THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 186471. January 25, 2010.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODANTE DE

LEON y DELA ROSA, accused-appellant.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J p:

The Case
This is an appeal from the April 4, 2008 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01811 entitled People of the Philippines v. Rodante
De Leon y Dela Rosa which affirmed the December 20, 2005 Decision 2 in Criminal
Case Nos. Q-03-122555-56 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82 in Quezon
City. The RTC found accused-appellant Rodante De Leon guilty of violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
The charges against appellant stemmed from the following Informations:

Criminal Case No. Q-03-122555

(Violation of Section 5 [Sale], Article II of RA 9165)

That on or about the 9th day of November, 2003, in the Quezon

City, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law, to sell,
dispense, deliver, transport or distribute of any dangerous drug, did, then
and there, wilfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport,
distribute or act as broker in the said transaction zero point sixteen
(0.16) gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride a dangerous drug.

Contrary to law. 3

Criminal Case No. Q-03-122556

 (Violation of Section 11 [Possession], Article II of RA 9165)

That on or about the 9th day of November, 2003, in the Quezon

City, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law, to
possess or use any dangerous drug, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and control zero
point eighteen (0.18) gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug. cEDIAa

Contrary to law. 4

On February 16, 2004, appellant was arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" to
the charge against him. After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued.
During the trial, the parties agreed to stipulate on the testimonies of Engr.
Leonard Jabonillo, the Forensic Chemist, and Police Officer 1 (PO1) Oliver Estrelles,
the police investigator of these cases. The prosecution thereafter presented PO2
Noel Magcalayo as its witness. The defense, on the other hand, presented Rodante
De Leon, the accused himself.
The trial court summarized the stipulation of Engr. Jabonillo, as follows:

. . . that he is a Forensic Chemist of the Philippine National Police,

that his Office received the request for laboratory examination marked as
Annex "A"; that together with the said request was a plastic sachet
marked as Exh. "B" which contained two (2) plastic sachets marked as
Exhibits "B-1" and "B-2"; that he conducted the requested laboratory
examination and, in connection therewith he submitted a Chemistry
Report marked as Exhibit "C", the finding thereon showing the specimen
positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride was marked as Exhibit
"C-1" and the signature of said police officer was marked as Exhibit "C-
2"; that he then issued a Certification marked as Exhibits "D" and "D-1"
and thereafter turned over the specimen to the evidence custodian . . . .
(Order dated September 14, 2004). 5

Also, as regards PO1 Estrelles, the following was agreed upon:

. . . that he was the investigator of these cases and in connection

with the investigation conducted by him, he received the evidence,
namely: the Joint Affidavit of Apprehension executed by PO2 Noel
Magcalayo and PO2 Cesar Collado marked as Exhibit "E" and "E-1";
that likewise prepared the request for examination marked as Exhibit "A"
 and submitted the specimen to the Crime Laboratory and receive the
Chemistry Report marked as Exhibit "C"; that he received the Pre-
Operation Report marked as Exhibit "E" as well as the buy bust money
marked as Exhibits "F" and "F-1", that he prepared the letter request to
the City Prosecutor Office marked as Exhibit "G"; and that Exhibit "A"
contains superimposition of the date thereof." (Order dated September
14, 2004). 6

The Prosecution's Version of Facts

On November 9, 2003, at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, a confidential
informant arrived at the office of the Station Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operation Task
Force at the Novaliches Police Station in Quezon City and reported the illegal
activities of a person named "Rodante De Leon."
Thereafter, Police Senior Inspector (P/SInsp.) Nilo Wong formed a team for a
buy-bust operation with PO2 Magcalayo as poseur-buyer and Senior Police Officer 3
(SPO3) Mario Concepcion, PO2 Fernando Salonga, PO2 Cesar Collado, PO2
Edmund Paculdar, and PO1 Emeterio Mendoza as team members. A pre-operation
report was prepared. P/SInsp. Wong then handed to PO2 Magcalayo two (2) pieces
of PhP100 bills as buy-bust money and on which PO2 Magcalayo wrote his initials
"NM." aAcHCT
At around 6:30 p.m. in the evening, the team proceeded to Sarmiento St.,
Barangay Sta. Monica, Novaliches, Quezon City, where the confidential informant
introduced PO2 Magcalayo to appellant as a buyer of shabu. PO2 Magcalayo then
asked appellant if he had shabu and the latter answered in the affirmative and asked
him how much he would buy. PO2 Magcalayo handed the money and, in return,
appellant handed him one (1) plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance.
He then scratched his head, which was the pre-arranged signal that the transaction
was consummated, and thereafter arrested appellant. He recovered the buy-bust
money from appellant as PO2 Collado approached them and handcuffed appellant.
Upon frisking appellant, PO2 Collado discovered another plastic sachet on the
person of appellant.
Afterwards, appellant was brought to the police station for investigation. PO2
Collado then placed his initials on the sachet he found on appellant. The evidence
was subsequently turned over to the police investigator, PO1 Estrelles, who
prepared a request for its laboratory examination.
PO2 Collado, PO1 Mendoza, PO2 Paculdar, and PO2 Magcalayo then
brought the transparent plastic sachets containing the white crystalline substance
subject of the buy-bust operation to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory, Eastern Police District on St. Francis Street, Mandaluyong City for
examination. Engr. Jabonillo, a Forensic Chemical Officer, conducted a qualitative
examination on the specimens, which yielded positive results for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. He issued Chemistry Report
No. D-1240-2003 dated November 9, 2003, which showed the following results:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

Two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets each containing

white crystalline substance having the following markings and recorded
net weights:

A (NM) = 0.16 gm

B (CC) = 0.18 gm

xxx xxx xxx

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

To determine the presence of dangerous drugs.

xxx xxx xxx

FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated

specimens gave POSITIVE result to the test for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. . . .

CONCLUSION:

Specimen A and B contain Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a

dangerous drug. . . . IEaCDH

Version of the Defense

On the other hand, appellant testified that, prior to his arrest, he was a police
officer of Station 7, Araneta, Cubao, Quezon City and had been connected with the
PNP for 10 years. On November 9, 2003, at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, he
went to Sarmiento St., Barangay Sta. Monica, Novaliches, Quezon City to look for a
kumpadre from whom he intended to borrow money when policemen accosted him
and poked their guns at him. The people around him ran, and as he was the only
one left on the scene, the policemen asked him to sit down. He told SPO3
Concepcion, whom he knew, that he was a police officer but he was told to shut up
and to explain his side at the police station instead.
Upon arrival at the police station in Novaliches, Quezon City, his wallet, with
his I.D. and police badge, were taken from him. PO2 Magcalayo told him that he had
a fake police I.D. When appellant tried to explain himself, PO2 Magcalayo allegedly
kicked him saying, "Hindi na uso ang pulis, sundalo na ang nakaupo ngayon."
The following night, he was presented on inquest during which he was
charged with violation of Secs. 5 and 11 of RA 9165. He denied all the charges
against him claiming that the alleged shabu marked as Exhibits "B-1" and "B-2"
came from the arresting police officers. He did not file a case against them, because
he had no money and because he knew that he was not guilty.
On cross-examination, appellant further testified that he was a follow-up
operative at the Station Investigation Division of Police Station 7. He admitted that
he was separated from the service because he was absent without official leave due
to a business problem he had to attend to. He likewise said that he did not know his
arresting officers, whom he saw then for the first time, and that he was not familiar
with RA 9165.
Ruling of the Trial Court
After trial, the RTC convicted appellant. The dispositive portion of its Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered as follows:

Re: Criminal Case NO. Q-03-122555, the Court finds accused

RODANTE DE LEON y DELA ROSA guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of a violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine
in the amount of P500,000.00;

Re: Criminal Case NO. Q-03-122556, the Court finds accused

RODANTE DE LEON y DELA ROSA guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of a violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day as minimum to fifteen (15) years and one (1) day as
maximum and to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00; TAEDcS 
 SO ORDERED. 7

On appeal to the CA, appellant disputed the trial court's decision finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. He argued that the alleged
buy-bust operation conducted by the police officers was tainted with irregularities
and that the prosecution failed to prove the chain of custody of the evidence.
Ruling of the Appellate Court
On April 4, 2008, the CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The
dispositive portion of its Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED for

lack of merit. The Decision dated 20 December 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 82 finding accused-appellant
Rodante De Leon y Dela Rosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt in
Criminal Case No. Q-03-122555 for violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00, and in
Criminal Case No. Q-03-122556 for violation of Section 11, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to fifteen (15) years and
one (1) day as maximum and to pay a fine in the amount of
P300,000.00, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 8

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal of the decision of the CA.

The Issues
Appellant assigns the following errors:

I.

The trial court gravely erred in ignoring the fact that the
prosecution failed to prove the chain of custody of the alleged
confiscated items from the accused-appellant.

II.
 The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty
of the crimes charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Our Ruling
We sustain appellant's conviction. IcAaSD
Guilt of Appellant Was Proved Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Appellant assails his conviction by contending that the trial court failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. According to him, the trial court
erroneously convicted him on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution despite a
question of the legality of the buy-bust operation. Further, he asserts that the trial
court relied on the disputable presumption of regularity in the performance of the
police function, despite the police officers violated the rule on chain of custody of the
alleged confiscated items.
The contentions are unmeritorious.
It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial court which are factual in
nature and which involve the credibility of witnesses are accorded with respect,
when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts, and speculative, arbitrary,
and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. 9 The reason for
this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses
having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial. 10
After a thorough examination of the entire records of this case, this Court has
failed to identify any error committed by the trial court in its appreciation of the
evidence presented before it and in the conclusion it reached.
In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the Court
has reiterated the essential elements in People v. Pendatun, to wit: (1) the accused
sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another; and (2) he knew that what he had
sold and delivered was a prohibited drug. 11 Therefore, what is material is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court
of evidence of the corpus delicti. 12 Corpus delicti is the body or substance of the
crime, and establishes the fact that a crime has actually been committed. It has two
elements, namely: (1) proof of the occurrence of a certain event; and (2) some
person's criminal responsibility for the act. 13
In the instant case, the prosecution sufficiently established the elements of
the crime. Appellant sold and delivered the shabu for PhP200 to PO2 Magcalayo
posing as buyer; the said drug was seized and identified as a prohibited drug and
subsequently presented in evidence; there was actual exchange of the marked
money and contraband; and finally, appellant was fully aware that he was selling and
delivering a prohibited drug. In fact, PO2 Magcalayo testified, thus:

Q: Mr. Witness, on November 9, 2003, did you report for duty?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What happened when you reported for duty? TaCDIc

A: Our confidential informant personally appeared in our station and

reporting to us the alleged drug pushing activity of Rodante De
Leon.

Q: What time was that when this confidential informant arrived at your
office?

A: Around 5:00 p.m., sir.

Q: What happened when this confidential informant relayed to you the

information about this Rodante De Leon?

A: Our Chief sir, formed a team for possible buy bust operation.

COURT:

Who formed?

A: P/Sr. Inspector Nilo Wong, your honor.

PROS. ANTERO:

Who composed this team?

A: Us, sir. SPO3 Mario Concepcion, PO2 Fernando Salonga, PO2 Cesar
Collado, PO2 Edmund Paculdar and PO1 Emeterio Mendoza,
your Honor.

Q: What happened when this team was formed, Mr. Witness?

A: We proceeded to Sarmiento Street, sir, for buy bust operation.

COURT:
 Were you among the team?

A: Yes, your Honor.

PROS. ANTERO:

Prior to the dispatch to conduct that buy-bust operation, what

happened, if any?

A: We prepared the pre-operation report and our Chief handed to me the
two (2) pieces of P100.00 bills as buy bust money.

Q: What did you do with that two (2) P100.00 bills?

A: Before we were dispatched, I put my initial on the buy-bust money.

Q: What initial?

A: NM, sir.

Q: What [does] NM stand for? cIHCST

A: Noel Magcalayo, sir.

Q: I am showing you these two (2) P100.00 bills, kindly examine the
same whether you know those P100.00 bills?

A: These are the buy bust money that we used in the operation, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What happened after you were given these buy bust money?

A: We proceeded to Sarmiento Street, Barangay Sta. Monica,

Novaliches, Quezon City.

Q: What time was that when you proceeded there?

A: At around 6:30 in the afternoon, sir.

Q: What happened, Mr. Witness?

A: We were able to meet Rodante De Leon.

Q: How did you meet this Rodante De Leon?

A: By the help of our confidential informant, sir.

Q: Can you tell this Hon. Court how you made a contact with this
Rodante De Leon?

A: We approached him and then our confidential informant introduced

me to him as a buyer of shabu.

COURT:

What?

A: I was introduced to him by the confidential informant as a buyer of

shabu.

PROS. ANTERO:

What happened thereafter?

A: He made transaction with us, sir.

Q: What happened during the transaction?

A: I asked him sir if he has shabu and then he answered yes and
magkano.

Q: What did he tell you, if any?

A: He asked me how much I would buy shabu.

Q: What did you tell, if any? aIAHcE

A: That was the time when I handed to him the money, sir.

Q: What happened when you handed the money to him?

A: In return, sir, he handed to me one (1) plastic sachet containing

suspected shabu.

Q: One?
 A: Yes, sir.

Q: What happened after he handed to you one plastic sachet?

A: I gave pre-arranged signal to my back-up and immediately effected

the arrest, sir.

Q: What was the pre-arranged signal?

A: By scratching my head, sir.

Q: Scratching your head?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What happened when you made that pre-arranged signal?

A: I effected the arrest, sir, and confiscated the buy bust money from
Rodante De Leon. 14

Evidently, all the elements of the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs were
proved in the instant case. The testimony cited above shows clearly that a sale
occurred between appellant, as the seller, and PO2 Magcalayo, as the buyer, for
PhP200 worth of shabu. In addition, the said testimony illustrated the seizing of the
prohibited drug and the exchange of the marked money. As a matter of fact, the trial
court, in disposing of the case, said:

. . . Set against this legal yardstick, the evidence adduced by the

prosecution have sufficiently established the elements aforesaid. The
prosecution witnesses in the person of PO2 Noel Magcalayo, the one
who acted as the poseur buyer in the buy bust operation conducted by
his team, described in detail how the operation was commenced with the
help of an informant, his introduction to the accused, the ensuing
negotiation and consummation of the sale of shabu which ended up in
the exchange of the item as well as the buy bust money. Accused was
positively identified as the seller thereof and the source of the plastic
sachet which contained crystalline substance later on determined after
laboratory examination as positive for methylamphetamine, a dangerous
drug. Said evidence was presented in court and properly identified as
the subject of the buy bust and which was submitted for examination by
the Forensic Chemist. All told, all the elements aforementioned are
hereby present. 15 . . . ISTDAH
 Further, the chain of custody was clearly established by the prosecution. It is
elementary that, in every prosecution for the illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the
presentation of the drug as evidence in court is material. 16 It is, therefore, essential
that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. What is more,
the fact that the substance bought during the buy-bust operation is the same
substance offered in court should be established. The chain of custody requirement
performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence are removed. 17
To ensure that the chain of custody is established, the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of RA 9165 provide:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized

and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner: 

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and

control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items . . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)
 A close examination of the law reveals that it admits of certain exceptions.
Thus, contrary to the assertions of appellant, Sec. 21 of the foregoing law need not
be followed as an exact science. Non-compliance with Sec. 21 does not render an
accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. 18
What is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused." 19
In the instant case, there was substantial compliance with the law and the
integrity of the drugs seized from appellant was preserved. The chain of custody of
the drugs subject matter of the case was shown not to have been broken. The
factual milieu of the case reveals that after PO2 Magcalayo seized and confiscated
the dangerous drugs, as well as the marked money, appellant was immediately
arrested and brought to the police station for investigation, where the sachet of
suspected shabu was marked with "NM." Immediately thereafter, the confiscated
substance, with a letter of request for examination, was submitted to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination to determine the presence of any dangerous drug. Per
Chemistry Report No. D-1240-2003 dated November 9, 2003, the specimen
submitted contained methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. The
examination was conducted by one Engr. Jabonillo, a Forensic Chemical Officer of
the PNP Crime Laboratory, whose stipulated testimony clearly established the chain
of custody of the specimens he received. Thus, it is without a doubt that there was
an unbroken chain of custody of the illicit drug purchased from appellant. cITCAa
Likewise, the prosecution was able to prove that appellant is guilty of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs with moral certainty. In the prosecution for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be proved with moral
certainty: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited
or regulatory drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 20
Here, appellant was caught in actual possession of the prohibited drugs
without showing any proof that he was duly authorized by law to possess them.
Having been caught in flagrante delicto, there is prima facie evidence of animus
possidendi on appellant's part. As held by this Court, the finding of a dangerous drug
in the house or within the premises of the house of the accused is prima facie
evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi and is enough to convict in the
absence of a satisfactory explanation. 21 In the case at bar, appellant failed to
present any evidence to rebut his animus possidendi of the shabu found in his
pocket during the buy-bust operation.
Buy-Bust Operation Was Valid
 Appellant further argues that the buy-bust operation was full of irregularities,
rendering it illegal. He notes that the Pre-Operation Report was full of discrepancies
and that the Joint Sworn Affidavit of Apprehension of PO2 Magcalayo and PO2
Collado failed to mention that they placed their markings on the plastic sachets.
The arguments are specious. Such irregularities cannot overturn the finding of
the presence in this case of the elements of violations of Secs. 5 and 11, Art. II of
RA 9165.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are
resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the
execution of their criminal plan. 22 In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has
been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due
regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken. 23
In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that the buy-bust operation
conducted by the police officers, who made use of entrapment to capture appellant
in the act of selling a dangerous drug, was valid and legal. Moreover, the defense
has failed to show any evidence of ill motive on the part of the police officers. Even
appellant himself declared that it was the first time he met the police officers during
his cross-examination. There was, therefore, no motive for the police officers to
frame up appellant.
Likewise, the identity of appellant as the person who sold the dangerous
drugs to PO2 Magcalayo and the one in possession of the shabu cannot be doubted
anymore. Such positive identification prevails over appellant's defenses of denial
and alibi. These defenses have been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor,
for they can easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and they are common and
standard defense ploys in most prosecutions arising from violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. 24 EaISTD
Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse appellant of such a grave
offense, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the
findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over
appellant's bare allegation. 25
We, therefore, uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties and find that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the
guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA's Decision in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 01811 finding appellant Rodante De Leon y Dela Rosa guilty of the crimes
charged is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 Corona, Nachura, Peralta and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

||| (People v. De Leon y Dela Rosa, G.R. No. 186471, [January 25, 2010], 624 PHIL
786-804)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 148431. July 28, 2005.]

SPO2 RUPERTO CABANLIG, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents.

Fajardo & Associates for petitioner.

SYLLABUS

 
1. CRIMINAL LAW; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; SELF-DEFENSE
DIFFERENTIATED FROM FULFILLMENT OF DUTY. — Self-defense and fulfillment
of duty operate on different principles. Self-defense is based on the principle of self-
preservation from mortal harm, while fulfillment of duty is premised on the due
performance of duty. The difference between the two justifying circumstances is
clear, as the requisites of self-defense and fulfillment of duty are different. The
elements of self-defense are as follows: a) Unlawful aggression; b) Reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; c) Lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. On the other hand, the
requisites of fulfillment of duty are: 1. The accused acted in the performance of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; 2. The injury caused or the offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the
lawful exercise of such right or office.
2. ID.; EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES; FULFILLMENT OF DUTY; A
POLICEMAN IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY IS JUSTIFIED IN USING SUCH
FORCE AS IS REASONABLY NECESSARY TO SECURE AND DETAIN THE
OFFENDER. — A policeman in the performance of duty is justified in using such
force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his
resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself
from bodily harm. In case injury or death results from the policeman's exercise of
such force, the policeman could be justified in inflicting the injury or causing the
death of the offender if the policeman had used necessary force. Since a
policeman's duty requires him to overcome the offender, the force exerted by the
policeman may therefore differ from that which ordinarily may be offered in self-
defense. However, a policeman is never justified in using unnecessary force or in
treating the offender with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when
the arrest could be affected otherwise.
3. ID.; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION FROM
THE VICTIM IS NOT A REQUISITE. — Unlike in self-defense where unlawful
aggression is an element, in performance of duty, unlawful aggression from the
victim is not a requisite. In People v. Delima, a policeman was looking for a fugitive
who had several days earlier escaped from prison. When the policeman found the
fugitive, the fugitive was armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a
lance. The policeman demanded the surrender of the fugitive. The fugitive lunged at
the policeman with his bamboo lance. The policeman dodged the lance and fired his
revolver at the fugitive. The policeman missed. The fugitive ran away still holding the
bamboo lance. The policeman pursued the fugitive and again fired his revolver,
hitting and killing the fugitive. The Court acquitted the policeman on the ground that
the killing was done in the fulfillment of duty. The fugitive's unlawful aggression in
People v. Delima had already ceased when the policeman killed him. The fugitive
was running away from the policeman when he was shot. If the policeman were a
private person, not in the performance of duty, there would be no self-defense
because there would be no unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased. It may
even appear that the public officer acting in the fulfillment of duty is the aggressor,
but his aggression is not unlawful, it being necessary to fulfill his duty.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE POLICEMAN USED FORCE TO PROTECT HIS LIFE OR
THAT OF A STRANGER. — While self-defense and performance of duty are two
distinct justifying circumstances, self-defense or defense of a stranger may still be
relevant even if the proper justifying circumstance in a given case is fulfillment of
duty. For example, a policeman's use of what appears to be excessive force could
be justified if there was imminent danger to the policeman's life or to that of a
stranger. If the policeman used force to protect his life or that of a stranger, then the
defense of fulfillment of duty would be complete, the second requisite being present.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GRABBING THE M16 ARMALITE CLEARLY SHOWED A
HOSTILE INTENTION AND EVEN CONSTITUTED UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION. —
By suddenly grabbing the M16 Armalite from his unsuspecting police guard, Valino
certainly did not intend merely to escape and run away as far and fast as possible
from the policemen. Valino did not have to grab the M16 Armalite if his sole intention
was only to flee from the policemen. If he had no intention to engage the policemen
in a firefight, Valino could simply have jumped from the jeep without grabbing the
M16 Armalite. Valino's chances of escaping unhurt would have been far better had
he not grabbed the M16 Armalite which only provoked the policemen to recapture
him and recover the M16 Armalite with greater vigor. Valino's act of grabbing the
M16 Armalite clearly showed a hostile intention and even constituted unlawful
aggression. Facing imminent danger, the policemen had to act swiftly. Time was of
the essence. It would have been foolhardy for the policemen to assume that Valino
grabbed the M16 Armalite merely as a souvenir of a successful escape.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE DUTY TO ISSUE A WARNING IS NOT ABSOLUTELY
MANDATED AT ALL TIMES AND AT ALL COST, TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE
LIFE OF LAW ENFORCERS. — The Sandiganbayan had very good reasons in
steadfastly adhering to the policy that a law enforcer must first issue a warning
before he could use force against an offender. A law enforcer's overzealous
performance of his duty could violate the rights of a citizen and worse cost the
citizen's life. We have always maintained that the judgment and discretion of public
officers, in the performance of their duties, must be exercised neither capriciously
nor oppressively, but within the limits of the law. The issuance of a warning before a
law enforcer could use force would prevent unnecessary bloodshed. Thus,
whenever possible, a law enforcer should employ force only as a last resort and only
after issuing a warning. However, the duty to issue a warning is not absolutely
mandated at all times and at all cost, to the detriment of the life of law enforcers. The
directive to issue a warning contemplates a situation where several options are still
available to the law enforcers. In exceptional circumstances such as this case,
where the threat to the life of a law enforcer is already imminent, and there is no
other option but to use force to subdue the offender, the law enforcer's failure to
issue a warning is excusable.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VERBAL WARNING NEED NOT COME FROM THE
OFFENDER HIMSELF. — For what is the purpose of a warning? A warning is
issued when policemen have to identify themselves as such and to give opportunity
to an offender to surrender. A warning in this case was dispensable. Valino knew
that he was in the custody of policemen. Valino was also very well aware that even
the mere act of escaping could injure or kill him. The policemen were fully armed
and they could use force to recapture him. By grabbing the M16 Armalite of his
police escort, Valino assumed the consequences of his brazen and determined act.
Surrendering was clearly far from Valino's mind. At any rate, Valino was amply
warned. Mercado shouted "hoy" when Valino grabbed the M16 Armalite. Although
Cabanlig admitted that he did not hear Mercado shout "hoy," Mercado's shout
should have served as a warning to Valino. The verbal warning need not come from
Cabanlig himself. The records also show that Cabanlig first fired one shot. After a
few seconds, Cabanlig fired four more shots. Cabanlig had to shoot Valino because
Valino at one point was facing the police officers. The exigency of the situation
warranted a quick response from the policemen.
8. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; GROSS NEGLIGENCE;
POLICEMEN TRANSPORTED AN ARRESTED ROBBER TO A RETRIEVAL
OPERATION WITHOUT HANDCUFFING HIM. — Cabanlig is thus not guilty of
homicide. At most, Cabanlig, Padilla, Abesamis, Mercado and Esteban are guilty
only of gross negligence. The policemen transported Valino, an arrested robber, to a
retrieval operation without handcuffing Valino. That no handcuffs were available in
the police precinct is a very flimsy excuse. The policemen should have tightly bound
Valino's hands with rope or some other sturdy material. Valino's cooperative
demeanor should not have lulled the policemen to complacency. As it turned out,
Valino was merely keeping up the appearance of good behavior as a prelude to a
planned escape. We therefore recommend the filing of an administrative case
against Cabanlig, Padilla, Abesamis, Mercado and Esteban for gross negligence.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., dissenting opinion:

1. CRIMINAL LAW; EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES; FULFILLMENT OF

DUTY; THE CONCLUSION THAT WARNING VICTIM WOULD COST THE LIVES
OF THE POLICEMEN LACKS BASIS AND PURELY SPECULATIVE. — The
conclusion that warning Valino would cost the lives of the policemen lacks basis and
purely speculative. There were five police officers guarding Valino and four of them
were armed with high powered guns. The five policemen were up against a lone
malefactor who was not even shown to be adept in handling an M-16 armalite rifle.
Besides Cabanlig was aware when Valino grabbed Mercado's rifle. He was thus
prepared to repel or overcome any threat posed by Valino. As the records show,
Valino ran away from the vehicle after he grabbed the armalite rifle. There was no
evidence that it was aimed at the police officers hence there is no imminent danger
to speak of.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE ACCUSED FIRST FIRED A SHOT FOLLOWED BY
FOUR MORE SHOTS COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT WARNING. —
That Cabanlig first fired a shot followed by four more shots could not be considered
sufficient warning. The succession of the shots was a mere one or two seconds thus
giving no ample time for Valino to surrender. Besides, as testified to by Cabanlig, he
was giving no warning at all because the shots were directly aimed at Valino.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEAL BY CERTIORARI;
FACTUAL QUESTIONS ARE NOT REVIEWABLE BY THE SUPREME COURT. —
In Escara v. People, we declared that factual questions are not reviewable by the
Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court of Civil Procedure. There is a question of fact when the doubt arises
as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. In appeals to this Court from the
Sandiganbayan only questions of law may be raised, not issues of fact.
4. ID.; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF
THE TRIAL COURT ARE ACCORDED GREAT WEIGHT AND RESPECT AND
WILL NOT BE DISTURBED ON APPEAL. — It is an established doctrine of long
standing that factual findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are
accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. The trial
court is in a unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable
evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, which
opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. Only the trial judge can observe the
furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone,
calmness, sigh or the scant or full realization of an oath — all of which are useful for
an accurate determination of a witnesses' honesty and sincerity.
 

DECISION

CARPIO, J p:

The Case
This petition for review 1 seeks to reverse the Decision 2 of the Fifth Division
of the Sandiganbayan dated 11 May 1999 and Resolution 3 dated 2 May 2001
affirming the conviction of SPO2 Ruperto Cabanlig ("Cabanlig") in Criminal Case No.
19436 for homicide. The Sandiganbayan sentenced Cabanlig to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four months of arresto mayor as minimum to two years and
four months of prision correctional as maximum and to pay P50,000 to the heirs of
Jimmy Valino ("Valino"). Cabanlig shot Valino after Valino grabbed the M16 Armalite
of another policeman and tried to escape from the custody of the police. The
Sandiganbayan acquitted Cabanlig's co-accused, SPO1 Carlos Padilla ("Padilla"),
PO2 Meinhart Abesamis ("Abesamis"), SPO2 Lucio Mercado ("Mercado") and SPO1
Rady Esteban ("Esteban").
The Charge
Cabanlig, Padilla, Abesamis, Mercado and Esteban were charged with
murder in an amended information that reads as follows:
 That on or about September 28, 1992, in the Municipality of
Penaranda, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, SPO[2]
Ruperto C. Cabanlig, SPO1 Carlos E. Padilla, PO2 Meinhart C.
Abesamis, SPO2 Lucio L. Mercado and SPO1 Rady S. Esteban, all
public officers being members of the Philippine National Police,
conspiring and confederating and mutually helping one another, with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, taking
advantage of nighttime and uninhabited place to facilitate the execution
of the crime, with use of firearms and without justifiable cause, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
one Jimmy Valino, hitting him several times at the vital parts of his
body, thereby inflicting upon the latter, serious and mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, which crime
was committed by the accused in relation to their office as members of
the Philippine National Police of Penaranda, Nueva Ecija, the
deceased, who was then detained for robbery and under the custody
of the accused, having been killed while being taken to the place
where he allegedly concealed the effects of the crime, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of said victim, in such amount as may be
awarded under the provisions of the New Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
Arraignment and Plea
On 15 December 1993, the accused police officers Cabanlig, Padilla,
Abesamis, Mercado and Esteban pleaded not guilty.
Version of the Prosecution
On 24 September 1992 a robbery occurred in the Municipality of Penaranda,
Nueva Ecija. Four days later or on 28 September 1992, the investigating authorities
apprehended three suspects: Jordan Magat ("Magat"), Randy Reyes ("Reyes") and
Valino. The police recovered most of the stolen items. However, a flower vase and a
small radio were still missing. Cabanlig asked the three suspects where these two
items were. Reyes replied that the items were at his house.
Cabanlig asked his colleagues, Padilla, Mercado, Abesamis and Esteban, to
accompany him in retrieving the flower vase and radio. Cabanlig then brought out
Reyes and Magat from their cell, intending to bring the two during the retrieval
operation. It was at this point that Valino informed Cabanlig that he had moved the
vase and radio to another location without the knowledge of his two cohorts.
Cabanlig decided instead to bring along Valino, leaving behind Magat and Reyes.
CDAcIT
Around 6:30 p.m., five fully armed policemen in uniform — Cabanlig, Padilla,
Mercado, Abesamis and Esteban — escorted Valino to Barangay Sinasahan, Nueva
Ecija to recover the missing flower vase and radio. The policemen and Valino were
aboard a police vehicle, an Isuzu pick-up jeep. The jeep was built like an ordinary
jeepney. The rear end of the jeep had no enclosure. A metal covering separated the
driver's compartment and main body of the jeep. There was no opening or door
between the two compartments of the jeep. Inside the main body of the jeep, were
two long benches, each of which was located at the left and right side of the jeep.
Cabanlig, Mercado and Esteban were seated with Valino inside the main
body of the jeep. Esteban was right behind Abesamis at the left bench. Valino, who
was not handcuffed, was between Cabanlig and Mercado at the right bench. Valino
was seated at Cabanlig's left and at Mercado's right. Mercado was seated nearest to
the opening of the rear of the jeep.
Just after the jeep had crossed the Philippine National Railway bridge and
while the jeep was slowly negotiating a bumpy and potholed road, Valino suddenly
grabbed Mercado's M 16 Armalite and jumped out of the jeep. Valino was able to
grab Mercado's M16 Armalite when Mercado scratched his head and tried to reach
his back because some flying insects were pestering Mercado. Mercado shouted
"hoy!" when Valino suddenly took the M16 Armalite. Cabanlig, who was then facing
the rear of the vehicle, saw Valino's act of taking away the M16 Armalite. Cabanlig
acted immediately. Without issuing any warning of any sort, and with still one foot on
the running board, Cabanlig fired one shot at Valino, and after two to three seconds,
Cabanlig fired four more successive shots. Valino did not fire any shot.
The shooting happened around 7:00 p.m., at dusk or "nag-aagaw ang dilim at
liwanag." Cabanlig approached Valino's body to check its pulse. Finding none,
Cabanlig declared Valino dead. Valino sustained three mortal wounds — one at the
back of the head, one at the left side of the chest, and one at the left lower back.
Padilla and Esteban remained with the body. The other three policemen, including
Cabanlig, went to a funeral parlor.
The following morning, 29 September 1992, a certain SPO4 Segismundo
Lacanilao ("Lacanilao") of the Cabanatuan Police went to Barangay Sinasahan,
Nueva Ecija to investigate a case. Lacanilao met Mercado who gave him instructions
on how to settle the case, that he was handling. During their conversation, Mercado
related that he and his fellow policemen "salvaged" (summarily executed) a person
the night before. Lacanilao asked who was "salvaged." Mercado answered that it
was "Jimmy Valino." Mercado then asked Lacanilao why he was interested in the
identity of the person who was "salvaged." Lacanilao then answered that "Jimmy
Valino" was his cousin. Mercado immediately turned around and left.
Version of the Defense
Cabanlig admitted shooting Valino. However, Cabanlig justified the shooting
as an act of self-defense and performance of duty. Mercado denied that he told
Lacanilao that he and his co-accused "salvaged" Valino. Cabanlig, Mercado,
Abesamis, Padilla, and Esteban denied that they conspired to kill Valino.
The Sandiganbayan's Ruling
The Sandiganbayan acquitted Padilla, Abesamis, Mercado and Esteban as
the court found no evidence that the policemen conspired to kill or summarily
execute Valino. Since Cabanlig admitted shooting Valino, the burden is on Cabanlig
to establish the presence of any circumstance that would relieve him of responsibility
or mitigate the offense committed.
The Sandiganbayan held that Cabanlig could not invoke self-defense or
defense of a stranger. The only defense that Cabanlig could properly invoke in this
case is fulfillment of duty. Cabanlig, however, failed to show that the shooting of
Valino was the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty. The
Sandiganbayan pointed out that while it was the duty of the policemen to stop the
escaping detainee, Cabanlig exceeded the proper bounds of performing this duty
when he shot Valino without warning. cHATSI
The Sandiganbayan found no circumstance that would qualify the crime to
murder. Thus, the Sandiganbayan convicted Cabanlig only of homicide. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused CARLOS
ESTOQUE PADILLA, MEINHART CRUZ ABESAMIS, LUCIO
LADIGNON MERCADO and RADY SALAZAR ESTEBAN are hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Accused RUPERTO
CONCEPCION CABANLIG is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Homicide and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate sentence of FOUR (4) MONTHS of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision
correccional, as maximum. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of
Jimmy Valino the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS,
and the costs.
SO ORDERED. 5
On motion for reconsideration, Associate Justice Anacleto D. Badoy Jr.
("Associate Justice Badoy") dissented from the decision. Associate Justice Badoy
pointed out that there was imminent danger on the lives of the policemen when
Valino grabbed the "infallible Armalite" 6 from Mercado and jumped out from the rear
of the jeep. At a distance of only three feet from Cabanlig, Valino could have
sprayed the policemen with bullets. The firing of a warning shot from Cabanlig was
no longer necessary. Associate Justice Badoy thus argued for Cabanlig's acquittal.
In a vote of four to one, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the decision. 7 The
dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration is hereby

DENIED. 8

The Issues
Cabanlig raises the following issues in his Memorandum:
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE DEFENSE OF FULFILLMENT OF DUTY PUT UP BY CABANLIG
WAS INCOMPLETE
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN RULING THAT
CABANLIG COULD NOT INVOKE SELF-DEFENSE/DEFENSE OF
STRANGER TO JUSTIFY HIS ACTIONS
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN SENTENCING
CABANLIG TO SUFFER IMPRISONMENT AND IN ORDERING HIM
TO PAY THE AMOUNT OF P50,000 TO THE HEIRS OF VALINO 9
The Court's Ruling
The petition has merit. We rule for Cabanlig's acquittal:
Applicable Defense is Fulfillment of Duty
We first pass upon the issue of whether Cabanlig can invoke two or more
justifying circumstances. While there is nothing in the law that prevents an accused
from invoking the justifying circumstances or defenses in his favor, it is still up to the
court to determine which justifying circumstance is applicable to the circumstances
of a particular case.
Self-defense and fulfillment of duty operate on different principles. 10 Self-
defense is based on the principle of self-preservation from mortal harm, while
fulfillment of duty is premised on the due performance of duty. The difference
between the two justifying circumstances is clear, as the requisites of self-defense
and fulfillment of duty are different.
The elements of self-defense are as follows:
 a) Unlawful Aggression;

b) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

c) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending

himself. 11

On the other hand, the requisites of fulfillment of duty are:

1. The accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful

exercise of a right or office;

2. The injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary

consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office. 12

A policeman in the performance of duty is justified in using such force as is

reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance,
prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily
harm. 13 In case injury or death results from the policeman's exercise of such force,
the policeman could be justified in inflicting the injury or causing the death of the
offender if the policeman had used necessary force. Since a policeman's duty
requires him to overcome the offender, the force exerted by the policeman may
therefore differ from that which ordinarily may be offered in self-defense. 14
However, a policeman is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating the
offender with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest
could be affected otherwise. 15
Unlike in self-defense where unlawful aggression is an element, in
performance of duty, unlawful aggression from the victim is not a requisite. In
People v. Delima, 16 a policeman was looking for a fugitive who had several days
earlier escaped from prison. When the policeman found the fugitive, the fugitive was
armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance. The policeman
demanded the surrender of the fugitive. The fugitive lunged at the policeman with his
bamboo lance. The policeman dodged the lance and fired his revolver at the fugitive.
The policeman missed. The fugitive ran away still holding the bamboo lance. The
policeman pursued the fugitive and again fired his revolver, hitting and killing the
fugitive. The Court acquitted the policeman on the ground that the killing was done in
the fulfillment of duty. HDITCS
The fugitive's unlawful aggression in People v. Delima had already ceased
when the policeman killed him. The fugitive was running away from the policeman
when he was shot. If the policeman were a private person, not in the performance of
duty, there would be no self-defense because there would be no unlawful
aggression on the part of the deceased. 17 It may even appear that the public officer
acting in the fulfillment of duty is the aggressor, but his aggression is not unlawful, it
being necessary to fulfill his duty. 18
While self-defense and performance of duty are two distinct justifying
circumstances, self-defense or defense of a stranger may still be relevant even if the
proper justifying circumstance in a given case is fulfillment of duty. For example, a
policeman's use of what appears to be excessive force could be justified if there was
imminent danger to the policeman's life or to that of a stranger. If the policeman used
force to protect his life or that of a stranger, then the defense of fulfillment of duty
would be complete, the second requisite being present.
In People v. Lagata, 19 a jail guard shot to death a prisoner whom he
thought was attempting to escape. The Court convicted the jail guard of homicide
because the facts showed that the prisoner was not at all trying to escape. The
Court declared that the jail guard could only fire at the prisoner in self-defense or if
absolutely necessary to avoid the prisoner's escape.
In this case, Cabanlig, Padilla, Abesamis, Mercado and Esteban were in the
performance of duty as policemen when they escorted Valino, an arrested robber, to
retrieve some stolen items. We uphold the finding of the Sandiganbayan that there is
no evidence that the policemen conspired to kill or summarily execute Valino. In fact,
it was not Valino who was supposed to go with the policemen in the retrieval
operations but his two other cohorts, Magat and Reyes. Had the policemen staged
the escape to justify the killing of Valino, the M16 Armalite taken by Valino would not
have been loaded with bullets. 20 Moreover, the alleged summary execution of
Valino must be based on evidence and not on hearsay.
Undoubtedly, the policemen were in the legitimate performance of their duty
when Cabanlig shot Valino. Thus, fulfillment of duty is the justifying circumstance
that is applicable to this case. To determine if this defense is complete, we have to
examine if Cabanlig used necessary force to prevent Valino from escaping and in
protecting himself and his co-accused policemen from imminent danger.
Fulfillment of Duty was Complete, Killing was Justified
The Sandiganbayan convicted Cabanlig because his defense of fulfillment of
duty was found to be incomplete. The Sandiganbayan believed that Cabanlig
"exceeded the fulfillment of his duty when he immediately shot Valino without issuing
a warning so that the latter would stop." 21
We disagree with the Sandiganbayan.
 Certainly, an M16 Armalite is a far more powerful and deadly weapon than
the bamboo lance that the fugitive had run away with in People v. Delima. The
policeman in People v. Delima was held to have been justified in shooting to death
the escaping fugitive because the policeman was merely performing his duty.
In this case, Valino was committing an offense in the presence of the
policemen when Valino grabbed the M16 Armalite from Mercado and jumped from
the jeep to escape. The policemen would have been justified in shooting Valino if the
use of force was absolutely necessary to prevent his escape. 22 But Valino was not
only an escaping detainee. Valino had also stolen the M16 Armalite of a policeman.
The policemen had the duty not only to recapture Valino but also to recover the
loose firearm. By grabbing Mercado's M16 Armalite, which is a formidable firearm,
Valino had placed the lives of the policemen in grave danger.
Had Cabanlig failed to shoot Valino immediately, the policemen would have
been sitting ducks. All of the policemen were still inside the jeep when Valino
suddenly grabbed the M16 Armalite. Cabanlig, Mercado and Esteban were hemmed
in inside the main body of the jeep, in the direct line of fire had Valino used the M16
Armalite. There would have been no way for Cabanlig, Mercado and Esteban to
secure their safety, as there were no doors on the sides of the jeep. The only way
out of the jeep was from its rear from which Valino had jumped. Abesamis and
Padilla who were in the driver's compartment were not aware that Valino had,
grabbed Mercado's M16 Armalite. Abesamis and Padilla would have been
unprepared for Valino's attack. IDTSaC
By suddenly grabbing the M16 Armalite from his unsuspecting police guard,
Valino certainly did not intend merely to escape and run away as far and fast as
possible from the policemen. Valino did not have to grab the M16 Armalite if his sole
intention was only to flee from the policemen. If he had no intention to engage the
policemen in a firefight, Valino could simply have jumped from the jeep without
grabbing the M16 Armalite. Valino's chances of escaping unhurt would have been
far better had he not grabbed the M16 Armalite which only provoked the policemen
to recapture him and recover the M16 Armalite with greater vigor. Valino's act of
grabbing the M16 Armalite clearly showed a hostile intention and even constituted
unlawful aggression.
Facing imminent danger, the policemen had to act swiftly. Time was of the
essence. It would have been foolhardy for the policemen to assume that Valino
grabbed the M16 Armalite merely as a souvenir of a successful escape. As we have
pointed out in Pomoy v. People 23 :
Again, it was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law
enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his possession of the weapon
when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an
 enforcer of the law, petitioner was duty-bound to prevent the snatching
of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a detained person in
his custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape
and to kill or maim persons in the vicinity, including petitioner himself.
The Sandiganbayan, however, ruled that despite Valino's possession of a
deadly firearm, Cabanlig had no right to shoot Valino without giving Valino the
opportunity to surrender. The Sandiganbayan pointed out that under the General
Rules of Engagement, the use of force should be applied only as a last resort when
all other peaceful and non-violent means have been exhausted. The Sandiganbayan
held that only such necessary and reasonable force should be applied as would be
sufficient to conduct self-defense of a stranger, to subdue the clear and imminent
danger posed, or to overcome resistance put up by an offender.
The Sandiganbayan had very good reasons in steadfastly adhering to the
policy that a law enforcer must first issue a warning before he could use force
against an offender. A law enforcer's overzealous performance of his duty could
violate the rights of a citizen and worse cost the citizen's life. We have always
maintained that the judgment and discretion of public officers, in the performance of
their duties, must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within the
limits of the law. 24 The issuance of a warning before a law enforcer could use force
would prevent unnecessary bloodshed. Thus, whenever possible, a law enforcer
should employ force only as a last resort and only after issuing a warning. ISADET
However, the duty to issue a warning is not absolutely mandated at all times
and at all cost, to the detriment of the life of law enforcers. The directive to issue a
warning contemplates a situation where several options are still available to the law
enforcers. In exceptional circumstances such as this case, where the threat to the
life of a law enforcer is already imminent, and there is no other option but to use
force to subdue the offender, the law enforcer's failure to issue a warning is
excusable.
In this case, the embattled policemen did not have the luxury of time. Neither
did they have much choice. Cabanlig's shooting of Valino was an immediate and
spontaneous reaction to imminent danger. The weapon grabbed by Valino was not
just any firearm. It was an M16 Armalite.
The M16 Armalite is an assault rifle adopted by the United States ("US") Army
as a standard weapon in 1967 during the Vietnam War. 25 The M16 Armalite is still
a general-issue rifle with the US Armed Forces and US law enforcement agencies.
26 The M16 Armalite has both, semiautomatic and automatic capabilities. 27 It is 39
inches long, has a 30-round magazine and fires high-velocity .223-inch (5.56-mm)
bullets. 28 The M16 Armalite is most effective at a range of 200 meters 29 but its
maximum effective range could extend as far as 400 meters. 30 As a high velocity
firearm, the M16 Armalite could be fired at close range rapidly or with much volume
of fire. 31 These features make the M16 Armalite and its variants well suited for
urban and jungle warfare. 32
The M16 Armalite whether on automatic or semiautomatic setting is a lethal
weapon. This high-powered firearm was in the hands of an escaping detainee, who
had sprung a surprise on his police escorts bottled inside the jeep. A warning from
the policemen would have been pointless and would have cost them their lives.
For what is the purpose of a warning? A warning is issued when policemen
have to identify themselves as such and to give opportunity to an offender to
surrender. A warning in this case was dispensable. Valino knew that he was in the
custody of policemen. Valino was also very well aware that even the mere act of
escaping could injure or kill him. The policemen were fully armed and they could use
force to recapture him. By grabbing the M16 Armalite of his police escort, Valino
assumed the consequences of his brazen and determined act. Surrendering was
clearly far from Valino's mind.
At any rate, Valino was amply warned, Mercado shouted "hoy" when Valino
grabbed the M16 Armalite. Although Cabanlig admitted that he did not hear Mercado
shout "hoy", Mercado's shout should have served as a warning to Valino. The verbal
warning need not come from Cabanlig himself.
The records also show that Cabanlig first fired one shot. After a few seconds,
Cabanlig fired four more shots. Cabanlig had to shoot Valino because Valino at one
point was facing the police officers. The exigency of the situation warranted a quick
response from the policemen. CcEHaI
According to the Sandiganbayan, Valino was not turning around to shoot
because two of the three gunshot wounds were on Valino's back. Indeed, two of the
three gunshot wounds were on Valino's back: one at the back of the head and the
other at the left lower back. The Sandiganbayan, however, overlooked the location
of the third gunshot wound. It was three inches below the left clavicle or on the left
top most part of the chest area based on the Medico Legal Sketch showing the
entrances and exits of the three gunshot wounds. 33
The Autopsy Report 34 confirms the location of the gunshot wounds, as
follows:

GUNSHOT WOUNDS — modified by embalming.

1. ENTRANCE — ovaloid, 1.6 x 1.5 cms; with area of tattooing

around the entrance, 4.0 x 3.0 cms.; located at the right postauricular
region, 5.5 cms. behind and 1.5 cms. above the right external auditory
meatus, directed forward downward fracturing the occipital bone,
lacerating the right occipital portion of the brain and fracturing the right
cheek bone and making an EXIT wound, 1.5 x 2.0 cms. located on
right cheek, 4.0 cms. below and 3.0 cms. in front of right external
auditory meatus.
2. ENTRANCE — ovaloid, 0.7 x 0.5 cms., located at the left
chest; 6.5 cms. from the anterior median line, 136.5 cms. from the left
heel directed backward, downward and to the right, involving soft
tissues, fracturing the 3rd rib, left, lacerating the left upper lobe and the
right lower lobe and finally making an EXIT wound at the back, right
side, 1.4 x 0.8 cms., 19.0 cms. from the posterior median line and
132.0 cms. from the right heel and grazing the medial aspect of the
right arm.
3. ENTRANCE — ovaloid, 0.6 x 0.5 located at the back, left
side, 9.0 cms. from the posterior median line; 119.5 cms. from the left
heel; directed forward, downward involving the soft tissues, lacerating
the liver; and bullet was recovered on the right anterior chest wall, 9.0
cms. from the anterior median line, 112.0 cms. from the right heel.
The Necropsy Report 35 also reveals the following:

1. Gunshot Wound, entrance, 0.5 cm X 1.5 cms in size, located at the

left side of the back of the head. The left parietal bone is
fractured. The left temporal bone is also fractured. A wound of exit
measuring 2 cms X 3 cms in size is located at the left temporal
aspect of the head.

2. Gunshot [W]ound, entrance, 0.5 cm in diameter, located at the left

side of the chest about three inches below the left clavicle. The
wound is directed medially and made an exit wound at the right
axilla measuring 2 X 2 cms in size.

3. Gunshot Wound, entrance, 0.5 cm in diameter located at the left lower

back above the left lumbar. The left lung is collapsed and the liver
is lacerated. Particles of lead [were] recovered in the liver tissues.
No wound of exit.

Cause of Death:
Cerebral Hemorrhage Secondary To Gunshot Wound In The
Head
 The doctors who testified on the Autopsy 36 and Necropsy 37 Reports
admitted that they could not determine which of the three gunshot wounds was first
inflicted. However, we cannot disregard the significance of the gunshot wound on
Valino's chest. Valino could not have been hit on the chest if he were not at one
point facing the policemen.
If the first shot were on the back of Valino's head, Valino would have
immediately fallen to the ground as the bullet from Cabanlig's M16 Armalite almost
shattered Valino's skull. It would have been impossible for Valino to still turn and
face the policemen in such a way that Cabanlig could still shoot Valino on the chest
if the first shot was on the back of Valino's head.
The most probable and logical scenario: Valino was somewhat facing the
policemen when he was shot, hence, the entry wound on Valino's chest. On being
hit, Valino could have turned to his left almost falling, when two more bullets felled
Valino. The two bullets then hit Valino on his lower left back and on the left side of
the back of his head, in what sequence, we could not speculate on. At the very least,
the gunshot wound on Valino's chest should have raised doubt in Cabanlig's favor.
Cabanlig is thus not guilty of homicide. At most, Cabanlig, Padilla, Abesamis,
Mercado and Esteban are guilty only of gross negligence. The policemen
transported Valino, an arrested robber, to a retrieval operation without handcuffing
Valino. That no handcuffs were available in the police precinct is a very flimsy
excuse. The policemen should have tightly bound Valino's hands with rope or some
other sturdy material. Valino's cooperative demeanor should not have lulled the
policemen to complacency. As it turned out, Valino was merely keeping up the
appearance of good behavior as a prelude to a planned escape. We therefore
recommend the filing of an administrative case against Cabanlig, Padilla, Abesamis,
Mercado and Esteban for gross negligence.
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 19436 convicting accused RUPERTO CONCEPCION CABANLIG of the
crime of homicide. We ACQUIT RUPERTO CONCEPCION CABANLIG of the crime
of homicide and ORDER his immediate release from prison, unless there are other
lawful grounds to hold him. We DIRECT the Director of Prisons to report to this
Court compliance within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., dissents.

Separate Opinions
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., dissenting:

Cabanlig was convicted of homicide based on the findings of the

Sandiganbayan that he exceeded his duty when he shot Valino without warning. 1
Since Cabanlig saw Valino grab Mercado's armalite rifle, the Sandiganbayan ruled
that he had no right to shoot Valino without giving him the opportunity to surrender. 2
Citing the General Rules of Engagement of the PNP, the Sandiganbayan held that
force and firearms shall be used as a last resort, and only when necessary and
reasonable to subdue or overcome the clear and imminent danger posed, or the
resistance being put up by the malefactor. 3 It disregarded Cabanlig's claim that
Valino was turning around when shot as it was not in accordance with the wounds
suffered by Valino. 4 It also found that Valino was shot at close range, not more than
three feet, because of the tattooing around the entrance of the gunshot wound on
the head. 5
The ponencia however, finds that Cabanlig was justified in killing Valino
because he placed the lives of the policemen in grave danger when he grabbed the
armalite rifle of Mercado. 6 It declares that the policemen would have been sitting
ducks inside the jeep had Cabanlig not immediately shot Valino. 7 Cabanlig was
reacting to imminent danger 8 and a warning from him would have been pointless
and would have cost their lives. 9 It points out that Valino was sufficiently warned
when Mercado shouted "hoy" when his rifle was grabbed. 10 Also, Cabanlig fired
one shot first followed by four more. 11 The ponencia declares that at one point
Valino was facing the police officers, 12 as shown by the location of his chest
wound, 13 thus warranting a quick response. DTIaHE
With due respect, we cannot subscribe to the conclusion that the policemen
would have been "sitting ducks" or easy targets if Cabanlig did not immediately gun
down Valino. It is well to note that Valino who was a suspected robber was being
escorted by five heavily armed policemen on their way to retrieve the stolen items
consisting of a flower vase and a clock. Three of the policemen were armed with M-
16 rifles while two were equipped with .38 pistols. 14
The conclusion that warning Valino would cost the lives of the policemen
lacks basis and purely speculative. There were five police officers guarding Valino
and four of them were armed with high powered guns. The five policemen were up
against a lone malefactor who was not even shown to be adept in handling an M-16
armalite rifle. Besides, Cabanlig was aware when Valino grabbed Mercado's rifle. He
was thus prepared to repel or overcome any threat posed by Valino. As the records
show, Valino ran away from the vehicle after he grabbed the armalite rifle. There
was no evidence that it was aimed at the police officers hence there is no imminent
danger to speak of.
 We take exception to the claim that Valino faced the police officers during the
encounter. Dr. Marcelo Gallardo, Jr. testified that the chest wound did not indicate
that Valino faced the police officers during the shooting. On the contrary, he said that
the assailant was either at the back or the side of the victim, thus:

PROS. TABANGUIL

Q. Doctor, in your findings there are three (3) gunshots wound,

numbered 1, 2 and 3, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, we go to gunshot wound no. 1. "Gunshot Wound, entrance, 0.5

cm x 1.5 cms in size, located at the left side of the back of the
head. The left parietal bone is fractured. The left temporal bone is
also fractured. A wound of exit measuring 2 cms x 3 cms in size is
located at the left temporal aspect of the head." Now, will you
demonstrate to the Honorable court where is this wound located?

A. The wound of entrance is located at the top of the head. In this part of
the head.

PJ GARCHITORENA

Witness is indicating a position above his left temple of his

forehead.

PROS TABANGUIL

Q: In that wound, will you please tell the Honorable Court the position of
the assailant in relation to the victim?

A: The assailant must be at the back of the victim in order to produce the
entrance at the back of the head, sir.

Q: Would you consider that wound a fatal wound?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, Gunshot Wound No. 2: entrance 0.5 cm in diameter, located at

the left side of the chest about three inches below the left clavicle.
The wound is directed medially and made an exit wound at the
 right axilla measuring 2x2 cms in size." Will you demonstrate to
the Court the location of this wound, the entrance and the exit?

A: The wound of entrance is located here below the clavicle then made
an exit wound on his right side, right axilla.

PROS TABAGUIL

Witness demonstrating using his body as a demonstration, your

Honor.

Q: Now, in this wound, what would be the position of the assailant in

relation to the victim?

A: The assailant must be on the left side of the victim in order to produce
that wound, sir.

PJ GARCHITORENA

Q: Before it exit is that the front part of the armpit or the rare part of the
armpit?

A: In the middle, sir.

Q: But the way you are pointing it, it seems to be closer to the chest
rather than the shoulder?

A: It is a little bit front of the oxilla, your Honor.

PROS TABANGUIL

Q: So in that case the assailant must be a little bit backward to the
victim?

A: No, on the lateral side.

Q: "Gunshot Wound No. 3, entrance, 0.5 cm in diameter located at the

left lower back above the left lumbar. The left lung is collapsed
and the liver is lacerated. Particles of lead was recovered in the
liver tissues. No wound of exit." Will you demonstrate to this
Honorable Court where is that wound?
 xxx xxx xxx

PROS TABANGUIL

Q: In the case of this wound no. 3, what would be the position of the
assailant to the victim?

A: The assailant must have been at the left side but a little bit at the
back.

Q: Now, these wounds, 2 and 3, would you consider these wounds a

fatal wound?

A: Yes, sir. 15

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. JACOBA

Q: You stated also Doctor, that the possible position of the assailant as
regards gunshot wound no. 1 was behind the victim a little to the
left, is that correct?

A: No, I did not say that it was a little to the left. Its just at the back. 16

We concede that the police officers were in danger after Valino grabbed the
rifle although the same was not imminent. It appears that Valino was running away
from the jeep and there is no proof that he, even at one point, faced the police
officers and aimed his rifle towards them. Even Cabanlig testified that:

Q: When you fired the first shot, what was the position of Jimmy Baleno?

A: He was running away from us, sir and he was in a position of about to
rotate "umikot".

JUSTICE SANDOVAL:

Q: What do you mean by "umikot"?

A: He would be turning towards my direction, sir.

Q: But he was not able to face you, is that correct?

 A: Yes, sir.

PJ:

Q: Was he able to face you?

A: No, sir. 17

SPO2 Mendoza's testimony that he warned Valino by shouting "hoy"

deserves no consideration. Assuming that it was uttered, there is no proof that it was
heard by Valino. It appears that it was more of a reflex reaction from Mendoza when
his rifle was grabbed rather than a warning issued to Valino.
The testimony of Mendoza is incredible, if not absurd to pretend to be
unaware of what transpired after his gun was allegedly taken by Valino, or that there
appears to be no struggle between him and Valino when the latter attempted to grab
his weapon. As a police officer, Mendoza offered no resistance when Valino stole his
gun. Thus:

Atty. Jacoba:

Q: But when Jimmy Valino grabbed your gun, was it with the left or right
hand?

A: I do not know which hand he used, sir.

Q: Do you remember if you were pushed by Jimmy Valino before

grabbing your gun?

A: No, sir.

Q: So Jimmy Valino was able to jump out of the vehicle with your gun?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Did he point the gun towards your direction?

A: I did not notice, sir.

Q: Did you notice if Jimmy Valino was trying to cock the gun?

A: I did not notice, sir.

 Q: Did you notice when Ruperto Cabanlig fired the first shot on Jimmy
Valino whether Jimmy Valino was facing the vehicle or his back
was towards the vehicle?

A: I did not notice whether he was facing us, sir. 18

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Now, did you notice what was the position of Jimmy Valino when he
was first shot by Ruperto Cabanlig, was he running away from the
jeep or was he facing the jeep?

A: I do not know what his position, Your Honor. 19

That Cabanlig first fired a shot followed by four more shots could not be
considered sufficient warning. The succession of the shots was a mere one or two
seconds thus giving no ample time for Valino to surrender. Besides, as testified to by
Cabanlig, he was giving no warning at all because the shots were directly aimed at
Valino.

ATTY. FAJARDO:

Q: Could you tell more details on that how this incident happened?

A: We had just crossed the PNR bridge, the road was in a very bad way
at that time, the driver was driving slowly and that is where he
took the gun away from Mercado and jumped out of the vehicle
and that is the time I was compelled to shoot him.

Q: How many shots did you fire?

A: Five (5) shots, sir.

Q: What weapon?

A: M-16, sir.

Q: The first five (5) shots that you fired where did you aim?

A: It was toward him, sir.

 Q: And you were not sure whether you hit him or not or you do not know
where you hit him?

A: I am not sure exactly where I had hit him, sir but I got the impression
that he was turning around to shoot me (witness making a gesture
as if somebody is holding a firearm) so I fired some more shots at
him.

JUSTICE SANDOVAL:

Q: What was the weapon grabbed by Baleno?

A: M-16, Your Honor.

Q: How about your other police companions what kind of weapons were
they carrying at that time?

A: Abesamis and Esteban were carrying 38 caliber, Mercado had an M-

16 rifle and the rest of us were carrying M-16. Your Honor.

ATTY. FAJARDO:

Q: You said that you fired several shots, how did you fire, did you aim it
to the victim?

A: Yes, sir the second shot was aimed at him, sir.

JUSTICE SANDOVAL:

Q: Why did you aim at him?

A: Because he had grabbed the weapon sir, and he could kill anyone of
us. 20

The sequence of events adverted to by the ponencia is not supported by the

records. Since the examining physician could not even determine which of the three
wounds was inflicted first, there is no basis to conclude that this is "the most
probable and logical scenario" —
"Valino was somewhat facing the policemen when he was shot,
hence, the entry wound on Valino's chest. On being hit, Valino could
have turned to his left almost falling, when two more bullets felled
Valino. The two bullets then hit Valino on his lower left back and on the
 left side of the back of his head, in what sequence, we could not
speculate on. At the very least, the gunshot wound on Valino's chest
should have raised doubt in Cabanlig's favor." 21
As Dr. Gallardo had testified:

ATTY. JACOBA

Q: Doctor, you are not in a position to state which of these wounds were
inflicted first?

A: I am not sure, sir.

Q: In other words you cannot tell which wound was inflicted first?

A: No sir. 22

In Escara v. People, 23 we declared that factual questions are not reviewable

by the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. There is a question of fact when the doubt arises
as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. In appeals to this Court from the
Sandiganbayan only questions of law may be raised, not issues of fact. cESDCa
The issues raised by petitioner, to wit: whether or not he issued warnings
before shooting Valino and whether the latter was facing him when shot, are issues
of fact and not of law.
It is an established doctrine of long standing that factual findings of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect and will
not be disturbed on appeal. The trial court is in a unique position of having observed
that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the
stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. Only the
trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation,
flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh or the scant or full realization of an oath —
all of which are useful for an accurate determination of a witness' honesty and
sincerity. 24
In People v. Lagata, 25 we held that:
While custodians of prisoners should take all care to avoid the
latter's escape, only absolute necessity would authorize them to fire
against them. Theirs is the burden of proof as to such necessity.
The summary liquidation of prisoners, under flimsy pretexts of attempts
of escape, which has been and is being practiced in dictatorial systems
 of government, has always been and is shocking to the universal
conscience of humanity. SDIACc
Human life is valuable, albeit, sacred. Cain has been the object
of unrelentless curse for centuries and millennia and his name will
always be remembered in shame as long as there are human
generations able to read the Genesis. Twenty centuries of Christianity
have not been enough to make less imperative the admonition that
"Thou shalt not kill," uttered by the greatest pundit and prophet of
Israel. Laws, constitutions, world charters have been written to protect
human life. Still it is imperative that all men be imbued with the spirit of
the Sermon on the Mount that the words of the gospels be translated
into reality, and that their meaning fill all horizons with the eternal
aroma of encyclic love of mankind. [Emphasis supplied] 26
Cabanlig admitting killing Valino. Therefore, the burden of proving that the
killing was reasonable and necessary rests on him. To our mind, Cabanlig failed to
discharge this burden. He also failed to convincingly show that there was a
misapprehension of facts by the Sandiganbayan, hence, its findings must be
accorded respect and weight. cITCAa
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and AFFIRM the decision of
the Sandiganbayan finding Cabanlig guilty of homicide.
||| (Cabanlig v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148431, [July 28, 2005], 502 PHIL 564-594)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 126968. April 9, 2003.]

RICARDO BALUNUECO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

R.P. Dimayacyac for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

On appeal by certiorari is the decision of the Curt of Appeals affirming with

modifications the decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting petitioner herein for the
crime of homicide for the death of Senando Iguico and frustrated homicide for the
injuries inflicted upon his wife Amelia. Of the five original accused, only four were
indicted in two informations, the first, for homicide and the second, for frustrated
homicide. Again, of the four accused, only two were brought to the jurisdiction of the
court a quo, as the other two remained at large. The other accused Reynaldo died while
the case was on trial, thus, only the case against petitioner was the subject of this
appeal. The Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of accused Ricardo for homicide,
giving full faith to the direct and positive testimony of Amelia who pointed to him as the
one who initially axed her husband on the head, shoulder and hand. However, the
appellate court ruled that the wounding of Amelia should be for attempted homicide only
because the hack wound was not proven to be fatal or would produce death had there
been no timely medical attention provided upon her. In effect, petitioner in this appeal
invoked the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives for his defense.

The Supreme Court did not agree with the defense of the petitioner because he
utterly failed to adduce sufficient proof of the existence of a positive strong act of real
aggression on the part of the victim. The trial court found the testimony of Amelia that
the petitioner was one of the principal actors in the slaying of her husband as worthy of
belief, hence, the Supreme Court found that such findings are entitled to the highest
degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. Appellant's conviction for
homicide was affirmed. As to the injuries sustained by Amelia, the Court opined that the
petitioner's homicidal intent had not been indubitably established. Considering that the
injuries suffered by Amelia required medical attendance of only four days, the Supreme
Court held that the offense committed by the petitioner was only slight physical injuries.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; DEFENSE OF

RELATIVES; ELEMENTS. — In effect, petitioner invokes the justifying circumstance of
defense of relatives under Art. 11, par. (2), of The Revised Penal Code. The essential
elements of this justifying circumstance are the following: (a) unlawful aggression; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and, (c) in case the
provocation was given by the person attacked, the one making the defense had no part
therein.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION AS A CONDITION SINE QUA

NON; CONSTRUED. — Of the three (3) requisites of defense of relatives, unlawful
aggression is a condition sine qua non, for without it any defense is not possible or
justified. In order to consider that an unlawful aggression was actually committed, it is
necessary that an attack or material aggression, an offensive act positively determining
the intent of the aggressor to cause an injury shall have been made; a mere threatening
or intimidating attitude is not sufficient to justify the commission of an act which is
punishable per se, and allow a claim of exemption from liability on the ground that it was
committed in self-defense or defense of a relative. It has always been so recognized in
the decisions of the courts, in accordance with the provisions of the Penal Code. Having
admitted the killing of the victim, petitioner has the burden of proving these elements by
clear and convincing evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if the prosecution evidence is
weak it cannot be disbelieved if the accused has admitted the killing.

3. ID.; HOMICIDE; ATTEMPTED OR FRUSTRATED; INTENT TO KILL AS

ESSENTIAL ELEMENT THEREOF; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — On the
injuries sustained by Amelia, we are of the opinion that, contrary to the finding of the
lower court as affirmed by the appellate court, petitioner's homicidal intent has not been
indubitably established. As held in People v. Villanueva, the intent to kill being an
essential element of the offense of frustrated or attempted homicide, said element must
be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and with the same degree of certainty as
required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be
drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond
reasonable doubt. EHTISC

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J p:

On appeal by certiorari is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals affirming with

modifications the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68,
convicting accused RICARDO BALUNUECO of homicide for the death of Senando
Iguico and frustrated homicide for injuries inflicted upon his wife Amelia Iguico. THDIaC

Of the five (5) original accused, 3 only petitioner Ricardo, accused Reynaldo,
Juanito, all surnamed Balunueco, and Armando Flores were indicted in two (2)
Informations, the first for homicide 4 and the second for frustrated homicide. 5 Again, of
the four (4) indictees, only Ricardo and Reynaldo were brought to the jurisdiction of the
court a quo, while Juanito and Armando have remained at large. Accused Reynaldo
died on 17 November 1986. Accordingly, as against him, the criminal cases were
dismissed. Thus, only the criminal cases against petitioner Ricardo Balunueco are
subject of this appeal.
 As principal witness for the prosecution, Amelia Iguico narrated that on 2 May
1982 at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening she was coddling her youngest child in front
of her house at Bagong Tanyag, Taguig, when she saw accused Reynaldo, his father
Juanito and brothers Ricardo and Ramon, all surnamed Balunueco, and one Armando
Flores chasing her brother-in-law Servando Iguico. With the five (5) individuals in hot
pursuit, Servando scampered into the safety of Amelia's house.

Meanwhile, according to private complainant Amelia, her husband Senando, who

was then cooking supper, went out of the house fully unaware of the commotion going
on outside. Upon seeing Senando, Reynaldo turned his attention on him and gave
chase. Senando instinctively fled towards the fields but he was met by Armando who hit
him with a stone, causing Senando to feel dizzy. Reynaldo, Ricardo, and Armando
cornered their quarry near a canal and ganged up on him. Armando placed a can on top
of Senando's head and Ricardo repeatedly struck Senando with an ax on the head,
shoulder, and hand. At one point, Ricardo lost his hold on the ax, but somebody tossed
him a bolo and then he continued hacking the victim who fell on his knees. To shield
him from further violence, Amelia put her arms around her husband but it was not
enough to detract Ricardo from his murderous frenzy. Amelia was also hit on the leg. 6

Dr. Maximo Reyes, NBI Senior Medico-legal officer, declared that on 3 May 1982
he conducted a post mortem examination on the body of the deceased Senando Iguico
and issued an Autopsy Report, which contained the following findings: 7 (a) two (2) stab
wounds and nine (9) gaping hack wounds; and, (b) cause of death was hemorrhage,
acute, profuse, secondary to multiple stab and hack wounds.

In his defense, accused Ricardo narrated a different version of the incident. He

testified that at that time he was fetching water when he heard somebody shouting:
"Saya, saya, tinataga," referring to his brother Reynaldo. When he hurried to the place,
he saw his brother Ramon embracing Senando who was continuously hacking
Reynaldo. Thereafter, Senando shoved Ramon to the ground and as if further enraged
by the intrusion, he turned his bolo on the fallen Ramon. Ricardo screamed, "tama na
yan, mga kapatid ko 'yan." But the assailant would not be pacified as he hacked Ramon
on the chest. At this point, Servando, 8 the brother of Senando, threw an axe at him but
Reynaldo picked it up and smashed Senando with it.

Manuel Flores, another witness for the defense, gave a substantially similar
version of the story. He testified that on the fateful day of the incident, while doing some
carpentry work in front of his mother's house, he saw Senando Iguico, 9 a.k.a.
"Bulldog," with a bolo on hand trailing brothers Reynaldo alias "Sayas" and Ramon
while walking towards Bagong Bantay. Suddenly, Senando confronted the two (2)
brothers and started hacking Reynaldo, hitting him on the head, arm and stomach.
Seeing that his brother was absorbing fatal blows, Ramon embraced Senando but the
latter shoved him (Ramon) and directed his fury at him instead. Ricardo went to the
rescue of his brothers but he too was hacked by Senando.

The trial court disbelieved the version of accused Ricardo, thus he was found
guilty of homicide in Crim. Case No. 49576 and frustrated homicide in Crim. Case No.
49577. It reasoned that the testimony of Amelia Iguico was clear, positive,
straightforward, truthful and convincing. On the other hand, according to the trial court,
the denial of Ricardo was self-serving and calculated to extricate himself from the
predicament he was in. Further, the trial court added that the wounds allegedly received
by Ricardo in the hands of the victim, Senando Iguico, if at all there were any, did not
prove that Senando was the aggressor for the wounds were inflicted while Senando
was in the act of defending himself from the aggression of Ricardo and his co-
conspirators. 10

The Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of accused Ricardo, giving full
faith to the direct and positive testimony of Amelia Iguico who pointed to him as the one
who initially axed her husband Senando on the head, shoulder and hand. 11 While the
appellate court upheld the conviction of Ricardo of homicide for the death of Senando
Iguico, it however ruled that his conviction for the wounding of Amelia Iguico, although
likewise upheld, should be for attempted homicide only. On the wounding of Amelia, the
appellate court had this to say — 12

For while intent to kill was proven, Amelia's hack wound in her left
leg was not proven to be fatal or that it could have produced her death
had there been no timely medical attention provided her, hence, the
stage of execution of the felony committed would only be attempted.

Petitioner now imputes errors to the Court of Appeals: (a) in not taking into
consideration the fact that petitioner, if indeed he participated, had acted in defense of
relatives; (b) in giving due credence to the self-serving and baseless testimony of
Amelia Iguico, the lone and biased witness for the prosecution; and, (c) in failing to
consider the several serious physical injuries sustained by petitioner and his brother
Reynaldo Balunueco.

In a reprise of his stance at the trial, petitioner argues that assuming he

participated in the killing of Senando, he acted in defense of his full-blood relatives:
Reynaldo whom he personally witnessed being boloed by the deceased in the arms,
head and stomach; and Ramon who also became a victim of the deceased's fury after
he was pushed by the deceased and had fallen to the ground. Under such
circumstances, the act of Senando in hacking him after he tried to rescue his brothers,
gave rise to a reasonable necessity for him to use a means to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression. Considering further that there was lack of sufficient provocation on
his part, his acts were therefore justified under Art. 11, par. (2), of The Revised Penal
Code. DIETHS

In effect, petitioner invokes the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives

under Art. 11, par. (2), of The Revised Penal Code. The essential elements of this
justifying circumstance are the following: (a) unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and, (c) in case the provocation
was given by the person attacked, the one making the defense had no part therein.

Of the three (3) requisites of defense of relatives, unlawful aggression is a

condition sine qua non, for without it any defense is not possible or justified. In order to
consider that an unlawful aggression was actually committed, it is necessary that an
attack or material aggression, an offensive act positively determining the intent of the
aggressor to cause an injury shall have been made; a mere threatening or intimidating
attitude is not sufficient to justify the commission of an act which is punishable per se,
and allow a claim of exemption from liability on the ground that it was committed in self-
defense or defense of a relative. It has always been so recognized in the decisions of
the courts, in accordance with the provisions of the Penal Code. 13

Having admitted the killing of the victim, petitioner has the burden of proving
these elements by clear and convincing evidence. He must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if the
prosecution evidence is weak it cannot be disbelieved if the accused has admitted the
killing. 14

In the case at bar, petitioner Ricardo utterly failed to adduce sufficient proof of
the existence of a positively strong act of real aggression on the part of the deceased
Senando. With the exception of his self-serving allegations, there is nothing on record
that would justify his killing of Senando.

First, Ricardo's theory that when he reached the crime scene he found Senando
repeatedly hacking his brother Reynaldo who thereafter retaliated by smashing an axe
on the victim's head is implausible in light of the seriousness of the wounds sustained
by the deceased as compared to the minor injuries inflicted upon petitioner and his two
(2) brothers. The fact that three (3) of the assailants suffered non-fatal injuries bolsters
the fact that Senando tried vainly to ward off the assaults of his assailants.

Second, Ricardo failed to present himself to the authorities. He may have

accompanied the injured Reynaldo to the hospital after the encounter but still he failed
to present himself to the authorities and report the matter to them. The natural impulse
of any person who has killed someone in defense of his person or relative is to bring
himself to the authorities and try to dispel any suspicion of guilt that the authorities might
have against him. This fact assumes a more special significance considering that his
co-accused, Juanito and Armando, have remained at large.

Third, petitioner had a rather erratic recollection of people and events. He vividly
remembered how Reynaldo was injured by Senando but conveniently failed to recall the
events leading to the fatal wounding of the deceased. At another point, he testified that
Reynaldo axed Senando but later retracted his statement by declaring that it was in fact
Senando who hacked Reynaldo. 15 We observe that the killing occurred within or near
the premises of the deceased. This proves per adventure the falsity of petitioner's claim
that it was Senando, rather than he and his kin, who had initiated the unlawful
aggression.

On the other hand, private complainant pointed to petitioner as one of the

principal actors in the slaying of her husband Senando and the court a quo found her
testimony worthy of belief. The unbending jurisprudence is that findings of trial courts on
the matter of credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and
will not be disturbed on appeal. 16 The lower court also declared, and we agree, that
private complainant's relationship with the deceased does not disqualify her from
testifying in the criminal case involving her relative or automatically sully her testimony
with the stain of bias. IEAaST

On the injuries sustained by Amelia, we are of the opinion that, contrary to the
finding of the lower court as affirmed by the appellate court, petitioner's homicidal intent
has not been indubitably established. As held in People v. Villanueva, 17 the intent to
kill being an essential element of the offense of frustrated or attempted homicide, said
element must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and with the same degree of
certainty as required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill
should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent
beyond reasonable doubt.

The facts as borne out by the records do not warrant a finding that petitioner
intended to kill Amelia. Contrarily, the circumstances of the instant case indicate the
opposite: (a) that while petitioner was repeatedly assaulting the deceased, Amelia
embraced her husband in an attempt to avert further infliction of pain upon him; and, (b)
when he hit Amelia once on the left leg, a wound of slight nature, he did not do anything
more to pursue his homicidal urge 18 but instead allowed her to scurry away. This set of
details reinforces this Court's belief that petitioner had no intention of killing Amelia but
nonetheless wounded her either because she unwittingly exposed herself in the so-
called "line-of-fire" when she embraced her husband, or that it was intended more to
deter her from further interfering. Had killing Amelia actually crossed petitioner's mind,
he would have opted to hit his quarry on the vital portions of her body or strike her
several times more to attain his objective. But these he never did.

Considering that the injuries suffered by Amelia were not necessarily fatal and
required a medical attendance of four (4) days, 19 we hold that the offense committed
by petitioner is only that of slight physical injuries. Under Art. 266, par. (1), of The
Revised Penal Code, this is punishable by arresto menor the duration of which is from
one (1) to thirty (30) days. 20

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in Crim. Case No.
49576 finding petitioner Ricardo Balunueco guilty of Homicide is AFFIRMED, and there
being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, petitioner is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years, two (2) months and ten (10) days of prision
mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20)
days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. Consistent with prevailing
jurisprudence, his civil liability to the heirs of Senando Iguico is fixed at P50,000.00. The
assailed Decision in Crim. Case No. 49577 for Attempted Homicide, on the other hand,
is MODIFIED. Petitioner Ricardo Balunueco is found guilty only of Slight Physical
Injuries for the wounding of Amelia Iguico, and is accordingly sentenced to suffer a
straight prison term of ten (10) days of arresto menor, and to pay the costs.

||| (Balunueco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126968, [April 9, 2003], 449 PHIL 52-62)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 37408. October 10, 1933.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

CANDIDO ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Guillermo B. Guevara, for appellant Enriquez.

Monico R. Mercado, for the other appellants.

Attorney-General Jaranilla, for appellee.

SYLLABUS
 1. CRIMINAL LAW; HOMICIDE; CONSPIRACY; RESPONSIBILITY OF
PERSONS ENGAGED. — Where several individuals conspire to do grave bodily
harm to another, and homicide or murder results from their acts of aggression, all
who participated in the conspiracy are liable for the killing, in this case murder,
although the actual intention was only to beat up the victim.
2. ID.; MURDER; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE THAT OFFENDER HAD
NO INTENTION TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG. — As murder in this
jurisdiction results from the presence of qualificative circumstances based for the
most part upon the manner in which the crime is committed, and not upon the state
of mind of the accused, it is permissible upon a conviction for murder to allow the
mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a
wrong.

DECISION

STREET, J p:

This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Pampanga, finding the appellants, Candido Enriquez,
Jose Palacio, Marcelo Franco, Marcelo Bonifacio, Pedro Mocpoc, Vicente Domingo,
and Ambrosio Basa, guilty of the offense of murder and sentencing Candido
Enriquez, as author by induction, to cadena perpetua, with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, and requiring him to pay the sum of P1,000 to the heirs of the
deceased, Ciriaco D. Gines, and one-eighth of the costs of prosecution; and
severally sentencing Marcelo Bonifacio, Marcelo Franco, Pedro Mocpoc, Vicente
Domingo, and Ambrosio Basa, as direct agents in said murder, to undergo cadena
perpetua, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and requiring them jointly
and severally to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000, and to
pay each one-eighth of the costs of prosecution.
Prior to October 28, 1931, two rival corporations were engaged in the
transportation of passengers in central Luzon, both using passenger trucks, or
busses, propelled by gasoline. These two lines were the Pampanga Bus Co.,
operating, among other places, between Apalit and Masantol, and the Mallorca
Transportation, operating from points in Pampanga to Manila.
The Mallorca Transportation is owned by Fernando Enriquez, father of the
appellant Candido Enriquez, and the latter was its manager with a garage in
Macabebe, Pampanga. For some time prior to the events with which we are now
concerned, the Mallorca Transportation had been called upon to answer various
complaints before the Public Service Commission for infractions of its rules: and as a
consequence of these complaints several fines had been imposed upon Fernando
Enriquez. One Ciriaco D. Gines, an inspector of the Pampanga Bus Co. on its Apalit-
Masantol line, was supposed to be the person who had supplied the material for
these complaints and, as a consequence, he had incurred the ill-will of Candido
Enriquez. This feeling of hostility was increased when, on October 26, 1931, Gines
was seen jotting down the number of one of the trucks of the Mallorca
Transportation, while parked near the station of the Manila Railroad Co. in Apalit.
This seems to have been too much for Candido Enriquez, and he decided that Gines
must be gotten out of the way. Accordingly, on the morning of October 27, he
boarded one of his busses at Macabebe headed for Manila. His purpose, as he
explained to an employee in the garage, was to hire ruffians in Manila who would
beat up Gines so that he would not interfere in the future with the business of the
Mallorca Transportation.
Arriving in Manila, Candido Enriquez found one Jose Palacio, formerly a
chauffeur in the employment of Enriquez, but who had lost his job by reason of some
accident for which he was supposed to have been responsible as driver. Enriquez
told Palacio that he wanted him to procure some ruffians (butañgeros) and bring
them up to Macabebe to beat up Gines. Palacio accepted the mandate and in the
course of the day got into touch with a notorious gangster, named Marcelo
Bonifacio, and four others, Marcelo Franco, Pedro Mocpoc, Vicente Domingo, and
Ambrosio Basa. These five agreed to undertake the job. Meanwhile Candido
Enriquez had already left Manila for Macabebe and upon his arrival in that place he
told two of his employees to be on the lookout for the gangsters who would be
coming up that night. True to schedule, Jose Palacio and his five ruffians boarded
the last truck of the Mallorca Transportation which left Manila at about 5 o'clock the
same afternoon. On this trip the six were charged no fares by the conductor.
Arriving in Macabebe near 8 o'clock, the truck was stopped at an old house
formerly used by Fernando Enriquez but now occupied by Maximo Tuason, a
mechanic of the Mallorca Transportation. Palacio and his five ruffians there
disembarked, and Palacio took them into this house. Before long Candido Enriquez
came in and directed that food be supplied and, finding that sufficient food was not
there available, he gave Tuason money and directed him to procure more food from
a store.
After the men had been fed, Jose Palacio, by direction of Enriquez, showed
the house of Gines to Marcelo Bonifacio. Upon the return of the two from this errand,
the six were taken into the kitchen and Enriquez there discussed with them the plan
for beating up Gines. Bonifacio was for doing the work that night, but Enriquez
objected, saying that an attack made at that hour would attract the attention of too
many people, observing further that Gines was not accustomed to leave his house at
night. It was accordingly decided to wait until early in the morning when Gines would
be leaving his home; and it was at the same time agreed that the stipulated
compensation would be paid on the morning when the work was done.
All then retired to rest, and at about 3 o'clock on the next morning, October
28, Candido Enriquez awoke his employees Amado San Andres and Francisco
Mallari, who were sleeping in a truck of the Mallorca Transportation in the garage,
and instructed them to go that day with Maximo Tuason to purchase stone in the
barrio of Santa Maria, municipality of Bocaue, in the Province of Bulacan.
He then had a conversation with Marcelo Bonifacio, the head of the gang, in
which the latter suggested that his men should be provided with iron bars with which
to beat up Gines. Enriquez agreed and took the men to the garage, where he
delivered to them two small iron bars. Passenger trucks in the garage were then
moved out into the street to make way for truck No. TH-4475, which was to be used
by Tuason and his companions in transporting stone from Santa Maria; but before
going on that errand this truck had something more important to do, which was to
transport Jose Palacio and his five ruffians to the house of Gines and to take them
away on the road to Bocaue, when their work of beating up Gines should be
accomplished.
Accordingly, as daylight approached, Tuason and his companions, as well as
Jose Palacio and his five, boarded the truck No. TH-4475 and started on their way.
Arriving at the house of Gines, Palacio and his men alighted, and Tuason was
instructed to proceed a certain distance so as not to attract attention, and await
Palacio's coming, with the others. Tuason therefore drove on and stopped the truck
a short distance away.
Before the truck left the garage that morning Candido Enriquez delivered to
Maximo Tuason the sum of P8.50, with which to buy stone in Bocaue, and at the
same time he delivered to him P20 more with directions to give it to Bonifacio and
his fellow ruffians when they should have finished the job of beating up Gines. After
the truck had stopped near the house of Gines, Bonifacio approached Tuason and
asked him for the money which Enriquez had placed in the former's hands. In
response to this request, Tuason gave Bonifacio the P20 above- mentioned,
although he had been told to deliver it only after the work of beating up Gines had
been completed. The reason Tuason did this was that he feared he might be
assaulted in case of refusal.
Meanwhile Jose Palacio, who personally knew Gines and was serving as
guide, had posted himself in front of the house where Gines was living. Presently
lights appeared, and as Gines came out, Palacio indicated that he was the man they
were after. Upon being struck, Gines gave an exclamation and in a moment fell to
the ground unconscious. The most serious wound received by Gines was a cut, four
centimeters in length and about seven and one-half centimeters in depth, on the
inner side of the upper part of the calf of the right leg. Other wounds were three
severe contusions, one on an arm and two on the body, and two lighter bruises on
the left side of the back. All of these contusions were evidently caused by the iron
bars which had been provided by Enriquez. The malefactors immediately fled. Jose
Palacio ran to the office of Candido Enriquez and reported that the victim was down;
the other assailants ran towards the waiting truck and the driver carried them rapidly
towards Bocaue. Arriving at Bocaue, the five from Manila got off the truck No. TH-
4475 and boarded another bound for Manila. While still aboard the first truck,
Marcelo Franco threw the iron bar which he had used in assaulting Gines to the
ground near a gasoline station in Bocaue; and Francisco Mallari threw the other iron
bar to the ground in the barrio of Santa Ana. Both of these bars were presently
recovered upon information received from Jose Palacio and were produced in
evidence in court.
Gines was left unconscious upon the ground as his assailants fled. As he
recovered consciousness, he called for help, and his cries attracted the attention of
his father and others who came to his aid. The seriousness of his wounds, especially
the cut on the leg, was apparently not at first realized, and it was 6 o'clock before he
was gotten to the Pampanga provincial hospital. At 3.30 p. m. on the afternoon of
the same day, he died from shock and loss of blood.
As Jose Palacio and his five companions were gathered in by the authorities,
they severally made confessions implicating themselves in varying degrees in the
incident. Jose Palacio and Marcelo Franco admitted that the purpose of the assault
was to put Gines to sleep, and it will be remembered that the former was the person
who had been commissioned by Enriquez to employ the others. Four of the
accused, namely, Franco, Basa, Mocpoc, and Domingo, admitted in these
statements that they had each been paid the sum of P4 for their part in the
enterprise.
Directing our attention now a little more closely to the circumstances of the
attack, we note that Gines, in a declaration made before his death, stated that he
was assaulted by three individuals, and it is satisfactorily proved that these three
must have been Marcelo Bonifacio, Marcelo Franco, and Pedro Mocpoc. Of these
three Franco and Mocpoc used the small iron bars which Enriquez had supplied.
There is no satisfactory proof as to the identity of the individual who used the knife.
Lieutenant Lauro Dizon, of the Constabulary, stated on the witness stand that Jose
Palacio told him that he (Palacio) saw Candido Enriquez give Bonifacio a knife at the
same time that he supplied Marcelo Franco and Pedro Mocpoc with the iron bars to
which reference has been made. This statement was of course competent against
Jose Palacio but not against the others. The trial judge makes no mention of the
incident in his opinion. Vicente Domingo, Ambrosio Basa and any other individual
who may have participated in the crime were apparently posted at places convenient
for keeping a lookout and giving alarm.
Upon the circumstance that the wound made with the knife on the leg of the
person assaulted was the primary cause of death and that the author of this injury
has not been identified, the attorneys for the accused chiefly plant their defense, and
in this connection it is insisted that the conspiracy to attack Gines contemplated only
beating him up and did not include the infliction of injury by means of a cutting
instrument. Such an act, so it is said, was not within the scope of the agreement;
and it is insisted that only the individual who inflicted the cut could be held
responsible for the death, if that person were known. It results, in this view, that none
of the appellants can be held liable further than for the bruises inflicted by means of
the iron bars. These injuries, so it is claimed, would in the natural course of events
have been curable in a few days.
We are of the opinion that this contention is not tenable. The accused had
undoubtedly conspired to do grave personal injury to the deceased, and now that the
injuries actually inflicted have resulted in death, they cannot escape from the legal
effect of their acts on the ground that one of the wounds was inflicted in a different
way from that which had been intended. A blow inflicted by one of the small iron bars
used in this assault might well have resulted in the taking of life, and the
circumstance that a knife was also used in striking the deceased does not relieve the
appellants from the consequence of their joint acts. As has been said by the
Supreme Court of the United States, "If a number of persons agree to commit, and
enter upon the commission of a crime which will probably endanger human life such
as robbery, all of them are responsible for the death of a person that ensues as a
consequence." (Boyd vs. U. S., 450; 35 Law. ed., 1077). In United States vs. Patten,
the court said: "Conspirators who join in a criminal attack on a defenseless man with
dangerous weapons, knock him down, and when he tries to escape, pursue him with
increased numbers, and continue the assault, are liable for manslaughter when the
victim is killed by a knife wound inflicted by one of them during the beating, although
in the beginning they did not contemplate the use of a nife." (42 Appeals, D. C.,
239.)
But the defense has undertaken to prove, as a matter of fact, that the fatal cut
was not inflicted by any of the hirelings brought from Manila, but by Amado San
Andres, an employee of Candido Enriquez. This individual was on the truck No. TH-
4475, which carried Jose Palacio and his gangsters from the garage in Macabebe to
the scene of the killing; and a witness was put on the stand by the defense who
testified that he saw Amado San Andres fleeing from the scene of the tragedy with a
knife in hand just before he climbed into the truck which was waiting. In addition to
this, there was testimony showing a suspicious bloodstain on the foot of San Andres
later in the morning. As against this proof, account must be taken of the fact that San
Andres was taken before Gines a short while before the death of the latter
supervened, and Gines explicitly stated that San Andres was not one of the men
who assaulted him. This circumstance no doubt accounts for the fact that the name
of San Andres was omitted from the information. Upon the whole the defense has
not proved that San Andres was the person who used the knife.
But even supposing that the cut was inflicted by San Andres, it would not
follow that the appellants should for that reason be exculpated from the homicide.
San Andres was an employee of Enriquez. He was present when Enriquez
announced in the garage that he was going to Manila to obtain gangsters to dispose
of Gines. He was present when the Manila contingent arrived at the garage in
Macabebe at about 8 p. m. on the night of October 27, and he was on the truck that
carried the accused (except Enriquez) the next morning on their fatal mission. There
is no proof that any of the accused objected to his participation in the assault upon
Gines or that they did anything to prevent such participation. Cooperation can be
inferred not only from proof of actual previous conspiracy, but from the nature of the
acts done when the unlawful act is committed. Assuming, then, that San Andres was
the person who inflicted the fatal cut, the conclusion would be that he was
cooperating with the appellants with their consent, and the appellants are
responsible for the consequences.
The crime committed in this case was murder, in which alevosia should be
taken as the qualifying circumstance. This circumstance is conspicuous in the fact
that the assault was characterized by surprise and was effected by lying in wait for
the deceased in the darkness of the night. The plan adopted was evidently designed
to insure the execution of the offense without risk to the appellants from any defense
which the deceased might make. Nocturnity and abuse of superior strength may
properly be considered as absorbed in the alevosia. There was present as to all of
the accused, except Jose Palacio, the aggravating circumstance that the offense
was committed for a price in money. There was also present, as to all the appellants,
the circumstance of known premeditation in that the offense had been under
contemplation overnight, and the appellants had ample time to reflect repeatedly on
the manner in which it could best be accomplished.
The trial court gave all of the accused the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance that the offenders had no intention to commit so grave a wrong. The
estimation of this circumstance was proper, and its allowance was not inconsistent
with the finding that the crime was murder (U. S. vs. Candelaria, 2 Phil., 104; U. S.
vs. Luciano, 2 Phil., 96; People vs. Cagoco, G. R. No. 38511, page 524, ante).
The judgment appealed from will be affirmed, it being understood that
reclusion perpetua is substituted for cadena perpetua, in accordance with the
Revised Penal Code. So ordered, with costs against the appellants.
 Avanceña, C.J., Hull, Vickers and Butte, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 37408, [October 10, 1933], 58 PHIL 536-545)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 146099. April 30, 2003.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JIMMEL SANIDAD,

PONCE MANUEL alias PAMBONG, JOHN DOE (at large) and PETER
DOE (at large), accused.

JIMMEL SANIDAD and PONCE MANUEL alias PAMBONG,

appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Blanco Law Office for accused-appellants.

SYNOPSIS

Appellants were convicted of the complex crime of murder of one Rolando

Tugadi and of multiple attempted murder of the passengers of the jeepney they
ambushed and were sentenced to death. The Supreme Court upheld their conviction on
appeal, ruling: that the trial court's findings on the witnesses' credibility are generally
upheld on appeal; that the supposed inconsistent and inaccurate details in the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses were relatively trivial; that crime victims cannot be
expected to recall with exact precision the minutiae of the incident; that surviving
passengers positively identified appellants as the malefactors; and that fear of reprisal
or the individual manner by which individuals react when confronted by a gruesome
event as to place the viewer in a state of shock for sometime, is a valid excuse for the
temporary silence of witnesses. The death penalty was affirmed.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; FACTUAL

FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT THEREON ARE GENERALLY UPHELD ON APPEAL;
CASE AT BAR. — It is axiomatic that the assessment on the credibility of witnesses is a
function best discharged by the trial court which is in a better position to determine
conflicting testimonies after having heard the witnesses, and observed their deportment
and manner of testifying. This Court will not interfere with the trial court's findings on the
credibility of witnesses unless those findings are arbitrary, or facts and circumstances of
weight and influence have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied by the judge
which, if considered, would have affected the outcome of the case. None of the
exceptions have been shown to exist in the instant case.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CRIME VICTIMS NOT EXPECTED TO RECALL WITH EXACT
PRECISION THE MINUTIAE OF THE INCIDENT; CASE AT BAR. — [W]e find that the
supposed inconsistent and inaccurate details are relatively trivial and do not affect the
veracity of the testimonies of Marlon Tugadi, Jun Quipay, Pepito Tugadi and Raymund
Fontanilla. Indeed, inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the testimonies of witnesses
which refer to minor and insignificant details do not destroy their credibility. Such minor
inconsistencies and inaccuracies even manifest truthfulness and candor, and erase any
suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. . . Verily, victims of crimes cannot be expected to
recall with exact precision the minutiae of the incident. Human memory is not as
unerring as a photograph. Different persons having different reflexes produce varying
reactions, impressions, perceptions and recollections. Their physical, mental and
emotional conditions may have also affected the recall of the details of the incident.
aAHDIc

3. ID.; ID.; ALIBI; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER THE POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION

OF THE ACCUSED AS THE MALEFACTORS; CASE AT BAR. — Significantly; the
victims positively identified accused-appellants Jimmel Sanidad and Ponce Manuel in
open court as among those who ambushed them in the early morning of 17 January
1999 at the Abra-Cervantes Road, which led to the death of Rolando Tugadi. Victims
Jun Quipay, Pepito Tugadi and Raymund Fontanilla were likewise asked during the trial
to identify the malefactors who staged the ambush, and they all pointed to Jimmel
Sanidad and Ponce Manuel. It must be stressed that the incidents prior to, during and
after the attack provided the victims with more than sufficient opportunity to identify
accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the dastardly acts. The victims had a drinking
session with their assailants that lasted for many hours. During the ambush itself, the
headlights of the victims' vehicle illuminated the assailants. Again, when the vehicle
burst into flames after the ambush, the surroundings were bathed in light including the
assailants who were standing nearby, thus enabling the victims to have a good look at
their faces. These circumstances, coupled with the victims' familiarity with accused-
appellants, rendered a mistaken identification very unlikely. The general denial and alibi
of the defense are too lame to be legally accepted as true, especially when measured
up against the positive identification of accused-appellants. The doctrine is well-settled
that denial and alibi are the weakest of all defenses as they are easy to concoct and
fabricate but difficult to disprove. Denial and alibi should be rejected when the identities
of accused-appellants are sufficiently and positively established by eyewitnesses to the
crime.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY FOR ACCUSED TO BE AT THE

CRIME SCENE AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT; CASE AT BAR. — For alibi to be
credible, the accused must not only prove his presence at another place at the time of
the commission of the offense but must also demonstrate that it would be physically
impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at that time. In the case at bar, accused-
appellants claimed that they were in their respective houses at the time of the ambush.
But the record shows that the house of accused-appellant Jimmel Sanidad's sister
where he was staying in Sitio Bio, San Isidro, Lagangilang, Abra, is but a mere six (6) to
seven (7)-minute walk, or about 700 meters, from the crime scene. While accused-
appellant Ponce Manuel lived "in the same place, (in) the same community."

5. ID.; ID,; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; DELAY IN REPORTING A CRIME,

WHEN SATISFACTORILY EXPLAINED, IS NOT A SETBACK TO THE EVIDENTIARY
VALUE OF THE TESTIMONY; CASE AT BAR. — Delay in reporting a crime to the
authorities is not an uncommon phenomenon. The rule is, delay by a witness in
divulging what he or she knows about a crime is not by itself a setback to the
evidentiary value of such witness' testimony, where the delay is sufficiently justified by
any acceptable explanation. Thus, a well-founded fear of reprisal or the individual
manner by which individuals react when confronted by a gruesome event as to place
the viewer in a state of shock for sometime, is a valid excuse for the temporary silence
of witnesses.

6. ID.; ID.; CONSPIRACY; CONCERTED ACTIONS OF ACCUSED CLEARLY

EVINCED CONSPIRACY; CASE AT BAR. — Conspiracy and treachery, as the trial
court found, attended the commission of the crime. For collective responsibility to be
established, it is not necessary that conspiracy be proved by direct evidence of a prior
agreement to commit the crime. Only rarely would such an agreement be demonstrable
because criminal undertakings, in the nature of things, are rarely documented by written
agreements. The concerted actions of accused-appellants, however, clearly evinced
conspiracy. Their simultaneous acts of peppering the victims' jeepney with bullets, and
thereafter chasing the vehicle to prevent its escape, were undoubtedly in pursuance of a
common felonious design. All these sufficiently prove beyond reasonable doubt that
they conspired to consummate the killing of the victim. caCSDT

7. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; FIRING

SUCCESSIVE SHOTS WITHOUT ALLOWING VICTIMS AN OPPORTUNITY TO PUT
UP A DECENT DEFENSE IS A TREACHEROUS ATTACK. — On treachery, the deadly
successive shots of accused-appellants did not allow the victims any opportunity to put
up a decent defense. The victims were like a flock of sheep waylaid and ferociously
attacked by a pack of ravening wolves. While the victims might have realized a possible
danger to their persons when they saw accused-appellants, all armed and positioned in
a mango tree ahead of them, the attack was executed in such a vicious manner as to
make the defense, not to say a counter-attack, virtually impossible.

8. ID.; ATTEMPTED MURDER; WHEN THE VICTIMS HAVE SUCCESSFULLY

DODGED THE HAIL OF GUNFIRE AND ESCAPED, THE ACCUSED ARE
NONETHELESS GUILTY OF ATTEMPTED MURDER. — Under the circumstances, it is
plain to us that accused-appellants had murder in their hearts when they waylaid their
unwary victims. They must consequently be held liable for their acts. Insofar as victims
Marlon Tugadi, Jun Quipay, Raymund Fontanilla, Pepito Tugadi, Delfin Tadeo, Ricardo
Tadeo, Edwin Tumalip, Bobby Velasquez and Dennis Balueg are concerned, although
they barely escaped the ambush with superficial injuries does not alter the nature of
accused-appellants' participation in the crime of murder except that not one of them
having suffered fatal injuries which could have resulted in their death, accused-
appellants should only be held guilty of attempted murder. Accused-appellants had
commenced their criminal scheme to liquidate all the victims directly by overt acts, but
were unable to perform all the acts of execution that would have brought about their
death by reason of some cause other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is,
the victims successfully dodged the hail of gunfire and escaped.

9. ID.; COMPLEX CRIME; WHERE A CONSPIRACY ANIMATES SEVERAL

REASONS WITH A SINGLE PURPOSE, THEIR INDIVIDUAL ACTS DONE IN
PURSUANCE OF THAT PURPOSE GIVE RISE TO A SINGLE COMPLEX OFFENSE.
— We fully agree with the lower court that the instant case comes within the purview of
Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code which, speaking of complex crimes, provides that
when "a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed in its maximum period." In a complex crime, although two or
more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the
law as well as in the conscience of the offender. Although several independent acts
were performed by the accused in firing separate shots from their individual firearms, it
was not possible to determine who among them actually killed victim Rolando Tugadi.
Moreover, there is no evidence that accused-appellants intended to fire at each and
every one of the victims separately and distinctly from each other. On the contrary, the
evidence clearly shows a single criminal impulse to kill Marlon Tugadi's group as a
whole. Thus, one of accused-appellants exclaimed in frustration after the ambush: "My
gosh, we were not able to kill all of them." Where a conspiracy animates several
persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose
are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a single complex
offense. cIHSTC

10. ID.; MURDER; PENALTY; CASE AT BAR. — The penalty for the most
serious offense of murder under Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code as amended by
Rep. Act No. 7659 is reclusion perpetua to death. It therefore becomes our painful duty
in the instant case to apply the maximum penalty in accordance with law, and sentence
accused-appellants to death.

DECISION

PER CURIAM p:

CONDEMNED TO DEATH by the trial court on 26 July 2000 1 for the complex
crime of murder and multiple attempted murder, accused-appellants JIMMEL SANIDAD
and PONCE MANUEL alias PAMBONG now seek the reversal of their conviction as we
review automatically the judgment pursuant to Sec. 22, Rep. Act No. 7659, amending
Art. 47 of The Revised Penal Code. CcaDHT

On 16 January 1999 at around five o'clock in the afternoon Marlon Tugadi, Jun
Quipay, Raymund Fontanilla, Rolando Tugadi, Pepito Tugadi, Delfin Tadeo, Ricardo
Tadeo, Edwin Tumalip, Bobby Velasquez and Dennis Balueg left Budac, Tagum, Abra,
on board a passenger jeepney driven by Delfin Tadeo to attend a barangay fiesta in the
neighboring town of Lagangilang, Abra. When they arrived they joined the residents in a
drinking spree that lasted up to the wee hours the following morning. In the course of
their conviviality, accused-appellants Jimmel Sanidad, Ponce Manuel alias Pambong
and several other residents of Lagangilang joined them in drinking. 2 Marlon Tugadi and
accused Jimmel Sanidad were drinking buddies and members of the CAFGU before
then. 3

On 17 January 1999 at about four o'clock in the morning Jimmel Sanidad and his
companions finished drinking and left. 4 Shortly after, the group of Marlon Tugadi also
stopped drinking and headed home for Budac, Tagum, Abra, boarding the same
jeepney driven by Delfin Tadeo. Seated next to Delfin in front were Ricardo Tadeo and
Rolando Tugadi, while on the left rear seat were Marlon Tugadi, Jun Quipay and
Raymund Fontanilla. Seated on the right rear seat were Bobby Velasquez, Dennis
Balueg, Edwin Tumalip and Pepito Tugadi. 5
 With Delfin Tadeo on the wheels the jeepney cruised the rough and gravelly dirt
road of Abra-Cervantes with its passengers completely unaware that danger lurked
ahead in the dark and dreary stretch of the road. The jeepney's headlights sharply
ablaze and glaring illuminated the path and radiated towards the lush vegetation of the
surrounding landscape. As the jeepney approached a plantation, its headlights beamed
at accused-appellants Jimmel Sanidad, Ponce Manuel and two (2) other unidentified
companions who were positioned next to a mango tree at the left side of the road
approximately fifteen (15) meters away. Accused-appellants were armed with an
armalite, a .45 caliber pistol and shotguns with buckshots.

As the jeepney moved closer, the accused in a classic case of ambuscade

suddenly and without warning unleashed a volley of shots at the jeepney. 6 Delfin
stepped on the gas in a vain effort to elude their assailants, but they continued firing at
the hapless victims. Bullets plowed the side of the vehicle and all the passengers sitting
at the back instinctively ducked on the floor to avoid being hit. The accused pursued the
vehicle on foot and fired at it incessantly until it finally stalled a few meters away. 7

The jeepney was left in shambles. Its tires, headlights and taillights were
shattered; its windshield broken to pieces, and the front and left sides of the vehicle
riddled with bullets. 8 Miraculously, almost all of its passengers, with the exception of
Rolando Tugadi, survived the ambush and suffered only minor injuries. Marlon Tugadi
tried to pull his brother Rolando Tugadi from the vehicle to safety only to realize that he
was not only too heavy, he was already dead. As the pursuing gunmen drew near,
Marlon decided to abandon Rolando and scampered away with the other victims until
they reached a bushy area about fifteen (15) meters away from the vehicle. 9

Meanwhile, the accused caught up with the crippled jeepney. Moments later, fire
engulfed it. The radiant flames of the burning vehicle illuminated the malefactors who
stood nearby and watched the blaze. It could not be determined whether the accused
purposely set the vehicle on fire or the fuel tank was hit during the shooting that ignited
the fire. Marlon Tugadi and Pepito Tugadi later heard one of the unidentified
companions of accused-appellant Sanidad say to him: "My gosh, we were not able to
kill all of them." 10 Thereafter, the accused left the scene, firing their guns
indiscriminately into the air as they walked away. 11

Apparently shaken and dazed by their terrifying ordeal, the victims hid in a culvert
on the side of the road and did not come out until the police arrived at the scene. The
police doused the burning vehicle with water and found the charred remains of Rolando
Tugadi. 12 Likewise retrieved at the crime scene were eighty-five (85) empty shells from
an armalite rifle, two (2) empty shells from a .45 caliber pistol, and a slug from another .
45 caliber pistol. 13
 Dr. Maria L. Dickenson, Medico-Legal Officer of Lagangilang, Abra, conducted
an autopsy on Rolando Tugadi immediately after the incident. Her postmortem findings
were: (a) carbonization of the body, (b) long bones of lower extremities still burning, (c)
presence of lower half portion of charred skull, (d) presence of left charred thigh, (e)
presence of right charred thigh, and (f) presence of upper third of charred right leg.
Cause of death: burns, generalized, 6th degree. 14

An Information for murder with multiple attempted murder and malicious mischief
was filed against Jimmel Sanidad, Ponce Manuel alias Pambong, John Doe and Peter
Doe. The defense of the accused rested on bare denial and alibi. They disclaimed
liability for the ambush insisting that at about 4:00 to 4:30 in the morning of 17 January
1999 they were already at home sleeping when they heard the clatter of gunfire and an
explosion nearby. But the trial court disregarded the defense interposed by the accused
and forthwith convicted them of the complex crime of murder and multiple attempted
murder, and sentenced them to death.

In this mandatory review, the legal questions raised essentially centered on: first,
the credibility of witnesses; and, second, the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence.

We affirm the conviction. We find that the prosecution succeeded overwhelmingly

in meeting the quantum of proof required to overturn the constitutional presumption of
innocence. The trial court properly convicted accused-appellants on the basis of the
credible and uncontroverted testimonies of the victims and other prosecution witnesses.
EaHATD

It is axiomatic that the assessment on the credibility of witnesses is a function

best discharged by the trial court which is in a better position to determine conflicting
testimonies after having heard the witnesses, and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying. This Court will not interfere with the trial court's findings on the
credibility of witnesses unless those findings are arbitrary, or facts and circumstances of
weight and influence have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied by the judge
which, if considered, would have affected the outcome of the case. 15 None of the
exceptions have been shown to exist in the instant case.

Accused-appellants pointed out supposed inconsistencies and inaccuracies in

the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Marlon Tugadi, Jun Quipay, Pepito Tugadi and
Raymund Fontanilla, thus —

. . . ordinary human conduct is very predictable. When confronted

with danger, the first reaction is to avoid it. But not Jun Quipay, Marlon
Tugadi, Pepito Tugadi and Raymund Fontanilla. While all claimed they
 have jumped out of the jeep, they did not run away. Instead they still
lingered at about 7–50 meters away from the jeep. So that they saw the
attackers when the jeep exploded. How remarkable is their depiction of
the accused as unafraid of an exploding jeep! The testimonies of Jun
Quipay and Marlon Tugadi cancel each other out. Marlon said he saw
the ambushers come out with guns blazing. Jun said Marlon was lying
down with eyes closed when that moment happened. Again, back to
human nature, Marlon Tugadi and Pepito Tugadi saw with the morning
light that their brother Rolando Tugadi is (sic) no more. A carbonized
cadaver he became. And yet they did not tell the police who did the
dastardly acts! How unnatural. And yet they claimed in court that they
positively identified the accused at the time of the ambush. 16

After a cursory reading of the transcripts, however, we find that the supposed
inconsistent and inaccurate details are relatively trivial and do not affect the veracity of
the testimonies of Marlon Tugadi, Jun Quipay, Pepito Tugadi and Raymund Fontanilla.
Indeed, inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer to
minor and insignificant details do not destroy their credibility. Such minor
inconsistencies and inaccuracies even manifest truthfulness and candor, and erase any
suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. 17

At any rate, the ineludible fact remains that Marlon Tugadi, Jun Quipay, Pepito
Tugadi and Raymund Fontanilla were all at the scene of the crime and almost got killed
during the ambush. They were eyewitnesses to the gruesome death of a family member
in the hands of accused-appellants. What is important is that they conveyed to the trial
court what they actually perceived, including those seeming improbabilities, on that
fateful day; and they categorically supplied all the facts necessary for accused-
appellants' conviction. Verily, victims of crimes cannot be expected to recall with exact
precision the minutiae of the incident. Human memory is not as unerring as a
photograph. 18 Different persons having different reflexes produce varying reactions,
impressions, perceptions and recollections. Their physical, mental and emotional
conditions may have also affected the recall of the details of the incident.

Significantly, the victims positively identified accused-appellants Jimmel Sanidad

and Ponce Manuel in open court as among those who ambushed them in the early
morning of 17 January 1999 at the Abra-Cervantes Road, which led to the death of
Rolando Tugadi. Quoted hereunder is an excerpt from Marlon Tugadi's testimony —

Q: Mr. Witness, do you know one by the name of Jimmel Sanidad?

A: Yes sir.
 Q: Will you please focus your eyes around and point to that person
Jimmel Sanidad?

A: (Witness pointed to a man seated at the accused bench and when

asked of his name he answered Jimmel Sanidad.)

Q: Why do you know this accused Jimmel Sanidad Mr. Witness?

A: We were in the same batch in the CAFGU sir.

Q: Aside from being a CAFGU batch member, what else do you know of
this accused Jimmel Sanidad?

A: We sometimes drink together when I go to their place, sir.

Q: How about the other accused Ponce Manuel alias Pambong, again I
ask you to focus your eyes around and point at him and identify
him?

A: (Witness pointed to a man seated at the accused bench and when

asked of his name he answered Ponce Manuel). 19

Victims Jun Quipay, Pepito Tugadi and Raymund Fontanilla were likewise asked
during the trial to identify the malefactors who staged the ambush, and they all pointed
to Jimmel Sanidad and Ponce Manuel. aEIcHA

It must be stressed that the incidents prior to, during and after the attack provided
the victims with more than sufficient opportunity to identify accused-appellants as the
perpetrators of the dastardly acts. The victims had a drinking session with their
assailants that lasted for many hours. During the ambush itself, the headlights of the
victims' vehicle illuminated the assailants. Again, when the vehicle burst into flames
after the ambush, the surroundings were bathed in light including the assailants who
were standing nearby, thus enabling the victims to have a good look at their faces.
These circumstances, coupled with the victims' familiarity with accused-appellants,
rendered a mistaken identification very unlikely.

The general denial and alibi of the defense are too lame to be legally accepted
as true, especially when measured up against the positive identification of accused-
appellants. The doctrine is well settled that denial and alibi are the weakest of all
defenses as they are easy to concoct and fabricate but difficult to disprove. Denial and
alibi should be rejected when the identities of accused-appellants are sufficiently and
positively established by eyewitnesses to the crime.
 For alibi to be credible, the accused must not only prove his presence at another
place at the time of the commission of the offense but must also demonstrate that it
would be physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at that time. In the
case at bar, accused-appellants claimed that they were in their respective houses at the
time of the ambush. But the record shows that the house of accused-appellant Jimmel
Sanidad's sister where he was staying in Sitio Bio, San Isidro, Lagangilang, Abra, is but
a mere six (6) to seven (7)-minute walk, or about 700 meters, from the crime scene. 20
While accused-appellant Ponce Manuel lived "in the same place, (in) the same
community." 21

Equally untenable is accused-appellants' assertion that the delay of the victims in

identifying their ambushers for more than four (4) weeks points to the conclusion that
"all the survivors of the ambush were really and timely clueless as to who the
perpetrators of the ambush (were)." 22

Delay in reporting a crime to the authorities is not an uncommon phenomenon.

The rule is, delay by a witness in divulging what he or she knows about a crime is not by
itself a setback to the evidentiary value of such witness' testimony, where the delay is
sufficiently justified by any acceptable explanation. Thus, a well-founded fear of reprisal
or the individual manner by which individuals react when confronted by a gruesome
event as to place the viewer in a state of shock for sometime, is a valid excuse for the
temporary silence of witnesses. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General in the
present case —

. . . the victims in the instant case were survivors of an extremely

violent incident which inflicts severe concomitant psychological stress on
them. Considering also that the survivors were being investigated by the
police from another municipality where the perpetrators not only reside
but one of them was even a member of the CAFGU, it is a natural
reaction for the victims not to reveal that they know the identities of the
perpetrators and induce them to take action to prevent the victims from
testifying. . . . Furthermore, Marlon Tugadi insisted to the police during
the investigation that he knew who ambushed them but that he would
talk only after his brother's interment. This hardly qualifies as an unusual
behavior. 23

Conspiracy and treachery, as the trial court found, attended the commission of
the crime. For collective responsibility to be established, it is not necessary that
conspiracy be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime. Only
rarely would such an agreement be demonstrable because criminal undertakings, in the
nature of things, are rarely documented by written agreements. The concerted actions
of accused-appellants, however, clearly evinced conspiracy. Their simultaneous acts of
peppering the victims' jeepney with bullets, and thereafter chasing the vehicle to prevent
its escape, were undoubtedly in pursuance of a common felonious design. All these
sufficiently prove beyond reasonable doubt that they conspired to consummate the
killing of the victim. 24

On treachery, the deadly successive shots of accused-appellants did not allow

the victims any opportunity to put up a decent defense. The victims were like a flock of
sheep waylaid and ferociously attacked by a pack of ravening wolves. While the victims
might have realized a possible danger to their persons when they saw accused-
appellants, all armed and positioned in a mango tree ahead of them, the attack was
executed in such a vicious manner as to make the defense, not to say a counter-attack,
virtually impossible.

Under the circumstances, it is plain to us that accused-appellants had murder in

their hearts when they waylaid their unwary victims. They must consequently be held
liable for their acts. Insofar as victims Marlon Tugadi, Jun Quipay, Raymund Fontanilla,
Pepito Tugadi, Delfin Tadeo, Ricardo Tadeo, Edwin Tumalip, Bobby Velasquez and
Dennis Balueg are concerned, although they barely escaped the ambush with
superficial injuries does not alter the nature of accused-appellants' participation in the
crime of murder except that not one of them having suffered fatal injuries which could
have resulted in their death, accused-appellants should only be held guilty of attempted
murder. Accused-appellants had commenced their criminal scheme to liquidate all the
victims directly by overt acts, but were unable to perform all the acts of execution that
would have brought about their death by reason of some cause other than their own
spontaneous desistance, that is, the victims successfully dodged the hail of gunfire and
escaped. EaHATD

We fully agree with the lower court that the instant case comes within the purview
of Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code which, speaking of complex crimes, provides that
when "a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed in its maximum period." In a complex crime, although two or
more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the
law as well as in the conscience of the offender. 25

Although several independent acts were performed by the accused in firing

separate shots from their individual firearms, it was not possible to determine who
among them actually killed victim Rolando Tugadi. Moreover, there is no evidence that
accused-appellants intended to fire at each and every one of the victims separately and
distinctly from each other. On the contrary, the evidence clearly shows a single criminal
impulse to kill Marlon Tugadi's group as a whole. 26 Thus, one of accused-appellants
exclaimed in frustration after the ambush: "My gosh, we were not able to kill all of them."
27 Where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose, their individual
acts done in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of
execution, giving rise to a single complex offense. 28

The penalty for the most serious offense of murder under Art. 248 of The
Revised Penal Code as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 is reclusion perpetua to death.
It therefore becomes our painful duty in the instant case to apply the maximum penalty
in accordance with law, and sentence accused-appellants to death.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo of 26 July 2000 finding accused-
appellants JIMMEL SANIDAD and PONCE MANUEL alias PAMBONG guilty of the
complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murder and imposing upon them the
supreme penalty of DEATH is AFFIRMED.

Accused-appellants are likewise ordered jointly and severally to: (a) INDEMNIFY
the heirs of the deceased victim Rolando Tugadi in the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity as well as P50,000.00 as moral damages; and, (b) PAY victim Delfin Tadeo
the sum of P50,000.00 for the loss of his jeepney.

In accordance with Art. 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 25

of Rep. Act No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to Her Excellency the President for the possible exercise of her
pardoning power. ScTIAH

||| (People v. Sanidad, G.R. No. 146099, [April 30, 2003], 450 PHIL 449-465)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 181409. February 11, 2010.]

INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE

CARUNGCONG, represented by MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, as
Administratrix, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
WILLIAM SATO, respondents.

DECISION
CORONA, J p:

Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. — No criminal,

but only civil liability shall result from the commission of the crime of
theft, swindling, or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by
the following persons:

1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by

affinity in the same line;

2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which

belonged to the deceased spouse before the same shall
have passed into the possession of another; and

3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if

living together.

The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable

to strangers participating in the commission of the crime. (emphasis
supplied)

For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the relationship by affinity

created between the husband and the blood relatives of his wife (as well as between
the wife and the blood relatives of her husband) dissolved by the death of one
spouse, thus ending the marriage which created such relationship by affinity? Does
the beneficial application of Article 332 cover the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification? ACTEHI
Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix
1 of petitioner intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de
Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit 2 for estafa against her brother-in-law,
William Sato, a Japanese national. Her complaint-affidavit read:

I, MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG Y GONZALE[S], Filipino, of legal

age, single, and resident of Unit 1111, Prince Gregory Condominium,
105 12th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, after being duly sworn, depose
and state that:

1. I am the duly appointed Administratrix of the Intestate

Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], docketed as Spec.
Procs. No. [Q]-95-23621[,] Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 104, being one (1) of her surviving daughters. Copy of the
Letters of Administration dated June 22, 1995 is hereto attached
as Annex "A" to form an integral part hereof.

2. As such Administratrix, I am duty bound not only to

preserve the properties of the Intestate Estate of Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], but also to recover such funds and/or
properties as property belonging to the estate but are presently in
the possession or control of other parties.

3. After my appointment as Administratrix, I was able to

confer with some of the children of my sister Zenaida Carungcong
Sato[,] who predeceased our mother Manolita Carungcong Y
Gonzales, having died in Japan in 1991.

4. In my conference with my nieces Karen Rose Sato and

Wendy Mitsuko Sato, age[d] 27 and 24 respectively, I was able to
learn that prior to the death of my mother Manolita Carungcong Y
Gonzale[s], [s]pecifically on o[r] about November 24, 1992, their
father William Sato, through fraudulent misrepresentations, was
able to secure the signature and thumbmark of my mother on a
Special Power of Attorney whereby my niece Wendy Mitsuko
Sato, who was then only twenty (20) years old, was made her
attorney-in-fact, to sell and dispose four (4) valuable pieces of
land in Tagaytay City. Said Special Power of Attorney, copy of
which is attached as ANNEX "A" of the Affidavit of Wendy Mitsuko
Sato, was signed and thumbmark[ed] by my mother because
William Sato told her that the documents she was being made to
sign involved her taxes. At that time, my mother was completely
blind, having gone blind almost ten (10) years prior to November,
1992. CSDAIa

5. The aforesaid Special Power of Attorney was signed by

my mother in the presence of Wendy, my other niece Belinda
Kiku Sato, our maid Mana Tingzon, and Governor Josephine
Ramirez who later became the second wife of my sister's widower
William Sato.

6. Wendy Mitsuko Sato attests to the fact that my mother

signed the document in the belief that they were in connection
with her taxes, not knowing, since she was blind, that the same
was in fact a Special Power of Attorney to sell her Tagaytay
properties.

7. On the basis of the aforesaid Special Power of Attorney,

William Sato found buyers for the property and made my niece
Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign three (3) deeds of absolute sale in favor
of (a) Anita Ng (Doc. 2194, Page No. 41, Book No. V, Series of
1992 of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio), (b) Anita Ng (Doc.
No. 2331, Page No. 68, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary
Public Vicente B. Custodio) and (c) Ruby Lee Tsai (Doc. No. II,
Page No. 65, Book No. II, Series of 1993 of Notary Public Toribio
D. Labid). . . .

8. Per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, the

considerations appearing on the deeds of absolute sale were not
the true and actual considerations received by her father William
Sato from the buyers of her grandmother's properties. She attests
that Anita Ng actually paid P7,000,000.00 for the property
covered by TCT No. 3148 and P7,034,000.00 for the property
covered by TCT No. 3149. All the aforesaid proceeds were turned
over to William Sato who undertook to make the proper
accounting thereof to my mother, Manolita Carungcong
Gonzale[s].

9. Again, per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato,

Ruby Lee Tsai paid P8,000,000.00 for the property covered by
Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0735, and the proceeds thereof
were likewise turned over to William Sato.

10. The considerations appearing on the deeds of sale

were falsified as Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato has actual knowledge of
the true amounts paid by the buyers, as stated in her Affidavit,
since she was the signatory thereto as the attorney-in-fact of
Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s]. DAHCaI

11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was not
in any position to oppose or to refuse her father's orders.

12. After receiving the total considerations for the

properties sold under the power of attorney fraudulently secured
 from my mother, which total P22,034,000.00, William Sato failed
to account for the same and never delivered the proceeds to
Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] until the latter died on June 8,
1994.

13. Demands have been made for William Sato to make an

accounting and to deliver the proceeds of the sales to me as
Administratrix of my mother's estate, but he refused and failed,
and continues to refuse and to fail to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of the estate of the deceased Manolita Carungcong Y
Gonzale[s] and of the heirs which include his six (6) children with
my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato. . . . 3

Wendy Mitsuko Sato's supporting affidavit and the special power of attorney
allegedly issued by the deceased Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in favor of
Wendy were attached to the complaint-affidavit of Mediatrix.
In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
dismissed the complaint. 4 On appeal, however, the Secretary of Justice reversed
and set aside the resolution dated March 25, 1997 and directed the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City to file an Information against Sato for violation of Article 315,
paragraph 3 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. 5 Thus, the following Information was
filed against Sato in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87: 6

INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of

ESTAFA under Article 315[,] par. 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:

That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in Quezon

City, Philippines, the above-named accused, by means of deceit, did,
then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud MANOLITA
GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG in the following manner, to wit:
the said accused induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De
Carungcong[,] who was already then blind and 79 years old[,] to sign
and thumbmark a special power of attorney dated November 24, 1992 in
favor of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, daughter of said accused, making her
believe that said document involved only her taxes, accused knowing
fully well that said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, then a
minor, to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of to any person or
entity of her properties all located at Tagaytay City, as follows: cHCIEA
 1. One Thousand Eight Hundred Seven(ty) One (1,871) square
meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3147;

2. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and

covered by T.C.T. No. 3148 with Tax Declaration No. GR-
016-0722, Cadastral Lot No. 7106;

3. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and

covered by T.C.T. No. 3149 with Tax Declaration No. GR-
016-0721, Cadastral Lot No. 7104;

4. Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) square meters more or less

with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-1735, Cadastral Lot No.
7062;

registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, and

once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other
pertinent documents, said accused made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the
three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title
[TCT] No. 3148 for P250,000.00, [TCT] No. 3149 for P250,000.00 and
[Tax Declaration] GR-016-0735 for P650,000.00 and once in possession
of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused,
misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong who died in 1994.

Contrary to law. 7

Subsequently, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information

so as to increase the amount of damages from P1,150,000, the total amount stated
in the deeds of sale, P22,034,000, the actual amount received by Sato. caIETS
Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332
of the Revised Penal Code, his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the
deceased Manolita who was his mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance. 
The prosecution disputed Sato's motion in an opposition dated March 29,
2006.
In an order dated April 17, 2006, 8 the trial court granted Sato's motion and
ordered the dismissal of the criminal case:
 The Trial Prosecutor's contention is that the death of the wife of
the accused severed the relationship of affinity between accused and his
mother-in-law. Therefore, the mantle of protection provided to the
accused by the relationship is no longer obtaining. DcITHE

A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the

Revised Penal Code convinces this Court of the correctness of the
contention of the [d]efense. While it is true that the death of Zenaida
Carungcong-Sato has extinguished the marriage of accused with her, it
does not erase the fact that accused and Zenaida's mother, herein
complainant, are still son[-in-law] and mother-in-law and they remained
son[-in-law] and mother-in-law even beyond the death of Zenaida.

Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and

states no proviso. "No criminal, but only civil liability[,] shall result from
the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief
committed or caused mutually by . . . 1) spouses, ascendants and
descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line."

Article 332, according to Aquino, in his Commentaries [to]

Revised Penal Code, preserves family harmony and obviates scandal,
hence even in cases of theft and malicious mischief, where the crime is
committed by a stepfather against his stepson, by a grandson against
his grandfather, by a son against his mother, no criminal liability is
incurred by the accused only civil (Vicente Alavare, 52 Phil. 65; Adame,
CA 40 OG 12th Supp. 63; Cristobal, 84 Phil. 473). STcDIE

Such exempting circumstance is applicable herein.

WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash Original Information

meritorious, the same is GRANTED and, as prayed for, case is hereby
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. 9 (underlining supplied in the original)

The prosecution's motion for reconsideration 10 was denied in an order dated

June 2, 2006. 11
Dissatisfied with the trial court's rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita,
represented by Mediatrix, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals 12
which, however, in a decision 13 dated August 9, 2007, dismissed it. It ruled:
 [W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death of
Zenaida did not extinguish the relationship by affinity between her
husband, private respondent Sato, and her mother Manolita, and does
not bar the application of the exempting circumstance under Article
332(1) of the Revised Penal Code in favor of private respondent Sato.

We further agree with the submission of the [Office of the Solicitor

General (OSG)] that nothing in the law and/or existing jurisprudence
supports the argument of petitioner that the fact of death of Zenaida
dissolved the relationship by affinity between Manolita and private
respondent Sato, and thus removed the protective mantle of Article 332
of the Revised Penal Code from said private respondent; and that
notwithstanding the death of Zenaida, private respondent Sato remains
to be the son-in-law of Manolita, and a brother-in-law of petitioner
administratrix. As further pointed out by the OSG, the filing of the
criminal case for estafa against private respondent Sato already created
havoc among members of the Carungcong and Sato families as private
respondent's daughter Wendy Mitsuko Sato joined cause with her aunt
[Mediatrix] Carungcong y Gonzales, while two (2) other children of
private respondent, William Francis and Belinda Sato, took the side of
their father.

There is a dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries

elaborating on the provision of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, from the plain language of the law, it is clear that the
exemption from criminal liability for the crime of swindling (estafa) under
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code applies to private respondent
Sato, as son-in-law of Manolita, they being "relatives by affinity in the
same line" under Article 332(1) of the same Code. We cannot draw the
distinction that following the death of Zenaida in 1991, private
respondent Sato is no longer the son-in-law of Manolita, so as to exclude
the former from the exempting circumstance provided for in Article 332
(1) of the Revised Penal Code.

Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic is the
rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the
courts should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the
application of law where none is indicated. The courts could only
distinguish where there are facts or circumstances showing that the
lawgiver intended a distinction or qualification. In such a case, the courts
would merely give effect to the lawgiver's intent. The solemn power and
 duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not include the
power to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein.
CcSTHI

Further, it is an established principle of statutory construction that

penal laws are strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor
of the accused. Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the
accused. In this case, the plain meaning of Article 332 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code's simple language is most favorable to Sato. 14

The appellate court denied reconsideration. 15 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the orders
of the trial court. It cites the commentary of Justice Luis B. Reyes in his book on
criminal law that the rationale of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code exempting
the persons mentioned therein from criminal liability is that the law recognizes the
presumed co-ownership of the property between the offender and the
offended party. Here, the properties subject of the estafa case were owned by
Manolita whose daughter, Zenaida Carungcong-Sato (Sato's wife), died on January
28, 1991. Hence, Zenaida never became a co-owner because, under the law,
her right to the three parcels of land could have arisen only after her mother's
death. Since Zenaida predeceased her mother, Manolita, no such right came
about and the mantle of protection provided to Sato by the relationship no
longer existed.
Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the relationship may
not be invoked in case of death of the spouse at the time the crime was allegedly
committed. Thus, while the death of Zenaida extinguished her marriage with Sato, it
did not dissolve the son-in-law and mother-in-law relationship between Sato and
Zenaida's mother, Manolita.
For his part, the Solicitor General maintains that Sato is covered by the
exemption from criminal liability provided under Article 332. Nothing in the law and
jurisprudence supports petitioner's claim that Zenaida's death dissolved the
relationship by affinity between Sato and Manolita. As it is, the criminal case against
Sato created havoc among the members of the Carungcong and Sato families, a
situation sought to be particularly avoided by Article 332's provision exempting a
family member committing theft, estafa or malicious mischief from criminal liability
and reducing his/her liability to the civil aspect only. TIEHDC
The petition has merit.
The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code. In particular, it calls for the determination of the following: (1)
the effect of death on the relationship by affinity created between a surviving spouse
and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse and (2) the extent of the coverage of
Article 332.
EFFECT OF DEATH ON RELATIONSHIP
BY AFFINITY AS ABSOLUTORY CAUSE
Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause 16 in the crimes of theft, estafa
(or swindling) and malicious mischief. It limits the responsibility of the offender to civil
liability and frees him from criminal liability by virtue of his relationship to the
offended party.
In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it has been
held that included in the exemptions are parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted
children. 17 By virtue thereof, no criminal liability is incurred by the stepfather who
commits malicious mischief against his stepson; 18 by the stepmother who commits
theft against her stepson; 19 by the stepfather who steals something from his
stepson; 20 by the grandson who steals from his grandfather; 21 by the accused
who swindles his sister-in-law living with him; 22 and by the son who steals a ring
from his mother. 23
Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other
spouse. It is a relationship by marriage or a familial relation resulting from marriage.
24 It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in connection with the institution of
marriage and family relations. DCTSEA
If marriage gives rise to one's relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of
one's spouse, does the extinguishment of marriage by the death of the spouse
dissolve the relationship by affinity?
Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with the issue that
confronts us in this case. That is why the trial and appellate courts acknowledged
the "dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries" on the matter. In contrast, in the
American legal system, there are two views on the subject. As one Filipino author
observed:

In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the

spouses, there are conflicting views. There are some who believe that
relationship by affinity is not terminated whether there are children or not
in the marriage (Carman vs. Newell, N.Y. 1 [Denio] 25, 26). However,
the better view supported by most judicial authorities in other
jurisdictions is that, if the spouses have no living issues or children and
one of the spouses dies, the relationship by affinity is dissolved. It
follows the rule that relationship by affinity ceases with the dissolution of
 the marriage which produces it (Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657, 659, 56 Am
Dec. 288). On the other hand, the relationship by affinity is continued
despite the death of one of the spouses where there are living issues or
children of the marriage "in whose veins the blood of the parties are
commingled, since the relationship of affinity was continued through the
medium of the issue of the marriage" (Paddock vs. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch.
331, 333). 25  

The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity
terminates with the dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which gave
rise to the relationship of affinity between the parties. 26 Under this view, the
relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent with the marriage that
produced it. Its duration is indispensably and necessarily determined by the
marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage subsists,
such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the
surviving spouse to the deceased spouse's blood relatives. SacTAC
The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues
even after the death of one spouse when there is a surviving issue. 27 The rationale
is that the relationship is preserved because of the living issue of the marriage in
whose veins the blood of both parties is commingled. 28
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by
affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse
continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the
marriage produced children or not. 29 Under this view, the relationship by affinity
endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the
death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers that, where
statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the "tie of
affinity" between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded
as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties. 30
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views,
we hold that the second view is more consistent with the language and spirit of
Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury
disqualification and incest. 31 On the other hand, the continuing affinity view has
been applied in the interpretation of laws that intend to benefit step-relatives or in-
laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article 332 (1) is meant to be
beneficial to relatives by affinity within the degree covered under the said provision,
the continuing affinity view is more appropriate.
 Second, the language of Article 332 (1) which speaks of "relatives by affinity
in the same line" is couched in general language. The legislative intent to make no
distinction between the spouse of one's living child and the surviving spouse of one's
deceased child (in case of a son-in-law or daughter-in-law with respect to his or her
parents-in-law) 32 can be drawn from Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code
without doing violence to its language.
Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the
family as a basic autonomous social institution are policies of the State and that it is
the duty of the State to strengthen the solidarity of the family. 33 Congress has also
affirmed as a State and national policy that courts shall preserve the solidarity of the
family. 34 In this connection, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony
and obviate scandal. 35 The view that relationship by affinity is not affected by the
death of one of the parties to the marriage that created it is more in accord with
family solidarity and harmony.
Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws
is to resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule
for the accused. 36 This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the
accused shall be presumed innocent unless and until his guilt is established beyond
reasonable doubt. 37
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity. 38 The
rule applies when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal
statute, one that its prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him.
The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the
accused.
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the
lens of the basic purpose of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to preserve
family harmony by providing an absolutory cause. Since the goal of Article 332 (1) is
to benefit the accused, the Court should adopt an application or interpretation that is
more favorable to the accused. In this case, that interpretation is the continuing
affinity view. ICacDE
Thus, for purposes of Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that
the relationship by affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood
relatives of the deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the marriage
which created the affinity. (The same principle applies to the justifying circumstance
of defense of one's relatives under Article 11 [2] of the Revised Penal Code, the
mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of grave offense committed against
one's relatives under Article 13[5] of the same Code and the absolutory cause of
relationship in favor of accessories under Article 20 also of the same Code.)
SCOPE OF ARTICLE 332 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE
The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only
applies to the felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said
provision, the State condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of
theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right
to prosecute the offender for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party
with the option to hold the offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies
mentioned therein. The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the
provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling
and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under
Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification or
estafa through falsification. 39
The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real
nature of the offense is determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the
designation of the offense. 40 What controls is not the title of the Information or the
designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the Information. 41 In other
words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature
of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the Information. 42 It is
the exclusive province of the court to say what the crime is or what it is named. 43
The determination by the prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime
committed is merely an opinion which is not binding on the Court. 44
A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being
charged not with simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents. In particular, the Information states that Sato, by
means of deceit, intentionally defrauded Manolita committed as follows: aDSTIC

(a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was already blind at

that time) and induced her to sign and thumbmark the same;

(b) he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection
with her taxes when it was in fact a special power of attorney
(SPA) authorizing his minor daughter Wendy to sell, assign,
transfer or otherwise dispose of Manolita's properties in Tagaytay
City;
 (c) relying on Sato's inducement and representation, Manolita signed
and thumbmarked the SPA in favor of Wendy Mitsuko Sato,
daughter of Sato;

(d) using the document, he sold the properties to third parties but he

neither delivered the proceeds to Manolita nor accounted for the
same and;

(d) despite repeated demands, he failed and refused to deliver the

proceeds, to the damage and prejudice of the estate of Manolita.

The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was committed
by attributing to Manolita (who participated in the execution of the document)
statements other than those in fact made by her. Manolita's acts of signing the SPA
and affixing her thumbmark to that document were the very expression of her
specific intention that something be done about her taxes. Her signature and
thumbmark were the affirmation of her statement on such intention as she only
signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document which she could not have read)
because of Sato's representation that the document pertained to her taxes. In
signing and thumbmarking the document, Manolita showed that she believed and
adopted the representations of Sato as to what the document was all about, i.e., that
it involved her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark, therefore, served as her
conformity to Sato's proposal that she execute a document to settle her taxes.
Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that
Manolita granted his daughter Wendy a special power of attorney for the purpose of
selling, assigning, transferring or otherwise disposing of Manolita's Tagaytay
properties when the fact was that Manolita signed and thumbmarked the document
presented by Sato in the belief that it pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the document
itself, the SPA, and everything that it contained were falsely attributed to Manolita
when she was made to sign the SPA. DaCEIc
Moreover, the allegations in the Information that:

(1) "once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and

other pertinent documents, [Sato] made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign
the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale" and

(2) "once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above

properties, said accused, misapplied, misappropriated and
converted the same to his own personal use and benefit" 
raise the presumption that Sato, as the possessor of the falsified document and the
one who benefited therefrom, was the author thereof.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the prosecution moved for the
amendment of the Information so as to increase the amount of damages from
P1,150,000 to P22,034,000. This was granted by the trial court and was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals on certiorari. This meant that the amended Information would
now state that, while the total amount of consideration stated in the deeds of
absolute sale was only P1,150,000, Sato actually received the total amount of
P22,034,000 as proceeds of the sale of Manolita's properties. 45 This also meant
that the deeds of sale (which were public documents) were also falsified by making
untruthful statements as to the amounts of consideration stated in the deeds.
EICSTa
Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that
was not simple estafa. Sato resorted to falsification of public documents (particularly,
the special power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a necessary means to
commit the estafa.
Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa
but the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, Sato
cannot avail himself of the absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code in his favor.
EFFECT OF ABSOLUTORY CAUSE UNDER
ARTICLE 332 ON CRIMINAL LIABILITY
FOR THE COMPLEX CRIME OF ESTAFA
THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC
DOCUMENTS
The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally liable
for simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code, should he not be absolved also from criminal liability for the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public documents? No.
True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and
falsification of public document is required for a proper conviction for the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public document. That is the ruling in
Gonzaludo v. People. 46 It means that the prosecution must establish that the
accused resorted to the falsification of a public document as a necessary means to
commit the crime of estafa.
However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article 332 of
the Revised Penal Code and of the nature of a complex crime would negate
exemption from criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through falsification
of public documents, simply because the accused may not be held criminally liable
for simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332. acCTIS
The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes
against property, namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. Thus, all other crimes, whether simple or complex, are not affected by
the absolutory cause provided by the said provision. To apply the absolutory
cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to one of the component crimes
of a complex crime for the purpose of negating the existence of that complex crime
is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332. In other words, to apply Article 332 to
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document would be to
mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a separate simple crime, not as the
component crime that it is in that situation. It would wrongly consider the indictment
as separate charges of estafa and falsification of public document, not as a single
charge for the single (complex) crime of estafa through falsification of public
document.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to
hold the offender criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief and considers the violation of the juridical right to property
committed by the offender against certain family members as a private matter and
therefore subject only to civil liability. The waiver does not apply when the violation
of the right to property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably intertwined
with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity and presumed authenticity of
public documents. For, in the latter instance, what is involved is no longer
simply the property right of a family relation but a paramount public interest.
The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate
scandal. 47 Thus, the action provided under the said provision simply concerns the
private relations of the parties as family members and is limited to the civil aspect
between the offender and the offended party. When estafa is committed through
falsification of a public document, however, the matter acquires a very serious public
dimension and goes beyond the respective rights and liabilities of family members
among themselves. Effectively, when the offender resorts to an act that breaches
public interest in the integrity of public documents as a means to violate the property
rights of a family member, he is removed from the protective mantle of the
absolutory cause under Article 332.
In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents, it would be wrong to consider the
component crimes separately from each other. While there may be two
component crimes (estafa and falsification of documents), both felonies are
animated by and result from one and the same criminal intent for which there is
only one criminal liability. 48 That is the concept of a complex crime. In other
words, while there are two crimes, they are treated only as one, subject to a
single criminal liability. EaHDcS
As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical right or interest is
violated (e.g., homicide which violates the right to life, theft which violates the right to
property), 49 a complex crime constitutes a violation of diverse juridical rights or
interests by means of diverse acts, each of which is a simple crime in itself. 50 Since
only a single criminal intent underlies the diverse acts, however, the component
crimes are considered as elements of a single crime, the complex crime. This is the
correct interpretation of a complex crime as treated under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code.
In the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or ideal) plurality
of crimes where the same criminal intent results in two or more component crimes
constituting a complex crime for which there is only one criminal liability. 51 (The
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document falls under this
category.) This is different from a material (or real) plurality of crimes where different
criminal intents result in two or more crimes, for each of which the accused incurs
criminal liability. 52 The latter category is covered neither by the concept of complex
crimes nor by Article 48.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal plurality of crimes
(concursus delictuorum or concurso de delitos) gives rise to a single criminal liability
and requires the imposition of a single penalty:

Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more

crimes, it is only one crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed
and the two or more crimes constituting the same are more conveniently
termed as component crimes. 53 (emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually

committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well
as in the conscience of the offender. The offender has only one criminal
intent. Even in the case where an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the evil intent of the offender is only one. 54

For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification of public
document requires that the elements of both estafa and falsification exist, it does not
mean that the criminal liability for estafa may be determined and considered
independently of that for falsification. The two crimes of estafa and falsification of
public documents are not separate crimes but component crimes of the single
complex crime of estafa and falsification of public documents.
Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be criminally liable for the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document, the liability for
estafa should be considered separately from the liability for falsification of public
document. Such approach would disregard the nature of a complex crime and
contradict the letter and spirit of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It would
wrongly disregard the distinction between formal plurality and material plurality, as it
improperly treats the plurality of crimes in the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document as a mere material plurality where the felonies are
considered as separate crimes to be punished individually. HcaATE
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS MAY BE
A NECESSARY MEANS FOR COMMITTING
ESTAFA EVEN UNDER ARTICLE 315 (3[A])
The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the
Revised Penal Code are as follows:

(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document;

(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document;

(3) the offended party personally signed the document and;

(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.

While in estafa under Article 315 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does
not require that the document be falsified for the consummation thereof, it does not
mean that the falsification of the document cannot be considered as a necessary
means to commit the estafa under that provision. DIESaC
The phrase "necessary means" does not connote indispensable means for if
it did, then the offense as a "necessary means" to commit another would be an
indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof. 55 In People
v. Salvilla, 56 the phrase "necessary means" merely signifies that one crime is
committed to facilitate and insure the commission of the other. 57 In this case, the
crime of falsification of public document, the SPA, was such a "necessary means" as
it was resorted to by Sato to facilitate and carry out more effectively his evil design to
swindle his mother-in-law. In particular, he used the SPA to sell the Tagaytay
properties of Manolita to unsuspecting third persons.  
 When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary
means to commit another crime, like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes
form a complex crime under Article 48 of the same Code. 58 The falsification of a
public, official or commercial document may be a means of committing estafa
because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another,
the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to
cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of a public, official or
commercial document. 59 In other words, the crime of falsification was committed
prior to the consummation of the crime of estafa. 60 Actually utilizing the falsified
public, official or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. 61 The damage
to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the
document. 62
Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information
show that the falsification of public document was consummated when Sato
presented a ready-made SPA to Manolita who signed the same as a statement of
her intention in connection with her taxes. While the falsification was consummated
upon the execution of the SPA, the consummation of the estafa occurred only when
Sato later utilized the SPA. He did so particularly when he had the properties sold
and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita
was caused not by the falsification of the SPA (as no damage was yet caused to the
property rights of Manolita at the time she was made to sign the document) but by
the subsequent use of the said document. That is why the falsification of the public
document was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary means for) the
commission of the estafa. aAIcEH
The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement,
had made Manolita sign a deed of sale of the properties either in his favor or in favor
of third parties. In that case, the damage would have been caused by, and at exactly
the same time as, the execution of the document, not prior thereto. Therefore, the
crime committed would only have been the simple crime of estafa. 63 On the other
hand, absent any inducement (such as if Manolita herself had been the one who
asked that a document pertaining to her taxes be prepared for her signature, but
what was presented to her for her signature was an SPA), the crime would have only
been the simple crime of falsification. 64
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August
9, 2007 and the resolution dated January 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. S.P. No. 95260 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the
trial court which is directed to try the accused with dispatch for the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public documents.
 SO ORDERED.
||| (Intestate Estate of Vda. de Carungcong v. People, G.R. No. 181409, [February 11,
2010], 626 PHIL 177-211)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-10951. October 23, 1958.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

GREGORIO RAMIREZ, defendant-appellant.

Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Pacifico P. de

Castro for appellee.

Porfirio V. Villaroman and Vedasto B. Gesmundo and Froilan Tafalla for

appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER; EVIDENCE; SELF-DEFENSE; CASE AT

BAR. — In pleading self-defense, appellant testified that he was assaulted first by
J.E., and later joint by M. and the deceased who grabbed him by the wrist from
behind: that when J. E. tried to hit him again, he drew his dagger and plunged it on
J.E., and then swung said dagger from right to left, hitting the deceased who was still
holding him by the waist thus disposing of his opponents and freeing himself.
Thereafter, J.E. left, the deceased released him from the hold, and M. just
disappeared. Held: Aside from the incredible nature of appellant's version, it is hard
to believe that the deceased, who was physically inferior and defective, would dare
enmesh himself in a scuffle and risk his life by embracing an opponent on the waist
from behind but whose arms were left free to retaliate. And it is even more
preposterous to suppose that the deceased was behind appellant at the time he was
wounded, for it was physically impossible that the dagger could have landed
precisely on the back of the deceased, left side, with an inward and downward
direction, causing a penetrating wound 4-1/2 inches deep. No matter in what
conceivable manner the dagger thrust might have been delivered, the same could
not have produced the kind and character of the wound inflicted upon the deceased,
and on the precise spot it landed, under the circumstances and relative positions of
deceased and appellant as described by the latter and his witnesses.
 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MOTIVE; PROOF OF, WHEN NOT REQUIRED. — The
question of motive is very important in cases where there is doubt as to whether the
defendant is or is not the person who committed the act. But where, as in the case at
bar, the defendant himself admitted that he was the one who stabbed the deceased,
there was no need for the prosecution to inquire into his motive.

DECISION

ENDENCIA, J p:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro
sentencing appellant Gregorio Ramirez to life imprisonment for the crime of murder,
and to pay P6,000 indemnity to the heirs of the deceased.
The facts as established by the prosecution, are as follows: On the evening of
April 29, 1955, at about half past eight, a religious organization known as "Iglesia ni
Cristo" was having a religious service in the poblacion of San Teodoro, Oriental
Mindoro, open to the public. Among the spectators was the deceased Crisanto
Manalo who was listening with folded arms to the Minister preaching a sermon on a
platform about thirty meters away. Mariano Canovas, who was also at the gathering
and was about five meters from Manalo, saw appellant Gregorio Ramirez walk in
front of Manalo, then situate himself behind the latter's left side, and, without any
ado, suddenly stab Manalo on the back with a double-edged dagger nine inches
long (Exhibit B). Manalo staggered on his left and fell. Just before the assault, Jose
Evangelista, another spectator, who was about two meters away from Manalo, upon
noticing that appellant was about to stab the deceased, exclaimed: "Goring, don't
hurt him because he has no fighting chance," but before he could finish uttering
these words, appellant had already plunged the dagger on Manalo's back.
The deceased was a short fellow, with short and paralized arms (sinkol), short
and paralized fingers that could not grasp anything as they could not be folded to
reach the palms of his hands, with scars around the neck, and with small narrow
eyes (sinkit), and this evidently explains why Evangelista said that the deceased had
no fighting chance. When Evangelista approached appellant with the intention of
separating him from Manalo and prevent further harm, appellant stabbed
Evangelista twice on the chest, inflicting two wounds thereby, whereupon
Evangelista ran away chased by appellant. For these two stab wounds Evangelista
was hospitalized for nine days.
Immediately after the incident and before Manalo was brought to the
provincial hospital of Calapan, his statement (Exhibit E) was right away taken down
by the chief of police because, Dr. Sulit, one of the witnesses to the affixing of
declarant's thumb mark, urged the chief of police to rush it as Manalo might die at
any moment, as he in fact died early the following morning at the provincial hospital
where he was taken to posthaste. After his death, Dr. Manuel R. Luna of the hospital
performed the corresponding autopsy and found that the deceased sustained a
profound stab wound 2 1/2 inches long and 4 1/2 inches deep, running inward and
downward, located at the infra-scapular region, back, a little below the level of the
left nipple, perforating and lacerating the left diaphragm, lower left lung, stomach and
intestines (Exhibits A and D).
Appellant admits having inflicted the stab wound which caused the death of
the deceased, but pleads self-defense. He testified that while the Minister was
delivering the sermon, two suffocating smokes were noticed, one from a burning
piece of cotton under the platform where the Minister was preaching, which
appellant put out, and another, some fifteen minutes later, in the midst of the
assemblage, which caused the people nearby to cough and shy away; that being a
member of the Iglesia ni Cristo, he went around to look for the person or persons
responsible therefor; that while thus walking around, Jose Evangelista approached
and asked him what he was looking for, and without waiting for his answer,
Evangelista continued, "So you're looking for the man who caused the smoke; it was
I," and at the same time Evangelista grabbed him by the breast and boxed him, the
blow landing on his left face; that soon after, another man who from information he
later found to be one Manikis, gave him a fist blow on the nape which felled him,
face down, and when he intended to get up, Manikis again hit him on the leg,
thereupon the deceased grabbed him by the waist; that he stood up facing
Evangelista, with the deceased at his back still holding him by the waist, and then
Evangelista again tried to grab him by the collar to hit him, hence he drew his dagger
and plunged it on Evangelista twice in succession, and then swung said dagger from
right to left, hitting the deceased who was still holding him by the waist from behind,
thus disposing of his opponents and freeing himself. Appellant further stated that
Evangelista left, the deceased released him from the hold, and Manikis just
disappeared. To corroborate him, appellant offered the testimony of Elpidio
Matanguihan and Dante Gutierrez, his co-members in the Iglesia ni Cristo.
Although we here have two conflicting versions on how the incident started
and developed, they however agree on this point: that the deceased Crisanto
Manalo was stabbed by appellant with a dagger, causing his death. Likewise it
stands without conflict that on the night in question while the Minister was preaching,
two annoying smokes were noticed, which set appellant to walk around, armed with
a dagger, to look for the man who caused them.
Upon careful consideration of these undisputed facts as well as of the
conflicting versions on the case, we are with the trial judge, who saw and heard the
witnesses, in not giving credence to the testimony of appellant and his witnesses.
Aside from the incredible nature of appellant's version, his two witnesses, who in
turn contradicted each other, contradict him in many respect. While he assures the
court that he was knocked down only once, that is to say, upon being hit on the nape
by a certain Manikis, his witness Elpidio Matanguihan states that appellant fell twice:
first when hit by Evangelista on the face, and then again when hit by Manikis on the
nape. Dante Gutierrez's version, on the other hand, is very much different. He said
that appellant, after receiving the blow from Evangelista, did not fall but just turned
his body, and that at this moment Manikis boxed appellant on the nape which felled
the latter, and when appellant stood up and attempted to run, his leg was "balked" or
tipped by Manikis, by reason of which appellant, again fell, and when appellant again
attempted to stand up, he was embraced on the waist from behind by the deceased.
These three different and conflicting versions on a single matter of fact, confusing
and contradictory as they are, should be disregarded for their dubious nature.
Again, while appellant said that he delivered thrusts with his dagger twice in
succession on Evangelista, Elpidio Matanguihan, contradicting him, stated that
appellant just swang the dagger from left to right hitting Evangelista in front, and
then from right to left hitting the deceased behind. On the other hand, Dante
Gutierrez testifying on this point stated positively that Evangelista parried the blow of
appellant, so that the latter had to push the blade on Evangelista and then directed
the dagger on the deceased who was behind.
Furthermore, while appellant and Elpidio Matanguihan state that the
deceased grabbed appellant's waist from behind, Gutierrez states on the other hand
that the deceased embraced appellant on the waist from behind, both facing the
same direction, and graphically showing it to the trial court. Either version could not
have been possible, as it was conclusively shown that the deceased had short and
paralized fingers that could not grasp anything, and his arms could not have
encircled around appellant's waist as they were short and paralized (sinkol).
Moreover, it is hard to believe that the deceased, who was physically inferior and
defective, would dare enmesh himself in a scuffle and risk his life by embracing an
opponent on the waist from behind but whose arms were left free to retaliate. And it
is even more preposterous to suppose that the deceased was behind appellant at
the time he was wounded, for it was physically impossible that the dagger could
have landed precisely on the back of the deceased, left side, with an inward and
downward direction, causing a penetrating wound 4 1/2 inches deep. No matter in
what conceivable manner the dagger thrust might have been delivered, the same
could not have produced the kind and character of the wound inflicted upon the
deceased, and on the precise spot it landed, under the circumstances and relative
positions of deceased and appellant as described by the latter and his witnesses.
 
 Appellant in his brief stresses the fact that, by reason of the failure of the
prosecution to prove any motive, thus affecting the credibility of its witnesses, he is
entitled to an acquittal, considering, besides, that he merely acted in self-defense.
"The question of motive is very important in cases where there is
doubt as to whether the defendant is or is not the person who committed
the act, but when there is no doubt, has in the case at bar, that the
defendant was the one who caused the death of the deceased, it is not
so important to know the exact reason for the deed. (U.S. vs. McMann, 4
Phil., 561; People vs. Ragsac, 61 Phil., 146; People vs. Tastatas, 65
Phil., 543; People vs. Tagasa, 68 Phil., 1947)." 1
There being an admission by appellant himself that he was the one who stabbed the
deceased, there was no need for the prosecution to inquire into his motive. On the
other hand, while it is true that the prosecution failed to prove any motive, the record
reveals that the defense itself has supplied it. It established that there were two
suffocating smokes noticed during the progress of the religious service, which made
appellant to go around. Certainly, the causing of these smokes, presumably by non-
members, which disturbed and interrupted the service, particularly at the time when
the Minister was preaching, is enough motive for any member of the sect to be
offended thereby, particularly appellant who has shown to be a member of some
importance. Armed with a deadly dagger before coming to the meeting as if
expecting trouble during the service from antagonistic elements, appellant has
imposed upon himself the duty to look for the person or persons responsible for the
annoying smokes, and it was not strange for him to pick on the deceased, a non-
member, as one of the authors of the nuisance.
In view of the above findings and considerations, we find it hard to believe in
the self-defense invoked by appellant. He himself admits that he and Evangelista
were friends and never had any misunderstanding of any kind prior to the incident. If
this is so, then there was absolutely no reason why Evangelista, a non-member,
should provoke and attack appellant in a meeting precisely organized and conducted
by the followers of the Iglesia ni Cristo of which appellant is a member in good
standing. Unarmed as he was, it would have been foolhardy for said Evangelista to
adopt an aggressive attitude and thus invite the risk of being manhandled by the
Iglesia ni Cristo followers. And were it true that appellant was assaulted by
Evangelista and Manikis prior to the stabbing of the deceased, his natural and
logical reaction would have been to seek redress by filing the corresponding
complaint against the two. He admits however that he has not done so, but that
instead he was accused by Evangelista of physical injuries. Moreover, Evangelista,
in rebuttal, not only denied having a tussle with appellant before the stabbing of the
deceased, but positively stated that he was alone in approaching appellant, and that
he does not know of any person who responds to the name of Manikis. And lastly,
 the deceased himself in his statement Exhibit E which may be considered as part of
the res gestae for it does not meet all the requirements of a dying declaration,
asseverates that he was stabbed all of a sudden from behind, without a word being
said.
The decision appealed from being in accordance with the facts and the law,
the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.
||| (People v. Ramirez, G.R. No. L-10951, [October 23, 1958], 104 PHIL 720-727)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 184500. September 11, 2012.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WENCESLAO

NELMIDA @ "ESLAO," and RICARDO AJOK @ "PORDOY,"
accused-appellants.

DECISION

PEREZ, J p:

The subject of this present appeal is the Decision 1 dated 18 June 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC No. 00246, affirming the Decision 2 dated 30
September 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte,
Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 21-910, finding herein appellants Wenceslao Nelmida
@ "Eslao" (Wenceslao) and Ricardo Ajok @ "Pordoy" (Ricardo) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double
attempted murder, thereby sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Appellants were likewise ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of each of
the deceased victims, i.e., Police Officer 3 Hernando P. dela Cruz (PO3 Dela Cruz) and
Technical Sergeant Ramon Dacoco (T/Sgt. Dacoco), the amount of P50,000.00 each as
moral damages and P50,000.00 each as civil indemnity for the death of each of the said
victims. Similarly, appellants were directed to pay, jointly and severally, Mayor Johnny
Tawan-tawan the amount of P50,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as well as the costs
of the suit.

Appellants and their co-accused Samuel Cutad @ "Sammy" (Samuel), Brigido

Abais @ "Bidok" (Brigido), Pedro Serafico @ "Peter" (Pedro), Eduardo Bacong, Sr.
(Eduardo, Sr.), Eduardo Bacong, Jr. @ "Junjun" (Eduardo, Jr.), Alejandro Abarquez
(Alejandro), Ruben Bartolo @ "Yoyoy Bulhog" (Ruben), Arnel Espanola @ "Toto Ilongo"
(Arnel), Alfredo Paninsuro @ "Tambok" (Alfredo), Opao Casinillo (Opao) and other John
Does, were charged in an Amended Information 3 dated 3 October 2001 with the crime
of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder, the
accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 5th day of June 2001, at SAN MANUEL,

Lala, Lanao del Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named [appellants and their co-accused],
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with
assorted high-powered firearms and hand-grenade, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery, evident premidation
(sic), taking advantage of their superiority in strength and in numbers,
and with intent to kill, ambush, attack, assault and use personal violence
upon the persons of the following, namely[:]

1. [PO3 Dela Cruz], [Philippine National Police (PNP)];

2. [T/Sgt. Dacoco], [Philippine Army (PA)];

3. [Private First Class (PFC)] Haron Angni, PA;

4. [PFC] Gador 4 Tomanto, PA;

5. Juanito Ibunalo; cHEATI

6. Mosanif 5 Ameril;

7. Macasubar 6 Tandayao;

8. Mayor Johnny Tawantawan; 7 and

9. Jun Palanas

by then and there firing and shooting them with said high-powered
firearms thereby inflicting upon the persons of [PO3 De la Cruz],
[T/Sgt. Dacoco], [PFC] Haron Angni, [PFC] Ga[p]or Tomanto, Juanito
Ibunalo, M[o]sani[p] Ameril and [Macasuba] Tandayao gunshot
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of the death of
[PO3 De la Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco] and the serious wounding of said
[PFC] Haron Angni, [PFC] Ga[p]or Tomanto, Juanito Ibunalo,
 Mosani[p] Ameril and [Macasuba] Tandayao that without the medical
assistance would have caused their deaths, while Mayor Johnny
Tawan[-]tawan and Jun Palanas were not hit. 8

When arraigned, appellants Wenceslao and Ricardo, assisted by their counsel

de parte 9 and counsel de oficio, 10 respectively; and their co-accused Samuel, likewise
assisted by counsel de oficio, 11 all entered separate pleas of NOT GUILTY to the
crime charged. The rest of the accused in this case, however, remained at large. Trial
on the merits ensued thereafter.

Meanwhile, or on 21 January 2003, however, the prosecution filed a Motion to

Discharge Accused [Samuel] to Be Utilized as State Witness, 12 which the court a quo
granted in an Order dated 12 February 2003. 13 Also, upon motion of the prosecution,
the court a quo issued another Order dated 17 March 2003, 14 directing the release of
Samuel from detention following his discharge as state witness.

As such, Samuel, together with 13 more witnesses, namely, Macasuba

Tandayao (Macasuba), Mosanip Ameril (Mosanip), PFC Gapor Tomanto (PFC
Tomanto), Merlina dela Cruz (Merlina), Senior Police Inspector Renato Salazar (Senior
P/Insp. Salazar), PFC Haron Angni (PFC Angni), Senior Police Officer 4 Raul Torres
Medrano (SPO4 Medrano), Senior Police Officer 1 Ferdinand Suaring (SPO1 Suaring),
Senior Police Officer 2 Ivan Mutia Evasco (SPO2 Evasco), Senior Police Officer 4
Emmie Subingsubing (SPO4 Subingsubing), Juanito Ibunalo (Juanito), Senior Police
Officer 3 Tommy Umpa (SPO3 Umpa), and Mayor Johnny Tawan-tawan (Mayor Tawan-
tawan), testified for the prosecution.

The factual milieu of this case as culled from the testimonies of the aforesaid
prosecution witnesses is as follows:

On 5 June 2001, Mayor Tawan-tawan of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, together

with his security escorts composed of some members of the Philippine Army, Philippine
National Police (PNP) and civilian aides, to wit: (1) T/Sgt. Dacoco; (2) PFC Angni; (3)
PFC Tomanto; (4) PO3 Dela Cruz; (5) Juanito; (6) Mosanip; (7) Macasuba; and (8) a
certain Jun, respectively, were in Tubod, Lanao del Norte. In the afternoon, the group
went home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte, on board the yellow pick-up service vehicle of
Mayor Tawan-tawan with Plate No. JRT 818 driven by Juanito. Sitting at the passenger
seat of the aforesaid vehicle was Mayor Tawan-tawan while those at the back seat were
Mosanip, Jun, and Macasuba, who was sitting immediately behind Juanito. Those
seated on a wooden bench installed at the rear (open) portion of the said yellow pick-up
service vehicle were PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco.
PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni were sitting beside each other facing the right side of the
road while PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco were both seated behind PFC Tomanto
and PFC Angni facing the left side of the road. 15 HATICc

At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, appellants, together with their aforenamed
co-accused, brought Samuel to a waiting shed in Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del
Norte, the one located on the left side of the road going to Salvador, Lanao del Norte.
Samuel was instructed by appellants and their co-accused to stay in the said waiting
shed while they assembled themselves in a diamond position on both sides of the road,
which is more or less five (5) meters away from the shed. Then, appellants and their co-
accused surreptitiously waited for the vehicle of the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan. 16

A few minutes later, Samuel saw the yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor
Tawan-tawan approaching towards the direction of Salvador, Lanao del Norte. The
moment the yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan passed by the
aforesaid waiting shed, appellants and their co-accused opened fire and rained bullets
on the vehicle using high-powered firearms. Both Macasuba, who was sitting
immediately behind the driver, and PFC Tomanto, who was then sitting on the rear
(open) portion of the yellow pick-up service vehicle, saw appellant Wenceslao on the
right side of the road firing at them in a squatting position using an M-16 armalite rifle.
Macasuba was also able to identify appellants Ricardo, Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo,
Jr., Brigido and Alfredo as among the ambushers. Mayor Tawan-tawan ordered Juanito
to keep on driving to avoid greater casualties. The vehicle stopped upon reaching the
army and Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) detachment in Curva,
Miagao, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Mayor Tawan-tawan then asked assistance
therefrom. 17

Immediately after the ambush, appellants and their co-accused ran towards the
house of Samuel's aunt located, more or less, 10 meters away from the site of the
ambush to get their bags and other stuff. The house of Samuel's aunt was the place
where appellants and their co-accused stayed prior to the incident. Samuel followed
appellants and their co-accused to the house of his aunt. Thereafter, appellants and
their co-accused hurriedly ran towards Barangay Lindongan, Municipality of Baroy,
Lanao del Norte. 18

On the occasion of the ambush, two security escorts of Mayor Tawan-tawan,

namely, PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, died, while others suffered injuries. In
particular, Macasuba was slightly hit on the head by shrapnel; Mosanip sustained injury
on his shoulder that almost severed his left arm; PFC Tomanto was hit on the right and
left sides of his body, on his left leg and knee; PFC Angni was hit on his left shoulder;
and Juanito was hit on his right point finger, right head and left hip. Mayor Tawan-tawan
and Jun were not injured. 19 HTSaEC
 All the victims of the ambush, except Macasuba, were brought to Bontilao
Country Clinic in Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, and were later transferred to
Mindanao Sanitarium and Hospital in Tibanga, Iligan City. PO3 Dela Cruz, however,
died before reaching the hospital while T/Sgt. Dacoco died in the hospital. PFC
Tomanto stayed at Mindanao Sanitarium and Hospital for 13 days before he was
transferred to Camp Evangelista Hospital in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City, and then in a
hospital in Manila and Quezon City. PFC Angni stayed for seven (7) days in Mindanao
Sanitarium and Hospital before he was transferred to Camp Evangelista Hospital, where
he was confined for one (1) month. PFC Angni was transferred to V. Luna Hospital in
Quezon City and was confined therein for two (2) months. 20

On the other hand, Mayor Tawan-tawan, Macasuba and the members of the
CAFGU went back to the site of the ambush but appellants and their co-accused were
no longer there. Not long after, SPO4 Medrano, Chief of Police of Salvador Municipal
Police Station, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, and his troops arrived. It was while inside the
Salvador Municipal Police Station that SPO4 Medrano heard gunfire and he came to
know that the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan was ambushed prompting him and his
troops to go to the scene of the crime. Mayor Tawan-tawan informed SPO4 Medrano
that appellant Wenceslao was one of those responsible for the ambush. SPO4 Medrano
and his troops, then, conducted an investigation during which he noticed Samuel at the
scene of the crime. Upon interrogation Samuel denied any involvement in the ambush.
Even so, SPO4 Medrano still found Samuel suspicious, hence, he and his fellow police
officers arrested him and turned him over to a certain SPO4 Micabalo, Chief of Police of
Lala, Lanao del Norte. Samuel was then brought to Lala Municipal Jail in Lanao del
Norte. Subsequently, SPO4 Medrano, together with the members of the CAFGU, PNP
and the rest of the troops who were at the scene of the crime, found a trail of footprints
believed to be from the culprits. They conducted a hot pursuit operation towards
Barangay Lindongan, Municipality of Baroy, Lanao del Norte, where appellants and their
co-accused were believed to have fled. They were able to recover an M-16 armalite rifle
caliber 5.26 concealed near a nipa hut. SPO4 Medrano then sent a Spot Report and a
follow-up report about the ambush. He did not, however, reveal the identity of appellant
Wenceslao so that with a warrant of arrest, appellant Wenceslao could be arrested at
the earliest possible time. SPO4 Medrano also informed the provincial headquarters
about the incident through a radio message. 21

The following day, or on 6 June 2001, Samuel informed SPO1 Suaring, member
of PNP Lala Municipal Police, Lala, Lanao del Norte, that there were electrical supplies
and radio antenna in San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, left by the malefactors. SPO1
Suaring, together with Samuel, Senior P/Insp. Salazar, SPO4 Subingsubing and a
certain SPO4 Sumaylo, proceeded to San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, where they
found the materials near the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) canal, which is 30
meters away from the house of Samuel's aunt. These were photographed. 22

Later, SPO2 Evasco, who was assigned at Lala Police Station, received a call
from Barangay Kagawad Renato Senahon (Brgy. Kgwd. Senahon) that a black
backpack was found in Mount Curay-curay, Rebe, Lala, Lanao del Norte, which is two
(2) kilometers away from the highway. Immediately, SPO2 Evasco and Brgy. Kgwd.
Senahon went to the location. Upon inspection, they recovered from the backpack an
army camouflage with name cloth, one Garand pouch and one fragmentation grenade
cacao type. SPO2 Evasco then brought these to the police station in Maranding, Lala,
Lanao del Norte, and turned it over to Senior P/Insp. Salazar. 23

On 8 June 2001, Samuel executed his sworn statement identifying appellants

and their co-accused as the persons responsible for the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan
and his companions. Samuel was, thereafter, incarcerated at the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology (BJMP) in Tubod, Lanao del Norte. 24 caIETS

On 29 August 2001, or more than two (2) months after the ambush, appellant
Wenceslao was arrested while he was in Katipa, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental.
Appellant Ricardo, on the other hand, was arrested on 20 December 2001 while
working in Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte. It was Senior P/Insp. Salazar who
effected the arrest of the appellants. 25

Appellants denied having any involvement in the ambush. Appellant Wenceslao

presented as witnesses Armida Nelmida (Armida), Jeffrey Paninsuro (Jeffrey),
Luzviminda Apolinares (Luzviminda), Rudy Alegado (Rudy), Sergeant Teofanis Garsuta
(Sgt. Garsuta) and Master Sergeant Pio Cudilla (M/Sgt. Cudilla). Appellant Ricardo, on
the other hand, did not present any witness other than himself.

Appellant Wenceslao testified that on 5 June 2001, he was in their house with his
family. At around 1:00 p.m., he went outside their house to clean the pigsty and feed the
pigs. Then, at around 2:30 p.m., Jacob Pepito, Rudy and a certain Romy, who is a
military personnel, arrived to get a copy of the election returns of the 15 May 2001
elections upon the orders of Tanny Pepito, a gubernatorial candidate. He told them that
he has no copy of the returns. He then advised them to get it to Atty. Aldoni Umpa (Atty.
Umpa) who has a copy. At that time, he, Jacob Pepito and Romy were outside the
house while his wife and nieces were just eight (8) to 10 meters away from them. After
10 minutes, his visitors left. 26 Suddenly, appellant Wenceslao heard gunfire coming
from the direction of the house of Mayor Tawan-tawan. His nephew, Jeffrey,
approached and informed him that Mayor Tawan-tawan and the latter's group were
ambushed. After about one (1) or two (2) minutes, he again heard gunfire. This time the
bullets were already hitting the roof and walls of their house. He then instructed Jeffrey,
who is also a CAFGU member, to report the said incident and to ask help from the
members of the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Allere, Salvador, Lanao del Norte.
27

When Jeffrey left, appellant Wenceslao stayed at their house. He did not know
where his wife and the rest of the women, who were in their house, went after the
gunburst. After more or less 15 minutes, he walked barefooted and unarmed towards
Camp Allere. There he saw M/Sgt. Cudilla and he informed the former regarding the
incident happened in their house. Not long after, a certain Captain Esmeralda (Capt.
Esmeralda), Commanding Officer of Bravo Company of the Philippine Army, arrived. He
also approached and informed Capt. Esmeralda about the incident in their house. Capt.
Esmeralda then ordered his men to board the samba and a six-by-six truck to fetch
appellant Wenceslao's wife and relatives in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. A six-
by-six truck returned to Camp Allere carrying appellant Wenceslao's wife and relatives.
28 AEDcIH

On the evening of 5 June 2001, appellant Wenceslao, together with his wife and
daughter, slept in his father's house located, more or less, 100 meters away from Camp
Allere and stayed there for five (5) days. Appellant Wenceslao's wife then requested for
transfer to their son's house in Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, as she could no longer
sleep because of what happened at their house. Thus, they went to their son's house in
Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, and stayed there for eight (8) days. During that period of
time, he did not hear of any case filed against him. No policemen even bothered to
arrest him. His wife, however, was still afraid, so they left the house of their son and
moved to Katipa, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. They stayed there until he was
arrested on 29 August 2001. 29

Appellant Wenceslao, however, disclosed that it would only take, more or less, a
15 minute-vehicle ride from his residence in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, to
the site of the ambush in San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte. Also, from his house to
Camp Allere it would only take, more or less, 5 minute-vehicle ride. Appellant
Wenceslao also admitted that he ran for the vice-mayoralty position in Salvador, Lanao
del Norte, against Rodolfo Oban during the 2001 elections. Way back in the 1998
elections, he ran for mayoralty position in the same locality against Mayor Tawan-tawan
but he lost. On both occasions, he and Mayor Tawan-tawan were no longer in the same
political party. Similarly, during the term of Mayor Tawan-tawan in 1998, appellant
Wenceslao revealed that he and his son were charged with illegal possession of
firearm. 30
 Other defense witnesses, namely, Armida, Jeffrey and Luzviminda, who are
appellant Wenceslao's wife, nephew and niece, respectively, corroborated appellant
Wenceslao's testimony on all material points. They all denied that appellant Wenceslao
has something to do with the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group.
Nonetheless, Armida admitted that there is a road connecting San Manuel, Lala, Lanao
del Norte, to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. There are also vehicles for hire plying the route
of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, to San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, and vice-versa. 31

Another defense witness, Rudy, corroborated appellant Wenceslao's testimony

with respect to the fact that on 5 June 2001, he, together with Jacob Pepito and a
certain member of the army intelligence group, went to the house of appellant
Wenceslao to get the election returns. However, he could not recall anything unusual
that happened while he was in the house of appellant Wenceslao. They left the house of
appellant Wenceslao at around 2:45 p.m. Still, no unusual incident happened thereafter.
Rudy similarly revealed that he did not go inside the house of appellant Wenceslao but
merely waited for Jacob Pepito and a member of the army intelligence group inside their
vehicle parked at a distance of, more or less, three (3) meters from the house of
appellant Wenceslao. As such, he did not hear the subject of the conversation between
appellant Wenceslao, Jacob Pepito and a member of the army intelligence group. 32

Sgt. Garsuta, who also testified for the defense, stated that in the afternoon of 5
June 2001, while he was at the legislative hall in Pigcarangan, Tubod, Lanao del Norte,
to secure the canvass of the elections, they received a radio call from M/Sgt. Cudilla
informing them that Mayor Tawan-tawan was ambushed and the house of appellant
Wenceslao was strafed. Thereafter, Capt. Esmeralda called them to board a six-by-six
truck and to proceed to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. As they passed by San Manuel,
Lala, Lanao del Norte, they stopped to get some information from the police officers
therein. They proceeded to Camp Allere in Salvador, Lanao del Norte. They arrived at
Camp Allere at around 4:30 p.m. to 4:35 p.m. and there he saw appellant Wenceslao
waiting and talking to 1st Sgt. Codilla. Appellant Wenceslao then requested that his
family and some personal effects be taken from his house. Thus, Capt. Esmeralda
ordered them to board a six-by-six truck and to proceed to appellant Wenceslao's
house. Upon reaching the house of appellant Wenceslao, nobody was there. Suddenly,
appellant Wenceslao's wife came out from the nearby house. Then they ordered her to
board a six-by-six truck after taking some personal belongings of appellant Wenceslao
in the latter's house. 33 THADEI

M/Sgt. Cudilla alleged that at around, more or less, 3:00 p.m. of 5 June 2001,
while he was at their command post at Camp Allere, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, his
detachment commander, a certain T/Sgt. Quijano, called and informed him through
radio that an ambush incident happened in his area of responsibility, i.e., Curva Miagao,
Salvador, Lanao del Norte. He advised T/Sgt. Quijano to verify the incident. M/Sgt.
Cudilla then called Capt. Esmeralda to inform the latter about the said ambush incident.
He, thereafter, prepared a perimeter defense in the camp. In the second call of T/Sgt.
Quijano, the latter told him that Mayor Tawan-tawan was ambushed. After about 15
minutes, M/Sgt. Cudilla heard gunbursts from Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte.
Later, more or less, 10 civilians arrived at Camp Allere.

M/Sgt. Cudilla further confirmed that on 5 June 2004, also at around 3:00 p.m.,
he saw appellant Wenceslao at the back of the stage inside Camp Allere near Km. Post
one. Appellant Wenceslao then informed him of the strafing incident in his house. When
their commanding officer arrived, appellant Wenceslao approached the former.
Thereafter, a platoon was organized heading towards Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del
Norte. 34

Appellant Ricardo, for his part, maintained that on 5 June 2001, he was also in
his house in Purok 5, Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, attending to his wife and
children because his wife had just given birth in April 2001. In the afternoon thereof, he
heard a gunburst somewhere in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, followed by
some commotion in the street. Later, his brother, Joji Ajok, arrived and informed him
that appellant Wenceslao was shot in his house. 35

Appellant Ricardo also confirmed that on the early evening of 5 June 2001, he
and his family transferred to the house of his parents-in-law at Camp Allere, Salvador,
Lanao del Norte. He so decided when he heard rumors that the supporters of Atty.
Umpa, the political rival of Mayor Tawan-tawan in the 2001 local elections, were being
persecuted. Being one of Atty. Umpa's supporters, he got scared, prompting him to
bring his family to Camp Allere. They stayed there until the following morning and then
he left alone for Ozamis City, Misamis Occidental, and stayed there for three (3)
months. Thereafter, he moved to Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte, where he
worked in the farm of his friend. He stayed there until he was arrested on 20 December
2001. 36 cACTaI

Nevertheless, appellant Ricardo divulged that there was never an instance that
Atty. Umpa was harassed or intimidated by the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan. He
claimed that only Atty. Umpa's supporters were harassed. He also revealed that prior to
the ambush incident, there was never an instance that he was threatened by the group
of Mayor Tawan-tawan. He just presumed that Atty. Umpa's supporters were being
harassed by the people of Mayor Tawan-tawan because others were already harassed.
37
 Finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, most of whom were victims
of the ambush, to be credible, categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and consistent,
coupled with their positive identification of the appellants as among the perpetrators of
the crime and their lack of ill-motive to falsely testify against them, vis-à-vis the defense
of denial and alibi proffered by the latter, the trial court rendered its Decision on 30
September 2005 finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder
with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder and imposing upon them
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the aforesaid trial court's
Decision states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment

is hereby rendered finding [herein appellants Wenceslao and
Ricardo] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of double
murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted
murder, and the Court hereby sentences them to suffer the
indivisible prison term of reclusion perpetua; to pay, jointly and
severally, the heirs of the late [PO3 Dela Cruz] the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages and another sum of P50,000.00 for and
by way of civil indemnity ex delicto; to pay, jointly and severally, the
heirs of the late [T/Sgt. Dacoco] the sum of P50,000.00 as moral
damages plus P50,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity ex delicto;
and to pay, jointly and severally, Ex-Mayor Johnny Tawantawan the
amount of P50,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.

The Armalite rifle with defaced serial number, the hand grenade
and the [G]arand pouch are hereby ordered turned-over to the Firearm
and Explosive Unit of the PNP Headquarters, Pigcarangan, Tubod,
Lanao del Norte, for proper disposition as authorized by law.

The full period of the preventive imprisonment of the [appellants]

shall be credited to them and deducted from their prison term provided
they comply with the requirements of Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code. [Appellant Wenceslao] was arrested on 29 August 2001 and
detained since then up to the present. While [appellant Ricardo] was
arrested on 20 December 2001 and detained since then up to the
present.

Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without
prejudice on the part of the prosecution to prosecute the case against
the other accused who remain at-large, as soon as said accused are
apprehended. 38 [Emphasis supplied].
 Unperturbed, appellants separately appealed the aforesaid trial court's Decision
to the Court of Appeals via Notice of Appeal, 39 and, thereafter, submitted their
respective appeal briefs.

In his brief, appellant Wenceslao assigned the following errors:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE

TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES ARE
CREDIBLE AND NOT ORCHESTRATED LIES INTENDED TO
FALSELY IMPUTE THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY TO [APPELLANT
WENCESLAO][;] DHAcET

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE

INCONSISTENCIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES ARE HONEST
INCONSISTENCIES ON MINOR AND TRIVIAL POINTS[;]

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT [APPELLANTS

WENCESLAO AND RICARDO] FAILED TO CAST ILL-MOTIVE ON
THE PART OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND THAT THESE
WITNESSES HAD NO IMPROPER AND NEFARIOUS MOTIVE IN
TESTIFYING AGAINST THE [APPELLANTS][;]

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE TESTIMONY OF

THE MILITARY MEN WHO ARE NEUTRAL, IMPARTIAL AND
OBJECTIVE WITNESSES[;]

V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT [APPELLANT

WENCESLAO] ABSCONDED AND IN IMPUTING MALICE ON THE
ACT OF [APPELLANT WENCESLAO] IN TEMPORARILY LEAVING
HIS RESIDENCE[;]

VI.
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING [APPELLANT
WENCESLAO] OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON
TESTIMONIES WHICH ARE OF DOUBTFUL VERACITY[;]

VII.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE DEFENSE

OF [APPELLANT WENCESLAO] BASED ON JURISPRUDENCE
WHICH ARE NOT APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR[.] 40

While appellant Ricardo, in his brief, raised this lone assignment of error:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING

[APPELLANT RICARDO] DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT. 41 aHTcDA

On 18 June 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision
affirming appellants' conviction of the crime charged. The Court of Appeals held that the
evidence on record disclosed that the alleged inconsistencies pointed to by appellant
Wenceslao refer only to minor matters. The same did not damage the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses, particularly that of PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, Juanito and Mayor
Tawan-tawan. Honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial points serve to strengthen
rather than destroy the credibility of a witness to a crime. Moreover, since the
prosecution witnesses positively identified appellants in open court as among the
perpetrators of the ambush, the same must prevail over the alleged inconsistencies, as
well as the defense of denial and alibi interposed by the appellants. Denial is a negative
and self-serving assertion that cannot overcome the victim's affirmative, categorical and
convincing testimony. In the same way, for alibi to prosper, it must be established by
positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was impossible for the accused to be at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission and not merely assert that he was
somewhere else. As in the present case, the trial court took judicial notice of the
distance of seven (7) kilometers between Salvador, Lanao del Norte, where appellants
reside, and San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, where the ambush incident took place.
Appellants, therefore, could not successfully invoke alibi as a defense because it was
not physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime. 42 The Court
of Appeals then decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the separate

APPEALS are DENIED, and the appealed Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED. 43
 Still undaunted, appellants elevated the aforesaid Decision of the Court of
Appeals to this Court via Notice of Appeal.

In a Resolution 44 dated 19 November 2008, the Court required the parties to

simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire. In lieu
thereof, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation 45 stating that it will no
longer file a supplement to its Consolidated Appellee's Brief 46 dated 14 December
2006 there being no transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since
the appellate court's Decision was rendered.

Appellants, on the other hand, filed their separate Supplemental Briefs, 47 which
were a mere rehash of the arguments already discussed in their respective Appellant's
Briefs 48 submitted before the appellate court. In his Supplemental Brief, appellant
Wenceslao reiterates that: the trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible
errors when they decided a question of substance which is not in accord with
established facts and the applicable laws. 49 He, once again, enumerated the following
errors committed by the appellate court, thus:

I.

The court a quo and the Court of Appeals gravely erred when they
ruled that the inconsistencies committed by the prosecution witnesses
are on minor and trivial points when these inconsistencies are
indicative of the innocence of [appellant Wenceslao][;] HAIDcE

II.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to consider as indicative
of innocence of [appellant Wenceslao] the fact that the authorities did
not include in the police report the name of [appellant Wenceslao] and
did not arrest him immediately after the ambush, or within a couple of
months from the date of the ambush[;]

III.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error
when they deliberately refused or failed to consider and appreciate the
testimonies of the military officers who are neutral, impartial, and
objective witnesses[;]

IV.
 Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals miserably failed to
consider the evidence for the defense despite the clear and
unmistakable proof of their honesty and integrity[;]

V.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals clearly and deliberately
[misinterpreted] the facts and [misapplied] the laws regarding "flight" as
an alleged indication of guilt[;]

VI.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals convicted [appellant

Wenceslao] based on jurisprudence on "alibi" which are not applicable
in the case at bar 50 [Emphasis and italicized omitted].

Appellant Wenceslao contends that a thorough perusal of the testimonies of the

prosecution witnesses would show these are tainted with glaring inconsistencies, which
are badges of lies and dishonesty, thus, casting doubts on their credibility.

The inconsistencies referred to by appellant Wenceslao are as follows: (1)

whether PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni were already with Mayor Tawan-tawan from
Salvador, Lanao del Norte, to Tubod, Lanao del Norte, and vice-versa, or they merely
hitched a ride in Mayor Tawan-tawan's vehicle on their way home to Salvador, Lanao
del Norte; (2) if so, the place where PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni hitched a ride in
Mayor Tawan-tawan's vehicle; (3) the officer from whom PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni
got permission in order to go home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte; (4) PFC Angni
allegedly knew appellant Wenceslao prior to the ambush incident on 5 June 2001 and
he even saw appellant Wenceslao as among the perpetrators of the ambush, yet, he did
not mention the name of the former in his affidavit; (5) Mayor Tawan-tawan should have
mentioned the name of appellant Wenceslao as one of those responsible in the ambush
incident when he reported the same to SPO4 Medrano; (6) SPO4 Medrano should have
included the name of appellant Wenceslao in the Spot Reports he transmitted to the
Provincial Police Office of the PNP and should have immediately caused his arrest if he
truly participated in the ambush incident; (7) it would no longer be necessary to
discharge Samuel and to make him as state witness if the victims of the ambush
incident, indeed, saw the perpetrators of the crime; and (8) if appellant Wenceslao was
one of the ambushers, Samuel would not have failed to mention the former in his sworn
statement.
 Appellant Wenceslao believes that the afore-enumerated inconsistencies only
proved that he has no participation in the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his
companions. The declaration of his innocence is thus called for.

Appellant Wenceslao further imputes ill-motive and malice on the testimonies of

the prosecution witnesses in testifying against him. The motive was to remove him,
being the only non-Muslim leader, in the Municipality of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, who
has the courage to challenge the reign of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his clan. It was also
an act of revenge against him for opposing Mayor Tawan-tawan during the 1998
elections. As to Samuel's motive, appellant Wenceslao claims that it was for self-
preservation, freedom, leniency and some other consideration. Evidently, after Samuel's
testimony, the latter was released from jail.

Appellant Wenceslao maintains that he was not at the ambush site on 5 June
2001 as can be gleaned from the testimonies of M/Sgt. Cudilla and Sgt. Garsuta.

Lastly, appellant Wenceslao argues that his flight was not an indication of guilt.
He justified his temporary absence from his residence by stating that it was because of
the traumatic experience of his wife, who had no peace of mind since their house was
riddled with bullets by lawless elements without any cause.

With all the foregoing, the resolution of this appeal hinges primarily on the
determination of credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

Time and again, this Court held that when the issues revolve on matters of
credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well
as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not
conclusive effect. This is so because the trial court has the unique opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether they
are telling the truth. 51 Moreover, credibility, to state what is axiomatic, is the sole
province of the trial court. In the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that
would have affected the result of the case, the trial court's findings on the matter of
credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal. 52 A careful perusal of the
records of this case revealed that none of these circumstances is attendant herein.

The affirmance by the Court of Appeals of the factual findings of the trial court
places this case under the rule that factual findings are final and conclusive and may not
be reviewed on appeal to this Court. No reason has been given by appellants to deviate
from the factual findings arrived at by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
 In the present case, most of the prosecution witnesses, i.e., Macasuba, Mosanip,
PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, Juanito and Mayor Tawan-tawan, were victims of the 5 June
2001 ambush incident. As such, they actually witnessed what exactly happened on that
fateful day, especially Macasuba and PFC Angni, who vividly saw appellant Wenceslao
on the right side of the road and in a squatting position firing at them with his M-16
armalite rifle. Macasuba and PFC Angni, having seated behind the driver and on the
rear (open) portion of the yellow pick-up service vehicle, respectively, both facing the
right side of the road, were in such a position to see without any obstruction how
appellant Wenceslao rained bullets on their vehicle with his M-16 armalite rifle while
they were traversing the road of San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, on their way home
to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Macasuba was also able to identify appellant Ricardo,
Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido and Alfredo as among the perpetrators of the
ambush.

It bears stressing that the ambush happened at around 3:00 p.m., in broad
daylight, such that it would not be impossible for Macasuba and PFC Angni to have
seen and identified their assailants, particularly appellant Wenceslao, who was once
chief of Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF), then municipal councilor and twice
elected vice-mayor of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, i.e., 1992 and 1995 elections, and
appellant Ricardo, who is a resident of Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. 53
IHDCcT

The aforesaid assertions of Macasuba and PFC Angni were equally confirmed by
Samuel, an accused-turned-state-witness, who, in his testimony before the open court,
narrated how appellants and their co-accused, Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr.,
Brigido, Alfredo, Alejandro, Ruben, Arnel, and Opao, brought him in the waiting shed in
Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte; assembled themselves in a diamond
position on both sides of the road; surreptitiously waited for the vehicle boarded by
Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group; and executed the ambush from the moment the
vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group passed by the aforesaid waiting
shed.

Samuel was in an advantageous position to substantiate the identities of the

appellants and their co-accused as the perpetrators of the ambush because he was
near the scene of the crime, i.e., merely five (5) meters away therefrom. This is aside
from the fact that appellants and their co-accused were the very same people who
brought him to the site of the ambush. Appellants and their co-accused likewise stayed
for a long period of time in the house of Samuel's aunt prior to the ambush incident and
Samuel is very well-acquainted with these people for he himself resided therein. 54
 Given the foregoing, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that prosecution witnesses,
Macasuba, PFC Angni and Samuel, have firmly established the identities of appellants
as the perpetrators of the ambush. In addition, their testimonies on who and how the
crime was committed were characterized by the trial court as simple and candid. Even
their answers to questions were simple, straightforward and categorical. Such simplicity
and candidness in their testimonies only prove that they were telling the truth, thus,
strengthening their credibility as witnesses.

Now, as regards the inconsistencies pointed out by appellant Wenceslao that

allegedly cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, this Court finds them
frivolous, trivial, minor, irrelevant and have nothing to do with the essential elements of
the crime charged, i.e., double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double
attempted murder. In the same manner, they do not detract from the fact that Mayor
Tawan-tawan and his group, which includes PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni, were
ambushed by appellants and their co-accused on 5 June 2001 while on board the
yellow pick-up service vehicle as it passed by the waiting shed in Purok 2, San Manuel,
Lala, Lanao del Norte. And, said ambush resulted in the death of PO3 Dela Cruz and
T/Sgt. Dacoco and injuries to Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and
Juanito.

It is axiomatic that slight variations in the testimony of a witness as to minor

details or collateral matters do not affect his or her credibility as these variations are in
fact indicative of truth and show that the witness was not coached to fabricate or
dissemble. An inconsistency, which has nothing to do with the elements of a
crime, is not a ground to reverse a conviction. 55

Similarly, PFC Angni and Samuel's failure to name appellant Wenceslao in their
affidavits/sworn statements as one of the ambushers does not necessarily render their
testimonies implausible and unworthy of belief.

Inconsistencies between the sworn statement and direct testimony given in open
court do not necessarily discredit the witness. An affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is
oftentimes incomplete and is generally regarded as inferior to the testimony of the
witness in open court. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that testimonies given
during trial are much more exact and elaborate than those stated in sworn statements,
which are usually incomplete and inaccurate for a variety of reasons. More so, because
of the partial and innocent suggestions, or for want of specific inquiries. In addition, an
extrajudicial statement or affidavit is generally not prepared by the affiant himself but by
another who uses his own language in writing the affiant's statement, hence, omissions
and misunderstandings by the writer are not infrequent. Indeed, the prosecution
witnesses' direct and categorical declarations on the witness stand are superior to their
extrajudicial statements. 56 Similarly, the failure of a witness to immediately disclose the
name of the culprit does not necessarily impair his or her credibility. 57

A meticulous perusal of Samuel's sworn statement reveals that he categorically

mentioned therein the name of appellant Wenceslao as one of the ambushers. In his
sworn statement, Samuel specifically stated that during the ambush, he saw appellant
Wenceslao at the other side of the road, just a few meters away from the bridge, who, at
that time armed with an M-16 rifle, was likewise firing towards the group of Mayor
Tawan-tawan. 58 Above all, both PFC Angni and Samuel positively identified appellant
Wenceslao in open court as one of those responsible for the ambush of Mayor Tawan-
tawan and his group. 59 Such open court declaration is much stronger than their
affidavits/sworn statements.

Mayor Tawan-tawan's failure to disclose to SPO4 Medrano the name of appellant

Wenceslao as one of those responsible in the ambush and SPO4 Medrano's failure to
include the name of appellant Wenceslao in the Spot Reports he transmitted to the
Provincial Police Office of the PNP would not inure to appellant Wenceslao's benefit.

As can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic notes, when Mayor

Tawan-tawan and SPO4 Medrano met at the scene of the crime, the former
immediately told the latter that appellant Wenceslao was one of the ambushers. 60 This
belied the claim of appellant Wenceslao that Mayor Tawan-tawan did not tell SPO4
Medrano that he (appellant Wenceslao) was among the ambushers. Also, SPO4
Medrano provided an explanation 61 for his failure to state in his Spot Reports the name
of appellant Wenceslao as one of the ambushers. And, even granting that his
explanation would not have been satisfactory, still, SPO4 Medrano's failure to mention
appellant Wenceslao's name in his Spot Reports was not fatal to the cause of the
prosecution. More especially because appellant Wenceslao was positively identified by
the prosecution witnesses as one of the perpetrators of the crime.

Even the discharge of Samuel to become state witness does not negate the fact
that prosecution witnesses, Macasuba and PFC Angni, indeed, saw appellants as
among the perpetrators of the crime. To note, appellants were not the only persons
accused of the crime; they were many including Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr.,
Brigido, Alfredo, Alejandro, Ruben, Arnel, and Opao. In order to give justice to the
victims of the ambush, especially those who have died by reason thereof, all persons
responsible therefor must be penalized. Since Samuel knew all those who have
participated in the ambush incident, his testimony as to the other accused in this case is
material to strengthen the case of the prosecution against them. Unfortunately, the other
accused in this case remained at large until now.
 As aptly observed by the trial court, thus: DTIaHE

. . . The Court is convinced without equivocation on the veracity of

the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses who are all in one
pointing to [herein appellant Wenceslao] as one of those who
participated in the ambush, and on the veracity of the testimonies of the
two prosecution eyewitnesses — [Macasuba and Samuel] — to the
effect that [appellant Ricardo] was among the people who perpetrated
the said ambush.

The testimonies of these witnesses were simple and candid. The

simplicity and candidness of their testimonies only prove that they were
telling the truth. Their answers to questions were simple, straightforward
and categorical; spontaneous, frank and consistent. Thus, a witness who
testifies categorically, spontaneously, frankly and consistently is a
credible witness. 62

Appellant Wenceslao's allegations of ill-motive and malice on the part of

prosecution witnesses, including Samuel, have no leg to stand on.

The records are bereft of any evidence to substantiate the claim of appellant
Wenceslao that the motive of the prosecution witnesses in testifying against him was to
remove him as the only non-Muslim leader in the Municipality of Salvador, Lanao del
Norte, and that it was an act of revenge for opposing Mayor Tawan-tawan during the
1998 elections. Appellant Wenceslao failed to present an iota of evidence to support his
aforesaid allegations. As properly stated by the Court of Appeals, "[m]ere allegation or
claim is not proof. Each party must prove his own affirmative allegation." Also, it must be
emphasized that during the 1998 elections, it was Mayor Tawan-tawan who won the
mayoralty position. It is, therefore, highly implausible for Mayor Tawan-tawan, who
emerged as the victor, to take revenge against the losing candidate, appellant
Wenceslao. As such, appellant Wenceslao failed to prove any ill-motive on the part of
the prosecution witnesses. It is settled that where the defense fails to prove that
witnesses are moved by improper motives, the presumption is that they were not so
moved and their testimonies are therefore entitled to full weight and credit. 63

To repeat, most of the prosecution witnesses are victims of the ambush. Being
the aggrieved parties, they all desire justice for what had happened to them, thus, it is
unnatural for them to falsely accuse someone other than the real culprits. Otherwise
stated, it is very unlikely for these prosecution witnesses to implicate an innocent person
to the crime. It has been correctly observed that the natural interest of witnesses, who
are relatives of the victims, more so, the victims themselves, in securing the conviction
of the guilty would deter them from implicating persons other than the culprits, for
otherwise, the culprits would gain immunity. 64

Contrary to appellant Wenceslao's assertion, this Court is convince that his and
appellant Ricardo's flight from the scene of the crime immediately after the ambush is
an evidence of their guilt. It is noteworthy that after the ambush incident, appellant
Wenceslao immediately left his residence and moved to his father's house, then to his
son's house in Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, and lastly to Katipa, Lopez Jaena,
Misamis Occidental, where he was arrested. Appellant Ricardo did the same thing.
From his residence in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, he transferred to his
parents-in-law's house, then he left alone for Ozamis City, Misamis Occidental, and
thereafter, moved to Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte, until he was arrested on 20
December 2001. If appellants were truly innocent of the crime charged, they would not
go into hiding rather they would face their accusers to clear their names. Courts go by
the biblical truism that "the wicked flee when no man pursueth but the righteous are as
bold as a lion." 65

Appellants' respective explanations regarding their flight fail to persuade this

Court. It bears emphasis that after the alleged strafing of appellant Wenceslao's house,
all he did is to move from one place to another instead of having it investigated by the
authorities. Until now, the alleged strafing of his house remains a mystery. If that
strafing incident truly happened, he would be much eager to know who caused it in
order to penalize the author thereof. Appellant Ricardo, on the other hand, was
allegedly afraid of being persecuted for being one of the supporters of Mayor Tawan-
tawan's political rival. His fear, however, was more imaginary than real. The aforesaid
claim of appellant Ricardo was uncorroborated, hence, cannot be given any
considerable weight.

In light of the clear, positive and straightforward testimonies of prosecution

witnesses, coupled with their positive identification of appellants as among the
perpetrators of the ambush, appellants' defense of denial and alibi cannot prosper.

As this Court has oft pronounced, both denial and alibi are inherently weak
defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses that appellants committed the crime. 66 For alibi to prosper, the
requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that
appellants were somewhere else when the crime happened. They must also
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them
to have been at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its commission. 67
Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-
serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. 68 A mere denial, like alibi, is inherently
a weak defense and constitutes self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be
accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters. 69

In this case, both appellants claimed that they were just in their respective
houses in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, when the ambush incident happened
and they have no involvement whatsoever in the commission thereof.

To corroborate appellant Wenceslao's testimony, the defense presented Armida,

Jeffrey and Luzviminda, who are appellant Wenceslao's wife, nephew and niece,
respectively. This Court, however, cannot give credence to the testimonies of these
defense witnesses. Being appellant Wenceslao's relatives, their testimonies are
rendered suspect because the former's relationship to them makes it likely that they
would freely perjure themselves for his sake. The defense of alibi may not prosper if it is
established mainly by the appellant himself and his relatives, and not by credible
persons. 70 This Court further quote with conformity the observation made by the trial
court, viz.: IDaEHS

FURTHER, the testimonies of the above-named witnesses for

[herein appellant Wenceslao] were shattered by the testimony of [Rudy],
another witness for [appellant Wenceslao], who categorically told the
Court that during the time he and his companions Jacob Pepito and a
certain Romy were in the house of [appellant Wenceslao] in the
afternoon of 5 June 2001, there was no unusual incident that took
place, as well as no unusual incident that happened when they left
the house of [appellant Wenceslao] at about 2:45 in the afternoon.

The foregoing testimony of [Rudy] clearly imparts that the visit of

[Rudy] and his companions to the house of [appellant Wenceslao], if
any, happened on another date. This will be so because if [appellant
Wenceslao] and his closely related witnesses are telling the truth that
Jacob Pepito, [Rudy] and Romy were in the house of [appellant
Wenceslao] talking about the said election returns during that fateful
afternoon, then definitely, [Rudy] should have had known of the
ambush incident, said incident being spreaded throughout or shall
we say, "the talk of the town" that afternoon of 5 June 2001.

If the ambush incident occurred on the day [Rudy] and his

companions visited [appellant Wenceslao], then, no doubt that
[Rudy] will tell the Court about it. But his testimony was otherwise.
71 [Emphasis supplied].
 In the same breath, appellant Ricardo's defense of denial and alibi cannot be
given any evidentiary value as it was unsubstantiated. Appellant Ricardo never
presented any witness to support his claim that he was simply inside their house
attending to his wife and children during the time that the ambush incident happened.
This Court reiterates that mere denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, is a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law. Between the
categorical and positive assertions of the prosecution witnesses and the negative
averments of the accused which are uncorroborated by reliable and independent
evidence, the former indisputably deserve more credence and are entitled to greater
evidentiary weight. 72

Withal, it was not physically impossible for the appellants to be at the scene of
the crime in the afternoon of 5 June 2001. As observed by the trial court and the
appellate court, Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, where both appellants' reside, is
only about seven (7) kilometers away from San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, where
the ambush took place. 73

All told, this Court affirms the findings of the trial court and the appellate court
that, indeed, appellants were among the perpetrators of the ambush against Mayor
Tawan-tawan and his group. Prosecution witnesses' categorical, positive and
straightforward testimonies, coupled with their positive identification of appellants as
among the perpetrators of the crime, prevail over appellants' defense of bare denial and
alibi.

As to the crime committed. The trial court, as well as the appellate court,
convicted appellants of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double
attempted murder. This Court believes, however, that appellants should be
convicted not of a complex crime but of separate crimes of two (2) counts of
murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder as the killing and wounding of the
victims in this case were not the result of a single act but of several acts of the
appellants, thus, making Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code inapplicable.

Appellants and their co-accused simultaneous act of riddling the vehicle boarded
by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group with bullets discharged from their firearms when
the said vehicle passed by San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, resulted in the death of
two security escorts of Mayor Tawan-tawan, i.e., PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the

provisions of article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and
 shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with

the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of
means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

xxx xxx xxx

5. With evident premeditation. [Emphasis supplied].

Treachery, which was alleged in the Information, attended the commission

of the crime. Time and again, this Court, in a plethora of cases, has consistently held
that there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and
specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense that the
offended party might make. There are two (2) conditions that must concur for treachery
to exist, to wit: (a) the employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution
was deliberately and consciously adopted. "The essence of treachery is that the
attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner,
affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape." 74

The deadly successive shots of the appellants and their co-accused did not allow
the hapless victims, i.e., PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, any opportunity to put up a
decent defense. The attack was executed by appellants and their-co-accused in such a
vicious manner as to make the defense virtually impossible. Under the circumstances, it
is very apparent that appellants had murder in their hearts when they waylaid
their unwary victims. 75 Thus, as to the death of PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt.
Dacoco, appellants should be held liable for murder.

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, however, cannot be

appreciated as it is deemed absorbed in treachery. 76

Since the prosecution failed to prove the attending circumstance of evident

premeditation, the circumstance cannot likewise be appreciated. To prove this
aggravating circumstance, the prosecution must show the following: (1) the time when
the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the
offender clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time, between the determination
to commit the crime and the execution thereof, sufficient to allow the offender to reflect
upon the consequences of his act. 77 None of these elements could be gathered from
the evidence on record.

As regards the victims Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and
Juanito, although they were injured during the ambush and were all hospitalized, except
for Macasuba, it was not mentioned that their injuries and wounds were mortal or fatal
such that without the timely medical assistance accorded to them, they would have
died. 78 However, it does not necessarily follow that the crimes committed against the
aforenamed victims were simply less serious physical injuries. Also, even though Mayor
Tawan-tawan and Jun did not sustain any injury during the ambush, it does not mean
that no crime has been committed against them. The latter were just fortunate enough
not to have sustained any injury on the occasion thereof. Since appellants were
motivated by the same intent to kill, thus, as to Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC
Tomanto, PFC Angni, Juanito, Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun, appellants should be
held guilty of attempted murder. aHcACT

What brings this case out of the ordinary is the issue of applicability of Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code. Its resolution would determine whether the conviction of
appellants must be for the separate crimes of two (2) counts of murder and seven (7)
counts of attempted murder or of the complex crime of double murder with multiple
frustrated murder and double attempted murder.

The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of the Revised Penal

Code which explicitly states that: 79

ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act

constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. [Emphasis supplied].

In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the
eyes of the law and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime,
thus, only one penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is
known as compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies while the other is known as complex crime proper, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The classic example of the first
kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two or more persons. A different rule
governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is
the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts
constitute separate and distinct crimes. 80
 Evidently, there is in this case no complex crime proper. And the circumstances
present in this case do not fit exactly the description of a compound crime.

From its factual backdrop, it can easily be gleaned that the killing and wounding
of the victims were not the result of a single discharge of firearms by the appellants and
their co-accused. To note, appellants and their co-accused opened fire and rained
bullets on the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. As a result, two
security escorts died while five (5) of them were wounded and injured. The victims
sustained gunshot wounds in different parts of their bodies. Therefrom, it cannot be
gainsaid that more than one bullet had hit the victims. Moreover, more than one
gunman fired at the vehicle of the victims. As held in People v. Valdez, 81 each act by
each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular
moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give
rise to a complex crime. 82

Obviously, appellants and their co-accused performed not only a single act but
several individual and distinct acts in the commission of the crime. Thus, Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code would not apply for it speaks only of a "single act."

There are, however, several rulings which applied Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code despite the fact that several acts were performed by several accused in the
commission of the crime resulting to the death and/or injuries to their victims.

In People v. Lawas, 83 the members of the Home Guard, upon order of their
leader, Lawas, simultaneously and successively fired at several victims. As a result, 50
persons died. It was there held that the killing was the result of a single impulse as
there was no intent on the part of the accused to fire at each and every victim
separately and distinctly from each other. If the act or acts complained of resulted
from a single criminal impulse, it constitutes a single offense. However, "single
criminal impulse" was not the only consideration in applying Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code in the said case because there was therein no evidence at all showing the
identity or number of persons killed by each accused. There was also no conspiracy to
perpetuate the killing, thus, collective criminal responsibility could not be imputed
upon the accused. Since it was impossible to ascertain the number of persons
killed by each of them, this Court was "forced" to find all the accused guilty of
only one offense of multiple homicide instead of holding each of them
responsible for 50 deaths. 84

Significantly, there was no conspiracy in People v. Lawas. However, as this

Court held in People v. Remollino, 85 the Lawas doctrine is more of an exception than
the general rule.
 There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and then decide to commit it. It arises on the
very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith
decide to pursue it. Once established, each and every one of the conspirators is made
criminally liable for the crime actually committed by any one of them. In the absence of
any direct proof, the agreement to commit a crime may be deduced from the mode and
manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. As such, it does not
matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as each of the actors incurs the same
criminal liability, because the act of one is the act of all. 86

The Information filed against appellants and their co-accused alleged conspiracy,
among others. Although the trial court did not directly state that a conspiracy existed,
such may be inferred from the concerted actions of the appellants and their co-accused,
to wit: (1) appellants and their co-accused brought Samuel to a waiting shed located on
the left side of the road where the yellow pick-up service vehicle boarded by Mayor
Tawan-tawan and his group would pass; (2) appellants and their co-accused, thereafter,
assembled themselves on both sides of the road and surreptitiously waited for the
aforesaid yellow pick-up service vehicle; (3) the moment the yellow pick-up service
vehicle passed by the waiting shed, appellants and their co-accused opened fire and
rained bullets thereon resulting in the killing and wounding of the victims; (4)
immediately, appellants and their co-accused ran towards the house of Samuel's aunt to
get their bags and other stuff; (5) Samuel followed appellants and their co-accused; and
(6) appellants and their co-accused fled.

Conspiracy is very much evident from the afore-enumerated actuations of the

appellants and their co-accused. Clearly, their acts were coordinated. They were
synchronized in their approach to riddle with bullets the vehicle boarded by Mayor
Tawan-tawan and his group. They were motivated by a single criminal impulse — to kill
the victims. Indubitably, conspiracy is implied when the accused persons had a common
purpose and were united in its execution. Spontaneous agreement or active cooperation
by all perpetrators at the moment of the commission of the crime is sufficient to create
joint criminal responsibility. 87

With the presence of conspiracy in the case at bench, appellants and their co-
accused had assumed joint criminal responsibility — the act of one is the act of all. The
ascertainment of who among them actually hit, killed and/or caused injury to the victims
already becomes immaterial. Collective responsibility replaced individual responsibility.
The Lawas doctrine, premised on the impossibility of determining who killed whom,
cannot, to repeat, be applied.
 Interestingly, in People v. De los Santos, 88 People v. Abella, 89 People v.
Garcia 90 and People v. Pincalin, 91 this Court also applied Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code even though several acts were performed by the accused and conspiracy
attended the commission of the crime. ICAcTa

In People v. De los Santos, 92 a prison riot occurred for two consecutive days
inside the national penitentiary between the members of two gangs, i.e., Sigue-Sigue
Sputnik and Oxo. As a result, nine (9) inmates were killed. Fourteen (14) inmates were
then convicted for the crime of multiple murder. The existence of conspiracy in the
commission of the crime was duly proven. There was, however, no discussion why the
accused were convicted of a complex crime instead of separate crimes.

In a similar case of People v. Abella, 93 involving the massacre of certain

prisoners in the Davao Penal Colony and a reprise of a similar riot that occurred in the
national penitentiary on 16 February 1958 (subject of De los Santos), all the accused
were also convicted for the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder. Conspiracy likewise attended the commission of the crime. This Court applied
the ruling in De los Santos and elucidated that the ruling in the said case is predicated
on the theory that "when for the attainment of a single purpose which constitutes an
offense, various acts are executed, such acts must be considered only as one
offense," a complex one. The Lawas doctrine was equally applied although
conspiracy had been duly proven. This Court then stated that where a conspiracy
animates several persons with a single purpose "their individual acts in
pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act — the act of execution
— giving rise to a complex offense. The felonious agreement produces a sole and
solidary liability: each confederate forms but a part of a single being." 94

People v. Garcia 95 and People v. Pincalin 96 have the same factual background
as De los Santos and Abella. They were the third and fourth cases, respectively, of
prison riots resulting to the killing of convicts by fellow convicts while inside the national
penitentiary. In Garcia, the accused were convicted for the complex crime of multiple
murder and double attempted murder, while in Pincalin the accused were convicted for
the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder. In both cases, this Court
found conspiracy to have attended the commission of the crime.

In applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in Garcia and Pincalin, this
Court, gave the same justification as in Abella: that both cases were covered by the rule
that "when for the attainment of a single purpose, which constitutes an offense
various acts are executed, such acts must be considered as only one offense, a
complex one." Correspondingly, "where a conspiracy animates several persons
with a single purpose, their individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose are
looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a complex
offense. Various acts committed under one criminal impulse may constitute a single
complex offense. 97

We however found no intention by this Court to establish as doctrine, contrary to

Lawas, that Article 48 is applicable even in cases where several acts were performed by
the accused and conspiracy attended the commission of the crime. In Pincalin, this
Court has already clarified that: [n]onetheless, this Court further held that "in other
cases where several killings on the same occasion were perpetrated, but not involving
prisoners, a different rule may be applied, that is to say, the killings would be treated as
separate offenses, as opined by Mr. Justice Makasiar and as held in some decided
cases." 98

De los Santos, Abella, Garcia and Pincalin, therefore, were exceptions to the
general rule stated in Article 48 which exceptions were drawn by the peculiar
circumstance of the cases.

It may be mentioned that in People v. Sanidad, 99 this Court, once again, applied
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code although the circumstances of the case were not
the same as in Lawas, De los Santos, Abella, Garcia and Pincalin, where this Court
departed from the general rule.

In Sanidad, suddenly and without a warning, several accused unleashed a volley

of shots at the jeepney boarded by the victims. Miraculously, all passengers, except
Rolando Tugadi (Rolando), survived the ambush and suffered only minor injuries.
Conspiracy attended the commission of the crime. Accused were convicted for the
complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murder. We there held that the case
comes within the purview of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Citing Lawas and
Abella, it was pronounced that although several independent acts were performed by
the accused, it was not possible to determine who among them actually killed Rolando;
and that there was no evidence that the accused intended to fire at each and every one
of the victims separately and distinctly from each other. On the premise that the
evidence clearly shows a single criminal impulse to kill Marlon Tugadi's group as a
whole, we repeated that where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single
purpose, their individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a
single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a single complex offense. 100

The reliance in Sanidad, on Lawas and Abella is incorrect.

The application of the Abella doctrine, has already been clarified in Pincalin, thus:
where several killings on the same occasion were perpetrated, but not involving
prisoners, a different rule may be applied, that is to say, the killings would be treated as
separate offenses. Since in Sanidad, the killings did not involve prisoners or it was not a
case of prisoners killing fellow prisoners. As such, Abella would not apply.

To repeat, in Lawas, this Court was merely forced to apply Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code because of the impossibility of ascertaining the number of persons
killed by each accused. Since conspiracy was not proven therein, joint criminal
responsibility could not be attributed to the accused. Each accused could not be held
liable for separate crimes because of lack of clear evidence showing the number of
persons actually killed by each of them.

Proven conspiracy could have overcome the difficulty. HIAESC

Our repeated ruling is that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. It is as
though each one performed the act of each one of the conspirators. Each one is
criminally responsible for each one of the deaths and injuries of the several victims. The
severalty of the acts prevents the application of Article 48. The applicability of Article 48
depends upon the singularity of the act, thus the definitional phrase "a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies." This is not an original reading of
the law. In People v. Hon. Pineda, 101 the Court already recognized the "deeply
rooted . . . doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts
constitute separate and distinct crimes." As we observed in People v. Tabaco, 102
clarifying the applicability of Article 48 of the [Revised Penal Code], [this Court] further
stated in [Hon.] Pineda that "to apply the first half of Article 48, . . . there must be
singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law." 103

With all the foregoing, this Court holds appellants liable for the separate
crimes of two (2) counts of murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder.

As to penalty. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposed
for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being neither aggravating
nor mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed upon appellants is reclusion
perpetua for each count, pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 63 104 of the Revised Penal
Code. 105

Appellants are also guilty of seven (7) counts of attempted murder. The penalty
prescribed by law for murder, i.e., reclusion perpetua to death, should be reduced by
two degrees, conformably to Article 51 106 of the Revised Penal Code. Under
paragraph 2, Article 61, 107 in relation to Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, such a
penalty is prision mayor. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance,
the same should be imposed in its medium period pursuant to paragraph 1, Article 64
108 of the Revised Penal Code. 109 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the
case of attempted murder, the maximum shall be taken from the medium period of
prision mayor, which is 8 years and 1 day to 10 years, while the minimum shall be taken
from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correctional, in any of its periods, the
range of which is 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. This Court, therefore, imposed upon
the appellants the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum, for each count of
attempted murder.

As to damages. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may
be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5)
temperate damages. 110

Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that when death occurs as a result of a
crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to be indemnified for the death of the victim
without need of any evidence or proof thereof. Moral damages like civil indemnity, is
also mandatory upon the finding of the fact of murder. 111 Therefore, the trial court and
the appellate court properly awarded civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and
moral damages also in the amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of each deceased victims.

Article 2230 of the Civil Code states that exemplary damages may be imposed
when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. In this
case, treachery may no longer be considered as an aggravating circumstance since it
was already taken as a qualifying circumstance in the murder, and abuse of superior
strength which would otherwise warrant the award of exemplary damages was already
absorbed in the treachery. 112 However, in People v. Combate, 113 this Court still
awards exemplary damages despite the lack of any aggravating circumstance to deter
similar conduct and to serve as an example for public good. Thus, to deter future similar
transgressions, the Court finds that an award of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in
favor of the heirs of each deceased victims is proper. 114 The said amount is in
conformity with this Court's ruling in People v. Gutierrez. 115

Actual damages cannot be awarded for failure to present the receipts covering
the expenditures for the wake, coffin, burial and other expenses for the death of the
victims. In lieu thereof, temperate damages may be recovered where it has been shown
that the victim's family suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be
proved with certainty as provided for under Article 2224 of the Civil Code.116 In this
case, it cannot be denied that the heirs of the deceased victims suffered pecuniary loss
although the exact amount was not proved with certainty. Thus, this Court similarly
awards P25,000.00 as temperate damages to the heirs of each deceased victims. 117
 The surviving victims, Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and
Juanito, are also entitled to moral, temperate and exemplary damages.

Ordinary human experience and common sense dictate that the wounds inflicted
upon the aforesaid victims would naturally cause physical suffering, fright, serious
anxiety, moral shock, and similar injuries. 118 It is only justifiable to grant them moral
damages in the amount of P40,000.00 each in conformity with this Court's ruling in
People v. Mokammad. 119

The award of P25,000.00 each as temperate damages to Macasuba, Mosanip,

PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito is also in order. It is beyond doubt that these
victims were hospitalized and spent money for their medication. As to Macasuba,
although he was not confined in a hospital, it cannot be gainsaid that he also spent for
the treatment of the minor injuries he sustained by reason of the ambush. However,
they all failed to present any receipt therefor. Nevertheless, it could not be denied that
they suffered pecuniary loss; thus, it is only prudent to award temperate damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 to each of them.

The award of exemplary damages is also in order. Thus, Macasuba, Mosanip,

PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito are awarded exemplary damages in the amount
of P30,000.00 to conform to current jurisprudence. 120

This Court likewise affirms the award of P50,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as
well as costs of the suit, in favor of Mayor Tawan-tawan.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. HC No. 00246 dated 18 June 2008 is hereby MODIFIED, as follows: (1) appellants
are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of murder thereby imposing
upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count; (2) appellants are also
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of seven (7) counts of attempted murder thereby
imposing upon them the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum, for each count;
(3) other than the civil indemnity and moral damages already awarded by the trial court
and the appellate court, appellants are further ordered to pay, jointly and severally,
exemplary and temperate damages in the amount of P30,000.00 and P25,000.00,
respectively, to the heirs of each deceased victims; and (4) appellants are also directed
to pay, jointly and severally, Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and
Juanito the amount of P40,000.00 each as moral damages, P25,000.00 each as
temperate damages and P30,000.00 each as exemplary damages.

||| (People v. Nelmida, G.R. No. 184500, [September 11, 2012], 694 PHIL 529-581)