The Semantics of Substantial Names AMERINI, Fabrizio

1398-08_RTPM08-02_05_Amerini 06-01-2009 13:19 Pagina 395
THE SEMANTICS OF SUBSTANTIAL NAMES:

THE TRADITION OF THE COMMENTARIES
ON ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS*
Fabrizio AMERINI
Abstract
Aristotle begins the third chapter of book VIII of the Metaphysics by claiming that
sometimes it is not clear whether a name refers to the composite substance or to
the actuality and the form, for instance whether «animal» refers to the soul in a
body or simply to the soul. In solving this problem, Aristotle states that the name
«animal» can refer to both, not, however, in one and the same sense (i.e. in a
univocal way) but rather by expressing two different senses which are nonethe-
less related to each other (viz. in an analogical way). Nevertheless, Aristotle does
not say anything concerning which of these two senses the name «animal» pri-
marily expresses. This text of the Metaphysics gives to the medieval Latin com-
mentators the occasion to deal with the topic of the signification of substantial
names and, more particularly, to assess Averroes’s interpretation of Aristotle’s
semantics. In the paper I attempt to reconstruct some important patterns of
argument elaborated by thirteenth- and fourteenth-century commentators on
the Metaphysics in their endeavor to solve the problem and to explain Averroes’s
interpretation.
1. Introduction
In the history of philosophy there is a certain tendency to employ
labels. The use of labels depends in part upon a wholesome demand
for conceptual and historical precision, didactic schematisation, and
practical division of labour. Some such labels, however, have raised
puzzles and discussions of such a dimension that sometimes it is dif-
ficult to pick out what, if anything, the labels refer to. With regard to
* I wish to express here all my gratitude to Russell L. Friedman for having revised the
English of this study and commented on its content. It is obvious that any eventual mis-
takes or misinterpretations must be imputed only to myself.
Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 75(2), 395-440. doi: 10.2143/RTPM.75.2.2033409

© 2008 by Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales. All rights reserved.
396 F. AMERINI
medieval philosophy, the label «Latin Averroism» provides a textbook

example of such difficulties. Can we legitimately claim that at some
point or other in the history of philosophy there really was a current
called «Latin Averroism»? Or should we speak of «Radical or Hetero-
dox Aristotelianism» rather than of «Latin Averroism» since Aver-
roes’s philosophy is in many respects nothing but an interpretation of
Aristotle’s philosophy? As is clear, the same problem might be posed
for similar labels, such as «Latin Avicennism». Is Latin Avicennism an
independent form of philosophy, different from and somewhat
opposed to Latin Aristotelianism, or does it express only a particular
interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy?
In the final footnote of his article L’averroïsme latin du XIIIe siècle,
published in the proceedings of the Congress Gli studi di filosofia
medievale fra Otto e Novecento, Ruedi Imbach claims his goal in the
paper had been that of sketching out the historiography of Latin Aver-
roism. If an Averroistic current really existed in the Latin West, he
says, this point would have to be established on the basis of an in-
depth and historically well-founded examination of the primary
sources1. With Imbach’s note in mind, someone could legitimately be
in doubt about the possibility of establishing this point. What features
should an historical phenomenon have in order to be characterised as
a Latin Averroistic current? Is it really possible to isolate such a phe-
nomenon? Or, perhaps, should we say that the isolation of such a
phenomenon really depends upon an act of arbitrarily selecting some
historical features while ignoring others?
In this paper, by focusing on the problem of the semantics of sub-
stantial names, I would like to explore the ways in which sometimes
labels such as «Latin Averroism» or «Radical Aristotelianism» could
meet with problems in indicating historical facts in a neutral or accu-
rate manner. This topic, the semantics of substantial names, is not a
«core» view in the modern understanding of Latin Averroism (as are,
for instance, the unicity of the possible intellect or the eternity of the
1. Cf. R. IMBACH, «L’averroïsme latin du XIIIe siècle», in: R. IMBACH — A. MAIERÙ

(eds.), Gli studi di filosofia medievale fra Otto e Novecento. Atti del convegno internazionale,
Roma, 21-23 settembre 1989, Rome 1991, pp. 191-208, esp. p. 208, n. 103.
THE SEMANTICS OF SUBSTANTIAL NAMES 397
world), but it is nevertheless a topic in which correctly interpreting

Averroes and Aristotle played a major role. And this is why it is an
extremely useful illustration of the difficulties involved in the employ-
ment of the expression «Latin Averroism»: it shows just how difficult
it was and is to isolate what «Averroism» is. A clear example of this
difficulty and of the relationship the present topic bears to Latin Aver-
roism is given by Thomas Aquinas. At the very beginning of his career
(for instance, in his De ente et essentia, chapter 2), Aquinas regards
Averroes as a supporter of his explanation of the semantics of sub-
stantial names. According to the early Aquinas, Averroes (like Aquinas
himself ) subscribed to the position that a substantial name such as
«man» primarily signifies the composite substance, because for Aver-
roes (again: like Aquinas himself ) both matter and form belong to the
essence of a sensible substance. But at the end of his career (for
instance, in his Commentary on the Metaphysics, book VII, lec. 9),
Aquinas counts Averroes among the advocates of a more Platonic the-
ory of signification, because of Averroes’s identification of the sub-
stantial form with the essence of the composite substance. Aquinas’s
change of opinion was probably induced by worries about the sepa-
rateness and uniqueness of the possible intellect, since the theological
consequences of such a position on the possible intellect might well
prompt a rethinking of the semantics of substantial names such as
«man» and «humanity». Aquinas’s siding Averroes with Plato, how-
ever, will be disputed by commentators coming after Aquinas, in such
a way that some commentators feel the need of giving an alternative,
and textually more accurate, reading of Averroes.
In what follows, then, I will first (§1) show how different interpre-
tations of Aristotle’s view on the semantics of substantial names could
arise on the basis of Aristotle’s own text. Then (§2) I will examine
Averroes’s own interpretation of Aristotle, showing again that multi-
ple interpretations of Averroes’s view are possible, although I will
suggest what I consider to be a plausible reconciliation of these views.
In addition, in this same section I will examine Thomas Aquinas’
interpretation of the Aristotelian texts on the issue. Next (§3), using
Alexander of Alessandria’s Metaphysics commentary as my guide, I will
show the way the late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century
commentators on the Metaphysics interpreted in divergent ways both
398 F. AMERINI
Aristotle and Averroes on this topic, doing so mostly with some jus-
tification in the original texts. In the final section (§4), I draw out
some philosophical ramifications of the later medieval discussion con-
cerning the nature of essence and the function of signification. In all
of this, what becomes clear is that it is never a trivial matter to deter-
mine «Aristotle’s view» or «Averroes’s view», and hence it is never a
trivial matter determining what «Latin Averroism» or «radical Aris-
totelianism» would look like. We must in all cases go to the primary
sources and be ready to give up our historiographic categories when
they clearly do not fit.
When commenting on the Metaphysics, an interpreter can address
the issue of the semantics of names in many places: for instance, when
tackling the problem of the principle of non-contradiction in book IV2,
or when examining the nature of substance in book VII. Here, I want
to focus on another passage, namely book VIII, chapter 3, where
Aristotle asks the question whether a name signifies the form or the
composite3.
2. The Aristotelian background

Nowadays interpreters agree that Aristotle devoted the central books
of the Metaphysics, i.e. books VII and VIII, to substance. But apart
from this, interpreters disagree on basically all other aspects of these
texts. For example, there is disagreement as to whether Aristotle
reaches some positive results about substance in book VII, or whether
the conception of substance emerging from book VII is indeed the one
endorsed by Aristotle or rather a doctrine put forward by Aristotle
for polemical purposes. Nor is it clear what the relationship is between
book VII and book VIII, which seems a highly fragmentary and
2. See, for instance, S. EBBESEN, «Words and Signification in 13th-century Questions

on Aristotle’s Metaphysics», in: Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin 71 (2000),
pp. 71-114.
3. This problem should be distinguished from another one, which is close to it, namely
that of the ontological status of the object signified by a name. The problem I mean to
discuss here does not concern the metaphysical nature of the object signified (i.e. whether
it is the extra-mental thing, the thing cognised, or the concept) but the inner structure of
such an object with regard to its hylomorphic composition. For an excellent presentation
of the other problem, see G. PINI, «Species, Concept, and Thing: Theories of Significa-
tion in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century», in: Medieval Philosophy and Theol-
ogy 8 (1999), pp. 21-52.
patchy book. Modern interpreters have different opinions about these

issues, and I cannot dwell on these various interpretations here4. If the
true structure of these books is unclear, still more puzzles concern
what Aristotle’s own position on substance is. One of the main puz-
zles is that the Metaphysics account of substance seems to conflict with
the account found in the Categories, so that from Late Antiquity
onward the problem has been posed of how to reconcile them.
The problem arises from the fact that there seem to be different ref-
erents of the expression «primary substance» in the Categories and in
the Metaphysics. In the Categories, chapter 5, Aristotle unequivocally
identifies a primary substance with an individual belonging to some
substantial species and genus, while he identifies a secondary sub-
stance with the species and the genus itself, which are said to be pred-
icated of a primary substance. The rationale behind this hierarchy has
to do with the nature of predication. Every thing belonging to any
other category is predicated of a substantial species and genus, and the
substantial species and genus are in turn predicated of each individ-
ual belonging to them, whereas such individuals are not predicated of
anything else5. But once the categorial substantial individual is equated
with the individual substantial composite that the Metaphysics refers
to, a shift in the referent of the expression «primary substance»
necessarily comes about. In fact Aristotle’s crucial argument in Meta-
physics, book VII, seems to be that no individual substantial compos-
ite can be the proper object of definition, since a definition is formed
of common names, and common names can be applied in principle
to more than one thing. But a primary substance is what is grasped
primarily by a definition. Hence no individual substantial composite
can be called a primary substance6. Furthermore, no substantial com-
posite, whether individual or universal, can be a primary substance,
because it is not the same as its essence, since its nature can be
explained by way of a predication, i.e. by predicating form of matter.
A primary substance, by contrast, must (i) be the same as its essence,
for otherwise its essence qua essence would be prior to it and hence
4. For an introduction to these problems and a discussion of the role played by books
VII and VIII in the Metaphysics, see Metaphysics: Books Zeta and Eta. Translated with a
Commentary by DAVID BOSTOCK, Oxford 1994. For a useful status quaestionis of mod-
ern interpretative debates on Metaphysics, Book VII, see G. GALLUZZO — M. MARIANI,
Aristotle’s Metaphysics Book Z: The Contemporary Debate, Pisa 2006.
5. Cf. Cat., 5, 2a11f.
6. Cf. Met., VII, 15 passim; 11, 1036a26f.
400 F. AMERINI
turn out to be primary, and (ii) be made in such a way as to be inex-

plicable in reference to something else more basic, i.e. by predicating
form of matter, for otherwise the matter would be the true primary
substance. Aristotle’s conclusion, therefore, seems to be that the form
(e¤dov) rather than the matter or the composite is a primary substance.
In spite of the modern interpretative controversies, much textual evi-
dence in Metaphysics, book VII, can be invoked in order to support
the Metaphysics identification between primary substances and forms
taken as lacking matter7.
An interpreter nonetheless might resist attributing to Aristotle this
view by pointing out that it is a kind of «inverse Platonism». If this
were the real position of Aristotle, one would be entitled to conclude
that an individual belonging to the category of substance does not
turn out to be a substance on account of itself but on account of a
form. But this deflationary and derivative explanation of a sensible
substance’s substantiality precisely is the hallmark of any Platonic
account of substantiality.
If one were to continue to defend the identification between pri-
mary substance and form, one could emphasise that this identification
has a different meaning for Plato and Aristotle. While Plato thinks of
forms as external to sensible substances and existing on their own,
just like independent primary substances, Aristotle holds that forms
7. The standard, traditional view argues for the identification between a primary sub-
stance and an individual composite belonging to the category of substance. In recent years,
the identification between primary substance and (individual) form has been put forward
in a strong way especially by M. FREDE — G. PATZIG (eds.), Aristoteles. “Metaphysik Z”.
Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar, 2 vols., München 1988. Such an identification, which
explicitly claims a discontinuity between the Categories and the Metaphysics, has been
attacked by several interpreters. On this debate, see references below, note 9. For textual
evidence supporting the identification between primary substance and substantial form,
one can refer to Met., VII, 7, 1032b1-2 and 14; 10, 1035b14-16; 11, 1037a5. Another
piece of evidence, which is nonetheless particularly controversial, is given in VII, 3,
1029a5-7. Here Aristotle argues that if the form is prior to and has more being than the
matter, for the same reason the form is prior to and has more being than the composite
(toÕ êz âmfo⁄n). According to a variant recorded by the second branch of the tradition,
however, which reads tò êz âmfo⁄n instead of toÕ êz âmfo⁄n, Aristotle’s argument sounds
very different: if the form is prior to and has more being than the matter, for the same
reason the composite too will be prior to and has more being than the matter. The Latin
translations, however, seem to adopt the first reading: see Recensio et Translatio Guillelmi
de Moerbeka, in Aristoteles Latinus, XXV 3.2, ed. G. VUILLEMIN-DIEM, Leiden / New York
/ Köln 1995, p. 134, ll. 73-74; Translatio Anonyma sive «Media», in Aristoteles Latinus,
XXV 2, ed. G. VUILLEMIN-DIEM, Leiden 1976, p. 125, ll. 15-17.
are intrinsic to sensible substances and incapable of existing separately

from those substances. All the same, according to an explanation of
substantiality like that we are imputing to Aristotle, no sensible sub-
stance turns out to be what it is in virtue of itself, but in virtue of
something else it is related to. This amounts to saying that the most
paradigmatic example of sensible substance, that is an individual man,
is not a man in virtue of himself, but in virtue of his soul, which
should be called «man» in a more proper way. An interpreter of Aris-
totle might well therefore insist that this reply sounds Platonic as well
and suggest narrowing down the Metaphysics’s identification between
primary substance and form to specific forms rather than to substan-
tial forms, i.e. to man, the form of the species to which the individ-
ual belongs in the case of an individual man, instead of soul, the form
of this individual man. In this way, Aristotle’s talk of forms should be
understood in a more «logical» fashion and confined to predicative
forms or species. But specific forms usually are thought of as univer-
sal in character and made up of two elements that directly refer to (or,
at least, are related in some way or another to) form and matter. Thus,
adopting this line of interpretation, the Metaphysics account of sub-
stance might seem to be quintessentially the same as the one found
in the Categories, except for two things: first, that in the Metaphysics
Aristotle adopts a more causal and explanatory point of view in inquir-
ing into substance, so that sometimes the emphasis is put by him on
the substantial form rather than on the composite substance, and, sec-
ond, that Aristotle carries out his inquiry in a predicative and abstract
way, hence focusing mostly on the categorial secondary rather than on
the primary substances.
We said above that there is disagreement among scholars on what
Aristotle’s position on substance is8. One reason for this is precisely
that Aristotle’s argument in book VII constantly shifts from substan-
tial forms, such as soul, to specific forms, such as man, and clearly the
two forms ought to be explained differently. For one thing, it is clear
that soul should be understood as a pure form, while one tends to
think of man as something made up of form and matter. For another
8. The literature concerning Aristotle’s different accounts of substance is enormous

and the discussion of it goes beyond the scope of the present study. For an excellent assess-
ment, see G. GALLUZZO — M. MARIANI, Aristotle’s Metaphysics Book Z (see above, note 4).
For other references, see the following note.
402 F. AMERINI
thing, a substantial form can be understood to be a principle of a con-

crete sensible substance, and hence it can be called on to serve some
decidedly metaphysical functions; a specific form, by contrast, can be
understood especially as a property of a concrete sensible substance, and
hence it can be granted some other, distinctly logical, functions. What
I mean is that a substantial form, such as soul, can be treated along
with matter as one of the two parts of a composite substance and,
specifically, as what is chiefly responsible for the composite’s being in
actuality. A specific form, such as man, in contrast, can be treated as
something that is predicable of the whole composite once this latter
is already in actuality, hence as something issuing from the whole
composite. To a certain degree, the two accounts of form can be rec-
onciled, for instance by distinguishing two different points of view or
ways of looking at substance, i.e. metaphysical and logical. To be sure,
someone could say that a specific form such as man is the counter-
part, within a «logical» or predicative account of things, of a substan-
tial form such as soul, which instead plays a role when we account for
things from a more metaphysical perspective. But many problems still
remain, for example whether a one-to-one correspondence can be
established between substantial and specific forms and whether such
a correspondence entails a reduction of specific to substantial forms9.
A clear example of the difficulties connected to the relationship
between substantial and specific forms is given in Metaphysics,
book VIII, chapter 3. After discussing the main results of book VII
(ch. 1) and substance as form (ch. 2), Aristotle begins the third
chapter of book VIII by claiming that we must not ignore that some-
times it is not clear whether a name means the composite substance
or the actuality and the form, for instance whether «animal» means
the soul in a body or simply the soul, for the soul is the substance and
9. For a discussion of the different ways of reconciling such explanations of the nature
of substantial forms, see M.J. LOUX, Primary Ousia: An Essay on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z
and H, Ithaca / London 1991, and M. BURNYEAT, A Map of Metaphysics Zeta, Pittsburgh
2001. For other detailed explanations, contrasting substance as form with substance as
composite, one can see F.A. LEWIS, Substance and Predication in Aristotle, Cambridge 1991;
T. SCALTSAS, Substance and Universals in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Ithaca & London 1994;
and M.V. WEDIN, Aristotle’s Theory of Substance. The Categories and Metaphysics Zeta,
Oxford 2000. For a strong emphasis on the opposition between form as a principle and
form as a property, see C. WITT, Substance and Essence in Aristotle. An Interpretation of
Metaphysics VII-IX, Ithaca / London 1989.
the actuality of a certain body10. In order to answer this question,

Aristotle states that the name «animal» can refer to both, not how-
ever in one and the same sense (i.e. in a univocal way) but expressing
two senses which are nonetheless related to each other (viz. in an ana-
logical way). Aristotle, however, does not say anything concerning
which of them is primarily referred to by the name «animal», confin-
ing himself to noting that these remarks are relevant to something, but
that they do not affect the investigation of sensible substance, because
the essence (tò tí ¥n e¤nai) attaches to the form (t¬ç e÷dei) and the
actuality. In fact, Aristotle says explicitly that soul and to-be-soul are
the same, while man and to-be-man are different, unless soul is called
man11. According to Aristotle’s words, one could conclude that such
a question, i.e. whether «animal» means the soul in a body or simply
the soul, is not important for the investigation of sensible substance
because a name refers always to the essence of a sensible substance
and, since the essence is given by the form (viz. the soul in the case
of an animal), a name refers always to the form.
This text appears to bear witness to an identification between form
and primary substance. In practice it limits itself to repeating what
Aristotle frequently stated in the previous book of the Metaphysics,
i.e. that the soul is the primary substance and the actuality of a body,
and that the essence attaches to the form and the actuality, so that
there is a full identity between form, essence, and primary substance.
A further consequence one could draw from Aristotle’s argument is
that since the form is the essence of a composite substance, it can be
called substance in a primary and proper way, expressing in this way
the core sense of the word «substance». As to the particular case of
animal, this view entails that the soul has to be seen as what prima-
rily is referred to by the name «animal», while a concrete animal
should be called animal only insofar as it has a soul. This consequence,
however, seems to conflict with the common use according to which
it is the concrete animal that primarily deserves the name of «ani-
mal», while its soul should be called animal only in a derivative way,
namely insofar as it is the soul of an animal, i.e. part and principle of
10. Cf. Met., VIII, 3, 1043a29-36.

11. Cf. Met., VIII, 3, 1043a36-b4. For more on this text, see W.D. ROSS (ed.),
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 2 vols., Oxford 1924, vol. II, p. 230 ff.
404 F. AMERINI
a concrete animal. Moreover, if we maintained that «form» (e¤dov)

referred to soul, we would meet with some problems in maintaining
Aristotle’s conviction that the essence (tò tí ¥n e¤nai), which is sub-
stance, is that whose formula is a definition and a definition is of the
form and the universal, while soul is thought as individual in charac-
ter. We could suppose that the soul, to which Aristotle makes refer-
ence in book VIII, chapter 3, is treated as an instance of the univer-
sal «soul» but clearly Aristotle seems to be interested in contrasting
soul to man and not a universal soul to this soul12.
3. Averroes’s and Aquinas’s interpretations

If it is difficult to establish Aristotle’s position on substance, it is a
long-standing puzzle to say what Averroes’s view on the substantiality
of sensible substances is13. Several passages in Averroes’s Long Com-
mentary on the Metaphysics enable us to conclude that, for Averroes,
it is the form qua substantial form that most deserves the name of pri-
mary substance14. But in other places Averroes characterises a primary
substance as an individual composite belonging to the category of
substance, on the one hand, and a form as a species, on the other,
since form is what is expressed by a definition and a definition spells
out the essential components of a specific rather than of a substantial
form. A proof of this is given by the fact that, for Averroes, only
composite objects properly can be defined, while substantial forms as
well as accidents can be defined only in an improper way, i.e. by
12. Cf. Met., VIII, 1, 1042a17, and VII, 4, 1030a6-7, with VII, 11, 1036a28-29.
13. For an introduction to Averroes’s doctrine of substance, see L. BAULOYE, La ques-
tion de l’essence: Averroès et Thomas d’Aquin commentateurs d’Aristote, Métaphysique Z1,
Louvain 1997.
14. Averroes explicitly states this, for instance, when commenting on book VII, ch. 3
(In Met., VII, t.c. 7, apud Iunctas, Venetiis 1572, f. 158A-B). Let me quote the text at
length: «Deinde dicit: Si igitur forma fuerit ante materiam et cetera, idest si igitur forma
fuerit prior in esse quam materia et magis ens, propter hoc quod materia est in potentia
et forma est in actu, erit etiam necessario prior composito ex ambobus. Compositum enim
ex ambobus non est in actu nisi propter formam. Et hoc intendebat cum dixit eadem
ratione, idest quod modus secundum quem forma est prior materia est idem cum eo secun-
dum quem est prior composito. Et intendebat quod cum forma sit prior composito ex
materia et forma, et compositum est substantia, sequitur quod forma sit magis substantia
quam compositum».
addition15. Furthermore, the object of definition has to be universal

and no substantial form is universal in character. According to these
texts, we should therefore conclude that, for Averroes, it is the com-
posite or the form qua specific form that best deserves being called
substance.
In Averroes’s Long Commentary on the Metaphysics there seems to
be no resolution to these conflicting views. Interpreters of Averroes,
however, have at their disposal many ways to reconcile these claims.
One especially good way might be the following. We could begin by
pointing out that Averroes reads Aristotle’s inquiry into substance as
an inquiry framed, in the greatest part of book VII, in definitional
terms16. One reason for this could be that definition is the only
procedure available to us in order to obtain scientific knowledge of
sensible substances and their essences. Second, we could note that a
further step in Averroes’s reading consists in assuming that the defi-
nitional practice primarily has to deal with ordinary sensible objects
(since all people agree in regarding them as unequivocally substances),
even though the task of the definitional formulas is to establish these
objects with regard to their specific characteristics, which depend in a
remote way upon their substantial forms17. Finally, we could try to rec-
oncile the contrasting claims that Averroes makes by distinguishing the
starting-point of an act of definition, i.e. the object that has to be
defined (this is the composite), from its ending-point, i.e. the object
once it has been defined (this is the quiddity or the species under
which the composite falls). Or, alternatively, while stressing the dif-
ference between a metaphysical and a logical point of view in inves-
tigating substance, we could distinguish between a metaphysical and
a logical object of definition. In fact, Averroes can be seen as reading
the Metaphysics through the Categories, so the primary substance of the
Categories is, for him, none other than the individual composite of the
Metaphysics. Every time Aristotle talks of a primary substance, Aver-
roes, in his long Metaphysics commentary, glosses it as «a primary
15. Cf. e.g. In Met., VII, t.c. 35 passim, f. 186E-187K; VIII, t.c. 9, f. 217D-E. For a
discussion of other textual occurrences, see F. AMERINI, «Aristotle, Averroes, and Thomas
Aquinas on the Nature of Essence», in: Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica
Medievale 14 (2003), pp. 79-122.
16. See e.g. In Met., VII, t.c. 2 passim; t.c. 10 passim; and, especially, t.c. 33, f. 182I-L.
17. See In Met., VIII, t.c. 1, ed. cit., f. 210G-H.
406 F. AMERINI
substance, i.e. a particular individual belonging to the category of sub-

stance»18. As a consequence, when Aristotle calls a substantial form,
such as soul, «primary substance», Averroes glosses it as «primary sub-
stance, i.e. primary form or cause of a (primary) substance», putting
emphasis in this way on the metaphysically causal power of the sub-
stantial form and therefore on the explanatory point of view Aristo-
tle adopts in the Metaphysics in dealing with substance19. According
to Averroes, therefore, the inquiry the Metaphysics carries out concerns
the primary causes and principles of what the Categories classified as
a primary substance20.
On the other hand many scholars have drawn attention to the fact
that Averroes insists as often as possible that Aristotle’s focus in the
Metaphysics, books VII and VIII, is on form while holding at the same
time that Aristotle carries out his inquiry in most of these books in a
«logical» manner, i.e. by endorsing some definitions and general char-
acterisations put forward in the logical works: for example, that a sub-
stance is that of which the other things are predicated without being
predicated itself of anything else, or that the substance of a thing is that
which is predicated essentially of that thing by answering the question
What is the thing21? So it makes sense to connect Averroes’s talking
about form to his talking about species to the extent that Aristotle
presents his inquiry as a «logical» treatment, i.e. as a «discourse on
the definition» of substance, consequently the form turns out to be
primarily the quiddity, i.e. what is expressed by a definition22. Thus,
from Averroes’s perspective, we should understand Aristotle’s talking
18. Cf. e.g. In Met., VII, t.c. 7, ed. cit., f. 157L; 4, t.c. 10, ed. cit., f. 160B.
19. See In Met., VII, t.c. 5, ed. cit., f. 156F; t.c. 9, ed. cit., f. 159L; t.c. 39, ed. cit.,
f. 191L.
20. Only once does Averroes call «primary substance» what the Categories classified as
a secondary substance. Cf. In Met., VII, t.c. 41, ed. cit., f. 193E: «Deinde exposuit pri-
mum et dicit: Et dico primum et cetera, idest et intelligo per primam substantiam illud
quod non dicitur <esse> in subiecto, et ista sunt universalia substantiarum, ut dictum est
in Predicamentis». This seems to entail that for Averroes a primary substance is every thing
that cannot be said to be in something else. Therefore both a categorial primary and sec-
ondary substance is a metaphysical primary substance. The reason could be that when a
categorial secondary substance is predicated of a categorial primary substance, there is an
identification between them, because the secondary substance says what a primary sub-
stance essentially is.
21. Cf. In Met., VII, t.c. 7, ed. cit., f. 157K; t.c. 11, ed. cit., f. 161D.
22. Cf. e.g. In Met., VII, t.c. 8, ed. cit., f. 159F-G; t.c. 33, ed. cit., f. 182I-L.
of substantial forms simply as a talk of (specific) forms of a substan-

tial kind. In conclusion, Averroes seems to subscribe to the view that
both soul and man can be called a substantial form albeit in different
respects: the former because it is a metaphysical part or principle of
a substance, the latter because it is a logical species belonging to the
category of substance. Usually, though, Averroes tends to refer Aris-
totle’s talking of forms to man rather than to soul23.
Two points, though, still need clarification. The first point con-
cerns the composition of specific forms. Once again, Averroes gives
contrasting claims about this point, mirroring the contrasting claims
he found in Aristotle’s work. For one thing, Averroes holds that a
species such as man has to be composed of genus and differentia, so
that if we connect in some way or another the genus/differentia dis-
tinction to the matter/form distinction, as Averroes sometimes seems
to do24, we are forced to conclude that a species has to be made up
of form and matter. But, on the other hand, Averroes also holds that
a form has to be apart from matter (indeed, it is opposed to the mat-
ter and the composite), and then we should understand the compo-
sition of the species in a purely formal fashion. This is to say that the
properties a form such as man exhibits depend only upon the man’s
soul and just one form is responsible both for a body’s being animated
and for its being human25. In this way, Averroes seems to regard ani-
mality and rationality as purely formal features of the human species.
Thus, when we define a man as a rational animal, both «rational»
and «animal» make reference to some formal aspects of the species
referred to by «man».
Once again, these claims can be reconciled26. Probably, it is true
that, for Averroes, a definition must include or mention only formal
23. See e.g. the summary at the beginning of book VIII: In Met., VIII, t.c. 1, ed. cit.,
f. 209G-I.
24. Cf. e.g. In Met., VII, t.c. 43 passim. On this aspect of Averroes’s thought, see
M. DI GIOVANNI, «Averroes on the Doctrine of Genus as Matter», in: Documenti e studi
sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 15 (2004), pp. 255-285.
25. Cf. e.g. In Met., VII, t.c. 20, f. 169E-F; t.c. 21, f. 171H-K. This is exactly what
Aquinas polemically attributes to Averroes in a celebrated passage of his Commentary on
the Metaphysics (In XII Libros Metaphysicorum Expositio, VII, lec. 9, ed. R. SPIAZZI, 2 vols.,
Turin / Rome 1964, vol. II, nn. 1467-1468).
26. See e.g. M. DI GIOVANNI, «La definizione delle sostanze sensibili nel Commento
Grande (Tafsir) di Averroè a Metafisica Z 10», in: Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica
medievale 14 (2003), pp. 27-63. Also see references above, n. 15.
408 F. AMERINI
characteristics of the thing defined. Nonetheless, Averroes holds that

a definition has to be made in such a way as to allow us to obtain from
it, by inference, information about the material characteristics of the
thing defined. For example, by knowing that something x is a man,
we know that x is a rational animal, i.e. an animal able to fulfil rational
acts. But when we try to refine our knowledge of what an animal is,
we then get acquainted with the fact that x is something able to see,
to perceive, and to self-move, and the like. From this, when we try to
further refine our concepts of seeing, perceiving, and self-moving, we
can then infer that x necessarily has to be made – with respect to the
available natural materials – in such a way as to be able to support the
above-mentioned biological functions. Thus, from a merely formal
characterisation of the species man it is possible to obtain, by reason-
ing, some definite information about the matter that is naturally
required in order for such characteristics to actually obtain. This fol-
lows from the fact that the soul serves the primary job of being a
body’s form, so it cannot be completely grasped as to its essence with-
out referring to a body able to guarantee its functions of form.
Averroes’s «formalistic» account of the definition of specific forms,
however, does not, as one might suspect, entail a so-to-speak «plas-
tic» view on matter, i.e. the substitutability of materials vis-à-vis their
form. For Averroes, definitions of natural things grasp things in the
way they are when they concretely exist. So a certain kind of matter
has to be entailed necessarily by such definitions and, once this mat-
ter is considered with regard to all the types of matter that are natu-
rally possible, it turns out that this particular matter is naturally nec-
essary to that thing. Thus, for example, while Averroes concedes that
the form of a circle or a sphere can be realised in different kinds of
matter, say iron or bronze, he assumes that the form of a man can be
realised only in flesh and bones. The reason is that the formal prop-
erties defining a man (summed up by animality and rationality) in
turn are defined with reference to a certain kind of natural body able
to support these properties. One could note, of course, that flesh and
bones are characterised formally here, since they are defined with
respect to the functions flesh and bones are called to fulfil, so noth-
ing in principle prevents us from thinking that it is possible to replace
ordinary flesh and bones with some similar kind of natural or artifi-
cial stuff as long as it is able to support the functions performed by
flesh and bones – as biomedical investigations and transplant practice

nowadays could prove. But for Averroes, this case seems to be impos-
sible if it is assessed with respect to the actual natural world, because
no natural form of a living being can be defined without making ref-
erence to a kind of basic material which is naturally appropriate to it.
The second point to clarify in Averroes’s interpretation concerns
the order of substantiality holding between substantial forms and
material composites, i.e. the question whether a form has to be
regarded as more substance than a composite or vice versa. Averroes
plainly holds that the substantial form is what is primarily responsi-
ble for the being of a material composite. Form actually is what «con-
stitutes» (constituit) a thing in being and essence27. On the one hand,
it is clear that, for Averroes, that by means of which something is a
substance can be called substance as well28. But, on the other hand,
it is not clear whether a substantial form can be called «substance»
because it is the form of a substance or, vice versa, a substance must
be called substance because it is caused or derived from a form, which
is substance in its own right.
Averroes’s Commentary on book VIII, chapter 329, seems to bear
witness to the fact that for Averroes it is the substantial form that pri-
marily must be named «substance». It is the form that is substance
in the first instance, while the composite is substance only in a sec-
ondary sense. According to Averroes, the problem of knowing whether
a name signifies the composite or the form concerns exclusively the
question of whether substantial names such as «animal» signify the
soul in the body or the soul alone. As Averroes has it, Aristotle’s answer
is in two steps30. First of all, Aristotle says that the name «animal»
refers to both the composite and the form, but not univocally, but to
one or the other of them primarily and to the other secondarily31.
27. See In Met., VII, t.c. 4, f. 154M; 4, t.c. 7, f. 157M; t.c. 13, f. 163G.
28. See In Met., VII, t.c. 8, f. 159C; 1, t.c. 2, f. 153I.
29. See In Met., VIII, t.c. 7, f. 215G-L.
30. For Aristotle’s argument, see above, pp. 402-403.
31. See In Met., VIII, t.c. 7, f. 215I-K: «Et cum induxit hanc interrogationem, dedit
responsionem et dicit: Et forte animal dicitur de ambobus et cetera, idest et nomen signi-
ficat utrumque, et cum dicitur de utroque, verbi gratia «animal» de composito ex mate-
ria et forma et de forma tantum, non dicitur sicut dicuntur nomina univoca, quorum def-
initio est eadem, sed dicitur principaliter et secundario, scilicet sicut res quae attribuuntur
eidem et quaedam in illo sunt priora quibusdam».
410 F. AMERINI
Second, Aristotle makes it clear that the name «animal» refers to the
form primarily and to the composite secondarily32. The reason
invoked by Averroes is that a substantial name designates a thing inso-
far as it is in actuality; but a thing in actuality is the composite and
the cause of a composite’s actuality is the form; hence, on the ground
of the rule (R) that if a is cause of b as to being P then a is more P
than b, a name refers primarily to the form and, by virtue of the form,
the composite33. As to the name «animal» according to Averroes’s
explanation, one should say that «animal» refers primarily to the form
that is responsible for a thing’s being animated and only secondarily
the concrete animated thing.
Averroes’s explanation can be understood prima facie as holding
that a name such as «animal» signifies primarily a substantial form
(i.e. the soul) and secondarily a composite (i.e. the concrete ensouled
animal). But if we look at Averroes’s explanation from a more «logi-
cal» point of view, it could also be understood as saying that «animal»
signifies primarily a predicative form (i.e. a generic property) and sec-
ondarily a composite (i.e. an individual animal as bearing that prop-
erty). Understood in this second way, Averroes’s explanation does not
introduce a distinction between two different referents of the name
«animal», i.e. the substantial form and the composite, but rather a dis-
tinction between two different ways of signifying one single thing,
i.e. in particular and in general. Evidence for this second understand-
ing may come from the fact that Averroes reads the identification
between soul and to-be-soul as stipulating the identification between
the soul and the thing of which it is the soul34. Thus, if soul and to-
be-soul are the same, and to be for a soul is to be the soul of a body,
it follows that soul and to-be-the-soul-of-a-body are the same. In this
way, a soul is not something different from the property of a body’s
being ensouled. If this is right, then one seems to be entitled to conclude
32. See In Met., VIII, t.c. 7, f. 215K: «Et intendebat quod hoc nomen «animal» dic-
itur principaliter de forma et dicitur de congregato ex materia et forma secundario, scil-
icet quia dicitur de forma».
33. See In Met., VIII, t.c. 7, ed. cit., f. 215K: «Nomen enim non significat rem nisi
secundum quod est in actu et causa actus in composito est forma; et cum duo fuerint quo-
rum alterum est causa reliqui, illud quod est causa dignius habebit nomen: illud enim
nomen est secundi propter primum».
34. Cf. In Met., VIII, t.c. 8, ed. cit., f. 216F: «illud enim quod significat animam et
illud cuius est anima est idem».
that «animal» signifies primarily the thing’s being animated, a prop-

erty which is reflected in the genus of the definition, and secondarily
the thing animated itself, insofar as it signifies the thing only with
reference to the property of being animated.
Textually speaking, it is quite clear that Averroes takes book VIII,
chapter 3, as a text displaying the real thought of Aristotle. The Com-
mentator’s explanation, and especially the rule (R), however, might
appear – as has been said – as a strongly Platonic reading of Aristotle
and this might sound strange, because, as is well known, the hub of
Averroes’s interpretation, which will be wholly inherited by Aquinas
and other medieval commentators, is that Aristotle’s inquiry into sen-
sible substance has to be set within an anti-Platonic context. For exam-
ple, the so-called Identity Thesis of book VII, chapter 6, namely the
thesis that a primary substance is the same as its essence, for instance
that a soul is the same as a soul’s essence – regarded by many mod-
ern interpreters as one of the most important results reached by
Aristotle about substantial forms – is read by Averroes as a thesis for-
mulated against the Platonic view that essences are separated from
substances while being in fact substances in their own right. In the
same vein, as we have seen, this is also his interpretation of the iden-
tification between soul and its being in book VIII, chapter 3. Accord-
ingly, the value of Averroes’s interpretation of book VIII, chapter 3,
should be assessed with reference to the anti-Platonic arrangement of
the Metaphysics’s strategy which he proposes. Assessed in this way, it
sounds curious, as we shall see, that some medieval commentators,
remarkably Thomas Aquinas have implicitly linked Averroes with
Plato.
Turning our attention now to Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on
the Metaphysics35, the first thing to note is that, in spite of his general
agreement with Averroes’s way of interpreting the Aristotelian work,
Aquinas regards Averroes’s interpretation of book VIII, chapter 3, as
unsatisfactory. In particular, Aquinas recognises the existence of a pos-
sible conflict between the anti-Platonic context within which the Aris-
totelian investigation develops and the «Platonic» argument of that
chapter; he therefore provides an explanation of the text that he thinks
35. For an introduction to Aquinas’s Commentary, see J. C. DOIG, Aquinas on Meta-

physics. A Historico-Doctrinal Study of the Commentary on the Metaphysics, The Hague
1972; G. GALLUZZO, «Aquinas’s Interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book Z», in:
Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 74 (2007), pp. 423-481.
412 F. AMERINI
is able to dissolve this apparent clash. According to Aquinas, the first

part of the chapter actually introduces a Platonic rather than an Aris-
totelian argument36. More particularly, Aquinas holds that Aristotle
means to demonstrate that a Platonic explanation of the semantics of
names, according to which a name signifies primarily, if not exclu-
sively, a form, does not work, because there are forms that cannot be
separated from matter or from sensible substances. So the second step
in Aristotle’s argument, as Averroes reconstructs it, is read by Aquinas
as a consequence of the fact that one looks at the first step as if it were
a good premise when it is in fact not37.
As has been said above, when we reconstructed Aristotle’s argument
of the chapter, Aristotle considers knowing whether a substantial name
signifies the composite or the form to be of no particular significance
to the inquiry into sensible substance. On Aquinas’s interpretation, the
reason is that every sensible substance is composed of matter and
form, therefore every substantial name signifies primarily, if not exclu-
sively, the composite. So if there were only pure forms, each name
would signify only a form and every thing would be the same as its
essence. But since there are also composite substances, there must be
names signifying composite substances and hence not every thing can
be the same as its essence, unless we mean to refer only to the forms
of composite substances38. Speaking in this way, Aquinas seems to
assume that the goal of this part of the chapter is nothing more than
36. See Exp. Met., VIII, lec. 3, n. 1704: «Et, quia Plato praecipue principium formale
tetigit, ideo determinat de principio formali secundum ea quae Plato posuit». The same
line of interpretation will be followed by Peter of Auvergne. Cf. PETER OF AUVERGNE,
Questiones in Metaphysicam, VIII, q. 1, ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, f. 205vb: «Omissa
prima parte, queritur de secunda, que incipit ibi: Oportet autem non ignorare… Philoso-
phus etiam ibidem ponit opinionem Platonis de principio formali, scilicet per modum
questionis, et queritur utrum nomen substantie significet formam tantum, ut Plato ponit,
aut substantiam compositam».
37. See Exp. Met., VIII, lec. 3, nn. 1705-1707. A criticism of such an anti-Platonic
interpretation can be found in FERRANDUS OF SPAIN, Exp. Met., VIII, c. 3, ms. cit.,
f. 115ra: «Patet quod principalius <communia nomina> significant formas, congregata
autem secundario. Hec est hic intentio Commentatoris et plane videtur enim (fort. pro
etiam) intentio Philosophi. Sed aliqui fingunt hic quandam expositionem, secundum quam
dicunt Philosophum inquirere de quattuor que non possunt <dici> de formis. Et credo
quod parum scitur apud latinos de positione formarum et (fort. pro secundum) Platonem
nisi quantum ab Aristotele habemus in libris suis. Et si etiam multa de illis non essent in
libris Philosophi, forte non minus valent apud nos, propter quod videtur superfluum tor-
quere literam Philosophi per improbationem Platonis ubi ipse mentionem (incionem ms.)
de hoc non videtur facere».
38. Cf. Exp. Met., VIII, lec. 3, nn. 1708-1711.
to recall the Identity Thesis of book VII, chapter 6: in the case of

pure forms the identity between a thing and its essence holds, while
in the case of composite substances the identity does not hold. The
reason for ruling out identity in the case of composite substances is
the same as that Aquinas introduced in his commentary on book VII:
the essence of a thing is what is expressed by a definition and a name
signifies what the definition explicitly spells out; but a definition mir-
rors the specific nature of a thing; therefore, if a thing is composed
of matter and form, its definition must express both matter and form,
since both matter and form belong to its specific nature; but an indi-
vidual thing includes something external to the specific nature, i.e.
the individual matter; hence an individual thing cannot be the same
as its essence, while a species in fact is so39.
With this interpretation Aquinas probably misunderstands Aristo-
tle’s argument. According to Aristotle, in fact, the reason why know-
ing whether a name signifies the composite or the form is not signif-
icant to the inquiry into sensible substance, is that a name designates
the essence of a thing and the essence always has to do with the form
and the actuality. Unlike Aquinas, Averroes seems to hit on Aristotle’s
point, although his interpretation might be committed to a certain
Platonism. Aquinas has probably been driven to his interpretation by
worries about such Platonism and he could have been misled because
the Latin translations of the Greek text tie the initial question to form
(morfß) and Aristotle’s answer to species (e¤dov), and, as is well known,
a species is more apt to be treated as a universal item, made up of uni-
versal matter and universal form40.
4. Medieval discussions of Averroes’s interpretation

Thus far, we have seen that Aquinas and Averroes provide two differ-
ent interpretations of how Aristotle treats the semantics of substantial
names such as «animal» in Metaphysics, book VIII, chapter 3. Averroes
thinks that «animal» primarily signifies the form and secondarily, by
virtue of the form, the composite. Aquinas, by contrast, considers this
explanation as too close to Plato and suggests that for Aristotle
39. Cf. Exp. Met., VIII, lec. 3, n. 1710.

40. See Recensio Guillelmi, AL XXV 3.2, p. 172, ll. 102-104 and 110-112; Translatio
Anonyma, AL XXV 2, p. 161, ll. 1-4 and 9-11.
414 F. AMERINI
«animal» refers exclusively to the composite41. More generally, Aver-

roes seems to think that a name can be endowed with two significa-
tions, i.e. a primary and a secondary signification. Aquinas, by con-
trast, seems to opt for the view that a name has only one signification,
since every name signifies a thing as if it were something subsisting
(even if it is not) and something of which something else can be pred-
icated. As to ordinary objects, while for Averroes a name such as «ani-
mal» primarily signifies a thing’s property, i.e. the thing’s being ani-
mated, and secondarily the thing itself which underlies such a
property, i.e. the animated thing, for Aquinas it primarily signifies a
thing, although that thing is signified according to a certain set of
properties42.
In what follows I mean to expand a little on this discussion, by
providing an overview of the medieval debates as they can be recon-
structed on the basis of Commentaries on the Metaphysics. I shall do
that with the aid of the Italian Franciscan theologian Alexander of
Alessandria’s Expositio Metaphysicorum. His commentum cum quaes-
tionibus, which can be dated to around the beginning of the four-
teenth century43, is particularly well suited to such a goal insofar as
Alexander lists the most relevant ways of reading the Aristotelian text,
and hence of assessing Averroes’s interpretation, which circulated at the
University of Paris in the second half of thirteenth century.
Neither in literal Commentaries nor in Commentaries per modum
quaestionis do all commentators comment on book VIII, and of those
who do, not all of them ask the question about the signification of
substantial names. In the 1290s William Bonkys and John Duns
Scotus, for instance, do not pose any question, while the first Oxford
and Paris commentators comment on this text more frequently. Among
41. Aquinas does not see as problematic Aristotle’s argument in book VIII, ch. 3 (see
above, n. 7), because, according to him, Aristotle is there considering only the causal order
between the substantial form and the composite substance. See Exp. Met., VII, lec. 2, ed.
cit., vol. II, nn. 1278-1279.
42. I do not dwell here on all the details and implications of Aquinas’s theory of sig-
nification. I consider them in my book, Mental Representation and Semantics. Two Essays
in Medieval Philosophy, part I: Thomas Aquinas on Mental Representation and Signification
of Names, which is forthcoming.
43. On Alexander and his Commentary, see F. KRAUSE, «Filozoficzne poglady Alek-
sandra z Aleksandrii i ich wplyw na Uniwersytet Krakowksi», in: Studia Mediewistyczne
24 (1985), pp. 1-164; F. AMERINI, «Thomas Aquinas, Alexander of Alexandria, and Paul
of Venice on the Nature of Essence», in: Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica
Medievale 15 (2004), pp. 541-589.
others, we can note that the question is discussed by Richard Rufus of

Cornwall, Adam of Bocfeld, Roger Bacon, and Geoffrey of Aspall. All
of them formulate the question as one concerning the order of signi-
fication of a name with regard to Aristotle’s threefold division of sub-
stance – namely, whether a name primarily signifies the form, the mat-
ter, or the composite – and none of them essentially departs from
Averroes’s answer44. Yet, they regard this question as tied together with
another question which is discussed when commenting on book VII,
chapter 3, namely whether substance primarily is said of the form, the
matter, or the composite. The reason behind this connection is that
both the mode and the order of a name’s signification are thought to
mirror the mode and the order of the signified object’s being. Thus, if
substance is to be said primarily of form, form is to be signified
primarily by a substantial name. But at least from Albert the Great
onward, the question is also formulated in a slightly different way,
namely as a question concerning the semantic range of a name’s
signification, i.e. whether a name signifies only the composite or also
the form45. Alexander formulates the question in this second way46.
44. See, for instance, GEOFFREY OF ASPALL, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, VIII, q. 5

(Utrum nomen primo significet formam vel materiam vel aggregatum), ms. Cambridge,
Gonville and Caius College, 509, f. 116va-b, for a useful presentation of the different
positions discussed at his times (Geoffrey’s Questions date to 1260s). See E. MACRAE,
«Geoffrey of Aspall’s Commentaries on Aristotle», in: Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies
6 (1968), pp. 94-134. On Richard Rufus and his context, see E. KARGER, «Richard Rufus
on Naming Substances», in: Medieval Philosophy and Theology 71 (1998), pp. 51-67.
45. See e.g. PETER OF AUVERGNE, Qu. in Met., VIII, q. 1 (Utrum nomen substantie sig-
nificet formam tantum, ut Plato ponit, aut substantiam compositam), ms. cit., f. 205vb-
206rb; ANONYMUS DOMUS PETRI, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, VIII, q. 3 (Utrum nomen
speciei significet formam tantum), ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, f. 44rb-va; AUGUSTI-
NUS TRIUMPHUS OF ANCONA, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, VIII, q. 2 (Utrum nomen speciei
significet solam formam vel totum aggregatum), ms. Innsbruck, Universitätsbibliothek, 192,
f. 131vb-132vb. For other examples, see below, appendix, §§2-4. Peter of Auvergne’s Ques-
tions on the Metaphysics date to the 1280s and Augustinus Triumphus’s to the 1310s,
while the Anonymus Domus Petri’s Questions are of uncertain dating. On Peter of
Auvergne’s Questions, see E. HOCEDEZ, Les Quaestiones in Metaphysicam de Pierre
d’Auvergne, in: Études d’Histoire de la Philosophie 9.3 (1932), pp. 179-234; A. MONAHAN,
Peter of Auvergne’s Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, in: J.R. O’DONNELL (ed.), Nine Medieval
Thinkers. A Collection of Hitherto Unedited Texts, Toronto 1955, pp. 145-81; and, for
further references, G. GALLE, «A Comprehensive Bibliography on Peter of Auvergne», in:
Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale 42 (2000), pp. 65-79, and EAD., «A Comprehensive Bib-
liography on Peter of Auvergne: Supplement», in: Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale 47
(2005), pp. 87-96 (for other bibliographical references, see also www.paleography.
unifr.ch/petrus_de_alvernia, by Lidia Lanza and Marco Toste). On Augustinus Trium-
phus’s Questions, see M. GRABMANN, «Der Metaphysikkommentar des Augustinus Trium-
phus von Ancona (†1328)», in: Scholastik 16 (1941), pp. 11-23.
46. See below, appendix, §1, n. 1.
416 F. AMERINI
Philosophically speaking, this question tends to overlap with

another question, namely whether the object signified is a mental or
an extra-mental item. But in some respects it can be treated quite
independently of that question, insofar as the question about the
signification of names we are considering here aims to establish
whether a substantial name signifies a property or the bearer of the
property, regardless of whether such entities be mental or extra-men-
tal. As we shall see, however, the two questions display a strong inter-
connection. At first sight, our question seems to deal exclusively with
the reference of a name. Speculating upon whether a name signifies
the form or the composite in fact amounts to speculating upon
whether the referent of a name is one item or another in the Aris-
totelian ontology. But we shall see, since form can be understood in
two different ways, two different accounts of signification are at issue,
so that both questions somehow must be considered. On the one
hand, if «form» refers to logical substantial forms (i.e. species and
genera), the primary semantic job of a substantial name seems to be
that of picking out either a set of specific/generic properties or the spe-
cific/generic subject of them (i.e. the universal composite underlying
them), without specifying which of these such a name primarily sig-
nifies. On the other hand, however, if «form» refers to metaphysical
substantial forms (i.e. one of the two parts of the composite), the
exclusive semantic job of a substantial name seems to be that of pick-
ing out a certain kind of external thing.
In order to make clear the difference between these different
accounts of signification, allow me to consider now Alexander’s ques-
tion more closely. Alexander’s question helps us to realise that in the
tradition of the Commentaries on the Metaphysics basically two dif-
ferent interpretative strategies are at odds with one another in explain-
ing the status of substance and the semantics of substantial names.
According to one of them, Aristotle’s wording should be taken liter-
ally, so that the opposition at issue in Metaphysics, book VIII, chap-
ter 3, is composite vs. substantial form of the composite. According
to the other interpretive strategy, Aristotle’s wording should instead be
paraphrased, so that the real opposition at issue is individual compos-
ite vs. universal composite (i.e. species). In other words, the term
«form»could be referred either to what is called, in medieval vocab-
ulary, the «form of the part», if Aristotle’s wording is taken literally,
or to the «form of the whole», if Aristotle’s wording is instead para-

phrased. The form of the part (forma partis) is but the substantial
form, which is just a part of a composite substance: in the case of
man, the soul. The form of the whole, by contrast, is the form char-
acterising a species and flowing out from the entire composite: in the
case of man, the humanity. Furthermore, the form of the part is sup-
posed to exist outside the mind and be individual in character, while
the form of the whole is supposed to exist only in the mind (when it
is considered as an independently existing item) and be universal.
Alexander begins his question by reminding us that a first and per-
haps most common way of understanding Aristotle is that which
could be extracted from Averroes’s Commentary. According to this
way
(T1) a name N signifies primarily a form F and secondarily a composite C47.
I noted above that such a solution, which is usually attributed to

Averroes, seems to be quite popular among the first interpreters of
Aristotle and throughout the tradition it is seen as the standard inter-
pretation48. As the Oxford philosopher Geoffrey of Aspall points out
in his Questions on the Metaphysics (1260s), which constitute a first
summing-up of this debate held at the Universities of Paris and
Oxford, this Averroes-inspired position is counted among those posi-
tions stating that a name signifies two things, i.e. both a form and a
composite, albeit in different ways.
The opposite view, by contrast, defends the idea that
(T2) a name N signifies only a form F.
Traditionally, three standard arguments are invoked in support of

(T2). A first argument connects signification to definition: A defini-
tion recollects the formal properties of the thing defined; but a name
has to be semantically synonymous with its definition; hence a name
signifies only a form. A second argument connecting signification to
cognition descends from Aristotle’s De interpretatione and Boethius’s

48. See e.g. PAUL OF VENICE, Expositio Metaphysicorum, VIII, tr. I, c. 3, ms. Casale
Monferrato, Biblioteca del Seminario I a (3-6), f. 88rb: «Ad questionem, quando quere-
batur utrum nomen speciei significet formam tantum vel compositum tantum vel
utrumque, responsum est quod utrumque significat, non quidem equaliter, sed inequaliter,
418 F. AMERINI
Commentary on that work, and runs as follows: A name signifies only

what is cognised by the intellect; but only the form or quiddity can
be cognised by the intellect, since the matter is unknowable because
it is pure potentiality; hence only the form can be signified by a name.
Finally, a third argument stresses the similarities between concrete and
abstract names: Abstract names signify only the form; but concrete
names are semantically synonymous with the abstract names corre-
sponding to them; hence concrete names too signify only the form49.
Two standard counter-arguments are formulated against both (T2)
and Averroes’s solution, when the latter is taken to argue for the
identification between F and the form of the part. Both of these
counter-arguments are recorded by Alexander. First, a name of a
species signifies the essence of that species and the essence is expressed
secundum prius et posterius, per attributionem ad unum. Quid autem sit illud unum non
manifestavit Philosophus, utrum sit forma vel compositum. Omnes tamen expositores et
omnes hanc materiam tractantes dicunt quod nomen speciei prius significat formam quam
compositum».
49. All these arguments are recorded by GEOFFREY OF ASPALL, Qu. in Met., VIII, q. 5,
ms. cit., f. 116va-b. But other commentators also make reference to some of them. See
e.g. PETER OF AUVERGNE, Qu. in Met., VIII, q. 1, ms. cit., f. 205vb: «nomen speciei sig-
nificat illud quod est apud intellectum de specie, sicut vult Aristoteles libro Periermenias,
unde voces sunt signa intellectuum; sed de specie in intellectu non est nisi ratio et forma»;
ANONYMUS DOMUS PETRI, Qu. in Met., VIII, q. 1, ms. cit., f. 44rb; RADULPHUS BRITO,
Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, VIII, q. 4, arg. 2 and 4, ms. Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale
Centrale, conv. soppr. E.I.252, f. 301rb: «Item, nomen significat illud quod apprehendi-
tur ab intellectu; sed de composito non apprehenditur nisi forma, quia materia est ignota…
Item, nomen speciei significat quidditatem; forma est quidditas, ut dicit Commentator,
qui dicit de solutione questionis sophistarum quod quidditas hominis est idem quodam
modo cum homine et quodam modo non; est enim homo qui est forma et non homo qui
est materia». Also see FERRANDUS OF SPAIN, Expositio Metaphysicorum, VIII, c. 3, ms.
Oxford, Merton College 281, f. 114vb-115rb. In his Commentary Ferrandus also intro-
duces a different kind of argument. Ferrandus records that there are some calumniators
(quidam calumpniantes) who attack Averroes’s position arguing as follows: if Averroes’s
interpretation were right, propositions such as «(a) man runs» or «(a) man eats» would
be true if their subjects would stand for (a) man’s soul, which obviously sounds absurd.
Ferrandus’s reply is that such calumniators confuse the signification and the supposition
of a name. Within a proposition, a name supposits for the composite, but it continues to
signify the formal features of it. Brito’s Questions on the Metaphysics date to the 1290s,
while Ferrandus’s Exposition probably dates to the beginning of the fourteenth century.
On Brito’s Questions, see S. EBBESEN, «Radulphus Brito on the Metaphysics», in:
J. A. AERTSEN — K. EMERY, Jr. — A. SPEER (eds.), Nach der Verurteilung von 1277, Berlin
/ New York 2001, pp. 450-492. On Ferrandus’s Questions, see A. ZIMMERMANN, «Aris-
tote et Averroès dans le commentaire de Ferrandus de Hispania sur la Métaphysique d'Aris-
tote», in: Diotima (Athinai) 8 (1980), pp. 159-163.
by a definition; but both essence and definition include matter and

form; hence a name of a species cannot signify only the form of the
species50. Second, a name of a species signifies something that can be
predicated of individuals; but no substantial form can be predicated
of individuals, since it is a part of them; hence a name of a species
cannot signify a substantial form51.
Clearly, behind each of these two counter-arguments lies a partic-
ular conception of signification. The first counter-argument, in par-
ticular, stresses again the connection between signification and defi-
nition, but holds that a definition has to spell out both the formal and
the material properties of the thing defined (supposed, obviously, that
the thing defined is a material thing). By this argument, the opponents
think that they are able to account for a much greater number of
authoritative statements than the supporters of (T2) are; they can
explain, for example, the well-known claim in Metaphysics, book VI,
chapter 1, that the definition of natural things must include both
matter and form. Moreover, by this argument, the opponents think
to safeguard the parallelism between essence and definition, rejected
in (T2), which therefore collapses into a Platonic position52. If a thing
is composed of matter and form, and one further assumes that the
definition has to include, directly or indirectly, matter and form, then
one has to admit that matter and form are parts of the essence as well,
for otherwise the definition of a material thing would turn out to be
a definition by addition53. Philosophically speaking, though, on the
ground of such arguments it seems to be impossible to choose between
these opposite views, because the entire question, i.e. to know whether
a definition expresses only formal or both formal and material prop-
erties of the thing defined, depends, firstly, upon our mode of
50. See below, appendix, §1, nn. 5-6.

52. This consequence is emphasised, among others, by RADULPHUS BRITO, Qu. in
Met., VIII, q. 4, arg. in contrarium, ms. cit., f. 301rb: «Oppositum arguitur, quia si nomen
significaret tantum formam, tunc forma solum pertineret ad quidditatem et non materia,
et esset forma tota quidditas, ut posuit Plato; quod est falsum».
53. This argument is introduced by Aquinas in his Commentary on the Metaphysics
(see VII, lec. 9, ed. cit., vol. II, n. 1468) and used, among others, by Peter of Auvergne
(Qu. in Met., VII, q. 15, ms. cit., f. 196va). For more details on this argument, see
F. AMERINI, «Il problema dell’identità tra una cosa e la sua essenza. Note sull’esegesi
medievale di Metafisica Zeta 6», in: Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale
13 (2002), pp. 435-505, esp. p. 463, n. 47.
420 F. AMERINI
describing what is material and what is formal in a thing and, sec-

ondly, upon the constraints we are disposed to attach to a linguistic
formula in order to regard it as a genuine definition.
The second counter-argument, moreover, importantly stresses the
connection between signification and predication, revealing in this
way the idea that signification must serve both a referential and a
sense-expressing function, that is, the idea that, by way of significa-
tion, a term not only makes reference to something extra-linguistic,
but also expresses a certain sense, which is associated to it and which
is fully and explicitly expressed by a definition.
After having presented Averroes’s interpretation and some criticism
of it, Alexander states he wants to follow «another way»54. Impor-
tantly for the issue with which I began this paper, i.e. the possibility
of isolating a single «Latin Averroes», Alexander suggests that Aver-
roes’s interpretation must not be seen as bearing one interpretation
only, but rather it can be understood in different ways. Consequently,
he suggests that one could read Aristotle’s text with some crucial dis-
tinctions in mind and then interpret Averroes on the basis of such a
previously established reading of Aristotle. In this way one could try
to reconcile Averroes with Aristotle. Specifically, Alexander lists three
different ways of understanding Aristotle’s argument.
The first way proposes to disambiguate the notion of «form» by
drawing the distinction between form of the whole and form of the part.
This proposal can be traced back to Giles of Rome55. According to
Giles, if «form» stands for the form of the whole, on the grounds that
every thing is signified in the way it is cognised, i.e. in the way it is
present to and in the intellect, it follows that a substantial name such
as «animal» signifies primarily the form and as a consequence (ex con-
sequenti) the bearer of the form. By contrast, if «form» stands for the
form of the part, «animal» signifies primarily the composite, since it
is actually existing, and as a consequence (ex consequenti) the form,
insofar as it is a part of the composite. Giles thinks that Averroes failed
to recognise such a distinction, therefore endorsing only one of these
two explanations, i.e. that holding that «animal» primarily signifies
the form and secondarily the composite (T1). But in spite of the fact

55. See below, appendix, §1, n. 9, and §2.
that Averroes does not explicitly recognise this distinction, Giles fur-
ther assumes that by «form» Averroes meant to refer to the form of
the whole rather than to the form of the part. In this way, Giles prob-
ably wants to avoid attributing to Averroes a Platonic position on the
semantics of substantial names – something Peter of Auvergne instead
will explicitly attribute to the Commentator. Not surprisingly Alexan-
der concludes his presentation of Giles’s position by stating hesitantly
that «perhaps»(forte) this was also Averroes’s opinion.
A second way of understanding Aristotle is that which seems to be
proposed by Radulphus Brito56. According to Brito, we must distin-
guish between that which is signified (illud quod significatur) and that
by virtue of which something is signified (illud quo aliquid signifi-
catur or ratio significandi). Brito’s suggestion relies upon the convic-
tion that the name’s modes of signifying follow upon the intellect’s
modes of cognising and these follow upon the thing’s modes of being.
But in the extra-mental world there is that which exists, i.e. the com-
posite, and that by means of which something exists, i.e. the form.
Likewise, in a name’s signification there is that which is signified, i.e.
the composite, and that by means of which something is signified, i.e.
the form. Brito’s conclusion therefore is that since the composite is
that which exists, only the composite can be cognised and hence sig-
nified. Although we arrive at cognising a thing by means of proper-
ties or operations that depend upon the form of the thing, nonethe-
less the subject of such operations is not the form but the composite
thing. Consequently, once a name has been imposed to signify, the
semantic value of that name is fixed by the operations on which it is
grounded and from which it has been derived; nonetheless the name
does not signify such operations but their subject, which is the com-
posite. This means that once a name has been imposed to signify, it
unchangingly signifies a given object rather than a class of properties,
even though those properties are required in order for the name to sig-
nify that object. In particular, Brito expresses this idea by stating that
a name signifies the composite in the way it is determined by the
form. Such a proposal therefore comes to a conclusion that is distinct
from both (T1) and (T2), namely
(T3) a name N signifies only a composite C (by means of a form F).
56. See below, appendix, §1, n. 10, and §3.1.

422 F. AMERINI
For Brito, composites are the proper object of signification, while

forms are the cause in virtue of which composites are signified.
Accordingly, when Averroes says that a name signifies primarily the
form and secondarily the composite, Brito’s answer consists in stress-
ing that, on the one hand, (i) if by «form» we mean to refer to the
form of the part, Averroes meant to say that the form is that in virtue
of which the composite is signified, not that which is signified; on the
other, (ii) if by «form» we mean to refer to the form of the whole,
Averroes meant to say that the species, which can be treated as a uni-
versal composite, is what is primarily signified57. Once again, after
having presented Brito’s view, Alexander concludes tentatively that
this too could have been Averroes’s opinion.
As to this second proposal, it can be noted incidentally that Alexan-
der does not record a position which had been criticised by Brito and
which tends to invert (T1), namely:
(T4) a name N signifies primarily a composite C and secondarily a form F.
This position is quite close to that elaborated by Peter of

Auvergne58. Peter introduced (T4) in order to differentiate his posi-
tion from Plato’s-Averroes’s, which is (T1). As one can easily notice,
(T4) is different from (T3) insofar as (T3) means to deny, first, that
a name can signify two different things which are related to each other
according to an order of priority, and, second, that a name can sig-
nify, by inference, something which is part of the thing primarily sig-
nified by the name. The reason why Alexander might have failed to
record (T4) is perhaps that such a position appears to be reducible in
some way to one of the two options considered by Giles of Rome,
insofar as a form of the whole can be regarded as a universal compos-
ite.
If this was Alexander’s reason for not discussing (T4), then it may
be that Alexander failed to recognise a crucial difference between (T4)
and Giles of Rome’s position. Consider, for example, the case of
«man». According to Giles’s distinction between «form of the whole»
and «form of the part», (T1) and (T4) should be reformulated as fol-
lows:
57. See below, appendix, §3.3.

58. See below, appendix, §§4.1-2.
(T1*) a name N signifies primarily the form of the whole F and secondarily
the supposit C of the form of the whole F (where the supposit has to be seen
as something composite).
(T4*) a name N signifies primarily the composite C and secondarily the form
of the part F, which is part of the composite C.
On the basis of such reformulations of (T1) and (T4), Giles would

think that «man» can signify primarily the humanity and secondar-
ily the supposit of humanity if we endorse (T1*), or primarily a con-
crete man and secondarily the man’s soul if we opt for (T4*). If we
confine our attention to (T1*), we see that Giles seems to treat the
semantics of substantial names in the same way as the semantics of
accidental names. An accidental name, either concrete or abstract, sig-
nifies only a form; for the same reason a substantial name, either con-
crete or abstract, signifies only a form, although Giles concedes that
in both cases the bearer of the form may be co-signified by the con-
crete name. Peter of Auvergne’s proposal, in contrast, takes the diamet-
rically opposite point of view, since it holds that a substantial name
signifies primarily the bearer of the form and secondarily the form
itself. For Giles, «man» means the humanity with regard to a concrete
but unspecified or indeterminate bearer; for this reason, «man» co-
signifies the bearer of humanity as well. For Peter, in contrast, «man»
means the bearer of humanity, co-signifying the humanity itself. As
we have seen, Brito marks off his position from both Giles’s and Peter’s
because he thinks that a name such as «man» signifies exclusively the
bearer of humanity.
The third and final way listed by Alexander introduces a different
distinction, namely that between what a name has been imposed to
signify (cui imponitur nomen), i.e. the composite, and that from which
a name has been imposed to signify what it signifies (quo imponitur),
i.e. the form. Alexander believes that this technique of interpretation
– which had been used, among others, by Albert the Great, Geoffrey
of Aspall, and Thomas Aquinas – is entailed by the previous one. Both
these last two ways, in fact, prima facie ignore the distinction between
form of the part and form of the whole, so it remains unclear if by
the expressions «that by means of which something is signified» and
«that from which a name has been imposed to signify what it signi-
fies» the supporters of this position mean to refer to the form of the
424 F. AMERINI
part or to the form of the whole. In any case, Alexander seems to be

right in underlining the similarities between the two last ways. Tech-
nically speaking, in fact, this third way makes use of the same tools
as the second one, insofar as it attempts to solve the question by dis-
tinguishing object and ratio of signification rather than by singling
out two possible objects of signification.
After having introduced these different solutions, Alexander does
not say which he prefers. At the end of the day, Alexander seems to
be interested only in presenting different ways of understanding Aris-
totle’s text and hence Averroes’s interpretation. But in some way
Alexander seems to consider these solutions as equally good for solv-
ing the question raised by Aristotle of the order of signification of
substantial names.
5. Final remarks: Different views on essence and the semantics of names

Thus far, I have looked into the problem of the object of names’
signification from the point of view of the different ways of
understanding Averroes’s interpretation of a crucial passage in
Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Specifically, I have briefly sketched out a
reconstruction of the debate held in the second half of the thir-
teenth century according to Alexander of Alessandria’s report in
his Expositio Metaphysicorum. Generally, Alexander’s first ques-
tion on book VIII, chapter 3, shows that, when reconstructing
Averroes’s position on form and substance, the interpretation of
the Commentator can be assessed differently according to
whether an interpreter is more willing to refer terms such as
«form» and «substantial form», frequently employed by Averroes
in his Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, to the form of the
part or to the form of the whole. Averroes’s interpretation changes
drastically if we understand «form» in the one or the other of
these two ways, i.e. as the substantial form (i.e. soul in the case
of man) or the specific form (i.e. humanity in the case of man),
respectively, since the form of the part can be regarded as
absolutely free of matter, while the form of the whole as includ-
ing or at least entailing a certain kind of matter. Although, like
Aristotle, Averroes unequivocally speaks in his Commentary on
book VIII, chapter 3, of soul and man (and not of humanity and
man)59, nonetheless we have pointed out that in many other places

Averroes has the term «substantial form» refer to the species belong-
ing to the category of substance. So, it always turns out to be possi-
ble for an interpreter to provide a reading of Averroes’s interpretation
that aptly brings it into line with Aristotle’s text as previously inter-
preted. Here, interpreting Averroes and interpreting Aristotle amount
to the same job. The reason is that, when reading the Latin transla-
tion of Averroes’s Commentary, an interpreter will need to disam-
biguate words in the same way he will need to do reading the Latin
translation of Aristotle’s text, especially because crucial terms such as
«form» and «species» sound ambiguous or polysemic in both works60.
From this perspective, the standard strategy – put forward, for exam-
ple, by Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome – consists in reformulat-
ing the form/composite distinction into the universal composite/par-
ticular composite distinction. Building on this reformulation, some
other interpreters such as Brito or, later, Paul of Venice insert the dis-
tinction between object and ratio of signification.
From a purely philosophical point of view, such different interpre-
tations reveal that it is possible to give at least four different accounts
of the signification of substantial names. Basically, such accounts turn
upon two main intuitions, singled out by (T1) and (T4), on the one
hand, and (T2) and (T3), on the other. According to the first of these
intuitions, a name can signify more than one thing, even though in
different ways, i.e. primarily and secondarily. According to the second
intuition, a name can signify only one thing, whether that thing is a
form or a composite. Furthermore, (T1) and (T4) invert the primary
object of signification, opting in this way for a more so-to-speak
59. This is the textual reason invoked, for instance, by Paul of Venice for rejecting
Alexander’s solution. See PAUL OF VENICE, Expositio Metaphysicorum, VIII, tr. I, c. 3,
f. 88va: «Tertia opinio est Alexandri distinguens inter formam partis et formam totius…
Hec opinio est dubia. Primo in hoc quod distinguendo de forma partis et forma totius
respondet ad questionem, quia ut ex littera apparet Philosophus non loquitur de forma
totius sed de forma partis; exemplificat enim de tegumento et anima».
60. On the different meanings of the word e¤dov in Aristotle, see J. DRISCOLL, «Eide
in Aristotle’s Earlier and Later Theories of Substance», in: D.J. O’MEARA (ed.), Studies in
Aristotle, Washington 1981, pp. 129-159, and A. MOTTE — Chr. RUTTEN — P. SOMVILLE
(eds.), Philosophie de la Forme. Eidos, idea, morphè dans la philosophie grecque des origines
à Aristote, Louvain-la-Neuve 2003; and, for the medieval tradition, P. MICHAUD-QUAN-
TIN, «Les champs sémantiques de species. Tradition latine et traductions du grec», in: ID.,
Études sur le vocabulaire philosophique du Moyen Âge, Rome 1970, pp. 113-150.
426 F. AMERINI
intensional or extensional account of signification, respectively. At the

same time, it is clear that by «form» the supporters of (T1) seem to
mean the form of the whole, while the supporters of (T4) the form
of the part, so (T1) and (T4) should in fact be understood as (T1*)
and (T4*), respectively. In this respect, (T1-T1*) assigns to significa-
tion especially a sense-expressing function, while (T4-T4*) treats sig-
nification in a more referential fashion. In a similar way, (T2) and
(T3) endorse different views on what a name signifies, since (T2)
states that substantial names signify a form, while (T3) that they sig-
nify a composite. Nevertheless (T2) could be reconciled with (T3) if
form were understood as form of the whole and this were not under-
stood in a purely formal manner, namely as including only the for-
mal properties (i.e. the properties depending upon the form) of the
thing to which it refers. For example, according to (T2), «man» sig-
nifies humanity, while according to (T3) it signifies a man. But if
humanity were understood as including both the formal and the mate-
rial features of man, then «man» could be said to signify a form which
is nonetheless something composite.
More particularly, it is clear that the answers that can be given to
the question of the object of signification of names depend upon two
things. (i) First, it depends upon how an Aristotelian interpreter
answers the prior question of the composition of the essence, since a
name usually is regarded as a shorthand for a definition and a (real)
definition, as was generally conceded, is regarded as a formula captur-
ing the essence of the thing defined. (ii) Second, it depends upon
what job an Aristotelian interpreter is disposed to assign to significa-
tion. Not all commentators agree that the function of naming is that
of summing up, in an implicit way, the essential features of the thing
named. In other words, not all commentators hold that the main goal
of signification is to express the sense associated with the signifying
term. Some commentators, like Brito, for instance, emphasise that a
name has to serve exclusively the function of referring to a compos-
ite object. Nonetheless even a philosopher like Brito recognises that a
primitive and primary sense, expressed by a certain set of formal prop-
erties, is required in order to impose a name to signify and to fix its
reference, although the sense is not what is signified by the name.
On the other hand, for the medieval commentators the question we
have considered in the present study appears to be closely related to
the question concerning the mental or extra-mental status of the sig-

nified object. At the very beginning of the previous section, I stated
that these questions could be treated quite independently of each other,
insofar as the question about the signification of names we have con-
sidered here aims to establish whether a substantial name signifies a
property or the bearer of the property, regardless of whether such enti-
ties be mental or extra-mental. As we have seen, however, for many
commentators what is signified by a substantial name should meet two
characteristics, namely to be predicable and to be knowable. Leaving
aside the question of what exactly «knowable» means, only what can
be considered by the process of abstraction can be regarded as predica-
ble and knowable. From this it follows that whether a name signifies the
form or the composite, the mind, by means of an act of abstraction,
plays a crucial role in fixing the object signified by natural-kind terms.
If this is right, namely if the object of signification (for instance, man)
finally is nothing but something universal and linguistically predicable,
then in the final analysis the real task for the commentators is to estab-
lish whether, on account of the mind’s process of abstraction, such a
predicable item brings to mind exclusively formal or both formal and
material properties (taking it for granted that it is possible to allow for
such a distinction of properties) of the things which the name has been
imposed to signify and of which the name actually can be predicated.
A basic ambiguity, however, tends to complicate this choice. Many
medieval commentators regard the form of the whole as well as the
bearer of that form as a composite of matter and form. The most
influential example of this ambiguity is given by Aquinas, who man-
ages to both include and exclude matter from the essence of a sensi-
ble substance by way of a twofold description of matter. It is a com-
monplace in Aquinas’s thought that the (common) matter is internal
to the essence, while the (designated) matter is external61; on the basis
of this, Aquinas often characterises a (specific) form as a composite of
61. Aquinas’s expressions «common matter» and «designated matter» probably indi-
cate degrees of abstraction of one and the same matter rather than two metaphysically dif-
ferent types of matter. In the case of a man, for example, common matter indicates the
kind of matter which characterises the human being, namely flesh and bones. By contrast,
designated matter indicates flesh and bones with respect to an individual man, namely this
flesh and these bones. As is known, though, there is a long-standing debate about such
notions, on which I cannot dwell here. For more on this debate, see J.F. WIPPEL, The
Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas. From Finite Being to Uncreated Being, Washing-
ton, D.C. 2000, ch. IX.
428 F. AMERINI
form and (common) matter. The fact that a specific form or a form
of the whole can be accounted for as a composite of matter and form
entails that there is no significant difference between the metaphysi-
cal composition of a form of the whole and that of the bearer of that
form, for both a form of the whole (for example, humanity) and its
bearer (i.e. man or what has humanity) make reference to things
which are the same with respect to their essential features. As a con-
sequence, according to Aquinas both concrete and abstract substan-
tial names signify the same thing, although they signify it in different
ways, i.e. including or excluding, respectively, some features (espe-
cially accidental features) of the signified thing. Aquinas stresses this
point several times in his writings when discussing the case of «man»
and «humanity»62. All the same, it remains debatable whether, in the
case of concrete names such as «man», Aquinas upholds that names
are called to signify primarily the supposit or primarily the form, for
instance whether «man» signifies primarily what has humanity (habens
humanitatem)63, as Brito and perhaps Peter of Auvergne endorse, or
whether it signifies primarily the humanity itself (humanitas) albeit as
concretised in a supposit (per modum suppositi)64, as Giles of Rome
seems to hold. In the second case, there can be no significant differ-
ence between the way that substantial and the way that accidental
names function. In the first case, by contrast, dissimilarity can be
introduced.
Clearly, this ambiguity remotely stems from Aristotle’s Categories,
chapter 5, where a name of a secondary substance is said to signify a
substantial quality, i.e. what kind of thing a primary substance is65.
Aquinas seems to commit himself strictly to this claim, hence
endorsing a so-to-speak essentialist interpretation of Aristotle’s doc-
trine of substance. This is to say that, when Thomas Aquinas says that
both concrete and abstract substantial names signify the same thing,
62. See e.g. Sent., III, d. 5, q. 1, a. 3; De ente et essentia, ch. 1; Quodlibet IX, q. 2,
a. 1, ad 1; Summa Contra Gentiles, IV, ch. 81; Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 3; Exp. Met.,
VII, lec. 5, nn. 1378-1379; Compendium Theologiae, I, ch. 154.
63. As, for instance, Aquinas says in Summa Theologiae, III, q. 17, a. 1, or in De Unione
Verbi, a. 3, ad 5.
64. As, for instance, Aquinas says in Summa Theologiae, I, q. 30, a. 4, or III, q. 4,
a. 3, ad 2. On the signification of form per modum suppositi, see Quaestiones de potentia,
q. 8, a. 2, ad 7.
65. Cf. Cat., 5, 3b10-21.
only in different ways, he looks at a sensible substance such as man

as a thing primitively characterised by essential properties, which are
determined by its belonging to a certain species and genus. On such
an interpretation of Aristotle’s doctrine, a substantial name primarily
has been imposed to refer to a thing, but at the same time and by way
of the same act of referring, it also refers to the essential properties of
that thing. From this perspective, we might state that, for Aquinas,
«man» signifies primarily both the bearer and the form, although con-
textually it signifies only one of them. The reason to speak in this
way is that, for him, first, «man» signifies according to a nominal
and substantive mode of signifying, and, second, the bearer and the
form amount to one and the same thing, since they can exist as def-
inite objects of signification only by virtue of an act of abstraction, i.e.
only according to what Aquinas sometimes calls a «logical»
consideration66.
6. Conclusion
Many interpreters present Averroes’s view on essence as a paradig-
matic case of «formalistic» interpretation of the Aristotle’s doctrine
of essence. On this interpretation, Averroes holds that the essence
of a thing is exhausted by the form and no difference must be
drawn between essence and quiddity. This interpretation clearly
seems to be confirmed by those passages in which Averroes holds
(i) that form is quiddity, (ii) that quiddity is what is signified by a
definition, and (iii) that definition expresses the essence of the thing
defined. But as has been said, it is not always so easy to decide
whether Averroes is talking about logical or metaphysical substan-
tial forms, about the form of the part or the form of the whole.
Thus, some interpreters, such as Radulphus Brito and the early
Thomas Aquinas, tend to resist attributing to Averroes this kind of
«Platonic» view on essence, consequently classifying the Commen-
tator among those philosophers subscribing to the view that essence
66. See e.g. Exp. Met., VII, lec. 11, n. 1536. Here I do not dwell further on these com-
plicate issues. I reconsider the entire question of Aquinas’s semantics of names in AMERINI,
Mental Representation and Semantics. Two Essays in Medieval Philosophy, part I: Thomas
Aquinas on Mental Representation and Signification of Names, forthcoming.
430 F. AMERINI
is made up of matter and form67. Other interpreters, by contrast,

such as the late Thomas Aquinas (against whom both Radulphus Brito
and Ferrandus of Spain polemicize) and Peter of Auvergne, probably
for polemical reasons connected to the Parisian debates revolving
around the separateness and uniqueness of the possible intellect (since
the soul tends to be seen as exhausting the whole essence of man and
intellective soul as expressing the core sense of soul), classify Averroes
among those thinkers who fully identify the essence with the form,
placing in this way Averroes side-by-side with Plato68. The interpreters
of the first group aim to reach their goal by clarifying those points of
Latin Averroes’s Long Commentary on the Metaphysics which seem to
be particularly in agreement with Plato’s doctrine. For example, when
Aristotle and Averroes make an identification between soul and to-be-
soul, they read this claim as saying either that the universal soul is the
same as its essence, or that the soul is the same as the essence of a body
in that it is not separated, qua essence, from the body69. Likewise,
when Aristotle and Averroes contrast soul with man, they read this
opposition as concerning the species vs. the individual70. Finally, when
Aristotle and Averroes identify the essence of man with his substan-
tial form, they read this claim as saying either that the essence of man
is the same as the species or that man’s substantial form only expresses
what is primarily responsible for the essence of man. The interpreters
of the second group, by contrast, take Aristotle and Averroes literally.
Accordingly, they hold that, for Averroes, a sensible substance’s essence
is nothing but its substantial form, a highly Platonic position.
67. Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, De ente et essentia, ch. 2, in SANCTI THOMAE DE AQUINO
Opera Omnia, t. XLIII, Cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum, Rome 1976, p. 370,
ll. 10-17, and p. 371, ll. 85-89; RADULPHUS BRITO, Qu. in Met., VII, q. 22 (Utrum mate-
ria pertineat ad quidditatem), ms. cit., f. 298va: «Aliqui volunt quod quidditas in substan-
tiis compositis esset solum forma, ut anima quidditas hominis. Et ista opinio attribuitur
Averroy. Sed non credo quod Commentatoris fuerit ista intentio. Et attribuitur sibi ab
Expositore propter illud dictum suum de questione sophistarum. Et ideo credo quod ista
magis fuit opinio Platonis, qui posuit quidditates rerum separatas. Quia materia non est
separata a morpheis et passionibus, primo De generatione, Philosophus vult quod utrumque
pertineat, et materia et forma, quia substantie sensibiles diffiniuntur, et non per <aliquod>
extraneum, quod non sit de genere suo».
68. Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, Exp. Met., VII, lec. 9, n. 1497. For Peter of Auvergne, see
below, appendix, §3.3.
69. See e.g. THOMAS AQUINAS, Exp. Met., VII, lec. 10, nn. 1492-1493.
70. See below, appendix, §3.1.
Finally, there are some other commentators, such as Alexander of

Alessandria, who opt for recording the changes in the meaning of
«quiddity» or «form» both in Aristotle and Averroes71, further assum-
ing, albeit wrongly, that Averroes had sometimes drawn a distinction
between essence and quiddity72. Nonetheless Alexander resists attribut-
ing to Averroes a Platonic view. Although he assumes that for Aver-
roes the primary meaning of quiddity or essence is form, nonetheless
matter can be entailed by essence, since for Averroes form cannot be
completely separated from a certain kind of matter. For Averroes, there
is a basic difference between the form of a natural substance and the
form of an artefact: the former is such a functionally sophisticated
item that it can be instantiated only in one natural matter, while the
latter can be instantiated in several materials. Thus, according to
71. Cf. e.g. ALEXANDER OF ALESSANDRIA, Expositio Metaphysicorum, VIII, 3, ed.

Venetiis 1572, f. 250ra-b: «Quereret aliquis utrum sit verum quod videtur dicere Philoso-
phus, videlicet quod quidditas et forma sunt idem. Respondeo. Dicendum est quod si
esset aliqua forma per se subsistens, ibi nullum dubium esset quod quidditas rei esset ipsa
forma. Ex quo enim talis res est pura forma, tota entitas sua est forma, et per consequens
sua quidditas non est nisi sua formalitas. In compositis autem ex materia et forma, magis
videtur habere dubium, quia si materia et forma sunt de quidditate rei, tota quidditas non
videtur esse sola forma. Dico ergo quod in talibus Philosophus aliquando accipit quidditatem
pro tota essentia rei. Et sic accipiendo, forma non est quidditas, sed pars quidditatis, quia ex
quo essentia est composita ex materia et forma, oportet quod materia sit pars essentie et
quidditatis. Aliquando accipit quidditatem pro eo a quo ipsum compositum et ipsa materia
est specialiter quid, et sic accipiendo, manifestum est quod forma est quidditas. Licet enim ad
essentiam rei composite concurrat materia et forma, tamen materia de se non est quid, sed
illud quod habet quidditatem specificam, et hoc est per formam. Et similiter quod ipsum
compositum sit quid specificum, hoc est per formam specificam» (my italics).
72. Cf. e.g. ALEXANDER OF ALESSANDRIA, Exp. Met., VIII, 6, ed. cit., f. 258vb-259ra:
«Quereret aliquis utrum substantie separate statim sint illud quod sunt. Videtur quod
non, quia secundum fidem producte sunt de non-esse ad esse; secundum autem esse tale,
primo potuerunt esse et postea fuerunt. Oppositum vult philosophia. Respondeo. Duplici
via possumus declarare propositum. Prima via est ex differentia que est inter compositum
ex materia et forma, et ipsam formam per se subsistentem… Secunda via ad hoc ostenden-
dum potest sumi ex verbis Commentatoris, qui dicit in isto passu quod in separatis a materia
idem est essentia et quidditas. Imaginatur enim Commentator quod quidditas est forma rei.
Utrum autem hoc sit verum, disputatum est superius. In compositis ergo ex materia, secundum
ipsum, differt essentia et quidditas, quia essentia dicit materiam et formam, quidditas dicit
tantum ipsam formam. In separatis autem a materia idem est essentia et quidditas, quia
separata a materia sunt forme non recepte, et ideo quidquid est ibi, totum est quidditas.
Et si totum est quidditas, essentia est tantum quantum quidditas, quia tota essentia est
quidditas et e converso… Huiusmodi autem ratio Commentatoris fundatur super duo fun-
damenta. Primum est quod essentia et quidditas differunt in aliquibus. Secundum est quod
quidditas et cuius est quidditas non differunt in separatis a materia. Que fundamenta non
sunt vera secundum multos. Quomodo autem hoc sit et quomodo non, dictum est in
septimo. Hec autem dicta sunt ad explanationem Philosophi et Commentatoris» (my
432 F. AMERINI
Alexander, if names mirror things’ essences, substantial names signify

things which are composed of matter and form.
To conclude, each of these interpretations seems to fit with some
statements found in Averroes’s Long Commentary on the Metaphysics.
Indeed, Averroes himself seems not to have been particularly interested
in disambiguating the Aristotelian notion of «form» by making it
refer either to the metaphysical or to the logical substantial form,
hence absorbing rather than solving the Aristotelian swings. Averroes
was most interested in simply clarifying the role a metaphysical substan-
tial form plays in explaining the properties possessed by a logical sub-
stantial form or species: as Averroes reminds us in the initial summary
of book VIII, «every thing that has been scrutinized [in book VII]
about the species of substance has been determined on account of
that substance which is said to be the form»73. Given this situation,
it may be very difficult to determine the actual position of the Latin
Averroes on the nature of essence and the semantics of substantial
names.
7. Note to the appendix

In §1 of the following appendix I provide a first transcription of
Alexander of Alessandria’s Expositio Metaphysicorum, book VIII, chap-
ter 3, q. 1. The transcription is based on the ms. Padova, Biblioteca
Antoniana, 386 Scaff. XVIII, f. 133vb-134ra, corrected with the mss.
Cordoba, Biblioteca del Cabildo, 57, and Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiel-
lonska, 650. Corrections are indicated in the footnotes. For the
description of the mss. and the evaluation of their relationship I refer
to the edition of Alexander’s Commentary on the Metaphysics,
book VII, which is forthcoming. Alexander’s entire Commentary was
published in Venice in 1572.
italics). The text of Averroes referred to by Alexander is the following: In Met., VIII, t.c.
16, f. 224K-L: «Omnia vero quae carent materia intelligibili et sensibili, sicut materia
rerum mathematicarum, unumquodque eorum est idem cum illo quod dat suum esse,
scilicet quod quidditas et essentia sunt in eis idem». Clearly, the Latin translation of Aver-
roes’s Commentary means that in the case of immaterial things, essence and quiddity are
the same as the thing. For details on this question, see AMERINI, «Thomas Aquinas, Alexan-
der of Alexandria, and Paul of Venice on the Nature of Essence».
73. Cf. In Met., VIII, t.c. 1, f. 209G-H: «Intendit in hoc tractatu facere rememora-
tionem de dictis in predicto et complere sermonem de substantia que dicitur forma, quo-
niam omne de quo perscrutatus est de speciebus substantie non est nisi propter substan-
tiam que dicitur forma».
In the sections following the transcription from Alexander, I pro-

vide some transcriptions and quotations from Giles of Rome’s (§2),
Radulphus Brito’s (§3.1), Anonymous Domus Petri’s (§3.2), Peter of
Auvergne’s (§3.3), Albert the Great’s (§4.1), and Geoffrey of Aspall’s
(§4.2)74 Commentaries on the Metaphysics, which appear to be the
main sources of Alexander’s Question. By […] I have indicated a por-
tion of text I have omitted, for the sake of brevity. By <> I have indi-
cated letters or words I have added.
APPENDIX
§1
Alexandri de Alexandria
Expositio Metaphysicorum, VIII, 3, q. 1
ms. Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana, 386 Scaff. XVIII,
f. 133vb-134ra
1. Quereret aliquis utrum nomen speciei significet formam tantum vel com-
positum.
2. Videtur quod formam tantum, quia primo Celi et Mundi75 dicitur quod
cum dico celum, dico formam, cum dico hoc celum, dico materiam; sed «celum»
5 est nomen speciei; ergo et cetera76.
3. Contra: illud quod est de essentia speciei debet significari per nomen eius;
sed materia et forma sunt de essentia speciei <substantie> materialis; ergo signi-
ficantur per nomen.
74. For Peter of Auvergne’s and Geoffrey of Aspall’s Questions I followed the numer-
ation provided by A. ZIMMERMANN, Verzeichnis ungedruckter Kommentare zur Metaphysik
und Physik des Aristoteles, Leiden / Koln 1971, while for Brito’s Question I referred to that
established by EBBESEN, «Radulphus Brito on the Metaphysics».
75. Cf. De caelo, I, 9, 278a12-15 (Auctoritates Aristotelis, 3.25, ed. J. HAMESSE,
Louvain / Paris 1974, p. 161).
76. See ANONYMUS DOMUS PETRI, Qu. in Met., VIII, q. 1, ms. cit., f. 44rb: «Que-
ritur utrum nomen speciei significet formam tantum. Videtur quod sic: dicit Aristoteles
quod qui dicit celum, dicit formam tantum; qui dicit hoc celum, dicit formam in mate-
riam; «celum» autem est nomen speciei; ergo et cetera». The same argument occurs in
RADULPHUS BRITO, Questiones in Metaphysicam, VIII, q. 4, arg. 3, ms. Florence, Biblioteca
Nazionale Centrale, conv. soppr. E.I.252, f. 301rb.
434 F. AMERINI
4. Respondeo. Ad hanc questionem respondet Commentator77 quod unum

10 et idem dicitur de composito ex materia et forma et de forma78, non tamen quia
illa79 significentur univoce ab uno nomine, sed secundum prius et posterius, ita
quod nomen principaliter dicitur de forma, secundario de aggregato. Probat
autem hoc, quia omne quod significatur, <significatur> secundum quod est in
actu – supple: essentie et non existentie; actualitas autem essentie inest composito
15 per formam, et ideo nomen principalius significat formam quam compositum.
Cum enim fuerint duo quorum alterum est causa alterius, causa est dignior
habere illud nomen quam causatum, sicut, quia res calide non sunt calide nisi
per calorem ignis, ideo nomen caloris prius80 convenit igni quam aliquibus aliis.
Cum ergo compositum non habeat esse actu nisi propter formam, ergo non habet
20 nomen nisi propter eam. Et ideo principaliter convenit nomen ipsi forme et per
primum quam conveniat ipsi composito.
5. Dicere autem quod forma partis significetur nomine speciei primo et prin-
cipaliter non videtur verum. Illud enim quod significatur nomine speciei est
essentia speciei. De essentia autem speciei <substantie> sensibilis est non solum
25 forma, sed etiam materia.
6. Ad idem: ratio quam significat nomen est diffinitio, ut patuit per iam
habita81. Ergo sicut res se habet ad diffiniri, ita se habet ad significari. In sexto
autem huius82 dictum est quod in diffinitione substantie sensibilis capitur materia
et forma. Ergo ipsum nomen significat compositum ex materia et forma.
30 7. Preterea: quod significatur nomine speciei predicatur de individuo; <forma
autem partis de individuo> non predicatur.
8. Incedamus ergo alia via. Quando queritur utrum nomen significet formam
vel compositum, possumus istam questionem solvere tribus modis.
9. Primo, distinguendo inter formam partis et formam totius. Si ergo questio
35 sit de forma totius, certum est quod nomen speciei significat formam, sicut
«homo» significat humanitatem, ita quod principaliter significat humanitatem,
secundario significat aggregatum ex humanitate et habente humanitatem. Et hoc
modo intendebat forte Commentator dicens quod nomen speciei significat prius
formam et posterius compositum. Licet enim «homo» significet humanitatem et
40 habentem humanitatem, tamen prius dictum est quod significat humanitatem et
consignificat habentem humanitatem. Et quia consignificatio est in habitudine
et respectu ad significationem, ideo bene dictum est quod significat unum in
respectu ad aliud. Si autem queratur de forma partis, quia ipsa non est tota
essentia, sed pars essentie, dicemus quod secundario et non principaliter signifi-
45 catur, ita quod primo significatur tota essentia, secundario significatur pars
essentie. Hic ergo est unus modus dicendi et solvendi83.
77. Cf. In Met., VIII, t.c. 7, f. 215I-L.
78. ex materia et forma et de forma scripsi: essentiam et formam de forma ms.
79. illa scripsi: illud ms.
80. prius scripsi: proprius ms.
81. Cf. Met., IV, 7, 1012a23-24.
82. Cf. Met., VI, 1, 1025b30-1026a8.
83. For this solution, see e.g. GILES OF ROME, Questiones Metaphisicales, VIII, q. 1, ed.
Venetiis 1501, f. 33ra-b (see below, appendix, §2).
10. Secundus modus solvendi est distinguendo inter illud quod significatur
et quod est ratio significandi. Modus enim significandi sequitur modum intelli-
gendi et modus intelligendi sequitur modum essendi. <In> essendo autem vide-
50 mus quod differunt illud quod est et illud quod est ratio essendi, quia illud quod
est est ipsum compositum, illud quod est ratio essendi est ipsa forma. Ita simi-
liter in eo quod intelligitur: illud quod intelligitur est ipsum compositum, ratio
intelligendi est ipsa forma. Sicut enim nihil est nisi <secundum> quod est in
actu, ita nihil intelligitur nisi secundum quod est in actu. Quod autem aliquid
55 sit in actu, hoc est per formam. Ergo forma est ratio essendi et intelligendi. A
simili, differt quod significatur et quod est ratio significandi. Quod enim signi-
ficatur potest esse ipsum compositum, ratio significandi est ipsa forma. Distincta
enim significatio non potest esse nisi <de distincto significato; distinctum autem
significatum non est nisi> per distinctam formam. Si ergo vellemus proprie loqui,
60 dicemus quod illud quod significatur est ipsum compositum, ratio autem signi-
ficandi est ipsa forma. Unde sicut in essendo compositum habet attributionem
ad formam sicut ad rationem essendi, ita similiter in significando. Et hoc forte
voluit dicere Commentator quod unum et idem nomen aspicit compositum et
formam, sed non ex equo, sed compositum sicut illud quod significatur,
65 forma<m> autem sicut illud quod est ratio significandi. Et super hoc videtur
fundari ratio sua, in hoc quod sicut forma est ratio essendi, ita est ratio intelli-
gendi et per consequens ratio significandi. Est ergo hic secundus modus84.
11. Tertius modus potest esse faciendo differentiam inter illud cui nomen
imponitur et illud a quo imponitur. Nomen enim imponitur habenti formam,
70 sed tamen imponitur a forma. Et quia habens formam est compositum, ideo
illud nomen imponitur ipsi composito, sed tamen a forma imponitur. Iste tamen
modus idem videtur cum secundo. Nam illud quod est ratio significandi et ratio
intelligendi ratio est imponendi. Et ideo iste tertius modus a secundo oritur85.
84. For this solution, see e.g. RADULPHUS BRITO, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, VIII,
q. 4, ms. cit., f. 301rb-va (see below, appendix, §3.1); ANONYMUS DOMUS PETRI, Qu. in
Met., VIII, q. 1, ms. cit., f. 44rb (see below, appendix, §3.2). In his question Radulphus
criticises a position which is close to that of Peter of Auvergne. See PETER OF AUVERGNE,
Qu. in Met., VIII, q. 1, ms. cit., f. 205vb-206ra (see below, appendix, §3.3); also VII,
q. 6 (Utrum materia vel forma vel aggregatum sit magis substantia), ms. cit., f. 191vb-192rb.
85. For this solution, see e.g. ALBERT THE GREAT, Metaphysica, Lib. 8, tract. 1, ch. 6,
ed. B. GEYER, Monasterii Westfalorum 1964, p. 396, ll. 26-40 (see below, appendix,
§4.1); GEOFFREY OF ASPALL, Qu. in Met., VIII, q. 4, ms. cit., f. 116vb (see below, appen-
dix, §4.2). This distinction also is introduced by Aquinas in order to mark off significa-
tion from etymology. See e.g. THOMAS AQUINAS, Super Sent., I, d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1;
III, d. 6, q. 1, a. 3, respondeo; Summa Theologiae, I, q. 13, a. 2, ad 2; a. 8, respondeo; II-
II, q. 92, a. 1, ad 2; III, q. 37, a. 2; De potentia, q. 9, a. 3, ad 1. For more on this dis-
tinction, see E.J. ASHWORTH, «Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-
Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy», in: Medieval Philosophy and Theology
1 (1991), pp. 39-67; AMERINI, Mental Representation and Semantics. Two Essays in
Medieval Philosophy, part I: Thomas Aquinas on Mental Representation and Signification
of Names, forthcoming.
436 F. AMERINI
§2
Aegidii de Roma
Questiones Metaphisicales, VIII, q. 1
ed. Venetiis 1501, f. 33ra-b
De hac questione Aristoteles non plus dicit nisi quod per nomen significatur
utrumque, scilicet forma et aggregatum, sed ad unum, idest unum per attribu-
tionem et analogiam ad alterum. Et non distinxit utrum forma significetur per
attributionem ad aggregatum vel e converso. Contingit autem formam accipere
5 dupliciter, scilicet ut est quoddam totum et una et forma totius, ut in nomine
«humanitas»; alio modo est forma partis, ut anima. Et uno modo, scilicet par-
tis, significatur per attributionem86 ad aggregatum, scilicet suppositum; alio modo
aggregatum, scilicet suppositum, significatur per attributionem ad formam,
scilicet naturam, que est forma totius, ut iam patebit utraque via. Unde verum
10 est dictum Aristotelis, scilicet quod nomen significat et formam et aggregatum,
sed per prius et posterius. Commentator tamen videtur intellexisse nonnisi altera
istarum viarum, scilicet quod nomen significat naturam et formam per prius, et
per posterius aggregatum vel suppositum. Vel si intellexerit87, per verba non
tamen expressit. Ad hoc autem advertendum est, cum res non habeant signifi-
15 cari nisi secundum quod intelliguntur, nec intelliguntur res nisi secundum quod
sunt res in intellectu – intellectus enim videtur magis esse receptivus et materialis
quam activus –, igitur oportet scire qualiter res habeant <in> intellectum agere
si oportet scire qualiter res habeant significari. […] Si igitur comparemus aggre-
gatum, scilicet suppositum, et88 formam et naturam totius ad significationem
20 nominis, cum forma talis sit id quod per se obicitur intellectui et sit ratio quare
suppositum obicitur, hoc modo comparando, nomen per prius significat formam
et naturam, et ex consequenti aggregatum, scilicet suppositum. Et hac via pro-
cessit Averroes, dicens quod nomen prius significat formam, secundo aggregatum,
intelligendum per hoc de forma totius et de natura et de aggregato, scilicet sup-
25 posito. […] Si autem comparemus aggregatum, scilicet suppositum, et for-
mam partis, scilicet animam, ad significationem hominis89, tunc est e contrario,
quia suppositum per prius significatur, quia ipsum tamquam ens per se ope-
ratur90 et agit in intellectum, forma autem partis significatur ex consequenti,
quia huiusmodi forma non proprie significatur nisi inquantum est alia pars
30 suppositi.
86. attributionem scripsi: aggregationem ed.

87. Intellexerit: fortasse supplendum aliter.
88. et scripsi: ad ed.
89. hominis: an scribendum nominis?
90. operatur scripsi: oportet ed.
§3.1
Radulphi Britonis
Questiones in Metaphysicam, VIII, q. 4
ms. Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, conv. soppr. E.I.252,
f. 301rb-va
Consequenter queritur circa illud capitulum utrum nomen significet formam
tantum vel compositum. Arguitur quod formam tantum primo per rationem
Commentatoris, quia nomen significat rem secundum quod in actu; non autem
est in actu <nisi> per formam; quando autem aliqua sic se habent quod unum est
5 sicut causa, aliud sicut causatum, tunc illud quod est causa dignius habet nomen
quam causatum; compositum et forma sunt huiusmodi, quia compositum est in
actu per formam; ergo nomen primo significabit formam. […] Item, nomen
speciei significat quidditatem; forma est quidditas, ut dicit Commentator, qui dicit
de solutione questionis sophistarum quod quidditas hominis est idem quodam
10 modo cum homine et quodam modo non: est enim homo qui est forma et non
homo qui est materia. […] Dicendum quod in sensibilibus importat compositum.
Et huius ratio est quia unumquodque significatur secundum quod intelligitur et
intelligitur secundum quod habet esse. […] Tunc ergo illud erit primo significa-
tum quod erit <primo> intellectum et quod habet primo esse. Nunc autem forma
15 non habet esse primo, quia non est ens in actu, sed est actus; compositum autem
est ens <in> actu et ideo compositum, quia primo est ens, primo habet intelligi et
significari. Ideo compositum primo per nomen significatur. Verumtamen hoc est
per formam. […] Nunc autem compositum est in actu per formam et intelligitur,
ergo […] forma erit illud quo significabitur compositum et compositum erit illud
20 quod significabitur. Nos enim devenimus in cognitionem substantiarum precise
per operationes que apparent nobis de ipsis. Modo actiones et operationes non
sunt formarum, sed compositorum mediantibus formis. Et ideo sicut compositum
intelligitur mediante forma, ita et significatur. Verum est tamen quod aliqui dicunt
quod primo significatur compositum et ex consequenti formam. Et dicunt quod
25 duplex est notificatio, una essendi et alia cognoscendi, et illud quod est causa essendi
aliquando ultimo cognoscitur et significatur, et sic forma, quia est causa essendi
compositi, potest ultimo significari; compositum autem est causa notificandi ipsam.
Credo tamen quod nullo modo forma significetur, sed compositum, quia quic-
quid est, est illud quod intelligitur, ergo est illud quod significatur, quia illud quod
30 intelligitur, significatur; quod quid est autem non solum est forma, ideo credo
quod forma nullo modo significatur. Ad rationem, cum dicitur quod homo signi-
ficat formam, quia quando aliqua se habent sicut causa et causatum […] volo quod
primo nomen sit primi tamquam illud quo et non tamquam illud quod. Et ideo
bene volo quod forma sit causa significandi compositum et illud mediante quo
35 significatur et non illud quod significatur. […] Ad aliud, cum dicitur quod nomen
importat quod quid est, concedo, et tunc arguo quia nomen importat illud cuius
est diffinitio, ut dicitur quarto huius91. Immo ad quod quid est quod importatur
91. Cf. Met., IV, 7, 1012a23-24.
438 F. AMERINI
per diffinitionem non solum pertinet materia, immo etiam forma, ut dictum est
septimo huius92, saltem in substantiis compositis. Credo quod nomen non solum
40 significabit formam vel materiam, sed compositum. Tu dicis quod quidditas est
forma, ut dicit Commentator. Dico quod Commentator intelligit ibi per formam
compositum ex materia et forma speciei, et per materiam intelligit materiam indivi-
dualem. Quare non valet illa ratio.
§3.2
Anonymi Domus Petri
ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, f. 44rb
Potest autem dictum Commentatoris uno modo habere veritatem, alio modo
non. Invenimus in voce significante id quod significatur et etiam quo aliquid
significatur. […] Cum per nomen speciei ipsum compositum est quod signi-
ficetur, forma autem sit illud quo totum compositum significatur, potest dictum
5 Commentatoris veritatem habere si sic intelligat quod nomen primo significat
formam pro tanto quia forma est quo primo significatur illud quod per talem
nomen significatur, scilicet compositum. Si autem intelligat quod forma sit
illud quod primo significatur nomine speciei, tunc falsum intelligit. Aristoteles
autem non negat Platonem quin per nomen speciei possit significari forma et
10 etiam compositum; vox enim nulli significationi repugnat; sed tamen si hec sig-
nificet, non significabit ea univoce. Sed quid dicendum est secundum veritatem?
Concedo quod nomen speciei significat aggregatum, non ipsam formam nisi
equivoce.
§3.3
Petri de Alvernia
ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, f. 205vb-206ra
Intelligendum quod illud quod per nomen significatur est illud cuius est dif-
finitio. […] Illa enim significamus que intelligimus et eo modo quo intelligi-
mus, eo modo significamus. Unde secundum Philosophum, quarto huius93, quod
non est intelligere non est significare et quod significatur per nomen est illud
5 quod est obiectum intellectus, quia nomen speciei significat quod quid est speciei.
[…] Dicendum est quod nomen significat aggregatum ex materia et forma, et
quia forma habet habitudinem ad aggregatum, sicut principium formale eius,
contingit in aliquibus quod nomen speciei significat aggregatum et etiam formam,
non tamen per unam rationem, quia aggregati et forme non est una ratio […]
92. Cf. e.g. Met., VII, 11, 1036b21-32.

93. Cf. Met., IV, 7, 1012a23-24.
10 quare nomen non significat ista per unam rationem. Et ulterius, quia unum habet
habitudinem ad aliud et talia non significat penitus per diversas rationes, ideo
nomen speciei non dicitur de eis penitus equivoce, sed per attributionem. Plato
tamen dixit quod in talibus nomen speciei primo significat formam, et quia
forma est principium intelligendi aggregatum et significare sequitur intelligere,
15 ideo nomen speciei primo significat formam, demum aggregatum. Et ipsum
sequitur Commentator, in hac opinione motus ex ista ratione, quia quando ali-
quid dicitur de causa et causato, verius dicitur de causa quam de causato. Tunc
accipiendo sicut prius illud significatur quod intelligitur et illud primo significatur
quod primo ab intellectu comprehenditur. Si autem dicamus quod forma a nobis
20 prius sit intellecta, dicemus sequendo Commentatorem quod nomen speciei
primo significat formam. Si autem dicamus quod illud quod intelligitur est totum
aggregatum, quia intellectus propter propinquitatem ad sensum, primo intelligit
aggregatum, tunc nomen speciei primo significat aggregatum […] quia tunc
aggregatum nobis est magis manifestum, ideo nomen speciei primo significat
25 aggregatum. Et in secundo94 dicebatur quod illud quod secundum suam naturam
est prius intelligibile, non oportet quod sit a nobis prius intelligibile; ergo non
oportet quod illa que sunt prima secundum rem, quod primo significentur. […]
Et cum dicitur a Commentatore quod illud quod inest cause et causato et cetera,
dico quod aliquid est causa in se et aliquid est causa intelligendi quo ad nos, et
30 ista non sunt idem: est enim aliquid causa essendi quod non est causa intelligendi
et e converso. Tunc dicendum est quod illud quod convenit cause secundum
quod causa est verius convenit cause quam causato, ita quod illud quod convenit
cause intelligendi quo ad nos prius significatur per nomen speciei; si autem con-
veniat cause secundum rem, que est causa essendi vel intelligendi simpliciter,
35 non oportet.
§4.1
Alberti Magni
Metaphysica, Lib. 8, tract. 1, chapter 6
ed. B. Geyer, Monasterii Westfalorum 1964, p. 396, ll. 26-40
Ad solutionem huius quaestionis praenotandum est, quod, cuius est nomen,
eius est definitio. In omni autem nomine quoddam est a quo imponitur nomen,
et quoddam est cui imponitur nomen; propter quod etiam omne nomen signi-
ficat substantiam cum qualitate. Hoc autem facile est videre in nominibus spe-
5 cierum et individuorum, quia in nominibus specierum actus ultimus est, a quo
nomen imponitur, et ipsum constitutum et compositum ex genere et differentia
est, cui imponitur nomen. […] Est autem hoc a quo imponitur nomen, in gram-
maticis pro qualitate, sed id cui imponitur est pro substantia.
94. Cf. Met., II, 1, 993a9-11.

440 F. AMERINI
§4.2
Galfridi de Aspall
ms. Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College, 509, f. 116vb
Dicendum quod omne nomen significat substantiam cum qualitate, ita quod
illa substantia est aggregatum et illa qualitas forma. […] Si enim considerentur
ut illud a quo imponitur nomen, sic forma dicitur; si autem ut illud cui impo-
nitur nomen, sic dicitur aggregatum et illud secundario significatur. Et similiter
5 est in nominibus abstractis, quia si consideratur nomen unde commune est ratione
sue communitatis, sic formam significat; si autem ratione eius cui imponitur, sic
aggregatum est et illud secundario significat. Unde quedam nomina significant
veram formam et verum aggregaturm, quedam non. Prima sunt concreta, cuius-
modi est «leo», «homo», «bos»; <alia> sunt abstracta, cuiusmodi est «animalitas».
10 Sed cuiuslibet nominis prima significatio forma est si consideretur ratione eius a
quo, secundario aggregatum si consideretur ratione eius cui imponitur nomen.

The Semantics of Substantial Names AMERINI, Fabrizio

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1398-08_RTPM08-02_05_Amerini 06-01-2009 13:19 Pagina 395

THE SEMANTICS OF SUBSTANTIAL NAMES:

Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 75(2), 395-440. doi: 10.2143/RTPM.75.2.2033409

medieval philosophy, the label «Latin Averroism» provides a textbook

1. Cf. R. IMBACH, «L’averroïsme latin du XIIIe siècle», in: R. IMBACH — A. MAIERÙ

THE SEMANTICS OF SUBSTANTIAL NAMES 397

world), but it is nevertheless a topic in which correctly interpreting

2. The Aristotelian background

2. See, for instance, S. EBBESEN, «Words and Signification in 13th-century Questions

THE SEMANTICS OF SUBSTANTIAL NAMES 399

patchy book. Modern interpreters have different opinions about these

turn out to be primary, and (ii) be made in such a way as to be inex-

THE SEMANTICS OF SUBSTANTIAL NAMES 401

are intrinsic to sensible substances and incapable of existing separately

8. The literature concerning Aristotle’s different accounts of substance is enormous

thing, a substantial form can be understood to be a principle of a con-

THE SEMANTICS OF SUBSTANTIAL NAMES 403

the actuality of a certain body10. In order to answer this question,

10. Cf. Met., VIII, 3, 1043a29-36.

a concrete animal. Moreover, if we maintained that «form» (e¤dov)

3. Averroes’s and Aquinas’s interpretations

THE SEMANTICS OF SUBSTANTIAL NAMES 405

addition15. Furthermore, the object of definition has to be universal

substance, i.e. a particular individual belonging to the category of sub-

THE SEMANTICS OF SUBSTANTIAL NAMES 407

of substantial forms simply as a talk of (specific) forms of a substan-

characteristics of the thing defined. Nonetheless, Averroes holds that

THE SEMANTICS OF SUBSTANTIAL NAMES 409

flesh and bones – as biomedical investigations and transplant practice

THE SEMANTICS OF SUBSTANTIAL NAMES 411

that «animal» signifies primarily the thing’s being animated, a prop-

35. For an introduction to Aquinas’s Commentary, see J. C. DOIG, Aquinas on Meta-

is able to dissolve this apparent clash. According to Aquinas, the first

THE SEMANTICS OF SUBSTANTIAL NAMES 413

to recall the Identity Thesis of book VII, chapter 6: in the case of

4. Medieval discussions of Averroes’s interpretation

39. Cf. Exp. Met., VIII, lec. 3, n. 1710.

«animal» refers exclusively to the composite41. More generally, Aver-

THE SEMANTICS OF SUBSTANTIAL NAMES 415

others, we can note that the question is discussed by Richard Rufus of

44. See, for instance, GEOFFREY OF ASPALL, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, VIII, q. 5

Philosophically speaking, this question tends to overlap with

THE SEMANTICS OF SUBSTANTIAL NAMES 417

or to the «form of the whole», if Aristotle’s wording is instead para-

I noted above that such a solution, which is usually attributed to

Traditionally, three standard arguments are invoked in support of

47. See below, appendix, §1, n. 4.

Commentary on that work, and runs as follows: A name signifies only

THE SEMANTICS OF SUBSTANTIAL NAMES 419

by a definition; but both essence and definition include matter and

50. See below, appendix, §1, nn. 5-6.

describing what is material and what is formal in a thing and, sec-

54. See below, appendix, §1, n. 8.

THE SEMANTICS OF SUBSTANTIAL NAMES 421

56. See below, appendix, §1, n. 10, and §3.1.

For Brito, composites are the proper object of signification, while

This position is quite close to that elaborated by Peter of

57. See below, appendix, §3.3.

THE SEMANTICS OF SUBSTANTIAL NAMES 423

On the basis of such reformulations of (T1) and (T4), Giles would

part or to the form of the whole. In any case, Alexander seems to be

5. Final remarks: Different views on essence and the semantics of names

THE SEMANTICS OF SUBSTANTIAL NAMES 425

man)59, nonetheless we have pointed out that in many other places