckless infliction of
emotional distress on Plaintiff, he has been injured and suffered damages. Plaintiff is entitled to
judgment against Defendants for actual damages in an amount to be determined by a jury at the
trial of this action.
FOR A THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Breach Of Fiduciary Duty)
152. By and through the relationships described herein, Defendants entered into a
fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff, in part, due to his status as a minor at the time of the events
in this case.
19
153. Defendants undertook the duty to provide a safe environment for Plaintiff at their
churches, during church activities, and during all interactions by agents and/or employees of
Defendants.
154. A relationship of trust and confidence, and therefore a fiduciary relationship, was
formed.
155. By entering a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff, Defendants were obligated to act
only in the best interests of Plaintiff.
156. This duty extended to Defendants’ agents and employees, including Kelly.
157. Plaintiff reposed trust and confidence in Kelly, as his priest, counselor, and
educator.
158. As a result of Kelly’s predatory acts described above and the Diocese and Bishop’s
failure to act properly on Kelly’s conduct both before and after the grooming, harassment,
exploitation, and abuse of Plaintiff, Defendants breached the fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff.
159. As a direct and proximate result of the breach of fiduciary duty by Defendants
towards the Plaintiff, he was injured and suffered damages. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against
Defendants for actual damages in an amount to be determined by a jury at the trial of this action.
FOR A FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Civil Conspiracy)
161. Prior to the grooming, harassment, exploitation, and abuse of Plaintiff, upon
information and belief, employees and/or agents of the Defendants were aware of Kelly’s sexual
proclivities with minor children.
20
162. The failure of Defendants’ agents to report Kelly to the proper authorities, the active
concealment of their knowledge about Kelly’s sexual proclivities with minor children, and their
agreement to do nothing to stop, or at least report, Kelly’s activities constitute a conspiracy.
163. The purpose behind this conspiracy was to protect Defendants and Kelly at
Plaintiff’s expense, proximately resulting in injury to Plaintiff.
164. This conspiracy constitutes a failure to protect minor boys, including Plaintiff, from
Kelly’s sexually inappropriate proclivities.
165. The predicate acts necessary to constitute a conspiracy includes failure to report
inappropriate behavior, active concealment of inappropriate behavior, and concealing the before-
act knowledge of Kelly’s proclivities.
166. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conspiracy towards Plaintiff, he
was injured and suffered damages. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Defendants for actual
and punitive damage in an amount sufficient to deter similar conduct by these Defendants, all to
be determined by a jury at the trial of this action.
FOR A FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Negligent Retention or Supervision)
168. Kelly was hired by Defendants Diocese and/or Bishop’s agents prior to the
grooming, harassment, exploitation, and abuse directed towards Plaintiff.
169. Prior to the grooming behavior of Kelly, Defendants represented to Plaintiff that he
was safe at their premises and in their religious domain.
170. Defendants also represented that if Plaintiff capitulated to the requests of their
religious leaders (including Kelly) regarding trusting the Priest and being left alone with him to
21
prepare for services, that such circumstances and position of the Priest would not be used to exploit
them.
171. The Defendants’ agents knew or should have known about Kelly’s sexual
proclivities to minor children.
172. Despite such knowledge, Defendants’ agents failed to take steps to protect minor
children at St. Andrew’s from Defendant Kelly, though they had represented that parishioners,
including the Plaintiff, were safe from such predatory Priests.
173. Despite having knowledge of Kelly’s sexually inappropriate behavior with
parishioners, Defendants Diocese and Bishop directly, or through agents, continued to retain Kelly
as a priest.
174. Plaintiff became Kelly’s prey.
175. Despite having knowledge of Kelly’s sexually inappropriate behavior with
parishioners, Defendants’ agents did not properly supervise him.
176. Consequently, Kelly was able to perpetrate sexually inappropriate behavior with
parishioners, including Plaintiff.
177. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ negligent retention and supervision
of Kelly, Plaintiff was injured and suffered damages. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against
Defendants for actual damages in an amount to be determined by a jury at the trial of this action.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays for judgment against Defendants for all actual,
consequential, and punitive damages, for the costs and disbursements of this action, and for such
other and further relief as this Honorable Court deems just and proper.
SIGNATURE PAGE TO FOLLOW
22
MCGOWAN, HOOD & FELDER, LLC
s/ Anna S. Magann
S. Randall Hood (S.C. Bar No.: 65360)
1539 Health Care Drive
Rock Hill, South Carolina 29732
(803) 327-7800
(803) 324-1483 Facsimile
rhood@mcgowanhood.com
Anna S. Magann (S.C. Bar No.: 74837)

137 Professional Ln. Suite B
Pawleys Island, South Carolina 29585
(843) 833-8082
(843) 822-8092 Facsimile
amagann@mcgowanhood.com
Pawleys Island, South Carolina

November 3, 2021
23

Diocese of Charleston Lawsuit

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Diocese of Charleston Lawsuit

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

ELECTRONICALLY FILED - 2021 Nov 03 8:59 AM - HORRY - COMMON PLEAS - CASE#2021CP2607327

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ) IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint.

MCGOWAN, HOOD & FELDER, LLC

Anna S. Magann (S.C. Bar No.: 74837)

Pawleys Island, South Carolina

3. Father Kelly started grooming Plaintiff to engage in a sexual relationship when

Plaintiff was a young altar boy at St. Andrews.

his time at the Charleston Diocese.

5. Father Kelly died in 2004.

(hereinafter “Doe” or “John Doe”).

of Horry, South Carolina.

Plaintiff and/or his family.

10. Plaintiff is vulnerable to the harms of disclosure.

13. Identification poses a risk of retaliation of mental or physical harm.

injury that is at issue in this litigation.

15. The public interest in the disclosure of Plaintiff’s identiy is minimal.

to Defendants in a confidential manner.

17. Defendant is not prejudiced by allowing Plaintiff to proceed anonymously, or any

prejudice will be mitigated by the confidential disclosure of the actual identity.

21. Defendant The Diocese of Charleston, a Corporation Sole (hereinafter referred to

Charleston, South Carolina.

the Roman Catholic Church in South Carolina are conducted.

the maintenance and well-being of its members, spiritual and otherwise.

24. The Bishop of the Diocese of Charleston (hereinafter referred to as “Bishop”) is

CONTROL AND DUTIES APPLICABLE TO DEFENDANTS

employees and/or agents operate within the Diocese.

minor children within the Diocese.

supervision, training, and employment of priests.

sexual abuse by pedophile priests within its Diocese employment.

organization to have unfettered access to minor children.

34. The Diocese of Charleston recognizes that “[s]sexual misconduct or abuse of a

physical contact or a discernable, harmful outcome.” Policy Concerning Allegations of Sexual

Misconduct or Abuse of a Minor by Church Personnel (2012).

continued to employ such priests within the Diocese, including Kelly.

access to minor children.

authority, agency, ostensible agency, and/or respondeat superior.

VENUE AND JURISDICTION

court of Common Pleas.

Church in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina.

may be maintained against one of the defendants pursuant to this section.”

County, South Carolina.

DAMAGES ALLEGATIONS AS TO DEFENDANTS

46. Diocese claims to be a charitable entity which would subject it to charitable

Claims Act, S.C. Code Ann. Section 15-78-120, provides as follows:

(1) Except as provided in Section 15-78-120(a)(3), no person shall recover in

sequence of events which proximately flow from a single act of negligence.”

the South Carolina Tort Claims Act.

“caps” (depending on what a jury ultimately decides).

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS APPLICABLE TO THIS ACTION

South Carolina and possibly elsewhere.

which is located in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina.

supervision, employ, and control.

and was in a position of authority over Plaintiff at St. Andrew’s.

including as altar boys.

up the Bible, and serving in other capacities.

responsibilities for the service.

the priest’s sick sexual proclivities.

relationship and maintains that relationship in secrecy.

65. The shrouding of the relationship is an essential feature of grooming.

68. Grooming is facilitated by an imbalance of power in a relationship.

as volunteers for the church.

ultimately become a participant of the sexual abuse.

73. Kelly has likely groomed other parishioners.