Dacanay v.

Baker- Mckenzie

Facts:
In a letter respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker &
McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman
for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H. E. Gabriel,
a client.

Attorney Dacanay denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that

he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not,
what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office."

Not having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.

Issue: The use of an alien law firm’s name

Held: The Court held that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot
practice law in the Philippines

Respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a

representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal
services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and
others engaged in foreign trade and investment". This is unethical because
Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practice law here.
Dulalia Jr. v. Cruz
Facts: Atty. Pablo C. Cruz, Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan , is charged by
Juan Dulalia, Jr of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility(Rules 1.01,
1 6.02, 2 and 7.03). Complainant's wife Susan Soriano Dulalia filed an application
for building permit for the construction of a warehouse.

Despite compliance with all the requirements for the purpose, she failed to
secure a permit, she attributing the same to the opposition of respondents who
wrote a September 13, 2004 letter to Carlos J. Abacan, Municipal Engineer and
concurrent Building Official of Meycauayan.

By complainant's claim, respondent opposed the application for building permit

because of a personal grudge against his wife Susan who objected to
respondent's marrying her first cousin Imelda Soriano, respondent's marriage
with Carolina Agaton being still subsisting.

IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, through Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-

Maala, recommended the dismissal of the complaint.

Issue: Is the respondent guilty of violating the provisions mentioned in the

complaint?

Held: No. The Court finds the dismissal of the charges of violating Rules 6.02
and 7.03 in order. Complaint failed to prove that respondent used his position
as Municipal Legal Officer to advance his own personal interest against
complainant and his wife.

As for respondent's letter, there is nothing to show that he opposed the

application for building permit. He just inquired whether complainant's wife
fully complied with the requirements provided for by the National Building Code.

However, respondent's admitted contracting of a second marriage while his first

marriage is still subsisting that the Court finds respondent liable, for
violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

He invokes good faith, however, he claiming to have had the impression that the
applicable provision at the time was Article 83 of the Civil Code

In respondent's case, he being out of the country since 1986, he can be given the
benefit of the doubt on his claim that Article 83 of the Civil Code was the
applicable provision when he contracted the second marriage abroad.

Respondent's claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already took
effect on August 3, 1988 as he was in the United States does not lie, as
"ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith."
Khan Jr. v. Simbillo
Facts: Administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement in Philippine
Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT' OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-
4333/521-2667.

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of
the Supreme Court called up the published telephone number and pretended to
be an interested party.

She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino
Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court
decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of
property or custody of children.

Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public
Information Office revealed that similar advertisements were published.

Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and
Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against
Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal
services.

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that
advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; time has come to
change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; the
interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer
advertising.

Issue: Is the respondent guilty of violating Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility?

Held: Yes. There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained
of. He himself admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements.

While he professes repentance and begs for the Court's indulgence, his contrition
rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after
he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate
the rules. Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous
affront on the Court's authority.

What adds to the gravity of respondent's acts is that in advertising himself as a

self- styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," for he erodes and undermines
not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered
sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society.

Ratio: The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to

public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not
primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital
that necessarily yields profits.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed.
However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity
of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would
bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar. The use of simple signs stating the
name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of
practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief
data, are permissible.
Facts: This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Pedro Linsangan against Atty.
Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of
professional services.

Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie

Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent
promised them financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims.
To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them
text messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James

Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-
client relations with complainant and utilize respondent's services instead, in
exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached "respondent's" calling
card.

Issue: Is the respondent guilty of charges complained?

Held: Yes. Through Labiano's actions, respondent's law practice was benefited.
Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of
Labiano's word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule
1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

With regard to respondent's violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule
that a lawyer should not steal another lawyer's client nor induce the latter
to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for
his services. Respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list
nor receiving benefits from Labiano's "referrals".

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers,

respondent violated Rule 16.04. A lawyer shall not lend money to his client.
The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses (such as 2 ling fees, stenographer's fees for transcript of
stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that
he is handling for the client.

However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the

Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly
responsible for the printing and distribution of Labiano's calling cards.

Ratio: The practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not
advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. Hence, lawyers are
prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground
for disbarment. This rule (Rule 2.03, 1.03) proscribes "ambulance chasing"
(the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney,
personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) as a measure
to protect the community from barratry and champerty.
Pangan v. Ramos
Facts: This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa Pangan, to cite
respondent Dionisio Ramos for contempt. These motions were predicated on
respondent's allegations that on said dates he had a case set for hearing
before Branch VII, Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled People v. Marieta
M. Isip. Upon verification, the attorney of record of the accused in said case is
one"Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos, 306 Doñ a Salud Bldg., Dasmariñ as, Manila."

Respondent admits that he used the name of "Pedro D.D. Ramos" before said
court in connection with Criminal Case No. 35906, but avers that he had a right
to do so because in his Birth Certificate (Annex "A"), his name is "Pedro Dionisio
Ramos", and his parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen Dayaw, and that the
"D.D." in "Pedro D.D. Ramos" is but an abbreviation of "Dionisio Dayaw", his
other given name and maternal surname.

Issue: Is the respondent’s use of a different name valid?

Held: No. The name appearing in the "Roll of Attorneys" is "Dionisio D. Ramos".
The attorney's roll or register is the official record containing the names and
signatures of those who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not
authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of
Attorneys in his practice of law.

In using the name of "Pedro D.D. Ramos" before the courts instead of the
name by which he was authorized to practice law — Dionisio D. Ramos —
respondent in effect resorted to deception.

Ratio: The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he "will
do no falsehood". As an officer in the temple of justice, an attorney has
irrefragable obligations of "truthfulness, candor and frankness". In representing
himself to the court as "Pedro D.D. Ramos" instead of "Dionisio D. Ramos",
respondent has violated his solemn oath.
People v. Estebia
Facts: Remigio Estebia was convicted of rape by the Court of First Instance of
Samar, and sentenced to suffer the capital punishment. His case came up before
this Court on review.

Lope E. Adriano, a member of the Bar, was appointed by this Court as Estebia's
counsel de oficio. In the notice of his appointment, Adriano was required to
prepare and file his brief within thirty days from notice. From December 20
until April 21, Adriano asked for an extension five times. All these motions
for extension were granted. The brief was due on April 26,1967. But no brief
was filed.

Adriano was ordered to show cause within ten days from notice thereof why
disciplinary action should not be taken against him for failure to file appellant's
brief despite the lapse of the time therefor. Adriano did not bother to give any
explanation.

For failing to comply the Court resolved to impose upon him a fine of P500
payable to this Court within fifteen days from notice with a warning that upon
further non-compliance. Still, counsel paid no heed.

Finally, Court ordered Adriano to show cause within ten days from notice
thereof why he should not be suspended from the practice of law "for gross
misconduct and violation of his oath office as attorney. The resolution was
personally served upon him. He ignored the resolution.

Issue: Should the respondent be held liable for not presenting appellant’s brief?

Held: Yes. Appellant was without brief since December 20, 1966. The effect of
this long delay need not be essayed. The Court, therefore, found that Attorney
Lope E. Adriano has violated his oath that he will conduct himself as a
lawyer according to the best of his "knowledge and discretion."

Furthermore, in the present case, counsel's pattern of conduct would seem

reveals a propensity on the part of counsel to benumb appreciation of his
obligation as counsel de oficio and of the courtesy and respect that should
be accorded this Court. We have a clear case of an attorney whose acts exhibit
willful disobedience of lawful orders of this Court. A cause sufficient is thus
present for suspension or disbarment.

Disrespect is here present. Contumacy is as patent. Disciplinary action is in

order.

Ratio: It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such

counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid
by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his
best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care.
The accused defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory
representation. The Court does not accept the paradox that responsibility is
less where the defended party is poor.

For, indeed, a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to

have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest. Because of
this, a lawyer should remain ever conscious of his duties to the indigent he
defends.

Moreover, an attorney's duty of prime importance is "[t]o observe and maintain

the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers." By his oath of office,
the lawyer undertook to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities."
PCGG v. Sandiganbayan
Facts: In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered
financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support
to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings.
It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various
loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests, of which 59%
was classified as doubtful and ₱0.505 million as uncollectible. Central Bank
extended emergency loans to GENBANK, but GENBANK failed to recover.
The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent;
ordering its liquidation.

A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held, wherein the Lucio Tan group
submitted the winning bid.  Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the
assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation.

After EDSA I, PCGG was formed to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former
President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. The PCGG, then, filed
with the Sandiganbayan complaints against former President Marcos and his
cronies; one of whom is Lucio Tan. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were
represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who
has then resumed his private practice of law.

The PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for

respondents Tan, et al. The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then
Solicitor General10 and counsel to Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the
liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan.

The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from
accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which
he had intervened while in said service."

Issue: Does the Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility apply to
respondent Mendoza?

Held: No. Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the
general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
but replaced the expansive phrase "investigated and passed upon" with the
word "intervened." It is, therefore, properly applicable to both "adverse-
interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts."

The case at bar does not involve the "adverse interest" aspect of Rule 6.03.
Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he
acted as Solicitor General.

Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists a "congruent-

interest conflict" sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from
representing respondents Tan.
The "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in
the case at bar is "advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said
bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of
Manila." In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central
Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the
concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03.

The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the
procedure to liquidate GENBANK is  not the "matter" contemplated by Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No.
342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the "drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing
abstract principles of law" are acts which do not fall within the scope of the
term "matter" and cannot disqualify.

Thirdly, the metes and bounds of the "intervention" contemplated by Rule

6.03.

There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word "intervene." Under

the first interpretation, "intervene" includes participation in a proceeding even
if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence. Under
the second interpretation, "intervene" only includes an act of a person who
has the power to influence the subject proceedings. We hold that this second
meaning is more appropriate to give to the word "intervention" under Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. In fine, the
intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant.

It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza as significant

and substantial. The Court disagreed. For one, the petition in the special
proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent
Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. The petition filed merely seeks
the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK.
Ulep v. Legal Clinic
Facts: Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist
from issuing advertisements to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from
making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other
than those allowed by law."

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are

champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that,
as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted.

Respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its

instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the
rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines.

Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal
services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of
Arizona.

Issue: whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the
same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained
of.

Held: Yes. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of
the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind
of service that involves legal knowledge or skill.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes
legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and
contracts by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may
not be pending in a court.

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of
court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the
perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations
that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services

can neither be seriously considered nor sustained.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information
to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and
non- diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for
example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the
credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look
for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were
merely a bookstore.

Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation
does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority
holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research,
giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not
controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by
virtue of the nature of the services it renders.

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an
attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be
hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person
into the practice of law.

On Advertising: Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned

advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in
making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts. The canons of the profession tell us
that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust.

He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services.

Not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The first of such
exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent
with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and
informative data. The law list must be a reputable law list published
primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a
paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card
may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is
connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona(allows publishing of
legal fees), which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification relied
upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. No such
exception in the Canons or the present Code.