PBM Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) [GR L-31195, firm.
firm. On the contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages for
5 June 1973]
Facts:
On 1 March 1969, members, and officers of the Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on 4
March 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in
by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular
second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M.,
respectively). They informed the Company of their proposed demonstration and
proceeded with the demonstration despite pleas from the Philippine Blooming Mills.
The Company filed on 4 March 1969 with the lower court, charging the PBMEO
officers and participating members of violation of Section 4(a) to 6 in relation to
Section 13 to 14, as well as Section 15, of Republic Act 875 and with the CBA
providing for No Strike and No Lockout. The charge was followed by the filing of a
corresponding complaint on 18 April 1969. Judge Joaquin Salvador, in an order dated
15 September 1969, found PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and declaring the
officers and members directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor
practice and were considered to have lost their status as employees of the company. A
motion for reconsideration was filed 15 September 1969, which was dismissed in a
resolution dated 9 October 1969. On 31 October 1969, PBMEO filed with the Court of
Industria Relations (CIR) a petition for relief from the order dated 9 October 1969, on
the ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time was due to
excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the president of the Union and
of the office clerk of their counsel. Without waiting for any resolution on their petition
for relief, PBMEO filed on 3 November 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of
appeal.
Issue:
Whether the Company can prevent its workers from engaging in concerted activity
against alleged abuses of policemen, especially if such work stoppage would prejudice
the Company’s operation, else its profits.
Held:
The demonstration, being directed against alleged abuses of policemen and not against
their employer, was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of expression
in general and of their right of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in
particular before the appropriate governmental agency. They exercised their civil and
political rights for their mutual aid and protection from what they believe were police
excesses. It was the duty of the firm to protect the Union and its members from the
harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest of the firm to rally to the
defense of, and to take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to
work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as a consequence perform more
efficiently their respective tasks to enhance its productivity as well as profits.
Although the demonstration paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the
complainant company, there is no finding involving the loss actually sustained by the
its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water, and electric consumption that day. Such
savings could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might
have sustained by reason of the absence of its workers for only one day.
Lozano v. Martinez [GR L-63419, 18 December 1986]
Facts: Batas Pambansa 22 (BP22; Bouncing Check Law) was approved on 3 April
1979. The petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under BP22.
(Florentina A. Lozano vs. RTC Judge Antonio M. Martinez [Manila, Branch XX] in
GR L-63419, Luzviminda F. Lobaton vs. RTC Executive Judge Glicerio L. Cruz
[Lemery Batangas, Branch V] in GR L-66839-42, Antonio and Susan Datuin vs. RTC
Judge Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII] in GR 71654, Oscar Violago
vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII] in GR 74524-25,
Elinor Abad vs. RTC Judge Nicolad A. Gerochi Jr. [Makati, Branch 139] in GR
75122-49, Amable and Sylvia Aguiluz vs. Presiding Judge of Branch 154 of Pasig in
GR 75812- 13, Luis M. Hojas vs. RTC Judge Senen Penaranda [Cagayan de Oro,
Branch XX] in GR 72565-67, and People vs. RTC Judge David Nitafan [Manila,
Branch 52] and Thelma Sarmiento in GR 75789]. Lozano, Lobaton, Datuin, Violago,
Abad, Aguiluz, Hojas and Sarmiento moved seasonably to quash the informations on
the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being
unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the trial courts, except in one case,
which is the subject of GR 75789 (People vs. Nitafan), wherein the trial court declared
the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have
come to the Supreme Court for relief.
Issue:
Whether BP 22 is a valid legislative act
Held:
Yes. It is within the authority of the legislature to enact such a law in the exercise of
the police power. It is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe
certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not
the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as
inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on
the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. BP
22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are
worthless, i.e. checks that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The thrust
of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks
and putting them in circulation. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order. It is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes, nor is it intended or designed to coerce a debtor to
pay his debt. Further, a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be
indulged in favor of its constitutionality. Where it is clear that the legislature has
overstepped the limits of its authority under the constitution, the Court should not
hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily on the offending statute.

Del Rosario v. Bengzon [GR 88265, 21 December 1989]
Facts:
On 15 March 1989, the full text of Republic Act 6675 was published in two
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. The law took effect on 30 March
1989, 15 days after its publication, as provided in Section 15 thereof. Section 7, Phase
3 of Administrative Order 62 was amended by Administrative Order 76 dated 28
August 1989 by postponing to 1 January 1990 the effectivity of the sanctions and
penalties for violations of the law, provided in Sections 6 and 12 of the Generics Act
and Sections 4 and 7 of the Administrative Order. Officers of the Philippine Medical
Association, the national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines, on behalf
of their professional brethren who are of kindred persuasion, filed a class suit
requesting the Court to declare some provisions (specifically penal) of the Generics
Act of 1988 and the implementing Administrative Order 62 issued pursuant thereto as
unconstitutional, hence, null and void. The petition was captioned as an action for
declaratory relief, over which the Court does not exercise jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in
view of the public interest involved, the Court decided to treat it as a petition for
prohibition instead.
Issue:
Whether the prohibition against the use by doctors of "no substitution" and/or words
of similar import in their prescription in the Generics Act is a lawful regulation.
Held:
Yes. There is no constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act; rather, it implements the
constitutional mandate for the State "to protect and promote the right to health of the
people" and "to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all
the people at affordable cost" (Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987
Constitution). The prohibition against the use by doctors of "no substitution" and/or
words of similar import in their prescription, is a valid regulation to prevent the
circumvention of the law. It secures to the patient the right to choose between the
brand name and its generic equivalent since his doctor is allowed to write both the
generic and the brand name in his prescription form. If a doctor is allowed to prescribe
a brand-name drug with "no substitution," the patient's option to buy a lower-priced,
but equally effective, generic equivalent would thereby be curtailed. The law aims to
benefit the impoverished (and often sickly) majority of the population in a still
developing country like ours, not the affluent and generally healthy minority.
Tablarin v. Gutierrez (J) [GR 78164, 31 July 1987]
Facts:
Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao
sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988.
However, they either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education and
administered by the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987,
Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges who
have not taken up or successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment
and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and
Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the
Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from
enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order
52 (series of 1985), dated 23 August 1985 [which established a uniform admission test
(NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for
admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year
1986-1987] and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for
securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting
applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on
26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of
preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The
NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Tablarin, et. al.
accordingly filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set
aside the Order of the RTC judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges contravenes the
Constitutional guarantee for the accessibility of education to all, and whether such
regulation is invalid and/or unconstitutional.
Held:
No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts 4224 and 5946, known as the
"Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives to govern (a) the standardization
and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of
physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine
in the Philippines. The Statute created a Board of Medical Education and prescribed
certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools. The State is not
really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education "accessible to all
who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather
merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable
and equitable admission and academic requirements." The regulation of the practice of
medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of
protecting the health and safety of the public. The power to regulate and control the
practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those
authorized to practice medicine. Legislation and administrative regulations requiring
those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations
have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly,
the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements for admission to the
medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory
authority of the state.
Ermita Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila [GR L-
24693, 31 July 1967]
Facts: On 13 June 1963, Ordinance 4760 was issued by the municipal board of the
City of Manila and approved by Vice Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time
acting Mayor of the City of Manila. The ordinance (1) imposes a P6,000.00 fee per
annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; (2) requires the
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging
house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any
room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed
form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the
surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation,
the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room,
if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data
furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled
with a certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and
affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound
together; (3) provides that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and
lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of
Police, or their duly authorized representatives. The ordinance also classified motels
into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first
class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or restaurant and
laundry; while second class motels are required to have a dining room. It prohibited a
person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging
houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian
and made it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative
of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24
hours. It provided a penalty of automatic cancellation of the license of the offended
party in case of conviction. On 5 July 1963, the Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association (EMHMOA), its member Hotel del Mar, and a certain Go Chiu
filed a petition for prohibition against the mayor of the City of Manila in his capacity
as he is charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of
Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of
such ordinances. There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a
final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The
lower court on 6 July 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the Mayor
to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance 4760 from and after 8 July 1963. After the
submission of the memoranda, ruled that the City of Manila lack authority to regulate
motels and rendering Ordinance 4760 unconstitutional and therefore null and void. It
made permanent the preliminary injunction issued by the Mayor and his agents to
restrain him from enforcing the ordinance. The Mayor of Manila appealed to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the regulations imposed on motels and hotels (increasing license fees,
partially restricting the freedom to contract, and restraining the liberty of individuals)
is valid and/or constitutional.
Held:
Yes. The ordinance was enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals.
It was made as there is observed an alarming increase in the rate of prostitution,
adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels,
which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and
thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers. The ordinance proposes
to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by
requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the
purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other
amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the
registration of transients and guests. The increase in the license fees was intended to
discourage establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal and
to increase the income of the city government. Further, the restriction on the freedom
to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house,
tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than
twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged,
cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the
immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, are being devoted.
Furthermore, the right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint
by general law for the common good. The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in
the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within
the proper scope of the police power. State in order to promote the general welfare
may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order
to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.
De la Cruz v. Paras [GR L-42571-72, 25 July 1983]
Facts:
The municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan issued Ordinance 84 (Prohibition and Closure
Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan) prohibited the operation of night clubs, and such clubs
employing hostesses. On 5 November 1975, two cases for prohibition with
preliminary injunction were filed with the CFI Bulacan. The cases were assigned to
Judge, now Associate Justice Paras of the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), who
issued a restraining order on 7 November 1975. The answers were thereafter filed. On
15 January 1976, the lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of
Ordinance 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence the petition for certiorari by way of
appeal.
Issue:
Whether the prohibition on the operation of night clubs, to foster public morals, is
reasonable and/or valid.
Held:
Reasonableness is consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal
corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. Sweeping
exercise of a lawmaking power could not qualify under the term reasonable. The
objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a
measure that does not encompass too wide a field. On its face, the Ordinance is
characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been
attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. A
prohibition is a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of
those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the
investments made and salaries to be earned by those therein employed. Republic Act
938 (An Act granting municipal or city boards and councils the power to regulate the
establishment, maintenance and operation of certain places of amusement within their
respective territorial jurisdiction) granted the municipal or city board or council of
each chartered city to have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment,
maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions,
cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of
amusement within its territorial jurisdiction. The power to regulate, was amended to
likewise prohibit on 21 May 1954; but the title remained intact. The power granted
remains that of regulation, not prohibition. The power claimed to enact the ordinance
is at the most dubious and under the present Local Government Code non-existent.
The law mandates the sangguniang bayan to "(rr) Regulate cafes, restaurants, beer-
houses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses and lodging houses, except travel
agencies, tourist guides, tourist transports, hotels, resorts, de luxe restaurants, and
tourist inns of international standards which shall remain under the licensing and
regulatory power of the Ministry of Tourism which shall exercise such authority
without infringing on the taxing or regulatory powers of the municipality; (ss)
Regulate public dancing schools, public dance halls, and sauna baths or massage
parlors; and (tt) Regulate the establishment and operation of billiard pools, theatrical
performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment. It is clear that municipal
corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but
not prevented from carrying on their business.
Velasco v. Villegas [GR L-24153, 14 February 1983]
Facts:
Ordinance 4964 was issued by the city of Manila prohibiting any operator of any
barbershop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any
adjacent room(s) of said barber shop, or in any room(s) within the same building
where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the
rooms where massaging is conducted is the same person. Tomas Velasco, Lourdes
Ramirez, Sy Pin, Edmundo Unson, Apolonia Ramirez, and Lourdes Lomibao, as
component members of the Sta. Cruz Barbershop Association, filed petition for
declaratory relief with the lower court, challenging the constitutionality of the
ordinance as it allegedly amounts to a deprivation of property of their means of
livelihood without due process of law. The petition was denied by the lower court as
its availability being dependent on there being as yet no case involving such issue
having been filed. Hence, the appeal.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance 4964 is a valid police power measure.
Held:
The objectives behind its enactment are: "(1) To be able to impose payment of the
license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance 3659 as
amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance
regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible
immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage
of customers. The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the
general welfare clause. It has made clear the significance and scope of such a clause,
which delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality. The clause has
been given wide application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the
particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such is the
progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence and it has continued to be. 10
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. [GR 111097, 20 July 1994]
Facts:
The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a corporation
created directly by Presidential Decree 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games
of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines (the constitutionality of the decree was sustained in Basco v. Philippine
Amusements and Gambling Corporation). Cagayan de Oro City, like other local
political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in
the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what
is known as the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16. Its Sangguniang
Panglungsod derives its powers, duties and functions under Section 458 of said Code.
In 1992, following its success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its
operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building
belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation Inc., renovated and equipped the same, and
prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season. The reaction of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On 7
December 1992, it enacted Ordinance 3353 (An Ordinance Prohibiting the issuance of
business permit and canceling existing business permit to any establishment for the
using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of
Casino). On 4 January 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance 3375-93 (An Ordinance
prohibiting the operation of Casino and providing penalty for violation therefore).
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by
PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. The Court found the ordinances
invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. Reconsideration
of the decision was denied on 13 July 1993. Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor filed a
petition for review under Rules of Court with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro can prohibit the
establishment of a casino, or gambling, operated by PAGCOR through an ordinance
or resolution.
Held:
The morality of gambling is not justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While
it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the
Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even
mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the
exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or
allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others
for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Further, there are two kinds of
gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a
modern concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The
suggestion that the Local Government Code (LGC) authorize Local Government Units
(LGUs) to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between these
two forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will of legislature.
Ordinances should not contravene a statute as municipal governments are only agents
of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers
conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot
be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.
Tano v. Socrates [GR 110249, 21 August 1997]
Facts:
On 15 December 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted
Ordinance 15-92 (taking effect on 1 January 1993; An ordinance banning the
shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from 1 January 1993
to 1 January 1998, and providing exemptions; penalties and for other purposes
thereof). To implement said ordinance, Acting Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office
Order 23 (series of 1993) dated 22 January 1993 authorizing the inspection of cargoes
shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Wharf, and any other port within the
jurisdiction of the City. On 19 February 1993, the Sangguniang Lalawigan of Palawan
enacted Resolution 33 [A resolution prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing,
buying, selling, and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms, to wit:
Family: Scaridae (Mameng), Epine Phelus Fasciatus (Suno), Cromileptes Altivelis
(Panther or Senorita), Lobster below 200 grams and spawning, Tridacna Gigas
(Takllobo), Pinctada Margaritefera (Mother pearl, Oysters, Giant clams, and other
species), Penaeus Monodon (Tiger Prawn, Breeder size or mother), Epinephelus
Suillus (Loba or Green grouper), and Family: Balistidae (Tropical Aquarium Fishes)
for a period of 5 years in and coming from Palawan waters]. Puerto Princesa City and
the province of Palawan implemented said ordinances. Tano, et. al., who were
criminally charged with violating Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution 33 and
Ordinance 2 of Palawan in Criminal Case 93-05-C of the 1st MCTC of Palawan; and
Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, who were charged with violating City Ordinance 15-92
of Puerto Princesa City and Ordinance 2 of Palawan before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa, questioned the validity of the said ordinances before
the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the ordinances in question, which prohibit the fishing of certain marine
species in Palawan, are constitutional and/or valid.
Held:
Laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the presumption
of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative
contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists, even if well-founded, there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain. In light of the principles of decentralization
and devolution enshrined in the Local Government Code (LGC) and the powers
granted therein to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare
Clause), and under Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458(a)(1)(vi) and 468(a)(1)(vi),
which involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the Ordinances cannot be
doubted. The ordinance also find full support under Republic Act 7611 (Strategic
Environmental Plan for Palawan Act), approved on 19 June 1992; which adopts a
comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of Palawan compatible
with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and endangered environment of
the province, which serve to guide the local government of Palawan and the
government agencies concerned in the formulation and implementation of plans,
programs and projects affecting said province. The first objective (to establish a
"closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period
of five years) is well within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal
waters which allows the establishment of "closed seasons." The second objective (to
protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province
of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities) falls within both
the general welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate thereunder to cities
and provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts
which endanger the environment.
Bautista v. Juinio [GR L-50908, 31 January 1984]
Facts:
Letter of Instruction 869 was issued on 31 May 1979 to respond to the protracted oil
crisis dating back to 1974, banning the use of private motor vehicles with H and EH
plates on weekends and holidays from 12 am Saturday to 5:00 am Monday, or 1 am of
holiday to 5:00 am of the day after the holiday; but exempting service, truck,
diplomatic, consular corps, and tourist cars. Pursuant thereto, Alfredo L. Juinio, then
Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications and Romeo P. Edu,
then Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission issued on 11 June 1979,
Memorandum Circular 39, which imposed "the penalties of fine, confiscation of
vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the above-specified vehicles"
found violating such Letter of Instruction. Memorandum Circular 39 does not impose
the penalty of confiscation but merely that of impounding, fine, and for the third
offense that of cancellation of certificate of registration and for the rest of the year or
for ninety days whichever is longer. Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique D.
Bautista questioned the validity of LOI 869 and MC 39 through a prohibition
proceeding with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether LOI 869 and Memorandum Circular 39, banning certain vehicles from using
the motorways in specified time, are constitutional and/or valid.
Held:
A regulatory measure enjoys a presumption of constitutionality or a presumption that
such an act falls within constitutional limitations. When a questioned statute deals
with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power, and which is asked to be
declare void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is
unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law, the presumption
of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record
for overthrowing the statute. Herein, as to LOI 869, the determination of the mode and
manner through which the objective of minimizing the consumption of oil products
and measures conducive to energy conservation (require and establish taxi stands
equipped with efficient telephone and communication systems; strict implementation
and observance of cargo truck hours on main arteries; strict observance of traffic
rules; effective solution of traffic problems and decongestion of traffic through
rerouting and quick repair of roads and efficient operation of double decker buses;
rationing of gasoline to avoid panic buying and give the private car owner the option
and responsibility of deciding on the use of his allocation; allow neon and electrically
devised advertising signs only from five o'clock p.m. to nine o'clock p.m.; prohibit
immediately the importation of heavy and luxury cars and seriously re-examine the
car manufacturing program) are left to the discretion of the political branches. The
question before the Court is limited to whether or not LOI 869 as implemented by MC
39 is violative of certain constitutional rights. On the other hand, as to MC 39, while
the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein
set forth is valid under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the impounding of a
vehicle finds no statutory justification. To apply that portion of MC 39 would be ultra
vires. It must likewise be made clear that a penalty even if warranted can only be
imposed in accordance with the procedure required by law.
Taxicab Operators v. The Board of Transportation [GR L-59234, 30 September
1982]
Facts:
On 10 October 1977, the Board of Transportation (BT) issued Memorandum Circular
77-42 which phases out old and dilapidated taxis; refusing registration to taxi units
within the National Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old. Pursuant to
the above BOT circular, the Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT)
issued Implementing Circular 52, dated 15 August 1980, instructing the Regional
Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the National
Capital Region (NCR), to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of
phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public
conveyances. In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in
registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980;
and those of model 1974, in 1981. On 27 January 1981, Taxicab Operators of Metro
Manila, Inc. (TOMMI), including its members Ace Transportation Corporation and
Felicisimo Cabigao, filed a petition with the BT (Case 80-7553), seeking to nullify
MC 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in
1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier
models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are
roadworthy and fit for operation. On 16 February 1981, TOMMI, et. al. filed before
the BT a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion", praying for an early hearing of their
petition. The case was heard on 20 February 1981. On 28 November 1981, TOMMI,
et. al. filed before the same Board a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or
Decide Main Petition" praying that the case be resolved or decided not later than 10
December 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of whatever remedy they
may have under the law for the protection of their interests before their 1975 model
cabs are phased-out on 1 January 1982. TOMMI, et. al., through its President,
allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that the
records of the case could not be located. On 29 December 1981, TOMMI, et. al.,
instituted a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether Memorandum Circular 77-42, phasing out 6-year old taxicabs and older, is a
valid administrative issuance.
Held:
Presidential Decree 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power to fix just and
reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service
to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor
vehicles. The overriding consideration in the issuance of Memorandum Circular 77-42
is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and
dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare
of society. It may also regulate property rights. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby
certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Dispensing
with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is not violative of
procedural due process. Previous notice and hearing is not essential to the validity of
general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or persons
or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. It is impractical to subject every
taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation to determine its road-worthiness, not to
speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards,
possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be
adopted to apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six
years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that
time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment
obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and
comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are in continuous
operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With
that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due
process has been met.
Anglo-Fil Trading v. Lazaro [GR L-54958, 2 September 1983
Facts:
23 contractors, among them the Philippine Integrated Port Services, Inc. (PIPSI),
Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation, Aduana Stevedoring Corporation, Anda Stevedoring
Corporation, Ben Paz Port Service, Inc., Manila Stevedoring and Arrastre Services,
Inc. (members of the Philippine Association of Stevedoring Operators and
Contractors, Inc. [PASOC]), competed at the South Harbor for the performance of
stevedoring work. The licenses of these contractors had long expired when the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA, created by Presidential Decree 505 [11 July 1974],
later superseded by Presidential Decree 857 [23 December 197]5) took over the
control and management of ports but they continued to operate afterwards on the
strength of temporary permits and hold-over authorities issued by PPA. On 4 May
1976, the Board of Directors of PPA passed Resolution 10, approving and adopting a
set of policies on Port Administration, Management and Operation. The PPA adopted
as its own the Bureau of Customs' policy of placing on only one organization the
responsibility for the operation of arrastre and stevedoring services in one port. On 11
April 1980, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of Instruction 1005-A which,
among other things, directed PPA to expeditiously evaluate all recognized cargo
handling contractors and port-related service operators and to determine the qualified
contractor or operator in order to ensure effective utilization of port facilities, etc. This
was followed by the President's memorandum to Col. Eustaquio S. Baclig Jr. dated 18
April 1980, directing submission of a report on the integration of the stevedoring
operations in Manila South Harbor and emphasizing the need for such integration as
well as the strengthening of the PPA in order to remedy the problems therein. On 28
April 1980, the committee submitted its report recommending the award of an
exclusive contract for stevedoring services in the South Harbor to Ocean Terminal
Services, Inc. (OTSI) after finding it the best qualified among the existing contractors.
The PPA submitted the committee report to the President, who, on 24 May 1980,
approved the recommendation to award an exclusive management contract to OTSI.
On 27 June 1980, PPA and OTSI entered into a management contract which provided,
among others, for a 5-year exclusive operation by OTSI of stevedoring services in the
South Harbor, renewable for another 5 years. The Board of Directors of the PPA gave
its approval on 27 June 1980. On 23 July 1980, PIPSI instituted an action before the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila against PPA and OTSI for the nullification of
the contract between the two, the annulment of the 10% of gross stevedoring revenue
being collected by PPA, and injunction with preliminary injunction. An ex-parte
restraining order was issued. On 21 August 1980. with leave of court, Anglo-Fil, et al.,
filed their complaint in intervention. The motion was granted and on 22 August 1980,
the CFI issued another ex-parte restraining order in the case to include Anglo-Fil et.
al., under the benefits of such order. On 30 August 1980, the PPA filed an urgent
motion to lift the restraining orders "in view of the long delay in the resolution of the
injunction incident and the countervailing public interest involved." On 1 September
1980, the CFI dissolved, lifted and set aside the restraining orders without prejudice to
the Court's resolution on the propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for. On 5 September 1980, PPA sent a letter to the General Manager of PIPSI
informing him that due to the lifting of the temporary restraining order, it was
withdrawing PIPSI's holdover authority to operate or provide stevedoring services at
South Harbor effective 7 September 1980. Anglo-Fil, et al., and PIPSI, therefore, filed
the petitions for certiorari with preliminary injunction alleging that the lifting of the
restraining orders ex-parte by the CFI was clearly effected with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether the issuance of a Permit to Operate (PTO) depended on the sound discretion,
and on the policies, rules and regulations implemented by the latter, or whether the
non-issuance thereof is an unlawful deprivation of property rights.
Held:
From the viewpoint of procedure, there was no grave abuse of discretion or want of
jurisdiction when the CFI judge lifted ex-parte the temporary restraining order he had
earlier issued also ex-parte. Subsequent to the issuance of the questioned order, the
CFI heard the parties on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction and, after
hearing the parties' evidence and arguments, denied the application for the writ. It is
also not grave abuse of discretion when a court dissolves ex-parte abuse of discretion
when a court dissolves ex-parte a restraining order also issued ex-parte. Further, the
contention that due process was violated resulting to a confiscatory effect on private
property is likewise without merit. In the first place, Anglo-Fil, et. al. were operating
merely on "hold-over" permits, which were based on PPA Memorandum Order 1 (19
January 1977). All hold-over permits were by nature temporary and subject to
subsequent policy guidelines as may be implemented by PPA. Such should have
served as sufficient notice that, at any time, PIPSI's and Anglo-Fil et.al.'s authorities
may be terminated. Whether PIPSI, and Anglo-Fil, et. al. would be issued a Permit to
Operate (PTO) depended on the sound discretion of PPA and on the policies, rules and
regulations that the latter may implement in accordance with the statutory grant of
power. The latter, therefore, cannot be said to have been deprived of property without
due process because, in this respect, what was given them was not a property right but
a mere privilege and they should have taken cognizance of the fact that since they
have no vested right to operate in the South Harbor, their permits can be withdrawn
anytime the public welfare deems it best to do so. Thus, unless the case justifies it, the
judiciary will not interfere in purely administrative matters. Such discretionary power
vested in the proper administrative body, in the absence of arbitrariness and grave
abuse so as to go beyond the statutory authority, is not subject to the contrary
judgment or control of others. In general, courts have no supervisory power over the
proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government. This is
particularly true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion,
and to findings of fact.
City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila [GR14355, 31 October 1919]
Facts:
On 11 December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Manila praying that certain lands (extension of Rizal Avenue within
Block 3 of the district of Binondo) be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a
public improvement. The Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community of
Manila] alleged in its answer that it was a corporation organized and existing under
and by virtue of the laws of the Philippine Islands, having for its purpose the benefit
and general welfare of the Chinese Community of the City of Manila; that it was the
owner of parcels one and two of the land described in paragraph 2 of the complaint;
that it denied that it was either necessary or expedient that the said parcels be
expropriated for street purposes; that existing street and roads furnished ample means
of communication for the public in the district covered by such proposed
expropriation; that if the construction of the street or road should be considered a
public necessity, other routes were available, which would fully satisfy the City's
purposes, at much less expense and without disturbing the resting places of the dead;
that it had a Torrens title for the lands in question; that the lands in question had been
used by the Chinese Community for cemetery purposes; that a great number of
Chinese were buried in said cemetery; that if said expropriation be carried into effect,
it would disturb the resting places of the dead, would require the expenditure of a
large sum of money in the transfer or removal of the bodies to some other place or site
and in the purchase of such new sites, would involve the destruction of existing
monuments and the erection of new monuments in their stead, and would create
irreparable loss and injury to the Chinese Community and to all those persons owning
and interested in the graves and monuments which would have to be destroyed; that
the City was without right or authority to expropriate said cemetery or any part or
portion thereof for street purposes; and that the expropriation, in fact, was not
necessary as a public improvement. Ildefonso Tambunting, answering the petition,
denied each and every allegation of the complaint, and alleged that said expropriation
was not a public improvement. Feliza Concepcion de Delgado, with her husband, Jose
Maria Delgado, and each of the other defendants, answering separately, presented
substantially the same defense as that presented by the Comunidad de Chinos de
Manila and Ildefonso Tambunting. Judge Simplicio del Rosario decided that there was
no necessity for the expropriation of the strip of land and absolved each and all of the
defendants (Chinese Community, Tambunting, spouses Delgado, et. al.) from all
liability under the complaint, without any finding as to costs. From the judgment, the
City of Manila appealed.
Issue:
Whether portions of the Chinese Cemetery, a public cemetery, may be expropriated
for the construction of a public improvement.
Held:
No. Section 2429 of Act 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila) provides that the city
(Manila) may condemn private property for public use. The Charter of the city of
Manila, however, contains no procedure by which the said authority may be carried
into effect. Act 190 provides for how right of eminent domain may be exercised.
Section 241 of said Act provides that the Government of the Philippine Islands, or of
any province or department thereof, or of any municipality, and any person, or public
or private corporation having, by law, the right to condemn private property for public
use, shall exercise that right in the manner prescribed by Section 242 to 246. The right
of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can
exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts
come to determine the question, they must not only find (a) that a law or authority
exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or
authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. Herein, the cemetery in
question is public (a cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or
church) and seems to have been established under governmental authority, as the
Spanish Governor-General, in an order creating the same. Where a cemetery is open
to the public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public
uses under a general authority. To disturb the mortal remains of those endeared to us
in life sometimes becomes the sad duty of the living; but, except in cases of necessity,
or for laudable purposes, the sanctity of the grave, the last resting place of our friends,
should be maintained, and the preventative aid of the courts should be invoked for that
object. While cemeteries and sepulchers and the places of the burial of the dead are
still within the memory and command of the active care of the living; while they are
still devoted to pious uses and sacred regard, it is difficult to believe that even the
legislature would adopt a law expressly providing that such places, under such
circumstances, should be violated.
Moday vs. Court of Appeals [GR 107916, 20 February 1997]
Facts:
On 23 July 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan
del Sur passed Resolution 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the
Petition for Expropriation of a 1 Hectare Portion of Lot 6138-Pls-4 Along the National
Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and
Other Government Sports Facilities." In due time, the Resolution was approved by
then Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and transmitted to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan for its approval. On 11 September 1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the comment that "expropriation is
unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the
establishment of the government center." The Municipality of Bunawan subsequently
filed a Petition for Eminent Domain against Percival Moday before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) at Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. The complaint was later amended to
include the registered owners, Percival Moday's parents, Zotico (+) and Leonora
Moday, as party defendants. On 6 March 1991, the municipality filed a Motion to
Take or Enter Upon the Possession of Subject Matter of This Case stating that it had
already deposited with the municipal treasurer the necessary amount in accordance
with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and that it would be in the
government's best interest for the municipality to be allowed to take possession of the
property. Despite Moday's opposition and after a hearing on the merits, the RTC
granted the municipality's motion to take possession of the land; holding that the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves it
effective, and that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to review the
ordinances and resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under Section 208 (1) of
BP 337 (the old Local Government Code) and that the exercise of eminent domain is
not one of the two acts enumerated in Section 19 thereof requiring the approval of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Moday's motion for reconsideration was denied by the
trial court on 31 October 1991. Moday elevated the case before the Court of Appeals
in a petition for certiorari, which was dismissed on 15 July 1992. The appellate court
also denied Moday's motion for reconsideration on 22 October 1992. Meanwhile, the
Municipality of Bunawan had erected three buildings on the subject property: the
Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall, the Municipal Motorpool, both
wooden structures, and the Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium, which is made of
concrete. Moday filed on 23 November 1992 the petition for review before the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal
resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Held:
Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised, is a
fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government's right
to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for
public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature the power of
eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities
and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid,
the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The
Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not
disputed as it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa 337, the Local Government
Code in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. The Sangguniang
Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution 43-89 is an infirm action which
does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of
BP 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal
resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang
Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the
authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan
clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang
Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted
Section 9 of BP337. Perforce; it follows that Resolution 43-89 is valid and binding
and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of Moday's
property.
Republic vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. [GR L-18841, 27 January
1969]
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising governmental powers
through its branches and instrumentalities, one of which is the Bureau of
Telecommunications. That office was created on 1 July 1947, under Executive Order
94, in addition to certain powers and duties formerly vested in the Director of Posts.
Sometime in 1933, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), and
the RCA Communications, Inc., entered into an agreement whereby telephone
messages, coming from the United States and received by RCA's domestic station,
could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls
collected by the PLDT for transmission from the Philippines to the United States. The
contracting parties agreed to divide the tolls, as follows: 25% to PLDT and 75% to
RCA. The sharing was amended in 1941 to 30% for PLDT and 70% for RCA, and
again amended in 1947 to a 50-50 basis. The arrangement was later extended to radio-
telephone messages to and from European and Asiatic countries. Their contract
contained a stipulation that either party could terminate it on a 24-month notice to the
other. On 2 February 1956, PLDT gave notice to RCA to terminate their contract on 2
February 1956. Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set
up its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and
equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call
private parties. At that time, the Bureau was maintaining 5,000 telephones and had
5,000 pending applications for telephone connection. The PLDT, on the other hand,
was also maintaining 60,000 telephones and had also 20,000 pending applications.
Through the years, neither of them has been able to fill up the demand for telephone
service. The Bureau of Telecommunications had proposed to the PLDT on 8 January
1958 that both enter into an interconnecting agreement, with the government paying
(on a call basis) for all calls passing through the interconnecting facilities from the
Government Telephone System to the PLDT. On 5 March 1958, the Republic, through
the Director of Telecommunications, entered into an agreement with RCA
Communications, Inc., for a joint overseas telephone service whereby the Bureau
would convey radio-telephone overseas calls received by RCA's station to and from
local residents. They actually inaugurated this joint operation on 2 February 1958,
under a "provisional" agreement. On 7 April 1958, PLDT complained to the Bureau of
Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditions under which their
Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is interconnected with the PLDT's facilities, referring
to the rented trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of
government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public, in
competition with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if said violations
were not stopped by midnight of 12 April 1958, the PLDT would sever the telephone
connections. When the PLDT received no reply, it disconnected the trunk lines being
rented by the Bureau at midnight on 12 April 1958. The result was the isolation of the
Philippines, on telephone services, from the rest of the world, except the United
States. On 12 April 1958, the Republic commenced suit against PLDT, in the Court of
First Instance of Manila (CFI, Civil Case 35805), praying in its complaint for
judgment commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with the Republic, through the
Bureau, for the use of the facilities of PLDT's telephone system throughout the
Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court might consider reasonable,
and for a writ of preliminary injunction against PLDT to restrain the severance of the
existing telephone connections and/or restore those severed. After trial, the lower
court rendered judgment that it could not compel the PLDT to enter into an agreement
with the Bureau because the parties were not in agreement; that under Executive
Order 94, establishing the Bureau of Telecommunications, said Bureau was not
limited to servicing government offices alone, nor was there any in the contract of
lease of the trunk lines, since the PLDT knew, or ought to have known, at the time that
their use by the Bureau was to be public throughout the Islands, hence the Bureau was
neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles of the PLDT; and, in view of
serious public prejudice that would result from the disconnection of the trunk lines,
declared the preliminary injunction permanent, although it dismissed both the
complaint and the counterclaims. Both parties appealed.
Issue:
Whether interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can
be an valid object for expropriation, i.e. the exercise of eminent domain.
Held:
Although parties can not be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had
between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the contract -- the freedom to
stipulate such terms and conditions being of the essence of our contractual system, and
by express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence,
intimidation or undue influence -- and thus the Republic may not compel the PLDT to
celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power
of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the
government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government
service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by
the court. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or
appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent
reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden
upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is
unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an
easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow
interservice connection between both telephone systems is not much different. In
either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If
under Section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of
national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just
compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to
render services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor.
Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both
telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use.
Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor [GR 138896, 20 June 2000]
Facts:
Barangay San Roque in Talisay, Cebu filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Talisay, Cebu (Branch 1) a Complaint to expropriate a property of Heirs of
Francisco Pastor (Eugenio Sylianco, Teodoro Sylianco, Isabel Sylianco, Eugenia S.
Ong, Lawrence Sylianco, Lawson Sylianco, Lawina S. Notario, Leonardo Sylianco,
Jr. and Lawford Sylianco). In an Order dated 8 April 1997, the MTC dismissed the
Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that "[e]minent domain is
an exercise of the power to take private property for public use after payment of just
compensation. In an action for eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of
action is the exercise of such power or right. The fact that the action also involves real
property is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not with this Court."
When the complaint was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the RTC also
dismissed the Complaint on 29 March 1999, holding that an action for eminent
domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be
expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the
RTC; therefore concluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC
since the value of the subject property was less than P20,000. The Barangay's motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied on 14 May 1999. The Barangay filed the
petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) has
jurisdiction over expropriation cases.
Held:
The primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any
of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private
property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the
necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the
subject of an expropriation suit is the government's exercise of eminent domain, a
matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. True, the value of the property to be
expropriated is
estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine the just
compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit.
Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of
the expropriation. Verily, the Court held in Republic of the Philippines v. Zurbano that
"condemnation proceedings are within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance," the
forerunners of the regional trial courts (RTC). The said case was decided during the
effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which, like Batas Pambansa 129 in respect to
RTCs, provided that courts of first instance had original jurisdiction over "all civil
actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation."
The 1997 amendments to the Rules of Court were not intended to change these
jurisprudential precedents.
Republic vs. Vda. de Castellvi [GR L-20620, 15 August 1974]
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines occupied the land of Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi, the
judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi, from 1 July 1947,
by virtue of a contract of lease, on a year to year basis (from July 1 of each year to
June 30 of the succeeding year). Before the expiration of the contract of lease on 30
June 1956, the Republic sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused. When the
AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the termination of the contract,
Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff of the AFP on 11 July 1956, informing the latter
that the heirs of the property had decided not to continue leasing the property in
question because they had decided to subdivide the land for sale to the general public,
demanding that the property be vacated within 30 days from receipt of the letter, and
that the premises be returned in substantially the same condition as before occupancy.
The Chief of Staff refused, saying that it was difficult for the army to vacate the
premises in view of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost
P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the property, and that, there
being no other recourse, the acquisition of the property by means of expropriation
proceedings would be recommended to the President. Castellvi then brought suit in
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pampanga (Civil Case 1458), to eject the
Philippine Air Force from the land. While this ejectment case was pending, the
Republic filed on 26 June 1959 complaints for eminent domain against Castellvi, and
Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun over 3 parcels of land situated in the barrio of San Jose,
Floridablanca, Pampanga. In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things,
that the fair market value of the above-mentioned lands, according to the Committee
on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or
a total market value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the provisional value of the
lands be fixed at P259,669.10, that the court authorizes the Republic to take
immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with the Provincial
Treasurer of Pampanga; that the court appoints 3 commissioners to ascertain and
report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated,
and that the court issues thereafter a final order of condemnation. The Republic was
placed in possession of the lands on 10 August 1959. Meanwhile, on 21 November
1959, the CFI of Pampanga, dismissed Civil Case 1458, upon petition of the parties.
After the parties filed their respective memoranda, the trial court, on 26 May 1961,
rendered its decision, finding that the unanimous recommendation of the
commissioners of P10.00 per square meter for the 3 lots subject of the action is fair
and just; and required the Republic to pay interests. On 21 June 1961 the Republic
filed a motion for a new trial and/or reconsideration, against which motion Castellvi
and Toledo- Gozun filed their respective oppositions, and which the trial court denied
on 12 July 1961. The Republic's record on appeal was finally submitted on 6
December 1961, after filing various ex-parte motions for extension of time within
which to file its record on appeal. On 27 December 1961 the trial court dismissed both
appeals for having been filed out of time, thereby . On 11 January 1962 the Republic
filed a "motion to strike out the order of 27 December 1961 and for reconsideration",
and subsequently an amended record on appeal, against which motion Castellvi and
Toledo-Gozun filed their opposition. On 26 July 1962 the trial court issued an order,
stating that "in the interest of expediency, the questions raised may be properly and
finally determined by the Supreme Court," and at the same time it ordered the
Solicitor General to submit a record on appeal containing copies of orders and
pleadings specified therein. In an order dated 19 November 1962, the trial court
approved the Republic's record on appeal as amended. Castellvi did not insist on her
appeal. Toledo-Gozun did not appeal.
Issue:
Whether the taking of Castellvi’s property occurred in 1947 or in 1959.
Held:
A number of circumstances must be present in the "taking" of property for purposes of
eminent domain. First, the expropriator must enter a private property. Second, the
entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period. Third, the
entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority. Fourth, the
property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected. Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such
a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property. The "taking" of Castellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain cannot
be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy
the property as lessee thereof. Two essential elements in the "taking" of property
under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by
the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting
the property to public use the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its
beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi
property in 1947. The "taking' of the Castellvi property should not be reckoned as of
the year 1947 when the Republic first occupied the same pursuant to the contract of
lease, and that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi property should not
be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. Under Section 4
of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the "just compensation" is to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled that when the taking of the
property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for
eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint. Herein, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in
possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on 10 August 1959. The
"taking" of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just
compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of 26 June 1959 when the
complaint for eminent domain was filed.
City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta [GR L-34915, 24 June 1983]
Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating the Establishment,
Maintenance and Operation of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial Ground
Within the Jurisdiction of Quezon City and Providing Penalties for the Violation
thereof" provides that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall
be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been
residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by
competent City Authorities, and where the area so designated shall immediately be
developed and should be open for operation not later than 6 months from the date of
approval of the application. For several years, section 9 of the Ordinance was not
enforced by city authorities but 7 years after the enactment of the ordinance, the
Quezon City Council passed a resolution requesting the City Engineer, Quezon City,
to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City
where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for
paupers burial. Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified Himlayang
Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be
enforced. Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Rizal (Branch XVIII at Quezon City), a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Special Proceeding Q-16002) seeking to
annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question for being contrary to the Constitution,
the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative
Code. There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal, both
the City Government and Himlayang Pilipino agreed to the rendition of a judgment on
the pleadings. The CFI rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance 6118,
S-64 null and void. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City
Government and City Council filed the petition or review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the setting aside of 6% of the total area of all private cemeteries for
charity burial grounds of deceased paupers is tantamount to taking of private property
without just compensation.
Held:
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least 6% of the total
area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the
promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people.
The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation.
Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes
the burden to private cemeteries. The expropriation without compensation of a portion
of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised
Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the
dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a
proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and
cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa 337 provides in
Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the
dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply
authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private
properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practice in the
past and it continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just
compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations
requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks,
playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of
subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very
clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of
communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the
regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots
are sold to homeowners.
People vs. Fajardo [GR L-12172, 29 August 1958]
Facts:
On 15 August 1950, during the incumbency of Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the
municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed Ordinance 7,
series of 1950, providing that "any person or persons who will construct or repair a
building should, before constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the
Municipal Mayor," that "a fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each
building permit and P1.00 for each repair permit issued," and that any violation of the
provisions of the ordinance shall make the violator liable to pay a fine of not less than
P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than 24
days or both, at the discretion of the court; and that if said building destroys the view
of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the expense
of the owner of the building or house. 4 years later, after the term of Fajardo as mayor
had expired, he and his son-in-law, Pedro Babilonia, filed a written request with the
incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their
gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the
national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. On 16 January 1954,
the request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would
destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. On 18 January 1954, Fajardo and
Babilonia reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the request was
turned down by the mayor. Whereupon, Fajardo and Babilonia proceeded with the
construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of
residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and
hitherto they had been living on leased property. On 26 February 1954, Fajardo and
Babilonia were charged before and convicted by the justice of the peace court of
Baao, Camarines Sur, for violation of Ordinance 7. Fajardo and Babilonia appealed to
the Court of First Instance (CDI), which affirmed the conviction, and sentenced both
to pay a fine of P35 each and the costs, as well as to demolish the building in question
because it destroys the view of the public plaza of Baao. From this decision, Fajardo
and Babilonia appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter forwarded the records to
the Supreme Court because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in
question.
Issue:
Whether the refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit on the ground that
the proposed building would destroy the view of the public plaza is an undue
deprivation of the use of the property in question, and thus a taking without due
compensation.
Held:
The refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit to Fajardo and Babilonia
was predicated on the ground that the proposed building would "destroy the view of
the public plaza" by preventing its being seen from the public highway. Even thus
interpreted, the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates — to
permanently deprive the latter of the right to use their own property; hence, it
oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of the property without
just compensation. But while property may be regulated in the interest of the general
welfare such as to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the
comfort and happiness of residents), and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit
structures offensive to the sight, the State may not, under the guise of police power,
permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically
confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the
community. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on Fajardo's
land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question,
because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. Fajardo
would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the
obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally
achieve that result, the municipality must give Fajardo just compensation and an
opportunity to be heard.
National Power Corporation vs. Gutierrez [GR 60077, 18 January 1991]
Facts:
The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), a government owned and controlled
entity, in accordance with Commonwealth Act 120, is invested with the power of
eminent domain for the purpose of pursuing its objectives, which among others is the
construction, operation, and maintenance of electric transmission lines for distribution
throughout the Philippines. For the construction of its 230 KV Mexico- Limay
transmission lines, NAPOCOR's lines have to pass the lands belonging to Matias
Cruz, Heirs of Natalia Paule and spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit
(covered by tax declarations 907, 4281 and 7582, respectively). NAPOCOR initiated
negotiations for the acquisition of right of way easements over the aforementioned lots
for the construction of its transmission lines but unsuccessful in this regard,
NAPOCOR was constrained to file eminent domain proceedings against Gutierrez, et.
al. on 20 January 1965. Upon filing of the corresponding complaint, NAPOCOR
deposited the amount of P973.00 with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga, tendered
to cover the provisional value of the land of the Malit and Gutierrez. And by virtue
of which, NAPOCOR was placed in possession of the property of the spouses so it
could immediately proceed with the construction of its Mexico-Limay 230 KV
transmission line. In this connection, by the trial court's order of 30 September 1965,
the spouses were authorized to withdraw the fixed provisional value of their land in
the sum of P973.00. Meanwhile, for the purpose of determining the fair and just
compensation due Gutierrez, et. al., the court appointed 3 commissioners, comprised
of one representative of NAPOCOR, one for the affected families and the other from
the court, who then were empowered to receive evidence, conduct ocular inspection of
the premises, and thereafter, prepare their appraisals as to the fair and just
compensation to he paid to the owners of the lots. Hearings were consequently held
before said commissioners and during their hearings, the case of the Heirs of Natalia
Paule was amicably settled by virtue of a Right of Way Grant executed by Guadalupe
Sangalang for herself and in behalf of her co-heirs in favor of NAPOCOR. The case
against Matias Cruz was earlier decided by the court, thereby leaving only the case
against the spouses Malit and Gutierrez still to be resolved. Accordingly, the
commissioners submitted their individual reports. With the reports submitted, the
lower court rendered a decision, ordering NAPOCOR to pay Malit and Gutierrez the
sum of P10 per square meter as the fair and reasonable compensation for the right-of-
way easement of the affected area, which is 760 squares, or a total sum of P7,600.00
and P800.00 as attorney's fees. Dissatisfied with the decision, NAPOCOR filed a
motion for reconsideration which was favorably acted upon by the lower court, and in
an order dated 10 June 1973, it amended its previous decision, reducing the amount
awarded to to P5.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable market value of the
760 square meters belonging to the said spouses, in light of the classification of the
land to be partly commercial and partly agricultural. Still not satisfied, an appeal was
filed by the NAPOCOR with the Court of Appeals but appellate court, on 9 March
1982, sustained the trial court. NAPOCOR filed the petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether the spouses are deprive of the property’s ordinary use and thus the easement
of right of way in favor of NAPOCOR constitutes taking.
Held:
The acquisition of the right-of-way easement falls within the purview of the power of
eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in similar cases of easement of right-
of-way where the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private
property condemned for public use. Herein, the easement of right-of-way is definitely
a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the
installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed
by NAPOCOR against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives spouses
Malit and Gutierrez of its ordinary use. For these reasons, the owner of the property
expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor less,
whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said
property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete
equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by
reason of the expropriation. The price or value of the land and its character at the time
it was taken by the Government are the criteria for determining just compensation.
The above price refers to the market value of the land which may be the full market
value thereof. It appearing that the trial court did not act capriciously and arbitrarily in
setting the price of P5.00 per square meter of the affected property, the said award is
proper and not unreasonable.
United States vs. Causby [328 US 256, 27 May 1946]
Facts:
Causby owns 2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. It has
on it a dwelling house, and also various outbuildings which were mainly used for
raising chickens. The end of the airport's northwest-southeast runway is 2,220 feet
from Causby's barn and 2,275 feet from their house. The path of glide to this runway
passes directly over the property-which is 100 feet wide and 1,200 feet long. The 30 to
1 safe glide angle approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority passes over this
property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above the house, 63 feet above the barn and 18
feet above the highest tree. The use by the United States of this airport is pursuant to a
lease executed in May 1942, for a term commencing 1 June 1942 and ending 30 June
1942, with a provision for renewals until 30 June 1967, or 6 months after the end of
the national emergency, whichever is the earlier. Various aircraft of the United States,
i.e. bombers, transports and fighters, use this airport. Since the United States began
operations in May 1942, its four-motored heavy bombers, other planes of the heavier
type, and its fighter planes have frequently passed over Causby's land buildings in
considerable numbers and rather close together. They come close enough at times to
appear barely to miss the tops of the trees and at times so close to the tops of the trees
as to blow the old leaves off. The noise is startling. And at night the glare from the
planes brightly lights up the place. As a result of the noise, the Causbys had to give up
their chicken business. As many as 6 to 10 of their chickens were killed in one day by
flying into the walls from fright. The total chickens lost in that manner was about 150.
Production also fell off. The result was the destruction of the use of the property as a
commercial chicken farm. The Causbys are frequently deprived of their sleep and the
family has become nervous and frightened. Although there have been no airplane
accidents on their property, there have been several accidents near the airport and
close to their place. These are the essential facts found by the Court of Claims. On the
basis of these facts, it found that the property had depreciated in value. It held that the
United States had taken an easement over the property on June 1, 1942, and that the
value of the property destroyed and the easement taken was $2,000. The United States
contends that when flights are made within the navigable airspace (Air Commerce Act
of 1926, as amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938) without any physical
invasion of the property of the landowners, there has been no taking of property. It
says that at most there was merely incidental damage occurring as a consequence of
authorized air navigation.
Issue:
Whether there was taking of the Causby’s property, even in the light that the United
States allegedly has complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space over
the country.
Held:
The United States conceded that if the flights over Causby's property rendered it
uninhabitable, there would be a taking compensable under the 5th Amendment. It is
the owner's loss, not the taker's gain, which is the measure of the value of the property
taken. Market value fairly determined is the normal measure of the recovery. And that
value may reflect the use to which the land could readily be converted, as well as the
existing use. If, by reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights, Causby could
not use this land for any purpose, their loss would be complete. It would be as
complete as if the United States had entered upon the surface of the land and taken
exclusive possession of it. Herein, there was a taking. Though it would be only an
easement of flight which was taken, that easement, if permanent and not merely
temporary, normally would be the equivalent of a fee interest. It would be a definite
exercise of complete dominion and control over the surface of the land. The fact that
the planes never touched the surface would be as irrelevant as the absence in this day
of the feudal livery of seisin on the transfer of real estate. The owner's right to possess
and exploit the land-that is to say, his beneficial ownership of it-would be destroyed. It
would not be a case of incidental damages arising from a legalized nuisance such as
was involved in Richards v. Washington Terminal Co. (233 U.S. 546). In that case
property owners whose lands adjoined a railroad line were denied recovery for
damages resulting from the noise, vibrations, smoke and the like, incidental to the
operations of the trains. Herein, the line of flight is over the land, and the land is
appropriated as directly and completely as if it were used for the runways themselves.
However, since the record in the case is not clear whether the easement taken is a
permanent or a temporary one, it would be premature for the Court to consider
whether the amount of the award made by the Court of Claims was proper, and thus
the Court remanded the cause to the Court of Claims so that it may make the
necessary findings in conformity with the Court's opinion.
Filstream International Inc. [GR 125218 and GR 128077. 23 January 1998]
Facts:
Filstream International, Inc., is the registered owner of the properties consisting of
adjacent parcels of land situated in Antonio Rivera Street, Tondo II, Manila, with a
total area of 3,571.10 square meters (TCT 203937, 203936, 169198, 169199, 169200
and 169202 of the Register of Deeds of Manila). On 7 January 1993, Filstream filed
an ejectment suit before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila (Branch 15,
Civil Case 140817-CV) against the occupants of the parcels of land (Orlando Malit,
Antonio Caguiat, Alicia Cabrera, Armando Lachica, Jacinto Caguiat, Gloria Antonio,
Elizalde Navarra, Dolores Fuentes, Susana Roy, Antonio Ibañez, Benigno Basilio,
Luceria Dematulac, Florencia Gomez, Lazaro Gomez, Jose Gomez, Venancio
Manaloto, Cristino Umali, Demetria Gatus, Priscilla Malong, Domingo Aguila,
Ramon San Agustin, Julian Ferrer, Jr., Francisco Galang, Florentino Maliwat,
Severina Villar, Trinidad Naguit, Jose Naguit, Fortunato Agustin Cabrera, Gaudencio
Intal, Danilo David, Enrique David, Vicente De Guzman, Policarpio Lumba, Belen
Palma, Elen Somvillo, Leonardo Manicad, Opreng Miclat, Benita Mata, Gregorio
Lopez, Marcelina Sapno, Jesus Mercado, and Calixto Gomez) on the grounds of
termination of the lease contract and non-payment of rentals. Judgment was rendered
by the MTC on September 14, 1993 ordering private respondents to vacate the
premises and pay back rentals to Filstream. Not satisfied, malit, et. al. appealed the
decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 4, Civil Case 93-
68130) which in turn affirmed the decision of the MTC. Still not content, Malit, et. al.
proceeded to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review (CA-GR SP 33714). The
result however remained the same as the appellate court affirmed the decision of the
RTC in its decision dated 25 August 1994. Thereafter, no further action was taken by
Malit, et. al., as a result of which the decision in the ejectment suit became final and
executory. However, during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings Malit, et. al.
filed on 25 May 1993, a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Exchange against
Filstream before the RTC of Manila (Branch 43, Civil Case 93-66059). It was at this
stage that City of Manila came into the picture when the city government approved
Ordinance 7813 on 5 November 1993, authorizing Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to initiate
the acquisition by negotiation, expropriation, purchase, or other legal means certain
parcels of land which formed part of Filstream's properties then occupied by Malit, et.
al. Subsequently, the City of Manila approved Ordinance 7855 declaring the
expropriation of certain parcels of land situated along Antonio Rivera and Fernando
Ma. Guerrero streets in Tondo, Manila which were owned by Mr. Enrique Quijano
Gutierrez, Filstream's predecessor-in-interest. The said properties were to be sold and
distributed to qualified tenants of the area pursuant to the Land Use Development
Program of the City of Manila. On 23 May 1994, the City of Manila filed a complaint
for eminent domain before the RTC of Manila (Branch 42, Civil Case 94-70560),
seeking to expropriate the parcels of land owned by Filstream which are situated at
Antonio Rivera Street, Tondo II, Manila. Pursuant to the complaint filed by the City
of Manila, the trial court issued a Writ of Possession in favor of the former which
ordered the transfer of possession over the disputed premises to the City of Manila.
Filstream filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for eminent domain as well as a
motion to quash the writ of possession. On 30 September 1994, the RTC of Manila
issued an order denying Filstream's motion to dismiss and the motion to quash the
Writ of Possession. Filstream filed a motion for reconsideration as well as a
supplemental motion for reconsideration seeking the reversal of the order but the same
were denied. Still, Filstream filed a subsequent motion to be allowed to file a second
motion for reconsideration but it was also denied. Aggrieved, Filstream filed on 31
March 1996, a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA- GR SP 36904)
seeking to set aside the RTC order. On 18 March 1996, the appellate court dismissed
the petition. Filsteream filed a motion for reconsideration and attached clearer copies
of the pertinent documents and papers pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 6 of the Revised
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals. But on 20 May 1996, the appellate court
issued a resolution denying the motion as petitioner failed to submit clearer and
readable copies of the pleadings. This prompted Filstream to proceed to the Supreme
Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari.
Meanwhile, owing to the finality of the decision in the ejectment suit (Civil Case
140817-CV), the MTC of Manila, Branch 15, upon motion of Filstream, issued a Writ
of Execution as well as a Notice to Vacate the disputed premises. Malit, et. al. filed a
Motion to Recall/Quash the Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate alleging the
existence of a supervening event in that the properties subject of the dispute have
already been ordered condemned in an expropriation proceeding in favor of the City
of Manila for the benefit of the qualified occupants thereof, thus execution shall be
stayed. For its part, the City of Manila filed on 13 March 1996, a motion for
intervention with prayer to stay/quash the writ of execution on the ground that it is the
present possessor of the property subject of execution. In its order dated 14 March
1996, the MTC of Manila denied Malit, et. al.'s motion as it found the allegations
therein bereft of merit and upheld the issuance of the Writ of Execution and Notice to
Vacate in Filstream's favor. Subsequently, the trial court also denied the motion filed
by the City of Manila. On 22 April 1996, the trial court issued an order commanding
the demolition of the structure erected on the disputed premises. To avert the
demolition, Malit, et. al. filed before the RTC of Manila, (Branch 14, Civil Case 96-
78098) a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction . On 15 May 1996, the City of
Manila filed its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction which was raffled to Branch
23 of the RTC of Manila (Civil Case 96-78382), seeking the reversal of the orders
issued by the MTC of Manila, Branch 14. Thereafter, upon motion filed by the City of
Manila, an order was issued by the RTC of Manila, Branch 10, ordering the
consolidation of Civil Case 96-78382 with Civil Case 96-78098 pending before
Branch 14 of the RTC of Manila. Injunctions were issued. Filstream then filed a
motion for reconsideration from the order of denial but pending resolution of this
motion, it filed a motion for voluntary inhibition of the presiding judge of the RTC of
Manila, Branch 14. The motion for inhibition was granted 25 and as a result, the
consolidated cases (Civil Cases 96-78382 and 96-78098) were re-raffled to the RTC
of Manila, Branch 33. During the proceedings before the RTC of Manila, Branch 33,
Filstream moved for the dismissal of the consolidated cases (Civil Cases 96-78382
and 96-78098) for violation of Supreme Court Circular 04-94 (forum shopping)
because the same parties, causes of action and subject matter involved therein have
already been disposed of in the decision in the ejectment
case (Civil Case 140817) which has already become final and executory prior to the
filing of these consolidated cases. On 9 December 1996, the RTC of Manila, Branch
33 ordered the dismissal of Civil Cases 96-78382 and 96-78098 due to forum
shopping. Immediately thereafter, Filstream filed an Ex-parte Motion for Issuance of
an Alias Writ of Demolition and Ejectment and a supplemental motion to the same
dated January 10 and 13, 1997, respectively, before the MTC of Manila, Branch 15,
which promulgated the decision in the ejectment suit (Civil Case No. 140817-CV). 23
On January 1997, the court granted the motion and issued the corresponding writ of
demolition. As a consequence of the dismissal of the consolidated cases, Malit, et. al.
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals
(CA-GR SP 43101). At the conclusion of the hearing for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, the Court of Appeals, in its resolution dated 18 February 1997,
found merit in Malit, et. al.'s allegations in support of their application of the issuance
of the writ and granted the same. Filstream filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65.
Issue:
Whether there is violation of due process against Filstream in the manner its
properties were expropriated and condemned in favor of the City of Manila.
Held:
That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not
diminish its public use character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land
and shelter for all who need them. Corollary to the expanded notion of public use,
expropriation is not anymore confined to vast tracts of land and landed estates. It is
therefore of no moment that the land sought to be expropriated in this case is less than
half a hectare only. Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain
has evolved into a flexible concept, influenced by changing conditions. Public use
now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in
particular, urban land reform and housing. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact
that urban land reform has become a paramount task in view of the acute shortage of
decent housing in urban areas particularly in Metro Manila. Nevertheless, despite the
existence of a serious dilemma, local government units are not given an unbridled
authority when exercising their power of eminent domain in pursuit of solutions to
these problems. The basic rules still have to be followed, which are as follows: "no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws; private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation". Thus, the exercise by local
government units of the power of eminent domain is not without limitations. Even
Section 19 of the 1991 Local Government Code is very explicit that it must comply
with the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws. Very clear from Sections 9
and 10 of Republic Act 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) are the
limitations with respect to the order of priority in acquiring private lands and in
resorting to expropriation proceedings as a means to acquire the same. Private lands
rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein,
expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only when the other modes of
acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions must be deemed
mandatory because these are the only safeguards in securing the right of owners of
private property to due process when their property is expropriated for public use.
There is nothing in the records that would indicate that City of Manila complied with
Section 9 and Section 10 of RA 7279. Filstream's properties were expropriated and
ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the
acquisition of other lands listed under Section 9 of RA 7279 have proved futile.
Evidently, there was a violation of Filstream's right to due process which must
accordingly be rectified.
Estate or Heirs of the late ex-Justice Jose B. L. Reyes vs. City of Manila [GR
132431, 13 February 2004];
Facts:
Jose B. L. Reyes and Heirs of Edmundo Reyes are the pro-indiviso co-owners in equal
proportion of 11 parcels of land with a total area of 13,940 square meters situated at
Sta. Cruz District, Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24359
issued by the Register of Deeds of Manila. These parcels of land are being occupied
and leased by different tenants, among whom are respondents Dr. Rosario Abiog,
Angelina Maglonso and members of the Sampaguita Bisig ng Magkakapitbahay,
Incorporated (SBMI). The Reyeses leased to Abiog Lot 2-E, Block 3007 of the
consolidated subdivision plan (LRC) Psd- 328345, with an area of 191 square meters
and to Maglonso, Lot 2-R, Block 2996 of the same consolidation plan, with an area of
112 square meters. On 9 November 1993 and 26 May 1994, respectively, Jose B.L.
Reyes and the Heirs of Edmundo Reyes filed ejectment complaints against Abiog and
Maglonso, among others. Upon his death, Jose B.L. Reyes was substituted by his
heirs. The heirs obtained favorable judgments in Civil Case 142851-CV (Metropolitan
Trial Court [MTC] of Manila, Branch 10, 9 May 1994) against Abiog, and in Civil
Case 144205-CV (MTC of Manila, Branch 3, 4 May 1995) against Maglonso. Abiog
and Maglonso appealed the MTC decisions but the same were denied by the RTC of
Manila, Branch 28, and the RTC of Manila, Branch 38, respectively. Their appeals to
the Court of Appeals were likewise denied. As no appeals were further taken, the
judgments of eviction against respondents Abiog and Maglonso became final and
executory in 1998. During the pendency of the two ejectment cases against Abiog and
Maglonso, the City of Manila filed on 25 April 1995 a complaint for eminent domain
(expropriation) of the properties of Reyeses at the RTC of Manila, Branch 9. The
properties sought to be acquired by the City included parcels of land occupied by
Abiog, Maglonso and members of SBMI. The complaint was based on Ordinance
7818 enacted on 29 November 1993 authorizing the City Mayor of Manila to
expropriate certain parcels of land with an aggregate area of 9,930 square meters,
more or less, owned by Jose B.L. Reyes and Edmundo Reyes situated along the streets
of Rizal Avenue, Tecson, M. Natividad, Sampaguita, Oroquieta, M. Hizon, Felix
Huertes, Bulacan, Sulu, Aurora Boulevard, Pedro Guevarra and Kalimbas in the third
district of Manila. The complaint alleged that, on 10 March 1995, the City thru City
Legal Officer Angel Aguirre, Jr. sent the Reyeses a written offer to purchase the
subject properties for P10,285,293.38 but the same was rejected. On 15 May 1995,
SBMI, a registered non-stock corporation composed of the residents of the subject
properties, filed a motion for intervention and admission of their attached complaint
with prayer for injunction. The trial court denied the motion for intervention in an
order dated 2 June 1995. On the day SBMI’s motion for intervention was denied, the
Reyeses filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for eminent domain for lack of merit,
alleging various grounds, among them, "that instead of expropriating the subject
property which enjoys the least priority in the acquisition by the City of Manila for
socialized housing under Sec. 9(t) of R.A. 7279, the money to be paid should be
channeled to the development of 244 sites in Metro Manila designated as area for
priority development." On 6 June 1995, the trial court allowed the City to take
possession of the subject property upon deposit of the amount of P1,542,793, based on
the P10,285,293.38 offer by the City to the Reyeses which the trial court fixed as the
provisional amount of the subject properties. On 14 June 1995, the City filed an
opposition to the Reyeses’ motion to dismiss. On 3 October 1995, the City’s
complaint for eminent domain was dismissed. The City’s motion for reconsideration
was denied. On 12 January 1996, the City appealed the decision of the trial court to
the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, several motions seeking the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction were filed by the City to prevent
petitioners from ejecting the occupants of the subject premises. On 21 March 1996,
the Court of Appeals issued a resolution denying the motions for lack of merit. The
City’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Meanwhile, on 27 January
1997, in view of the finality of the judgment in the ejectment case against Abiog, the
MTC of Manila, Branch 10, issued a writ of execution. On 31 January 1997, SBMI
filed in the Court of Appeals a motion for leave to intervene with prayer for injunctive
relief praying that the ejectment cases be suspended or that the execution thereof be
enjoined in view of the pendency of the expropriation case filed by the City over the
same parcels of land. Abiog also filed a reiteratory motion for issuance of TRO and to
stop the execution of the order of the MTC of Manila, Branch 10. On 26 August 1997,
the Court of Appeals issued a resolution finding prima facie basis to grant SBMI’s
motions, and issued a TRO to Judge Salvador, his employees and agents to maintain
the status quo. On 27 January 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision
reversing the trial court judgment and upholding as valid City’s exercise of its power
of eminent domain over the Reyeses’ properties. From the aforementioned decision of
the Court of Appeals, the Reyeses filed on 19 March 1998 the petition for review
before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether there is violation of due process against the Reyeses in the manner their
property were expropriated and condemned in favor of the City of Manila.
Held:
The Filstream case is substantially similar in facts and issues to the present case. In
Filstream vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the Sections 9 and 10 of Republic
Act 7279 are limitations to the exercise of the power of eminent domain, specially
with respect to the order of priority in acquiring private lands and in resorting to
expropriation proceedings as a means to acquire the same. Private lands rank last in
the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein,
expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only after the other modes of
acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is mandatory
because these are the only safeguards of often-times helpless owners of private
property against violation of due process when their property is forcibly taken from
them for public use. Herein, the City failed to prove strict compliance with the
requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. The City neither alleged in its
complaint nor proved during the proceedings before the trial court that it complied
with said requirements. Even in the Court of Appeals, the City in its pleadings failed
to show its compliance with the law. The Court of Appeals was likewise silent on this
specific jurisdictional issue. This is a clear violation of the right to due process of the
Reyeses.
City of Mandaluyong vs. Aguilar [GR 137152, 29 January 2001]
Facts:
Antonio, Francisco, Thelma, Eusebio, and Rodolfo N. Aguilar, constructed residential
houses several decades ago on a portion of the 3 lots located at 9 de Febrero Street,
Barangay Mauwag, City of Mandaluyong. The Aguilars had since leased out these
houses to tenants until the present. On the vacant portion of the lots, other families
constructed residential structures which they likewise occupied. In 1983, the lots were
classified by Resolution 125 of the Board of the Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council as an Area for Priority Development for urban land reform
under Proclamation 1967 and 2284 of then President Marcos. As a result of this
classification, the tenants and occupants of the lots offered to purchase the land from
the Aguilars, but the latter refused to sell. On 7 November 1996, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Mandaluyong, upon petition of the Kapitbisig, an association of tenants
and occupants of the subject land, adopted Resolution 516, Series of 1996 authorizing
Mayor Benjamin Abalos of the City of Mandaluyong to initiate action for the
expropriation of the subject lots and construction of a medium-rise condominium for
qualified occupants of the land. On 10 January 1996, Mayor Abalos allegedly sent a
letter to the Aguilars offering to purchase the said property at P3,000.00 per square
meter. On 4 August 1997, the City filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
168, Pasig City a complaint for expropriation, seeking to expropriate 3 adjoining
parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,847 square meters in the names of the
Aguilars, and praying that the fixing of just compensation at the fair market value of
P3,000.00 per square meter. In their answer, the Aguilars, except Eusebio who died in
1995, denied having received a copy of Mayor Abalos' offer to purchase their lots.
They alleged that the expropriation of their land is arbitrary and capricious, and is not
for a public purpose; that the subject lots are their only real property and are too small
for expropriation, while the City has several properties inventoried for socialized
housing; and that the fair market value of P3,000.00 per square meter is arbitrary
because the zonal valuation set by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is P7,000.00 per
square meter. As counterclaim, the Aguilars prayed for damages of P21 million. On 5
November 1997, the City filed an Amended Complaint and named as an additional
defendant Virginia N. Aguilar and, at the same time, substituted Eusebio Aguilar with
his heirs. The City also excluded from expropriation TCT N59870 and thereby
reduced the area sought to be expropriated from three (3) parcels of land to two (2)
parcels totalling 1,636 square meters.The Amended Complaint was admitted by the
trial court on 18 December 1997. On 17 September 1998, the trial court issued an
order dismissing the Amended Complaint after declaring the Aguilars as "small
property owners" whose land is exempt from expropriation under Republic Act 7279.
The court also found that the expropriation was not for a public purpose for the City's
failure to present any evidence that the intended beneficiaries of the expropriation are
landless and homeless residents of Mandaluyong. The City moved for reconsideration.
On 29 December 1998, the court denied the motion. The City filed a petition for
review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the City has exhausted all means to acquire the land under the hands of
private persons, but which is within the Areas for Priority Development (APD).
Held:
Presidential Decree (PD) 1517, the Urban Land Reform Act, was issued by then
President Marcos in 1978. The decree adopted as a State policy the liberation of
human communities from blight, congestion and hazard, and promotion of their
development and modernization, the optimum use of land as a national resource for
public welfare. Pursuant to this law, Proclamation 1893 was issued in 1979 declaring
the entire Metro Manila as Urban Land Reform Zone for purposes of urban land
reform. This was amended in 1980 by Proclamation 1967 and in 1983 by
Proclamation 2284 which identified and specified 245 sites in Metro Manila as Areas
for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones. The acquisition of lands for
socialized housing is governed by several provisions in the law. Pursuant to Section 9
of RA 7279, Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the following order:
(1) government lands; (2) alienable lands of the public domain; (3) unregistered or
abandoned or idle lands; (4) lands within the declared Areas for Priority Development
(APD), Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement
(SIR) sites which have not yet been acquired; (5) BLISS sites which have not yet been
acquired; and (6) privately- owned lands. Section 9, however, is not a single provision
that can be read separate from the other provisions of the law. It must be read together
with Section 10 of RA 7279. Thus, lands for socialized housing under RA 7279 are to
be acquired in several modes. Among these modes are the following: (1) community
mortgage;
(2) land swapping, (3) land assembly or consolidation; (4) land banking; (5) donation
to the government; (6) joint venture agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8)
expropriation. The mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall be
resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted; and (b)
parcels of land owned by small property owners are exempt from such acquisition.
The acquisition of the lands in the priority list must be made subject to the modes and
conditions set forth in the next provision. In other words, land that lies within the APD
may be acquired only in the modes under, and subject to the conditions of, Section 10.
Herein, the City claims that it had faithfully observed the different modes of land
acquisition for socialized housing under RA 7279 and adhered to the priorities in the
acquisition for socialized housing under said law. It, however, did not state with
particularity whether it exhausted the other modes of acquisition in Section 9 of the
law before it decided to expropriate the subject lots. The law states "expropriation
shall be resorted to when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted." The City
alleged only one mode of acquisition, i.e., by negotiated purchase. The City, through
the City Mayor, tried to purchase the lots from the Aguilars but the latter refused to
sell. As to the other modes of acquisition, no mention has been made. Not even
Resolution 516, Series of 1996 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod authorizing the Mayor
of Mandaluyong to effect the expropriation of the subject property states whether the
city government tried to acquire the same by community mortgage, land swapping,
land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the government, or joint
venture agreement under Section 9 of the law.
Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes [GR L-60549, 60553 to 60555; 26 October
1983]
Facts:
The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the Court of First Instance
of Cebu City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in
barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's express authority "to acquire
by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private land within
and without the tourist zones" for the purposes indicated in Section 5, paragraph B(2),
of its Revised Charter (PD 564), more specifically, for the development into integrated
resort complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism
value, specifically for the construction of a sports complex (basketball courts, tennis
courts, volleyball courts, track and field, baseball and softball diamonds, and
swimming pools), clubhouse, gold course, children's playground and a nature area for
picnics and horseback riding for the use of the public. The Heirs of Juancho Ardona
(Represented by Gloria Ardona) Anastacio C. Cabilao, Heirs of Cipriano Cabilao
(Represented by Jose Cabilao) Modesta Cabilao, Heirs of Roman Cabuenas
(Represented by Alberto Cabuenas), Agripino Gabisay and Prudencia Mabini,
Antonio Labrador and Lucia Gabisay, Geronimo Mabini and Marcelina Sabal,
Inocencio Mabini and Arsenia Reyes, Patricio Mabini and Gregoria Borres, Aniceto
Gadapan and Maxima Gabisay, Bartolome Magno and Calineca
E. Magno, Alberto Cabuenas, Narciso Cabuenas and Victoria Cabuenas,
Eutiquioseno, Heirs of Esperidion Cabuenas (Represented by Alberto Cabuenas),
Maximina Navaro, Sulpicio Navaro, Eduardo Navaro, Martiniano Roma (In
Representation of Arcadio Mabini, Deceased), Martin Seno, Fausto Arda, Maxima
Cabilao, Estrella Seno, Eduvegis S. Cabilao, Rosario Cabilao, Minors Danilo,
Socorro, Josefina and Marites, All Surnamed Cabilao, Juan Borres (Represented by
Francisca Borres), Ramon Jabadan, Jesus Alipar and Leonila Kabahar, Antonio
Labrador, Heirs of Nicasio Gabisay (Represented by Arsenio Gabisay), Pacifico
Labrador, Demetrio Labrador and Fructosa Tabura, Venancio Del Mar, Marino Del
Mar, Heirs of Teodora Arcillo (Represented by Brigida Arcillo) Dionisia Gabunada,
Heirs of Buenaventura Francisco (Represented by Felicidad Sadaya Francisco), Heirs
of Victoria C. Cabuenas (Represented by Alberto Cabuenas) Heirs of Cipriano
Gabunada (Represented by Claudio Gabunada) filed their oppositions, and had a
common allegation in that the taking is allegedly not impressed with public use under
the Constitution; alleging that there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing
the taking of private property for tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA has such
power, the intended use cannot be paramount to the determination of the land as a land
reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation by legislative fiat is
constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform program, it
is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance (CFI), that has
jurisdiction over the expropriation cases.The Philippine Tourism Authority having
deposited with the Philippine National Bank, Cebu City Branch, an amount equivalent
to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1533, the
lower court issued separate orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of
the premises and directing the issuance of writs of possession. The Heirs of Ardona,
et. al. filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether the expropriation of parcels of land for the purpose of constructing a sports
complex, including a golf course, by the Philippine Tourism Authority be considered
taking for “public use.”
Held:
There are three provisions of the 1973 Constitution which directly provide for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain. Section 2, Article IV states that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Section 6,
Article XIV allows the State, in the interest of national welfare or defense and upon
payment of just compensation to transfer to public ownership, utilities and other
private enterprises to be operated by the government. Section 13, Article XIV states
that the Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon payment of just compensation the
expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to
deserving citizens. While not directly mentioning the expropriation of private
properties upon payment of just compensation, the provisions on social justice and
agrarian reforms which allow the exercise of police power together with the power of
eminent domain in the implementation of constitutional objectives are even more far
reaching insofar as taxing of private property is concerned. The restrictive view of
public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes the scope of
government activities and public concerns and which possesses big and correctly
located public lands that obviate the need to take private property for public purposes.
Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. The Philippines has never been a
laissez faire State, and the necessities which impel the exertion of sovereign power are
all too often found in areas of scarce public land or limited government resources.
There can be no doubt that expropriation for such traditional purposes as the
construction of roads, bridges, ports, waterworks, schools, electric and
telecommunications systems, hydroelectric power plants, markets and
slaughterhouses, parks, hospitals, government office buildings, and flood control or
irrigation systems is valid. However, the concept of public use is not limited to
traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere the idea that "public use" is strictly limited to
clear cases of "use by the public" has been discarded. The Philippine Tourism
Authority has stressed that the development of the 808 hectares includes plans that
would give the Heirs of Ardona, et. al. and other displaced persons productive
employment, higher incomes, decent housing, water and electric facilities, and better
living standards. The Court’s dismissal of the petition is, in part, predicated on those
assurances. The right of the PTA to proceed with the expropriation of the 282 hectares
already identified as fit for the establishment of a resort complex to promote tourism
is, therefore, sustained.
Sumulong vs. Guerrero [GR L-48685, 30 September 1987]
Facts:
On 5 December 1977 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for
expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately 25 hectares, (in Antipolo
Rizal) including the lots of Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an
area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333 square meters respectively. The land sought to
be expropriated were valued by the NHA at P1.00 per square meter adopting the
market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees
prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings. Together with the
complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA
deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representing
the "total market value" of the subject 25 hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential
Decree 1224 which defines "the policy on the expropriation of private property for
socialized housing upon payment of just compensation." On 17 January 1978, Judge
Buenaventura Guerrero issued the order issuing a writ of possession in favor of NHA.
Sumulong and Vidanes-Balaoing filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that
they had been deprived of the possession of their property without due process of law.
This was, however, denied. They filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether the taking of private property for “socialized housing,” which would benefit
a few and not all citizens, constitutes taking for “public use.”
Held:
The exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject to certain limitations imposed
by the constitution (1973), i.e. that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation" (Art. IV, sec. 9); and that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws" (Art. IV, sec. 1). The "public use" requirement for a
valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept
influenced by changing conditions. The term "public use" has acquired a more
comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term signifying strict use or
employment by the public has been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit
or advantage. Specifically, urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of
low-cost housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded
concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. The
1973 Constitution made it incumbent upon the State to establish, maintain and ensure
adequate social services including housing [Art. II, sec. 7]. Housing is a basic human
need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and
significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum, the general
welfare. The public character of housing measures does not change because units in
housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed
qualifications. A beginning has to be made, for it is not possible to provide housing
for all who need it, all at once. "Socialized housing" falls within the confines of
"public use". Provisions on economic opportunities inextricably linked with low-cost
housing, or slum clearance, relocation and resettlement, or slum improvement
emphasize the public purpose of the project. Herein, the use to which it is proposed to
put the subject parcels of land meets the requisites of "public use". The lands in
question are being expropriated by the NHA for the expansion of Bagong Nayon
Housing Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried government employees.
The Supreme Court holds that "socialized housing" defined in Presidential Decree
1224, as amended by Presidential Decrees 1259 and 1313, constitutes "public use" for
purposes of expropriation. However, as previously held by the Supreme Court, the
provisions of such decrees on just compensation are unconstitutional. Herein, the
Court finds that the Orders issued pursuant to the corollary provisions of those decrees
authorizing immediate taking without notice and hearing are violative of due process.
Province of Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals [GR 103125, 17 May 1993]
Facts:
On 22 December 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines
Sur passed Resolution 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to
purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to
establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing
project for provincial government employees. Pursuant to the Resolution, the
Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon. Luis R. Villafuerte, filed two
separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San
Joaquin with the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur (Hon. Benjamin V. Panga
presiding; Special Civil Action Nos. P-17-89 and P-19-89). Forthwith, the Province of
Camarines Sur filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. The San
Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the motion. The San Joaquins moved to
dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their
property. In an order dated 6 December 1989, the trial court denied the motion to
dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the
property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the
amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that San Joaquin
may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court
issued a writ of possession in an order dated 18 January 1990. The San Joaquins filed
a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss.
Both motions were denied in the order dated 26 February 1990. The San Joaquins
filed their petition before the Court of Appeals, praying (a) that Resolution No. 129,
Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the
complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order dated December 6,
1989 (i) denying the motion to dismiss and (ii) allowing the Province of Camarines
Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated
February 26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set
aside. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing
the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction. The Court of
Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, and ordered the trial court to suspend the
expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have
submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the
classification of the property of the San Joaquins from agricultural to non-agricultural
land. The Province of Camarines Sur filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether the establishment of the Pilot Development Center and the housing project
are deemed for “public use.”
Held:
Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it
only when expressly authorized by the legislature. In delegating the power to
expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on
the exercise thereof by the local governments. While such delegated power may be a
limited authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the
exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring
the power or in other legislations. It is the legislative branch of the local government
unit that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated
shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to
such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking
has no real or substantial relation to the public use. Statutes conferring the power of
eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by
implication. Section 9 of BP 337 does not intimate in the least that local government
units must first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the
conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute
the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of
agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of
Agrarian Reform. The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k)
and 5 (1) of Executive Order 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the
authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a
parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the
expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform
the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for
residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to the applications
for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries. Further, there
has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of "public purpose" or
"public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The old
concept was that the condemned property must actually be used by the general public
(e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the
constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the new concept, "public use" means
public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general
welfare and the prosperity of the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists
or housing project. The expropriation of the property authorized by Resolution 129,
Series of 1988, is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development
center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of
Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the community
invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry.
Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be
enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the
Constitution. Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state
concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the
environment and in sum the general welfare. Thus, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the
Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property of the San Joaquins; (b)
orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the
Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian
Reform to convert or reclassify the property of the San Joaquins property from
agricultural to non-agricultural use.
Manosca vs. Court of Appeals [GR 106440, 29 January 1996]
Facts:
Alejandro, Asuncion and Leonica Manosca inherited a piece of land located at P.
Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about 492 square
meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the National Historical Institute (NHI) to
have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed
Resolution 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree 260,
declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 6
January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS).
Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the measure.
In his opinion 133, Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative.
Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the office of the Solicitor-
General, instituted a complaint for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI. At the same time, the Republic filed an urgent
motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the
property. The motion was opposed by the Manoscas. After a hearing, the trial court
issued, on 3 August 1989, an order fixing the provisional market (P54,120.00) and
assessed (P16,236.00) values of the property and authorizing the Republic to take over
the property once the required sum would have been deposited with the Municipal
Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila. The Manoscas moved to dismiss the complaint on
the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and,
incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity,
contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution. The
trial court issued its denial of said motion to dismiss. The Manoscas moved for
reconsideration thereafter but were denied. The Manoscas then lodged a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On 15 January 1992, the
appellate court dismissed the petition/A motion for the reconsideration of the decision
was denied by the appellate court on 23 July 1992. The Manoscas filed a petition for
review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the setting up of the marker in commemoration of Felix Manalo, the founder
of the religious sect Iglesia ni Cristo, constitutes “public use.”
Held:
Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency, as
condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It
need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our
Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the
exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so described as "the highest and
most exact idea of property remaining in the government" that may be acquired for
some public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State.
It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or
to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of governance even in its
most primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. The only direct
constitutional qualification is that "private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation." This prescription is intended to provide a safeguard
against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual against whose property
the power is sought to be enforced. The term "public use," not having been otherwise
defined by the constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting a
public need or a public exigency. The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent
domain for traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however,
that public use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that
"public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has long been
discarded. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the
distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines,
rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The
attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for
what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences
that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The practical reality that greater
benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could
well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and
secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the
expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of
public use.
Estate of Salud Jimenez vs. Philippine Export Processing Zone [GR 137285, 16
January 2001]
Facts:
On 15 May 1981, Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA), then called as the
Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), initiated before the Regional Trial Court
of Cavite expropriation proceedings on 3 parcels of irrigated riceland in Rosario,
Cavite. One of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate,
with an approximate area of 29,008 square meters, is registered in the name of Salud
Jimenez (TCT T-113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite). More than 10 years
later, the said trial court in an Order dated 11 July 1991 upheld the right of PEZA to
expropriate, among others, Lot 1406 (A and B). Reconsideration of the said order was
sought by the Estate of Salud Jimenez contending that said lot would only be
transferred to a private corporation, Philippine Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be
utilized for a public purpose. In an Order dated 25 October 1991, the trial court
reconsidered the Order dated 11 July 1991 and released Lot 1406-A from
expropriation while the expropriation of Lot 1406-B was maintained. Finding the said
order unacceptable, PEZA interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile,
the Estate and PEZA entered into a compromise agreement, dated 4 January 1993.
The compromise agreement provides "(1) That plaintiff agrees to withdraw its appeal
from the Order of the Honorable Court dated October 25, 1991 which released lot
1406-A from the expropriation proceedings. On the other hand, defendant Estate of
Salud Jimenez agrees to waive, quitclaim and forfeit its claim for damages and loss of
income which it sustained by reason of the possession of said lot by plaintiff from
1981 up to the present. (2) That the parties agree that defendant Estate of Salud
Jimenez shall transfer lot 1406-B with an area of 13,118 square meters which forms
part of the lot registered under TCT No. 113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite to
the name of the plaintiff and the same shall be swapped and exchanged with lot 434
with an area of 14,167 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
14772 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite which lot will be transferred to the name of
Estate of Salud Jimenez. (3) That the swap arrangement recognizes the fact that the lot
1406-B covered by TCT No. T-113498 of the estate of defendant Salud Jimenez is
considered expropriated in favor of the government based on Order of the Honorable
Court dated July 11, 1991. However, instead of being paid the just compensation for
said lot, the estate of said defendant shall be paid with lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-
14772. (4) That the parties agree that they will abide by the terms of the foregoing
agreement in good faith and the Decision to be rendered based on this Compromise
Agreement is immediately final and executory." The Court of Appeals remanded the
case to the trial court for the approval of the said compromise agreement entered into
between the parties, consequent with the withdrawal of the appeal with the Court of
Appeals. In the Order dated 23 August 1993, the trial court approved the compromise
agreement. However, PEZA failed to transfer the title of Lot 434 to the Estate
inasmuch as it was not the registered owner of the covering TCT T-14772 but
Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. Thus, on 13 March 1997, the Estate filed a "Motion to
Partially Annul the Order dated August 23, 1993." In the Order dated 4 August 1997,
the trial court annulled the said compromise agreement entered into between the
parties and directed PEZA to peacefully turn over Lot 1406- A to the Estate.
Disagreeing with the said Order of the trial court, respondent PEZA moved for its
reconsideration, which was denied in an order dated 3 November 1997. On 4
December 1997, the trial court, at the instance of the Estate, corrected the Orders
dated 4 August 1997 and 3 November 1997 by declaring that it is Lot 1406-B and not
Lot 1406-A that should be surrendered and returned to the Estate. On 27 November
1997, PEZA interposed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and
prohibition seeking to nullify the Orders dated 4 August 1997 and 3 November 1997
of the trial court. Acting on the petition, the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated 25
March 1998, partially granted the petition by setting aside the order of the trial court
regarding "the peaceful turn over to the Estate of Salud Jimenez of Lot 1406- B" and
instead ordered the trial judge to "proceed with the hearing of the expropriation
proceedings regarding the determination of just compensation over Lot 1406-B." The
Estate sought reconsideration of the Decision dated 25 March 1998. However, the
appellate court in a Resolution dated 14 January 1999 denied the Estate's motion for
reconsideration. The Estate filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether the purpose of the expropriation by PEZA is of “public use.”
Held:
This is an expropriation case which involves two (2) orders: an expropriation order
and an order fixing just compensation. Once the first order becomes final and no
appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use cannot anymore
be questioned. Contrary to the Estate's contention, the incorporation of the
expropriation order in the compromise agreement did not subject said order to
rescission but instead constituted an admission by the Estate of PEZA's authority to
expropriate the subject parcel of land and the public purpose for which it was
expropriated. This is evident from paragraph three (3) of the compromise agreement
which states that the "swap arrangement recognizes the fact that Lot 1406-B covered
by TCT T-113498 of the estate of defendant Salud Jimenez is considered expropriated
in favor of the government based on the Order of the Honorable Court dated 11 July
1991." It is crystal clear from the contents of the agreement that the parties limited the
compromise agreement to the matter of just compensation to the Estate. Said
expropriation order is not closely intertwined with the issue of payment such that
failure to pay by PEZA will also nullify the right of PEZA to expropriate. No
statement to this effect was mentioned in the agreement. The Order was mentioned in
the agreement only to clarify what was subject to payment. Since the compromise
agreement was only about the mode of payment by swapping of lots and not about the
right and purpose to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B, only the originally agreed
form of compensation that is by cash payment, was rescinded. PEZA has the legal
authority to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B and that the same was for a valid
public purpose. PEZA expropriated the subject parcel of land pursuant to
Proclamation 1980 dated 30 May 1980 issued by former President Ferdinand Marcos.
Meanwhile, the power of eminent domain of respondent is contained in its original
charter, Presidential Decree 66. Accordingly, subject Lot 1406-B was expropriated
"for the construction of terminal facilities, structures and approaches thereto." The
authority is broad enough to give PEZA substantial leeway in deciding for what public
use the expropriated property would be utilized. Pursuant to this broad authority,
PEZA leased a portion of the lot to commercial banks while the rest was made a
transportation terminal. Said public purposes were even reaffirmed by Republic Act
7916, a law amending PEZA's original charter. As reiterated in various case, the
"public use" requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a
flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. The term "public
use" has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term
signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added the broader notion of
indirect public benefit or advantage. What ultimately emerged is a concept of public
use which is just as broad as "public welfare."
Municipality of Meycauayan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court [GR L-72126, 29
January 1988]
Facts:
In 1975, the Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation (PPMC) filed with the
Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a permit
to fence a parcel of land with a width of 26.8 meters and a length of 184.37 meters
covered by TCTs 215165 and 37879. The fencing of said property was allegedly to
enable the storage of PMC's heavy equipment and various finished products such as
large diameter steel pipes, pontoon pipes for ports, wharves, and harbors, bridge
components, pre-stressed girders and piles, large diameter concrete pipes, and parts
for low cost housing. In the same year, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, headed
by then Mayor Celso R. Legaspi, passed Resolution 258, Series of 1975, manifesting
the intention to expropriate the respondent's parcel of land covered by TCT 37879. An
opposition to the resolution was filed by the PPMC with the Office of the Provincial
Governor, which, in turn, created a special committee of four members to investigate
the matter. On 10 March 1976, the Special Committee recommended that the
Provincial Board of Bulacan disapprove or annul the resolution in question because
there was no genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the
respondent's property for use as a public road. On the basis of this report, the
Provincial Board of Bulacan passed Resolution 238, Series of 1976, disapproving and
annulling Resolution 258, Series of 1975, of the Municipal Council of Meycauayan.
The PPMC, then, reiterated to the Office of the Mayor its petition for the approval of
the permit to fence the aforesaid parcels of land. On 21 October 1983, however, the
Municipal Council of Meycauayan, now headed by Mayor Adriano D. Daez, passed
Resolution 21, Series of 1983, for the purpose of expropriating anew PPMC's land.
The Provincial Board of Bulacan approved the aforesaid resolution on 25 January
1984. Thereafter, the Municipality of Meycauayan, on 14 February 1984, filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch VI, a special civil action for
expropriation. Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is the market value
of the land, with the Philippine National Bank, the trial court on 1 March 1984 issued
a writ of possession in favor of the municipality. On 27 August 1984, the trial court
issued an order declaring the taking of the property as lawful and appointing the
Provincial Assessor of Bulacan as court commissioner who shall hold the hearing to
ascertain the just compensation for the property. PPMC went to the Intermediate
Appellate Court on petition for review. On 10 January 1985, the appellate court
affirmed the trial court's decision. However, upon motion for reconsideration by
PPMC, the decision was re-examined and reversed. The appellate court held that there
is no genuine necessity to expropriate the land for use as a public road as there were
several other roads for the same purpose and another more appropriate lot for the
proposed public road. The court, taking into consideration the location and size of the
land, also opined that the land is more ideal for use as storage area for respondent's
heavy equipment and finished products. After its motion for reconsideration was
denied, the municipality went to the Supreme Court on petition for review on
certiorari on 25 October 1985.
Issue:
Whether there is genuine necessity to expropriate PPMC’s property for the purpose of
a connecting road, in light of other appropriate lots for the purpose.
Held:
There is no question here as to the right of the State to take private property for public
use upon payment of just compensation. What is questioned is the existence of a
genuine necessity therefor. The foundation of the right to exercise the power of
eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character.
Condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there
is a genuine necessity of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the power
to require into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to
determine whether there is a genuine necessity therefor. The government may not
capriciously choose what private property should be taken. With due recognition then
of the power of Congress to designate the particular property to be taken and how
much
thereof may be condemned in the exercise of the power of expropriation, it is still a
judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence, the party adversely
affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal protection clause will
not allow. The Special Committee's Report, dated 10 March 1976, stated that "there is
no genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the aforesaid
property of the Philippine Pipes and Merchandizing Corporation for use as a public
road. Considering that in the vicinity there are other available road and vacant lot
offered for sale situated similarly as the lot in question and lying idle, unlike the lot
sought to be expropriated which was found by the Committee to be badly needed by
the company as a site for its heavy equipment after it is fenced together with the
adjoining vacant lot, the justification to condemn the same does not appear to be very
imperative and necessary and would only cause unjustified damage to the firm. The
desire of the Municipality of Meycauayan to build a public road to decongest the
volume of traffic can be fully and better attained by acquiring the other available roads
in the vicinity maybe at lesser costs without causing harm to an establishment doing
legitimate business therein. Or, the municipality may seek to expropriate a portion of
the vacant lot also in the vicinity offered for sale for a wider public road to attain
decongestion of traffic because as observed by the Committee, the lot of the
Corporation sought to be taken will only accommodate a one-way traffic lane and
therefore, will not suffice to improve and decongest the flow of traffic and pedestrians
in the Malhacan area." There is absolutely no showing in the petition why the more
appropriate lot for the proposed road which was offered for sale has not been the
subject of the municipalities's attempt to expropriate assuming there is a real need for
another connecting road.
De Knecht vs. Bautista [GR L-51078, 30 October 1980]
Facts:
In 1970, the government through the Department of Public Works and
Communications (now Ministy of Public Highways [MPH]) prepared a plan to extend
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) to Roxas Boulevard. The proposed extension,
an adjunct of another road-building program, the Manila—Cavite Coastal Road
Project, would pass through Cuneta Avenue up to Roxas Boulevard. The route was
designed to be a straight one, taking into account the direction of EDSA. Preparatory
to the implementation of the aforesaid plan, or on 13 December 1974, then Secretary
Baltazar Aquino of the Department of Public Highways directed the City Engineer of
Pasay City not to issue temporary or permanent permits for the construction and/or
improvement of buildings and other structures located within the proposed extension
through Cuneta Avenue. Shortly thereafter the Department of Public Highways
decided to make the proposed extension go through Fernando Rein and Del Pan
Streets which are lined with old substantial houses. Upon petition of the residents
therein to the President of the Philippines for the implementation of the original plan,
the President referred the matter to the Human Settlements Commission. The
Commission submitted its report recommending the reversion to the original plan
passing through Cuneta Avenue. Notwithstanding said recommendation, the MPH
insisted on implementing the plan to make the extension of EDSA go through
Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. In February 1979, the government filed in the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch III, Pasay City (Judge Pedro JL.
Bautista presiding; Civil Case 7001-P), a complaint for expropriation against the
owners of the houses standing along Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets, among them
Cristina de Knecht. De Knecht filed a motion to dismiss dated 9 March 1979. An
urgent motion dated 28 March 1979 for preliminary injunction was also filed. In June
1979 the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession of the property sought to be expropriated on the ground that said Republic
had made the required deposit with the Philippine National Bank. Judge Bautista
issued a writ of possession dated 14 June 1979 authorizing the Republic of the
Philippines to take and enter upon the possession of the properties sought so be
condemned. De Knecht filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme
Court, praying that judgment be rendered annulling the order for immediate
possession issued by respondent court in the expropriation proceedings and
commanding the Republic to desist from further proceedings in the expropriation
action or the order for immediate possession issued in said action.
Issue:
Whether the expropriation of the residential lots in Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets
is genuinely necessary, in light of similar acceptable lots along Cuneta Avenue which
were subject of the original plan.
Held: There is no question as to the right of the Republic of the Philippines to take
private property for public use upon the payment of just compensation. Section 2,
Article IV of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "Private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation." It is recognized, however, that
the government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose what private property
should be taken. A landowner is covered by the mantle of protection due process
affords. It is a mandate of reason. It frowns on arbitrariness, it is the antithesis of any
governmental act that smacks of whim or caprice. It negates state power to act in an
oppressive manner. It is, as had been stressed so often, the embodiment of the sporting
idea off air play. In that sense, it stands as a guaranty of justice. That is the standard
that must be met by any governmental agency in the exercise of whatever competence
is entrusted to it. As was so emphatically stressed by the present Chief Justice, Acts of
Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny due process only under pain of
nullity. Herein, it is a fact that the Department of Public Highways originally establish
the extension of EDSA along Cuneta Avenue. It is to be presumed that the
Department of Public Highways made studies before deciding on Cuneta Avenue. It is
indeed odd why suddenly the proposed extension of EDSA to Roxas Boulevard was
changed to go through Fernando Rein — Del Pan Streets which the Solicitor General
concedes "the Del Pan — Fernando Rein Streets line follows northward and inward
direction While admitting "that both lines, Cuneta Avenue and Del Pan — Fernando
Rein Streets lines, meet satisfactorily planning and design criteria and therefore are
both acceptable", the Solicitor General justifies the change to Del Pan — Fernando
Rein Streets on the ground that the government "wanted to minimize the social impact
factor or problem involved." It is doubtful whether the extension of EDSA along
Cuneta Avenue can be objected to on the ground of social impact. The improvements
and buildings along Cuneta Avenue to be affected by the extension are mostly motels.
Even granting, arguendo, that more people will be affected, the Human Settlements
Commission has suggested coordinative efforts of said Commission with the National
Housing Authority and other government agencies in the relocation and resettlement
of those adversely affected. From the facts of record and recommendations of the
Human Settlements Commission, it is clear that the choice of Fernando Rein — Del
Pan Streets as the line through which the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue should be
extended to Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval.
Republic vs. de Knecht [GR 87335, 12 February 1990]
Facts:
On 20 February 1979 the Republic of the Philippines filed in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Rizal in Pasay City an expropriation proceedings against the owners
of the houses standing along Fernando Rein- Del Pan streets among them Cristina De
Knecht together with Concepcion Cabarrus, and some 15 other defendants (Civil Case
7001-P). On 19 March 1979, de Knecht filed a motion to dismiss alleging lack of
jurisdiction, pendency of appeal with the President of the Philippines, prematureness
of complaint and arbitrary and erroneous valuation of the properties. On 29 March
1979 de Knecht filed an ex parte urgent motion for the issuance by the trial court of a
restraining order to restrain the Republic from proceeding with the taking of
immediate possession and control of the property sought to be condemned. In June
1979, the Republic filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession of the
property to be expropriated on the ground that it had made the required deposit with
the Philippine National Bank (PNB) of 10% of the amount of compensation stated in
the complaint. In an order dated 14 June 1979 the lower court issued a writ of
possession authorizing the Republic to enter into and take possession of the properties
sought to be condemned, and created a Committee of three to determine the just
compensation for the lands involved in the proceedings. On 16 July 1979, de Knecht
filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition (GR No. L-51078) and
directed against the order of the lower court dated 14 June 1979 praying that the
Republic be commanded to desist from further proceeding in the expropriation action
and from implementing said order. On 30 October 1980, the Supreme Court rendered
a decision, granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition and setting aside the 14
June 1979 order of the Judge Bautista. On 8 August 1981, Maria Del Carmen Roxas
Vda. de Elizalde, Francisco Elizalde and Antonio Roxas moved to dismiss the
expropriation action in compliance with the dispositive portion of the aforesaid
decision of the Supreme Court which had become final and in order to avoid further
damage to latter who were denied possession of their properties. The Republic filed a
manifestation on 7 September 1981 stating, among others, that it had no objection to
the said motion to dismiss as it was in accordance with the aforestated decision.
However, on 2 September 1983, the Republic filed a motion to dismiss said case due
to the enactment of the Batas Pambansa 340 expropriating the same properties and for
the same purpose. The lower court in an order of 2 September 1983 dismissed the case
by reason of the enactment of the said law. The motion for reconsideration thereof
was denied in the order of the lower court dated 18 December 1986. De Knecht
appealed from said order to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a decision
was rendered on 28 December 1988, setting aside the order appealed from and
dismissing the expropriation proceedings. The Republic filed the petition for review
with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether an expropriation proceeding that was determined by a final judgment of the
Supreme Court may be the subject of a subsequent legislation for expropriation.
Held:
While it is true that said final judgment of the Supreme Court on the subject becomes
the law of the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the Republic
to take private properties for public use upon the payment of the just compensation is
so provided in the Constitution and our laws. Such expropriation proceedings may be
undertaken by the Republic not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners
but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation. When on 17 February
1983 the Batasang Pambansa passed BP 340 expropriating the very properties subject
of the present proceedings, and for the same purpose, it appears that it was based on
supervening events that occurred after the decision of the Supreme Court was
rendered in De Knecht in 1980 justifying the expropriation through the Fernando
Rein- Del Pan Streets. The social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider
this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared. All residents in the area have been
relocated and duly compensated. 80% of the EDSA outfall and 30% of the EDSA
extension had been completed. Only De Knecht remains as the solitary obstacle to this
project that will solve not only the drainage and flood control problem but also
minimize the traffic bottleneck in the area. Moreover, the decision, is no obstacle to
the legislative arm of the Government in thereafter making its own independent
assessment of the circumstances then prevailing as to the propriety of undertaking the
expropriation of the properties in question and thereafter by enacting the
corresponding legislation as it did in this case. The Court agrees in the wisdom and
necessity of enacting BP 340. Thus the anterior decision of this Court must yield to
this subsequent legislative fiat.

National Housing Authority vs. Heirs f Isidro Guivelondo [GR 154411, 19 June
2003]
Facts:
On 23 February 1999, the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 11, an Amended Complaint for eminent
domain against Associacion Benevola de Cebu, Engracia Urot and the Heirs of Isidro
Guivelondo (Civil Case CEB-23386), alleging that Associacion Benevola de Cebu
was the claimant/owner of Lot 108-C located in the Banilad Estate, Cebu City; that
Engracia Urot was the claimant/owner of Lots 108-F, 108-I, 108-G, 6019-A and 6013-
A, all of the Banilad Estate; that the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo were the
claimants/owners of Cadastral Lot 1613-D located at Carreta, Mabolo, Cebu City; and
that the lands are within a blighted urban center which petitioner intends to develop as
a socialized housing project. On 12 November 1999, the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo,
filed a Manifestation stating that they were waiving their objections to the NHA’s
power to expropriate their properties. Hence, the trial court issued an Order declaring
that the NHA has a lawful right to expropriate the properties of the heirs of Isidro
Guivelondo. Thereafter, the trial court appointed 3 Commissioners to ascertain the
correct and just compensation of the properties of the Heirs. On 17 April 2000, the
Commissioners submitted their report wherein they recommended that the just
compensation of the subject properties be fixed at P11,200.00 per square meter. On 7
August 2000, the trial court rendered Partial Judgment adopting the recommendation
of the Commissioners and fixing the just compensation of the lands of the Heirs at
P11,200.00 per square meter. The NHA filed two motions for reconsideration dated
30 August 2000 and 31 August 2000, assailing the inclusion of Lots 12, 13 and 19 as
well as the amount of just compensation, respectively. The Heirs also filed a motion
for reconsideration of the Partial Judgment. On 11 October 2000, the trial court issued
an Omnibus Order denying the motion for reconsideration of the Heirs and the 31
August 2000 motion of petitioner, on the ground that the fixing of the just
compensation had adequate basis and support. On the other hand, the trial court
granted NHA’s 30 August 2000 motion for reconsideration on the ground that the
Commissioner’s Report did not include Lots 12, 13 and 19 within its coverage. The
NHA filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari (CA-GR SP 61746).
Meanwhile, on 31 October 2000, the trial court issued an Entry of Judgment over the
Partial Judgment dated 7 August 2000 as modified by the Omnibus Order dated 11
October 2000. Subsequently, the Heirs filed a Motion for Execution, which was
granted on 22 November 2000. On 31 January 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition for certiorari on the ground that the Partial Judgment and Omnibus Order
became final and executory when the NHA failed to appeal the same. NHA’s Motion
for Reconsideration and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for a Clarificatory Ruling were
denied in a Resolution dated 18 March 2001. A petition for review was filed by the
NHA with the Supreme Court (GR 147527). However, the same was denied in a
Minute Resolution dated 9 May 2001 for failure to show that the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error. NHA filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
however denied with finality on 20 August 2001. Prior to the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration, NHA, on 16 July 2001, filed with the trial court a Motion to Dismiss
Civil Case CEB-23386, complaint for eminent domain, alleging that the
implementation of its socialized housing project was rendered impossible by the
unconscionable value of the land sought to be expropriated, which the intended
beneficiaries can not afford. The Motion was denied on 17 September 2001, on the
ground that the Partial Judgment had already become final and executory and there
was no just and equitable reason to warrant the dismissal of the case. NHA filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in an Order dated 20 November 2001.
NHA thus filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA-GR SP 68670),
praying for the annulment of the Order of the trial court denying its Motion to Dismiss
and its Motion for Reconsideration. On 5 February 2002, the Court of Appeals
summarily dismissed the petition. Immediately thereafter, Sheriff Pascual Y. Abordo
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 11, served on the NHA a
Notice of Levy pursuant to the Writ of Execution issued by the trial court to enforce
the Partial Judgment of 7 August 2000 and the Omnibus Order of 11 October 2000.
On 18 February 2002, the Court of Appeals set aside the dismissal of the petition and
reinstated the same. Thereafter, a temporary restraining order was issued enjoining the
sheriff to preserve the status quo. On 27 May 2002, the sheriff served on the
Landbank of the Philippines a Notice of Third Garnishment against the deposits,
moneys and interests of NHA therein. Subsequently, the sheriff levied on funds and
personal properties of the NHA. On 16 July 2002, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for certiorari. NHA filed the petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the NHA can abandon an expropriation proceedings if it disagrees with the
price recommended by the Commissioners appointed by the court as just
compensation.
Held:
Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property
after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and,
second, the determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private
property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three
commissioners. The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in
the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of
the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of
the filing of the complaint." An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final
one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be
done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final
one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial
Court, "no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety
thereof) shall be filed or heard." The second phase of the eminent domain action is
concerned with the determination by the Court of "the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more
than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of
the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would
finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by
the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the
order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or
otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek a reversal of the order by
taking an appeal therefrom. Herein, the NHA did not appeal the Order of the trial
court dated 10 December 1999, which declared that it has a lawful right to expropriate
the properties of the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo. Hence, the Order became final and
may no longer be subject to review or reversal in any court. A final and executory
decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it
may be. Although judicial determinations are not infallible, judicial error should be
corrected through appeals, not through repeated suits on the same claim. The public
purpose of the socialized housing project is not in any way diminished by the amount
of just compensation that the court has fixed. The need to provide decent housing to
the urban poor dwellers in the locality was not lost by the mere fact that the land cost
more than the NHA had expected. It is worthy to note that petitioner pursued its
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the amount of just
compensation and its petition for review with the Supreme Court which eloquently
indicates that there still exists a public use for the housing project. It was only after its
appeal and petitions for review were dismissed that the NHA made a complete turn-
around and decided it did not want the property anymore. The landowners had already
been prejudiced by the expropriation case. The NHA cannot be permitted to institute
condemnation proceedings against respondents only to abandon it later when it finds
the amount of just compensation unacceptable.
Eslaban vs. Vda. de Onorio [GR 146062, 28 June 2001]
Facts:
Clarita Vda. de Onorio is the owner of a lot in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nino, South
Cotabato with an area of 39,512 square meters (Lot 1210-A-Pad-11-000586, TCT T-
22121 of the Registry of Deeds, South Cotabato). On 6 October 1981, Santiago
Eslaban, Jr., Project Manager of the NIA, approved the construction of the main
irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot, affecting a 24,660 square meter portion
thereof. De Onorio's husband agreed to the construction of the NIA canal provided
that they be paid by the government for the area taken after the processing of
documents by the Commission on Audit. Sometime in 1983, a Right- of-Way
agreement was executed between De Onorio and the NIA. The NIA then paid De
Onorio the amount of P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way damages. De Onorio subsequently
executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees whereby she waived any
compensation for damages to crops and improvements which she suffered as a result
of the construction of a right-of-way on her property. The same year, Eslaban offered
De Onorio the sum of P35,000,00 by way of amicable settlement (financial assistance)
pursuant to Executive Order 1035, §18. De Onorio demanded payment for the taking
of her property, but Eslaban/NIA refused to pay. Accordingly, De Onorio filed on 10
December 1990 a complaint against Eslaban before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
praying that Eslaban/NIA be ordered to pay the sum of P111,299.55 as compensation
for the portion of her property used in the construction of the canal constructed by the
NIA, litigation expenses, and the costs. Eslaban admitted that NIA constructed an
irrigation canal over the property of De Onorio and that NIA paid a certain landowner
whose property had been taken for irrigation purposes, but Eslaban interposed the
defense that: (1) the government had not consented to be sued; (2) the total area used
by the NIA for its irrigation canal was only 2.27 hectares, not 24,600 square meters;
and (3) that De Onorio was not entitled to compensation for the taking of her property
considering that she secured title over the property by virtue of a homestead patent
under Commonwealth Act 141. On 18 October 1993, the trial court rendered a
decision, ordering the NIA to pay to De Onorio the sum of P107,517.60 as just
compensation for the questioned area of 24,660 square meters of land owned by De
Onorio and taken by the NIA which used it for its main canal plus costs. On 15
November 1993, the NIA appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on 31 October
2000, affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. NIA filed the petition for
review.
Issue:
Whether the valuation of just compensation is determined at the time the property was
taken or at the time the complaint for expropriation is filed.
Held:
Whenever public lands are alienated, granted or conveyed to applicants thereof, and
the deed grant or instrument of conveyance [sales patent] registered with the Register
of Deeds and the corresponding certificate and owner's duplicate of title issued, such
lands are deemed registered lands under the Torrens System and the certificate of title
thus issued is as conclusive and indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued to
private lands in ordinary or cadastral registration proceedings. The only servitude
which a private property owner is required to recognize in favor of the government is
the easement of a "public highway, way, private way established by law, or any
government canal or lateral thereof where the certificate of title does not state that the
boundaries thereof have been pre-determined." This implies that the same should have
been pre-existing at the time of the registration of the land in order that the registered
owner may be compelled to respect it. Conversely, where the easement is not pre-
existing and is sought to be imposed only after the land has been registered under the
Land Registration Act, proper expropriation proceedings should be had, and just
compensation paid to the registered owner thereof. Herein, the irrigation canal
constructed by the NIA on the contested property was built only on 6 October 1981,
several years after the property had been registered on 13 May 1976. Accordingly,
prior expropriation proceedings should have been filed and just compensation paid to
the owner thereof before it could be taken for public use. With respect to the
compensation which the owner of the condemned property is entitled to receive, it is
likewise settled that it is the market value which should be paid or "that sum of money
which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor."
Further, just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner
of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for then the
property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of
his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the
amount necessary to cope with his loss. Nevertheless, there are instances where the
expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit, in which
case just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time
of filing of the action of eminent domain. The value of the property, thus, must be
determined either as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the
complaint, "whichever came first."
Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court [GR 71176, 21 May 1990]
Facts:
Avegon, Inc., offered 4 parcels of land with a total area of 9,650 square meters located
at 2090 Dr. Manuel L. Carreon Street, Manila, for sale to the City School Board of
Manila on 21 July 1973 at P2,300,000. The school board was willing to buy at
P1,800,000 but the then Mayor of Manila intervened and volunteered to negotiate with
Avegon, Inc. for a better price. Inasmuch as the alleged negotiation did not
materialize, on 3 June 1974, Avegon, Inc. sold the property and its improvements to
Amerex Electronics, Phils. Corporation for P1,800,000. Thereafter, TCTs 115571,
115572, 115573 and 115574 were issued in favor of Amerex. On 29 August 1975, the
Solicitor General filed for the Department of Education and Culture (DEC) a
complaint against Amerex for the expropriation of said property before the Court of
First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 99190), stating therein that the property was
needed by the government as a permanent site for the Manuel de la Fuente High
School (later renamed Don Mariano Marcos Memorial High School); that the fair
market value of the property had been declared by Amerex as P2,435,000, and that the
assessor had determined its market value as P2,432,042 and assessed it for taxation
purposes in the amount of P1,303,470. On 9 October 1975, the court issued an order
directing the sheriff to place the Republic in possession of the property, after
informing the court that the assessed value of the property for taxation purposes had
been deposited with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in Escolta, Manila on 30
September 1975. The plaintiff took actual possession thereof on 13 October 1975.
Amerex filed a motion to dismiss the complaint stating that while it was not contesting
the merits of the complaint, the same failed to categorically state the amount of just
compensation for the property. It therefore prayed that in consonance with Presidential
Decree 794, the just compensation be fixed at P2,432,042, the market value of the
property determined by the assessor which was lower than Amerex's own declaration.
Alleging that its motion to dismiss merely sought a clarification on the just
compensation for the property, Amerex filed a motion to withdraw the Republic's
deposit of P1,303,470 with the PNB without prejudice to its entitlement to the amount
of P1,128,572, the balance of the just compensation of P2,432,042 insisted upon. On 3
December 1975, the lower court issued an order vesting the Republic with the lawful
right to take the property upon payment of just compensation as provided by law. On
19 December 1975, after the parties had submitted the names of their respective
recommendees to the appraisal committee, the lower court appointed Atty. Narciso
Pena, Aurelio V. Aquino and Atty. Higinio Sunico as commissioners. On 24 January
1977, the commissioners submitted their appraisal report finding that the fair market
value of the property was P2,763,400. Both parties objected to the report of the
commissioners. On 15 March 1977, the lower court rendered a decision, "fixing the
amount of P2,258.018.57 as just compensation for the property of the defendant and
declaring the plaintiff entitled to possess and appropriate it to the public use alleged in
the complaint and to retain it upon payment of the said amount, after deducting the
amount of P1,303,470.00, with legal interest from October 13, 1975 when the plaintiff
was placed in possession of the real property, and upon payment to each of the
commissioners of the sum of P35.00 for their attendance during the hearings held on
January 23, February 16, May 11, July 23, September 17, October 12 and December
10, 1976, plus P500.00 each for the preparation of the report, and the costs." The
Republic elevated the case to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) for review.
On 29 October 1984, it affirmed the appealed decision with the modification that the
Republic of the Philippines be exempted from the payment of the commissioners' fees,
the P500.00 granted each of them for he preparation of the report and the costs. Its
motion for the reconsideration of said decision having been denied, the Republic filed
the petition for review.
Issue:
Whether the just compensation for the expropriated property should be the price first
offered to the Government in 1973.
Held:
The determination of just compensation for a condemned property is basically a
judicial function. As the court is not bound by the commissioners' report, it may make
such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property
essential to the exercise of its right of condemnation, and to the defendant just
compensation for the property expropriated. For that matter, the Supreme Court may
even substitute its own estimate of the value as gathered from the record. Hence,
although the determination of just compensation appears to be a factual matter which
is ordinarily outside the ambit of its jurisdiction, the Supreme Court may disturb the
lower court's factual finding on appeal when there is clear error or grave abuse of
discretion. Herein, the just compensation prescribed by the lower court is based on the
commissioners' recommendation which in turn is founded on the "audited" statements
of Amerex that the property is worth P2,258,018.57. The Certification from the
accounting firm issued to Amerex merely compared the figures in the schedules or
"audited" statements with those of the records and books of accounts of Amerex. As
no investigation was made as to the veracity of the figures in the account, there was no
audit in the real sense of the term. Thus, the accuracy of the "audited" statements is
therefore suspect. Besides the fact that the Republic was not furnished a copy of the
audited statements which were also not introduced in evidence, Enrique P. Esteban,
vice-president and treasurer of Amerex, and even a representative of the accounting
firm, were likewise not presented during the trial thereby depriving the Republic of
the opportunity to cross-examine them. The Supreme Court having declared as
unconstitutional the mode of fixing just compensation under Presidential Decree 794
in Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Dulay (GR 59603, 29 April 1987), just
compensation should be determined either at the time of the actual taking of the
government or at the time of the judgment of the court, whichever comes first. The
reasonableness of the 5 June 1975 appraisal fixing at P2,400,000 the fair market value
of the property, is bolstered by the fact that on 4 June 1975, Traders Commodities
Corporation offered to buy the property at P2,750,000. It must be emphasized,
however, that legal interest on the balance of the just compensation of P2,400,000
after deducting the amount of P1,303,470 which had been delivered to Amerex,
should be paid by the Republic from the time the government actually took over the
property. Much as the Court realizes the need of the government, under these trying
times, to get the best possible price for the expropriated property considering the
ceaseless and continuing necessity for schools, the Court cannot agree with the
Republic that the just compensation for the property should be the price it commanded
when it was first offered for sale to the City School Board of Manila.
City of Cebu vs. Dedamo [GR 142971, 7 May 2002]
Facts:
On 17 September 1993, the City of Cebu filed in Civil Case CEB-14632 a complaint
for eminent domain against the spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo, alleging that it
needed the latter's parcels of land for a public purpose, i.e., for the construction of a
public road which shall serve as an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to
the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in
Cebu City; the lots being the most suitable site for the purpose. The total area sought
to be expropriated is 1,624 square meters with an assessed value of P1,786.400. The
City deposited with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) the amount of P51,156
representing 15% of the fair market value of the property to enable the City to take
immediate possession of the property pursuant to Section 19 of Republic Act (RA)
7160. The spouses, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because the purpose for
which their property was to be expropriated was not for a public purpose but for
benefit of a single private entity, the Cebu Holdings, Inc., besides that the price
offered was very low in light of the consideration of P20,000 per square meter, more
or less, which the City paid to the neighboring lots. On 23 August 1994, the City filed
a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Section 19 of RA7160.
The motion was granted by the trial court on 21 September 1994. On 14 December
1994, the parties executed and submitted to the trial court an Agreement wherein they
declared that they have partially settled the case. Pursuant to said agreement, the trial
court appointed three commissioners to determine the just compensation of the lots
sought to be expropriated. Thereafter, the commissioners submitted their report, which
contained their respective assessments of and recommendation as to the valuation of
the property. On the basis of the commissioners' report and after due deliberation
thereon, the trial court rendered its decision on 7 May 1996, directing the City to pay
the spouses Dedamo the amount of P24,865.930.00 representing the compensation.
The City filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the commissioners'
report was inaccurate since it included an area which was not subject to expropriation
(i.e. 478 of 793 square meters only of Lot 1528). On 16 August 1996, the
commissioners submitted an amended assessment for the 478 square meters of Lot
1528 and fixed it at P12,824.10 per square meter, or in the amount of P20,826,339.50.
The assessment was approved as the just compensation thereof by the trial court in its
Order of 27 December 1996. Accordingly, the dispositive portion of the decision was
amended to reflect the new valuation. The City elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. The City filed with the
Supreme Court the petition for review.
Issue:
Whether the valuation of the just compensation that which was recommended by the
appointed commissioners.
Held:
Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It
is the Government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the
State, private property for public use or purpose. However, the Government must pay
the owner thereof just compensation as consideration therefor. Herein, the applicable
law as to the point of reckoning for the determination of just compensation is Section
19 of Republic Act 7160, which expressly provides that just compensation shall be
determined as of the time of actual taking. Further, the Court did not categorically rule
in the case of NAPOCOR vs. Court of Appeals that just compensation should be
determined as of the filing of the complaint. What the Court explicitly stated therein
was that although the general rule in determining just compensation in eminent
domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the
rule "admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the
date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings." Furthermore, the parties, by a solemn document freely and voluntarily
agreed upon by them, agreed to be bound by the report of the commission and
approved by the trial court. Records show that the City consented to conform with the
valuation recommended by the commissioners. It cannot detract from its agreement
now and assail correctness of the commissioners' assessment.
Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Dulay [GR L-59603, 29 April 1987]
Facts:
On 15 January 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation 1811,
reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-
Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and covering a total area of 1,193,669 square meters,
more or less, for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export
Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). Not all the reserved area, however, was public
land. The proclamation included, among others, 4 parcels of land with an aggregate
area of 22,328 square meters owned and registered in the name of the San Antonio
Development Corporation. The EPZA, therefore, offered to purchase the parcels of
land from the corporation in accordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92,
Presidential Decree (PD) 464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement
regarding the sale of the property. EPZA filed with the then Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of possession against the corporation, to expropriate the
aforesaid parcels of land pursuant to PD 66, as amended, which empowers EPZA to
acquire by condemnation proceedings any property for the establishment of export
processing zones, in relation to Proclamation 1811, for the purpose of establishing the
Mactan Export Processing Zone. On 21 October 1980, Judge Ceferino E. Dulay issued
a writ of possession authorizing EPZA to take immediate possession of the premises.
At the pre-trial conference on 13 February 1981, the judge issued an order stating that
the parties have agreed that the only issue to be resolved is the just compensation for
the properties and that the pre-trial is thereby terminated and the hearing on the merits
is set on 2 April 1981. On 17 February 1981, the judge issued the order of
condemnation declaring EPZA as having the lawful right to take the properties sought
to be condemned, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the
filing of the complaint. The respondent judge also issued a second order appointing
certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. On 19 June 1981, the three
commissioners submitted their consolidated report recommending the amount of
P15.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation for the
properties. On 29 July 1981, EPZA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of
19 February 1981 and Objection to Commissioner's Report on the grounds that PD
1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the
ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners; and that the
compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by PD 1533. On 14
November 1981, the trial court denied EPZA's motion for reconsideration. On 9
February 1982, EPZA filed the petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary
restraining order, enjoining the trial court from enforcing the order dated 17 February
1981 and from further proceeding with the hearing of the expropriation case.
Issue:
Whether the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in
Presidential Decree 1533 is valid and constitutional, and whether the lower values
given by provincial assessors be the value of just compensation.
Held:
Presidential Decree 76 provides that "For purposes of just compensation in cases of
private property acquired by the government for public use, the basis shall be the
current and fair market value declared by the owner or administrator, or such market
value as determined by the Assessor, whichever is lower." Section 92 of PD 464
provides that "In determining just compensation which private property is acquired by
the government for public use, the basis shall be the market value declared by the
owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market
value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower." Section 92 of PD 794, on
the other hand, provides that "In determining just compensation when private property
is acquired by the government for public use, the same shall not exceed the market
value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the
property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower."
Lastly, Section 1 of PD 1533 provides that "In determining just compensation for
private property acquired through eminent domain proceedings, the compensation to
be paid shall not exceed the value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone
having legal interest in the property or determined by the assessor, pursuant to the
Real Property Tax Code, whichever value is lower, prior to the recommendation or
decision of the appropriate Government office to acquire the property." The
provisions of the Decrees on just compensation unconstitutional and void as the
method of ascertaining just compensation under the said decrees constitutes
impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the Supreme
Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final
determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or
one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the
court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such
amount. Further, various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific
properties singled out for expropriation. The values given by provincial assessors are
usually uniform for very wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire town
with the exception of the poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into
account. The value of land is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for
rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often land described as "cogonal" has been
cultivated for generations. Buildings are described in terms of only two or three
classes of building materials and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than
correct. Thus, tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just
compensation.
Ansaldo vs. Tantuico [GR 50147, 3 August 1990]
Facts:
Two lots of private ownership were taken by the Government and used for the
widening of a road more than forty-three years ago, without benefit of an action of
eminent domain or agreement with its owners, albeit without protest by the latter. The
lots belong to Jose Ma. Ansaldo and Maria Angela Ansaldo, are covered by title in
their names, and have an aggregate area of 1,041 square meters. These lots were taken
from the Ansaldos sometime in 1947 by the Department of Public Works,
Transportation and Communication and made part of what used to be Sta. Mesa Street
and is now Ramon Magsaysay Avenue at San Juan, Metro Manila. Said owners made
no move whatever until 26 years later. They wrote to ask for compensation for their
land on 22 January 1973. Their claim was referred to the Secretary of Justice who
rendered an opinion dated 22 February 1973, that just compensation should be paid in
accordance with Presidential Decree (PD) 76, and thus advised that the corresponding
expropriation suit be forthwith instituted to fix the just compensation to be paid to the
Ansaldos. Pursuant to the said opinion, the Commissioner of Public Highways
requested the Provincial Assessor of Rizal to make a redetermination of the market
value of the Ansaldos' property in accordance with PD 76. The new valuation was
made, after which the Auditor of the Bureau of Public Highways forwarded the
Ansaldos' claim to the Auditor General with the recommendation that payment be
made on the basis of the "current and fair market value and not on the fair market
value at the time of taking." The Commission on Audit, however, declined to adopt
the recommendation. In a decision handed down on 26 September 1973, the Acting
Chairman ruled that "the amount of compensation to be paid to the claimants is to be
determined as of the time of the taking of the subject lots," i.e. 1947. The ruling was
reiterated by the Commission on 8 September 1978, and again on 25 January 1979
when it denied the Ansaldos' motion for reconsideration. The Ansaldos appealed to
the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the valuation of just compensation should be determined at the time of taking
in 1947, especially in light of the absence of any expropriation proceeding undertaken
before the said taking.
Held:
Where the institution of an expropriation action precedes the taking of the property
subject thereof, the just compensation is fixed as of the time of the filing of the
complaint. This is so provided by the Rules of Court, the assumption of possession by
the expropriator ordinarily being conditioned on its deposits with the National or
Provincial Treasurer of the value of the property as provisionally ascertained by the
court having jurisdiction of the proceedings. There are instances, however, where the
expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit. In these
instances, the just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of
the time of filing of the action of eminent domain. There was undoubtedly a taking of
the Ansaldos' property when the Government obtained possession thereof and
converted it into a part of a thoroughfare for public use. It is as of the time of such a
taking, to repeat, that the just compensation for the property is to be established. The
value of the Ansaldos' property must be ascertained as of the year 1947, when it was
actually taken, and not at the time of the filing of the expropriation suit, which, by the
way, still has to be done. It is as of that time that the real measure of their loss may
fairly be adjudged. The value, once fixed, shall earn interest at the legal rate until full
payment is effected, conformably with other principles laid down by case law. The
Court thus directed the Department of Public Works and Highways to institute the
appropriate expropriation action over the land in question so that the just
compensation due its owners may be determined in accordance with the Rules of
Court, with interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the time of taking until full
payment is made.
National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals [GR 107631, 26 February
1996]
Facts:
A contract was forged between the government through the National Power
Corporation (NAPOCOR) and PECORP, Inc. (PECORP, formerly Pacific Equipment
Corporation, as party-CONTRACTOR on 27 June 1974 for the construction of the
Mariveles Dam 1 and appurtenant structures of the water supply system of the Bataan
Export Processing Zone at Mariveles, Bataan. It was agreed upon that the contract is
of a "Cost-Plus a Percentage" type — meaning, PECORP will be paid a certain
percentage as fee based on the "Actual Final Cost" of the work, and what constitutes
"Actual Final Cost" is the total cost to NAPOCOR of all the work performed by
PECORP which includes cost of materials and supplies, structures, furnitures, charges,
etc. and all other expenses as are inherent in a Cost- Plus and Percentage Contract and
necessary for the prosecution of the work that are approved by NAPOCOR. In a letter
dated 11 July 1974, NAPOCOR communicated to PECORP that it was inclined to
contract directly and separately with Philippine Grouting and Guniting., Inc.
(GROGUN) for the drilling and grouting work on the construction project and
consequently, PECORP will not be entitled to any fees for said task. Contending that
such NAPOCOR-GROGUN arrangement will violate its rights under the NAPOCOR-
PECORP contract, PECORP made known to NAPOCOR its desire to bring the matter
to arbitration. The NAPOCOR-GROGUN drilling and grouting contract, nonetheless,
pushed through on 23 August 1974. As a result of such purported "withdrawal", it
appeared that the drilling and grouting work ceased to be a Part of the NAPOCOR-
PECORP contract. Roughly 5 years after, PECORP on 14 June 1979 presented to
NAPOCOR 4 claims, i.e. (1) Fee on the cost of drilling and grouting which is 10% of
the Actual Final Cost of P6,962,519.50, or P696.251.95; (2) Fee on the minimum
guaranteed equipment rental which is 10% of the Actual Final Cost of P1.67 million,
or P167,000.00; (3) Fee on the inventory of unused stocks and POL, P155,844.95; and
(4) Reimbursement of Medical Hospital expenses re: TK-001 Accident case, or
P50,085.93, coupled with a request for arbitration. A board of arbitrators was
thereafter convened. But after a series of written communications among the board,
NAPOCOR and PECORP, it appeared that NAPOCOR was willing to arbitrate on
claims (3) and (4) only. As NAPOCOR was uncompromising, PECORP filed an
action in the Regional Trial Court of Manila to compel NAPOCOR to
submit/confirm/certify all the 4 claims for arbitration, where judgment was thereafter
rendered in favor of PECORP. After the trial court denied NAPOCOR's motion for
reconsideration of its decision, the Court of Appeals, on appeal, affirmed the same but
deleted the award of attorney's fees. However, in affirming said decision which merely
ordered NAPOCOR and PECORP to arbitrate on all 4 claims, the appellate court went
further in disposing of issues which could have been appropriately ventilated and
passed upon in the arbitration proceedings. From the adverse judgment, NAPOCOR
filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether PECORP is entitled to the collection of fees for drilling and grouting work
conducted by GROGUN under the NAPOCOR-GROGUN contract.
Held:
The NAPOCOR-PECORP Contract is for the construction, complete, of the Mariveles
Dam 1. Drilling and grouting work is just a part of the complete construction of the
total project, hence, covered by and within the scope of the NAPOCOR-PECORP
Contract. The word "Project" is defined in the contract to mean the Dam and
Appurtenant Structures. Drilling and Grouting is part of the dam or appurtenant
structures, and therefore a part of PECORP's scope of work. Article 1725 of the New
Civil Code, which provides that "The owner may withdraw at will from the
construction of the work, although it may have been commenced, indemnifying the
contractor for all the latter's expenses, work and the usefulness which the owner may
obtain therefrom, and damages," is not applicable herein inasmuch as (a) there was
actually no withdrawal from the "construction of the work," but only a transfer of a
part of the construction, which is the drilling and grouting work, and (b) said drilling
and grouting still forms part of the project as a mere NAPOCOR-GROGUN sub-
contract. Since the NAPOCOR-GROGUN Contract did not amend nor nullify the
"cost plus" provision of the NAPOCOR-Pecorp Contract, therefore, appellee Pecorp is
still entitled to the said 10% fee. Further, the allegation that PECORP withdrew its
claim for fee on the minimum guaranteed equipment rental hours of P167,000.00 is
without merit, as it is clear that withdrawal is only a proposal conditioned upon
NAPOCOR's adjudication, endorsement and approval of all the 3 other claims.
However, as the record shows, NAPOCOR refused to certify for arbitration all the
said 3 other claims, hence, the withdrawal was rendered null and void. These were the
findings of the Court of Appeals which were approved by the Supreme Court.
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform [GR 78741, 14 July 1989];
Facts:
On 17 July 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (EO) 228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of Presidential Decree (PD)
27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as
well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on 22 July 1987 by PD 131,
instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229, providing
the mechanics for its implementation. Subsequently, with its formal organization, the
revived Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power from the President
and started its own deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the
improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited
debate, was the enactment of Republic Act (RA) 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on 10
June 11988. This law, while considerably changing RA 3844 (Agricultural Land
Reform Code, 8 August 1963) and PD 27 (21 October 1972), nevertheless gives them
suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. [GR 79777]
Nicolas Manaay and his wife owned a 9-hectare riceland worked by 4 tenants, while
Augustin Hermano Jr. owned a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants. The tenants
therein were declared full owners of these lands by EO 228 as qualified farmers under
PD 27. Manaay and Hermano questioned the constitutionality of PD 27, and EOs 228
and 229, before the Supreme Court, in GR 79777, on grounds inter alia of separation
of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no
private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. In the
amended petition dated 22 November 1988, it was contended that PD 27, EOs 228 and
229 (except Sections 20 and 21) have been impliedly repealed by RA 6657, but that
the latter statute should itself also be declared unconstitutional because it suffers from
substantially the same infirmities as the earlier measures. A petition for intervention
was filed with leave of court on 1 June 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner of a 1.83-hectare
land, who complained that the department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) was insisting
on the implementation of PD 27 and EO 228 despite a compromise agreement he had
reached with his tenant on the payment of rentals. [GR 79310] Arsenio Al. Acuña,
Newton Jison, Victorino Ferraris, Dennis Jereza, Herminigildo Gustilo, and Paulino
D. Tolentino are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District,
Victorias, Negros Occidental; while the Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization
composed of 1,400 planter-members. They filed a petition (GR 79310) seeking to
prohibit the implementation of Proclamation 131 and EO 229, claiming that the power
to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the
Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President; that although they agree that
the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she
could do so only to enact emergency measures during the transition period; and that,
even assuming that the interim legislative power of the President was properly
exercised, Proclamation 131 and EO 229 would still have to be annulled for violating
the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and equal protection.
Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just
compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such
payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the EO 229. On the contrary, Section 6,
thereof provides that the Land Bank of the Philippines "shall compensate the
landowner in an amount to be established by the government, which shall be based on
the owner's declaration of current fair market value as provided in Section 4 hereof,
but subject to certain controls to be defined and promulgated by the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council." This compensation may not be paid fully in money but in
any of several modes that may consist of part cash and part bond, with interest,
maturing periodically, or direct payment in cash or bond as may be mutually agreed
upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be prescribed or approved by the
PARC. A motion for intervention was filed on 27 August 1987 by the National
Federation of Sugarcane Planters (NASP) which claims a membership of at least
20,000 individual sugar planters all over the country. On 10 September 1987, another
motion for intervention was filed, this time by Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing
coconut and riceland owners. Both motions were granted by the Court. On 11 April
1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a petition on his own behalf,
assailing the constitutionality of EO 229. In addition to the arguments already raised,
Serrano contends that the measure is unconstitutional because (1) only public lands
should be included in the CARP; (2) EO 229 embraces more than one subject which is
not expressed in the title; (3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated
on 2 July 1987; and (4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the
National Treasury did not originate from the House of Representatives.
[GR 79744] Inocentes Pabico in his petition (GR 79744) alleges that the then
Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due process and the
requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to
Salvador Talento, Jaime Abogado, Conrado Avanceña, and Roberto Taay, who then
refused payment of lease rentals to him. On 3 September 1986, Pabico protested the
erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land Transfer and
asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name
of the Talento, et. al. Pabico claims that on 24 December 1986, his petition was denied
without hearing. On 17 February 1987, he filed a motion for reconsideration, which
had not been acted upon when EO 228 and 229 were issued. These orders rendered his
motion moot and academic because they directly effected the transfer of his land to
Talento, et. al. Pabico argues that (1) EOs 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the
President of the Philippines; 92) the said executive orders are violative of the
constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or
just compensation; and
(3) Pabico is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the 1987
Constitution. [GR 78742] The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Inc., Juanito D. Gomez, Gerardo B. Alarcio, Felife A. Guico, Jr., Bernardo M.
Almonte, Canuto Ramir B. Cabrito, Isidro T. Guico, Felisa I. Llamido, Fausto J.
Salva, Reynaldo G. Estrada, Felisa C. Bautista, Esmenia J. Cabe, Teodoro B.
Madriaga, Aurea J. Prestosa, Emerenciana J. Isla, Felicisima C. Apresto, Consuelo M.
Morales, Benjamin R. Segismundo, Cirila A. Jose, and Napoleon S. Ferrer invoke in
their petition (GR 78742) the right of retention granted by PD 27 to owners of rice and
corn lands not exceeding 7 hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to
cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are
occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands. They claim they cannot
eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has so far not issued the implementing rules
required under PD 316, implementing PD 27. They therefore ask the Court for a writ
of mandamus to compel the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to issue the said rules.
Issue:
Whether just compensation should exclusively be made in money and not other things
of value.
Held:
This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively
limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and
perhaps local purpose. What is dealt with herein is a revolutionary kind of
expropriation. The Court assumes that the framers of the Constitution were aware of
this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of the
government. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation
that would be needed, they also intended that the just compensation would have to be
paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more practical method. There
can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial limitations of the government
and had no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for
the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. The court may therefore
assume that their intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided
for by the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be
paid fully with money), or indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with
other things of value. The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional
Commission any categorical agreement among the members regarding the meaning to
be given the concept of just compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian
reform program being contemplated. On the other hand, there is nothing in the records
either that militates against the assumptions we are making of the general sentiments
and intention of the members on the content and manner of the payment to be made to
the landowner in the light of the magnitude of the expenditure and the limitations of
the expropriator. Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not
always required to be made fully in money, the Court find further that the proportion
of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as
determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly
oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the
payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more
than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of
value. No less importantly, the government financial instruments making up the
balance of the payment are "negotiable at any time." The other modes, which are
likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because
payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits,
and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation. Admittedly,
the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and small,
not a little inconvenience. However, this cannot be avoided.
Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Court of Appeals [GR 118745, 6 October
1995];
Facts:
On 4 September 1992, the TCTs of Pedro L. Yap were totally cancelled by the
Registrar of Deeds of Leyte and were transferred in the names of farmer beneficiaries
collectively, based on the request of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
together with a certification of the Landbank that the sum of P735,337.77 and
P719,869.54 have been earmarked for Yap for the parcels of lands covered by TCTs
6282 and 6283 respectively, without notice to Yap and without complying with the
requirement of Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 to deposit the compensation in cash and
Landbank bonds in an accessible bank. On the other hand, in November and
December 1990, without notice to the heirs of Emiliano F. Santiago, the owners of a
parcel of land located at Laur, Nueva Ecija (18.5615 hectares, TCT NT-60359 of the
registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija), the Landbank (or DAR, according to Landbank)
required and the beneficiaries executed Actual tillers Deed of Undertaking to pay
rentals to the Landbank for the use of their farmlots equivalent to at least 25% of the
net harvest. On 24 October 1991 the DAR Regional Director issued an order directing
the Landbank to pay the heirs directly or through the establishment of a trust fund in
the amount of P135,482.12. On 24 February 1992, the Landbank reserved in trust
P135,482.12 in the name of Emiliano F. Santiago. The beneficiaries stopped paying
rentals to the heirs after they signed the Actual Tiller's Deed of Undertaking
committing themselves to pay rentals to the Landbank (The Landbank, although
armed with the ATDU, allegedly did not collect any amount as rental from the
substituting beneficiaries). Lastly, the Agricultural Management and Development
Corporation (AMADCOR) owned properties in San Francisco, Quezon (a parcel of
land with an area of 209.9215 hectares, TCT 34314; another parcel with an area of
163.6189 hectares, TCT 10832), and in Tabaco, Albay (a parcel of land with an area
of 1,629.4578 hectares, TCT T- 2466 of the Register of Deeds of Albay). Without
notice to AMADCOR, a summary administrative proceeding to determine
compensation of the property covered by TCT 34314 was conducted by the DARAB
in Quezon City. A decision was rendered on 24 November 1992 fixing compensation
for the parcel of land covered by TCT 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares at
P2,768,326.34 and ordering the Landbank to pay or establish a trust account for said
amount in the name of AMADCOR. With respect to AMADCOR's property in Albay,
emancipation patents were issued covering an area of 701.8999 hectares which were
registered on 15 February 1988 but no action was taken thereafter by the DAR to fix
the compensation for said land. On 21 April 1993, a trust account in the name of
AMADCOR was established in the amount of P12,247,217.83, three notices of
acquisition having been previously rejected by AMADCOR. Thus, Yap, the Heirs of
Santiago, AMADCOR, being landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the
DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, and were aggrieved by the alleged lapses of
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Landbank with respect to the
valuation and payment of compensation for their land pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act (RA) 6657, filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction, questioning the validity
of DAR Administrative Order 6, Series of 1992 and DAR Administrative Order 9,
Series of 1990, and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary
administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their
properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively
"earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and
to allow them to withdraw the same. Through a Resolution of the Second Division
dated 9 February 1994, the Supreme Court referred the petition to respondent Court of
Appeals for proper determination and disposition. On 20 October 1994, the Court of
Appeals granted the petition, declaring that DAR Administrative order 9, Series of
1990, null and void insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of
deposits in cash or bonds; ordering Landbank to immediately deposit
— not merely "earmark," "reserve" or "deposit in trust" — with an accessible bank
designated by DAR in the names of Yap, the Heirs of Santiago, and AMADCO the
amounts of P1,455,207.31, P135,482.12, and P15,914,127.77 respectively in cash and
in government financial instruments within the parameters of Sec. 18
(1) of RA 6657; ordering the DAR-designated bank to allow Yap, et. al. to withdraw
the amounts without prejudice to the final determination of just compensation by the
proper authorities; and ordering DAR to immediately conduct summary administrative
proceedings to determine the just compensation for the lands in question giving Yap,
et. al. 15 days from notice within which to submit evidence and to decide the cases
within 30 days after they are submitted for decision. DAR and Landbank moved for
reconsideration, but were denied on 18 January 1995. DAR and Landbank filed their
respective petitions for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the deposit may be made in other forms besides cash or LBP bonds, and
whether there should be a distinction between the deposit of compensation and the
determination of just compensation.
Held:
It is very explicit in Section 16(e) of Republic Act 6657 that the deposit must be made
only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that
the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust
account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at
least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced
that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA
6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit". Herein, the DAR
clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it
issued Administrative Circular 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust
account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because Section
16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in
"LBP bonds". In the same vein, DAR and Landbank cannot invoke LRA Circular 29,
29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear
provision of the law. There should be no distinction between the deposit of
compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of just
compensation under Section 18. To withhold the right of the landowners to
appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their
properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that
they have already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an
oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The irresistible expropriation of Yap, et. al.'s
properties was painful enough for them; but DAR rubbed it in all the more by
withholding that which rightfully belongs to Yap, et. al. in exchange for the taking,
under an misplaced appreciation of the Association of Small Landowners case. It must
be noted that the immediate effect in both situations, the deposit of compensation and
determination of just compensation, is the same; the landowner is deprived of the use
and possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately
compensated. Thus, to reiterate the cardinal rule, "within the context of the State's
inherent power of eminent domain, just compensation means not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment
of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered 'just' for the property owner is made to suffer the
consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a
decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss."
Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) vs. Pineda [GR 59791, 13 February
1992]
Facts:
For the purpose of constructing a 230 KV Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to
Tower 220 at Pililla, Rizal, the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) needed
portions of the land of Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Gil de Guzman, Lucito Santiago and
Teresa Bautista (simple fee owners), consisting of an aggregate area of 237,321 square
meters. Despite MERALCO's offers to pay compensation and attempts to negotiate
with Arayon, et. al., the parties failed to reach an agreement. On 29 October 1974, a
complaint for eminent domain was filed by MERALCO against 42 defendants
(including Teofilo Arayon Sr., Gil de Guzman, Lucito Santiago, and Teresa Bautista)
with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXII,
Pasig, Metro Manila. Despite the opposition of Arayon, et. al., the court issued an
Order dated 13 January 1975 authorizing MERALCO to take or enter upon the
possession of the property sought to be expropriated. On 13 July 1976, Arayon, et. al.,
filed a motion for withdrawal of deposit claiming that they are entitled to be paid at
P40.00 per square meter or an approximate sum of P272,000.00 and prayed that they
be allowed to withdraw the sum of P71,771.50 from MERALCO's deposit-account
with the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Pasig Branch. However, Arayon, et. al.'s
motion was denied in an order dated 3 September 1976. Pursuant to a government
policy, MERALCO on 30 October 1979 sold to the National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR) the power plants and transmission lines, including the transmission lines
traversing Arayon, et. al.'s property. On 11 February 1980, the court issued an Order
appointing the members of the Board of Commissioners to make an appraisal of the
properties. On 5 June 1980, MERALCO filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that it has lost all its interests over the transmission lines and properties
under expropriation because of their sale to the NAPOCOR. In view of this motion,
the work of the Commissioners was suspended. On 9 June 1981, Arayon, et. al. filed
another motion for payment, but despite the opposition of MERALCO, the court
issued an order dated 4 December 1981 granting the motion for payment of Arayon,
et. al. (P20,400 or P3.00 per square meter without prejudice to the just compensation
that may be proved in the final adjudication of the case). On 15 December 1981,
Arayon, et. al. filed an Omnibus Motion praying that they be allowed to withdraw an
additional sum of P90,125.50 from MERALCO's deposit-account with PNB. By order
dated 21 December 1981, the court granted the Omnibus Motion. Arayon, et. al. filed
another motion dated 8 January 1982 praying that MERALCO be ordered to pay the
sum of P169,200.00. On 12 January 1982, MERALCO filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Orders and to declare Arayon, et. al. in contempt of court for
forging or causing to be forged the receiving stamp of MERALCO's counsel and
falsifying or causing to be falsified the signature of its receiving clerk in their
Omnibus Motion. On 9 February 1982, the court denied MERALCO's motion for
reconsideration and motion for contempt. In said order, the Court adjudged in favor of
Arayon, et. al. the fair market value of their property taken by MERALCO at P40.00
per square meter for a total of P369.720.00; the amount to bearing legal interest from
24 February 1975 until fully paid plus consequential damages in terms of attorney's
fees in the sum of P10,000.00; all these sums to be paid by MERALCO the former
with costs of suit, minus the amount of P102,800.00 already withdrawn by Arayon, et.
al. Furthermore, the court stressed in said order that "at this stage, the Court starts to
appoint commissioners to determine just compensation or dispenses with them and
adopts the testimony of a credible real estate broker, or the Judge himself would
exercise his right to formulate an opinion of his own as to the value of the land in
question. Nevertheless, if he formulates such an opinion, he must base it upon
competent evidence." MERALCO filed a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the court can dispense with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners in an
expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation.
Held:
In an expropriation case where the principal issue is the determination of just
compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to
present evidence on the issue of just compensation. The appointment of at least 3
competent persons as commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property
sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. While it is true
that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its
own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where the
Commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them or
where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount
allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive (Manila Railroad Company v.
Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286) Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial
right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all. Moreover, in
such instances, where the report of the commissioners may be disregarded, the trial
court may make its own estimate of value from competent evidence that may be
gathered from the record. The "Joint Venture Agreement on Subdivision and Housing
Projects" executed by ABA Homes and Arayon, et. al. relied upon by the judge, in the
absence of any other proof of valuation of said properties, is incompetent to determine
just compensation. The judge's act of determining and ordering the payment of just
compensation without the assistance of a Board of Commissioners is a flagrant
violation of MERALCO's constitutional right to due process and is a gross violation of
the mandated rule established by the Revised Rules of Court.
National Power Corporation vs. Henson [GR 129998, 29 December 1998]
Facts:
On 21 March 1990, the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) originally instituted
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Third Judicial District, Branch 46, San
Fernando, Pampanga a complaint for eminent domain, later amended on 11 October
1990, for the taking for public use of 5 parcels of land, owned or claimed by Lourdes
Henson (married to Eugenio Galvez), Josefina Henson (married to Petronio Katigbak,
Jesusa Henson, Corazon Henson (married to Jose Ricafort), Alfredo Tanchiatco,
Bienvenido David, Maria Bondoc Capili (married to Romeo Capili), and Miguel
Manoloto, with a total aggregate area of 58,311 square meters, for the expansion of
the NAPOCOR Mexico Sub-Station. On 28 March 1990, NAPOCOR filed an urgent
motion to fix the provisional value of the subject parcels of land. On 20 April 1990,
Henson, et. al. filed a motion to dismiss. They did not challenge NAPOCOR's right to
condemn their property, but declared that the fair market value of their property was
from P180.00 to P250.00 per square meter. On 10 July 1990, the trial court denied
Henson, et. al.'s motion to dismiss, but the court did not declare that NAPOCOR had a
lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated. However, the court fixed
the provisional value of the land at P100.00 per square meter, for a total area of
63,220 square meters of Henson, et. al.'s property, to be deposited with the Provisional
Treasurer of Pampanga. NAPOCOR deposited the amount on 29 August 1990. On 5
September 1990, the trial court issued a writ of possession in favor of NAPOCOR,
and, on 11 September 1990, the court's deputy sheriff placed NAPOCOR in
possession of the subject land. On 22 November 1990, and 20 December 1990, the
trial court granted the motions of Henson, et. al. to withdraw the deposit made by
NAPOCOR of the provisional value of their property amounting to P5,831,100.00,
with a balance of P690,900.00, remaining with the Provisional Treasurer of
Pampanga. On 5 April 1991, the trial court issued an order appointing 3
commissioners to aid the in the reception of evidence to determine just compensation
for the taking of subject property. After receiving the evidence and conducting an
ocular inspection, the commissioners submitted to the court their individual reports.
However, the trial court did not conduct a hearing on any of the reports. On 19 May
1993, the trial court rendered judgment fixing the amount of just compensation to be
paid by the NAPOCOR for the taking of the entire area of 63,220 squares meters at
P400.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon computed from 11 September
1990, when NAPOCOR was placed in possession of the land, plus attorney's fees of
P20,000.00, and costs of the proceedings. In due time, NAPOCOR appealed to the
Court of Appeals. On 23 July 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered decision affirming
that of the Regional Trial Court, except that the award of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees
was deleted. NAPOCOR filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the determination of the court would be valid without hearing on the report
of the Commissioners.
Held:
The trial court and the Court of Appeals fixed the value of the land at P400.00 per
square meter, which was the selling price of lots in the adjacent fully developed
subdivision, the Santo Domingo Village Subdivision. The parcels of land sought to be
expropriated, however, are undeniably idle, undeveloped, raw agricultural land, bereft
of any improvement. Except for the Henson family, all the other landowners were
admittedly farmer beneficiaries under operation land transfer of the Department of
Agrarian Reform. However, the land has been reclassified as residential. The nature
and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion to determine
just compensation to the landowner. Unfortunately, the trial court, after creating a
board of commissioners to help it determine the market value of the land did not
conduct a hearing on the report of the commissioners. The trial court fixed the fair
market value of subject land in an amount equal to the value of lots in the adjacent
fully developed subdivision. This finds no support in the evidence. The valuation was
even higher than the recommendation of anyone of the commissioners (Commissioner
Mariano C. Tiglao fixed the fair market value at P350.00 per square meter, while
Commissioner Arnold P. Atienza fixed it at P375.00 per square meter, and
Commissioner Victorino Oracio fixed it at P170.00 per square meter). Commissioner
Atienza's recommendation appears to be the closest valuation to the market value of
lots in the adjoining fully developed subdivision. Considering that the subject parcels
of land are undeveloped raw land, the price of P375.00 per square meter would appear
to the Court as the just compensation for the taking of such raw land.
National Power Corporation vs. Angas [GR 60225-26, 8 May 1992]
Facts:
On 13 April and 3 December 1974, the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), a
government- owned and controlled corporation and the agency through which the
government undertakes the on-going infrastructure and development projects
throughout the country, filed two complaints for eminent domain with the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Lanao del Sur (against Lacsamana
Batugan, and/or Guimba Shipping & Development Corporation, Magancong Digayan,
Moctara Lampaco, Lampaco Pasandalan, Dimaporo Subang, Hadji Daluma Kinidar,
Dimaampao Baute, Pangonotan Cosna Tagol, Salacop Dimacaling, Hadji Sittie Sohra
Linang Batara, Bertudan Pimping And/Or Cadurog Pimping, Butuan Tagol,
Disangcopan Marabong, and Hadji Salic Sawa in Civil Case 2248; and against
Mangorsi Casan, Casnangan Batugan, Pundamarug Atocal, Pasayod Pado,
Dimaampao Baute, Casnangan Baute, Dimaporo Subang, Tambilawan Ote, Manisun
Atocal, and Masacal Tomiara in Civil Case 2277). The complaint which sought to
expropriate certain specified lots situated at Limogao, Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur was
for the purpose of the development of hydro-electric power and production of
electricity as well as the erection to such subsidiary works and constructions as may
be necessarily connected therewith. Both cases were jointly tried upon agreement of
the parties. After a series of hearings were held, on 15 June 1979, a consolidated
decision was rendered by the lower court, declaring and confirming that the lots
mentioned and described in the complaints have entirely been lawfully condemned
and expropriated by NAPOCOR, and ordering the latter to pay the landowners certain
sums of money as just compensation for their lands expropriated "with legal interest
thereon until fully paid. Two consecutive motions for reconsideration of the
consolidated decision were filed by NAPOCOR. The same were denied by the court.
NAPOCOR did not appeal on the consolidated decision, which became final and
executory. Thus, on 16 May 1980, one of the landowners (Sittie Sohra Batara) filed an
ex-parte motion for the execution of the decision, praying that petitioner be directed to
pay her the unpaid balance of P14,300.00 for the lands expropriated from her,
including legal interest which she computed at 6% per annum. The said motion was
granted by the lower court. Thereafter, the lower court directed the petitioner to
deposit with its Clerk of Court the sums of money as adjudged in the joint decision
dated 15 June 1979. NAPOCOR complied with said order and deposited the sums of
money with interest computed at 6% per annum. On 10 February 1981, another
landowner (Pangonatan Cosna Tagol) filed with the trial court an ex- parte motion
praying, for the first time, that the legal interest on the just compensation awarded to
her by the court be computed at 12% per annum as allegedly "authorized under and by
virtue of Circular 416 of the Central Bank issued pursuant to Presidential Decree 116
and in a decision of the Supreme Court that legal interest allowed in the judgment of
the courts, in the absence of express contract, shall be computed at 12% per annum."
On 11 February 1981, the lower court granted the said motion allowing 12% interest
per annum. Subsequently, the other landowners filed motions also praying that the
legal interest on the just compensation awarded to them be computed at 12% per
annum, on the basis of which the lower court issued on 10 March 1981 and 28 August
1981 orders bearing similar import. NAPOCOR moved for the reconsideration of the
lower court's last order dated 28 August 1981, which the court denied on 25 January
1982. NAPOCOR filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether, in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just compensation for
expropriated lands, the rate applicable as legal interest is 6% (Article 2209 of the Civil
Code) or 12% (Central Bank Circular 416).
Held:
Article 2209 of the Civil Code, which provides that "If the obligation consists in the
payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs a delay, the indemnity for damages,
there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed
upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six percent per
annum," and not Central Bank Circular 416, is the law applicable. The Central Bank
circular applies only to loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits and to
judgments involving such loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. This is
evident not only from said circular but also from Presidential Decree 116, which
amended Act 2655, otherwise known as the Usury Law. On the other hand, Article
2209 of the Civil Code applies to transactions requiring the payment of indemnities as
damages, in connection with any delay in the performance of the obligation arising
therefrom other than those covering loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits.
Herein, the transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money, goods
or credits but expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public purpose, the
payment of which is without stipulation regarding interest, and the interest adjudged
by the trial court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The legal interest required
to be paid on the amount of just compensation for the properties expropriated is
manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the delay in the payment thereof.
Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in the joint judgment of the lower court
sought to be enforced in this case is interest by way of damages, and not by way of
earnings from loans, etc. Article 2209 of the Civil Code shall apply.
City of Manila, vs. Serrano [GR 142304, 20 June 2001]
Facts:
On 21 December 1993, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance 7833,
authorizing the expropriation of certain properties in Manila's First District in Tondo,
covered by TCTs 70869, 105201, 105202, and 138273 of the Register of Deeds of
Manila, which are to be sold and distributed to qualified occupants pursuant to the
Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila. One of the properties sought
to be expropriated, denominated as Lot 1-C, consists of 343.10 square meters, and was
in the name of Feliza de Guia. Lot 1-C was assigned to Edgardo De Guia, one of the
heirs of Alberto De Guia, in turn one of the heirs of Feliza de Guia. On 29 July 1994,
the said property was transferred to Lee Kuan Hui, in whose name TCT 217018 was
issued. The property was subsequently sold on 24 January 1996 to Demetria De Guia
to whom TCT 226048 was issued. On 26 September 1997, the City of Manila filed an
amended complaint for expropriation (Civil Case 94-72282) with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 16, Manila, against the supposed owners of the lots covered by TCTs
70869 (including Lot 1-C), 105201, 105202, and 138273, which included herein
respondents Oscar, Felicitas, Jose, Benjamin, Estelita, Leonora, Adelaida, all
surnamed Serrano. On 12 November 1997, the Serranos filed a consolidated answer,
praying the exemption of Lot 1-C from expropriation. Upon motion by the City, the
trial court issued an order, dated 9 October 1998, directing the City to deposit the
amount of P1,825,241.00 equivalent to the assessed value of the properties. After the
City had made the deposit, the trial court issued another order, dated 15 December
1998, directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the City. The Serranos
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On 16 November 1999, the
Court of Appeals rendered a decision holding that although Lot 1-C is not exempt
from expropriation because it undeniably exceeds 300 square meters which is no
longer considered a small property within the framework of RA 7279, the other modes
of acquisition of lands enumerated in §§59-10 of the law must first be tried by the city
government before it can resort to expropriation, and thus enjoined the City from
expropriating Lot 1-C. In its resolution, dated 23 February 2000, the Court of Appeals
likewise denied two motions for reconsideration filed by the City. The City filed a
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether it was premature to determine whether the requirements of RA 7279, §§9-10
have been complied with.
Held:
Rule 67, §2 provides that "Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter
and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter
upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized
government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for
purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such
deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a
certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable
on demand to the authorized government depositary. If personal property is involved,
its value shall be provisionally ascertained and the amount to be deposited shall be
fixed by the court. After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other
proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved
and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the parties."
Thus, a writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government
of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit
made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the
property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with these requirements, the
issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial. Herein, these requirements
were satisfied and, therefore, it became the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue
the writ of possession. The distinction between the Filstream and the present case is
that in the former, the judgment in that case had already become final while herein,
the trial court has not gone beyond the issuance of a writ of possession. Hearing is still
to be held to determine whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the
requirements provided in RA 7279. Whether the City has complied with these
provisions requires the presentation of evidence, although in its amended complaint
petitioner did allege that it had complied with the requirements. The determination of
this question must await the hearing on the complaint for expropriation, particularly
the hearing for the condemnation of the properties sought to be expropriated.
Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property
after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and,
second, the determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private
property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three
commissioners.
City of Baguio vs. National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority [GR L-12032,
31 August 1959]
Facts:
The City of Baguio filed on 25 April 1956, in the Court of First Instance of Baguio, a
complaint for declaratory relief against the National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority (NAWASA), a public corporation created by Republic Act 1383,
contending that said Act does not include within its purview the Baguio Waterworks
System; that assuming that it does, said Act is unconstitutional because it has the
effect of depriving the City of the ownership, control and operation of said
waterworks system without compensation and without due process of law, and that it
is oppressive, unreasonable and unjust to plaintiff and other cities, municipalities and
municipal districts similarly situated. On 22 May 1956, NAWASA filed a motion to
dismiss. On 21 June 1956, the Court, acting on the motion to dismiss as well as on the
answer and rejoinder filed by both parties, denied the motion and ordered NAWASA
to file its answer to the complaint. On 6 July 1956, NAWASA filed its answer
reiterating and amplifying the grounds already advanced in its motion to dismiss. On
14 August 1956, the parties submitted a written stipulation of facts and filed written
memoranda. And after allowing the City to file a supplementary complaint, the Court
on 5 November 1956, rendered decision holding that the waterworks system of the
City of Baguio falls within the category of "private property," as contemplated by our
Constitution and may not be expropriated without just compensation. NAWASA filed
a motion for reconsideration, and upon its denial, it took the present appeal.
Issue:
Whether the Baguio Waterworks partakes of the nature of public property or
private/patrimonial property of the City.
Held:
The Baguio Waterworks System is not like any public road, park, street or other
public property held in trust by a municipal corporation for the benefit of the public
but it is rather a property owned by the City in its proprietary character. While the
cases may differ as to the public or private character of waterworks, the weight of
authority as far as the legislature is concerned classes them as private affairs. (sec.
239, Vol. I, Revised, McQuillin Municipal Corporations, p. 239; Shrik vs. City of
Lancaster, 313 Pa. 158, 169 Atl. 557). And in this jurisdiction, this Court has already
expressed the view that a waterworks system is patrimonial property of the city that
has established it. (Mendoza vs. De Leon, 33 Phil. 509). And being owned by a
municipal corporation in a proprietary character, waterworks cannot be taken away
without observing the safeguards set by our Constitution for the protection of private
property. The State may, in the interest of National welfare, transfer to public
ownership any private enterprise upon payment of just compensation. At the same
time, one has to bear in mind that no person can be deprived of his property except for
public use and upon payment of just compensation. Unless the City is given its due
compensation, the City cannot be deprived of its property even if NAWASA desires to
take over its administration in line with the spirit of the law (Republic Act 1383). The
law, insofar as it expropriates the waterworks in question without providing for an
effective payment of just compensation, violates our Constitution.
Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga [G.R. No. L-24440.
March 28, 1968.]
Facts:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to
be the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On 12 October 1936,
Commonwealth Act (CA) 39 was approved converting the Municipality of
Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Section 50 of the Act also provided that "buildings
and properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to
another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be
fixed by the Auditor General." The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50
lots and some buildings constructed thereon, located in the City of Zamboanga and
covered individually by Torrens certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga
Province. The lots are utilized as the Capitol Site (1 lot), School site (3 lots), Hospital
site (3 lots), Leprosarium (3 lots), Curuan school (1 lot), Trade school (1 lot), Burleigh
school (2 lots), burleigh (9 lots), high school playground (2 lots), hydro-electric site (1
lot), san roque (?1 lot), and another 23 vacant lots. In 1945, the capital of Zamboanga
Province was transferred to Dipolog and on 16 June 1948, Republic Act (RA) 286
created the municipality of Molave and making it the capital of Zamboanga Province.
On 26 May 1949, the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, pursuant
to CA 39, fixed the value of the properties and buildings in question left by
Zamboanga Province in Zamboanga City at P1,294,244.00. However, on 14 July
1951, a Cabinet Resolution was passed, conveying all the said 50 lots and buildings
thereon to Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective as of 1945, when the provincial capital
of the Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog. On 6 June 1952, RA 711 was
approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into Zamboanga del Norte and
Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the assets and obligations of the old province were to
be divided between the two new ones, Section 6 of the law provided that “upon the
approval of the Act, the funds, assets and other properties and the obligations of the
province of Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between the Province of
Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the
Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Auditor General." On 11 January 1955,
the Auditor General apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct Province of
Zamboanga, apportioning 54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and 45.61% for
Zamboanga del Sur. On 17 March 1959, the Executive Secretary, by order of the
President, issued a ruling holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as
owner (should be co-owner pro-indiviso) of the properties mentioned in Section 50 of
CA 39, and is entitled to the price thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. This
effectively revoked the Cabinet Resolution of 14 July 1951. The Secretary of Finance
then authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct an amount equal to
25% of the regular internal revenue allotment for the City of Zamboanga for the
quarter ending 31 March 1960, then for the quarter ending 30 June 1960, and again for
the first quarter of the fiscal year 1960-1961. The deductions, all aggregating
P57,373.46 was credited to the province of Zamboanga del Norte, in partial payment
of the P704,220,05 due it. However, on 17 June 1961, RA 3039 was approved
amending Section 50 of CA 39 by providing that "all buildings, properties and assets
belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of
Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of
Zamboanga." On 12 July 1961, the Secretary of Finance ordered the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to stop from effecting further payments to Zamboanga del Norte and
to return to Zamboanga City the sum of P57,373.46 taken from it out of the internal
revenue allotment of Zamboanga del Norte. Zamboanga City admits that since the
enactment of RA 3039, P43,030.11 of the P57,373.46 has already been returned to it.
This constrained Zamboanga del Norte to file on 5 March 1962, a complaint entitled
"Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction" in the CFI Zamboanga
del Norte against Zamboanga City, the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue. On 4 June 1962, the lower court ordered the issuance of preliminary
injunction as prayed for. After trial and on 12 August 1963, judgment was rendered
declaring RA 3039 unconstitutional as it deprives the province of its private
properties, ordered the city to pay the province the sum of P704,200.05 and in relation
to this ordered the finance secretary to direct the Commissioner of Internal revenue to
deduct from its regular quarterly internal revenue allotment equivalent to 25%, 25%
from the regular quarterly internal revenue allotment for the City and to remit the
same to the province until the sum has been fully paid; ordered the province to
execute the corresponding public instrument deeding to the city the 50 parcels of land
and the improvements thereon under the certificates of title upon full payment;
dismissed the counterclaim of the city; and declared permanent the preliminary
mandatory injunction issued on 8 June 1967. The province filed a motion to
reconsider praying that the City be ordered instead to pay the P704,220.05 in lump
sum with 6% interest per annum. Over the city’s opposition, the lower court granted
the province’s motion. Hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether Zamboanga del Norte is entitled to its share of the value of the properties
belonging to the former Zamboanga province that were transferred to the City of
Zamboanga.
Held:
Article 423 of the Civil Code provides that “the property of provinces, cities and
municipalities, is divided into property for public use and patrimonial properly."
Article 424 of the same code provides that “property for public use, in the provinces,
cities, and municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal
streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public
service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities. All other property
possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws." Applying the norm in the Civil Code, all
the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High School playgrounds,
could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga province.
Even the capitol site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be
considered patrimonial for they are not for public use inasmuch as they would not fall
under the phrase "public works for public service." Under the ejusdem generis rule,
such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the
preceding enumerated properties in the first paragraph of Article 424. The
playgrounds, however, would fit into this category. The records do not disclose,
however, whether the buildings were constructed at the expense of the former
Province of Zamboanga. Considering however the fact that said buildings must have
been erected even before 1936 when CA 39 was enacted and the further fact that
provinces then had no power to authorize construction of buildings at their own
expense, it can be assumed that said buildings were erected by the National
Government, using national funds. Hence, Congress could very well dispose of said
buildings in the same manner that it did with the lots in question. On the other hand,
Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its share in
the value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since
they are not being utilized for distinctly governmental purposes. The fact that these 26
lots are registered strengthens the proposition that they are truly private in nature.
Thus, Zamboanga del Norte is still entitled to collect from the City of Zamboanga the
former's 54.39% share in the 26 properties which are patrimonial in nature, said share
to be computed on the basis of the valuation of said 26 properties as contained in
Resolution 7, dated 26 March 1949, of the Appraisal Committee formed by the
Auditor General. The share, however, cannot be paid in lump sum, except as to the
P43,030.11 already returned to the City, as the return of said amount to the city was
without legal basis. RA 3039 took effect only on 17 June 1961 after a partial payment
of P57,373.46 had already been made. Since the law did not provide for retroactivity,
it could not have validly affected a completed act. Hence, the amount of P43,030.11
should be immediately returned by the City to the province. The remaining balance, if
any, in the amount of plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 lots should then be paid by the
City in the same manner originally adopted by the Secretary of Finance and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and not in lump sum.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Algue [GR L-28896, 17 February 1988]
Facts:
The Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company (PSEDC) appointed Algue Inc.
as its agent, authorizing it to sell its land, factories, and oil manufacturing process. The
Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation (VOICP) purchased PSEDC properties. For the
sale, Algue received a commission of P125,000 and it was from this commission that
it paid Guevara, et. al. organizers of the VOICP, P75,000 in promotional fees. In
1965, Algue received an assessment from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in
the amount of P83,183.85 as delinquency income tax for years 1958 amd 1959. Algue
filed a protest or request for reconsideration which was not acted upon by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR). The counsel for Algue had to accept the warrant of
distraint and levy. Algue, however, filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax
Appeals.
Issue:
Whether the assessment from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was reasonable.
Held:
No. Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without
unnecessary hindrance. Every person who is able to pay must contribute his share in
the running of the government. The Government, for his part, is expected to respond
in the form of tangible and intangible benefits intended to improve the lives of the
people and enhance their moral and material values. This symbiotic relationship is the
rationale of taxation and should dispel the erroneous notion that is an arbitrary method
of exaction by those in the seat of power. Tax collection, however, should be made in
accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for government
itself. For all the awesome power of the tax collector, he may still be stopped in his
tracks if the taxpayer can demonstrate that the law has not been observed. Herein, the
claimed deduction (pursuant to Section 30 [a] [1] of the Tax Code and Section 70 [1]
of Revenue Regulation 2: as to compensation for personal services) had been
legitimately by Algue Inc. It has further proven that the payment of fees was
reasonable and necessary in light of the efforts exerted by the payees in inducing
investors (in VOICP) to involve themselves in an experimental enterprise or a
business requiring millions of pesos. The assessment was not reasonable.
Commissioner of Customs v. Makasiar [GR 79307, 29 August 1989]
Facts:
On 7 December 1978, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila issued Search
and Seizure Warrants in Criminal Cases 8602 and 8603 (People v. Sosis) for violation
of Section 11 (a) and/or 11(e) of Republic Act 3720, and violation of Article 188 of
the Revised Penal Code (Substituting and altering trademarks, tradenames, or service
marks; in this case, Johnnie Walker Scotch Whisky), respectively. On 8 December
1978, a composite team from the Ministry of Finance Bureau of Investigation and
Intelligence (BII), the Bureau of Customs and the Integrated National Police (INP)
enforced the search and seizure warrants, and seized and confiscated 6 tanks of scotch
whisky, 417 cartons of 1doz. Johnny Walker black, 109 empty bottles, among others,
found in the premises of the Hercules Bottling at Paco, Manila. The articles seized
remained in the premises of Hercules guarded and secured by BII personnel. On 2
January 1979, the Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila issued a warrant of
seizure and detention and ordered the immediate seizure and turnover of the seized
items to its Auction and Cargo Disposal Division at the Port of Manila. Seizure and
forfeiture proceedings were then initiated against the articles for alleged violation of
Section 2530 (f) of the Tariff and Customs Code, in relation to RA 3720. On 29
January 1979, the CFI issued an order authorizing the transfer and delivery of the
seized articles to the customs warehouse located at South Harbor, Port of Manila. The
City Fiscal of Manila proceeded with the preliminary investigation of the criminal
cases and the Bureau of Customs also resumed hearing the seizure and forfeiture
proceedings over the said articles. On 11 June 1982, the Distiller Co. Ltd. of England
objected to the continuation by the Collector of Customs of the seizure proceedings
claiming that these proceedings would hamper or even jeopardize the preliminary
investigation being conducted by the fiscal. The Collector of Customs ignored the
objections. On 24 September 1982, the company filed a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction and/or TRO (Civil Case 82-12721) to enjoin the Hearing
Officer of the Bureau of Customs from taking further action in the seizure proceedings
of the subject goods. The petition was heard not before the CFI-MANILA which
originally issued the search warrants, but before another sala, that of Judge Ramon P.
Makasiar of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Manila. The judge issued a TRO on
29 September 1982. Subsequently, a writ for preliminary injunction was issued as
well. On 20 July 1987, the judge rendered a decision holding that the Collector of
Customs acted in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the warrant of seizure and
detention considering that the subject goods had already come under the legal custody
of the CFI. Hence, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, represented by the Solicitor
General, filed the instant petition on 11 August 1987. In the meantime, Howard Sosis
and company were charged for violation of Chapter VI, Sec. 11(a) & (e) of RA 3720
(Criminal Case 88-63157) and for violation of Article 188 of the Revised Penal Code
(Criminal Case 88-63156) before the RTC and the MTC Manila.
Issue:
Whether the Regional Trial Court has the power to review the acts of the Collector of
Custom.
Held:
Tariff and customs duties are taxes constituting a significant portion of the public
revenue which are the lifeblood that enables the government to carry out functions it
has been instituted to perform. The Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) are devoid of any
competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture
proceedings conducted in the Bureau of Customs, and to enjoin, or otherwise interfere
with, these proceedings. The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture
proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on
the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The RTCs are precluded from assuming
cognizance over such matters even through petitions of certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus. The provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code and that of RA 1125
specify the proper fora for the ventilation of any legal objections or issues raised
concerning these proceedings. Actions of the Collector of Customs are appealable to
the Commissioner of Customs, whose decisions, in turn, are subject to the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the CTA. Thereafter, an appeal lies to the Supreme Court
through the appropriate petition for review by writ of certiorari. Undeniably, RTCs do
not share these review powers. The rule is anchored upon the policy of placing no
unnecessary hindrance on the government's drive not only to prevent smuggling and
other frauds upon customs, but also, and more importantly, to render effective and
efficient the collection of import and export duties due the state.
YMCA v. Collector of Internal Revenue [GR 7988, 19 January 1916]
Facts:
The Young Men's Christian Association came to the Philippines with the army of
occupation in 1898. The association is nonsectarian, it is preeminently religious; and
the fundamental basis and groundwork is the Christian religion. All of the officials of
the association are devoted Christians, members of a church, and have dedicated their
lives to the spread of the Christian principles and the building of Christian character.
Its building is located in Calle Concepcion, Ermita, which was formally dedicated on
20 October 1909. The building is composed of three parts. The main structure is three
stories high and includes a reception hall, social hall and game rooms, lecture room,
library, reading room and rooming apartments. The small building lying to the left of
the principal structure is the kitchen and servants' quarters. The bowling alleys,
swimming pool, locker rooms and gymnasium -auditorium are located at the large
wing to the right (athletic building). The association claimed exemption from taxation
on ground that it is a religious, charitable and educational institution combined, under
Section 48 of the Charter of the City of Manila. The city of Manila, contending that
the property is taxable, assessed it and levied a tax thereon. It was paid under protest
and this action begun to recover it on the ground that the property was exempt from
taxation under the charter of the city of Manila. The decision was made in favor of the
city, and the association appealed.
Issue:
Whether the institution must be devoted exclusive for religious purposes, or
exclusively for charitable purposes, or exclusively to educational purposes, to be
entitled to tax exemption.
Held:
It may be admitted that there are 64 persons occupying rooms in the main building as
lodgers or roomers and that they take their meals at the restaurant below. These facts,
however, are far from constituting a business in the ordinary acceptation of the word;
as there is no profit realized by the association in any sense; and that the purpose of
the association is not, primarily, to obtain the money which comes from the lodgers
and boarders. The real purpose is to keep the membership continually within the
sphere of influence of the institution; and thereby to prevent, as far as possible, the
opportunities which vice presents to young men in foreign countries who lack home or
other similar influences. There is no doubt about the correctness of the contention that
an institution must devote itself exclusively to one or the other of the purposes
mentioned in the statute before it can be exempt from taxation; but the statute does not
say that it must be devoted exclusively to any one of the purposes therein mentioned.
It may be a combination of two or three or more of those purposes and still be entitled
to exemption. The YMCA cannot be said to be an institution used exclusively for
religious purposes, or exclusively for charitable purposes, or exclusively to
educational purposes; but the Court believed that it is an institution used exclusively
for all three purposes. As such, it is entitled to be exempted from taxation.
Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board, Ilocos Norte [GR 27588, 31
December 1927]
Facts:
The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, represented by the Bishop of Nueva Segovia,
possesses and is the owner of a parcel of land in the municipality of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte, all four sides of which face on public streets. On the south side is a part
of the church yard, the convent and an adjacent lot used for a vegetable garden,
containing an area of 1,624 square meters, in which there is a stable and a well for the
use of the convent. In the center is the remainder of the churchyard and the church. On
the north side is an old cemetery with two of its walls still standing, and a portion
where formerly stood a tower, the base of which may still be seen, containing a total
area of 8,955 square meters. As required by the provincial board, the Church paid on 3
July 1925, under protest, the land tax on the lot adjoining the convent and the lot
which formerly was the cemetery with the portion where the tower stood. The Church
filed an action for the recovery of the sum paid by it to Board by way of land tax,
alleging that the collection of this tax is illegal. The lower court absolved the Board
from the complaint in regard to the lot adjoining the convent and declared that the tax
collected on the lot, which formerly was the cemetery and on the portion where the
tower stood, was illegal. Both parties appealed from this judgment.
Issue:
Whether the churchyard, the adjacent lot used for a vegetable garden, and the old
cemetery, besides the church and the convent, are exempt from land taxes.
Held:
The exemption in favor of the convent in the payment of the land tax (sec. 344 [c]
Administrative Code) refers to the home of the priest who presides over the church
and who has to take care of himself in order to discharge his duties. It therefore must,
in this sense, include not only the land actually occupied by the church, but also the
adjacent ground destined to the ordinary incidental uses of man. Except in large cities
where the density of the population and the development of commerce require the use
of larger tracts of land for buildings, a vegetable garden belongs to a house and, in the
case of a convent, its use is limited to the necessities of the priest, which comes under
the exemption. Also, land used as a lodging house by the people who participate in
religious festivities, which constitutes an incidental use in religious functions, not for
commercial purposes, comes within the exemption. It cannot be taxed according to its
former use (cemetery).
Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue [GR L-19201, 16 June 1965]
Facts:
Sometime in 1957, the MB Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated P10,000.00 in cash
to Fr. Crispin Ruiz then parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor
of Fr. Casimiro Lladoc, for the
construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality. The total amount was actually
spent for the purpose intended. On 3 March 1958, MB Estate filed the donor's gift tax
return. Under date of 29 April 1960, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued as
assessment for donee's gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros
Occidental, of which petitioner was the priest. The tax amounted to P1,370.00
including surcharges, interest of 1% monthly from 15 May 1958 to 15 June 1960, and
the compromise for the late filing of the return. Petitioner lodged a protest to the
assessment and requested the withdrawal thereof. The protest and the motion for
reconsideration presented to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue were denied. The
petitioner appealed to the CTA on 2 November 1960. After hearing, the CTA affirmed
the decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue except the imposition of
compromise penalty of P20. Fr. Lladoc appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether a donee’s gift tax may be assessed against the Catholic Church.
Held:
The phrase "exempt from taxation," as employed in the Constitution supra should not
be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. Section 22(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from taxation cemeteries, churches and
personages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements used exclusively for religious purposes. The exemption is only from the
payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra-
distinguished from excise taxes. A donee’s gift tax is not a property tax but an excise
tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos. Its assessment was
not on the property themselves. It does not rest upon general ownership, but an excise
upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the
properties. The imposition of such excise tax on property used for religious purposes
do not constitute an impairment of the Constitution.
Abra v. Hernando [GR L-49336, 31 August 1981]
Facts:
The provincial assessor made a tax assessment on the properties of the Roman
Catholic Bishop of Bangued. The bishop claims tax exemption from real estate tax,
through an action for declaratory relief. Judge Hernando of the CFI Abra presided
over the case. The Province of Abra filed a motion to dismiss, based on lack of
jurisdiction, which was denied. It was followed by a summary judgment granting the
exemption without hearing the side of the province.
Issue:
Whether the properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued are tax exempt.
Held:
Exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it
must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. Affirmatively put, the law frowns on
exemption from taxation, hence, an exempting provision should be construed
strictissimi juris. Herein, the judge accepted at its face the allegation of Bishop – that
the certain parcels of land owned by it, are used "actually, directly and exclusively" as
sources of support of the parish priest and his helpers and also of the Bishop – instead
of demonstrating that there is compliance with the constitutional provision that allows
an exemption. There was an allegation of lack of jurisdiction (contesting that the
validity of the assessment may be questioned before the Local Board of Assessment
Appeals and not the court), and of lack of cause of action (contesting that declaratory
relief is not proper, as there had been breach or violation of the right of government to
assess and collect taxes on such property), which should have compel the judge to
accord a hearing to the petitioner rather than deciding the case immediately in favor of
the Bishop.
Abra Valley College v. Aquino [GR L-39086, 15 June 1988]
Facts:
Abra Valley College rents out the ground floor of its college building to Northern
Marketing Corporation while the second floor thereof is used by the Director of the
College for residential purposes. On 6 July 1972, the Municipal and Provincial
treasurers (Gaspar Bosque and Armin Cariaga, respectively) and issued a Notice of
Seizure upon the petitioner for the college lot and building (OCT Q-83) for the
satisfaction of said taxes thereon. The treasurers served upon the College a Notice of
Sale on 8 July 1972, the sale being held on the same day. Dr. Paterno Millare, then
municipal mayor of Bangued, Abra, offered the highest bid of P 6,000 on public
auction involving the sale of the college lot and building. The certificate of sale was
correspondingly issued to him. The College filed a complaint on 10 July 1972 in the
court a quo to annul and declare void the "Notice of Seizure" and the "Notice of Sale"
of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes
and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. The trial court ruled for the government,
holding that the property is not being used “exclusively” for educational purposes.
Instead of perfecting an appeal, the College availed of the petition for review on
certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, by filing
said petition on 17 August 1974.
Issue:
Whether the College is exempt from realty taxes.
Held:
No. The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes
mentioned in the Constitution. While the Court allows a more liberal and non-
restrictive interpretation of the phrase "exclusively used for educational purposes,"
reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to facilities which
are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main
purposes. The use of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither
contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Herein, the lease of the first floor of the
building to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the
imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education.
American Bible Society v. City of Manila [GR L-9637, 30 April 1957]
Facts:
In the course of its ministry, American Bible Society's Philippine agency has been
distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (since 1898, but except
during the Japanese occupation) throughout the Philippines and translating the same
into several Philippine dialects. On 29 May 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City
of Manila informed the Society that it was conducting the business of general
merchandise since November 1945, without providing itself with the necessary
Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance 3000, as amended,
and Ordinances 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required the Society to secure, within 3
days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise covering
the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of
P5,821.45. On 24 October 1953, the Society paid to the City Treasurer under protest
the said permit and license fees, giving at the same time notice to the City Treasurer
that suit would be taken in court to question the legality of the ordinances under which
the said fees were being collected, which was done on the same date by filing the
complaint that gave rise to this action. After hearing, the lower court dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit. the Society appealed to the Court of Appeals, which in
turn certified the case to the Supreme Court for the reason that the errors assigned
involved only questions of law.
Issue:
Whether the Society is required to secure municipal permit to allow it to sell and
distribute bibles and religious literature, and to pay taxes from the sales thereof.
Held:
No. Section 27 (e) of Commonwealth Act 466 (NIRC) exempts corporations or
associations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes, Provided however, That the income of whatever kind and
character from any of its properties, real or personal, or from any activity conducted
for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be liable to the tax
imposed under the Code. Herein, the act of distributing and selling bibles, etc. is
purely religious and cannot be made liable for taxes or fees therein. Further,
Ordinance 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to the Society, for in doing so it
would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship
as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. The fact that the price of the
bibles and other religious pamphlets are little higher than the actual cost of the same
does not necessarily mean that it is already engaged in the business or occupation of
selling said “merchandise” for profit. Furthermore, Ordinance 3000 of the City of
Manila is of general application and it does not contain any provisions whatsoever
prescribing religious censorship nor restraining the free exercise and enjoyment of any
religious profession. The ordinance is not applicable to the Society, as its business,
trade or occupation is not particularly mentioned in Section 3 of the Ordinance, and
the record does not show that a permit is required therefor under existing laws and
ordinances for the proper supervision and enforcement of their provisions governing
the sanitation, security and welfare of the public and the health of the employees
engaged in the business of the Society.
Punsalan v. Municipal Board of Manila [GR L-4817, 26 May 1954]
Facts:
Ordinance 3398 was approved by the municipal board of the City of Manila on 25
July 1950. It imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various
professions in the city and penalizes non-payment of the tax by a fine of not more than
P200 or by imprisonment of not more than 6 months, or by both such fine and
imprisonment in the discretion of the court. The ordinance was enacted pursuant to
paragraph (1) of section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (as
amended by RA 409), which empowers the Municipal Board of said city to impose a
municipal occupation tax, not to exceed P50 per annum, on persons engaged in the
various professions, such as those were Silvestre M. Punsalan, et. al. belong.
Punsalan, et. al. (2 lawyers, a medical practitioner, a public accountant, a dental
surgeon and a pharmacist) filed a suit in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila in
their own behalf and in behalf of other professionals practicing in the City of Manila,
calling for the annulment of Ordinance 3398 of the City of Manila together with the
provision of the Manila charter authorizing it and the refund of taxes collected under
the ordinance but paid under protest (as they have paid their occupation tax under
Section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code [NIRC]). The lower court upheld
the validity of the provision of law authorizing the enactment of the ordinance but
declared the ordinance itself illegal and void on the ground that the penalty therein
provided for non-payment of the tax was not legally authorized. Both parties appealed
to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether professionals in Manila are being subjected to double taxation, in light of the
municipal occupation tax imposed against them by the City of Manila.
Held:
The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in
the exercise of that discretion it may tax all, or it may select for taxation certain
classes and leave the others untaxed. Manila, as the seat of the National Government
and with a population and volume of trade many times that of any other Philippine
city or municipality, offers a more lucrative field for the practice of the professions, so
that it is but fair that the professionals in Manila be made to pay a higher occupation
tax than their brethren in the provinces. The ordinance imposes the tax upon every
person "exercising" or "pursuing" any one of the occupations named, but does not say
that such person must have his office in Manila. There is no distinction found in the
ordinance between professionals having offices in manila and outsiders who have no
offices in the city but practice their profession therein. Where one tax is imposed by
the state and the other is imposed by the city, the argument against double taxation
may not be invoked, as there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the requirement that
license fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation, calling or activity
by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof.
Physical Therapy Organization v. Municipal Board of Manila [GR L-10448, 30
August 1957]
Facts:
The Physical Therapy Organization , an association of registered massagists and
licensed operators of massage clinics in the City of Manila and other parts of the
country, filed an action in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila for declaratory
judgment regarding the validity of Municipal Ordinance 3659, promulgated by the
Municipal Board and approved by the City Mayor (Enacted 27 August 1954, and
approved and effective 7 September 1954). To stop the City from enforcing said
ordinance, the Organization secured an injunction upon filing of a bond in the sum of
P1,000.00. A hearing was held, but the parties without introducing any evidence
submitted the case for decision on the pleadings, although they submitted written
memoranda. Thereafter, the trial court dismissed the petition and later dissolved the
writ of injunction previously issued. The Organization appealed said order of
dismissal directly to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the license fees imposed by the Ordinance against massage clinic operators is
unreasonable.
Held:
No. The purpose of the Ordinance is not to regulate the practice of massage, much less
to restrict the practice of licensed and qualified massagists of therapeutic massage in
the Philippines. The end sought to be attained in the Ordinance is to prevent the
commission of immorality and the practice of prostitution in an establishment
masquerading as a massage clinic where the operators thereof offer to massage or
manipulate superficial parts of the bodies of customers for hygienic and aesthetic
purposes. The permit fee is made payable not by the masseur or massagist, but by the
operator of a massage clinic who may not be a massagist himself. Compared to permit
fees required in other operations, P100.00 may appear to be too large and rather
unreasonable, but much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining
the amount of said fee without considering it as a tax for revenue purposes. There is a
marked distinction between license fees imposed upon useful and beneficial
occupations which the sovereign wishes to regulate but not restrict, and those which
are inimical and dangerous to public health, morals or safety. In the latter case the fee
may be very large without necessarily being a tax. Evidently, the Manila Municipal
Board considered the practice of hygienic and aesthetic massage not as a useful and
beneficial occupation which will promote and is conducive to public morals, and
consequently, imposed the said permit fee for its regulation.
Hurtado vs. People of State of California [3 March 1884]
Facts:
The constitution of the state of California adopted in 1879, in article 1, 8, provides as
follows: "Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be
prosecuted by information, after examination and commitment by a magistrate, or by
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment, as may be prescribed
by law. A grand jury shall be drawn and summoned at least once a year in each
county." In pursuance of the foregoing provision of the constitution, and of the several
sections of the penal Code of California, the district attorney of Sacramento county,
on 20 February 1882, filed an information against Joseph Hurtado, charging him with
the crime of murder in the killing of one Jose Antonio Stuardo. Upon this information,
and without any previous investigation of the cause by any grand jury, Hurtado was
arraigned on 22 March 1882, and pleaded not guilty. A trial of the issue was thereafter
had, and on 7 May 1882, the jury rendered its verdict, in which it found Hurtado
guilty of murder in the first degree. On 5 June 1882, the superior court of Sacramento
county rendered its judgment upon said verdict, that Hurtado be punished by the
infliction of death, and the day of his execution was fixed for 20 July 1882. From this
judgment an appeal was taken, and the supreme court of the State of California
affirmed the judgment. On 6 July 1883, the superior court of said county of
Sacramento ordered that Hurtado be in court on 11 July 1883, in order that a day for
the execution of the judgment in said cause should be fixed. In pursuance of said
order, Hurtado, with his counsel, appeared in court, and upon the court's inquiry,
objected to the execution of said judgment and to any order which the court might
make fixing a day for the execution of the same, upon the grounds (1) that it appeared
upon the face of the judgment that Hurtado had never been legally, or otherwise,
indicted or presented by any grand jury, and that he was proceeded against by
information made and filed by the district attorney of the county of Sacramento, after
examination and commitment by a magistrate of the said county; (2) that the said
proceedings, as well as the laws and constitution of California, attempting to authorize
them, and the alleged verdict of the jury, and judgment of the said superior court of
said county of Sacramento, were in conflict with and prohibited by Amendments 5
and 14 of the constitution of the United States, and that they were therefore void; (3)
that Hurtado had been held to answer for the said crime of murder by the district
attorney of the said county of Sacramento, upon an information filed by him, and had
been tried and illegally found guilty of the said crime, without any presentment or
indictment of any grand or other jury, and that the judgment rendered upon the alleged
verdict of the jury in such case was and is void, and if executed would deprive
Hurtado of his life or liberty without due process of law. Thereupon the court
overruled the said objections, and fixed 13 August 1883, as the time for the execution
of the sentence. From this latter judgment, Hurtado appealed to the supreme court of
the state. On 18 September 1883, the supreme court of the state affirmed the said
judgment. A review of which, by a writ of error, by the US Supreme Court was
allowed.
Issue:
Whether Hurtado was denied due process by being tried and found guilty without
being presented or indicted by a grand jury.
Held:
The clause of the 14th article of amendment to the constitution of the United States,
provides that "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law." The phrase is to be construed by the usus loquendi of the
constitution itself. The same words are contained in the 5th amendment. That article
makes specific and express provision for perpetuating the institution of the grand jury,
so far as relates to prosecutions for the more aggravated crimes under the laws of the
United States. It declares that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual
service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall he be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." It then immediately adds: "nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." The natural and
obvious inference is that, in the sense of the constitution, "due process of law" was not
meant or intended to include, ex vi termini, the institution and procedure of a grand
jury in any case. The conclusion is equally irresistible, that when the same phrase was
employed in the 14th amendment to restrain the action of the states, it was used in the
same sense and with no greater extent; and that if in the adoption of that amendment it
had been part of its purpose to perpetuate the institution of the grand jury in all the
states, it would have embodied, as did the 5th amendment, express declarations to that
effect. Due process of law in the latter refers to that law of the land which derives its
authority from the legislative powers conferred upon congress by the constitution of
the United States, exercised within the limits therein prescribed, and interpreted
according to the principles of the common law. In the fourteenth amendment, by
parity of reason, it refers to that law of the land in each state which derives its
authority from the inherent and reserved powers of the state, exerted within the limits
of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions, and the greatest security for which resides in the right
of the people to make their own laws, and alter them at their pleasure. The 14th
amendment does not profess to secure to all persons in the United States the benefit of
the same laws and the same remedies. Great diversities in these respects may exist in
two states separated only by an imaginary line. On one side of this line there may be a
right of trial by jury, and on the other side no such right. Each state prescribes its own
modes of judicial proceeding. Further, any legal proceeding enforced by public
authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of
the legislative power in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and
preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law.
Herein, the Court is unable to say that the substitution for a presentment or indictment
by a grand jury of the proceeding by information after examination and commitment
by a magistrate, certifying to the probable guilt of the defendant, with the right on his
part to the aid of counsel, and to the cross-examination of the witnesses produced for
the prosecution, is not due process of law. The Court found no error and thus affirmed
the judgment of the supreme court of California.
Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho [GR L-29646, 10 Nov 1978]
Facts:
On 22 February 1968, Ordinance 6537 (An ordinance making it unlawful for any
person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or
to be engaged in any kind of trade, business or occupation within the City of Manila
without first securing an employment permit from the mayor of Manila; and for other
purposes) was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila and signed by Manila Mayor
Antonio J. Villegas on 27 March 1968. The Ordinance prohibits aliens from
employment and trade in the City of Manila without the requisite mayor’s permit; but
excepting persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign
countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government
and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and
members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid
monetarily or in kind. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty is imprisonment of 3 to 6
months or fine of P100-200, or both. On 4 May 1968, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who
was employed in Manila, filed a petition, with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Manila (Civil Case 72797), praying for (1) the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction and restraining order to stop the implementation of the ordinance, and (2)
judgment to declare the ordinance null and void. On 24 May 1968, Judge Francisco
Arca (CFI Manila, Branch I) issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on 17
September 1968, the Judge rendered a decision declaring the ordinance null and void,
and the preliminary injunction is made permanent. Mayor Villegas filed a petition for
certiorari to review the decision of the CFI.
Issue:
Whether the Ordinance, requiring aliens - however economically situated - to secure
working permits from the City of Manila at a uniform fee of P50, is reasonable.
Held:
The ordinance is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens
who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore,
violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Requiring a
person, before he can be employed, to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila,
who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of
the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. The shelter of
protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons,
both aliens and citizens. The ordinance does not lay down any criterion or standard to
guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor
arbitrary and unrestricted powers. The ordinance’s purpose is clearly to raise money
under the guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who have been cleared for
employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive because it fails to consider
differences in situation among aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent,
full-time, part-time, rank-an-file or executive.
Rubi, et. al. vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [GR 14078, 7 March 1919]
Facts:
On 1 February 1917, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted Resolution 25 creating
a reservation / permanent settlement for Mangyans (Mangyanes) in an 800-hectare
public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake, and resolving that Mangyans may
only solicit homesteads on the reservation provided that said homestead applications
be previously recommended by the provincial governor. On 21 February 1917, the
Secretary of Interior approved Resolution 25. On 4 December 1917, the provincial
governor of Mindoro issued Executive Order 2 which directed all Mangyans in the
vicinities of the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco
River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take
up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than 31 December
1917, and penalizing any Mangyan who refused to comply with the order with
imprisonment of not exceeding 60 days, in accordance with section 2759 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed
their dwellings within the reservation of Tigbao and are prosecuted in accordance with
section 2759 of Act No. 2711. On the other hand, Doroteo Dabalos, was detained by
the sheriff of Mindoro by virtue of the provisions of Articles 2145 and 2759 of Act
2711, for having run away from the reservation. Rubi and other Manguianes of the
Province of Mindoro applied for writs of habeas corpus, alleging that the Manguianes
are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province.
Issue:
Whether due process was followed in the restraint of the Manguianes’ liberty, either
on their confinement in reservations and/or imprisonment due to violation of Section
2145 of the Administrative Code.
Held:
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. The
meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty,
property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern
society." To constitute "due process of law," a judicial proceeding is not always
necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite, a rule which
is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative
officers in applying a law to particular cases. Neither is due process a stationary and
blind sentinel of liberty. Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether
sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative
power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves these principles
of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law. Due process of law"
means simply that "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the
general powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that this law
shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the
regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to
all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." What is due process of law depends on
circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation. The
pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed
by a statute which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a
reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature. Herein, one cannot hold that
the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of
the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general
good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been
followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of
the laws. There exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according
to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
Action pursuant to Section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person
of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection
of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does
not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power,
somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Rubi and the other
Manguianes are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas
corpus can, therefore, not issue.
Ople v. Torres [ GR 127685, 23 July 1998]
Facts:
On 12 December 1996, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order 308,
entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System." It
was published in 4 newspapers of general circulation on 22 and 23 January 1997. On
24 January 1997, Senator Blas F. Ople, as a Senator, taxpayer and member of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), filed instant petition against then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as
members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee are charged with the
implementation of Administrative Order 308.
Issue:
Whether the Philippine President can issue an Administrative Order for the adoption
of a National Computerized Identification Reference System, independent of a
legislative act.
Held:
Administrative Order 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-
encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign
resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy. Such a system requires
a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies: the primacy of national
security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the
choice of policies, etc. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some
basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the
administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of
Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by
law. The Order is a law, negating claims that it confers no right, imposes no duty,
affords no protection, and creates no office. Under it, a citizen cannot transact
business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the
contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card
for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear that without the ID, a
citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges.
Administrative Order 308 does not merely implements the Administrative Code of
1987, but establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification
Reference System. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President
which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It
must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing
the law and carrying out the legislative policy. The authority to prescribe rules and
regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws. AO 308 was beyond
the power of the President to issue.
Lawrence and Garner vs. Texas [539 US 558, 26 June 2003]
Facts:
Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police
entered John Geddes Lawrence’s apartment and saw him and another adult man,
Tyron Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Petitioners were arrested
and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding
two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. The two
were arrested, held in custody over night, and charged and convicted before a Justice
of the Peace. The two exercised their right to a trial de novo in Harris County
Criminal Court. They challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment and of a like provision of the Texas Constitution.
Those contentions were rejected. The two, having entered a plea of nolo contendere,
were each fined $200 and assessed court costs of $141.25. The Court of Appeals for
the Texas Fourteenth District considered the two accused’s federal constitutional
arguments under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. After hearing the case en banc the court, in a divided opinion, rejected
the constitutional arguments and affirmed the convictions. The majority opinion
indicated that the Court of Appeals considered the US Supreme Court decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick (478 US 186 [1986]), to be controlling on the federal due process
aspect of the case. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari (537 U. S. 1044 [2002],
to consider 3 questions: (1) whether the criminal convictions under the Texas
“Homosexual Conduct” law violate the 14th Amendment guarantee of equal
protection of laws; (2) Whether the criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual
intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the
Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment; and (3) Whether Bowers v. Hardwick
(478 US 186 [1986]), should be overruled.
Issue:
Whether the statute and the Bower decision denies homosexual persons the autonomy
of decisions involving relationships available to heterosexual ones.
Held:
The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no
more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have
more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct,
sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes do seek to
control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the
law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.
This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to
define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person
or abuse of an institution the law protects. It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults
may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their
own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one
element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the
Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice. Our laws and
tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. These
matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the 14th Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were
they formed under compulsion of the State. Persons in a homosexual relationship may
seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do. The decision in
Bowers would deny them this right. The case of Bowers was not correct when it was
decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers
v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled. Thus, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with the present opinion.
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan [GR 148560, 19 November 2001]
Facts:
On 4 April 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8
separate Information, docketed as: (a) Criminal Case 26558, for violation of Republic
Act (RA) 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Criminal Cases 26559 to 26562,
inclusive, for violation of Sections 3, paragraph (a), 3, paragraph (a), 3, paragraph (e),
and 3, paragraph (e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively;
(c) Criminal Case 26563, for violation of Section 7, paragraph (d), of RA 6713 (The
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d)
Criminal Case 26564, for Perjury (Article. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e)
Criminal Case 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (Commonwealth Act 142, as
amended by RA 6085). On 11 April 2001, Joseph Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion
for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with
respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Criminal Case 26558;
and, for reconsideration / reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b,"
and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other
documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. The grounds raised were only
lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration / reinvestigation of offenses, and
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges
and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that
Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder
Law. On 25 April 2001, the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in
Criminal Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of plunder
exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June
2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan. On 14
June 2001, Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case 26558 on the
ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the
law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended
Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 9 July 2001, the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
Issue:
Whether the Plunder law, and the information, are clear to inform Estrada of the
accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
Held:
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation.
Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions
required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable
certainty and particularity. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or
rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them
liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge
in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more
importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it
can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act
of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least
P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Section 1,
paragraph (d), of the Plunder Law. Herein, the amended Information itself closely
tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various
elements of the offense which Estrada is alleged to have committed. There was
nothing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse Estrada in his defense. Factual
assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and
provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such
unequivocal assertions, Estrada is completely informed of the accusations against him
as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense. There is no basis for Estrada's
claim that the Supreme Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its
entirety. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which
is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is
that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to
justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person
making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a
statute drawn with narrow specificity." This rationale does not apply to penal statutes.
Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence,
and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be
prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. The void-for-
vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of
an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of
law." The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental
purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." The doctrines of strict scrutiny,
overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes in free speech cases. "On its face" invalidation of statutes has been described
as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort,"
and is generally disfavored.
Tanada v. Tuvera [ GR L-63915, 29 December 1986]
Facts:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern (Section 6,
Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the principle that laws to be
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
effectively promulgated, Lorenzo M. Tañada, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and the
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. [MABINI]
sought a writ of mandamus to compel Hon. Juan C. Tuvera, in his capacity as
Executive Assistant to the President, Hon. Joaquin Venus, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President, Melquiades P. De La Cruz, in his capacity as
Director, Malacañang Records Office, and Florendo S. Pablo, in his capacity as
Director, Bureau of Printing, to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication to the Official
Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and
unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. The decision was
concurred only by 3 justices. Tanada, et. al. move for reconsideration / clarification of
the decision on various questions. They suggest that there should be no distinction
between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means
complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official
Gazette. The Solicitor General avers that the motion is a request for advisory opinion.
Meanwhile, the February EDSA Revolution took place, which subsequently required
the new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of
the Rules of Court).
Issue:
Whether laws should be published in full and in the Official Gazette only.
Held:
Omission of publication would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. it is not unlikely that persons not
aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a
failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence.
Publication is required, even if their enactment is “otherwise provided” or effective
immediately. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are
some that do not apply to them directly. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the
public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some
of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. Publication requirements applies
to (1) all statutes, including those of local application and private laws; (2)
presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise
of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or
directly conferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the
purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation;
(4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national
territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board
circulars to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce. Publication requirements does not apply to (1) interpretative regulations and
those merely internal in nature, i.e. regulating only the personnel of the administrative
agency and not the public; (2) Letters of Instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties; and (3) instructions of Ministry heads on case studies.
Further, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws. It should be published in the Official
Gazette and not elsewhere. Even if newspapers of general circulation could better
perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are
more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly, this kind of
publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law.
Philippine International Trading Corp. (PITC) v. Angeles [GR 108461, 21
October 1996]
Facts:
On 6 August 1973, the Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC) was
created as a government owned or controlled corporation under Presidential Decree
(PD) 252. On 9 May 1977, PD 1071 revised the provisions of PD 252, where the
purposes and powers of the said governmental entity were enumerated under Sections
5 and 6 thereof. On 9 August 1976, the late President Ferdinand Marcos issued Letter
of Instruction (LOI) 444, directing, inter alia, that trade (export or import of all
commodities) between the Philippines and any of the Socialist and other Centrally
Planned Economy Countries (SOCPEC), including the People's Republic of China
(PROC) shall be undertaken or coursed through the PITC. After the EDSA
Revolution, or more specifically on 27 February 1987, then President Corazon C.
Aquino promulgated Executive Order (EO) 133 reorganizing the DTI empowering the
said department to be the "primary coordinative, promotive, facilitative and regulatory
arm of the government for the country's trade, industry and investment activities." The
PITC was made one of DTI's line agencies. Sometime in April 1988, following the
State visit of President Aquino to the PROC, the Philippines and PROC entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) wherein the two countries agreed to make
joint efforts within the next five years to expand bilateral trade and to strive for a
steady progress towards achieving a balance between the value of their imports and
exports during the period. Conformably with the MOU, the Philippines and PROC
entered into a Trade Protocol for the years 1989, 1990 and 1991, under which was
specified the commodities to be traded between them. On August 1989, PITC issued
Administrative Order (AO) SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which, applications to the PITC
for importation from China (PROC) must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed
Export Program of Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the importer himself
or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer in an amount equivalent to the value of
the importation from PROC being applied for or 1:1 ratio. Remington Industrial Sales
Corp. and Firestone Ceramics, both domestic corporations, organized and existing
under Philippine-laws, individually applied for authority to import from PROC with
PITC. They were granted such authority. Subsequently, for failing to comply with
their undertakings to submit export credits equivalent to the value of their
importations, further import applications were withheld by PITC from Remington and
Firestone, such that the latter were both barred from importing goods from PROC. On
20 January 1992, Remington filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus, with
prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against PITC in the Regional Trial Court (RTC, Makati Branch 58). On 4
January 1993, Judge Zosimo Z. Angeles (Presiding Judge) upheld the petition for
prohibition and mandamus of Remington and Firestone (Civil Case 92-158), and
declaring PITC AO SOCPEC 89-08-01 and its regulations null, void, and
unconstitutional. PITC filed the petition seeking the reversal of Angeles’ decision.
Issue: Whether AO SOCPEC 89-08-01 binds Remington and Firestone.
Held:
The PITC was legally empowered to issue Administrative Orders, as a valid exercise
of a power ancillary to legislation. Administrative Order SOCPEC 89-08-01 is not,
however, a valid exercise of such quasi-legislative power. The original AO issued on
30 August 1989, under which the respondents filed their applications for importation,
was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The
questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid within the
context of Article 2 of Civil Code. The AO under consideration is one of those
issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce
and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., PD 1071, in relation
to LOI 444 and EO 133. It was only on 30 March 1992 when the amendments to the
said Administrative Order were filed in the UP Law Center, and published in the
National Administrative Register as required by the Administrative Code of 1987.The
fact that the amendments to AO SOCPEC 89 08-01 were filed with, and published by
the UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register, does not cure the defect
related to the effectivity of the Administrative Order. Further, the Administrative
Order, without force and effect due to the lack of publication, thus cannot exact any
obligation from Remington and Firestone, specifically, charges for the 0.5% Counter
Export Development Service.
Republic vs. Express Telecommunications Co. Inc. (Extelcom) [GR 147096, 15
January 2002]
Facts:
On 29 December 1992, the International Communications Corporation (now Bayan
Telecommunications, Inc. or Bayantel) filed an application with the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for a Certificate of Public Convenience or
Necessity (CPCN, NTC Case 92-486) to install, operate and maintain a digital
Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a Provisional
Authority (PA). Shortly thereafter, or on 22 January 1993, the NTC issued
Memorandum Circular 4-1-93 directing all interested applicants for nationwide or
regional CMTS to file their respective applications before the Commission on or
before 15 February 1993, and deferring the acceptance of any application filed after
said date until further orders. On 6 May 1993, and prior to the issuance of any notice
of hearing by the NTC with respect to Bayantel's original application, Bayantel filed
an urgent ex-parte motion to admit an amended application. On 17 May 1993, the
notice of hearing issued by the NTC with respect to this amended application was
published in the Manila Chronicle. Copies of the application as well as the notice of
hearing were mailed to all affected parties. Subsequently, hearings were conducted on
the amended application. But before Bayantel could complete the presentation of its
evidence, the NTC issued an Order dated 19 December 1993 stating that in view of
the recent grant of 2 separate Provisional Authorities in favor of ISLACOM and
GMCR, Inc., which resulted in the closing out of all available frequencies for the
service being applied for by Bayantel, and in order that the case may not remain
pending for an indefinite period of time, the case was ordered archived without
prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency becomes available.
On 17 May 1999, Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Revive Case, citing the
availability of new frequency bands for CMTS operators. On 1 February 2000, the
NTC granted BayanTel's motion to revive the latter's application and set the case for
hearings on February 9, 10, 15, 17 and 22, 2000. The NTC noted that the application
was ordered archived without prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite
frequency shall become available. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc. (Extelcom)
filed in NTC Case 92-486 an Opposition (With Motion to Dismiss) praying for the
dismissal of Bayantel's application; arguing that Bayantel's motion sought the revival
of an archived application filed almost 8 years ago, and thus, the documentary
evidence and the allegations of Bayantel in said application are all outdated and
should no longer be used as basis of the necessity for the proposed CMTS service. On
3 May 2000, the NTC issued an Order granting in favor of Bayantel a provisional
authority to operate CMTS service, applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1978 Rules of
Practice and Procedure. Extelcom filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari and prohibition (CA-GR SP 58893), seeking the annulment of the Order
reviving the application of Bayantel, the Order granting Bayantel a provisional
authority to construct, install, operate and maintain a nationwide CMTS, and
Memorandum Circular 9-3-2000 allocating frequency bands to new public
telecommunication entities which are authorized to install, operate and maintain
CMTS. On 13 September 2000, the Court of Appeals granted the writs of certiorari
and prohibition prayed for, annulling and setting aside the NTC orders dated 1
February and 3 May 2000 in NTC Case 92-486, dismissing Bayantel's Amended
Application without prejudice to the filing of a new CMTS application. Bayantel and
the NTC, the latter being represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision. On the other hand, Extelcom
filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, praying that NTC Memorandum Circular
9-3- 2000 be also declared null and void. On 9 February 2001, the Court of Appeals
issued a resolution denying all of the motions for reconsideration of the parties for
lack of merit. Hence, the
NTC and Bayantel filed their petitions for review on certiorari (GR 147096, and GR
147210 respectively). In the present petition, Extelcom contends, among others, that
the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules which were filed with the Office of
the National Administrative Register on 3 February 1993. These Revised Rules
deleted the phrase "on its own initiative;" accordingly, a provisional authority may be
issued only upon filing of the proper motion before the Commission. The NTC, on the
other hand, issued a certification to the effect that inasmuch as the 1993 Revised Rules
have not been published in a newspaper of general circulation, the NTC has been
applying the 1978 Rules.
Issue:
Whether the 1978 or 1993 NTC Rules of Practice and Procedure should govern in the
approval of Bayantel’s application.
Held:
The absence of publication, coupled with the certification by the Commissioner of the
NTC stating that the NTC was still governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly indicate that
the 1993 Revised Rules have not taken effect at the time of the grant of the provisional
authority to Bayantel. The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP
Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the
Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP
Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. The National
Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules and it is furnished only
to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts, the National Library,
other public offices or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a
price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs. Still, publication
in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua
non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect. The Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the NTC, which implements Section 29 of the Public Service Act
(Commonwealth Act 146, as amended), fall squarely within the scope of these laws,
as explicitly mentioned in the case Tañada v. Tuvera. Administrative rules and
regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative regulations,
those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties. Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should
be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation before it
can take effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself mandates that said Rules shall take
effect only after their publication in a newspaper of general circulation. In the absence
of such publication, therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that governs.
Tanada v. Philippine Atomic Energy Commission [GR 70632, 11 February 1986]
Facts:
The Official Philippine Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) pamphlet, entitled "The
Philippine Nuclear Power Plant-1" was published in 1985 when Commissioners
Manuel Eugenio, Quirino Navarro, and Alejandro Ver Albano had already been
appointed to their present positions. Other pamphlets entitled "Nuclear Power – Safe,
Clean, Economical, and Available," and “Nuclear Power Plant and Environmental
Safety” were issued earlier, but the majority of the Commissioners even then were
already occupying positions of responsibility in the PAEC. Commissioner Eugenio
was Acting Chief of the PAEC Department on Nuclear Technology and Engineering
from June, 1980 to July, 1984; Commissioner Navarro was PAEC Chief Science
Research Specialist from May, 1980 to September, 1984; and Commissioner Albano
was PAEC Deputy Commissioner from March, 1980 to September, 1984. These
pamphlets continued to be distributed by PAEC as late as March 1985. Their official
distribution continued after the filing of National Power Corporation (Napocor)'s
motion for conversion on 27 June 1984 and even after PAEC had issued its order
dated 26 February 1985 formally admitting the said motion for conversion. In GR
70632, the competence of the PAEC Commissioners to pass judgment on the safety of
the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant-1 (PNPP-1) was questioned; (2) the validity of
Napocor's motion/application for the conversion of its construction permit into an
operating license for PNPP-1 was assailed, and (3) PAEC Commissioners were
charged with bias and prejudgment.
Issue:
Whether the PAEC Commissioner may sit in judgment in determining the safety of
PNPP-1.
Held:
The PAEC Commissioners would be acting with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction were they to sit in judgment upon the safety of the plant, absent
the requisite objectivity that must characterize such an important inquiry because they
already have prejudged the safety of PNPP- 1. The PAEC Commissioners cannot
escape responsibility from the official pamphlets, which clearly indicate the
prejudgment that PNPP-1 is safe. The official distribution of the pamphlets continued
when the Commissioners had already been appointed to their present positions and
and even after PAEC had issued its order dated 26 February 1985 formally admitting
Napocor’s motion for conversion.
Anzaldo v. Clave [GR L-54597, 15 December 1982]
Facts:
In 1974, the position of Science Research Supervisor II (Medical Research
Department) became vacant when the incumbent, Dr. Kintanar, became Director of
the Biological Research Center of the National Institute of Science and Technology
(NIST) . Dr. Anzaldo and Dr. Venzon were both next-in-rank to the vacant position,
both holding positions of Scientist Research Associate IV. Dr. Anzaldo finished BS
Pharmacy (1950, College of Pharmacy, UP), and MS Pharmacy (1962, CEU), Doctor
of Pharmacy (1965, CEU). Aside from her civil service eligibility as a pharmacist, she
is a registered medical technologist and supervisor (unassembled). She started
working in the NIST in 1954 and has served for 28 years. On the other hand, Dr.
Venzon finished Medicine (1957, UST) . She started working in the NIST in 1960 and
has served for 21 years. Dr. Anzaldo is senior to her in point of service. Dr. Quintin
Kintanar recommended Dr. Venzon for the position. Dr. Anzaldo protested against
such recommendation, to which the NIST Reorganization Committee found such
protest to be valid and meritorious. Due to the impasse, the NIST Commissioner,
however, did not resolve the issue. The position was not filled up. Dr. Pedro Afable,
Vice Chairman, later became OIC of the NIST. He appointed Dr. Anzaldo to the
position effective 4 January 1978, after thorough study and screening of the
qualifications of both doctors and upon recommendation of the NIST Staff Evaluation
(88-61 votes). The Civil Service Commission approved the appointment. Dr. Venzon
appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines (addressed to Presidential
Executive Assistant Jacobo Clave, who was concurrently the Chairman of the CSC).
The appeal was forwarded to the NIS OIC Jose P. Planas, who reiterated Dr. Afable’s
decision. The appeal-protest was later sent to the CSC. CSC Chairman Clave and
Commissioner Jose A. Melo recommended In Resolution 1178 dated 23 August 1979
that Dr. Venzon be appointed to the position, in conflict with the 1978 appointment of
Dr. Anzaldo which was duly attested and approved by the CSC. The Resolution was
made in pursuance to Section 19(6) of the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines (PD
807, 6 October 1975), which provides that "before deciding a contested appointment,
the Office of the President shall consult the Civil Service Commission." On 5 January
1980, after denial of her motion for the reconsideration of the resolution, Dr. Anzaldo
appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines. Presidential Executive
Assistant Clave in his decision of 20 March 1980 revoked Dr. Anzaldo's appointment
and ruled that, "as recommended by the Civil Service Commission" (meaning
Chairman Clave himself and Commissioner Melo), Dr. Venzon should be appointed
to the contested position but that Dr. Anzaldo's appointment to the said position
should be considered "valid and effective during the pendency" of Dr. Venzon's
protest. In a resolution dated 14 August 1980, Presidential Executive Assistant Clave
denied Dr. Anzaldo's motion for reconsideration. On 25 August 1980, Dr. Anzaldo
filed in the Supreme Court the special civil action of certiorari.
Issue:
Whether CSC Commissioner Jacobo Clave can concur with the recommendation of
the Presidential Executive Assistant, who is himself, in the appointment of Dr.
Venzon.
Held:
The 20 March 1980 decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Clave implemented
the 23 August 1979 Resolution (1178) of Clave (as CSC Chairman), concurred with
by Commissioner Melo, recommending the appointment of Dr. Venzon as Science
Research Supervisor II in place of Dr. Anzaldo. When Presidential Executive
Assistant Clave said in his decision that he was "inclined to concur in the
recommendation of the Civil Service Commission", what he meant was that he was
concurring with Chairman Clave's recommendation: he was concurring with himself .
It is evident that Doctor Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential
Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of Chairman Clave of
the Civil Service Commission (See also Zambales Chromite Mining Co. vs. Court of
Appeals). Common sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in the Civil
Service Commission, who should be consulted by the Office of the President, should
be a person different from the person in the Office of the President who would decide
the appeal of the protestant in a contested appointment.
Tumey vs. Ohio [273 US 510, 7 March 1927]
Facts:
Tumey was arrested at White Oak, and was brought before Mayor Pugh, of the village
of North College Hill, charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor. He
moved for his dismissal because of the disqualification of the mayor to try him under
the 14th Amendment. The mayor denied the motion, proceeded to the trial, convicted
Tumey of unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor within Hamilton county as
charged, fined him $100, and ordered that he be imprisoned until the fine and costs
were paid. Tumey obtained a bill of exceptions and carried the case on error to the
court of common pleas of Hamilton county. That court heard the case and reversed the
judgment, on the ground that the mayor was disqualified as claimed. The state sought
review by the Court of Appeals of the First Appellate District of Ohio, which reversed
the common pleas and affirmed the judgment of the mayor. On 4 May 1926, the state
Supreme Court refused Tumey's application to require the Court of Appeals to certify
its record in the case. Tumey then filed a petition in error in that court as of right,
asking that the judgment of the mayor's court and of the appellate court be reversed on
constitutional grounds. On 11 May 1926, the Supreme Court adjudged that the petition
be dismissed for the reason that no debatable constitutional question was involved in
the cause. The judgment was then brought to the US Supreme Court upon a writ of
error allowed by the Chief Justice of the state Supreme Court, to which it was rightly
directed.
Issue:
Whether the pecuniary interest of the Mayor and his village, and the system of courts
in prosecuting violations of the Prohibition Act, renders the mayor disqualified from
hearing the case.
Held:
All questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus
matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would seem
generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion. But it certainly violates the
14th Amendment and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law to
subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court, the judge of which has a
direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in
his case. Herein, the mayor has authority, which he exercised in the case, to order that
the person sentenced to pay a fine shall remain in prison until the fine and costs are
paid. The mayor thus has a direct personal pecuniary interest in convicting the
defendant who came before him for trial, in the $12 of costs imposed in his behalf,
which he would not have received if the defendant had been acquitted. This was not
exceptional, but was the result of the normal operation of the law and the ordinance.
The system by which an inferior judge is paid for his service only when he convicts
the defendant has not become so embedded by custom in the general practice, either at
common law or in this country, that it can be regarded as due process of law, unless
the costs usually imposed are so small that they may be properly ignored as within the
maxim "de minimis non curat lex." The Court cannot regard the prospect of receipt or
loss of such an emolument in each case as a minute, remote, trifling, or insignificant
interest. It is certainly not fair to each defendant brought before the mayor for the
careful and judicial consideration of his guilt or innocence that the prospect of such a
prospective loss by the mayor should weigh against his acquittal. But the pecuniary
interest of the mayor in the result of his judgment is not the only reason for holding
that due process of law is denied to the defendant here. The statutes were drawn to
stimulate small municipalities, in the country part of counties in which there are large
cities, to organize and maintain courts to try persons accused of violations of the
Prohibition Act everywhere in the county. The inducement is offered of dividing
between the state and the village the large fines provided by the law for its violations.
The trial is to be had before a mayor without a jury, without opportunity for retrial,
and with a review confined to questions of law presented by a bill of exceptions, with
no opportunity by the reviewing court to set aside the judgment on the weighing of
evidence, unless it should appear to be so manifestly against the evidence as to
indicate mistake, bias, or willful disregard of duty by the trial court. Thus, no matter
what the evidence was against him, the defendant had the right to have an impartial
judge. He seasonably raised the objection, and was entitled to halt the trial because of
the disqualification of the judge, which existed both because of his direct pecuniary
interest in the outcome, and because of his official motive to convict and to graduate
the fine to help the financial needs of the village. There were thus presented at the
outset both features of the disqualification. The judgment of the Supreme Court of
Ohio is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
the present opinion.
People v. CA [GR 118882, 26 September 1996]
Facts:
The are no preliminary facts provided regarding CA-GR SP No. 31733, "People vs.
Hon. Pedro S. Espina et al." (in Court of Appeals), Criminal Case 93-01-38, "People
vs. Cristeta Reyes, et al.," and Criminal Case 93-01-39, "People of the Philippines vs.
Jane C. Go" (both in RTC branch presided by Judge Pedro Espina, Branch 7, RTC,
8th Judicial Region: Tacloban) in the present resolution; except the fact that Jane Go
is the principal accused in the killing of her husband Dominador Go. The Office of the
Solicitor General filed a petition for review with urgent prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order to annul and set aside the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP 31733 in so far as it denied People’s prayer for the
inhibition of Judge Espina in hearing Criminal cases 93-01- 38 and 93-01-39, and
enjoining the judge from conducting further proceedings in such criminal cases,
before the Supreme Court. On 3 April 1995, the Court resolved to require Cristeta
Reyes and Roger Doctora, Johny Santos and Antonio Alegro, and Jane C. Go to
comment within 10 days from notice, to issue the temporary restraining order prayed
for, and to enjoin Judge Pedro S. Espina from taking further action in Criminal Cases
93-01-38 and 93-01-39 until further orders from the Court. Reyes, Doctora, Santos,
Alegro, and Go failed to file their respective comments within the reglementary
period, nor within the second deadline. As the latter are already in detention and that
sanction relating to delay in the submission of the comments may not amount to
much, and as not to unduly delay the disposition of Criminal Cases 93-01-38 and 93-
01-39, the Court resolved to dispense with the latter's comments and to proceed with
the disposition of the petition.
Issue:
Whether the decision of a Judge favorable to the accused in a different special civil
proceeding is enough basis to render the Judge to be partial or bias in the present
criminal case.
Held:
One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a judicial proceeding is
that there must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear
and determine the matter before it. Thus, every litigant, including the State, is entitled
to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The judge must not only be impartial but
must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision
will be just. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a
judge who shall give them justice. They must believe in his sense of fairness,
otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Due process is intended to insure that
confidence by requiring compliance with the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for
equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already
committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be
formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing.
The Judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the
arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law. Herein,
Judge Pedro Espina cannot be considered to adequately possess such cold neutrality of
an impartial judge as to fairly assess both the evidence to be adduced by the
prosecution and the defense in view of his previous decision in Special Civil Action
92-11-219 wherein he enjoined the preliminary investigation at the Regional State
Prosecutor's Office level against Jane Go, the principal accused in the killing of her
husband Dominador Go. Judge Espina's decision in favor of Jane Go serves as
sufficient and reasonable basis for the prosecution to seriously doubt his impartiality
in handling the criminal cases. It would have been more prudent for Judge Espina to
have voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the criminal cases.
Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan [GR 103501-03, 17 February 1997]
Facts:
Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the
president's office and in cash what the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA)
owes the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to the 7
January 1985 memorandum of then Minister Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin.
Tabuena agreed. About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa -Gimenez,
then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated 8 January 1986
reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction. In obedience to President
Marcos' verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo G.
Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by
means of three (3) withdrawals. On 10 January 1986, the first withdrawal was made
for P25 Million, following a letter of even date signed by Tabuena and Dabao
requesting the PNB extension office at the MIAA the depository branch of MIAA
funds, to issue a manager's check for said amount payable to Tabuena. The check was
encashed, however, at the PNB Villamor Branch. Dabao and the cashier of the PNB
Villamor branch counted the money after which, Tabuena took delivery thereof. The
P25 Million in cash was delivered on the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez.
Mrs. Gimenez did not issue any receipt for the money received. Similar circumstances
surrounded the second withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another P25 Million,
made on 16 January 1986. The third and last withdrawal was made on 31 January
1986 for P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuena's co-signatory to the letter- request for a
manager's check for this amount. Peralta accompanied Tabuena to the PNB Villamor
branch as Tabuena requested him to do the counting of the P5 Million. After the
counting, the money was loaded in the trunk of Tabuena's car. Peralta did not go with
Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs. Gimenez' office. It was only upon delivery of
the P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts she received
from Tabuena. The receipt was dated January 30, 1986. Tabuena and Peralta were
charged for malversation of funds, while Dabao remained at large. One of the justices
of the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a defense witness and of
the accused themselves; the volume of the questions asked were more the combined
questions of the counsels. On 12 October 1990, they were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Tabuena and Peralta filed separate petitions for review, appealing
the Sandiganbayan decision dated 12 October 19990 and the Resolution of 20
December 1991.
Issue:
Whether Tabuena and Peralta were denied due process by the active participation of a
Sandiganbayan justice in the questioning witnesses in the trial.
Held:
Due process requires no less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Bolstering
this requirement, we have added that the judge must not only be impartial but must
also appear to be impartial, to give added assurance to the parties that his decision will
be just. The parties are entitled to no less than this, as a minimum guaranty of due
process. Our courts should refrain from showing any semblance of one-sided or more
or less partial attitude in order not to create any false impression in the minds of the
litigants. For obvious reasons, it is the bounden duty of all to strive for the
preservation of the people's faith in our courts. Respect for the Constitution is more
important than securing a conviction based on a violation of the rights of the accused.
The Court was struck by the way the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the
questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves, as shown in the
records. The volume of questions hurled by the Sandiganbayan was more the
combined questions of the counsels. More importantly, the questions of the court were
in the nature of cross examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and
insinuation. We have not adopted in this country the practice of making the presiding
judge the chief inquisitor. It is better to observe our time-honored custom of orderly
judicial procedure, even at the expense of occasional delays. The impartiality of the
judge; his avoidance of the appearance of becoming the advocate of either one side or
the other of the pending controversy is a fundamental and essential rule of special
importance in criminal cases.
People v. Medenilla [GR 131638-39, 26 March 2001]
Facts:
On 16 April 1996, Loreto Medenilla y Doria was caught for illegal possession and
unlawfully selling 5.08g of shabu (Criminal Case 3618-D), was in unlawful
possession of 4 transparent plastic bags of shabu weighing 200.45g (Criminal Case
3619-D) in Mandaluyong City. Versions of facts leading to the arrest are conflicting;
the prosecution alleging buy-bust operations, while defense claim illegal arrest, search
and seizure. Arraigned on 25 June 1996, Medenilla pleaded not guilty. The judge
therein, for the purpose of clarification, propounded a question upon a witness during
the trial. On 26 November 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig (Branch 262) found
Medenilla, in Criminal Cases 3618-D and 3619-D, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Sections 15 and 16 of RA 6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972).
Issue:
Whether judges are allowed to asked clarificatory questions.
Held:
A single noted instance of questioning cannot justify a claim that the trial judge was
biased. The Court have exhaustively examined the transcript of stenographic notes and
determined that the trial judge was more than equitable in presiding over the hearings
of this case. Moreover, a judge is not prohibited from propounding clarificatory
questions on a witness if the purpose of which is to arrive at a proper and just
determination of the case. “The trial judge must be accorded a reasonable leeway in
putting such questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts to make
the record speak the truth. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions
he propounds happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of one
party.
Webb v. de Leon [GR 121234, 23 August 1995]
Facts:
This was a highly-publicized case (dubbed as Vizconde Massacre, and involves a son
of a Philippine Senator). On 19 June 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a letter-complaint charging petitioners
Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian. Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons, with the
crime of Rape with Homicide. Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors
headed by Assistant Chief State prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño to conduct the
preliminary investigation of those charged with the rape and killing on 30 June 1991
of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizoonde, and sister Anne
Marie Jennifer in their home at Parañaque. During the preliminary investigation, the
NBI presented the sworn statements of Maria Jessica Alfaro, 2 former housemaids of
the Webb family, Carlos Cristobal (a plane passenger), Lolita Birrer (live -in partner
of Biong), 2 of Vizconde’s maids, Normal White (a security guard) and Manciano
Gatmaitan (an engineer). The NBI also submitted the autopsy report involving
Estrellita (12 stab wounds), Carmela (9 stab wounds), and Jennifer (19 stab wounds);
and the genital examination of Carmela confirming the presence of spermatozoa. The
NBI submitted photocopies of the documents requested by Webb in his Motion for
Production and Examination of Evidence and Documents, granted by the DOJ Panel.
Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not commit the crime
as he went to the United States on 1 March 1991 and returned to the Philippines on 27
October 1992. The others — Fernandez, Gatchalian, Lejano, Estrada, Rodriguez and
Biong — submitted sworn statements, responses, and a motion to dismiss denying
their complicity in the rape-killing of the Vizcondes. Only Filart and Ventura failed to
file their counter-affidavits though they were served with subpoena in their last known
address. On 8 August 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution "finding
probable cause to hold respondents for trial" and recommending that an Information
for rape with homicide be filed against Webb, et. al. On the same date, it filed the
corresponding Information against Webb, et. al. with the RTC Parañaque. Docketed as
Criminal Case 95-404 and raffled to Branch 258 presided by Judge Zosimo V.
Escano. It was, however, Judge Raul de Leon, pairing judge of Judge Escano, who
issued the warrants of arrest against Webb, et. al. On 11 August 1995, Judge Escano
voluntarily inhibited himself from the case to avoid any suspicion about his
impartiality considering his employment with the NBI before his appointment to the
bench. The case was re-raffled to branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino
who issued new warrants of arrest against Webb, et. al. On 11 August 1995, Webb
voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities at Camp Ricardo Papa Sr., in Taguig.
Webb, et. al. filed petitions for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court to: (1) annul and set aside the
Warrants of Arrest issued against petitioners by respondent Judges Raul E. de Leon
and Amelita Tolentino in Criminal Case No. 95-404; (2) enjoin the respondents from
conducting any proceeding in the aforementioned criminal case; and (3) dismiss said
criminal case or include Jessica Alfaro as one of the accused therein. Gatchalian and
Lejano likewise gave themselves up to the authorities after filing their petitions before
the Court.
Issue:
Whether the attendant publicity of the case deprived Webb, et.al, of their right to fair
trial.
Held:
Pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an
accused of his due process right to fair trial. Herein, however, nothing in the records
that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation
of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. The DOJ
Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State
Prosecutors; and their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider
in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. At
no instance in the case did Webb, et. al. seek the disqualification of any member of the
DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial
publicity. Further , on the contention of the denial of their constitutional right to due
process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation, records show that the
DOJ Panel did not conduct the preliminary investigation with indecent haste. Webb,
et. al. were given fair opportunity to prove lack of probable cause against them. Still,
the Supreme Court reminds a trial judge in high profile criminal cases of his/her duty
to control publicity prejudicial to the fair administration of justice. The ability to
dispense impartial justice is an issue in every trial and in every criminal prosecution,
the judiciary always stands as a silent accused. More than convicting the guilty and
acquitting the innocent, the business of the judiciary is to assure fulfillment of the
promise that justice shall be done and is done, and that is the only way for the
judiciary to get an acquittal from the bar of public opinion.
People v. Sanchez [GR 121039-45, 18 October 2001]
Facts:
(The Sarmenta-Gomez rape- slay) On 28 June 1993, Luis and Rogelio "Boy"
Corcolon approached Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez, forcibly took the two and
loaded them at the back of the latter's van, which was parked in front of Café Amalia,
Agrix Complex, Los Banos, Laguna. George Medialdea, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion
and Pepito Kawit also boarded the van while Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio
Malabanan, who were also with the group, stayed in the ambulance. Both vehicles
then headed for Erais Farm situated in Barangay Curba, which was owned by Mayor
Antonio Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna. The two youngsters were then brought inside
the resthouse where Eileen was taken to the Mayor’s room. Allan was badly beaten up
by Luis, Boy, Ama and Medialdea and thereafter thrown out of the resthouse. At
around 1:00 a.m. of the next day, a crying Eileen was dragged out of the resthouse by
Luis and Medialdea – her hair disheveled, mouth covered by a handkerchief, hands
still tied and stripped of her shorts. Eileen and Allan were then loaded in the Tamaraw
van by Medialdea, et. al. and headed for Calauan, followed closely by the ambulance.
En route to Calauan, gunfire was heard from the van. The van pulled over whereupon
Kawit dragged Allan, whose head was already drenched in blood, out of the vehicle
onto the road and finished him off with a single gunshot from his armalite. The
ambulance and van then sped away. Upon reaching a sugarcane field in Sitio Paputok,
Kilometro 74 of Barangay Mabacan, Eileen was gang-raped by Luis Corcolon,
Medialdea, Rogelio Corcolon, Ama, Brion and Kawit. After Kawit’s turn, Luis
Corcolon shot Eileen with his baby armalite. Moments later, all 8 men boarded the
ambulance and proceeded to Calauan, leaving the Tamaraw van with Eileen’s remains
behind. Initially, the crime was attributed to one Kit Alqueza, a son of a feared general
(Dictador Alqueza). Luis and Rogelio Corcolon were also implicated therein.
However, further investigation, and forensic findings, pointed to the group of Mayor
Sanchez. Centeno and Malabanan bolstered the prosecution's theory. On 11 March
1995, Judge Harriet O. Demetriou of the Regional Trial Court (Pasig City, Branch 70)
found Mayor Sanchez, Medialdea, Ama, Brion, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon and
Kawit guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, ordering
them to pay Eileen Sarmenta the amount of P50,000 and additionally, the amount of
P700,000.00 to the heirs of Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez as additional
indemnity. On 25 January 1999, the Supreme Court, through Justice Martinez,
affirmed in toto the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court. Antonio
Sanchez, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit seasonably filed their
respective motions for reconsideration. The Office of the Solicitor General filed its
Comment on 6 December 1999. Sanchez avers that he is a victim of trial and
conviction by publicity, besides claims that principal witness Centeno and Malabanan
lack credibility, that the testimony of his 13-year old daughter should have been given
full faith and credit, and that the gargantuan damages awarded have no factual and
legal bases. Ama, Brion and Kawit maintain that Centeno and Malabanan were
sufficiently impeached by their inconsistent statements pertain to material and crucial
points of the events at issue, besides that independent and disinterested witnesses have
destroyed the prosecution’s version of events. On 2 February 1999, Justice Martinez
retired in accordance with AM 99-8-09. The motions for reconsideration was assigned
to Justice Melo for study and preparation of the appropriate action on 18 September
2001.
Issue:
Whether the publicity of the case impaired the impartiality of the judge handling the
case.
Held:
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The
mere fact that the trial of Mayor Sanchez, et. al., was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-
gavel coverage does not by itself prove that publicity so permeated the mind of the
trial judge and impaired his impartiality. The right of an accused to a fair trial is not
incompatible to a free press. Responsible reporting enhances an accused's right to a
fair trial. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against
the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes
to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Our judges are learned in the law and
trained to disregard off-court evidence and on camera performances of parties to a
litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se
fatally infect their impartiality. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there
must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced by the
barrage of publicity. Records herein do not show that the trial judge developed actual
bias against Mayor Sanchez, et. al., as a consequence of the extensive media coverage
of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not
prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed position as a result of prejudicial publicity
which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Mayor
Sanchez, et. al., has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the
burden.
Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita [GR 130442, 6 April 2000]
Facts:
On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, with his aide,
PO2 Java, in the front seat and his wife with two ladies at the backseat, were
overtaken by a Mazda pick-up owned by Congressman Manuel Puey and driven by
one Reynaldo Consejo with four (4) passengers in the persons of Alex Edwin del
Rosario, Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristina Dawa. After the Mazda pick-up
has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, and after a vehicular collision almost took place, it
accelerated speed and proceeded to Hacienda Aimee, a sugarcane plantation owned by
the congressman. The red Cortina Ford followed also at high speed until it reached the
hacienda where Torcita and Java alighted and the confrontation with del Rosario and
Jesus Puey occurred. Torcita identified himself but the same had no effect. PO2 Java
whispered to him that there are armed men around them and that it is dangerous for
them to continue. That at this point, they radioed for back-up. Torcita,upon the arrival
of the back-up force of PNP Cadiz City, proceeded to the place where Capt. Jesus
Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario were. On 6 July 1994, 12 verified administrative
complaints were filed against Torcita for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer,
Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of
Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban. The 12 administrative complaints
were consolidated into 1 major complaint for conduct unbecoming of a police officer.
The Summary Dismissal Board, however, did not find sufficient evidence to establish
that Torcita threatened anybody with a gun, nor that a serious confrontation took place
between the parties, nor that the urinating incident took place, and held that the
charges of violation of domicile and illegal search were not proven. Still, while the
Board found that Torcita was "in the performance of his official duties" when the
incident happened, he allegedly committed a simple irregularity in performance of
duty (for being in the influence of alcohol while in performance of duty) and was
suspended for 20 days and salary suspended for the same period of time. Torcita
appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the Philippine National
Police (PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City), but the appeal was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. Whereupon, Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City (Branch 31), questioning the legality of the conviction of an
offense for which he was not charged (lack of procedural due process of law). The
Board filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. The RTC granted the petition for
certiorari and annulled the dispositive portion of the questioned decision insofar as it
found Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in the performance of duty. The Board
appealed from the RTC decision, by petition of review to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the same for the reason that the respondent could not have been guilty of
irregularity considering that the 12 cases were eventually dismissed. The Board filed
the petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether Torcita may be proceeded against or suspended for breach of internal
discipline, when the original charges against him were for Conduct Unbecoming of a
Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile,
and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban.
Held:
Notification of the charges contemplates that the respondent be informed of the
specific charges against him. The absence of specification of the offense for which he
was eventually found guilty is not a proper observance of due process. There can be
no short-cut to the legal process. While the definition of the more serious offense is
broad, and almost all -encompassing a finding of guilt for an offense, no matter how
light, for which one is not properly charged and tried cannot be countenanced without
violating the rudimentary requirements of due process. Herein, the 12 administrative
cases filed against Torcita did not include charges or offenses mentioned or made
reference to the specific act of being drunk while in the performance of official duty.
There is no indication or warning at all in the summary dismissal proceedings that
Torcita was also being charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking
alcoholic drinks while in the performance of his duties. The omission is fatal to the
validity of the judgment finding him guilty of the offense for which he was not
notified nor charged. Further, the cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that
Torcita "committed breach of internal discipline by taking drinks while in the
performance of same" should have been substantiated by factual findings referring to
this particular offense. Even if he was prosecuted for irregular performance of duty, he
could not have been found to have the odor or smell of alcohol while in the
performance of duty because he was not on duty at the time that he had a taste of
liquor; he was on a private trip fetching his wife.
Justice Secretary v. Lantion [GR 139465, 17 October 2000]
Facts:
On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree
1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed
Crimes in a Foreign Country". On 13 November 1994, then Secretary of Justice
Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America. "The Senate, by
way of Resolution 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It
also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a),
Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition
request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the
requested state resident in the Requesting State). On 18 June 1999, the Department of
Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale 0522
containing a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States.
Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest
issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting
documents for said extradition. Jimenez was charged in the United States for violation
of (a) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States, 2
counts), (b) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts), (c) 18 USC 1343
(Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 2 counts), (d) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or
entries, 6 counts), and (E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33
counts). On the same day, the Secretary issued Department Order 249 designating and
authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending
evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez (on 1 July 1999)
requested copies of the official extradition request from the US Government, as well
as all documents and papers submitted therewith, and that he be given ample time to
comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers.
The Secretary denied the request. On 6 August 1999, Jimenez filed with the Regional
Trial Court a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel the
Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez the extradition documents, to give him access
thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition
request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively);
certiorari (to set aside the Justice Secretary’s letter dated 13 July 1999); and
prohibition (to restrain the Justice Secretary from considering the extradition request
and from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition
of Jimenez to the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court ruled in favor of
Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. On 18
January 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered
the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his
comment with supporting evidence. On 3 February 2000, the Secretary timely filed an
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether Jimenez had the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an
extradition process.
Held:
Presidential Decree (PD) 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty
provides the time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for
extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for
extradition in the extradition court (Section 6). It is of judicial notice that the
summons includes the petition for extradition which will be answered by the
extraditee. There is no provision in the Treaty and in PD 1069 which gives an
extraditee the right to demand from the Justice Secretary copies of the extradition
request from the US government and its supporting documents and to comment
thereon while the request is still undergoing evaluation. The DFA and the DOJ, as
well as the US government, maintained that the Treaty and PD 1069 do not grant the
extraditee a right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an extradition
process. It is neither an international practice to afford a potential extraditee with a
copy of the extradition papers during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
Jimenez is, thus, bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the extradition
process’ evaluation stage. Further, as an extradition proceeding is not criminal in
character and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a
preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily
apply to the former. The procedural due process required by a given set of
circumstances "must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the
government function involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action." The concept of due process is flexible for "not all situations
calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure." Thus, the
temporary hold on Jimenez's privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his
right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he
decide to resist the request for his extradition to the US. There is no denial of due
process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.
People v. Estrada [GR 130487, 19 June 2000]
Facts:
On 27 December 27, 1994, Roberto Estrada y Lopez sat at the bishop’s chair while the
sacrament of confirmation was being performed at the St. John’s Cathedral, Dagupan
City. Rogelio Mararac, the security guard at the cathedral, was summoned by some
churchgoers. Mararac went near Estrada and told him to vacate the Bishop's chair.
Mararac twice tapped Estrada’s hand with his nightstick. When Mararac was about to
strike again, Estrada drew a knife from his back, lunged at Mararac and stabbed him,
hitting him below his left throat. Mararac fell. Wounded and bleeding, Mararac slowly
dragged himself down the altar. SP01 Conrado Francisco received a report of the
commotion inside the cathedral, went inside the cathedral, approached Estrada who
was sitting on the chair, and advised the latter to drop his knife. Estrada obeyed.
However, when Chief Inspector Wendy Rosario, Deputy Police Chief, who was also
at the confirmation rites, went near Estrada, Estrada embraced Rosario and two
wrestled with each other. Rosario was able to subdue Estrada. Estrada was brought to
the police station and placed in jail. Maranac expired a few minutes after arrival at the
hospital. On 29 December 1994, Estrada was charged with the crime of murder for the
killing of Mararac. On 6 January 1995, at the arraignment, the Public Attorney's
Office, filed an "Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to
Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital." It was alleged that Estrada could not
properly and intelligently enter a plea because he was suffering from a mental defect;
that before the commission of the crime, he was confined at the psychiatric ward of
the Baguio General Hospital in Baguio City. The motion was opposed by the City
Prosecutor. The trial court, motu proprio, propounded several questions on Estrada.
Finding that the questions were understood and answered by him "intelligently," the
court denied the motion that same day. The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not
guilty was entered by the court on Estrada's behalf. On 23 June 1997, the trial court
(RTC Dagupan City, Branch 44, Criminal Case 94-00860-D) rendered a decision
upholding the prosecution evidence and found Estrada guilty of the crime charged and
thereby sentenced him to death, and ordered him to pay P50,000 for indemnity,
P18,870 for actual expenses, and P100,000 as moral damages. Estrada’s counsel
appealed.
Issue:
Whether a mental examination of the accused should be made before the accused may
be subjected to trial.
Held:
The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the
accused, rather than of the public. It has been held that it is inhuman to require an
accused disabled by act of God to make a just defense for his life or liberty. To put a
legally incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the
constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process of law. Section 12, Rule 116 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure speaks of a "mental examination." An intelligent
determination of an accused's capacity for rational understanding ought to rest on a
deeper and more comprehensive diagnosis of his mental condition than laymen can
make through observation of his overt behavior. Once a medical or psychiatric
diagnosis is made, then can the legal question of incompetency be determined by the
trial court. By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively
deprived appellant of a fair trial. The trial court's negligence was a violation of the
basic requirements of due process; and for this reason, the proceedings before the said
court must be nullified.
Lim vs. Court of Appeals [GR 111397, 12 August 2002]
Facts:
On 7 December 1992, Bistro Pigalle Inc. filed before the trial court a petition for
mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction, against Alfredo Lim in his capacity as Mayor of the City of
Manila. The Bistro filed the case because policemen under Lim’s instructions
inspected and investigated the Bistro’s license as well as the work permits and health
certificates of its staff. This caused the stoppage of work in the Bistro’s night club and
restaurant operations (i.e. the New Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant).
Lim also refused to accept the Bistro’s application for a business license, as well as
the work permit applications of the Bistro’s staff, for the year 1993. Acting on the
Bistro’s application for injunctive relief, the trial court issued the temporary
restraining order on 29 December 1992, ordering Lim and/or his agents to refrain from
inspecting or otherwise interfering in the operation of the establishments of the Bistro.
At the hearing, the parties submitted their evidence in support of their respective
positions. On 20 January 1993, the trial court granted the Bistro’s application for a
writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction. However, despite the trial court’s order,
Lim still issued a closure order on the Bistro’s operations effective 23 January 1993,
even sending policemen to carry out his closure order. Lim insisted that the power of a
mayor to inspect and investigate commercial establishments and their staff is implicit
in the statutory power of the city mayor to issue, suspend or revoke business permits
and licenses. This statutory power is expressly provided for in Section 11 (l), Article II
of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and in Section 455, paragraph 3 (iv) of
the Local Government Code of 1991. On 25 January 1993, the Bistro filed an "Urgent
Motion for Contempt" against Lim and the policemen who stopped the Bistro’s
operations on January 23, 1993. At the hearing of the motion for contempt on 29
January 1993, the Bistro withdrew its motion on condition that Lim would respect the
court’s injunction. However, on February 12, 13, 15, 26 and 27, and on March 1 and
2, 1993, Lim, acting through his agents and policemen, again disrupted the Bistro’s
business operations. Meanwhile, on 17 February 1993, Lim filed a motion to dissolve
the injunctive order and to dismiss the case. The trial court denied Lim’s motion to
dissolve the injunction and to dismiss the case in an order dated 2 March 1993. On 10
March 1993, Lim filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus against the Bistro and Judge Wilfredo Reyes. The Court of Appeals
sustained the RTC orders in a decision on 25 March 1993, and denied Lim's motion
for reconsideration in a resolution dated 13 July 1993. On 1 July 1993, Manila City
Ordinance 778314 took effect. On the same day, Lim ordered the Western Police
District Command to permanently close down the operations of the Bistro, which
order the police implemented at once. Lim filed the petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the Bistro should be given an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it
violated the conditions of its licenses and permits.
Held:
From the language of Section 11 (l), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila and Section 455 (3) (iv) of the Local Government Code, it is clear that the
power of the mayor to issue business licenses and permits necessarily includes the
corollary power to suspend, revoke or even refuse to issue the same. However, the
power to suspend or revoke these licenses and permits is expressly premised on the
violation of the conditions of these permits and licenses. The laws specifically refer to
the "violation of the condition(s)" on which the licenses and permits were issued.
Similarly, the power to refuse to issue such licenses and permits is premised on non-
compliance with the prerequisites for the issuance of such licenses and permits. The
mayor must observe due process in exercising these powers, which means that the
mayor must give the applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard. True,
the mayor has the power to inspect and investigate private commercial establishments
for any violation of the conditions of their licenses and permits. However, the mayor
has no power to order a police raid on these establishments in the guise of inspecting
or investigating these commercial establishments. Lim has no authority to close down
Bistro’s business or any business establishment in Manila without due process of law.
Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and the Local
Government Code. There is no provision in these laws expressly or impliedly granting
the mayor authority to close down private commercial establishments without notice
and hearing, and even if there is, such provision would be void. The due process
clause of the Constitution requires that Lim should have given the Bistro an
opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the conditions of its licenses and
permits.
Roxas vs. Vasquez [GR 114944, 19 June 2001]
Facts:
Manuel C. Roxas and Ahmed S. Nacpil were Chairman and Member, respectively, of
the Bids and Awards Committee of the PC-INP. Sometime in September 1990, the
PC-INP invited bids for the supply purchase of 65 units of fire trucks, and
accordingly, the public bidding was held on 14 September 1990. The lowest bidder,
Aeolus Philippines, was disqualified since its fire trucks had a water tank capacity of
only 1,800 liters, far below the required 3,785 liter capacity. After ocular inspections
made by a A Technical Evaluation Committee, two fire trucks, namely Morita Isuzu
and Nikki-Hino, were recommended. The Bids and Awards Committee, however,
voted to award the contract in favor of the Korean company CISC, which offered
Ssangyong fire trucks. To avoid the possibility of failure to bid, the Bids and Awards
Committee reviewed its recommendations, and thus limited its choice to the two
brands recommended by Gen. Tanchanco and, by majority vote, elected Nikki-Hino of
the Tahei Co., Ltd. as the lower bidder. Thereafter, the Contract of Purchase and Sale
of 65 units of Nikki-Hino fire trucks was executed between Gen. Nazareno, on behalf
of the PC-INP, and Tahei Company, Ltd. The corresponding Purchase Order was then
prepared. Pursuant to a disbursement voucher, the PNP paid Tahei Co., Ltd. the
amount of P167,335,177.24, representing marginal deposit for the 65 units of fire
truck. The Disbursement Voucher showed that, while the bid price of Tahei Co. was
only P2,292,784.00 per unit, the price appearing on the Purchase Order was
P2,585,562.00 per unit. Hence, there was a discrepancy of P292,778.00 per unit of fire
truck, or a total of P19,030,570.00 for all 65 fire trucks. The Commission on Audit
discovered the irregularities in the bidding, awarding and purchase of the 65 fire
trucks, thus prompting then DILG Secretary Rafael Alunan III to file a complaint on
12 February 1993 for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 before the
Ombudsman, against (1) Dir. Gen. Cesar Nazareno, PNP, (2) Dep. Dir. Manuel
Roxas, PNP, (3) Fire Marshal Mario Tanchanco, (4) Fire B/Gen. Diosdado Godoy
(Ret.), (5) P/Sr. Supt. Ahmed Nacpil, PNP, (6) P/Supt. Juhan Kairan, PNP, (7) Insp.
Reynaldo Osea, PNP, (8) Dep. Dir. Gen. Gerardo Flores, PNP, (9) Dir. Nicasio
Custodio, PNP, (10) Supt. Obedio Espeña, PNP, (11) Former DILG Secretary Luis
Santos, and (12) Ms. Generosa Ramirez. The Deputy Ombudsman for the Military
conducted a preliminary investigation where the accused submitted their respective
counter-affidavits. On 19 March 1993, it recommended the indictment of all, except
Generosa Ramirez. On review, the Office of the Special Prosecutor Review
Committee recommended the dismissal of the complaints against Roxas, Nacpil,
Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez. This latter recommendation was approved by the Special
Prosecutor and the Ombudsman in a Memorandum dated 15 April 1993. Accordingly,
the appropriate Information was filed by the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan
(Criminal Case 18956), against Nazareno, Flores, Tanchanco, Custodio, Osea, Espena
and Santos. Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez were not included among the
accused. However, upon motion of Generals Flores and Tanchanco, a reinvestigation
was conducted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor. On 19 October 1993, without
any notice to or participation of Roxas and Nacpil, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor issued an Order, dismissing the charges against Flores and Tanchanco, and
recommending that Roxas, Nacpil, and Kairan be likewise indicted. Deputy Special
Prosecutor Jose de Ferrer voted for the approval of the recommendation, while Special
Prosecutor Aniano A. Desierto dissented. Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez approved
the recommendation. Roxas and Nacpil, together with Kairan, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. The Review Committee of the Office of the Special Prosecutor
recommended that the Motion be granted and the charge against the movants be
dismissed. However, Deputy Special Prosecutor de Ferrer and Ombudsman Vasquez
disapproved the recommendation in the second assailed Order dated 10 February
1994. Thus, on 27 March 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Amended
Information with respondent Sandiganbayan, impleading Roxas and Nacpil as
additional accused. Roxas and Nacpil filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the lack of notice to Roxas and Nacpil at the reinvestigation render the
issuance of Office of the Ombudsman null and void.
Held:
It is not material either that no new matter or evidence was presented during the
reinvestigation of the case. It should be stressed that reinvestigation, as the word itself
implies, is merely a repeat investigation of the case. New matters or evidence are not
prerequisites for a reinvestigation, which is simply a chance for the prosecutor, or in
this case the Office of the Ombudsman, to review and re-evaluate its findings and the
evidence already submitted. Neither do the lack of notice to, or participation of, Roxas
and Nacpil at the reinvestigation render the questioned issuances of Office of the
Ombudsman null and void. At any rate, Roxas and Nacpil cannot argue that they have
been deprived of due process. The rule is well established that due process is satisfied
when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
the controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Herein, the record clearly shows that petitioners not only filed their
respective Counter-Affidavits during the preliminary investigation, they also filed
separate Motions for Reconsideration of the 19 October 1993 Order of the
Ombudsman impleading them as accused in Criminal Case 18956.
Philcomsat v. Alcuaz [GR 84818, 18 December 1989]
Facts:
By virtue of Republic Act 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT) was granted "a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and
operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station or stations
and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite communications," the
authority to "construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver
telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground
terminal or terminals." By designation of the Republic of the Philippines, it is also the
sole signatory for the Philippines in the Agreement and the Operating Agreement
relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT),
as well as in the Convention and the Operating Agreement of the International
Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), which two global commercial
telecommunications satellite corporations were collectively established by various
states in line with the principles set forth in Resolution 1721 (XVI) of the United
Nations’s General Assembly. Since 1968, It has been leasing its satellite circuits to
PLDT, Philippine Global Communications, Eastern Telecom, Globe Mackay Cable
and Radio Corp. ITT, and Capitol Wireless or their predecessors-in-interest. The
satellite services thus provided by PHILCOMSAT enable said international carriers to
serve the public with indispensable communication services, such as overseas
telephone, telex, facsimile, telegrams, high speed data, live television in full color, and
television standard conversion from European to American or vice versa. It was
exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC). However, pursuant to Executive Order
(EO) 196 issued on 17 June 1987, it was placed under the jurisdiction, control and
regulation of NTC, including all its facilities and services and the fixing of rates.
Implementing said executive order, NTC required PHILCOMSAT to apply for the
requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity covering its facilities and the
services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority to charge rates therefor. On
9 September 1987, PHILCOMSAT filed with NTC an application for authority to
continue operating and maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously
operating and maintaining since 1967, to continue providing the international satellite
communications services it has likewise been providing since 1967, and to charge the
current rates applied for in rendering such services. Pending hearing, it also applied
for a provisional authority so that it can continue to operate and maintain the facilities,
provide the services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for. On 16
September 1987, PHILCOMSAT was granted a provisional authority to continue
operating its existing facilities, to render the services it was then offering, and to
charge the rates it was then charging. This authority was valid for 6 months from the
date of said order. When said provisional authority expired on 17 March 1988, it was
extended for another 6 months, or up to 16 September 1988. Thereafter, the NTC
further extended the provisional authority of PHILCOMSAT for another 6 months,
counted from 16 September 1988, but it directed PHILCOMSAT to charge modified
reduced rates through a reduction of 15% on the present authorized rates.
PHILCOMSAT assailed said order.
Issue:
Whether the NTC is not required to provide notice and hearing to PHILCOMSAT in
its rate-fixing order, which fixed a temporary rate pending final determination of
PHILCOMSAT’s application.
Held:
The NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of
public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which
conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative
power. The NTC order violates procedural due process because it was issued motu
proprio, without notice to PHILCOMSAT and without the benefit of a hearing. Said
order was based merely on an "initial evaluation," which is a unilateral evaluation, but
had PHILCOMSAT been given an opportunity to present its side before the order in
question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction and the consequent
deterioration of the public service could have been shown and demonstrated to NTC.
The order pertains exclusively to PHILCOMSAT and to no other. Reduction of rates
was made without affording PHILCOMSAT the benefit of an explanation as to what
particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate
reduction. PHILCOMSAT was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the
inspector who issued the report on which NTC based its questioned order. While the
NTC may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of
PHILCOMSAT, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt
from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the
requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may
not exercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an
order as temporary in nature does not perforce entail the applicability of a different
rule of statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied to any other order on the
same matter unless otherwise provided by the applicable law. NTC has no authority to
make such order without first giving PHILCOMSAT a hearing, whether the order be
temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a
complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion.
Suntay v. People [GR L-9430, 29 June 1957]
Facts:
On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years,
filed a verified complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of
Quezon City, alleging that on or about 21 June 21954, the accused took Alicia Nubla
from St. Paul's College in Quezon City with lewd design and took her to somewhere
near the University of the Philippines (UP) compound in Diliman and was then able to
have carnal knowledge of her. On 15 December 1954, after an investigation, an
Assistant City Attorney recommended to the City Attorney of Quezon City that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. On 23 December 1954 attorney for the
complainant addressed a letter to the City Attorney of Quezon City wherein he took
exception to the recommendation of the Assistant City Attorney referred to and urged
that a complaint for seduction be filed against Suntay. On 10 January 1955, Suntay
applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs (5981
[A39184]). On 20 January 1955, Suntay left the Philippines for San Francisco,
California, where he is at present enrolled in school. On 31 January 1955, Alicia
Nubla subscribed and swore to a complaint charging Suntay with seduction which was
filed, in the Court of First Instance (CFI) Quezon City, after preliminary investigation
had been conducted (Criminal case Q-1596). On 9 February 1955 the private
prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order "directing such
government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the National Bureau of
Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the
accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance
with law." On 10 February 1955 the Court granted the motion. On 7 March 1955 the
Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States instructing him to order the
Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to Suntay and to
compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges against him.
However, this order was not implemented or carried out in view of the
commencement of this proceedings in order that the issues raised may be judicially
resolved. On 5 July 1955, Suntay’s counsel wrote to the Secretary requesting that the
action taken by him be reconsidered, and filed in the criminal case a motion praying
that the Court reconsider its order of 10 February 1955. On 7 July 1955, the Secretary
denied counsel's request and on 15 July 1955 the Court denied the motion for
reconsideration. Suntay filed the petition for a writ of certiorari.
Issue:
Whether Suntay should be accorded notice and hearing before his passport may be
cancelled.
Held:
Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is
exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a
serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing may be dispensed with by
such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing
does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of
the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious because of
the absence of such hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with
the due process of law clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction
issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause. Hearing would have been proper
and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not
clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in
our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion (Section 25, EO 1, S. 1946, 42 OG 1400) to
revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or
capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Suntay’s suddenly leaving
the country in such a convenient time, can reasonably be interpreted to mean as a
deliberate attempt on his part to flee from justice, and, therefore, he cannot now be
heard to complain if the strong arm of the law should join together to bring him back
to justice.
De Bisschop v. Galang [GR 18365, 31 May 1963]
Facts:
George de Bisschop, an American citizen, was allowed to stay in this country for 3
years, expiring 1 August 1959, as a prearranged employee of the Bissmag Production,
Inc., of which he is president and general manager. He applied for extension of stay
with the Bureau of Immigration, in a letter dated 10 July 1959. In view, however, of
confidential and damaging reports of the Immigration Office, Benjamin de Mesa, to
the effect that the Bissmag Production, Inc., is more of a gambling front than the
enterprise for promotions of local and imported shows that it purports to be, and that
de Bisschop is suspected of having evaded payment of his income tax, the
Commissioner of Immigration (Emilio L. Galang), in a communication of 10
September 1959, advised him that his application for extension of stay as a
prearranged employee has been denied by the Board of Commissioners, and that he
should depart within 5 days. Thereafter, counsel of de Bisschop requested for a copy
of the adverse decision of said Board, but the legal officer of the Bureau of
Immigration replied that, pursuant to immigration practice and procedure and as is
usual in such cases where the result is a vote for denial, for reasons of practicability
and expediency, no formal decision, order or resolution is promulgated by the Board.
Thereafter, Mr. Bisschop was simply advised of said denial as per letter dated 10
September 1959. No request for reinvestigation was made with the Bureau of
Immigration. Instead, to forestall his arrest and the filing of the corresponding
deportation proceedings, de Bisschop filed the case on 18 September 1959. Pending
resolution of the main case for prohibition, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued
ex-parte by the Court of First Instance (CFI) Manila (with Judge Antonio Canizares
presiding, Civil Case 41477) on the same day ordering the Commissioner of
Immigration to desist from arresting and detaining de Bisschop. During the hearing,
only documentary evidence were presented. On 27 March 1961, the lower court
granted the petition for prohibition and ordered the Commissioner of Immigration to
desist and refrain from arresting and expelling de Bisschop from the Philippines
unless and
until proper and legal proceedings are conducted by the Board of Commissioners of
the Bureau of Immigrations in connection with the application for extension of stay
filed by de Bisschop with said Board. The Commissioner of Immigration appealed.
Issue:
Whether the right to notice and hearing is essential to due process in administrative
proceedings, and whether the Board of Commissioners are required to render written
decisions on petitions for extension of stay.
Held:
The administration of immigration laws is the primary and exclusive responsibility of
the Executive branch of the government. Extension of stay of aliens is purely
discretionary on the part of immigration authorities. Since CA 613 (Philippines
Immigration Act of 1940) is silent as to the procedure to be followed in these cases,
the Courts are inclined to uphold the argument that courts have no jurisdiction to
review the purely administrative practice of immigration authorities of not granting
formal hearings in certain cases as the circumstances may warrant, for reasons of
practicability and expediency. This would not violate the due process clause as, in the
case at bar, the letter of appellant-commissioner advising de Bisschop to depart in 5
days is a mere formality, a preliminary step, and, therefore, far from final, because, as
alleged in paragraph 7 of appellant's answer to the complaint, the "requirement to
leave before the start of the deportation proceedings is only an advice to the party that
unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be compelled to take steps for his
expulsion". It is already a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a day in court is not a
matter of right in administrative proceedings. Further, the immigration laws
specifically enumerate when the decisions of the Board of Commissioners shall be in
writing, to wit: (1) in cases of appeal from a decision of the Board of Special Inquiry
as to matters of admission or exclusion of aliens, as provided in Section 27(c) of the
Immigration Act; and (2) the decision of the Board of Commissioners in cases of
deportation under Section 37, paragraph (a) and (c). There is nothing in the
immigration law which provides that the Board of Commissioners must render written
decisions on petitions for extension of stay. Section 8 of the Immigration Act merely
refers to the number of “votes” necessary to constitute the decision of said Board.
Var-Orient Shipping v. Achacoso [GR L-81805, 31 May 1988]
Facts:
Var-Orient Shipping Co. Inc. and Comninos Bros. filed a complaint with the Workers'
Assistance and Adjudication Office (WAAO), Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) against the Edgar T. Bunyog, Vedasto Navarro, Eugenio
Capalad, Raul Tumasis, Antonio Tanio-an, Celestino Cason, Danilo Manela and
Roberto Genesis, crew members of the MPV "Silver Reefer," for having allegedly
violated their Contracts of Employment with them, which supposedly resulted in
damages arising from the interdiction of the vessel by the International Transport
Workers' Federation (ITF) at Kiel Canal, Germany, in March 1986. After joinder of
the issues, the case was heard on 4 March 1987 with both parties required to submit
memoranda. Only the seamen submitted memoranda. On 10 June 1987, the seamen
filed a motion to resolve, which the companies' counsel did not oppose. Thus, on the
basis of the pleadings and memoranda, Achacoso rendered a decision on 9 September
1987 ordering (1) the dismissal of the case with a reprimand and against Navarro,
Capalad, Tumasis, Tanio- an, Cagon, Manela and Genesis, against the commission of
the same or similar offense otherwise it shall be dealt with more severe penalty; (2)
exclusion of Llanes from the case; (3) reprimanding Var-Orient Shipping Co. for
failure to comply with its obligations pursuant to POEA rules and regulations and
warning against committing the same or a similar offense otherwise it shall be dealt
with more severely; (4) archiving the case of Arsolon, A. dela Cruz, Montero and D.
de la Cruz with their names included in the POEA watchlist until they shall have
voluntarily submitted themselves to WAAO’s jurisdiction; (5) payment by the
companies jointly and severally, unto Navarro, Capalad, Tumasis, Tanio-an, Cason,
Manela and Genesis the amount of P1,550.59 each, representing deductions from
allotments, plus P1,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and (6) payment by the
companies jointly and severally unto Bunyog the amount of US$4,680.00 or its peso
equivalent at the time of payment representing his salaries for the unserved portion of
his employment contract plus P4,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; to be tendered thru
WAAO, 10 days from receipt of the decision. A copy of the decision was sent by
registered mail and delivered by the postman to the companies' counsel, then Attorney
Francisco B. Figura through the receptionist, Marlyn Aquino on 21 September 1987.
Atty. Figura alleged he did not receive the envelope containing the decision. The
companies allegedly learned about the decision only when the writ of execution was
served on them on 20 November 1987 by National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) Deputy Sheriff Rene Masilungan and Attorney Wilfredo Ong. Previously, on
19 October 1987, the seamen filed "Motion for Execution of Decision," the
companies' counsel did not oppose. On 23 November 1987, the companies, through
new counsel, Atty. Quintin Aseron, Jr., filed an "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of
Execution" on the ground that the decision had not been received by them, hence, it
was not yet final and executory. On 19 January 1988, the POEA Administrator
(Tomas D. Achacoso). In due time, the companies filed the petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the decision of the POEA administrator has been received, rendering said
decision final and unappealable.
Held:
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Herein, the parties agreed
that they would file their respective memoranda at the 4 March 1987 hearing and
thereafter consider the case submitted for decision. This procedure is authorized by
law to expedite the settlement of labor disputes. Atty. Figura's affidavit involving that
he has not received the decision is self- serving. The companies failed to submit an
affidavit of the receptionist Marlyn Aquino explaining what she did with the decision
which she received for Atty. Figura. Under the circumstances, the Administrator's
ruling that the decision had been properly served on companies' counsel and that it is
now final and unappealable, should be sustained. The issuance of the writ of execution
is therefore not premature.
Ang Tibay v. CIR [GR 46496, 27 February 1940]
Facts:
Toribio Teodoro, the manager and proprietor of Ang Tibay, laid off 89 laborers, who
were members of the National Labor Union (NLU), due to alleged shortages of leather
materials. The National Labor Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against
Ang Tibay, alleging therein, among others, that Toribio dominates the National
Workers’ Brotherhood (NWB) of Ang Tibay, another union in the company, and that
Toribio discriminated against the NLU and unjustly favoring the NWB, which he
allegedly dominated. The Court of Industrial Relations ruled in favor of NLU, due to
the failure of Ang Tibay to present records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of
Accounts of native dealers in leather and thus to disprove NLU’s allegation that the
lack of leather materials as a scheme to discharge NLU members. The Supreme Court,
however, reversed the decision, finding no substantial evidence that the 89 workers
were dismissed due to their union affiliation or activities. Thus, the Solicitor General,
in behalf of the Court of Industrial Relations filed a motion for reconsideration, while
the NLU filed a motion for new trial, praying that the case be remanded to the Court
of Industrial Relations.
Issue:
Whether the CIR’s freedom from the rigidity of procedural requirements prescribe
special requirements of due process in administrative cases.
Held:
The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) is not narrowly constrained by technical rules
of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall
not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such
manner as it may deem just and equitable." The fact, however, that the CIR may be
said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that
it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of
an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected
even in proceedings of this character, to wit: a. Right to a hearing which
includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof. The liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected
by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. b. The tribunal must consider the
evidence presented, after the party is given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts. The right to adduce
evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is
vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence
is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration.
c. Wile the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something
to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a
place when directly attached. This principle emanates from the more fundamental
principle that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of
unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power. d. Not
only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence
must be "substantial." Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." The statute provides that 'the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law
and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions
is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere
admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings
would not invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable
flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a
basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or
rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. e. The decision must be rendered
on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected. Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the
evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and
meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to
see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods
of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the
controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and
determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only
advisory. (Section 9, CA 103.) The CIR may refer any industrial or agricultural
dispute of any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry,
a provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such
board or public official such powers and functions as the CIR may deem necessary,
but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers
(Section 10) f. The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume
of work is such that it is literally impossible for the titular heads of the CIR personally
to decide all controversies coming before them. There is no statutory authority to
authorize examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with right to appeal
to board or commission, to solve the difficulty. g. The CIR should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred
upon it.
Montemayor v. Araneta University [GR L-44251, 31 May 1977]
Facts:
Felix Montemayor was a full-time professor of Araneta University Foundation (AUF),
serving as head of its Humanities and Psychology Department. On 17 April 1974, a
complaint for immorality lodged against him by the Chaplain of the AUF for alleged
immorality. Its then President, Dr. Juan Salcedo, Jr., created a committee to
investigate such charge. The accusation centered on conversations on sex and immoral
advances committed against the person of Leonardo de Lara. The first hearing, which
took place on 24 April 1974, was attended by Montemayor as well as the complainant
with his two witnesses. Montemayor sought the postponement of the investigation to 3
May 1974, which was granted. On 28 May 1974, he filed a motion to dismiss or to
hold the hearing in abeyance, and on 17 June 1974, he filed an affidavit to sustain his
defense. On 8 July 1974, the report and recommendation of the investigating
committee came, and was adverse to Montemayor. The recommendation was for his
demotion in rank by one degree. On 5 August 1974, Salcedo adopted such
recommendation and thereafter referred the same to the Board of Trustees of the AUF
for appropriate action. On 8 November 1974, new charges were filed by Professor
Luis R. Almazan, one Jaime Castañeda, and Jesus Martinez against Montemayor for
conduct unbecoming of a faculty member. Another committee was appointed.
Montemayor moved to postpone the hearing set for 18 and 19 November 1974, but
was denied. The hearing proceeded in his absence. On 5 December 1974, the
Committee submitted its report finding the charges against Montemayor to have been
sufficiently established and recommending to the President and the Board of Trustees
of the AUF his separation from the University, in accordance with Sections 116 and
351 of the Manual of Policies of the University. On 10 December 1974, his dismissal
was ordered effective 15 November 1974, the date of his preventive suspension. On
12 December 1974, the University filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) a report of his suspension and application for clearance to
terminate his employment. Meanwhile, on 21 November 1974, Montemayor in turn
lodged a complaint with the NLRC against AUF for reinstatement and payment of
back wages and salaries, with all the privileges, benefits and increments attendant
thereto. There was a motion to dismiss on the part of the latter. Both the labor arbiter
and the NLRC found in favor of Montemayor. He was ordered reinstated to his former
position with back wages and without loss of seniority and other privileges.
Montemayor's complaint for unfair labor practice was, however, dismissed. AUF
appealed to the Secretary of Labor who, on 14 July 1976, set aside the Commission's
order for his reinstatement, finding Montemayor's dismissal justified. The AUF was,
however, required to pay Montemayor the amount of P14,480.00 representing the
latter's accrued back wages which the former voluntarily offered to extend him.
Dissatisfied with the Secretary's decision, Montemayor filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether Montemayor was absolutely denied of due process in the proceedings
relating to his dismissal from AUF.
Held:
In procedural due process, there must be a hearing before condemnation, with the
investigation to proceed in an orderly manner, and judgment to be rendered only after
such inquiry. Academic due process, a term coined, is a system of procedure designed
to yield the best possible judgment when an adverse decision against a professor may
be the consequence with stress on the clear, orderly, and fair way of reaching a
conclusion. Every university or college teacher should be entitled before dismissal or
demotion, to have the charges against him stated in writing, in specific terms and to
have a fair trial on these charges before a special or permanent judicial committee of
the faculty or by the faculty at large. At such trial the teacher accused should have full
opportunity to present evidence. Herein, the procedure followed in the first
investigation of Montemayor (June 1974) satisfied the procedure due process
requisite. The second investigation (November 1974), however, did not. The motion
for postponement therein was denied, the hearing proceeded as scheduled in the
absence of Montemayor, and the committee lost no time in submitting its report
finding the charges against Montemayor to have been sufficiently established and
recommending his removal. The deficiency, however, was remedied, as Montemayor
was able to present his case before the Labor Commission. Denial of due process
happened only in the proceeding he had before the investigating committees and not
in the proceedings before the NLRC wherein he was given the fullest opportunity to
present his case, the latter being the subject matter of the petition for certiorari.
Montemayor was afforded his day in court.
Meralco vs. PSC [GR L-13638-40, 30 June 1964]
Facts:
On 10 March 1955, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) filed two applications
with the Public Service Commission (PSC), one, for revision and reduction of its rates
for commercial and other non-residential customers for general lighting, heating
and/or power purposes (PSC Case 85889) and the other for revision and reduction of
its residential meter rate, schedule RM-3 (PSC Case 85890). These applications were
approved by the PSC in a decision rendered on 24 September 1955. On 24 August
1955, the Meralco filed another application for revision and reduction of its general
power rate, Schedule GP-2 (PSC Case 89293), which was provisionally approved on
31 August 1955. Previous to these applications, Meralco filed 7 other applications for
revision and reduction rates. On 9 June 1954, upon petition of Dr. Pedro Gil, the
Commission requested the Auditor General to cause an audit and examination of
Meralco's books of accounts. The General Auditing Office (GAO) examined and
audited the books and under date of 11 May 1956, it presented a report which was
submitted to the Commission on 28 May 1956. On 30 May 1956, the PSC, thru
Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo, reset the hearing of the cases for 22 June 1956 "for
the purpose of considering such further revision of applicant's rates as may be found
reasonable." On said date, the parties appeared and Atty. Venancio L. de Peralta,
Technical Assistant and Chief of the Finance and Rate Division of the PSC, who was
duly authorized to receive the evidence of the parties, announced that the hearing was
an "informal hearing", and its purpose was to hear any remarks or statements of the
parties and to define the issues "so that at the hearing we know exactly what are
disputed at this informal hearing". Dr. Pedro Gil submitted the 3 cases on the report of
the GAO dated 11 May 1956 and on a letter dated 7 June 1956 he sent to the
Commission, in which he asked the Commission, inter alia, to allow the Meralco "a
rate of return of only 8% on its invested capital.". The Solicitor General submitted the
case on the same report and letter of Dr. Gil and on a letter-report addressed by the
Deputy Auditor General to the Commission on 21 November 1955. Other parties
made common cause with Dr. Gil. Meralco was given by the Commission a period of
30 days within which to file an answer, specifying its objections to the report of the
GAO. On 31 July 1956, the Meralco filed its answer to the GAO's report, specifying
its objection, and prayed that the cases be reset for hearing to enable the parties to
present their proofs. Without having (1) first reset the said 3 cases for hearing; (2)
Without having given the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by it, to
cross-examine the officers of the GAO who prepared the report dated May 11, 1956,
on which report the Commission based its decision; and (3) Without having given
the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by it, to present evidence in support of its
answer to refute the facts alleged in said report and controverted by Meralco, on 27
December 1957, the PSC handed down a decision, granting the petition for the
reduction of rates. The motion for reconsideration and to set aside decision, filed on
14 January 1958 by Meralco, was denied by the Commission on a 2 to 1 vote, on 3
March 1958. Meralco filed the petition for review with preliminary injunction before
the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the informal hearing held 22 June 1956 serves the purpose of “proper notice
and hearing” in administrative cases.
Held:
The record shows that no hearing was held. On 22 June 1956, parties appeared before
"Attorney Vivencio L. Peralta, Technical Assistant, and Chief, Finance and Rate
Division, Public Service Commission, who was duly authorized to receive the
evidence of the parties", and the record shows that the hearing held before the said
Commissioner was merely an informal hearing because, using his own words, "I said
at the beginning that this is only preliminary because I want that the parties could
come to some kind of understanding." Meralco has not been given its day in court.
The decision of 27 December 1957 was not promulgated "upon proper notice and
hearing", as required by law, and that therefore it can not serve as a legal basis for
requiring the Meralco to put in effect the reductions ordered in the decision. It is the
cardinal right of a party in trials and administrative proceedings to be heard, which
includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof and to have such evidence presented considered by the
tribunal. Even if the Commission is not bound by the rules of judicial proceedings, it
must how its head to the constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of
right without due process of law, which binds not only the government of the
Republic, but also each and everyone of its branches, agencies, etc. Due process of
law guarantees notice and opportunities to be heard to persons who would be affected
by the order or act contemplated.
Ateneo v. CA [GR L-56180, 16 October 1986]
Facts:
On 12 December 1967, Juan Ramon Guanzon (from Bacolod, son of Romeo Guanzon
and Teresita Regalado), first year student of AdMU Loyola Heights, and boarder at
the Cervini Hall) struck at the left temple of Carmelita Mateo, a waitress in the
Cervini Hall cafeteria. Other boarders held him from striking again, but the boarders
hid the incident from Fr. Campbell. The university conducted an investigation of the
slapping incident. On the basis of the investigation results, Juan Ramon was dismissed
from the university. The dismissal of Juan Ramon triggered off the filing of a
complaint for damages by his parents against the university in the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City. The complaint states that Juan
Ramon was expelled from school without giving him a fair trial in violation of his
right to due process and that they are prominent and well known residents of Bacolod
City, with the unceremonious expulsion of their son causing them actual, moral, and
exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. In its answer, the university denied the
material allegations of the complaint and justified the dismissal of Juan Ramon on the
ground that his unbecoming behavior is contrary to good morals, proper decorum, and
civility, that such behavior subjected him as a student to the university's disciplinary
regulations' action and sanction and that the university has the sole prerogative and
authority at any time to drop from the school a student found to be undesirable in
order to preserve and maintain its integrity and discipline so indispensable for its
existence as an institution of learning. After due trial, the lower court found for the
Guanzons and ordered the university to pay them P92.00 as actual damages;
P50,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the costs of the
suit. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by the university, the trial court's decision
was initially reversed and set aside. However, upon motion for reconsideration filed
by the Guanzons, the appellate court reversed its decision and set it aside through a
special division of five. The motion for reconsideration had to be referred to a special
division of five in view of the failure to reach unanimity on the resolution of the
motion, the vote of the regular division having become 2 to 1. Hence, the University
filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the absence of notice to the dismissed student’s parents negates the
compliance of the requirements of administrative due process.
Held:
Besides the administrative body undertaking a fair and objective investigation of the
incident, due process in administrative proceedings also requires consideration of the
evidence presented and the existence of evidence to support the decision. Herein, the
original Court of Appeals decision (penned by Justice Gancayco) showed that the
procedures in the expulsion case were fair, open, exhaustive, and adequate. There
were nothing in the records to reverse the findings in the reconsideration. Clearly,
there was absolutely no indication of malice, fraud, and improper or wilful motives or
conduct on the part of the Ateneo de Manila University. Juan Ramon was given notice
of the proceedings. He actually appeared to present his side. The investigating board
acted fairly and objectively. All requisites of administrative due process were met. It
cannot be negated by the fact that the parents of Juan Ramon were not given any
notice of the proceedings. Juan Ramon, who at the time was 18 years of age, was
already a college student, intelligent and mature enough to know his responsibilities.
He was fully cognizant of the gravity of the offense he committed as he asked if he
could be expelled for what he did. When informed about the 19 December 1967
meeting of the Board of Discipline, he was asked to seek advice and assistance from
his guardian and or parents. The fact that he chose to remain silent and did not inform
them about his case, not even when he went home to Bacolod City for his Christmas
vacation, was not the fault of the University.
Alcuaz v. PSBA [GR 76353, 2 May 1988]
Facts:
Sophia Alcuaz, Ma. Cecilia Alindayu, Bernadette Ang, Irna Anonas, Ma. Remedios
Baltazar, Corazon Bundoc, John Carmona, Anna Shiela Dinoso, Rafael Encarnacion,
et. al., are all bonafide students of the Philippine School of Business Administration
(PSBA) Quezon City. As early as 22 March 1986, the students and the PSBA, Q.C.
had already agreed on certain matters which would govern their activities within the
school. In spite of the agreement, the students felt the need to hold dialogues. Among
others they demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was turned
down by the school, resulting in mass assemblies and barricades of school entrances.
Subsequently dialogues proved futile. Finally, on 8 October 1996, the students
received uniform letters from PSBA giving them 3 days to explain why the school
should not take/mete out any administrative sanction on their direct participation
and/or conspiring with others in the commission of tumultuous and anarchic acts on
October 2, 3, and 7. On 22 October 1982, the letter was answered by the counsel for
the students in a reply letter. During the regular enrollment period, the students were
allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester of SY 1986-1987.
On 28 October 1986 the President of the Student Council filed a complaint with the
Director of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) against the PSBA
for barring the enrollment of the Student Council Officers and student leaders.
Simultaneously on the same date, the student council wrote the President, Board of
Trustees, requesting for a written statement of the schools final decision regarding
their enrollment. Another demand letter was made by Counsel for the students Atty.
Alan Romullo Yap, also to the President, Board of Trustees, to enroll his clients
within 48 hours. All these notwithstanding, no relief appeared to be forthcoming. The
students filed a petition for review on certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
mandatory injunction.
Issue:
Whether the students were deprived of due process in the refusal of PSBA to readmit
them.
Held:
After the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract
either with the students or with the intervening teachers. The contract having been
terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to
enter into another contract with said students and teachers. The right of the school to
refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of
disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by the Court, as it is sanctioned
by law. Section 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools considers
academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations as valid grounds for
refusing re-enrollment of students. Due process in disciplinary cases involving
students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for
actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Such proceedings may be summary and
cross-examination is not even an essential part thereof. Accordingly, the minimum
standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of procedural due process are:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the
assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against
them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the
evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. Herein, conditions 3,
4 and 5 had not been complied with. The Court, however, ordered an investigation to
be conducted by the school authorities in the interest of justice. Further, it is well
settled that by reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the
handling of specific matters falling under their respective jurisdictions, the Court
ordinarily accords respect if not finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals,
unless the factual findings are not supported by evidence; where the findings are
vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedure which led to the factual
findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. Herein, a careful scrutiny of the
Report and Recommendation of the Special Investigating Committee shows it does
not fall under any of the above exceptions. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the
petition, but in the light of compassionate equity, students who were, in view of the
absence of academic deficiencies, scheduled to graduate during the school year when
the petition was filed, should be allowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time.
Non v. Dames [GR 89317, 20 May 1990]
Facts:
Ariel Non, Rex Magana, Alvin Agura, Normandy Occiano, Jorge Dayaon, Lourdes
Banares, Bartolome Ibasco, Emmanuel Barba, Sonny Moreno. Giovani Palma,
Joselito Villalon, Luis Santos and Daniel Torres, students in Mabini Colleges, Inc. in
Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic
year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school
in the preceding semester. They thus filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of
Daet (Branch 38) seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial
court dismissed the petition in an order dated 8 August 1988. A motion for
reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial court on 24 February 1989;
stating that they waived- their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with
respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the
first semester of school year 1988-89. In addition, for the same semester, they duly
signed pledges "to abide and comply with all the rules and regulations laid down by
competent authorities in the College Department or School in which I am enrolled."
Hence, the affected students filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the school exclude students because of failing grades when the cause for the
action taken against them relates to possible breaches of discipline.
Held:
The contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is
imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to
education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all
educational institutions. The authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a student on
the ground that his contract, which has a term of one semester, has already expired,
cannot be justified. Still, institutions' discretion on the admission and enrollment of
students as a major component of the academic freedom guaranteed to institutions of
higher learning. The right of an institution of higher learning to set academic
standards, however, cannot be utilized to discriminate against students who exercise
their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise there will be a
violation of their right to equal protection. Thus, an institution of learning has a
contractual obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course
they seek to pursue. However, when a student commits a serious breach of discipline
or fails to maintain the required academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right;
and the court should not review the discretion of university authorities. Excluding
students because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them
undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due
process but also constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair play. Further, the
failures in one or two subjects by some cannot be considered marked academic
deficiency. Neither can the academic deficiency be gauged from the academic
standards of the school due to insufficiency of information. Herein, the students could
have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings in connection with the mass actions,
but the penalty that could have been imposed must be commensurate to the offense
committed and it must be imposed only after the requirements of procedural due
process have been complied with (Paragraph 145, Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools). But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of
administrative sanctions have become moot and academic; as the students have been
refused readmission or re-enrollment and have been effectively excluded from for 4
semesters, have already been more than sufficiently penalized for any breach of
discipline they might have committed when they led and participated in the mass
actions that resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject them to disciplinary
proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would only further aggravate the
strained relations between the students and the officials of the school which
necessarily resulted from the heated legal battle.
PASEI [Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc] v. Drilon [GR L-81958,
30 June 1988]
Facts:
The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) is a firm "engaged
principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas
placement." It challenged the Constitutional validity of DOLE’s Department Order 1
(series of 1988), in the character of "Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension
of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers," in a petition for
certiorari and prohibition. The measure is assailed (1) for "discrimination against
males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic
helpers and females with similar skills;" (2) for being violative of the right to travel,
and (3) for being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being
legislative, and not executive, in character. PASEI also invoked Section 3 of Article
XIII of the Constitution providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law as
Department Order No. 1, as contended, was passed in the absence of prior
consultations. It also claimed that it violated the Charter's non-impairment clause, in
addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the
Order be further enforced. On 25 May 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the
Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the POEA, filed a Comment informing the
Court that on 8 March 1988, the Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the
states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway,
Austria, and Switzerland. In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the
Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State.
Issue:
Whether Department Order 1 unduly discriminates against women.
Held:
Department Order 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby
make an undue discrimination between the sexes. ‘Equality before the law" under the
Constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It
admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined
to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.
The classification made — the preference for female workers — rests on substantial
distinctions. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers,
even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers,
are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of
Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In
fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts. There is no evidence
that, except perhaps for isolated instances, Filipino men abroad have been afflicted
with an identical predicament. Discrimination in this case is justified. Further, the
impugned guidelines are applicable to all female domestic overseas workers, not all
Filipina workers. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have
been unreasonable and arbitrary, due to the fact that not all of them are similarly
circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or
group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or
resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons. Where the
classification is based on such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy, sex,
and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule is to recognize its validity
only if the young, the women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable
treatment.
Sison v. Ancheta [GR L-59431, 25 July 1984]
Facts:
Antero M. Sison Jr., as taxpayer, alleges that Section 1 of BP 135 (allegedly
modifying Section 21 of the 1977 National Internal Revenue Code, which provides for
rates of tax on citizens or residents on [a] taxable compensation income, [b] taxable
net income, [c] royalties, prizes, and other winnings, [d] interest from bank deposits
and yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes and from trust fund
and similar arrangements, [e] dividends and share of individual partner in the net
profits of taxable partnership, [f] adjusted gross income. ) unduly discriminated
against him by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income arising from the
exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those which are imposed upon fixed income or
salaried individual taxpayers. He characterizes the above section as arbitrary
amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in character; that there is a
transgression of both the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution
as well as of the rule requiring uniformity in taxation.
Issue:
Whether professionals and businessmen, like Sison, are unduly discriminated for not
being entitled to deductions for income tax purposes.
Held:
The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. This requirement is met when the
tax operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject may be
found. The rule of uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity or perfect equality,
because this is hardly attainable. Taxpayers may be classified into different categories.
It is enough that the classification must rest upon substantial distinctions that make
real differences. In the case of the gross income taxation embodied in BP 135, the
discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of the income to the application
of generalized rules removing all deductible items for all taxpayers within the class
and fixing a set of reduced tax rates to be applied to all of them. Taxpayers who are
recipients of compensation income are set apart as a class. As there is practically no
overhead expense, these taxpayers are not entitled to make deductions for income tax
purposes because they are in the same situation more or less. On the other hand, in the
case of professionals in the practice of their calling and businessmen, there is no
uniformity in the costs or expenses necessary to produce their income. It would not be
just then to disregard the disparities by giving all of them zero deduction and
indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax rates on the basis of gross income.
There is ample justification to adopt the gross system of income taxation to
compensation income, while continuing the system of net income taxation as regards
professional and business income.
People v. Hernandez [GR L-6025-26, 18 July 1956]
Facts:
(1) Amado V. Hernandez alias Victor alias Soliman alias Amado alias AVH alias
Victor Soliman, (2) Guillermo Capadocia alias Huan Bantiling alias Cap alias G.
Capadocia, (3) Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony Collantes alias Bonifacio, (4)
Alfredo Saulo alias Elias alias Fred alias A.B.S. alias A.B., (5) Andres Baisa, Jr. alias
Ben alias Andy (6) Genaro de la Cruz alias Gonzalo alias Gorio alias Arong, (7)
Aquilino Bunsol alias Anong, (8) Adriano Samson alias Danoy, (9) Juan J. Cruz alias
Johnny 2, alias Jessie Wilson alias William, (10) Jacobo Espino, (11) Amado
Racanday, (12) Fermin Rodillas, and (13) Julian Lumanog alias Manue, were accused
of the crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies. The prosecution
maintained that Hernandez is charged with rebellion complexed with murders, arsons
and robberies, for which the capital punishment may be imposed. The defense
contends, among other things, that rebellion can not be complexed with murder, arson,
or robbery. The lower court sentenced Hernandez merely to life imprisonment. A
petition for bail was filed by Amado Hernandez on 28 December 1953, which was
denied by a resolution of the Supreme Court dated 2 February 1954. A similar petition
for bail was filed by Hernandez on 26 June 1954 and renewed on 22 December 1955.
Issue:
Whether Hernandez is entitled to right to bail.
Held:
Inasmuch as the acts specified in Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code constitute one
single crime, it follows necessarily that said acts offer no occasion for the application
of Article 48, which requires therefor the commission of, at least, two crimes. Hence,
the Supreme court has never in the past convicted any person of the "complex crime
of rebellion with murder". What is more, it appears that in every one of the cases of
rebellion published in the Philippine Reports (US vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil. 472; US vs.
Baldello, 3 Phil. 509, US vs. Ayala, 6 Phil. 151; League vs. People, 73 Phil. 155), the
defendants therein were convicted of simple rebellion, although they had killed
several persons, sometimes peace officers. The ingredients of a crime form part and
parcel thereof, and, hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either
separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
The law punishing rebellion (Article 135, Revised Penal Code) specifically mentions
the act of engaging in war and committing serious violence among its essential
elements, thus clearly indicating that everything done in the prosecution of said war,
as a means necessary therefor, is embraced therein. National, as well as international,
laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes,
perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as
"common" offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which
they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the
principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver
penalty. The policy of our statutes on rebellion is to consider all acts committed in
furtherance thereof as constituting only one crime, punishable with one single penalty.
Further, the settled policy of our laws on rebellion, since the beginning of the century,
has been one of decided leniency, in comparison with the laws enforce during the
Spanish regime. Although the Government has, for the past 5 or 6 years, adopted a
more vigorous course of action in the apprehension of violators of said law and in
their prosecution the established policy of the State, as regards the punishment of the
culprits has remained unchanged since 1932. Furthermore, to deny bail it is not
enough that the evidence of guilt is strong; it must also appear that in case of
conviction the defendant's criminal liability would probably call for a capital
punishment. Thus, in conclusion, under the allegations of the amended information
against Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere
ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means
"necessary" for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in
the amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty
imposable under such charge cannot exceed 12 years of prision mayor and a fine of
P20,000; and that, in conformity with the policy of the Supreme Court in dealing with
accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed
bail.
People v. Isinain [GR L-2857, 28 February 1950]
Facts:
In the morning of 7 March 1947, Urbano Cruz, the encargado of the coconut grove of
Arturo Eustaquio in Latuan and Balagtasan, City of Zamboanga, was informed by one
of the guards that there were 3 persons stealing coconuts in the said plantation. Cruz
called Ernesto Fargas, Eustaquio’s truck driver, and accompanied by some laborers,
proceeded to the plantation. There the group saw 3 persons, chopping coconuts. When
they approached, the trespassers started to run away, but Cruz fired a shot into the air,
and one stopped and was apprehended. He turned out to be Moro Isnain, who, upon
investigation by the precinct commander of the police station (Lt. Bucoy)
acknowledged his culpability, asked for pardon and identified his confederates as
Moros Addi and Akik (who are still at large). Before the justice of the peace he
pleaded guilty to the charge. However, in the Court of First Instance (CFI), he
changed his mind. He admitted he had been arrested during the raid, but submitted the
flimsy excuse that he had merely gone to the place because he was thirsty, and
confessed that he joined the other two thieves in order to drink coconut water. His
attorney de officio raised the constitutionality of Article 310 of the Revised Penal
Code, as it allegedly punishes the larceny of such products (the stealing of coconuts)
more heavily than the taking away of similar produce (rice and sugar) and thereby
denies Moro Isinain equal protection of the laws.
Issue:
Whether the harsher penalties in the theft of coconuts over other objects of theft
renders the penal law contrary to the constitutional guaranty on equal protection of the
law.
Held:
No. Although the constitutional guaranty requires the treatment alike, in the same
place and under like circumstances and conditions, of all persons subjected to state
legislation; a state, as a part of its police power, may exercise a large measure of
discretion, without violating the equal protection guaranty, in creating and defining
criminal offenses, and may make classifications as to persons amenable to
punishment, so long as the classifications are reasonable and the legislation bears
equally on all in the same class, and, where a reasonable classification is made as
between persons or corporations, the persons or corporations in each class may be
dealt with in a manner different from that employed with regard to the persons or
corporations in other classes. Herein, on the theft of coconuts, the purpose of the
heavier penalty is to encourage and protect the development of the coconut industry as
one of the sources of the national economy. Unlike rice and sugar cane farms where
the range of vision is unobstructed, coconut groves can not be efficiently watched
because of the nature of the growth of coconut trees; and without a special measure to
protect this kind of property, it will be the favorite resort of thieves. There is therefore,
some reason for the special treatment accorded the industry and as it can not be said
that the classification is entirely without basis.
Chavez v. PCGG [GR 130716, 9 December 1998]
Facts:
Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former government official who
initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed
unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the
country's economy," alleges that what impelled him to bring the action were several
news reports bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997
referring to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited
in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a
compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how
to split or share these assets. Chavez, invoking his constitutional right to information
and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving
the national interest, demands that the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's
task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claimed that any compromise
on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public
interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be
greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. PCGG claimed
Chavez’s action is premature as he has not asked the PCGG to disclose the
negotiations and agreements and that the proposed terms of the Agreements have not
become effective and binding. They further aver that the Marcos heirs have submitted
the subject Agreements to the Sandiganbayan for its approval, which the Republic has
opposed as it has not been ratified nor submitted to the President for approval; and
that the Marcos heirs have failed to comply with the undertakings, particularly the
collation and submission of an inventory of their assets. On 19 August 1998, Gloria,
Celnan, Scarlet and Teresa, all surnamed Jopson, filed before the Court a Motion for
Intervention, attaching thereto their Petition in Intervention. They aver that they are
"among the 10,000 claimants whose right to claim from the Marcos Family and/or the
Marcos Estate is recognized by the decision in In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos,
Human Rights Litigation, Maximo Hilao, et al., Class Plaintiffs No. 92-15526, U .S.
Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit US App. Lexis 14796, June 16, 1994 and the
Decision of the Swiss Supreme Court of December 10, 1997"; and as such, they claim
to have personal and direct interest in the subject matter of the case, since a
distribution or disposition of the Marcos properties may adversely affect their
legitimate claims. In a minute Resolution issued on 24 August 1998, the Court granted
their motion to intervene.
Issue:
Whether the civil and criminal liabilities of the Marcoses may be compromised, as
embodied in the General and Supplemental Agreements between the PCGG and the
Marcoses.
Held:
In general, the law encourages compromises in civil cases, except with regard to the
following matters: (1) the civil status of persons, (2) the validity of a marriage or
a legal separation, (3) any ground for legal separation, (4) future support, (5) the
jurisdiction of courts, and (6) future legitime. And like any other contract, the terms
and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public policy or public order. A compromise is binding and has the force of law
between the parties, unless the consent of a party is vitiated — such as by mistake,
fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence — or when there is forgery, or if the
terms of the settlement are so palpably unconscionable. In the latter instances, the
agreement may be invalidated by the courts. In the absence of an express prohibition,
the rule on compromises in civil actions under the Civil Code is applicable to PCGG
cases. Such principle is pursuant to the objectives of Executive Order (EO) 14,
particularly the just and expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth, so that it may be
used to hasten economic recovery. However, any compromise relating to the civil
liability arising from an offense does not automatically terminate the criminal
proceeding against or extinguish the criminal liability of the malefactor. While a
compromise in civil suits is expressly authorized by law, there is no similar general
sanction as regards criminal liability. The authority must be specifically conferred.
The power to grant criminal immunity was conferred on PCGG by Section 5 of EO
14, as amended by EO 14-A. From the wording of the law, however, it can be easily
deduced that the person referred to is a witness in the proceeding, not the principal
respondent, defendant or accused. Herein, the General and Supplemental Agreements
between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs have serious legal flaws. First, the
Agreements do not conform to the above requirements of EO 14 and 14-A. Criminal
immunity under Section 5 cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the principal
defendants in the spate of ill-gotten wealth cases pending before the Sandiganbayan.
Second, under Item 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from
all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear
violation of the Constitution. The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in
the Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local legislative bodies. The PCGG has
absolutely no power to grant tax exemptions, even under the cover of its authority to
compromise ill-gotten wealth cases. Third, the government binds itself to cause the
dismissal of all cases against the Marcos heirs, pending before the Sandiganbayan and
other courts. This is a direct encroachment on judicial powers, particularly in regard to
criminal jurisdiction. Once a case has been filed before a court of competent
jurisdiction, the matter of its dismissal or pursuance lies within the full discretion and
control of the judge, once jurisdiction is acquired by the trial court. The PCGG, as the
government prosecutor of ill-gotten wealth cases, cannot guarantee the dismissal of all
such criminal cases against the Marcoses pending in the courts, for said dismissal is
not within its sole power and discretion. Fourth, the government also waives all claims
and counterclaims, "whether past, present, or future, matured or inchoate," against the
Marcoses. Again, this all-encompassing stipulation is contrary to law. Under the Civil
Code, an action for future fraud may not be waived. The stipulation in the Agreement
does not specify the exact scope of future claims against the Marcoses that the
government thereby relinquishes. This is a palpable violation of the due process and
equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. It effectively ensconces the Marcoses
beyond the reach of the law. It also sets a dangerous precedent for public
accountability. It is a virtual warrant for public officials to amass public funds
illegally, since there is an open option to compromise their liability in exchange for
only a portion of their ill-gotten wealth. Fifth, the Agreements do not provide for a
definite or determinable period within which the parties shall fulfill their respective
prestations. It may take a lifetime before the Marcoses submit an inventory of their
total assets. Sixth, the Agreements do not state with specificity the standards for
determining which assets shall be forfeited by the government and which shall be
retained by the Marcoses. While the Supplemental Agreement provides that the
Marcoses shall be entitled to 25% of the $356 million Swiss deposits (less government
recovery expenses), such sharing arrangement pertains only to the said deposits. No
similar splitting scheme is defined with respect to the other properties. Neither is
there, anywhere in the Agreements, a statement of the basis for the 25-75 percent
sharing ratio. Finally, the absence of then President Ramos' approval of the principal
Agreement, and express condition therein, renders the compromise incomplete and
unenforceable. Nevertheless, even if such approval were obtained, the Agreements
would still not be valid.
Nunez v. Sandiganbayan [GR L-50581-50617, 30 January 1982]
Facts:
Information were filed against Rufino V. Nunez before Sandiganbayan on 21
February and 26 March 1979 for the crime of estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents committed in connivance with his co-accused, all public
officials, in several cases. Thereafter, on 15 May, upon being arraigned, he filed a
motion to quash on constitutional and juridical grounds. A week later, the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration was filed a day later,
and was likewise denied. Nunez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Supreme Court, claiming that Presidential Decree 1486, which created the
Sandiganbayan, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto
clauses of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether the trial of the accused, a public official, by the Sandiganbayan unduly
discriminates against the accused, in light of the difference of the procedures
(especially appellate) in the Sandiganbayan vis-a-vis regular courts.
Held:
The Constitution provided for but did not create a special Court, the Sandiganbayan,
with "jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices
and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those
in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be
determined by law." It came into existence with the issuance in 1978 of a Presidential
Decree. Classification must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. The
constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the
Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, i.e. dishonesty in the public
service, the urgency of which cannot be denied. It follows that those who may
thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as 17 January
1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the
accused therein, whether petitioner is a private citizen or a public official, is not
necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the
omission of the Court of Appeals as intermediate tribunal does not deprive protection
of liberty. The innocence or guilt of an accused in the Sandiganbayan is passed upon
by 3-judge court of its division. Moreover, a unanimous vote is required, failing which
"the Presiding Justice shall designate two other justices from among the members of
the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five justices, and the
concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment."
If convicted, the Sandiganbayan en banc has the duty if he seeks a review to see
whether any error of law was committed to justify a reversal of the judgment.
UNIDO v. Comelec [GR 56515, 3 April 1981]
Facts:
UNIDO IS a political organization or aggrupation campaigning for "NO" votes to the
amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines of 1973 proposed by the Batasang
Pambansa. Comelec issued 3 resolutions all dated 5 March 1981 (Resolution 1467
providing for Rules and Regulations for "equal opportunity" on public discussions and
debates on the plebiscite questions to be submitted to the people on 7 April 1981;
Resolution 1468 providing "equal time on the use of the broadcast media [radio and
television] in the plebiscite campaign"; and Resolution 1469 providing for "equal
space on the use of the print media in the 1981 plebiscite of 7 April 1981".) UNIDO
addressed a letter to Comelec on 10 March 1981 to grant it the same opportunity as
given President Marcos, who was campaigning for “YES”. It also requested radio and
television coverage for its Plaza Miranda meeting on a letter dated 17 March 1981.
Comelec issued a resolution on 18 March1981 denying the request of UNIDO; stating
that Marcos conduct his pulong-pulong in light of the official government thrust to
amend the constitution and in his capacity as President/Prime Minister and not as head
of any political party to which the UNIDO or any of its leaders does not have the same
constitutional prerogatives vested in the President/Prime Minister, as such, it has no
right to "demand" equal coverage by media accorded President Marcos. UNIDO sent a
letter serving as its motion for reconsideration. The Comelec denied the letter-motion
for lack of merit in its resolution of 22 March 1981. UNIDO appealed to the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether the opposition should be given the same opportunity and facilities given to
the President to communicate and dialogue with the people on matters affecting the
plan of government or of public interest.
Held:
It is undeniable and but natural that the head of state of every country in the world
must, from the very nature of his position, be accorded certain privileges not equally
available to those who are opposed to him in the sense that, since the head of state has
the grave and tremendous responsibility of planning and implementing the plan of
government itself, either by virtue of the popular mandate given to him under the
corresponding provisions of the Constitution and the laws or any other duly
recognized grant of power and authority, the opposition cannot be placed at par with
him, since logically the opposition can only fiscalize the administration and
punctualize its errors and shortcomings to the end that when the duly scheduled time
for the people to exercise their inalienable power to make a better choice, the
opposition may have the chance to make them accept the alternative they can offer.
Therefore, when the head of state is afforded the opportunity or when he feels it
incumbent upon him to communicate and dialogue with the people on any matter
affecting the plan of government or any other matter of public interest, no office or
entity of the government is obliged to give the opposition the same facilities by which
its contrary views may be ventilated.
Philippine Judges Association [GR 105371, 11 November 1993]
Facts:
The Philippine Judges Association (duly represented by its President, Bernardo P.
Abesamis, Vice-President for Legal Affairs Mariano M. Umali, Director for Pasig,
Makati and Pasay, Metro Manila Alfredo C. Flores, and Chairman of the Committee
on Legal Aid, Jesus G. Bersamira, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila,
respectively); the National Confederation of the Judges Association of the Philippines
(composed of the Metropolitan Trial Court Judges Association represented by its
President, Reinato Quilala of the Municipal Trial Circuit Court, Manila); and the
Municipal Judges League of the Philippines (represented by its President, Tomas G.
Talavera); by themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and
Shari'a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts throughout the
Country, filed the petition assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act 7354 (An
Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Power, Functions and
Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes
Connected Therewith), as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through
its Circular 92-28, on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and
does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses
of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among
the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the
independence of the Judiciary; contending that their official functions as judges will
be prejudiced by the withdrawal of franking privilege. The National Land Registration
Authority (NLRA) has taken common cause with them insofar as its own activities,
such as the sending of requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial
proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene.
Issue:
Whether the withdrawal of the franking privilege of the Judiciary violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
Held:
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every
unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has
nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1, of the
Constitution to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue
favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down
is the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on
all persons or things without distinction. What the clause requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different
from all others in these same particulars. The withdrawal of franking privilege from
the Judiciary would further deepen the problem in the delay in the administration of
justice. The Court are dependent on the postal service for communicating with
lawyers and litigants as part of the judicial process. It should not be hard to imagine
the increased difficulties of our courts if they have to affix a purchased stamp to every
process they send in the discharge of their judicial functions, considering that the
Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national budget compared to the
Legislative and Executive Departments (.84% of P309 billion budgeted for 1993). The
repealing clause is a discriminatory provision that denied the Judiciary the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The
distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions
that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking
privilege (The President of the Philippines; the Vice President of the Philippines;
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives; the Commission on
Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; widows of former Presidents of the
Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the
filing of complaints against public offices or officers). In lumping the Judiciary with
the other offices (the Office of Adult Education; the Institute of National Language;
the Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the
National Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed
Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee; the City and Provincial
Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan or the Office of Special Prosecutor; the Kabataang
Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the Provincial and City
Assessors; and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.) from which
the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice
in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of
the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no
reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the
Judiciary for such privilege.
Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan [GR 118533, 4 October 1995]
Facts:
On 15 December 1992, Baclaran Credit Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI), through its board
member Roger de Leon, charged Parañaque Mayor Dr. Pablo R. Olivarez with
Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for unreasonably refusing to
issue a mayor's permit despite request and follow-ups to implement Parañaque
Sangguniang Bayan Resolution 744, (series of 1992) which Olivarez himself
approved on 6 October 1992. Resolution 744 authorized BCCI to set up a night
manufacturer's fair during the Christmas fiesta celebration of and at Baclaran for 60
days from 11 November 1992 to 15 February 1993 for which they will use a portion
of the service road of Roxas Boulevard. Allegedly, BCCI exerted all possible efforts
to secure the necessary permit but Olivarez simply refused to issue the same unless
BCCI gives money to the latter. Attached to BCCI’s Reply-Affidavit was a copy of
Executive Order dated 23 November 1992 issued by Olivarez granting a group of
Baclaran-based organizations/associations of vendors the holding of "Christmas Agro-
Industrial Fair Sa Baclaran" from 28 November 1992 to 28 February 1993 using
certain portions of the National and Local Government Roads/Streets in Baclaran for
fund raising. Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) III Ringpis conducted a preliminary
investigation and issued on 22 September 1993 a resolution recommending the
prosecution of Olivarez for violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act (RA) 3019, as
amended. On 16 February 1994, the information was filed against Olivares (Criminal
Case 20226). On 17 January 1994, Olivarez filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Reinvestigation allegedly to rectify error of law and on ground of newly discovered
evidence. The motion was granted on 24 January 1994. On 9 February 1993,
Ombudsman disapproved the recommendation to withdraw the information as
Olivarez does not refute the allegation and that bad faith is evident with his persistent
refusal to issue permit. On 18 February 1994, Olivarez voluntarily surrendered and
posted a cash bail bond with the Sandiganbayan for his temporary release. On 21
February 1994, Olivarez filed an Omnibus Motion for a re-examination and re-
assessment of the prosecution's report and documentary evidence with a view to set
aside the determination of the existence of probable cause and ultimately the dismissal
of the case; which was denied by the Sandiganbayan on 3 March 1994 in Open Court.
In view of Olivarez's refusal to enter any plea, the court ordered a plea of "not guilty"
entered into his record. On 8 March 1994, the prosecution filed a Motion to suspend
Accused Pendente Lite. On March 9, 14 and 15, 1994, Olivarez filed a Motion to Set
Aside Plea and To Reduce Denial Order Into Writing (With Entry of Appearance),
Supplemental Motion to Set Aside Plea and Opposition to Motion to Suspend
Accused and Supplemental Pleading with Additional Opposition to Motion to
Suspend Accused; which were denied by the Sandiganbayan on 4 April 1994. The
Sandiganbayan, however, set aside the proceedings conducted on 3 March 1994
including Olivarez's arraignment thus revoking the plea of "not guilty" entered in his
record in the interest of justice and to avoid further delay in the prompt adjudication of
the case due to technicalities. On 20 April 1994, Olivarez filed a motion for
reconsideration which was granted on 15 May 1994. Consequently, the case was
remanded to the Office of the Ombudsman for another reinvestigation to be
terminated within 30 days from notice. The reinvestigation was reassigned to SPO III
Angel C. Mayoralgo who on 3 November 1994, recommended the dismissal of the
case. On 9 December 1994, DSP Jose de G. Ferrer reversed the recommendation,
finding Olivarez liable by giving unwarranted benefit thru manifest partiality to
another group on the flimsy reason that complainant failed to apply for a business
permit. The Ombudsman approved the reversal and on 27 December 1994 directed the
prosecution to proceed under the existing information. On 13 January 1995, Olivarez
filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum to DSP
Jose de G. Ferrer, SPO III Roger Berbano, Sr., and SPO III Angel Mayoralgo, Jr. and
on 16 January 1995, Olivarez filed a Motion to Strike Out and/or Review Result of
Reinvestigation. The latter motion was denied by Sandiganbayan. Olivarez filed the
petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue:
Whether Olivarez exhibited partiality in the denial of / inaction over BCCI’s
application for license.
Held:
Olivarez's suspected partiality may be gleaned from the fact that he issued a permit in
favor of the unidentified Baclaran-based vendors' associations by the mere expedient
of an executive order, whereas so many requirements were imposed on BCCI before it
could be granted the same permit. Worse, Olivarez failed to show, in apparent
disregard of BCCI's right to equal protection, that BCCI and the unidentified
Baclaran-based vendors' associations were not similarly situated as to give at least a
semblance of legality to the apparent haste with which said executive order was
issued. It would seem that if there was any interest served by such executive order, it
was that of Olivarez. As the mayor of the municipality, the officials referred to were
definitely under his authority and he was not without recourse to take appropriate
action on the letter-application of BCCI although the same was not strictly in
accordance with normal procedure. There was nothing to prevent him from referring
said letter-application to the licensing department, but which paradoxically he refused
to do. Whether Olivarez was impelled by any material interest or ulterior motive may
be beyond the Court for the moment since this is a matter of evidence, but the
environmental facts and circumstances are sufficient to create a belief in the mind of a
reasonable man that this would not be completely improbable, absent countervailing
clarification. Lastly, it may not be amiss to add that Olivarez, as a municipal mayor, is
expressly authorized and has the power to issue permits and licenses for the holding of
activities for any charitable or welfare purpose, pursuant to Section 444 (b) (3) (iv and
v) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act 7160). Hence, he cannot
really feign total lack of authority to act on the letter-application of BCCI.
Tiu v. Court of Appeals [GR 127410, 20 January 1999]
Facts:
On 13 March 1992, Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law
Republic Act 7227 ("An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations
Into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development
Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes.”).
Section 12 thereof created the Subic Special Economic Zone and granted thereto
special privileges, such as tax exemptions and duty-free importation of raw materials,
capital and equipment to business enterprises and residents located and residing in the
said zones. On 10 June 1993, President Ramos issued Executive Order (EO) 97
clarifying the application of the tax and duty incentives. On 19 June 1993, the
President issued EO 97-A, specifying the area within which the tax-and-duty-free
privilege was operative (i.e. the secured area consisting of the presently fenced-in
former Subic Naval Base). On 26 October 1994, Conrado L. Tiu, Juan T. Montelibano
Jr. and Isagani M. Jungco challenged before the Supreme Court the constitutionality
of EO 97-A for allegedly being violative of their right to equal protection of the laws,
inasmuch as the order granted tax and duty incentives only to businesses and residents
within the "secured area" of the Subic Special Economic Zone and denying them to
those who live within the Zone but outside such "fenced-in" territory. In a Resolution
dated 27 June 1995, the Supreme Court referred the matter to the Court of Appeals,
pursuant to Revised Administrative Circular 1-95. Incidentally, on 1 February 1995,
Proclamation 532 was issued by President Ramos, delineating the exact metes and
bounds of the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone, pursuant to Section 12 of
RA 7227. The Court of Appeals denied the petition as there is no substantial
difference between the provisions of EO 97-A and Section 12 of RA 7227, holding
that EO 97-A cannot be claimed to be unconstitutional while maintaining the validity
of RA 7227; that the intention of Congress to confine the coverage of the SSEZ to the
secured area and not to include the entire Olongapo City and other areas rely on the
deliberations in the Senate; and that the limited application of the tax incentives is
within the prerogative of the legislature, pursuant to its "avowed purpose [of serving]
some public benefit or interest. Tiu, et. al.’s motion for reconsideration was denied,
and hence, they filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether there was a violation of the equal protection of the laws when EO 97-A
granted tax and duty incentives only to businesses and residents within the "secured
area" of the Subic Special Economic Zone and denied such to those who live within
the Zone but outside such "fenced-in" territory.
Held:
The EO 97-A is not violative of the equal protection clause; neither is it
discriminatory. The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute,
but is subject to reasonable classification. The classification occasioned by EO 97-A
was not unreasonable, capricious or unfounded. It was based, rather, on fair and
substantive considerations that were germane to the legislative purpose. There are
substantial differences between the big investors who are being lured to establish and
operate their industries in the so-called "secured area" and the present business
operators outside the area. On the one hand, we are talking of billion- peso
investments and thousands of new jobs, and on the other hand, definitely none of such
magnitude. In the first, the economic impact will be national; in the second, only local.
Even more important, at this time the business activities outside the "secured area" are
not likely to have any impact in achieving the purpose of the law, which is to turn the
former military base to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine economy.
There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits and
incentives accorded in RA 7227. Additionally, it will be easier to manage and monitor
the activities within the "secured area," which is already fenced off, to prevent
"fraudulent importation of merchandise" or smuggling. The classification applies
equally to all the resident individuals and businesses within the "secured area." The
residents, being in like circumstances or contributing directly to the achievement of
the end purpose of the law, are not categorized further. Instead, they are all similarly
treated, both in privileges granted and in obligations required. The equal -protection
guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are actual
and material differences between territories, there is no violation of the constitutional
clause. Herein, anyone possessing the requisite investment capital can always avail of
the same benefits by channeling his or her resources or business operations into the
fenced-off free port zone.
International School Alliance of Educators (ISAE) vs. Quisumbing [GR 128845, 1
June 2000]
Facts:
The International School, Inc., pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic
educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic
personnel and other temporary residents. To enable the School to continue carrying
out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the
same decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management
personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities,
such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations
attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the
protection of employees. Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers
as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2)
local-hires. The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty member
should be classified as a foreign- hire or a local hire, i.e. (a) What is one's domicile?
(b) Where is one's home economy? (c) To which country does one owe economic
allegiance? (d) Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and
was the School responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines? The School
grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires
are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires. The School justifies the
difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure,
namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The compensation scheme
is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international
level in terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of international
education. The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to
all, regardless of race. There are foreigners who have been hired locally and who are
paid equally as Filipino local hires. When negotiations for a new collective bargaining
agreement were held on June 1995, the International School Alliance of Educators
(ISAE), "a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all
faculty members" of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between
foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires
should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock
between the parties. On 7 September 1995, ISAE filed a notice of strike. The failure of
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring the parties to a compromise
prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction
over the dispute. On 10 June 1996, the DOLE Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B.
Trajano, issued an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in favor of the
School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied ISAE's
motion for reconsideration in an Order dated 19 March 1997. ISAE sought relief from
the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the School unduly discriminated against the local-hires.
Held:
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our
Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the
Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority
to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19
of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. International law, which springs from general principles of
law, likewise proscribes discrimination. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention
against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation 16 — all embody the
general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The
Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its
national laws. In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are
often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all
the more reprehensible. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank,
the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is
borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than
the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others
receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated
against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated
unfairly. Herein, the International School has failed to discharge this burden. There is
no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than
the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they
perform under similar working conditions. The School cannot invoke the need to
entice foreign- hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates
without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay. The point-of-hire
classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary
rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no
reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.
The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes
public policy.
Philippine Rural Electric Cooperative Association Inc. (PHILRECA), et. al. vs.
Secretary of Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) [GR 143076,
10 June 2003]
Facts:
Under Presidential Decree (PD) 269, as amended, or the National Electrification
Administration Decree, it is the declared policy of the State to provide “the total
electrification of the Philippines on an area coverage basis” the same “being vital to
the people and the sound development of the nation.” Pursuant to this policy, PD 269
aims to “promote, encourage and assist all public service entities engaged in supplying
electric service, particularly electric cooperatives” by “giving every tenable support
and assistance” to the electric cooperatives coming within the purview of the law.
From 1971 to 1978, in order to finance the electrification projects envisioned by PD
269, as amended, the Philippine Government, acting through the National Economic
Council (now National Economic Development Authority) and the NEA (National
Electrification Administration), entered into 6 loan agreements with the government
of the United States of America through the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) with electric cooperatives, including Agusan Del Norte
Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ANECO); Iloilo I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ILECO I);
and Isabela I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ISELCO I), as beneficiaries. The 6 loan
agreements involved a total amount of approximately US$86,000,000.00. These loan
agreements are existing until today. The loan agreements contain similarly worded
provisions on the tax application of the loan and any property or commodity acquired
through the proceeds of the loan. On 23 May 2000, a class suit was filed by the
Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA); ANECO,
ILECO I and ISELCO I; in their own behalf and in behalf of other electric
cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269, against the Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the Secretary of the
Department of Finance, through a petition for prohibition, contending that pursuant to
the provisions of PD 269, as amended, and the provision in the loan agreements, they
are exempt from payment of local taxes, including payment of real property tax. With
the passage of the Local Government Code, however, they allege that their tax
exemptions have been invalidly withdrawn, in violation of the equal protection clause
and impairing the obligation of contracts between the Philippine Government and the
United States Government.
Issue:
Whether the Local Government Code unduly discriminated against electric
cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269, in violation of the equal protection
clause, by providing a different tax treatment between the former and cooperatives
created under RA 6938.
Held:
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no person or class of
persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other
persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.” Thus, the
guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a law based on
reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. There is
reasonable classification under the Local Government Code to justify the different tax
treatment between electric cooperatives covered by PD 269, as amended, and electric
cooperatives under RA 6938 (Cooperative Code of the Philippines). First, nowhere in
PD 269, as amended, does it require cooperatives to make equitable contributions to
capital. Under the Cooperative Code, the articles of cooperation of a cooperative
applying for registration must be accompanied with the bonds of the accountable
officers and a sworn statement of the treasurer elected by the subscribers showing that
at least 25% of the authorized share capital has been subscribed and at least 25% of
the total subscription has been paid and in no case shall the paid-up share capital be
less than P2,000.00. Second, another principle adhered to by the Cooperative Code is
the principle of subsidiarity. Pursuant to this principle, the government may only
engage in development activities where cooperatives do not possess the capability nor
the resources to do so and only upon the request of such cooperatives. In contrast, PD
269, as amended by PD 1645, is replete with provisions which grant the NEA, upon
the happening of certain events, the power to control and take over the management
and operations of cooperatives registered under it. The extent of government control
over electric cooperatives covered by PD 269, as amended, is largely a function of the
role of the NEA as a primary source of funds of these electric cooperatives. It is
crystal clear that NEA incurred loans from various sources to finance the development
and operations of the electric cooperatives. Consequently, amendments to PD 269
were primarily geared to expand the powers of the NEA over the electric cooperatives
to ensure that loans granted to them would be repaid to the government. In contrast,
cooperatives under RA 6938 are envisioned to be self-sufficient and independent
organizations with minimal government intervention or regulation. Lastly, the
transitory provisions of RA 6938 are indicative of the recognition by Congress of the
fundamental distinctions between electric cooperatives organized under PD 269, as
amended, and cooperatives under the new Cooperative Code. Article 128 of the
Cooperative Code provides that all cooperatives registered under previous laws shall
be deemed registered with the CDA upon submission of certain requirements within
one year. However, cooperatives created under PD 269, as amended, are given three
years within which to qualify and register with the CDA, after which, provisions of
PD 1645 which expand the powers of the NEA over electric cooperatives, would no
longer apply.
Rutter v. Esteban [GR L-3708, 18 May 1953]
Facts:
On 20 August 1941, Royal L. Rutter sold to Placido J. Esteban 2 parcels of land
situated in the City of Manila. To secure the payment of said balance of P4,800, a first
mortgage over the same parcels of land has been constituted in favor of Rutter. The
deed of sale having been registered, a new title was issued in favor of Placido J.
Esteban with the mortgage duly annotated on the back thereof. Esteban failed to pay
the two installments as agreed upon, as well as the interest that had accrued thereon,
and so on 2 August 1949, Rutter instituted an action in the Court of First Instance
(CFI) Manila to recover the balance due, the interest due thereon, and the attorney's
fees stipulated in the contract. The complaint also contains a prayer for the sale of the
properties mortgaged in accordance with law. Esteban admitted averments of the
complaint but set up defense on the moratorium clause embodied in RA 342
(approved 26 July 1948), allowing a war sufferer 8 years from the settlement of his
claim by the Philippine War Damage Commission. After a motion for summary
judgment has been presented by Esteban, and the requisite evidence submitted
covering the relevant facts, the court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint
holding that the obligation which Rutter seeks to enforce is not yet demandable under
the moratorium law. Rutter filed a motion for reconsideration wherein he raised for
the first time the constitutionality of the moratorium law, but the motion was denied.
Rutter appealed.
Issue:
Whether Republic Act 342 is unconstitutional for being violative of the constitutional
provision forbidding the impairment of the obligation of contracts.
Held:
Statutes declaring a moratorium on the enforcement of monetary obligations are not of
recent enactment. These moratorium laws are not new. Moratorium laws have been
adopted "during times of financial distress, especially when incident to, or caused by,
a war." The Moratorium Law is a valid exercise by the State of its police power, being
an emergency measure. Although conceding that the obligations of the contract were
impaired, the impairment was within the police power of the State as that power was
called into exercise by the public economic emergency which the legislature had
found to exist. Not only is the constitutional provision (contract clause) qualified by
the measure of control which the State retains over remedial processes, but the State
also continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interest of its people. It does
not matter that legislation appropriate to that end "has the result of modifying or
abrogating contracts already in effect." Not only are existing laws read into contracts
in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential
attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal
order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the
maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are worth while,
a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of
society. Some of these laws, however, have also been declared "void as to contracts
made before their passage where the suspension of remedies prescribed is indefinite or
unreasonable in duration." The true test, therefore, of the constitutionality of a
moratorium statute lies in the determination of the period of suspension of the remedy.
It is required that such suspension be definite and reasonable, otherwise it would be
violative of the constitution. Herein, obligations had been pending since 1945 as a
result of the issuance of Executive Orders 25 and 32 and at present their enforcement
is still inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act 342 and would continue to
be unenforceable during the 8-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an
opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language means that the
creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least 12 years before they could effect a
liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. This period seems to be
unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible, and
should be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are
practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes
extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. And the injustice is more
patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the
operation of the relief. Thus, the Court declared that the continued operation and
enforcement of Republic Act 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive,
and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and the same should be declared null
and void and without effect. This also holds true as regards Executive Orders 25 and
32, considering that said Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time as
regards the suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations.
This pronouncement is most especially needed in view of the revival clause embodied
in said Act if and when it is declared unconstitutional or invalid.
Ortigas v. Feati [GR L-24670, 14 December 1979]
Facts:
Ortigas, Madrigal & Sia is a limited partnership and Feati Bank and Trust Co., is a
corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines. Ortigas is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to
the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA, Mandaluyong.
On 4 March 1952, Ortigas, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla and Natividad Angeles, as
vendees, entered in separate agreements of sale on installments over two parcels of
land. On 19 July 1962, the vendees transferred their rights and interests over the lots
in favor of Emma Chavez. Both agreements contained stipulations or restrictions as to
the removal of soil, the materials of the buildings, and sanitary installations, which
were annotated in the TCTs with the Rizal Registry of Deeds. Feati Bank eventually
acquired said lots on 23 July 1962, one bought directly from Chavez, and the other
from Republic Flour Mills (to whom Chavez sold it previously). On 5 May 1963,
Feati Bank began laying the foundation and commenced the construction of a building
to be devoted to banking purposes, but which could also be devoted to, and used
exclusively for, residential purposes. The following day, Ortigas demanded that Feati
Bank stop the construction of the commercial building on the lots, claiming that the
restrictions annotated were imposed as part of its general building scheme designated
for the beautification and development of Highway Hills Subdivision. Feati Bank
refused to comply with the demand, contending that the building was being
constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations (Resolution 27, dated 4
February 1960 by Municipal Council of Mandaluyong), that it has filed building and
planning permit applications with the municipality of Mandaluyong, and that it had
accordingly obtained building and planning permits to proceed with the construction.
Ortigas filed the complaint with the lower court (Civil Case 7706), seeking the
issuance of "a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the construction of a
commercial bank building in the premises in view of the building restrictions
annotated in the Feati Bank's TCTs. The trial court dismissed the complaint holding
that the restrictions were subordinate to Municipal Resolution 27, rendering the
restrictions ineffective and unenforceable. On 2 March 1965, Ortigas filed a motion
for reconsideration. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration in its order
of 26 March 1965. On 2 April 1965 Ortigas filed its notice of appeal, its record on
appeal, and a cash appeal bond. On 14 April 1965, the appeal was given due course by
the appellate court and the records of the case were elevated directly to the Supreme
Court, since only questions of law were raised.
Issue:
Whether the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of contracts is absolute.
Held:
While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not
absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e.,
"the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people." Invariably described as "the
most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in a sense, the greatest and
most powerful attribute of government," the exercise of the power may be judicially
inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable,
there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee. Police power "is elastic and must be responsive to various
social conditions; it is not confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents
resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of
life. Public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should prevail
through the state's exercise of its police power. Herein, the municipality of
Mandaluyong exercised police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety,
peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. EDSA, a main
traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila
area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and
pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its
route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision
ordinances or regulations, the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong was reasonably
justified under the circumstances in passing the subject resolution. The motives behind
the passage of the questioned resolution being reasonable, and it being a "legitimate
response to a felt public need," not whimsical or oppressive, the non-impairment of
contracts clause of the Constitution will not bar the municipality's proper exercise of
the power. Further, laws and reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power are
read into contracts agreed upon by the parties. Not only are existing laws read into
contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of
essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the
legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairments presupposes the
maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile,
a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of
society. The law forms part of, and is read into, every contract, unless clearly excluded
therefrom in those cases where such exclusion is allowed.
Villanueva v. Castaneda [GR L-61311, 21 September 1987]
Facts:
On 7 November 1961, the municipal council of San Fernando (Pampanga) adopted
Resolution 218 authorizing some 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants
and Traders Association (FUMTA) to construct permanent stalls and sell along
Mercado street, on a strip of land measuring 12 by 77 meters (talipapa). The action
was protested on 10 November 1961 by Felicidad Villanueva, Fernando Caisip,
Antonio Liang, Felina Miranda, Ricardo Puno, Florencio Laxa, and Rene Ocampo
(claiming that they were granted previous authorization by the municipal government
to conduct business therein), in Civil Case 2040, where the Court of First Instance
(CFI) Pampanga, Branch 2, issued a writ of preliminary injunction that prevented the
FUMTA members from constructing the said stalls until final resolution of the
controversy. On 18 January 1964, while the case was pending, the municipal council
of San Fernando adopted Resolution 29, which declared the subject area as "the
parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality," thereby impliedly revoking
Resolution 218 (series of 1961). On 2 November 1968, Judge Andres C. Aguilar
decided the aforesaid case and held that the land occupied by Villanueva, et. al., being
public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the
subject of private occupancy. The writ of preliminary injunction was made permanent.
The decision was not enforced as the petitioners were not evicted from the place. The
number of vendors in the area (talipapa) ballooned to 200. The area deteriorated
increasingly to the great prejudice of the community in general, as the makeshift stalls
render the area as virtual fire trap. The problem festered for some more years under a
presumably uneasy truce among the protagonists, none of whom made any move, for
some reason. On 12 January 1982, the Association of Concerned Citizens and
Consumers of San Fernando filed a petition for the immediate implementation of
Resolution 29, to restore the property to its original and customary use as a public
plaza. Acting thereon after an investigation conducted by the municipal attorney, OIC
(Office of the Mayor) Vicente Macalino issued on 14 June 1982 a resolution requiring
the municipal treasurer and the municipal engineer to demolish the stalls beginning 1
July 1982. The Villanueva, et. al. filed a petition for prohibition with the CFI
Pampanga (Civil Case 6470) on 26 June 1982. The judge denied the petition on 19
July 1982, and the motion for reconsideration on 5 August 1982, prompting
Villanueva, et. al. to file a petition on certiorari with the Supreme Court. Paterno
Guevarra, who replaced Macalino as OIC of San Fernando, was impleaded.
Issue:
Whether the Ordinance impairs the alleged lease contracts between the market stall
vendors occupying the municipal plaza and the Government.
Held:
A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease
or any other contractual undertaking. The lease of a public plaza of a municipality in
favor of a private person is null and void. A plaza cannot be used for the construction
of market stalls, specially of residences, and that such structures constitute a nuisance
subject to abatement according to law. Town plazas are properties of public dominion,
to be devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in general. They are
outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the
municipality to private parties. Also, a portion of a public sidewalk is likewise beyond
the commerce of man. Any contract entered into in connection with the sidewalk, is
ipso facto null and ultra vires. The sidewalk was intended for and was used by the
public, in going from one place to another. The streets and public places of the city
shall be kept free and clear for the use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings
for the pedestrians, and the same shall only be used or occupied for other purposes as
provided by ordinance or regulation; stalls block the free passage of pedestrians
resulting to clogged with vehicular traffic. On the other hand, police power under the
general welfare clause authorizes the municipal council to enact such ordinances and
make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect
and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein. Thus, police
power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract.
Every contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it
contains an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal
order. This power can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the
contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general
welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject
to and limited by the paramount police power.
Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) [GR 71169, 22 December 1988]
Bel-Air Village Association Inc. (BAVA) vs. Intermediate Appellate Court [GR
74376]
Bel-Air Village Association Inc. (BAVA) vs. Court of Appeals [GR 76394],
Bel-Air Village Association Inc. (BAVA) vs. Court of Appeals [GR 78182]
Bel-Air Village Association Inc. (BAVA) vs. Court of Appeals [GR 82281]
Facts:
[GR 71169] Bel-Air Village is located north of Buendia Avenue extension across a
stretch of commercial block from Reposo Street in the west up to Zodiac Street in the
east. When Bel-Air Village was planned, this block between Reposo and Zodiac
Streets adjoining Buendia Avenue in front of the village was designated as a
commercial block. Bel-Air Village was owned and developed into a residential
subdivision in the 1950s by Makati Development Corporation (MDC), which in 1968
was merged with Ayala Corporation. Spouses Sangalang reside at 110 Jupiter St.
between Makati Ave. and Reposo St.; Spouses Gaston reside at 64 Jupiter St. between
Makati Ave. and Zodiac St.; Spouses Briones reside at 66 Jupiter St.; while Bel- Air
Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is the homeowners' association in Bel-Air Village
which takes care of the sanitation, security, traffic regulations and general welfare of
the village. The lots which were acquired by the Sangalangs, the Gastons, the
Brioneses in 1960, 1957 and 1958, respectively, all sold by MDC subject to certain
conditions and easements contained in Deed Restrictions which formed a part of each
deed of sale (i.e. being automatic members of Bel-Air Association who must abide by
the rules and regulations laid down by the Association [as per sanitation, security and
general welfare of the community]; that lots cannot be subdivided and only used for
residential purposes; that single family house be constructed in single lot; no
commercial or advertising signs placed or erected on the lot; no farm animals allowed,
pets allowed; easement of 2 meters within lot; lot not used for immoral or illegal trade
or activity; grass always trimmed; Restrictions in force for 50 years starting 15
January 1957). MDC constructed a fence on the commercial block along Jupiter Street
in 1966, although it was not part of the original plan. The fence was partially
destroyed in 1970 due to a typhoon. The fence was subsequently rebuilt by the Ayala.
Jupiter Street was widened in 1972, and the fence had to be destroyed. Upon request
of BAVA, the wall was rebuilt inside the boundary of the commercial block. Ayala
finally decided to subdivide and sell the lots in the commercial block between
Buendia and Jupiter. BAVA requested confirmation of use of the commercial lots. On
30 June 1972, Ayala likewise informed BAVA that in a few months it shall
subdivided and sell the commercial lots bordering the north side of Buendia Avenue
Extension from Reposo St. up to Zodiac St. Deed restrictions (building having set
back of 19 meters, and matters RE entrances and exits) are imposed in such
commercial lots to harmonize and blend with the development and welfare of Bel-Air
Village. Ayala further applied for special membership in BAVA of the commercial lot
owners, the application submitted to BAVA’s board of governors for decision. On 25
September 1972, height limitations for buildings were increased from 12.5 meters to
15 meters and Jupiter street is widened by 3.5 meters. The widening of the street
reduced the association dues to be remitted to BAVA, inasmuch that it now applies to
76,726 sq.m. rather than 81,590 sq.m. Due rates have increased from P0.5/sq.m in
1972 to P3/sq.m in 1980. On 4 April 1975, Makati enacted Ordinance 81, providing
for the zonification of Makati, which classified Bel-Air Village as a Class A
Residential Zone, with its boundary in the south extending to the center line of Jupiter
Street (Chapter 3, Article 1, Section 3.03, paragraph F). The Buendia Avenue
extension area was classified as Administrative Office Zone with its boundary in the
North-North East Extending also up to the center line of Jupiter Street (Chapter 3,
Article 1, Section 3.05, paragraph C). The Residential Zone and the Administrative
Office Zone have a common boundary along the center line of Jupiter Street. The
zoning was later followed under the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the
National Capital Region adopted by the Metro Manila Commission as Ordinance 81-
01 on 14 March 1981, with modification that Bel-Air Village is simply bounded in the
South-Southeast by Jupiter Street, and the block-deep strip along the northwest side of
Buendia Avenue Extension from Reposo to EDSA as High Intensity Commercial
Zone. Under the zoning classification, Jupiter Street is a common boundary of Bel-Air
Village and the commercial zone. On 17 January 1977, the Office of the Mayor of
Makati directed BAVA, in the interest of public welfare and purpose of easing traffic
congestion, the opening of the Amapola (Estrella-Mercedes; Palma gate-Villena),
Mercedes (EDSA-Imelda/Amapola junction), Zodiac (Mercedes-Buendia), Jupiter
(Zodiac-Reposo, connecting Metropolitan avenue to Pasong Tamo and V. Cruz
extension), Neptune (Makati ave.-Reposo), Orbit (F.Zobel/ Candelaria intersection –
Jupiter Paseo de Roxas; Mercedes- Buendia) streets of Bel-Air Village for public use.
On 10 February, BAVA replied, expressing concern of the residents about the opening
of the streets to general public and requesting the indefinite postponement of the plan
to open Jupiter St. to public vehicles. BAVA, however, voluntarily opened the other
streets. On 12 August 1977, the municipal officials of Makati allegedly opened,
destroyed and removed the gates constructed at the corner of Reposo St. and Jupiter
St. as well as gates/fences constructed at Jupiter Street and Makati Avenue forcibly;
thereby opening Jupiter street to public traffic. Increased traffic was observed along
Jupiter Street after its opening to public use. Purchasers of the commercial lots started
constructing their respective buildings and demolished the fence or wall within the
boundary of their lots. Many owners constructed their own fences and walls and
employed their own security guards. On 27 January 1978, Ayala donated the entire
Jupiter Street from Metropolitan Avenue to Zodiac Street to BAVA. With the opening
of the entire Jupiter street to public traffic, the residential lots located in the northern
side of Jupiter Street ceased to be used for purely residential purposes, and became
commercial in character. On 29 October 1979, spouses Sangalang filed an action for
damages against Ayala predicated on both breach of contract and on tort or quasi-
delict. A supplemental complaint was later filed by the Sangalangs to augment the
reliefs prayed for in the original complaint because of alleged supervening events
which occurred during the trial of the case. Claiming to be similarly situated, spouses
Gaston, Briones, and BAVA intervened in the case. The CFI Pasig rendered a decision
in favor of the Sangalangs awarding them P500,000 as actual and consequential
damages, P2M as moral damages, P500,000 as exemplary damages, P100,000 as
attorney’s fees, and the cost of suit. The intervenors Gaston and Briones were awarded
P400,000 as consequential damages, P500,000 as moral damages, P500,000 as
exemplary damages, P50,000 as attorney’s fees, and the cost of suit; each. Intervenor
BAVA was awarded the same except for moral damages. The damages awarded bear
legal interest from the filing of the complaint. Ayala was also ordered to
restore/reconstruct the perimeter wall at the original position in 1966 at its own
expense within 6 months from finality of judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the decision for not being supported by facts and law on the
matter; and entered another, dismissing the case for lack of cause of action; without
pronouncement as to costs. Sangalang appealed.
[GR 74376] The Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) filed and action to enforce the
restrictions stipulated in the deeds of sale executed by the Ayala Corporation. BAVA
originally brought the complaint in the RTC Makati, principally for specific
performance, BAVA alleging that Rosario de Jesus Tenorio allowed Cecilia
Gonzalvez to occupy and convert the house at 60 Jupiter Street into a restaurant,
without its knowledge and consent, and in violation of the deed restrictions which
provide that the lot and building thereon must be used only for residential purposes
upon which the prayed-for main relief was for Tenorio and Gonzalves to permanently
refrain from using the premises as commercial and to comply with the terms of the
Deed Restrictions. The trial court dismissed the complaint on a procedural ground,
i.e., pendency of an identical action, Civil Case 32346 (BAVA v. Tenorio). The Court
of Appeals affirmed, and held, in addition, that Jupiter Street "is classified as High
density commercial (C-3) zone as per Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance 81-01 for
NCR following its own ruling in AC-GR 66649 (BAVA v. Hy-Land Realty &
Development Corp.). BAVA appealed.
[GR 76394] Spouses Eduardo Romualdez and Buena Tioseco are the owners of a
house and lot located at 108 Jupiter St (TCT 332394, Registry of Deeds Rizal).At the
time they acquired the subject house and lot, several restrictions were already
annotated on the reverse side of their title. The restriction(s) remain in force for 50
years from 15 January 1957, unless sooner cancelled in its entirety by 2/3 vote of the
members in good standing of the Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA). However, the
Association may from time to time, add new ones, amend or abolish particular
restrictions or parts thereof by majority rule. During the early part of 1979, BAVA
noted that certain renovations and constructions were being made by the spouses on
the premises. The latter failed to inform BAVA of the activity, even upon request, that
prompted BAVA to send its chief security officer to visit the premises on 23 March
1979 and found out that the spouses were putting up a bake and coffee shop. The
spouses were reminded that they were violating the deed restriction, but the latter
proceeded with the construction of the bake shop. On 30 April 1979, BAVA wrote the
spouses to desist from using the premises for commercial purposes, with threat of suit.
Despite the warning, the spouses proceeded with the construction of their bake shop.
The trial court adjudged in favor of BAVA. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision on the strength of its holding in AC-GR 66649. BAVA elevated the
matter to the Supreme Court by a petition for review on certiorari. The Court initially
denied the petition for lack of merit, for which BAVA sought a reconsideration.
Pending resolution, the case was referred to the Second Division and thereafter, to the
Court En Banc en consulta. Per Resolution, dated 29 April 1988, the case was
consolidated with GR 74376 and 82281.
[GR 78182] Dolores Filley leased her building and lot situated at 205 Reposo Street to
the advertising firm J. Romero and Associates, in alleged violation of deed restrictions
which stipulated that Filley's lot could only be used for residential purposes. The Bel
-Air Village Association (BAVA) sought judgment from the lower court ordering the
Filley and J.Romero to permanently refrain from using the premises in question as
commercial and to comply with the terms of the deed restrictions. The trial court
granted the relief sought for by BAVA with the a additional imposition of exemplary
damages of P50,000.00 and attorney's fees of P10,000.00. The trial court gave
emphasis to the restrictive clauses contained in Filley's deed of sale from BAVA,
which made the conversion of the building into a commercial one a violation. Appeal
was made claiming that the restrictions in the deed of sale are outmoded. BAVA on
the other hand relied on a rigid interpretation of the contractual stipulations agreed
upon with Filley, in effect arguing that the restrictions are valid ad infinitum. The
Court of Appeals overturned the lower court, observing that J. Romero & Associates
had been given authority to open a commercial office by the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission.
[GR 82281] Violeta Moncal, owner of a parcel of land with a residential house
constructed thereon situated at 104 Jupiter Street, leased her property to Majal
Development Corporation, without the consent of the Bel-Air Village Association
(BAVA). She purchased the lot from Makati Development Corporation. The lot in
question is restricted to be used for residential purposes only as part of the deed
restrictions annotated on its title. It is on the same side of the street where there are
restaurants, clinics, placement or employment agencies and other commercial or
business establishments. These establishments, however, were sued by BAVA in the
proper court. The trial court dismissed the BAVA's complaint, a dismissal affirmed on
appeal. The appellate court declared that the opening of Jupiter Street to human and
vehicular traffic, and the commercialization of the Municipality of Makati in general,
were circumstances that had made compliance by Moncal with the aforesaid "deed
restrictions" "extremely difficult and unreasonable, a development that had excused
compliance altogether under Article 1267 of the Civil Code. BAVA appealed.
Short Facts:
GR 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281 are efforts to enforce the "deed restrictions"
against specific residents of Jupiter Street and, with respect to GR 78182, Reposo
Street. The residents have allegedly converted their residences into commercial
establishments (a restaurant in GR 74376, a bakery and coffee shop in GR 76394, an
advertising firm in GR 78182; and a construction company, apparently, in GR 82281)
in violation of the said restrictions. Their mother case, GR 71169 is, on the other hand,
a petition to hold the vendor itself, Ayala Corporation (formerly Makati Development
Corporation), liable for tearing down the perimeter wall along Jupiter Street that had
theretofore closed its commercial section from the residences of Bel-Air Village and
ushering in, as a consequence, the full "commercialization" of Jupiter Street, in
violation of the very restrictions it had authored. The Court of Appeals dismissed all 5
appeals on the basis primarily of its ruling in AC-GR 66649, "Bel-Air Village, Inc. v.
Hy-Land Realty Development Corporation, et al.," in which the appellate court
explicitly rejected claims under the same "deed restrictions" as a result of Ordinance
81 enacted by the Government of the Municipality of Makati, as well as
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance 8101 promulgated by the Metropolitan Manila
Commission, which two ordinances allegedly allowed the use of Jupiter Street both
for residential and commercial purposes. It was likewise held that these twin measures
were valid as a legitimate exercise of police power.
Issue:
Whether the constitutional guarantee on non-impairment of contracts can be raised as
a deterrent to the exercise of police power.
Held:
All contracts are subject to the overriding demands, needs, and interests of the greater
number as the State may determine in the legitimate exercise of police power. The
Court guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the "law between the
contracting parties," but while it is so, it cannot contravene "law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy." Above all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent to
police power, designed precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the
common good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary. Police power
is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Invariably described as "the
most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in a sense, the greatest and
most powerful attribute of government," the exercise of the power may be judicially
inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable,
there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee. Police power is elastic and must be responsive to various
social conditions; it is not confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents
resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of
life. Public welfare, when clashing with the individual right to property, should be
made to prevail through the state's exercise of its police power. Herein, the MMC
Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of police power, as the ordinance is neither
capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable; but that it is based on compelling interests of
general welfare. The restrictive easements are similar to any other contract, and should
not deter the valid exercise of police power. The MMC has reclassified Jupiter Street
into a “high density commercial zone, pursuant to Ordinance 81-01. Sangalang,
BAVA, et. al., thus have no cause of action on the strength alone of said “deed
restrictions.”
Ortigas v. Court of Appeals [GR 126102, 4 December 2000]
Facts:
On 25 August 1976, Ortigas & Company sold to Emilia Hermoso, a parcel of land
located in Greenhills Subdivision IV, San Juan, Metro Manila (TCT 0737) with
conditions duly annotated on the certificate of title issued to Emilia. In 1981, the
Metropolitan Manila Commission (now MMDA) enacted MMC Ordinance 81-01
(Comprehensive Zoning Area for the National Capital Region), which reclassified as a
commercial area a portion of Ortigas Avenue from Madison to Roosevelt Streets of
Greenhills Subdivision where the lot is located. On 8 June 1984, Ismael Mathay III
leased the lot from Emilia Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp.. The lease
contract did not specify the purposes of the lease. Thereupon, Mathay constructed a
single story commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company.
On 18 January 1995, Ortigas filed a complaint against Emilia Hermoso with the RTC
Pasig (Branch 261, Civil Case 64931), seeking the demolition of the said commercial
structure for having violated the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale. The
complaint was later amended to implead Ismael G. Mathay III and J.P. Hermoso
Realty Corp., which have 10% interest in the lot. In his answer, Mathay III denied any
knowledge of the restrictions on the use of the lot and filed a cross-claim against the
Hermosos. On 16 June 1995, the trial court issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
On 29 June 1995, Mathay III moved to set aside the injunctive order, but the trial
court denied the motion. Mathay III then filed with the CA a special civil action for
certiorari (CA-GR SP 39193), ascribing to the trial court grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the writ of preliminary injunction. He claimed that MMC Ordinance 81-01
classified the area where the lot was located as commercial area and said ordinance
must be read into the 25 August 1976 Deed of Sale as a concrete exercise of police
power. Ortigas & Company averred that restrictions duly annotated on the title must
prevail over the ordinance. On 25 March 1996, the appellate court granted the petition,
nullified and set aside the assailed orders. The appellate court held that the MMC
Ordinance effectively nullified the restrictions allowing only residential use of the
property in question. Ortigas seasonably moved for reconsideration, but the appellate
court denied it on 13 August 1996. Ortigas filed the petition for review.
Issue:
Whether ordinances, in exercise of police power, be given retroactive effect and
impair vested rights and contracts.
Held:
In general, laws are to be construed as having only prospective operation. Lex
prospicit, non respicit. Equally settled, only laws existing at the time of the execution
of a contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are
specifically intended to have retroactive effect. A later law which enlarges, abridges,
or in any manner changes the intent of the parties to the contract necessarily impairs
the contract itself and cannot be given retroactive effect without violating the
constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts. One exception involves
police power. A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern
certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably
impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to
future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. Non-impairment of
contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate
exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of
valid police power must be read into every contract. MMC Ordinance 81-01 is a
legitimate police power measure as previously held in Sangalang vs. IAC. Thus,
following the ruling in Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Feati Bank & Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533
(1979), the contractual stipulations annotated on the Torrens Title must yield to the
ordinance. When that stretch was reclassified, the restrictions in the contract of sale
were deemed extinguished by the retroactive operation of the zoning ordinance and
could no longer be enforced. While Philippine legal system upholds the sanctity of
contract so that a contract is deemed law between the contracting parties, nonetheless,
stipulations in a contract cannot contravene "law, morals, good customs, public order,
or public policy." Otherwise such stipulations would be deemed null and void.
Tiro v. Hontanosas [GR L-32312, 25 November 1983]
Facts:
Zafra Financing Enterprise extended loans to public school teachers in Cebu City and
the teachers concerned executed promissory notes and special powers of attorney in
favor of Zafra to take and collect their salary checks from the Division Office in Cebu
City of the Bureau of Public Schools. Aurelio Tiro, Superintendent of Schools in Cebu
City, forbade the collection of checks by persons other than the employees concerned
with Circular 21 (series of 1969, Memorandum Order 93 of the Executive Office
dated 5 February 1968 was quoted) dated 5 December 1969. Zafra sued Tiro with the
now defunct Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu (Civil Case 11616). Zafra sought to
compel Tiro to honor the special powers of attorney, to declare Circular 21 to be
illegal, and to make Tiro pay attorney’s fees and damages. The trial court granted the
prayer but the claim for money was disallowed on the ground that he acted in good
faith in implementing Circular 21. Tiro seeks in the petition for review before the
Supreme Court a reversal of the trial court’s decision.
Issue:
Whether Circular 21 impairs the obligations of contracts between Zafra Financing
Enterprise and the teachers.

Held:
The salary check of a government officer or employee such as a teacher does not
belong to him before it is physically delivered to him. Until that time the check
belongs to the Government. Accordingly, before there is actual delivery of the check,
the payee has no power over it; he cannot assign it without the consent of the
Government. The Circular, further, is authorized by relevant statutes such as the
Revised Administrative Code (Section 79b, Power to regulate) and the Magna Carta
for Teachers (RA 4670, Section 21, Deductive prohibited). The Circular does not
impair the obligation of contracts with the teachers as the Circular does not prevent
Zafra from collecting the loans but merely makes the Government a non-participant in
their collection.
Caleon v. Agus Development Corp. [GR 77365, 7 April 1992]
Facts:
Agus Development Corporation (ADC) is the owner of a parcel of land located at
Lealtad, Sampaloc, Manila, which it leased to Rita Caleon for a monthly rental of
P180.00. ADC constructed on the lot leased a 4- door apartment building. Without the
consent of ADC, Caleon sub-leased 2 of the 4 doors of the apartment to Rolando
Guevarra and Felicisima Estrada for a monthly rental of P350.00 each. Upon learning
of the sub-lease, ADC through counsel demanded in writing that Caleon vacate the
leased premises. For Caleon’s failure to comply with the demand, ADC filed a
complaint for ejectment with Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila (Branch 12),
citing the provisions of Batas Pambansa 25, Section 5, as ground, which is the
unauthorized sub-leasing of part of the leased premises to third persons without
securing the consent of the lessor within the required 60-day period from the
promulgation of the new law (BP 25). After trial, the court a quo rendered its decision
ordering Caleon and all persons claiming possession under her (a) to vacate the
premises alluded to in the complaint; (b) to remove whatever improvement she
introduced on the property; (c) to pay ADC the amount of P2,000.00 as attorney's
fees; and (d) to pay the costs. Caleon appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) and on 24 November 1980, the RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.
The RTC decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals for review. The appellate
court, on 28 January 1987, dismissed the petition outright for not being prima facie
meritorious. Caleon filed the petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether legislation, appropriate to safeguard vital interests of the people, may modify
or abrogate contracts already in effect.
Held:
The constitutional guaranty of non- impairment of obligations of contract is limited by
and subject to the exercise of police power of the State in the interest of public health,
safety, morals and general welfare. In spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State
continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation
appropriate to safeguarding said interest may modify or abrogate contracts already in
effect. Every contract affecting public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it
contains an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal
order. This power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract,
or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare.
Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and
limited by the paramount police power. Batas Pambansa 25, "An Act Regulating
Rentals of Dwelling Units or of Land On Which Another's Dwelling is Located and
For Other Purposes" shows that the subject matter is the regulation of rentals and is
intended only for dwelling units with specified monthly rentals constructed before the
law became effective. BP 25 is derived from PD 20 which has been declared by the
Court as a police power legislation, applicable to leases entered into prior to 14 July
1971 (effectivity date of RA 6539), so that the applicability thereof to existing
contracts cannot be denied.
Meralco v. Laguna [GR 131359, 5 May 1999]
Facts:
On various dates, certain municipalities of the Province of Laguna, including, Biñan,
Sta. Rosa, San Pedro, Luisiana, Calauan and Cabuyao, by virtue of existing laws then
in effect, issued resolutions through their respective municipal councils granting
franchise in favor of the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) for
the supply of electric light, heat and power within their concerned areas. On 19
January 1983, Meralco was likewise granted a franchise by the National
Electrification Administration to operate an electric light and power service in the
Municipality of Calamba, Laguna. On 12 September 1991, Republic Act 7160 (1991
Local Government Code [LGC]) was enacted to take effect on 1 January 1992
enjoining local government units to create their own sources of revenue and to levy
taxes, fees and charges, subject to the limitations expressed therein, consistent with
the basic policy of local autonomy. Pursuant to the provisions of the Code, Laguna
enacted Provincial Ordinance 01-92, effective 1 January 1993, which provided a
Franchise Tax (Section 2.09) . On the basis of the ordinance, Provincial Treasurer sent
a demand letter to Meralco for the corresponding tax payment. Meralco paid the tax
under protest. A formal claim for refund was thereafter sent by Meralco to the
Provincial Treasurer of Laguna claiming that the franchise tax it had paid and
continued to pay to the National Government pursuant to PD 551 (Section 1) already
included the franchise tax imposed by the Provincial Tax Ordinance. On 28 August
1995, the claim for refund of Meralco was denied in a letter signed by Governor Lina.
In denying the claim, the province relied on a more recent law, RA 7160 (1991 LGC),
than the old decree invoked by Meralco (PD 551). On 14 February 1996, Meralco
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a complaint for
refund, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO,
against the Province of Laguna and Balazo in his capacity as the Provincial Treasurer
of Laguna. The trial court, in its assailed decision of 30 September 1997, dismissed
the complaint and declared the ordinance valid, binding, reasonable, and enforceable.
Hence, the petition.

Issue:
Whether the withdrawal of tax exemption to Meralco by the local government unit
(province) violates the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.
Held:
The Local Government Code of 1991 has incorporated and adopted, by and large, the
provisions of the now repealed Local Tax Code (PD 231 pursuant to Section 2, Article
XI, 1973 Constitution; in effect since 1 July 1973). The 1991 Code explicitly
authorizes provincial governments, notwithstanding "any exemption granted by any
law or other special law to impose a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise (Section
137). Indicative of the legislative intent to carry out the Constitutional mandate of
vesting broad tax powers to local government units, the Local Government Code has
effectively withdrawn tax exemptions or incentives theretofore enjoyed by certain
entities (Section 193). While tax exemptions contained in special franchises are in the
nature of contracts and a part of the inducement for carrying on the franchise, these
exemptions, nevertheless are far from being strictly contractual in nature. Contractual
tax exemptions, in the real sense of the term and where the non-impairment clause of
the Constitution can rightly be invoked, are those agreed to by the taxing authority in
contracts, such as those contained in government bonds or debentures, lawfully
entered into by them under enabling laws in which the government, acting in its
private capacity, sheds its cloak of authority and waives its governmental immunity.
Truly, tax exemptions of this kind may not be revoked without impairing the
obligations of contracts. These contractual tax exemptions, however, are not to be
confused with tax exemptions granted under franchises. A franchise partakes the
nature of a grant which is beyond the purview of the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution. Indeed, Article XII, Section 11, of the 1987 Constitution, like its
precursor provisions in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, is explicit that no
franchise for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except under the
condition that such privilege shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by
Congress as and when the common good so requires. Indeed, Article XII, Section 11,
of the 1987 Constitution is explicit that no franchise for the operation of a public
utility shall be granted except under the condition that such privilege shall be subject
to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress as and when the common good so
requires.
Alvero vs. Dizon [GR L-342, 4 May 1946]
Facts:
On 12 February 1945, while the battle for Manila was raging, soldiers of the United
States Army, accompanied by men of Filipino Guerrilla Forces, placed Aurelio S.
Alvero under arrest, having been suspected of collaboration with the enemy, and
seized and took certain papers from his house in Pasay, Rizal. On or about 4 October
1945, Alvero was accused of treason, in criminal case 3 of the People's Court; after
which, on 1 December 1945, he filed a petition, demanding the return of the papers
allegedly seized and taken from his house. Alvero also filed a petition for bail, at the
hearing of which the prosecution presented certain papers and documents, which were
admitted as part of its evidence, and said petition was denied. At the trial of the case
on the merits, the prosecution again presented said papers and documents, which were
admitted as part of its evidence, and were marked as exhibits. On 26 February 1946,
the judges issued an order denying the petition for the return of the documents, and
admitted as competent evidence the documents presented by the prosecution. On the
same date that said order was issued, denying the petition for the return of said
documents, Alvero asked for the reconsideration of said order, which was also denied.
Alvero filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the documents seized by United States Army personnel at Alvero’s home can
be used as evidence against the latter.
Held:
The right of officers and men of the United States Army to arrest Alvero, as a
collaborationist suspect, and to seize his personal papers, without any search warrant,
in the zone of military operations, is unquestionable, under the provisions of article 4,
Chapter II, Section I, of the Regulations relative to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land of the Hague Conventions of 1907, authorizing the seizure of military papers in
the possession of prisoners of war; and also under the proclamation, dated 29
December 1944, issued by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, as Commander in Chief of the
United States Army, declaring his purpose to remove certain citizens of the
Philippines, who had voluntarily given aid and comfort to the enemy, in violation of
the allegiance due the Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of
the Philippines, when apprehended, from any position of political and economic
influence in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the duration of the war.
The purpose of the constitutional provisions against unlawful searches and seizures is
to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful
invasions of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or
judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted. But it
does not prohibit the Government from taking advantage of unlawful searches made
by a private person or under authority of state law. Herein, as the soldiers of the
United States Army, that took and seized certain papers and documents from the
residence of Alvero, were not acting as agents or on behalf of the Government of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; and that those papers and documents came into the
possession of the authorities of the Commonwealth Government, through the Office of
the CIC of the United States Army in Manila, the use and presentation of said papers
and documents, as evidence for the prosecution against Alvero, at the trial of his case
for treason, before the People's Court, cannot now be legally attacked, on the ground
of unlawful or unreasonable searches and seizures, or on any other constitutional
ground, as declared by the Supreme Court of the United States in similar cases. (See
Burdeau vs. McDowell, 256 U. S., 465; Gambino vs. United States, 275 U. S., 310.)
People vs. Andre Marti [GR 81561, 18 January 1991]
Facts:
On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to
the booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino
Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them 4 gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes
(the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. Marti informed
Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Marti
filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport
number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely,
"WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland." Anita Reyes did not
inspect the packages as Marti refused, who assured the former that the packages
simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In
view of Marti's representation, the 4 packages were then placed inside a brown
corrugated box, with styro-foam placed at the bottom and on top of the packages, and
sealed with masking tape. Before delivery of Marti's box to the Bureau of Customs
and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes),
following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection, where
a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. Job pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding
from the opening of one of the gloves, and took several grams of the contents thereof.
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting
a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. At
the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the box
containing Marti's packages was opened, yielding dried marijuana leaves, or cake-like
(bricks) dried marijuana leaves. The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of
the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody
of the said effects. Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no avail,
inasmuch as the latter's stated address was the Manila Central Post Office. Thereafter,
an Information was filed against Marti for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional
Trial Court, Branch XLIX) rendered the decision, convicting Marti of violation of
Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e)(i),
Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act. Marti appealed.
Issue:
Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accused's
constitutional rights, be invoked against the State.
Held:
In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The contraband herein, having come
into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing the accused's rights
against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the
same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by
Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to
observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that
which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search.
Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the
arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution. The
constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as
a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the search
is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if
it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or
initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes,
as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
Bache & Co. (Phil.) Inc. vs. Ruiz [GR L-32409, 27 February 1971]
Facts:
On 24 February 1970, Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a
letter addressed to Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant
against Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. and Frederick E. Seggerman for violation of Section
46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), in relation to all other pertinent
provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing
Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon to make and file the application for search
warrant which was attached to the letter. In the afternoon of the following day, De
Leon and his witness, Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: Vera's letter-request; an
application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by De Leon; an
affidavit of Logronio subscribed before De Leon; a deposition in printed form of
Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a
search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by Judge. At that time the
Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy
Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had
adjourned, the Judge was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The
stenographer, upon request of the Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and
thereafter, the Judge asked Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his
deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for
perjury. The Judge signed de Leon's application for search warrant and Logronio's
deposition. Search Warrant 2-M-70 was then signed by Judge and accordingly issued.
3 days later (a Saturday), the BIR agents served the search warrant to the corporation
and Seggerman at the offices of the corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. The
corporation's lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or
transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded
with their search which yielded 6 boxes of documents. On 3 March 1970, the
corporation and Seggerman filed a petition with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Rizal praying that the search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the search
warrant be declared null and void, and that Vera, Logronio, de Leon, et. al., be ordered
to pay the corporation and Seggerman, jointly and severally, damages and attorney's
fees. After hearing and on 29 July 1970, the court issued an order dismissing the
petition for dissolution of the search warrant. In the meantime, or on 16 April 1970,
the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax assessments on the corporation in the total
sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the documents thus seized. The
corporation and Seggerman filed an action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.
Issue:
Whether the corporation has the right to contest the legality of the seizure of
documents from its office.
Held:
The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. In Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al.
(GR L-19550, 19 June 1967; 20 SCRA 383) the Supreme Court impliedly recognized
the right of a corporation to object against unreasonable searches and seizures; holding
that the corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of the corporate officers, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the
interest of each of them in said corporations, whatever, the offices they hold therein
may be; and that the corporate officers therefore may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations, since the right to object to the admission of said papers
in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them
in their individual capacity. The distinction between the Stonehill case and the present
case is that: in the former case, only the officers of the various corporations in whose
offices documents, papers and effects were searched and seized were the petitioners;
while in the latter, the corporation to whom the seized documents belong, and whose
rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a petitioner. On that score, the corporation
herein stands on a different footing from the corporations in Stonehill. Moreover,
herein, the search warrant was void inasmuch as First, there was no personal
examination conducted by the Judge of the complainant (De Leon) and his witness
(Logronio). The Judge did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which
could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there was probable cause
against Bache & Co. and Seggerman. The participation of the Judge in the
proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant 2-M-70 was thus limited to
listening to the stenographer's readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against
the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his
witness. This cannot be consider a personal examination. Second, the search warrant
was issued for more than one specific offense. The search warrant was issued for at
least 4 distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the violation of Section 46(a),
Section 72 and208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and the fourth is the
violation of Section 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or gross
value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Even in their
classification the 6 provisions are embraced in 2 different titles: Sections 46(a), 53, 72
and 73 are under Title (Income Tax); while Sections 208 and 209 are under Title V
(Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation). Lastly, the search warrant does not
particularly describe the things to be seized. Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 tends to
defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of general
warrants, for the language used therein is so all-embracing as to include all
conceivable records of the corporation, which, if seized, could possibly render its
business inoperative. Thus, Search Warrant 2-M-70 is null and void.
Stonehill vs. Diokno [GR L-19550, 19 June 1967]
Facts:
Upon application of the officers of the government, Special Prosecutors Pedro D.
Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Manases G.
Reyes; Judge Amado Roan (Municipal Court of Manila), Judge Roman Cansino
(Municipal Court of Manila), Judge Hermogenes Caluag (Court of First Instance of
Rizal-Quezon City Branch), and Judge Damian Jimenez (Municipal Court of Quezon
City) issued, on different dates, a total of 42 search warrants against Harry S.
Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, HJohn J. Brooks, and Karl Beck, and/or the corporations
of which they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search the said persons
and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and
take possession of the following personal property to wit: "Books of accounts,
financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)" as "the subject of the offense; stolen or
embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as
the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted
to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code." Alleging that the search warrants are
null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court, Stonehill, et.
al. filed with the Supreme Court the original action for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and injunction. On 22 March 1962, the Supreme Court issued the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated 29
June 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents
and things seized from the offices of the corporations are concerned; but, the
injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and
seized in the residences of Stonehill, et. al.
Issue:
Whether Stonehill, et. al. can assail the legality of the contested warrants that allowed
seizure of documents, papers and other effects in the corporate offices, and other
places besides their residences.
Held:
Stonehill, et. al. maintained that the search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants and that, accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority thereof are null
and void. No warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and the warrant shall particularly
describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with
in the contested warrants. The grave violation of the Constitution made in the
application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description
therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized. The warrants authorized the
search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of Stonehill, et.
al., regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants
sanctioned the seizure of all records of the corporate officers and the corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. However, the
documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the
offices of the corporations and (b) those found seized in the residences of Stonehill, et.
al. As regards the first group, Stonehill, et. al. have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for
the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate
and distinct from the personality of Stonehill, et. al., regardless of the amount of
shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever
the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a
seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,
and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot
be availed of by third parties. Consequently, Stonehill, et. al. may not validly object to
the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the
offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to
the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to
whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity. With respect to the documents,
papers and things seized in the residences of Stonehill, et. al., the 29 June 1962
Resolution of the Supreme Court, denying the lifting of the writ of preliminary
injunction previously issued by the Court on the documents, papers and things seized
in the residences, in effect, restrained the prosecutors from using them in evidence
against Stonehill, et. al. Thus, the Court held that the warrants for the search of 3
residences are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal;
that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the
documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences is made permanent,
that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other
effects so seized in the residences are concerned; and that the petition herein is
dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other
effects seized in the 29 places, offices and other premises.
Zurcher vs. Stanford Daily [436 US 547, 31 May 1978]
Facts:
On 9 April 1971, officers of the Palo Alto Police Department and of the Santa Clara
County Sheriff's Department responded to a call from the director of the Stanford
University Hospital requesting the removal of a large group of demonstrators who had
seized the hospital's administrative offices and occupied them since the previous
afternoon. After several futile efforts to persuade the demonstrators to leave
peacefully, more drastic measures were employed. The police chose to force their way
in at the west end of the corridor. As they did so, a group of demonstrators emerged
through the doors at the east end and, armed with sticks and clubs, attacked the group
of nine police officers stationed there. All nine were injured. The officers themselves
were able to identify only two of their assailants, but one of them did see at least one
person photographing the assault at the east doors. On April 11 (Sunday), a special
edition of the Stanford Daily (Daily), a student newspaper published at Stanford
University, carried articles and photographs devoted to the hospital protest and the
violent clash between demonstrators and police. The photographs carried the byline of
a Daily staff member and indicated that he had been at the east end of the hospital
hallway where he could have photographed the assault on the 9 officers. The next day,
the Santa Clara County District Attorney's Office secured a warrant from the
Municipal Court for an immediate search of the Daily's offices for negatives, film, and
pictures showing the events and occurrences at the hospital on the evening of April 9.
The warrant issued on a finding of "just, probable and reasonable cause for believing
that: Negatives and photographs and films, evidence material and relevant to the
identity of the perpetrators of felonies, to wit, Battery on a Peace Officer, and Assault
with Deadly Weapon, will be located [on the premises of the Daily]." The warrant
affidavit contained no allegation or indication that members of the Daily staff were in
any way involved in unlawful acts at the hospital. The search pursuant to the warrant
was conducted later that day by 4 police officers and took place in the presence of
some members of the Daily staff. The Daily's photographic laboratories, filing
cabinets, desks, and wastepaper baskets were searched. Locked drawers and rooms
were not opened. The search revealed only the photographs that had already been
published on April 11, and no materials were removed from the Daily's office. A
month later the Daily and various members of its staff brought a civil action in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the police officers who conducted
the search, the chief of police, the district attorney and one of his deputies, and the
judge who had issued the warrant. The complaint alleged that the search of the Daily's
office had deprived respondents under color of state law of rights secured to them by
the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The
District Court denied the request for an injunction but, on the newspaper staff's motion
for summary judgment, granted declaratory relief. The court did not question the
existence of probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed and to believe
that relevant evidence would be found on the Daily's premises. It held, however, that
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments forbade the issuance of a warrant to search
for materials in possession of one not suspected of crime unless there is probable
cause to believe, based on facts presented in a sworn affidavit, that a subpoena duces
tecum would be impracticable. The District Court further held that where the innocent
object of the search is a newspaper, First Amendment interests are also involved and
that such a search is constitutionally permissible "only in the rare circumstance where
there is a clear showing that (1) important materials will be destroyed or removed
from the jurisdiction; and (2) a restraining order would be futile." Since these
preconditions to a valid warrant had not been satisfied, the search of the Daily's
offices was declared to have been illegal. The Court of Appeals affirmed per curiam,
adopting the opinion of the District Court. Zurcher, et. al. filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the Fourth Amendment is to be construed and applied to the "third party"
search, the recurring situation where state authorities have probable cause to believe
that fruits, instrumentalities, or other evidence of crime is located on identified
property but do not then have probable cause to believe that the owner or possessor of
the property is himself implicated in the crime that has occurred or is occurring.
Held:
First, a State is not prevented by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments from issuing
a warrant to search for evidence simply because the owner or possessor of the place to
be searched is not reasonably suspected of criminal involvement. The critical element
in a reasonable search is not that the property owner is suspected of crime but that
there is reasonable cause to believe that the "things" to be searched for and seized are
located on the property to which entry is sought. Second, the District Court's new rule
denying search warrants against third parties and insisting on subpoenas would
undermine law enforcement efforts since search warrants are often used early in an
investigation before all the perpetrators of a crime have been identified; and the
seemingly blameless third party may be implicated. The delay in employing a
subpoena duces tecum could easily result in disappearance of the evidence. Nor would
the cause of privacy be served since search warrants are more difficult to obtain than
subpoenas. Lastly, properly administered, the preconditions for a search warrant
(probable cause, specificity with respect to the place to be searched and the things to
be seized, and overall reasonableness), which must be applied with particular
exactitude when First Amendment interests would be endangered by the search, are
adequate safeguards against the interference with the press' ability to gather, analyze,
and disseminate news that respondents claim would ensue from use of warrants for
third-party searches of newspaper offices.
Wilson vs. Layne [526 US 603, 24 May 1999]
Facts:
In early 1992, the Attorney General of the United States approved "Operation
Gunsmoke," a special national fugitive apprehension program in which United States
Marshals worked with state and local police to apprehend dangerous criminals. This
effective program ultimately resulted in over 3,000 arrests in 40 metropolitan areas.
One of the dangerous fugitives identified as a target of "Operation Gunsmoke" was
Dominic Wilson, the son of Charles and Geraldine Wilson. Dominic Wilson had
violated his probation on previous felony charges of robbery, theft, and assault with
intent to rob, and the police computer listed "caution indicators" that he was likely to
be armed, to resist arrest, and to "assault police." The computer also listed his address
as 909 North StoneStreet Avenue in Rockville, Maryland. Unknown to the police, this
was actually the home of Dominic Wilson's parents. Thus, in April 1992, the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County issued three arrest warrants for Dominic Wilson, one
for each of his probation violations. The warrants were each addressed to "any duly
authorized peace officer," and commanded such officers to arrest him and bring him
"immediately" before the Circuit Court to answer an indictment as to his probation
violation. The warrants made no mention of media presence or assistance. In the early
morning hours of 16 April 1992, a Gunsmoke team of Deputy United States Marshals
and Montgomery County Police officers assembled to execute the Dominic Wilson
warrants. The team was accompanied by a reporter and a photographer from the
Washington Post, who had been invited by the Marshals to accompany them on their
mission as part of a Marshal's Service ride-along policy. At 6:45 a.m., the officers,
with media representatives in tow, entered the dwelling at 909 North StoneStreet
Avenue in the Lincoln Park neighborhood of Rockville. Charles and Geraldine Wilson
were still in bed when they heard the officers enter the home. Charles Wilson, dressed
only in a pair of briefs, ran into the living room to investigate. Discovering at least 5
men in street clothes with guns in his living room, he angrily demanded that they state
their business, and repeatedly cursed the officers. Believing him to be an angry
Dominic Wilson, the officers quickly subdued him on the floor. Geraldine Wilson
next entered the living room to investigate, wearing only a nightgown. She observed
her husband being restrained by the armed officers. When their protective sweep was
completed, the officers learned that Dominic Wilson was not in the house, and they
departed. During the time that the officers were in the home, the Washington Post
photographer took numerous pictures. The print reporter was also apparently in the
living room observing the confrontation between the police and Charles Wilson. At no
time, however, were the reporters involved in the execution of the arrest warrant.
Charles and Geraldine Wilson sued the law enforcement officials in their personal
capacities for money damages, and contended that the officers' actions in bringing
members of the media to observe and record the attempted execution of the arrest
warrant violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court denied the police
officers' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. On
interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals, a divided panel reversed and held that
the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The case was twice reheard en banc,
where a divided Court of Appeals again upheld the defense of qualified immunity.
The Court of Appeals declined to decide whether the actions of the police violated the
Fourth Amendment. It concluded instead that because no court had held (at the time of
the search) that media presence during a police entry into a residence violated the
Fourth Amendment, the right allegedly violated by petitioners was not "clearly
established" and thus qualified immunity was proper. 141 F. 3d 111 (CA4 1998). Five
judges dissented, arguing that the officers' actions did violate the Fourth Amendment,
and that the clearly established protections of the Fourth Amendment were violated.
Issue:
Whether the police officers were justified to bring along the Washington Post
reporters in the execution of the warrant inside the house of Charles and Geraldine
Wilson.
Held:
No. Although the officers undoubtedly were entitled to enter the Wilson home in order
to execute the arrest warrant for Dominic Wilson, they were not entitled to bring a
newspaper reporter and a photographer with them. While it does not mean that every
police action while inside a home must be explicitly authorized by the text of the
warrant (Fourth Amendment allows temporary detainer of homeowner while police
search the home pursuant to warrant), the Fourth Amendment does require that police
actions in execution of a warrant be related to the objectives of the authorized
intrusion (The purposes justifying a police search strictly limit the permissible extent
of the search). Certainly the presence of reporters inside the home was not related to
the objectives of the authorized intrusion. Inasmuch as that the reporters did not
engage in the execution of the warrant and did not assist the police in their task, the
reporters were not present for any reason related to the justification for police entry
into the home--the apprehension of Dominic Wilson. This is not a case in which the
presence of the third parties directly aided in the execution of the warrant. Where the
police enter a home under the authority of a warrant to search for stolen property, the
presence of third parties for the purpose of identifying the stolen property has long
been approved by this Court and our common-law tradition. The claim of the officers,
that the presence of the Washington Post reporters in the Wilsons' home nonetheless
served a number of legitimate law enforcement purposes ignores, the importance of
the right of residential privacy at the core of the Fourth Amendment. It may well be
that media ride-alongs further the law enforcement objectives of the police in a
general sense, but that is not the same as furthering the purposes of the search. Were
such generalized "law enforcement objectives" themselves sufficient to trump the
Fourth Amendment, the protections guaranteed by that Amendment's text would be
significantly watered down. Although it may be claimed the presence of third parties
could serve in some situations to minimize police abuses and protect suspects, and
also to protect the safety of the officers, such a situation is significantly different from
the media presence in this case, where the Washington Post reporters in the Wilsons'
home were working on a story for their own purposes. Taken in their entirety, the
reasons advanced by the officers fall short of justifying the presence of media inside a
home. Thus, it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to bring members of
the media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when
the presence of the third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of the
warrant.
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP [GR 64261, 26 December 1984]
Facts:
On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz -Paño, Executive Judge of the then CFI
Rizal [Quezon City], issued 2 search warrants where the premises at 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum"
newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines,
equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and
control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were
seized. A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed after 6 months following the raid to
question the validity of said search warrants, and to enjoin the Judge Advocate
General of the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using the articles seized
as evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos).
Issue:
Whether allegations of possession and printing of subversive materials may be the
basis of the issuance of search warrants.
Held:
Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may
be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized. Probable cause for a search is defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In mandating that "no warrant
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce”; the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the
complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant
may be justified. Herein, a statement in the effect that Burgos "is in possession or has
in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other
documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of
committing the offense of subversion punishable under PD 885, as amended" is a
mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause.
Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause,
said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant. Further,
when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor
in connection with the publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its
supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged
subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization
will not suffice.
Chandler vs. Miler [520 US 305, 15 April 1997] Ginsburg
Facts:
The Libertarian Party nominated Walker L. Chandler for the office of Lieutenant
Governor, Sharon T. Harris for the office of Commissioner of Agriculture, and James
D. Walker for the office of member of the General Assembly. In May 1994, about one
month before the deadline for submission of the certificates required by §21-2-140,
Chandler, Harris, and Walker filed an action in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia. They asserted, inter alia, that the drug tests required by
§21-2-140 violated their rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution, naming Governor Zell D. Miller and two other state
officials involved in the administration of §21-2-140, as defendants. Chandler, et .al.
requested declaratory and injunctive relief barring enforcement of the statute. In June
1994, the District Court denied Chandlers' motion for a preliminary injunction. The
provision in the statute of the State of Georgia required candidates for designated state
offices to certify that they have taken a drug test and that the test result was negative.
Chandler, et. al. apparently submitted to the drug tests, obtained the certificates
required by §21-2-140, and appeared on the ballot. After the 1994 election, the parties
jointly moved for the entry of final judgment on stipulated facts. In January 1995, the
District Court entered final judgment for Miller, et. al. A divided Eleventh Circuit
panel, relying on the US Court's precedents sustaining drug testing programs for
student athletes, customs employees, and railway employees, the United States
affirmed and judged the Georgia's law to be constitutional.
Issue:
Whether the suspicionless searches, required in Georgia’s drug testing for candidates
for public offices, is reasonable.
Held:
Georgia's drug testing requirement, imposed by law and enforced by state officials,
effects a search within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
(Collection and testing of urine to meet Georgia's certification statute "constitutes a
search subject to the demands of the Fourth Amendment"). As explained in Skinner,
government ordered "collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of
privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable." (Skinner and Von Raab, 489
U.S., at 617). To be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search ordinarily must
be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. But particularized exceptions to
the main rule are sometimes warranted based on "special needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement." When such "special needs"--concerns other than crime
detection--are alleged in justification of a Fourth Amendment intrusion, courts must
undertake a context specific inquiry, examining closely the competing private and
public interests advanced by the parties. In limited circumstances, where the privacy
interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental
interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of
individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such
suspicion. Our precedents establish that the proffered special need for drug testing
must be substantial--important enough to override the individual's acknowledged
privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal
requirement of individualized suspicion. Miller, et. al.'s defense of the statute rests
primarily on the incompatibility of unlawful drug use with holding high state office;
but notably lacking therein is any indication of a concrete danger demanding departure
from the Fourth Amendment's main rule, and nothing in the record hints that the
hazards Miller, et. al., broadly describe (i.e. the use of illegal drugs draws into
question an official's judgment and integrity; jeopardizes the discharge of public
functions, including antidrug law enforcement efforts; and undermines public
confidence and trust in elected officials) are real and not simply hypothetical for
Georgia's polity. Further, Georgia's certification requirement is not well designed to
identify candidates who violate antidrug laws; nor is the scheme a credible means to
deter illicit drug users from seeking election to state office. What is left, after close
review of Georgia's scheme, is the image the State seeks to project. By requiring
candidates for public office to submit to drug testing, Georgia displays its
commitment to the struggle against drug abuse. The need revealed, in short, is
symbolic, not "special," as that term draws meaning from our case law. Thus, however
well meant, the candidate drug test Georgia has devised diminishes personal privacy
for a symbol's sake. The Fourth Amendment shields society against that state action.
In fine, where the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless
searches calibrated to the risk may rank as "reasonable." But where, as herein, public
safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless
search, no matter how conveniently arranged.
People vs. Chua Ho San [GR 128222, 17 June 1999]
Facts:
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Jim
Lagasca Cid, as Chief of Police of the Bacnotan Police Station, of La Union began
patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area
of Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he intercepted a radio call at around 12:45
p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting
police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted, which
looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was
poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and 6 of his men led by his Chief
Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua, proceeded forthwith to Tammocalao beach,
conferred with Almoite, and observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male
passenger. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, and using both
hands, carried what appeared a multicolored strawbag, and walked towards the road.
By this time, Almoite, Cid and Badua, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform and
issued side-arms, became suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and
broke into a run upon seeing the approaching officers. Badua, prevented the man from
fleeing by holding on to his right arm. Although Cid introduced themselves as police
officers, the man appeared impassive. Speaking in English, then in Tagalog, and later
in Ilocano, Cid then requested the man to open his bag, but he seemed not to
understand. Cid then resorted to "sign language," motioning with his hands for the
man to open the bag. The man apparently understood and acceded to the request. A
search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish
crystalline substances. As Cid wished to proceed to the police station, he signaled the
man to follow, but the latter did not comprehend. Hence, Cid placed his arm around
the shoulders of the man and escorted the latter to the police headquarters. At the
police station, Cid then "recited and informed the man of his constitutional rights" to
remain silent, to have the assistance of a counsel, etc. Eliciting no response from the
man, Cid ordered his men to find a resident of the area who spoke Chinese to act as an
interpreter. In the meantime, Badua opened the bag and counted 29 plastic packets
containing yellowish crystalline substances. The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan,
finally arrived, through whom the man was "apprised of his constitutional rights."
When the policemen asked the man several questions, he retreated to his obstinate
reticence and merely showed his ID with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon.
Chua's bag and its contents were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Diego
Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for laboratory examination. In the
meantime, Chua was detained at the Bacnotan Police Station. Later, Police Chief
Inspector and Forensic Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid (wife of Cid), conducted
a laboratory examination of 29 plastic packets, adn in her Chemistry Report D- 025-
95, she stated that her qualitative examination established the contents of the plastic
packets, weighing 28.7 kilos, to be positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a regulated drug. Chua was initially charged with illegal possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC (Criminal Case 4037). However,
pursuant to the recommendation of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San
Fernando, La Union, the information was subsequently amended to allege that Chua
was in violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425 as amended by RA 7659 (illegal
transport of a regulated drug). At his arraignment on 31 July 1995, where the amended
complaint was read to him by a Fukien-speaking interpreter, Chua entered a plea of
not guilty. Trial finally ensued, with interpreters assigned to Chua (upon the RTC's
direct request to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines, after its
failure to acquire one from the Department of Foreign Affairs). Chua provided a
completely different story, claiming that the bags belong to his employer Cho Chu
Rong, who he accompanied in the speedboat; that they decided to dock when they
were low on fuel and telephone battery; that the police, with nary any spoken word but
only gestures and hand movements, escorted him to the precinct where he was
handcuffed and tied to a chair; that the police, led by an officer, arrived with the motor
engine of the speedboat and a bag, which they presented to him; that the police
inspected opened the bag, weighed the contents, then proclaimed them as
methamphetamine hydrochloride. In a decision promulgated on 10 February 1997, the
RTC convicted Chua for transporting 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride
without legal authority to do so. Chua prays for the reversal of the RTC decision and
his acquittal before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband
articles, Chua's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that
commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chua’s illegal entry into the Philippines,
Chua’s suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw the police
authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return to and navigate his
speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, constitute "probable cause."
Held:
No. Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy of home and
person. It explicitly ordains that people have the right to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose. Inseparable, and not merely corollary or incidental to said
right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is the exclusionary principle
which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding. The Constitutional proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures does not, of course, forestall reasonable searches and seizure.
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute
and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence. The Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit:
(1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of
escaped prisoners. The prosecution and the defense painted extremely divergent
versions of the incident, but the Court is certain that Chua was arrested and his bag
searched without the benefit of a warrant. There are no facts on record reasonably
suggestive or demonstrative of Chua’s participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise
that could have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. The
RTC never took the pains of pointing to such facts, but predicated mainly its decision
on the finding that "accused was caught red-handed carrying the bagful of shabu when
apprehended." In short, there is no probable cause. Persistent reports of rampant
smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in
appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas,
Chua’s illegal entry into the Philippines, Chua’s suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted
to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can
return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas,
do not constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package
emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug, 20 confidential
report and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug
and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious
demeanor or behavior and suspicious bulge in the waist — accepted by the Court as
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in the case. There was no classified
information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing
prohibited drug on the date in question. Chua was not identified as a drug courier by a
police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no
resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the
process of perpetrating an offense. The search cannot therefore be denominated as
incidental to an arrest. To reiterate, the search was not incidental to an arrest. There
was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions
allowed by the Rules of Court as already shown. From all indications, the search was
nothing but a fishing expedition. Casting aside the regulated substance as evidence,
the same being the fruit of a poisonous tree, the remaining evidence on record are
insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to sustain Chua’s conviction.
People vs. Molina [GR 133917, 19 February 2001]
Facts:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an
information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. The
first time he came to see the said marijuana pusher in person was during the first week
of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a motorcycle passed
by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, Gregorio Mula y Malagura
(@"Boboy"), as the pusher. As to Nasario Molina y Manamat (@ "Bobong"), SPO1
Paguidopon had no occasion to see him prior to 8 August 1996. At about 7:30 a.m. of
8 August 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the alleged pusher will
be passing at NHA, Maa, Davao City any time that morning. Consequently, at around
8:00 a.m. he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct 3, Matina, Davao City, which
immediately dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2
Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed
to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged
pusher to pass by. At around 9:30 a.m., while the team were positioned in the house of
SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying Mula and Molina passed by. At that instance,
SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to Mula and Molina as the pushers. Thereupon, the team
boarded their vehicle and overtook the "trisikad." SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his
house, 30 meters from where Mula and Molina were accosted. The police officers
then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, Mula, who was holding a black bag,
handed the same to Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a
police officer and asked Molina to open the bag. Molina replied, "Boss, if possible we
will settle this." SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried
marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police
officers. On 6 December 1996, the accused Mula and Molina, through counsel, jointly
filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from
them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of their
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The demurrer was
denied by the trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the accused, but
this was likewise denied. The accused waived presentation of evidence and opted to
file a joint memorandum. On 25 April 1997, the trial court rendered the decision,
finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and sentenced both to suffer the
penalty of death by lethal injection. Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code
and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case was elevated to the Supreme
Court on automatic review.
Issue:
Whether Mula and Molina manifested outward indication that would justify their
arrest, and the seizure of prohibited drugs that were in their possession.
Held:
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in
a reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant
predicated upon the existence of a probable cause. Complementary to the foregoing
provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2,
which bolsters and solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without
exceptions. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident
to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of
customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself
waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search). The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest)
includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid
warrantless arrest which must precede the search. Still, the law requires that there be
first a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.
Herein, Mula and Molina manifested no outward indication that would justify their
arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, they could not be said to be committing,
attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that Molina responded
"Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the
bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting officers
that Mula and Molina were committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which
standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an in flagrante delicto
arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, Mula and Molina could not
be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. Further, it would appear that
the names and addresses of Mula and Molina came to the knowledge of SPO1
Paguidopon only after they were arrested, and such cannot lend a semblance of
validity on the arrest effected by the peace officers. Withal, the Court holds that the
arrest of Mula and Molina does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules.
Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the
marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against them.
People vs. Salanguit [GR 133254-55, 19 April 2001]
Facts:
On 26 December 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñias, Cavite, to search the residence of Robert Salanguit y
Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1
Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12
grams of shabu from Salanguit. The sale took place in Salunguit's room, and Badua
saw that the shabu was taken by Salunguit from a cabinet inside his room. The
application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge
Dolores L. Español. At about 10:30 p.m. of said day, a group of about 10 policemen,
along with one civilian informer, went to the residence of Salunguit to serve the
warrant. The police operatives knocked on Salanguit’s door, but nobody opened it.
They heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then
forced the door open and entered the house. After showing the search warrant to the
occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching the house. They
found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline
substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two
bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint having a
total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was
prepared, but Salanguit refused to sign it. After the search, the police operatives took
Salanguit with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the
items they had seized. PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the
confiscated evidence. The white crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77
grams and those contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37 grams were
found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two
bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found
to be marijuana. Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of Republic
Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95-
64357 and Q-95-64358, respectively) were filed on 28 December 1995. After hearing,
the trial court rendered its decision, convicting Salanguit in Criminal Cases Q-95-
64357 and Q-95-64358 for violation of Section 16 and 8, respectively, RA 6425, and
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a minimum of 6 months of
arresto mayor and a maximum of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, and
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00, respectively. Salanguit appealed;
contesting his conviction on the grounds that (1) the admissibility of the shabu
allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the ground that the
warrant used in obtaining it was invalid; (2) the admissibility in evidence of the
marijuana allegedly seized from Salanguit to the "plain view" doctrine; and (3) the
employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant.
Issue:
Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to support the
seizure of “drug
paraphernalia”, and whether the marijuana may be included as evidence in light of the
“plain view doctrine.”
Held:
The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia." Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that there was no probable cause
to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the
conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug
paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by
virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only
insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the
seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented
showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the seizure of
shabu from Salanguit's residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such
warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge under
oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. With respect to, and in light of the "plain view
doctrine," the police failed to allege the time when the marijuana was found, i.e.,
whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or
whether it was recovered on Salanguit's person or in an area within his immediate
control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the
shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his
deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case Q-
95-64357 only.
Sta. Rosa Mining Company vs. Assistant Provincial Fiscal Zabala [GR L-44723,
31 August 1987]
Facts:
On 21 March 1974, Sta. Rosa Mining Company filed a complaint for attempted theft
of materials (scrap iron) forming part of the installations on its mining property at Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte against Romeo Garrido and Gil Alapan with the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte, then headed by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin
Ilustre. The case was assigned to third Assistant Fiscal Esteban P. Panotes for
preliminary investigation who, after conducting said investigation, issued a resolution
dated 26 August 1974 recommending that an information for Attempted Theft be filed
against Garrido and Alapan on a finding of prima facie case which resolution was
approved by Fiscal Ilustre. Garrido and Alapan sought reconsideration of the
resolution but the same was denied by Fiscal Ilustre in a resolution dated 14 October
1974. On 29 October 1974, Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Camarines Norte an Information dated 17 October 1987 (Criminal Case 821),
charging Garrido aand Alapan with the crime of Attempted Theft. In a letter dated 22
October 1974, Garrido and Alapan requested the Secretary of Justice for a review of
the Resolutions of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal dated 26 August 1974 and 14
October 1974. On 6 November 1974, the Chief State Prosecutor ordered the
Provincial Fiscal by telegram to "elevate entire records PFO Case 577 against Garrido
et al., review in five days and defer all proceedings pending review." On 6 March
1975, the Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the records, reversed the findings of
prima facie case of the Provincial Fiscal and directed said prosecuting officer to
immediately move for the dismissal of the criminal case. The Company sought
reconsideration of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but the latter denied the
same in a letter dated 11 June 1975. A motion to dismiss dated 16 September 1975
was then filed by the Provincial Fiscal but the court denied the motion on the ground
that there was a prima facie evidence against Garrido and Alapan and set the case for
trial on 25 February 1976. Garrido and Alapan sought reconsideration of the court's
ruling but in an Order dated 13 February 1976, the motion filed for said purpose was
likewise denied. Trial of the case was reset to 23 April 1976. Thereafter, Fiscal Ilustre
was appointed a judge in the CFI of Albay and Fiscal Zabala became officer-in-charge
of the Provincial Fiscal's Office of Camarines Norte. On 19 April 1976, Fiscal Zabala
filed a Second Motion to Dismiss the case. This second motion to dismiss was denied
by the trial court in an order dated 23 April 1976. Whereupon, Fiscal Zabala
manifested that he would not prosecute the case and disauthorized any private
prosecutor to appear therein. Hence, the Company filed a petition for mandamus
before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the fiscal can refuse to prosecute the case if the Secretary of Justice reversed
the findings of prima facie case by the fiscal.
Held:
If the fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima facie case exists, he simply cannot
move for the dismissal of the case and, when denied, refuse to prosecute the same. He
is obliged by law to proceed and prosecute the criminal action. He cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. At least what he can do is to continue appearing for the
prosecution and then turn over the presentation of evidence to another fiscal or a
private prosecutor subject to his direction and control. Where there is no other
prosecutor available, he should proceed to discharge his duty and present the evidence
to the best of his ability and let the court decide the merits of the case on the basis of
the evidence adduced by both parties. The mere fact that the Secretary of Justice had,
after reviewing the records of the case, directed the prosecuting fiscal to move for the
dismissal of the case and the motion to dismiss filed pursuant to said directive is
denied by the trial court, is no justification for the refusal of the fiscal to prosecute the
case. Once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as
its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion
of the Court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before
it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A
motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should he addressed to the Court who has
the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after
the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or
upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.
Paderanga vs. Drilon [GR 96080, 19 April 1991]
Facts:
On 16 October 1986, an information for multiple murder was filed in the Regional
Trial Court, Gingoog City, against Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito
Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe, for the deaths on 1 May
1984 of Renato Bucag, his wife Melchora Bucag, and their son Renato Bucag II.
Venue was, however, transferred to Cagayan de Oro City per Administrative Matter
87-2-244. Only Felipe Galarion was tried and found guilty as charged. The rest of the
accused remained at large. Felipe Galarion, however, escaped from detention and has
not been apprehended since then. In an amended information filed on 6 October 1988,
Felizardo Roxas, alias "Ely Roxas," "Fely Roxas" and "Lolong Roxas," was included
as a co-accused. Roxas retained Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga as his counsel. As counsel
for Roxas, Paderanga filed, among others, an Omnibus Motion to dismiss, to Quash
the Warrant of Arrest and to Nullify the Arraignment on 14 October 1988. The trial
court in an order dated 9 January 1989, denied the omnibus motion but directed the
City Prosecutor "to conduct another preliminary investigation or reinvestigation in
order to grant the accused all the opportunity to adduce whatever evidence he has in
support of his defense." In the course of the preliminary investigation, through a
signed affidavit, Felizardo Roxas implicated Atty. Paderanga in the commission of the
crime charged. The City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City inhibited himself from
further conducting the preliminary investigation against Paderanga at the instance of
the latter's counsel, per his resolution dated 7 July 1989. In his first indorsement to the
Department of Justice, dated 24 July 1989, said city prosecutor requested the
Department of Justice to designate a state prosecutor to continue the preliminary
investigation against Paderanga. In a resolution dated 6 September 1989, the State
Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, who was designated to continue with the conduct of
the preliminary investigation against Paderanga, directed the amendment of the
previously amended information to include and implead Paderanga as one of the
accused therein. Paderanga moved for reconsideration, contending that the
preliminary investigation was not yet completed when said resolution was
promulgated, and that he was deprived of his right to present a corresponding counter-
affidavit and additional evidence crucial to the determination of his alleged "linkage"
to the crime charged. The motion was, however, denied by Gingoyon in his order
dated 29 January 1990. From the aforesaid resolution and order, Paderanga filed a
Petition for Review with the Department of Justice. Thereafter, he submitted a
Supplemental Petition with Memorandum, and then a Supplemental Memorandum
with Additional Exculpatory/Exonerating Evidence Annexed, attaching thereto an
affidavit of Roxas dated 20 June 1990 and purporting to be a retraction of his affidavit
of 30 March 1990 wherein he implicated Paderanga. On 10 August 1990, the
Department of Justice, through Undersecretary Silvestre H. Bello III, issued
Resolution 648 dismissing the said petition for review. His motion for reconsideration
having been likewise denied, Paderanga then filed the petition for mandamus and
prohibition before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether there is no prima facie evidence, or probable cause, or sufficient justification
to hold Paderangato a tedious and prolonged public trial.
Held:
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of
determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a
crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of
evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to
"engender a well founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the
respondent's probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for
the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of
such evidence only as may engender a well grounded belief that an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Preliminary investigation is
generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who
may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint
or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that
of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person
against whom it is taken in jeopardy. The institution of a criminal action depends upon
the sound discretion of the fiscal. He has the quasi- judicial discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court. Hence, the general rule is that
an injunction will not be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution. The case of
Brocka, et al. vs. Enrile, et al. cites several exceptions to the rule, to wit: (a) To afford
adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (b) When necessary for
the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
(c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (d) When the acts of the
officer are without or in excess of authority; (e) Where the prosecution is under an
invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (g)
Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (h) Where it is a case of
persecution rather than prosecution; (i) Where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (j) When there is clearly no prima facie case
against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied. A careful
analysis of the circumstances obtaining in the present case, however, will readily show
that the same does not fall under any of the aforesaid exceptions.
Pita vs. Court of Appeals [GR 80806, 5 October 1989]
Facts:
On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor
of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics
Group, Auxiliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan
Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand
owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other
reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned
the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila,
in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various
student organizations. Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy
Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by Leo Pita. On 7 December 1983, Pita
filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of
Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin and or restrain
Bagatsing, Cabrera and their agents from confiscating his magazines or from
otherwise preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a
decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the
publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of
the press. On 12 December 1983, Pita filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a
temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of
plaintiffs "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary
injunction in view of Mayor Bagatsing's pronouncement to continue the Anti-Smut
Campaign. The Court granted the temporary restraining order on 14 December 1983.
On 5 January 1984, Pita filed his Memorandum in support of the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction, raising the issue as to "whether or not the defendants, and or
their agents can without a court order confiscate or seize plaintiff's magazine before
any judicial finding is made on whether said magazine is obscene or not." The
restraining order lapsed on 3 January 1984, Pita filed an urgent motion for issuance of
another restraining order, which was opposed by Bagatsing on the ground that
issuance of a second restraining order would violate the Resolution of the Supreme
Court dated 11 January 1983, providing for the Interim Rules Relative to the
Implementation of Batas Pambansa 129, which provides that a temporary restraining
order shall be effective only for 20 days from date of its issuance. On 11 January
1984, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for hearing on 16 January 1984
"for the parties to adduce evidence on the question of whether the publication 'Pinoy
Playboy Magazine' alleged (sic) seized, confiscated and or burned by the defendants,
are obscence per se or not." On 3 February 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order
appealed from denying the motion for a writ of preliminary injunction, and dismissing
the case for lack of merit. Likewise, the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal, holding
that the freedom of the press is not without restraint, as the state has the right to
protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as
indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene
publications; and that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures recognizes
certain exceptions, as when there is consent to the search or seizure, or search is an
incident to an arrest, or is conducted in a vehicle or movable structure. Pita filed the
petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the Mayor can order the seizure of “obscene” materials as a result of an anti-
smut campaign.
Held:
The Court is not convinced that Bagatsing and Cabrera have shown the required proof
to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory
injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful
court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them
to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. The fact that the former
Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police power" is no license to seize property in
disregard of due process. Presidential Decrees 960 and 969 are, arguably, police
power measures, but they are not, by themselves, authorities for high-handed acts.
They do not exempt our law enforcers, in carrying out the decree of the twin
presidential issuances, from the commandments of the Constitution, the right to due
process of law and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, specifically.
Significantly, the Decrees themselves lay down procedures for implementation. It is
basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant,
otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. The Court finds
greater reason to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete absence of a warrant,
valid or invalid. The fact that the present case involves an obscenity rap makes it no
different from Burgos vs. Chief of Staff AFP, a political case, because speech is
speech, whether political or "obscene." Although the Court is not ruling out
warrantless searches, the search must have been an incident to a lawful arrest, and the
arrest must be on account of a crime committed. Here, no party has been charged, nor
are such charges being readied against any party, under Article 201, as amended, of
the Revised Penal Code. There is no "accused" here to speak of, who ought to be
"punished". Further, to say that the Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a
result of an anti -smut campaign) without a lawful search warrant because, in his
opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed, is to make the Mayor judge,
jury, and executioner rolled into one. Thus, the court mae a resume, to wit: (1) The
authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their
opinion, an obscenity rap is in order; (2) The authorities must convince the court that
the materials sought to be seized are "obscene", and pose a clear and present danger of
an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action; (3) The judge
must determine whether or not the same are indeed "obscene:" the question is to be
resolved on a case-to-case basis and on His Honor's sound discretion. (4) If, in the
opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it may issue the search warrant prayed for;
(5) The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code; and (6) Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court may assess
whether or not the properties seized are indeed "obscene." The Court states, however,
that "these do not foreclose, however, defenses under the Constitution or applicable
statutes, or remedies against abuse of official power under the Civil Code or the
Revised Penal code."
Abdula vs. Guiani [GR 118821, 18 February 2000]
Facts:
On 24 June 1994, a complaint for murder (IS 94-1361) was filed before the Criminal
Investigation Service Command, ARMM Regional Office XII against Mayor Bai
Unggie D. Abdula and Odin Abdula and 6 other persons in connection with the death
of a certain Abdul Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar of Kabuntalan,
Maguindanao. The complaint alleged that the Abdulas paid the 6 other persons the
total amount of P200,000.00 for the death of Dimalen. Acting on this complaint, the
Provincial Prosecutor of Maguindanao, Salick U. Panda, in a Resolution dated 22
August 1994, dismissed the charges of murder against the Abdulas and 5 other
respondents on a finding that there was no prima facie case for murder against them.
Prosecutor Panda, however, recommended the filing of an information for murder
against one of the respondents, a certain Kasan Mama. Pursuant to this Resolution, an
information for murder was thereafter filed against Kasan Mama before the sala of
Judge Japal M. Guiani. In an Order dated 13 September 1994, the Judge ordered that
the case (Criminal Case 2332), be returned to the Provincial Prosecutor for further
investigation. In this Order, the judge noted that although there were 8 respondents in
the murder case, the information filed with the court "charged only 1 of the 8
respondents in the name of Kasan Mama without the necessary resolution required
under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court to show how the
investigating prosecutor arrived at such a conclusion." As such, the judge reasons, the
trial court cannot issue the warrant of arrest against Kasan Mama. Upon the return of
the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for Maguindanao, it
was assigned to 2nd Assistant Prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw for further investigation.
In addition to the evidence presented during the initial investigation of the murder
charge, two new affidavits of witnesses were submitted to support the charge of
murder against the Abdulas and the other respondents in the murder complaint. Thus,
Prosecutor Dimaraw treated the same as a re-filing of the murder charge and pursuant
to law, issued subpoena to the respondents named therein. On 6 December 1994, the
Abdulas submitted and filed their joint counter-affidavits. After evaluation of the
evidence, Prosecutor Dimaraw, in a Resolution dated 28 December 1994, found a
prima facie case for murder against the Abdulas and 3 other respondents. He thus
recommended the filing of charges against the Abdulas, as principals by inducement,
and against the 3 others, as principals by direct participation. Likewise in this 28
December 1994 Resolution, Provincial Prosecutor Salick U. Panda, who conducted
the earlier preliminary investigation of the murder charge, added a notation stating
that he was inhibiting himself from the case and authorizing the investigating
prosecutor to dispose of the case without his approval. The reasons he cited were that
the case was previously handled by him and that the victim was the father-in-law of
his son. On 2 January 1995, an information for murder dated 28 December 1994 was
filed against the Abdulas and Kasan Mama, Cuenco Usman and Jun Mama before
Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, then the sala of Judge Guiani.
This information was signed by investigating prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw. A
notation was likewise made on the information by Provincial Prosecutor Panda, which
explained the reason for his inhibition. The following day, the judge issued a warrant
for the arrest of the Abdulas. Upon learning of the issuance of the said warrant, the
Abdulas filed on 4 January 1995 an Urgent Ex-parte Motion for the setting aside of
the warrant of arrest on 4 January 1995. In this motion, the Abdulas argued that the
enforcement of the warrant of arrest should be held in abeyance considering that the
information was prematurely filed and that the Abdulas intended to file a petition for
review with the Department of Justice. A petition for review was filed by the Abdulas
with the Department of Justice on 11 January 1995. Despite said filing, the judge did
not act upon the Abdulas' pending Motion to Set Aside the Warrant of Arrest. The
Abdulas filed the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the judge may rely upon the findings of the prosecutor in determining
probable cause in the issuance of search or arrest warrant.
Held:
The 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine probable cause "personally," a
requirement which does not appear in the corresponding provisions of our previous
constitutions. This emphasis evinces the intent of the framers to place a greater degree
of responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed under previous Constitutions.
Herein, the Judge admits that he issued the questioned warrant as there was "no reason
for (him) to doubt the validity of the certification made by the Assistant Prosecutor
that a preliminary investigation was conducted and that probable cause was found to
exist as against those charged in the information filed." The statement is an admission
that the Judge relied solely and completely on the certification made by the fiscal that
probable cause exists as against those charged in the information and issued the
challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor's findings and
recommendations. He adopted the judgment of the prosecutor regarding the existence
of probable cause as his own. Clearly, the judge, by merely stating that he had no
reason to doubt the validity of the certification made by the investigating prosecutor
has abdicated his duty under the Constitution to determine on his own the issue of
probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. Consequently, the warrant of arrest
should be declared null and void.
Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin [GR 45950, 20 June 1938]
Facts:
On 10 November 1934, Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board,
obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac, a search warrant commanding
any officer of the law to search the person, house or store of Leona Pasion Vda. de
Garcia at Victoria, Tarlac, for "certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents and
other papers relating to her activities as usurer." The search warrant was issued upon
an affidavit given by the said Almeda "that he has and there is just and probable cause
to believe and he does believe that Leona Pasion de Garcia keeps and conceals in her
house and store at Victoria, Tarlac, certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents, and
other papers relating to her activities as usurer, all of which is contrary to the statute in
such cases made and provided." On the same date, Almeda, accompanied by a captain
of the Philippine Constabulary, went to the office of Pasion de Garcia in Victoria,
Tarlac and, after showing the search warrant to the latter's bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas,
and, without Pasion de Garcia's presence who was ill and confined at the time,
proceeded with the execution thereof. Two packages of records and a locked filing
cabinet containing several papers and documents were seized by Almeda and a receipt
therefor issued by him to Salas. The papers and documents seized were kept for a
considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury Board and thereafter were turned over
by it to the provincial fiscal Felix Imperial, who subsequently filed, in the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, 6 separate criminal cases against Pasion de Garcia for
violation of the Anti-Usury Law. On several occasions, after seizure, Pasion de
Garcia, through counsel, demanded from the Anti-Usury Board the return of the
documents seized. On January 7, and, by motion, on 4 June 1937, the legality of the
search warrant was challenged by Pasion de Garcia's counsel in the 6 criminal cases
and the devolution of the documents demanded. By resolution of 5 October 1937,
Judge Diego Locsin (CFI) denied Pasion de garcia's motion of June 4 for the reason
that though the search warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on the latter's part. A
motion for reconsideration was presented but was denied by order of 3 January 1938.
Pasion de Garcia registered her exception.
Issue:
Whether the lack of personal examination of witnesses renders the warrant void.
Held:
Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a
search warrant to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable
cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other
person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under
oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized. These requirements are complemented by the Code of
Criminal Procedure, particularly with reference to the duration of the validity of the
search warrant and the obligation of the officer seizing the property to deliver the
same to the corresponding court. Herein, the existence of probable cause was
determined not by the judge himself but by the applicant. All that the judge did was to
accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. He did not decide for himself. It
does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even
accepting the description of the properties to be seized to be sufficient and on the
assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed within the meaning of the
law, the properties seized were not delivered to the court which issued the warrant, as
required by law. Instead, they were turned over to the provincial fiscal and used by
him in building up cases against Pasion de Garcia. Considering that at the time the
warrant was issued there was no case pending against Pasion de Garcia, the averment
that the warrant was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not without basis.
The search warrant was illegally issued by the justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac. In
any event, the failure on the part of Pasion de Garcia and her bookkeeper to resist or
object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of
constitutional right. It is, as Judge Cooley observes, but a submission to the authority
of the law. As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of
the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an
officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold
that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation
thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.
Yee Sue Koy vs. Almeda [GR 47021, 15 June 1940]
Facts:
In response to a sworn application of Mariano G. Almeda, chief agent of the Anti-
Usury Board, dated 5 May 1938, the justice of the peace of Sagay, Occidental Negros,
after taking the testimony of applicant's witness, Jose Estrada, special agent of the
Anti-Usury Board, issued on the same date a search warrant commanding any peace
officer to search during day time the store and premises occupied by Sam Sing & Co.,
situated at Sagay, Occidental Negros, as well as the person of said Sam Sing & Co.,
and to seize the documents, notebooks, lists, receipts and promissory notes being used
by said Sam Sing & Co. in connection with their activities of lending money at
usurious rates of interest in violation of law, or such as may be found, and to bring
them forthwith before the aforesaid justice of the peace of Sagay. On the same date, at
10:30 a. m., search was accordingly made by Mariano G. Almeda, Jose Estrada, 2
internal revenue agents and 2 members of the Philippine Army, who seized certain
receipt books, vales or promissory notes, chits, notebooks, journal book, and
collection list belonging to Sam Sing & Co. and enumerated in the inventory receipt
issued by Mariano G. Almeda to the owner of the documents, papers and articles
seized. Immediately after the search and seizure thus effected, Mariano G. Almeda
filed a return with the justice of the peace of Sagay together. With a request that the
office of the Anti-Usury Board be allowed to retain possession of the articles seized
for examination, pursuant to section 4 of Act 4109, which request was granted. Under
the date of 11 March 1939, Godofredo P. Escalona, counsel for Sam Sing & Co. filed
a motion with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Occidental Negros praying that the
search warrant and the seizure effected thereunder be declared illegal and set aside
and that the articles in question be ordered returned to Sam Sing & Co., which motion
was denied in the order dated 24 July 1939. A similar motion was presented to the
justice of the peace of Sagay on 27 October 1939 but was denied the next day.
Meanwhile, an information dated 30 September 1939 had been filed in the CFI
Occidental Negros, charging Yee Fock alias Yee Sue Koy, Y. Tip and A. Sing,
managers of Sam Sing & Co., with a violation of Act 2655. Before the criminal case
could be tried, Yee Sue Koy and Yee Tip filed the petition with the Supreme Court on
6 November 1939. The petition is grounded on the propositions (1) that the search
warrant issued on 2 May 1938, by the justice of the peace of Sagay and the seizure
accomplished thereunder are illegal, because the warrant was issued three days ahead
of the application therefor and of the affidavit of the Jose Estrada which is insufficient
in itself to justify the issuance of a search warrant, and because the issuance of said
warrant manifestly contravenes the mandatory provisions both of section 1, paragraph
3, of Article III of the Constitution and of section 97 of General Orders 58, and (2)
that the seizure of the aforesaid articles by means of a search warrant for the purpose
of using them as evidence in the criminal case against the accused, is unconstitutional
because the warrant thereby becomes unreasonable and amounts to a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against compelling the accused to testify against themselves.
Issue:
Whether the application of the search warrant is supported by the personal knowledge
of the witness, besides the applicant, for the judge to determine probable cause in
issuing the warrant.
Held: Strict observance of the formalities under section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III
of the Constitution and of section 97 of General Orders 58 was followed. The
applicant Mariano G. Almeda, in his application, swore that "he made his own
personal investigation and ascertained that Sam Sing & Co. is lending money without
license, charging usurious rate of interest and is keeping, utilizing and concealing in
the store and premises occupied by it situated at Sagay, Occidental Negros,
documents, notebooks, lists, receipts, promissory notes, and book of accounts and
records, all of which are being used by it in connection with its activities of lending
money at usurious rate of interest in violation of the Usury Law." In turn, the witness
Jose Estrada, in his testimony before the justice of the peace of Sagay, swore that he
knew that Sam Sing & Co. was lending money without license and charging usurious
rate of interest, because he personally investigated the victims who had secured loans
from said Sam Sing & Co. and were charged usurious rate of interest; that he knew
that the said Sam Sing & Co. was keeping and using books of accounts and records
containing its transactions relative its activities as money lender and the entries of the
interest paid by its debtors, because he saw the said Sam Sing & d make entries and
records of their debts and the interest paid thereon. As both Mariano G. Almeda and
Jose Estrada swore that they had personal knowledge, their affidavits were sufficient
for, thereunder, they could be held liable for perjury if the facts would turn out to be
not as their were stated under oath. That the existence of probable cause had been
determined by the justice of the peace of Sagay before issuing the search warrant
complained of, is shown by the following statement in the warrant itself, to wit: "After
examination under oath of the complainant, Mariano G. Almeda, Chief Agent of the
Anti-Usury Board, Department of Justice and Special Agent of the Philippine Army,
Manila, and the witness he presented, . . .
and this Court, finding that there is just and probable cause to believe as it does
believe, that the above described articles, relating to the activities of said Sam Sing &
Co. of lending money at usurious rate of interest, are being utilized and kept and
concealed at its store and premises occupied by said Sam Sing & Co., all in violation
of law."
Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas [GR 45358, 29 January 1937]
Facts:
On 3 June 1936, the chief of the secret service of the Anti- Usury Board, of the
Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding
over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that according to
reliable information, Narciso Alvarez kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books,
documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his
activities as a moneylender, charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law.
In his oath at the end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his
answers to the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did
not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon
the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit the judge,
on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the petition, ordering
the search of the Alvarez's house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the
books and documents and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in
accordance with the law. With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board
entered Alvarez's store and residence at 7:00 p.m. of 4 June 1936, and seized and took
possession of the following articles: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to
1936, 1 ledger, 2 journals, 2 cashbooks, 9 order books, 4 notebooks, 4 check stubs, 2
memorandums, 3 bankbooks, 2 contracts, 4 stubs, 48 stubs of purchases of copra, 2
inventories, 2 bundles of bills of lading, 1 bundle of credit receipts, 1 bundle of stubs
of purchases of copra, 2 packages of correspondence, 1 receipt book belonging to Luis
Fernandez, 14 bundles of invoices and other papers, many documents and loan
contracts with security and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of
used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). The search
for and seizure of said articles were made with the opposition of Alvarez who stated
his protest below the inventories on the ground that the agents seized even the
originals of the documents. As the articles had not been brought immediately to the
judge who issued the search warrant, Alvarez, through his attorney, filed a motion on
8 June 1936, praying that the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered
immediately to deposit all the seized articles in the office of the clerk of court and that
said agent be declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of the court.
On said date the court issued an order directing Siongco to deposit all the articles
seized within 24 hours from the receipt of notice thereof and giving him a period of 5
days within which to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of
court. On 10 June, Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-Usury Board,
filed a motion praying that the order of the 8th of said month be set aside and that the
Anti-Usury Board be authorized to retain the articles seized for a period of 30 days for
the necessary investigation. On June 25, the court issued an order requiring agent
Siongco forthwith to file the search warrant and the affidavit in the court, together
with the proceedings taken by him, and to present an inventory duly verified by oath
of all the articles seized. On July 2, the attorney for the petitioner filed a petition
alleging that the search warrant issued was illegal and that it had not yet been returned
to date together with the proceedings taken in connection therewith, and praying that
said warrant be cancelled, that an order be issued directing the return of all the articles
seized to Alvarez, that the agent who seized them be declared guilty of contempt of
court, and that charges be filed against him for abuse of authority. On September 10,
the court issued an order holding: that the search warrant was obtained and issued in
accordance with the law, that it had been duly complied with and, consequently,
should not be cancelled, and that agent Siongco did not commit any contempt of court
and must, therefore, be exonerated, and ordering the chief of the Anti-Usury Board in
Manila to show cause, if any, within the unextendible period of 2 days from the date
of notice of said order, why all the articles seized appearing in the inventory should
not be returned to Alvarez. The assistant chief of the Anti-Usury Board of the
Department of Justice filed a motion praying, for the reasons stated therein, that the
articles seized be ordered retained for the purpose of conducting an investigation of
the violation of the Anti-Usury Law committed by Alvarez. On October 10, said
official again filed another motion alleging that he needed 60 days to examine the
documents and papers seized, which are designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory
by Nos. 5, 10, 16, 23, 25-27, 30-31 , 34, 36-43 and 45, and praying that he be granted
said period of 60 days. In an order of October 16, the court granted him the period of
60 days to investigate said 19 documents. Alvarez, herein, asks that the search warrant
as well as the order authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board to retain the
articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in
question be returned to him.
Issue:
Whether the search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it has been based
upon the affidavit of agent Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no personal
knowledge of the facts which were to serve as a basis for the issuance of the warrant
but that he had knowledge thereof through mere information secured from a person
whom he considered reliable, and that it is illegal as it was not supported by other
affidavits aside from that made by the applicant.
Held:
Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General
Orders 58 require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search
warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by
oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath
includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in
conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as
an outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made
under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The oath required must refer to
the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses,
because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant
issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that
perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. The
affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and
fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore,
the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other
papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of
at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge
who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made
by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other
witness. Neither the Constitution nor General Orders 58 provides that it is of
imperative necessity to take the depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the
applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both
in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the
committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of
the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other
witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his
knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge
to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the
existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the
affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal
and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable
cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of
one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus the
warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the
agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.
Mata vs. Bayona [GR 50720, 26 March 1984]
Facts:
Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by PD
1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and
arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by "selling illegal tickets known as 'Masiao tickets'
without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from
the government authorities concerned." Mata claimed that during the hearing of the
case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found the
search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so
that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge
Josephine K. Bayona, presiding Jufe of the City Court of Ormoc replied, "it is with the
court". The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the
records. This led Mata to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for
the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by the Judge on 1 March
1979, stating that the court has made a thorough investigation and examination under
oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence
Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a
certification to that effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the search
warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no
moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be
attached to the records. Mata's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order
having been denied, he came to the Supreme Court, with the petition for certiorari,
praying, among others, that the Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for its
alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court, and that all the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as
evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.
Issue:
Whether the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits
presented to him.
Held:
Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce". More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the
constitutional injunction, The Rules provide that the judge must before issuing the
warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses
he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in
addition to any affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in
writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the
record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or nonexistence of the probable cause, to hold liable
for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of
the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing
and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
Olaez vs. People of the Philippines [GR 78347-49, 9 November 1987]
Facts:
Adolfo Olaes and Linda M. Cruz were charged for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act. Olaes and Cruz filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, challenging the admission by Judge Alicia L. Santos (in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 73) of evidence
seized by virtue of an allegedly invalid search warrant and of an extrajudicial
confession taken from them without according them the right to assistance of counsel;
and thus seek to restrain further proceedings in the criminal case against them and ask
that they be acquitted with the setting aside of the questioned orders (the facts do not
provide the disposition of the said orders). Olaes and Cruz claim that the search
warrant issued by the judge is unconstitutional because it does not indicate the specific
offense they are supposed to have committed. There is, therefore, according to them,
no valid finding of probable cause as a justification for the issuance of the said
warrant in conformity with the Bill of Rights.
Issue:
Whether the lack of specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act renders the caption
vague, and negate the claim that the specific offense was committed to serve as basis
for the finding of probable cause.
Held:
No. The search warrant issued does not come under the strictures of the Stonehill
doctrine. While in the case cited, there was a bare reference to the laws in general,
without any specification of the particular sections thereof that were alleged to have
been violated out of the hundreds of prohibitions contained in such codifications, there
is no similar ambiguity herein. While it is true that the caption of the search warrant
states that it is in connection with "Violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Acts of 1972," it is clearly recited in the text thereof that "There is
probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias 'Debie' and alias 'Baby' of No. 628
Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in their possession and control and
custody of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other
regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations which is the subject of the
offense stated above." Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is
not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been
committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause. The search warrant also
satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the description to
be made of the "place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
Prudente vs. Dayrit [GR 82870, 14 December 1989]
Facts:
On 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the Intelligence Special
Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD), filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33, presided over by Judge Abelardo Dayrit,
now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, an application for the issuance of a
search warrant (Search Warrant 87-14) for violation of Presidential Decree 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Nemesio
E. Prudente." On the same day, the Judge issued the Search Warrant, commanding
Dimagmaliw "to make an immediate search at any time in the day or night of the
premises of Polytechnic University of the Philippines, more particularly (a) offices of
the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor and other rooms at
the ground floor; (b) office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second
Floor and other rooms at the second floor, and forthwith seize and take possession of
the following personal properties, to wit: (a) M 16 Armalites with ammunition; (b) .38
and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols; (c) explosives and hand grenades; and (d)
assorted weapons with ammunitions." On 1 November 1987, a Sunday and All Saints
Day, the search warrant was enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by P/Col.
Edgar Dula Torre, Deputy Superintendent, WPD, and P/Major Romeo Maganto,
Precinct 8 Commander. In his affidavit, dated 2 November 1987, Ricardo Abando y
Yusay, a member of the searching team, alleged that he found in the drawer of a
cabinet inside the wash room of Dr. Prudente's office a bulging brown envelope with 3
live fragmentation hand grenades separately wrapped with old newspapers. On 6
November 1987, Prudente moved to quash the search warrant. He claimed that (1) the
complainant's lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal knowledge of the
facts which formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant; (2) the
examination of the said witness was not in the form of searching questions and
answers; (3) the search warrant was a general warrant, for the reason that it did not
particularly describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific
offense; and (4) the search warrant was issued in violation of Circular 19 of the
Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under oath that the issuance of
the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent. On 9 March 1988, the Judge issued an
order, denying Prudente's motion and supplemental motion to quash. Prudente's
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in the order dated 20 April 1988.
Prudente filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the allegations contained in the application of P/ Major Alladin Dimagmaliw
and the declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in his deposition were sufficient basis
for the issuance of a valid search warrant.
Held:
The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched." This probable cause must be shown to be
within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce
and not based on mere hearsay. Thus, for a valid search warrant to issue, there must be
probable cause, which is to be determined personally by the judge, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense,and the judge
must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and any witness he
may produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with any affidavits submitted. Herein, in his application for search
warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw stated that "he has been informed" that
Nemesio Prudente "has in his control and possession" the firearms and explosives
described therein, and that he "has verified the report and found it to be a fact." On the
other hand, in his supporting deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles declared that, as a
result of their continuous surveillance for several days, they "gathered informations
from verified sources" that the holders of the said firearms and explosives are not
licensed to possess them. In other words, the applicant and his witness had no personal
knowledge of the facts and circumstances which became the basis for issuing the
questioned search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through information
from other sources or persons. While it is true that in his application for search
warrant, applicant P/Major Dimagmaliw stated that he verified the information he had
earlier received that petitioner had in his possession and custody the firearms and
explosives described in the application, and that he found it to be a fact, yet there is
nothing in the record to show or indicate how and when said applicant verified the
earlier information acquired by him as to justify his conclusion that he found such
information to be a fact. He might have clarified this point if there had been searching
questions and answers, but there were none. In fact, the records yield no questions and
answers, whether searching or not, vis-a-vis the said applicant. Evidently, the
allegations contained in the application of P/ Major Alladin Dimagmaliw and the
declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in his deposition were insufficient basis for
the issuance of a valid search warrant.
Chia vs. Acting Collector of Customs [GR L-43810, 26 September 1989]
Facts:
Acting on a verified report of a confidential informant that assorted electronic and
electrical equipment and other articles illegally imported into the Philippines by a
syndicate engaged in unlawful "shipside" activities (foreign goods are unloaded from
foreign ships in transit through Philippine waters into motorized bancas and landed on
Philippine soil without passing through the Bureau of Customs, thereby evading
payment of the corresponding customs duties and taxes thereon) were found inside
"Tom's Electronics" and "Sony Merchandising (Philippines)" stores located at 690 and
691 Gonzalo Puyat corner Evangelista Street, Quiapo, Manila, a letter-request dated
23 April 1976 was addressed to the Collector of Customs by the Deputy Director of
the Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center, Manila Bay Area (RASAC-MBA) for
the issuance of warrants of seizure and detention. After evaluation, the Collector of
Customs issued Warrants of Seizure and Detention 14925 and 14925-A, directing the
Anti-Smuggling Action Center to seize the goods mentioned therein, i.e. various
electronic equipments like cassette tape recorders, car stereos, phonograph needles
(diamond), portable TV sets, imported long playing records, spare parts of TVs and
radios and other electrical appliances. A RASAC team was formed and given a
mission order to enforce the warrants, which it implemented with the assistance of: (1)
the National Customs Police (augmenting the team with 2 members),
(2) the Detective Bureau of the Manila Western Police District Headquarters
(with 3 detectives), as well as, (3) Precinct 3 of the Manila Western Police District
which exercised jurisdictional control over the place to be raided. The intended raid
was entered in the respective police blotters of the police detective bureaus. On the
strength of the warrants of seizure and detention, the raid was conducted in the
afternoon of 25 April 1976 at the 2 stores of Tomas Chia. ASAC team leader Gener
Sula, together with his agents Badron Dobli, Arturo Manuel, Rodolfo Molina and
Servillano Florentin of Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, assisted by two customs
policemen, Val Martinez and Renato Sorima, and Manila policemen Rogelio Vinas
and John Peralta, recovered from the stores, assorted electronic equipment and other
articles, the customs duties on which allegedly had not been paid. They were turned
over to the Customs Auction and Cargo Disposal Unit of the Bureau of Customs. On
17 May 1976, in the afternoon, the hearing officer of Acting Collector of Customs
Alfredo Francisco conducted a hearing on the confiscation of the goods taken by
Gener Sula and his agents. 2 days later, Chia filed the petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court to enjoin the Collector of
Customs and/or his agents from further proceeding with the forfeiture hearing and
prayed that the search warrants be declared null and void, that the latter be ordered to
return the confiscated articles to Chia, and to pay damages.
Issue:
Whether the warrants issued by the Collector of Customs partakes the nature of a
general warrants, and thus are invalid.
Held:
Not only may goods be seized without a search and seizure warrant under Section
2536 of the Customs and Tariff Code, when they (the goods) are openly offered for
sale or kept in storage in a store as herein, but the fact is that Chia's stores — "Tom's
Electronics" and "Sony Merchandising (Phil.)" — were searched upon warrants of
search and detention issued by the Collector of Customs, who, under the 1973
Constitution, was "a responsible officer authorized by law" to issue them. Sections
2208 and 2209 of the Tariff and Customs Code provide when a search may be made
without a warrant and when a warrant is necessary. Section 2208 provides that "For
the more effective discharge of his official duties, any person exercising the powers
herein conferred, may at any time enter, pass through or search any land or inclosure
or any warehouse, store or other building, not being a dwelling house. A warehouse,
store or other building or inclosure used for the keeping or storage of articles does not
become a dwelling house within the meaning hereof merely by reason of the fact that
a person employed as watchman lives in the place, nor will the fact that his family
stays there with him alter the case." On the other hand, Section 2209 provides that "A
dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a Judge of
the court or such other responsible officers as may be authorized by law, upon sworn
application showing probable cause and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or thing to be seized." The warrants issued by the Collector of
Customs in this case were not general warrants for they identified the stores to be
searched, described the articles to be seized and specified the provision of the Tariff
and Customs Code violated. Upon effecting the seizure of the goods, the Bureau of
Customs acquired exclusive jurisdiction not only over the case but also over the goods
seized for the purpose of enforcing the tariff and customs laws. Further, a party
dissatisfied with the decision of the Collector may appeal to the Commissioner of
Customs, whose decision is appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals in the manner and
within the period prescribed by law and regulations. The decision of the Court of Tax
Appeals may be elevated to the Supreme Court for review. Since Chia did not exhaust
his administrative remedies, his recourse to this Court is premature.
20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-76649-51, 19
August 1988]
Facts:
In a letter-complaint dated 26 August 1985, 20th Century Fox Film Corporation
through counsel sought the National Bureau of Investigation's (NBI) assistance in the
conduct of searches and seizures in connection with the NBI's anti- film piracy
campaign. Specifically, the letter-complaint alleged that certain videotape outlets all
over Metro Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of
copyrighted films in videotape form which constitute a flagrant violation of
Presidential Decree 49 (Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property). Acting on
the letter-complaint, the NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets
pinpointed by the film corporation and subsequently filed 3 applications for search
warrants against the video outlets owned by Eduardo M. Barreto, Raul Sagullo, and
Fortune Ledesma. The applications were consolidated and heard by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 132. On 4 September 1985, the lower court issued the
desired search warrants, describing the articles sought to be seized as"(c) Television
sets, Video Cassettes Recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories,
equipments and other machines used or intended to be used in the unlawful
reproduction, sale, rental/lease, distribution of the above-mentioned video tapes which
she is keeping and concealing in the premises above-described.". Armed with the
search warrants, the NBI accompanied by the film corporation's agents, raided the
video outlets and seized the items described therein. An inventory of the items seized
was made and left with Barreto, et. al. Acting on a motion to lift search warrants and
release seized properties filed by Barreto, et. al., the lower court issued an order dated
8 October 1985, lifting the 3 search warrants issued earlier against them by the court,
due to the failure of the NBI to deliver the articles to the Court, and thus ordered the
return of the articles to their respective owners. The lower court denied a motion for
reconsideration filed by the film corporation in its order dated 2 January 1986. The
film corporation filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the
orders of the lower court. The petition was dismissed. The 20th Century Fox Film
Corporation filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the inclusion of certain articles of property which are usually connected to
legitimate business, and not involving piracy of intellectual property or infringement
of copyright laws, renders the warrant to be unreasonable.
Held:
Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners are articles
which can be found in a video tape store engaged in the legitimate business of lending
or renting out betamax tapes. In short, these articles and appliances are generally
connected with, or related to a legitimate business not necessarily involving piracy of
intellectual property or infringement of copyright laws. Hence, including these articles
without specification and/or particularity that they were really instruments in violating
an Anti-Piracy law makes the search warrant too general which could result in the
confiscation of all items found in any video store. In fact, this actually happened in the
present case. Although the applications and warrants themselves covered certain
articles of property usually found in a video store, the Court believes that the search
party should have confined themselves to articles that are according to them, evidence
constitutive of infringement of copyright laws or the piracy of intellectual property,
but not to other articles that are usually connected with, or related to, a legitimate
business, not involving piracy of intellectual property, or infringement of copyright
laws. So that a television set, a rewinder, and a whiteboard listing Betamax tapes,
video cassette cleaners video cassette recorders as reflected in the Returns of Search
Warrants, are items of legitimate business engaged in the video tape industry, and
which could not be the subject of seizure. The applicant and his agents therefore
exceeded their authority in seizing perfectly legitimate personal property usually
found in a video cassette store or business establishment. The search and seizure is
unreasonable.
Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano [GR L-69803, 8 October 1985]
Facts:
Prior to 6 August 1984, Mila Aguilar-Roque was one of the accused of Rebellion in
Criminal Case SMC-1-1 before Special Military Commission 1, and also one of the
accused of Subversion in Criminal Case MC-25-113 of Military Commission 25, both
cases being entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al." She was then
still at large. At around 9:00 a.m. on August 6, Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the
CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from the Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño, Executive Judge
of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street,
Quezon City, determined to be the leased residence of Aguilar-Roque, after almost a
month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground
house of the CPP/NPA." Aguilar-Roque has been long wanted by the military for
being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly
connected with the MV Karagatan/Doña Andrea cases. At 11:30 a.m., Aguilar-Roque
and Cynthia D. Nolasco were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the
intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City. The record does not
disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously been issued against Nolasco. At 12:00
noon on the same day, elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239- B Mayon
Street, Quezon City. Willie C. Tolentino, a person then in charge of the premises, was
arrested by the searching party presumably without a warrant of arrest. The searching
party seized 428 documents and written materials, and additionally a portable
typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431 items in all. On August 10, Aguilar-
Roque, Nolasco and Tolentino, were charged before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office
upon complaint filed by the CSG against the former for "Subversion/Rebellion and/or
Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion. On August 13, the City Fiscal filed an
Information for Violation of Presidential Decree (PD) 33 (Illegal Possession of
Subversive Documents) against Aguilar-Roque, et. al. before Branch 42 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Judge Antonio P. Santos, presiding. On
August 16, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the City Fiscal, praying that
Aguilar-Roque and Nolasco be charged with Subversion. The Motion was denied on
November 16. On September 10, the CSG submitted an Amended Return in the
Search Warrant case praying, inter alia, that the CSG be allowed to retain the seized
431 documents and articles, "in connection with cases that are presently pending
against Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office and the court." On
December 13, Judge Paño admitted the Amended Return and ruled that the seized
documents "shall be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying the case against
respondent." A day before that, Aguilar-Roque, et. al. filed a Motion to Suppress,
praying that such of the 431 items belonging to them be returned to them. It was
claimed that the proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Judge Santos
denied the Motion on 7 January 1985 on the ground that the validity of the Search
Warrant has to be litigated in the other case, apparently unaware of the Order issued
by Judge Paño on December 13. Nolasco, Aguilar-Roque, and Tolentino filed the
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus to annul and set aside the (1)
Search Warrant issued by RTC Judge Paño; (2) his Order admitting the Amended
Return and granting the Motion to Retain Seized Items; and (3) Order of MTC Judge
Santos denying Aguilar-Roque, et. al.'s Motion to Suppress.
Issue:
Whether the description of the personalities to be seized in the search warrant is too
general to render the warrant void.
Held:
The disputed Search Warrant (80-84) describes the personalities to be seized as
"Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New
Peoples Army and/or the National Democratic Front, such as Minutes of the Party
Meetings, Plans of these groups, Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive
books and instructions, manuals not otherwise available to the public, and support
money from foreign or local sources." It is at once evident that the Search Warrant
authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not particularized.
It is an all-embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not
specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not
otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to
be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching
team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law
discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a
portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant
and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the
things to be seized. Search warrants of similar description were considered null and
void for being too general. Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search
Warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles seized under an invalid search warrant
should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned to Aguilar-Roque. Some searches
may be made without a warrant. Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, is declaratory
in the sense that it is confined to the search, without a search warrant, of a person who
had been arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or
premises where the arrest was made can also be search without a search warrant. In
this latter case, "the extent and reasonableness of the search must be decided on its
own facts and circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the application of general
rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the extent of the
place or premises which may be searched". Considering that Aguilar-Roque has been
charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against public order; that the warrant for her
arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time; that she was arrested
within the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was
made within a half hour of her arrest, the Court was of the opinion that, in her respect,
the search at No. 239- B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a search warrant;
this, for possible effective results in the interest of public order. Such being the case,
the personalities seized may be retained by CSG, for possible introduction as evidence
in the Rebellion Case, leaving it to Aguilar-Roque to object to their relevance and to
ask Special Military Commission 1 to return to her any all irrelevant documents and
articles.
Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines vs. Asuncion [GR 122092, 19
May 1999]
Facts:
On 25 January 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search
warrant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 104, of Quezon City, stating
"(1) that the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at
PICOP compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr.
Vice President Ricardo G. Santiago, is in possession or has in its control high powered
firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or used or
intended to be used in committing the offense, and which are being kept and
concealed in the premises herein described; (2) that a Search Warrant should be issued
to enable any agent of the law to take possession and bring to this Honorable Court the
following described properties: 'Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56, ten (10)
M16 US rifles, two (2) AK-47 rifle[s], two (2) UZI submachinegun[s], two (2) M203
Grenade Launcher[s] cal 40mm., ten (10) cal. 45 pistol[s], ten (10) cal. 38 revolver[s],
two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s], assorted ammunitions for said calibers of
firearms and ten (10) handgrenades.'" The joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S.
Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito, as well as a summary of the information and the
supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno were attached to the
application. After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C.
Asuncion issued the contested search warrant. On 4 February 1995, the police
enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and seized various firearms and
ammunition. Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable,
Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, Evaristo M. Narvaez Jr., Ricardo G.
Santiago, Roberto A. Dormendo, Reydande D. Azucena, Niceforo V. Avila,
Florentino M. Mula, Felix O. Baito, Harold B. Celestial, Elmedencio C. Calixtro,
Carlito S. Legacion, Albino T. Lubang, Jeremias I. Abad and Herminio V. Villamil
filed a "Motion to Quash" 16 before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a
"Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash" and a "Motion to Suppress
Evidence." On 23 March 1995, the RTC issued the Order which denied PICOP, et.
al.'s motions. On 3 August 1995, the trial court rendered its Order denying their
Motion for Reconsideration. PICOP, et. al. filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition.
Issue:
Whether the fact that the warrant identifies only one place, i.e. the "Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig,
Surigao del Sur," satisfies the requirements of the particularity of the place to be
search, and thus render the warrant valid.
Held:
No. The fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures and the basic
conditions for the issuance of a search warrant are laid down in Section 2, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution. Consistent with the foregoing constitutional provision,
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, detail the requisites for the issuance
of a valid search warrant. The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable
cause is present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the
complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the
judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses
testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes
the place to be searched and the things to be seized. In view of the manifest objective
of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable search, the Constitution and the
Rules limit the place to be searched only to those described in the warrant. Thus, this
Court has held that "this constitutional right is the embodiment of a spiritual concept:
the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford it constitutional
protection against the long reach of government no less than to value human dignity,
and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need,
and then only under stringent procedural safeguards." Additionally, the requisite of
particularity is related to the probable cause requirement in that, at least under some
circumstances, the lack of a more specific description will make it apparent that there
has not been a sufficient showing to the magistrate that the described items are to be
found in a particular place. Herein, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial
court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents: (2) SPO3
Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the search
warrant, had no personal knowledge that PICOP, et. al. were not licensed to possess
the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not described with
particularity. As to the particularity of the place to be searched, the assailed search
warrant failed to described the place with particularity. It simply authorizes a search of
"the aforementioned premises," but it did not specify such premises. The warrant
identifies only one place, and that is the "Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur."
The PICOP compound, however, is made up of "200 offices/buildings, 15 plants, 84
staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service
outlets and some 800 miscellaneous structures, all of which spread out over some one
hundred fifty-five hectares." Obviously, the warrant gives the police officers unbridled
and thus illegal authority to search all the structures found inside the PICOP
compound. Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution
and the Rules of Court, all the firearms, explosives and other materials seized were
"inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
Yousef Al-Ghoul vs. Court of Appeals [GR 126859, 4 September 2001]
Facts:
On 31 March 1995, Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding judge of the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 125, Kalookan City, issued search
warrants 54- 95 and 55-95 for the search and seizure of certain items in Apartment 2
at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City. On 1 April 1995, the
police searched Apartment 8, in the same compound and found one (1) .45 caliber
pistol. Found in Apartment 2 were 2 M-16 rifles with 2 magazines and 20 live M -16
ammunitions, 1 Bar of demolition charge, 1 Caliber Pistol with no. 634 and other nos.
were placed with magazine of Caliber .45 and 3 live 45 ammunitions, 1 22 Caliber
handgun with 5 live ammunitions in its cylinder, 1 Box containing 40 pieces of .25
caliber ammunitions, 2 pieces of fragmentation grenade, 1 roll of detonating cord
color yellow, 2 big bags of ammonium nitrate suspected to be explosives substance,
22 detonating cords with blasting caps, ½ and ¼ pound of high explosives TNT, 1
timer alarm clock, 2 bags of suspected gun powder, 2 small plastic bag of suspected
explosive substance, 1 small box of plastic bag of suspected dynamites, One weighing
scale, and 2 batteries 9 volts with blasting caps and detonating cord. The firearms,
ammunitions, explosives and other incendiary devices seized at the apartments were
acknowledged in the receipt signed by SPO2 Melanio de la Cruz. Yousef Al Ghoul,
Isam Mohammad Abdulhadi, Wail Rashid Al-Khatib, Nabeel Nasser Al-Riyami,
Ashraf Hassam Al-Yazori, and Mohammad Abushendi were charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 123, in informations (Criminal Cases
C-48666-67) accusing them with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and
explosives, pursuant to Presidential Decree 1866. Thereafter, they were arrested and
detained. They filed a motion for bail on 24 May 1995, the resolution of which was
held in abeyance by the RTC pending the presentation of evidence from the
prosecution to determine whether or not the evidence presented is strong. On 7
February 1996, at the hearing for bail, the RTC "admitted all exhibits being offered
for whatever purpose that they maybe worth" after the prosecution had finished
adducing its evidence despite the objection by the petitioners on the admissibility of
said evidence. On 19 February 1996, the RTC denied their motion for bail earlier
filed. As their action before appellate court also proved futile, with the appellate court
dismissing their special civil action for certiorari, they filed the petition for review
before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the search and seizure orders are valid, and the objects seized admissible in
evidence.
Held:
As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged
nor amplified by the police. Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing their task
with vigor, but in doing so, care must be taken that constitutional and legal safeguards
are not disregarded. Exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Hence, the search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45 caliber
pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against Al-Ghoul, et. al. In contrast,
the search conducted at Apartment 2 could not be similarly faulted. The search
warrants specifically mentioned Apartment 2. The search was done in the presence of
its occupants, in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court. The
articles seized during the search of Apartment 2 are of the same kind and nature as
those items enumerated in the search warrant. The items seized from Apartment 2
were described with specificity in the warrants in question. The nature of the items
ordered to be seized did not require a technical description. Moreover, the law does
not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details
as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities, otherwise, it
would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they
would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Once described,
however, the articles subject of the search and seizure need not be so invariant as to
require absolute concordance between those seized and those described in the warrant.
Substantial similarity of those articles described as a class or species would suffice.
People v. Omaweng [GR 99050, 2 September 1992]
Facts:
In the morning of 12 September 1988, PC constables with the Mt. Province PC
Command put up a checkpoint at the junction of the roads, one going to Sagada and
the other to Bontoc. They stopped and checked all vehicles that went through the
checkpoint. At 9:15 a.m., they flagged down a cream-colored Ford Fiera (ABT-634)
coming from the Bontoc Poblacion and headed towards Baguio. The vehicle was
driven by Conway Omaweng and had no passengers. The Constables (Layong, et.al.)
asked permission to inspect the vehicle to which Omaweng acceded to. When they
peered into the rear of the vehicle, they saw a travelling bag which was partially
covered by the rim of a spare tire under the passenger seat on the right side of the
vehicle. They asked permission to see the contents of the bag to which Omaweng
consented to. When they opened the bag, they found that it contained 41 plastic
packets of different sizes containing pulverized substances. The constable gave a
packet to his team leader, who, after sniffing the stuff concluded that it was marijuana.
The Constables thereafter boarded the vehicles and proceeded to the Bontoc poblacion
to report the incident to the PC Headquarters. The prohibited drugs were surrendered
to the evidence custodian. The PC Forensic Chemist at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet conducted 2 chemistry examinations of the substance contained in the plastic
packets taken from appellant and found them to be positive for hashish or marijuana.
Omaweng was indicted for the violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended, in a criminal complaint filed with the
MTC Bontoc, Mountain Province on 12 September 1988. Upon his failure to submit
counter-affidavits despite the granting of an extension of time to do so, the court
declared that he had waived his right to a preliminary investigation and, finding
probable cause against Omaweng, ordered the elevation of the case to the proper
court. On 14 November 1988, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Mountain
Province filed an Information charging Omaweng with the violation of Section 47
Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended (Crim Case 713). After his
motion for reinvestigation was denied by the Provincial Fiscal, Omaweng entered a
plea of not guilty during his arraignment on 20 June 1989. During the trial on the
merits, the prosecution presented 4 witnesses. Omaweng did not present any evidence
other than portions of the Joint Clarificatory Sworn Statement, dated 23 December
1988, of prosecution witnesses Joseph Layong and David Fomocod. On 21 March
1991, the trial court promulgated its Judgment convicting Omaweng of the crime of
transporting prohibited drugs (Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, as amended).
Omaweng appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether Omaweng was subjected to search which violates his Constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Held:
Omaweng was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a violation of
his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. He willingly gave
prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle
and travelling bag. The testimony of the PC Constable (Layung) was not dented on
cross-examination or rebutted by Omaweng for he chose not to testify on his own
behalf. Omaweng waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures when
he voluntarily submitted to a search or consents to have it made in his person or
premises. He is precluded from later complaining thereof right to be secure from
unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made
either expressly or impliedly. Since in the course of the valid search 41 packages of
drugs were found, it behooved the officers to seize the same; no warrant was
necessary for such seizure.
People vs. Correa [GR 119246, 30 January 1998]
Facts:
A week before 18 June 1994, Leonardo Dulay was placed under surveillance by the
Police Operatives from the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Western Police District
Command (DEU-WPDC) on account of confidential and intelligence reports received
in said Unit about his drug trafficking around Bambang Street, Tondo, Manila. The
police surveillance brought forth positive results and confirmed Dulay's illegal drug
trade. On 17 June 1994, operatives were alerted that Dulay would transport and
deliver a certain quantity of drugs that night on board a owner-type jeep (FMR948).
Thereafter, the operatives, together with the informer proceeded to A. Bonifacio Street
on board 3 vehicles, and inconspicuously parked along the side of North Cemetery
and waited for the suspect. The police informant spotted Dulay’s vehicle at 3:00 am.
The operatives tailed the subject jeepney until they reached Bambang extension and
Jose Abad Santos Avenue, where they accosted the passengers of said jeepney. The
team inspected a cylindrical tin can of El Cielo Vegetable Cooking Lard, about two
feet high, loaded in the vehicle of the appellants. The can contained 8 bundles of
suspected dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in pieces of paper and plastic tapes.
The team seized the suspected contrabands and marked each bundle consecutively.
The 3 suspects were brought to the police headquarters at DEU-WPDC for
investigation. The packages of suspected marijuana were submitted to the NBI for
laboratory analysis to determine their chemical composition. The tests confirmed that
the confiscated stuff were positive for marijuana and weighed 16.1789 kilograms. The
defense, however, contends that the 3 accused were arrested without warrant in
Camarin D, Caloocan City, enroute to Dulay’s house to get the things of his child
allegedly rushed previously to the Metropolitan Hospital, for an alleged charge of
trafficking on 'shabu,' and were brought to the WPDC headquarters at U.N. Avenue,
where they were detained. On 12 July 1994, an Information was filed with the RTC
Manila (Branch 35) indicting Antonio Correa y Cayton @ "Boyet," Rito Gunida y
Sesante @ "Dodong," and Leonardo Dulay y Santos @ "Boy Kuba" for having
violated Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, as amended. When arraigned, the 3 accused
pleaded not guilty. After trial and on 3 March 1995, the lower court found the
appellants guilty as charged and were sentenced to death and a fine of P10 million.
Issue:
Whether the accused are precluded from assailing the warrantless search and seizure,
due to waiver on their part.
Held:
Antonio Correa y Cayton @ "Boyet," Rito Gunida y Sesante @ "Dodong," and
Leonardo Dulay y Santos @ "Boy Kuba" are precluded from assailing the warrantless
search and seizure when they voluntarily submitted to it as shown by their actuation
during the search and seizure. They never protested when the police officer opened the
tin can loaded in their vehicle, nor when he opened one of the bundles, nor when they,
together with their cargo of drugs and their vehicle, were brought to the police station
for investigation and subsequent prosecution. When one voluntarily submits to a
search or consents to have it made on his person or premises, he is precluded from
later complaining thereof The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like
every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly."
Further, they effectively waived their constitutional right against the search and
seizure by their voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, when they
entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and by participating in the trial.
People v. Ramos [GR 85401-02, 4 June 1990]
Facts:
On 29 November 1982, a civilian informer came to the Narcotics Command Office in
Olongapo City and reported that a cigarette vendor by the name of "Mama Rose"
(Rosalinda Ramos) was selling marijuana at the corner of 3rd Street and Rizal Avenue
in Olongapo City. Tests buys were made using marked money. The Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) team proceeded to the place where appellant was selling
cigarettes, and arrested the latter for illegal peddling of marijuana. Ramos was
requested to take out the contents of her wallet. The four marked five-peso bills used
in the test buys were found among her possessions and were confiscated after the
serial numbers were confirmed. Search of Ramos’ stall yielded 20 sticks of marijuana
cigarettes in a trash can placed under the small table where Ramos displayed the wares
she was selling. Ramos was thereafter brought to the station. At the station, Ramos
executed a statement confessing to her crimes which she swore to before Assistant
City Fiscal. The marijuana sticks confiscated were sent to the Philippine Constabulary
Crime Laboratory (PCCL) for analysis, and thereafter were confirmed to be
marijuana. The defense contends however that she assented to the invitation of the
NARCOM operatives for investigation, after search of her buri bags (which she stores
the fruits that she sells) were fruitless. She claimed that she was forced to affix her
signature on the four 5-peso bills by one Sgt. Sudiacal, purportedly to be the same
money which was used to buy marijuana from her, but which she insists was her
money being saved for the rentals. She was later brought to the Fiscal’s Office after
investigation, where she signed a document. She claimed she was not assisted by any
counsel during the investigation, neither during the time she signed the document at
the Fiscal’s Office. Two informations were filed against Ramos, one for sale
(Criminal Case 5991) and the other for possession of marijuana (Criminal Case 5990).
After trial, the RTC Olongapo City (Branch 73) found her guilty beyond reasonable
doubt in Criminal Case 5990 for violating Section 8 of RA 6425 and sentenced her to
imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day and a fine of P6,000. She was likewise found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case 5991 for violating Section 4 of RA
6425 and was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000. Ramos sought
reversal of the decisions with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether Ramos waived her right against the warrantless search of the trash can,
where illegal drugs were found, under her control.
Held:
The trash can (where the contraband were found) was found under the table where her
legitimate wares were being sold. Ramos he was the only person who had access to
the trash can. The same was under her immediate physical control. She had complete
charge of the contents of the trash can under the table to the exclusion of all other
persons. In law, actual possession exists when the thing is in the immediate occupancy
and control of the party. But this is not to say that the law requires actual possession.
In criminal law, possession necessary for conviction of the offense of possession of
controlled substances with intent to distribute may be constructive as well as actual. It
is only necessary that the defendant must have dominion and control over the
contraband. These requirements are present in the situation described, where the
prohibited drugs were found inside the trash can placed under the stall owned by
Ramos. In fact, the NARCOM agents who conducted the search testified that they had
to ask Ramps to stand so that they could look inside the trash can under Ramos' papag.
The trash can was positioned in such a way that it was difficult for another person to
use the trash can. The trash can was obviously not for use by her customers.
Therefore, the twenty sticks of marijuana are admissible in evidence and the trial
court's finding that Ramos is guilty of possession is correct.
People v. Barros [GR 90640, 29 March 1994]
Facts:
On 6 September 1987, M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan, both members
of the P.C. Mountain Province Command, rode the Dangwa Bus bearing Plate ABZ-
242 bound for Sabangan, Mountain Province. Upon reaching Chackchakan, Bontoc,
Mountain Province, the bus stopped and both M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan, who
were seated at the back, saw Bonifacio Barros carrying a carton, board the bus and
seated himself on seat 18 after putting the carton under his seat. Thereafter, the bus
continued and upon reaching Sabangan, M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan before they
alighted, it being their station, called C2C [Fernando] Bongyao to inspect the carton
under seat 18. After C2C Bongyao inspected the carton, he found out that it contained
marijuana and he asked the passengers who the owner of the carton was but nobody
answered. Thereafter, C2C Bongyao alighted with the carton and S/Sgt. Ayan and
C2C Bongyao invited Barros to the detachment for questioning as the latter was the
suspected owner of the carton containing marijuana. Upon entering the detachment the
carton was opened in the presence of Barros. When Barros denied ownership of the
carton of marijuana, the P.C. officers called for the bus conductor who pinpointed to
Barros as the owner of the carton of marijuana. Barros was charged with violating
Section 4 of RA 6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). After trial, the
trial court convicted Bonifacio Barros of violation of Section 4 of RA 6425 as
amended and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of P20,000.00. Barros appealed.
Issue:
Whether the failure of the carton bearer to object to the search made in the moving
vehicle, resulting to his warrantless arrest, constitutes a waiver.
Held:
The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a
judicial warrant; otherwise such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within
the meaning of Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The evidence secured
thereby — i.e., the "fruits" of the search and seizure — will be inadmissible in
evidence "for any purpose in any proceeding." The requirement that a judicial warrant
must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is, however, not
absolute. There are certain exceptions recognized in our law, one of which relates to
the search of moving vehicles. Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of
moving vehicles — automobiles, trucks, etc. — without need of a warrant, it not being
practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle
can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be
sought. In carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles, however, peace
officers are limited to routine checks, that is, the vehicles are neither really searched
nor their occupants subjected to physical or body searches, the examination of the
vehicles being limited to visual inspection. When, however, a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search would be constitutionally
permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable
cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or the
contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or
the proceeds of some criminal offense. The Court has in the past found probable cause
to conduct without a judicial warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in
situations where (1) there had emanated from a package the distinctive smell of
marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine
National Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a
sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search
was conducted; (3) Narcom agents were informed or "tipped off" by an undercover
"deep penetration" agent that prohibited drugs would be brought into the country on a
particular airline flight on a given date; (4) Narcom agents had received information
that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession
prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian,
because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and
other identification papers when requested to do so; and (5) Narcom agents had
received confidential information that a woman having the same physical appearance
as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana. Herein, there is nothing in the
record that any circumstance which constituted or could have reasonably constituted
probable cause for the peace officers to search the carton box allegedly owned by
Barros. The testimony of the law enforcement officers who had apprehended the
accused (M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan), and who had searched the
box in his possession, (C2C Fernando Bongyao), simply did not suggest or indicate
the presence of any such probable cause. Further, The accused is not to be presumed
to have waived the unlawful search conducted on the occasion of his warrantless
arrest "simply because he failed to object." To constitute a waiver, it must appear first
that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right. The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry
into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein. As the
constitutional quaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the
courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority
by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful
submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is
merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. Courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that
we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. Accordingly, the
search and seizure of the carton box was equally non-permissible and invalid. The
"fruits" of the invalid search and seizure — i.e., the 4) kilos of marijuana — should
therefore not have been admitted in evidence against Barros.
Veroy v. Layague [GR 95630, 18 June 1992]
Facts:
Leopoldo and Ma. Luisa Veroy are husband and wife residing in Davao City. When
Veroy was promoted to the position of Assistant Administrator of the Social Security
System sometime in June 1988, he and his family transferred to Quezon City. The
care and upkeep of their residence in Davao City was left to 2 houseboys, Jimmy
Favia and Eric Burgos, who had their assigned quarters at a portion of the premises.
The Veroys would occasionally send money to Edna Soquilon for the salary of the
said houseboys and other expenses for the upkeep of their house. While the Veroys
had the keys to the interior of the house, only the key to the kitchen, where the circuit
breakers were located, was entrusted to Edna Soquilon to give her access in case of an
emergency. On 12 April 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo Patrol Station,
PC/INP raided Veroy’s house in Davao City on information that the said residence
was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with
the help of the caretakers but did not enter the house since the owner was not present
and they did not have a search warrant. Permission was requested by phone to Ma.
Luisa Veroy who consented on the condition that the search be conducted in the
presence of Major Macasaet. The following day, Capt. Obrero and Maj. Macasaet met
at the Veroy’s house to conduct the search pursuant to the authority granted by Ma.
Luisa. Capt. Obrero recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine containing 7 live
bullets in a black clutch bag inside an unlocked drawer in the children’s room. 3 half-
full jute sacks containing printed materials of RAM-SFP were also found in the
children's room. A search of the children's recreation and study area revealed a big
travelling bag containing assorted clothing, a small black bag containing a book
entitled "Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation", a road map of the Philippines,
a telescope, a plastic bag containing assorted medicines and religious pamphlets was
found in the master's bedroom. Inventory and receipt of seized articles were made.
The case was referred for preliminary investigation to the Quezon City Assistant
Prosecutor , who was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor for Davao City by the
DOJ through Department Order 88 (16 May 1990). In a resolution dated 6 August
1990, the Fiscal recommended the filing of an Information against the Veroys for
violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Furtherance
of Rebellion). Hence, on 8 August 1990, an Information for the said offense was filed
by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City before the RTC Davao City). No
bail was recommended by the prosecution. The fiscal’s resolution was received by the
Veroys on 13 August 1990. The latter filed a motion for bail on the same day which
was denied for being premature, as they have not been arrested yet. The Veroys
voluntarily surrendered to Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao, but who refused to receive them o
the ground that his office has not received copies of their warrants of arrest. In the
meantime, on 15 August 1990, the Veroys were admitted to the St. Luke's Hospital for
various ailments brought about or aggravated by the stress and anxiety caused by the
filing of the criminal complaint. On 17 August 1990, Gen. Dumlao granted their
request that they be allowed to be confined at the hospital and placed under guard
thereat. Upon arraignment on 1 October 1990, the Veroys pleaded not guilty and filed
a motion for hospital confinement, which was denied. The court ordered their
commitment at the Davao City Rehabilitation Center pending trial on the merits. At
the conclusion thereof, the court issued a second order denying their motion for
reconsideration. The Veroys were returned to the St. Luke's Hospital where their
physical condition remained erratic. Gen. Dumlao informed the Veroys that he had
issued a directive for their transfer from the St. Luke's Hospital to Camp Crame on the
basis of the 2 October 1990 Order. They would proceed with their transfer pursuant to
the order of the trial court, unless otherwise restrained by the court. The Veroys filed
the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.
Issue:
Whether the permission granted by ma. Luisa Veroy for ascertaining thereat the
presence of alleged “rebel soldiers” include the authority to conduct a room to room
search once inside the house.
Held:
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). However, the rule that searches and seizures must
be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among the recognized
exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a moving
vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (People v. Lo Ho Wing). The
necessity of the permission obtained from Ma. Luisa underlines the recognition of
Capt. Obrero of the need of a search warrant to enter the house. The permission
granted by was for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged
"rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to
room search once inside the house. The police officers had ample time to procure a
search warrant but did not. Warrantless searches were declared illegal because the
officials conducting the search had every opportunity to secure a search warrant. The
items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of their
constitutional rights. As such, they are inadmissible in evidence in the criminal actions
instituted against them. The offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum
prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se.
Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense may not
be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still
necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the
articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the
exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the Veroys in the
criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms. Besides, assuming that
there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala prohibita, while there is no need of
criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed. Without the
knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime.
People vs. Damaso [GR 93516, 12 August 1992]
Facts:
On 18 June 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer connected
with the 152nd PC Company at Lingayen, Pangasinan, and some companions were
sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-
Bani, Dagupan City. In said place, the group apprehended Gregorio Flameniano,
Berlina Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa and Deogracias Mayaoa. When interrogated, the
persons apprehended revealed that there was an underground safehouse at Gracia
Village in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating with the Station Commander of
Urdaneta, the group proceeded to the house in Gracia Village. They found subversive
documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm and other items. After the raid, the
group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under surveillance the rented
apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier
arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba.
She stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza/Basilio Damaso. She guided the
group to the house rented by Damaso(@Mendoza). When they reached the house, the
group found that it had already vacated by the occupants. Since Morados was hesitant
to give the new address of Damaso (@Mendoza), the group looked for the Barangay
Captain of the place and requested him to point out the new house rented by Damaso
(@Mendoza). The group again required Morados to go with them. When they reached
the house, the group saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her that they already
knew that she was a member of the NPA in the area. At first, she denied it, but when
she saw Morados she requested the group to go inside the house. Upon entering the
house, the group, as well as the Barangay Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled
"Ang Bayan," xerox copiers and a computer machine. They also found persons who
were companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely, Teresita Calosa, Ricardo Calosa,
Marites Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados) . The group requested the
persons in the house to allow them to look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one
of the rooms, they saw books used for subversive orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets
and ammunitions, Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales,
Mindoro and Laguna and other items. They confiscated the articles and brought them
to their headquarters for final inventory. They likewise brought the persons found in
the house to the headquarters for investigation. Said persons revealed that Damaso
(@Mendoza) was the lessee of the house and owned the items confiscated therefrom.
Thus, Basilio Damaso, was originally charged in an information filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City with violation of Presidential Decree 1866 in
furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion, together
with Luzviminda Morados y Galang @ Ka Mel, Teresita Calosa y Macabangon @ Ka
Tessie, Ricardo Calosa y Perez @ Ka Ric, Marites Calosa y Evangelista @ Ka Tess,
Eric Tanciangco y Capira @ Ka Ric and Luz Tanciangco y Pencial @ Ka Luz. Such
information was later amended to exclude all other persons except Damaso from the
criminal charge. Upon arraignment, Damaso pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution rested its case and offered its exhibits for
admission. The defense counsel interposed his objections to the admissibility of the
prosecution's evidence on grounds of its being hearsay, immaterial or irrelevant and
illegal for lack of a search warrant; and thereafter, manifested that he was not
presenting any evidence for the accused. On 17 January 1990, the trial court rendered
its decision, finding Damaso guilty beyond reasonable doubt, sentencing the latter to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
Damaso appealed.
Issue:
Whether there was waiver on the part of Damaso to allow the warrantless search of his
house.
Held:
Damaso was singled out as the sole violator of PD 1866, in furtherance of, or incident
to, or in connection with the crime of subversion. There is no substantial and credible
evidence to establish the fact that the appellant is allegedly the same person as the
lessee of the house where the M-14 rifle and other subversive items were found or the
owner of the said items. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Damaso is the
lessee of the house, the case against him still will not prosper, the reason being that the
law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizure
proceedings. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures,
being a personal one cannot he waived by anyone except the person whose rights are
invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her . The records show
that Damaso was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his
alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it. There is no evidence that would
establish the fact that Luz Morados was indeed Damaso's helper or if it was true that
she was his helper, that Damaso had given her authority to open his house in his
absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an
authority. Without this evidence, the authorities' intrusion into Damaso's dwelling
cannot be given any color of legality. While the power to search and seize is necessary
to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute
is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government. As a consequence, the search conducted by the authorities was illegal. It
would have been different if the situation here demanded urgency which could have
prompted the authorities to dispense with a search warrant. But the record is silent on
this point. The fact that they came to Damaso's house at nighttime, does not grant
them the license to go inside his house.
Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs [GR L-27968, 3 December 1975]
Facts:
M/V Jolo Lema had been under strict surveillance by the combined team of agents of
the NBI, PC, RASAC, and City Police of Davao prior to its apprehension at a private
wharf in Batjak, Sasa, Davao City. M/V [Jolo Lema] was skippered (sic) by Capt.
Aquilino Pantinople and chartered by Mr. Tomas Velasco. During the period from the
latter part of August to September 18, 1966, the said vessel was in Indonesian waters
where it loaded copra and coffee beans from Taruna, Pitta, and Mangenito, all of
Indonesia. In its trip to Indonesia it brought various merchandise from the Philippines
which were exchanged and/or bartered for copra and coffee beans and subsequently
taken to Davao City. Said vessel passed Marore, Indonesia on 18 September 1966 on
its a way to Tahuna, Indonesia before proceeding to Davao City where it was
apprehended on 19 September 1966. At about 3:00 p.m. of the said day, when the
vessel was searched and after Captain Pantinople informed the team that Velasco, the
charterer of the vessel, had other documents showing that vessel came from Indonesia
carrying smuggled copra and coffee, a combined team of Constabulary and Regional
Anti-Smuggling Center operatives headed by Earl Reynolds, Senior NBI Agent of
Davao, proceeded to the Velasco's room at the Skyroom Hotel in Davao City, to ask
for said document. Velasco was not inside the hotel room when they entered the room.
There are conficting claims whether the manicurist Teofila Ibañez or whether
Velasco's wife, who was allegedly inside the room at that time, voluntarily allowed
the police officers to enter; and whether the police officers "forcibly opened luggages
and boxes from which only several documents and papers were found, then seized,
confiscated and took away the same," or whether Mrs. Velasco volunteered to open
the suitcases and baggages of Velasco and delivered the documents and things
contained therein to Reynolds. The Collector of Customs of Davao seized 1,480 sacks
of copra and 86 sacks of coffee from the M/V motor vessel Jolo Lema. The seizure
was declared lawful by the Court of Tax Appeals, and its decision was affirmed by the
Supreme Court on 29 November 1974 in Nasiad vs. Court of Tax Appeals (GR L-
29318, November 29, 1974, 61 SCRA 238). In the present special civil action for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus; the only question left then is whether the search
conducted by a party headed by Reynolds without the search warrant for the hotel
room of Velasco, who entered into a contract with Jose G. Lopez, the awardee of such
Philippine Reparations Commission vessel, for its operation and use ostensibly for
fishing, is violative of such constitutional provision.
Issue:
Whether there was consent on the part of the person who was the occupant of the hotel
room then rented by Velasco.
Held:
There was an attempt on the part of Lopez and Velasco to counteract the force of the
recital of the written statement of Teofila Ibañez (allegedly wife of Tomas Velasco)
by an affidavit of one Corazon Y. Velasco, who stated that she is the legal wife of
Velasco, and another by Velasco himself; reiterating that the person who was present
at his hotel room was one Teofila Ibañez, "a manicurist by occupation." If such indeed
were the case, then it is much more easily understandable why that person, Teofila
Ibañez, who could be aptly described as the wrong person at the wrong place and at
the wrong time, would have signified her consent readily and immediately. Under the
circumstances, that was the most prudent course of action. It would save her and even
Velasco himself from any gossip or innuendo. Nor could the officers of the law be
blamed if they would act on the appearances. There was a person inside who from all
indications was ready to accede to their request. Even common courtesy alone would
have precluded them from inquiring too closely as to why she was there. Under all the
circumstances, therefore, it can readily be concluded that there was consent sufficient
in law to dispense with the need for a search warrant.
Caballes vs. Court of Appeals [GR 136292, 15 January 2002]
Facts:
About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro,
while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a
passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was
loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged down the vehicle. The
jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes y Taiño. When asked what was loaded on the jeep,
he did not answer, but he appeared pale and nervous. With Caballes' consent, the
police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm
aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power
Corporation (NAOCOR). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at
P55,244.45. Noceja asked Caballes where the wires came from and Caballes answered
that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from
Sampalucan. Thereafter, Caballes and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were
brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of Caballes and
the jeep loaded with the wires which were turned over to the Police Station
Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Caballes was incarcerated for 7 days in the
Municipal jail. Caballes was charged with the crime of theft in an information dated
16 October 1989. During the arraignment, Caballes pleaded not guilty and hence, trial
on the merits ensued. On 27 April 1993, Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna
rendered judgment, finding Caballes, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
theft. In a resolution dated 9 November 1998, the trial court denied Caballes' motion
for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision on 15
September 1998. Caballes appealed the decision by certiorari.
Issue:
Whether Caballes’ passive submission to the statement of Sgt. Noceja that the latter
"will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive" be considered
as waiver on Caballes’ part on warrantless search and seizure.
Held:
Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their
persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under
Section 2, Article III thereof. The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of
the Constitution bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not
absolute but admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to
a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of moving
vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search); and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. In cases
where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in
the Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is
not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be
performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the
place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured. It is not controverted
that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers was not authorized by a
search warrant. The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police
officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if
made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. Herein,
the police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of
Caballes' vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and
look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It thus cannot be
considered a simple routine check. Also, Caballes' vehicle was flagged down because
the police officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that
the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them,
was unusual and uncommon. The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply
because it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not
constitute "probable cause" as would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant.
In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report
or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle
which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Philippine jurisprudence is
replete with cases where tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to
effect a warrantless search and seizure. Unfortunately, none exists in the present case.
Further, the evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally surrendered his right
against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers allegedly
obtained the consent of Caballes for them to conduct the search leaves much to be
desired. When Caballes' vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached Caballes
and "told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the
positive." By uttering those words, it cannot be said the police officers were asking or
requesting for permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle of Caballes. For
all intents and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing upon Caballes that they
will search his vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. In
addition, in cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be
noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent
of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear
and positive proof. Neither can Caballes' passive submission be construed as an
implied acquiescence to the warrantless search. Casting aside the cable wires as
evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to sustain Caballes'
conviction. His guilt can only be established without violating the constitutional right
of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure.
People vs. Asis [GR 142531, 15 October 2002]
Facts:
Danilo Asis y Fonperada and Gilbert Formento y Saricon were charged in an
Information dated 18 February 1998; the information stating "That on or about
February 10, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and by means of force and violence
upon person, to wit: by then and there stabbing one YU HING GUAN @ ROY
CHING with a bladed instrument on the different parts of the body thereafter take, rob
and carry away the following, to wit: Cash money in the amount of P20,000.00; one
(1) wristwatch' one (1) gold necklace; and undetermined items; or all in the total
amount of P20,000.00 more or less, belonging to said YU HING GUAN @ ROY
CHING against his will, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the
aforesaid amount more or less of P20,000.00, Philippine Currency, and as a result
thereof, he sustained mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause
of his death." When arraigned on 9 July 1998, both accused pleaded not guilty. Found
to be deaf-mutes, they were assisted, not only by a counsel de oficio, but also by an
interpreter from the Calvary Baptist Church. The prosecution presented 9 witnesses.
Although none of them had actually seen the crime committed, strong and substantial
circumstantial evidence presented by them attempted to link both accused to the
crime. After due trial, both accused were found guilty and sentenced to death. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 54; Criminal Case 98-163090), on 8
March 2000, held that the "crime charged and proved is robbery with homicide under
Article 294, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code," ruled that "although no witnesses to
the actual killing and robbery were presented, the circumstantial evidence including
the recovery of bloodstained clothing from both accused definitely proved that the two
(2) x x x committed the crime," and appreciated the aggravating circumstances of
abuse of confidence, superior strength and treachery and thus sentenced both accused
to the supreme penalty of death. Hence, the automatic review before the Supreme
Court. Both the accused do not question the legality of their arrest, as they made no
objection thereto before the arraignment, but object to the introduction of the
bloodstained pair of shorts allegedly recovered from the bag of Formento; arguing that
the search was illegally done, making the obtainment of the pair of shorts illegal and
taints them as inadmissible. The prosecution, on the other hand, contends that it was
Formento's wife who voluntarily surrendered the bag that contained the bloodstained
trousers of the victim, and thus claims that her act constituted a valid consent to the
search without a warrant.
Issue:
Whether Formento, a deaf-mute, has given consent to the recovery of the bloodstained
pair of short, in his possession during the warrantless search.
Held:
Primarily, the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, being a
personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded
or who is expressly authorized to do so on his or her behalf. In the present case, the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses show that at the time the bloodstained pair of
shorts was recovered, Formento, together with his wife and mother, was present.
Being the very subject of the search, necessarily, he himself should have given
consent. Since he was physically present, the waiver could not have come from any
other person. Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs does not apply as the accused
therein was not present when the search was made. Further, to constitute a valid
waiver, it must be shown that first, the right exists; second, the person involved had
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and third, the
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Herein, Formento could not have
consented to a warrantless search when, in the first place, he did not understand what
was happening at that moment. There was no interpreter to assist him -- a deaf-mute --
during the arrest, search and seizure. The point in the case Pasion vda. de Garcia v.
Locsin, i.e. "as the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act
of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an
officer’s authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold
that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation
thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law,"
becomes even more pronounced in the present case, in which Formento is a deaf
-mute, and there was no interpreter to explain to him what was happening. His
seeming acquiescence to the search without a warrant may be attributed to plain and
simple confusion and ignorance. The bloodstained pair of shorts was a piece of
evidence seized on the occasion of an unlawful search and seizure. Thus, it is tainted
and should thus be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. In the
language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose
in any proceeding. Lastly, as to evidence vis-a-is the case in its totality, circumstantial
evidence that merely arouses suspicions or gives room for conjecture is not sufficient
to convict. It must do more than just raise the possibility, or even the probability, of
guilt. It must engender moral certainty. Otherwise, the constitutional presumption of
innocence prevails, and the accused deserves acquittal.
People vs. Tudtud [GR 144037, 26 September 2003]
Facts:
Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao
City received a report from a “civilian asset” named Bobong Solier about a certain
Noel Tudtud. Solier related that his neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud,
who was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their area.
Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta and their superior,
SPO1 Villalonghan, all members of the Intelligence Section of the Toril Police
Station, conducted surveillance in Solier’s neighborhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City.
For 5 days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal
drugs. According to his neighbors, Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana. On 1
August 1999, Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and
would be back later that day with new stocks of marijuana. Solier described Tudtud as
big-bodied and short, and usually wore a hat. At around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a
team composed of PO1 Desierto, PO1 Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan posted
themselves at the corner of Saipon and McArthur Highway to await Tudtud’s arrival.
All wore civilian clothes. About 8:00 p.m., 2 men disembarked from a bus and helped
each other carry a carton marked “King Flakes.” Standing some 5 feet away from the
men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit Tudtud’s
description. The same man also toted a plastic bag. PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto
then approached the suspects and identified themselves as police officers. PO1
Desierto informed them that the police had received information that stocks of illegal
drugs would be arriving that night. The man who resembled Tudtud’s description
denied that he was carrying any drugs. PO1 Desierto asked him if he could see the
contents of the box. Tudtud obliged, saying, “it was alright.” Tudtud opened the box
himself as his companion looked on. The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath
which were two bundles, one wrapped in a striped plastic bag and another in
newspapers. PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages. They contained
what seemed to the police officers as marijuana leaves. The police thus arrested
Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their rights and brought them to the
police station. The two did not resist. The confiscated items were turned over to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. Forensic tests on
specimens taken from the confiscated items confirmed the police officers’ suspicion.
The plastic bag contained 3,200 grams of marijuana leaves while the newspapers
contained another 890 grams. Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were
subsequently charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City with
illegal possession of prohibited drugs. Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not
guilty. The defense, however, reserved their right to question the validity of their
arrest and the seizure of the evidence against them. Trial ensued thereafter. Tudtud,
denying the charges against them, cried frame-up. Swayed by the prosecution’s
evidence beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment convicting both
accused as charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign,
among other errors, the admission in evidence of the marijuana leaves, which they
claim were seized in violation of their right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Issue:
Whether the Tudtud’s implied acquiescence (Tudtud’s statement of “it’s all right”
when the police officers requested that the box be opened) be considered a waiver.
Held:
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article
III of the Constitution. The RTC justified the warrantless search of appellants’
belongings under the first exception, as a search incident to a lawful arrest. A search
incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It is significant to
note that the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds that
the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a
search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the
police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. The question,
therefore, is whether the police herein had probable cause to arrest Tudtud, et. al. The
long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is
that “reliable information” alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under
Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some
overt act that would indicate that he “has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.” For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to
apply, this Court ruled, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer. Reliable information alone is insufficient. Thus,
herein, in no sense can the knowledge of the arresting officers that Tudtud was in
possession of marijuana be described as “personal,” having learned the same only
from their informant Solier. Solier, for his part, testified that he obtained his
information only from his neighbors and the friends of Tudtud. Solier’s information is
hearsay. Confronted with such a dubious informant, the police perhaps felt it
necessary to conduct their own “surveillance.” This “surveillance,” it turns out, did
not actually consist of staking out Tudtud to catch him in the act of plying his illegal
trade, but of a mere “gathering of information from the assets there.” The police
officers who conducted such “surveillance” did not identify who these “assets” were
or the basis of the latter’s information. Clearly, such information is also hearsay, not
of personal knowledge. Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures only if the following requisites are present: (1) It
must appear that the rights exist; (2) The person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; (3) Said person had an actual intention to
relinquish the right. Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third
requisites. Records disclose that when the police officers introduced themselves as
such and requested Tudtud that they see the contents of the carton box supposedly
containing the marijuana, Tudtud said “it was alright.” He did not resist and opened
the box himself. Tudtud's implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more
than mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and
is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee. Consequently, Tudtud's lack of objection to the search and seizure is not
tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the
warrantless search and seizure. As the search of Tudtud's box does not come under the
recognized exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained
thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is no evidence other than the
hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the conviction of
Tudtud, et. al. cannot be sustained.
Chimel vs. California [395 US 752, 23 June 1969]
Facts:
Late in the afternoon of 13 September 1965, three police officers arrived at the Santa
Ana, California, home of the Chimel with a warrant authorizing his arrest for the
burglary of a coin shop. The officers knocked on the door, identified themselves to
Chimel's wife, and asked if they might come inside. She ushered them into the house,
where they waited 10 or 15 minutes until Chimel returned home from work. When
Chimel entered the house, one of the officers handed him the arrest warrant and asked
for permission to "look around." Chimel objected, but was advised that "on the basis
of the lawful arrest," the officers would nonetheless conduct a search. No search
warrant had been issued. Accompanied by Chimel's wife, the officers then looked
through the entire three-bedroom house, including the attic, the garage, and a small
workshop. In some rooms the search was relatively cursory. In the master bedroom
and sewing room, however, the officers directed Chimel's wife to open drawers and
"to physically move contents of the drawers from side to side so that they might view
any items that would have come from the burglary." After completing the search, they
seized numerous items - primarily coins, but also several medals, tokens, and a few
other objects. The entire search took between 45 minutes and an hour. At Chimel's
subsequent state trial on two charges of burglary, the items taken from his house were
admitted into evidence against him, over his objection that they had been
unconstitutionally seized. He was convicted, and the judgments of conviction were
affirmed by both the California Court of Appeal, and the California Supreme Court.
Both courts accepted Chimel's contention that the arrest warrant was invalid because
the supporting affidavit was set out in conclusory terms, but held that since the
arresting officers had procured the warrant "in good faith," and since in any event they
had sufficient information to constitute probable cause for Chimel's arrest, that arrest
had been lawful. From this conclusion the appellate courts went on to hold that the
search of Chimel's home had been justified, despite the absence of a search warrant,
on the ground that it had been incident to a valid arrest.
Issue:
Whether the “search incident to arrest” extends to the whole of the house where the
accused was arrested.
Held:
Approval of a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest seems first to have been
articulated by the Court in 1914 as dictum in Weeks v. United States, 232 US 383.
The statement therein however made no reference to any right to search the place
where an arrest occurs, but was limited to a right to search the "person." 11 years later,
the case of Carroll v. United States (267 U.S. 132) brought the following
embellishment of the Weeks statement: "When a man is legally arrested for an
offense, whatever is found upon his person or in his control which it is unlawful for
him to have and which may be used to prove the offense may be seized and held as
evidence in the prosecution." A similar analysis underlies the "search incident to
arrest" principle, and marks its proper extent. When an arrest is made, it is reasonable
for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons
that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise,
the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In
addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any
evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.
And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. There is ample
justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area "within his
immediate control" - construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. There is no comparable
justification, however, for routinely searching any room other than that in which an
arrest occurs - or, for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other
closed or concealed areas in that room itself. Such searches, in the absence of well-
recognized exceptions, may be made only under the authority of a search warrant. The
"adherence to judicial processes" mandated by the Fourth Amendment requires no
less. Herein, the search went far beyond Chimel's person and the area from within
which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used
as evidence against him. There was no constitutional justification, in the absence of a
search warrant, for extending the search beyond that area. The scope of the search
was, therefore, "unreasonable" under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and
Chimel's conviction cannot stand.
People vs. dela Cruz [GR 83260, 18 April 1990]
Facts:
After receiving a confidential report from Arnel, their informant, a "buy-bust"
operation was conducted by the 13th Narcotics Regional Unit through a team
composed of T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas as Team Leader, S/Sgt. Rodelito Oblice, Sgt.
Dante Yang, Sgt. Vicente Jimenez, P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy as poseur-buyer and Pat.
Deogracias Gorgonia at Maliclic St., Tondo, Manila at around 2:30 p.m. of 4 May
1987 to catch the pusher/s. P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy acted as the poseur-buyer with Arnel
as his companion to buy marijuana worth P10.00 from the two accused, Juan de la
Cruz and Reynaldo Beltran. At the scene, it was Juan de la Cruz whom Arcoy first
negotiated with on the purchase and when Arcoy told De la Cruz that he was buying
P10.00 worth of marijuana, De la Cruz instructed Reynaldo Beltran to give one
aluminum foil of marijuana which Beltran got from his pants' pocket and delivered it
to Arcoy. After ascertaining that the foil of suspected marijuana was really marijuana,
Arcoy gave the prearranged signal to his teammates by scratching his head and his
teammates who were strategically positioned in the vicinity, converged at the place,
identified themselves as NARCOM agents and effected the arrest of De la Cruz and
Beltran. The P10.00 marked bill used by Arcoy was found in the possession of Juan
de la Cruz together with two aluminum foils and containing marijuana. Juan de la
Cruz y Gonzales and Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban were charged in Criminal Case 87-
54417 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila with violation of Section 4, Art.
II, in relation to Section 21, Article IV of Republic Act 6425, as amended. The court,
on 15 March 1988, found Dela Cruz and Beltran guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory
penalties provided by law; to pay a fine of P20,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to pay one-half of the costs. From this
decision, de la Cruz and Beltran appealed. In a letter of the Warden, Manila City Jail,
dated 3 March 1989, the Court was informed of the death of de la Cruz on 21
February 1989. Thus, the criminal case against de la Cruz was dismissed in the
Supreme Court resolution of 25 September 1989. The present appellate proceeding is
limited only to Beltran.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless seizure incidental to the buy-bust operation violates Beltran’s
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure.
Held:
A buy-bust operation is the method employed by peace officers to trap and catch a
malefactor in flagrante delicto. It is essentially a form of entrapment since the peace
officer neither instigates nor induces the accused to commit a crime. Entrapment is the
employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a
lawbreaker from whose mind the criminal intent originated. Oftentimes, it is the only
effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of the offense.
While it is conceded that in a buy-bust operation, there is seizure of evidence from
one's person without a search warrant, needless to state a search warrant is not
necessary, the search being incident to a lawful arrest. A peace officer may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense. It is a matter
of judicial experience that in the arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act in a
buy-bust operation, the malefactors were invariably caught red-handed. There being
no violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure, the
confiscated articles are admissible in evidence.
People v. Kalubiran [GR 84079, 6 May 1991]
Facts:
Nestor Kalubiran was arrested on 12 July 1985, in Dumaguete City, by Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) elements. His arrest was the result of a "buy-bust" operation
in which Pat. Leon Quindo acted as the buyer while the other team members lay in
wait to arrest Kalubiran at the pre- arranged signal. Quindo approached the accused-
appellant, who was with a group of friends in front of the Gamo Memorial Clinic, and
asked if he could "score," the jargon for buying marijuana. Kalubiran immediately
produced two sticks of marijuana, for which Quindo paid him a previously marked
P5.00 bill. Quindo then gave the signal and Cpl. Levi Dorado approached and arrested
Kalubiran. Dorado frisked the accused-appellant. He recovered the marked money and
found 17 more sticks of marijuana on Kalubiran's person. The other team members,
namely M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor and Sgt. Ruben Laddaran, came later in a jeep,
where they boarded Kalubiran to take him to the police station. The 19 sticks of
marijuana were marked and then taken to the PC Crime Laboratory, where they were
analyzed, with positive results. Kalubiran contended however that one Quindo
approached and frisk him on the same night, and found nothing on him. However, he
was called back by one Villamor, who told him at gun point to board the jeep and
taken to PC headquarters, then to the police station. He was released the following day
with the help of a lawyer. After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Dumaguete City
found Kalubiran guilty as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a
P20,000 fine. Kalubiran appealed.
Issue:
Whether Kalubiran should be made to answer for the 19 sticks of marijuana found in
his possession during his arrest.
Held:
Kalubiran was arrested in flagrante delicto as a result of the entrapment and so came
under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorizing a warrantless arrest of
any person actually committing a crime. The search was made as an incident of a
lawful arrest and so was also lawful under Section 12 of Rule 116. In addition to the
Rules, there is abundant jurisprudence justifying warrantless searches and seizures
under the conditions established in the case. However, Kalubiran was accused only of
selling the two sticks of marijuana under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act when
he should also have been charged with possession of the 17 other sticks found on his
person at the time of his arrest. It is unfortunate that he cannot be held to answer for
the second offense because he has not been impleaded in a separate information for
violation of Section 8 of the said law.
People v. Malmstedt [GR 91107, 19 June 1991]
Facts:
Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the 3rd time in
December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985. In
the evening of 7 May 1989, Malmstedt left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in
the morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for
2 days. On 11 May 1989, Capt. Alen Vasco of NARCOM, stationed at Camp
Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop,
Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the
Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted
by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana
and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding
Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had
in his possession prohibited drugs. At about 1:30 pm, the bus where Malmstedt was
riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that
they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on Malmstedt's waist. Suspecting
the bulge on Malmstedt's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for Malmstedt's passport
and other identification papers. When Malmstedt failed to comply, the officer required
him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist, which was a pouch
bag. When Malmstedt opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed 4
suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, which turned out to
contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana, when opened. Malmstedt stopped to get 2
travelling bags from the luggage carrier, each containing a teddy bear, when he was
invited outside the bus for questioning. It was observed that there were also bulges
inside the teddy bears which did not feel like foam stuffing. Malmstedt was then
brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa for further
investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they
were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the
hashish found among the personal effects of Malmstedt and the same were brought to
the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis, which established the objects
examined as hashish. Malmstedt claimed that the hashish was planted by the
NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the 2 travelling bags were not owned by
him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in
Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus
with him but because there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to
take the next ride and asked Malmstedt to take charge of the bags, and that they would
meet each other at the Dangwa Station. An information was filed against Malmstedt
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. During the arraignment, Malmstedt entered
a plea of "not guilty." After trial and on 12 October 1989, the trial court found
Malmstedt guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 4, Article II of RA
6425 and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000. Malmstedt
sought reversal of the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether the personal effects of Malmstedt may be searched without an issued
warrant.
Held:
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However,
where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a
search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a
private person under the following circumstances. Section 5 provides that “a peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section
7." Herein, Malmstedt was caught in flagrante delicto, when he was transporting
prohibited drugs. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under
paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest.
Espano vs. Court of Appeals [GR 120431, 1 April 1998]
Facts:
On 14 July 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., Pat. Romeo Pagilagan and other police officers,
namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquilino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of the
Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and Pandacan
Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw Rodolfo
Espano selling "something" to another person. After the alleged buyer left, they
approached Espano, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search
yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana . When asked if he had more
marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The policemen went to his
residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Espano was
brought to the police headquarters where he was charged with possession of
prohibited drugs. On 24 July 1991, Espano posted bail and the trial court issued his
order of release on 29 July 1991. On 14 August 1992, the trial court rendered a
decision, convicting Espano of the crime charged. Espano appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, on 15 January 1995 affirmed the
decision of the trial court in toto. Espano filed a petition for review with the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether the search of Espano’s home after his arrest does not violate against his right
against unreasonable search and seizure.
Held:
Espano's arrest falls squarely under Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He
was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers
on the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area
of Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw Espano handing over
something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered
two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane
bags of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime. As
for the 10 cellophane bags of marijuana found at Espano's residence, however, the
same inadmissible in evidence. The articles seized from Espano during his arrest were
valid under the doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful arrest. The warrantless
search made in his house, however, which yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana
became unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a search warrant at the
time. Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of Espano. The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purposes shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." An exception to the said rule is
a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend beyond
the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control. Herein, the ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioner's
house after his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said
exceptions.
People vs. Tangliben [GR L-63630, 6 April 1990]
Facts:
In the late evening of 2 March 1982, Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo L.
Punzalan of the San Fernando Police Station, together with Barangay Tanod Macario
Sacdalan, were conducting surveillance mission at the Victory Liner Terminal
compound located at Barangay San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga. The
surveillance mission was aimed not only against persons who may commit
misdemeanors at the said place but also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic
of dangerous drugs based on informations supplied by informers. Around 9:30 p.m.,
said Patrolmen noticed a person carrying a red traveling bag who was acting
suspiciously and they confronted him. The person was requested by Patrolmen
Quevedo and Punzalan to open the red traveling bag but the person refused, only to
accede later on when the patrolmen identified themselves. Found inside the bag were
marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or less.
The person was asked of his name and the reason why he was at the said place and he
gave his name as Medel Tangliben and explained that he was waiting for a ride to
Olongapo City to deliver the marijuana leaves. The accused was taken to the police
headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga, for further investigation; and that Pat.
Silverio Quevedo submitted to his Station Commander his Investigator's Report. The
Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Third Judicial Region at San Fernando, Pampanga,
found Medel Tangliben y Bernardino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as
amended) and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P20,000 and to pay
the costs. Tangliben appealed.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest, even in light of the Court’s
ruling in People vs. Aminnudin.
Held:
One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search
incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12 (Search incident to a lawful arrest) of
Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that "A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant." Meanwhile, Rule
113, Sec. 5(a) provides that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Tangliben
was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This
case therefore falls squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was incident
to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid. The Court is not unmindful of its decision
in People v. Aminnudin (163 SCRA 402 [1988]). In that case the PC officers had
earlier received a tip from an informer that accused-appellant was on board a vessel
bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip, they waited for
him one evening, approached him as he descended from the gangplank, detained him
and inspected the bag he was carrying. Said bag contained marijuana leaves. The
Court held that the marijuana could not be admitted in evidence since it was seized
illegally, as there was lack of urgency, and thus a search warrant can still be procured.
However, herein, the case presented urgency. Although the trial court's decision did
not mention it, the transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer
who pointed to Tangliben as carrying marijuana. Faced with such on-the- spot
information, the police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to
secure a search warrant. The Court cannot therefore apply the ruling in Aminnudin
herein. To require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers,
illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods,
robbers, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes
with which these persons are associated.
People v. Che Chun Ting [GR 130568-69, 21 March 2000]
Facts:
Following a series of buy-bust operations, the elements of the Special Operation Unit,
Narcotics Command, apprehended a suspected drug courier, Mabel Cheung Mei Po,
after she delivered a transparent plastic bag containing a white crystalline substance to
an informant, in full view of NARCOM agents. When questioned, Mabel Cheung Mei
Po cooperated with the government agents and revealed the name of Che Chun Ting
as the source of the drugs. On 27 June 1996 NARCOM deployed a team of agents for
the entrapment and arrest of Che Chun Ting. At 7:00 am they proceeded to the Roxas
Seafront Garden in Pasay City where Che Chun Ting was and had the place under
surveillance. When they moved to the McDonald's parking lot, Mabel called Che
Chun Ting through her cellular phone and spoke to him in Chinese, ordering one (1)
kilo of shabu. At 10:30 am Mabel receive a call from the accused. Mabel, along with
NARCOM agents, proceeded to the Roxas Seafront Garden. Mabel honked twice
upon arriving at the said place and went to Unit 122. NARCOM agents parked 2
meters away saw the door of the unit open as a man went out to hand Mabel a
transparent plastic bag containing a white crystalline substance. The NARCOM agents
immediately alighted and arrested the surprised man who was positively identified by
Mabel as Che Chun Ting. Unit 122 was searched by the agents, where a black bag
with several plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance in an open cabinet in
the second floor was seized. The bag was examined in the presence of Maj. Garbo, the
accused and his girlfriend. The accused and the evidence were brought to Camp
Crame. The contents of the bank were tested and found positive for shabu. The
Defense alleged otherwise. It alleged that it was Noli Ortiz, the brother of Che Chun
Ting’s girlfriend who rang the doorbell of Unit 122. When Nimfa opened the door, 2
NARCOM officers suddenly forced their way inside and searched the premises. Noli
alleged that he did not see any black bag seized but saw his sister’s video camera
being carted away by the NARCOM agents. He claimed that his sister was frightened
and crying during the conduct of the search while Che Chun Ting was asleep at the
second floor. Defense further contends that Unit 122 is owned by Nimfa Ortiz and that
Che Chun Ting lived at 1001 Domingo Poblete St., BF Homes, Parañaque. Che Chun
Ting was found guilty by the trial court on 22 August 1997 of delivering, distributing
and dispatching in transit 999.48 grams of shabu; and, having in his custody,
possession and control 5,578.68 grams of the same regulated drug. He was meted two
(2) death sentences, one for violation of Sec. 15 and the other for violation of Sec. 16,
both of Art. III, of RA 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended). He was
likewise ordered to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00 in the first case, and P12,000,000.00
in the second. He is now before the Supreme Court on automatic review.
Issue:
Whether the search of Unit 122 is within the purview of the warrantless search
incidental to an arrest.
Held:
The 1987 Constitution ordains that no arrest, search or seizure can be made without a
valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized. The right is not absolute and admits of certain
well-recognized exceptions. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the
offense, without a search warrant. The search may extend beyond the person of the
one arrested to include the permissible area or surroundings within his immediate
control. The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless
search under the exception, the same must be limited to and circumscribed by the
subject, time and place of the arrest. As to subject, the warrantless search is sanctioned
only with respect to the person of the suspect, and things that may be seized from him
are limited to "dangerous weapons" or "anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense." With respect to the time and place of the warrantless
search, it must be contemporaneous with the lawful arrest. Stated otherwise, to be
valid, the search must have been conducted at about the time of the arrest or
immediately thereafter and only at the place where the suspect was arrested, or the
premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Herein, although the case falls
within the exception, Che Chun Ting was admittedly outside unit 122, which was not
his residence but a sojourner thereof, and in the act of delivering to Mabel Cheung
Mei Po a bag of shabu when he was arrested by the NARCOM operatives. The inner
portion of the house can hadly be said to constitute a permissible area within his reach
or immediate control, to justify a warrantless search therein. The search in Unit 122
and the seizure therein of some 5,578.68 grams of shabu were illegal for being
violative of one's basic constitutional right and guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and thus are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary
rule. The inadmissibility of such however does not totally exonerate the accused. The
illegal search in Unit 122 was preceded by a valid arrest. The accused was caught in
flagrante delicto as a result of an entrapment conducted by NARCOM operatives on
the basis of the information provided by Mabel Cheung Mei Po regarding the
accused's illegal trade. NARCOM agents P/Insp. Santiago and SPO3 Campanilla saw
him handing over a bag of white crystalline substance to Mabel Cheung Mei Po. His
arrest was lawful and the seized bag of shabu weighing 999.43 grams was admissible
in evidence, being the fruit of the crime.
People vs. Estrella [GR 138539-40, 21 January 2003]
Facts:
Prior to 20 November 1996, Executive Judge Romulo Estrada of the Regional Trial
Court of Zambales issued a warrant for the conduct of a search and seizure in the
residence of Antonio C. Estella at Purok Yakal, Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc,
Zambales. In the morning of 20 November 1996, Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1)
Antonio Buloron, then Intelligence and Investigation Officer, together with SPO1 Jose
Arca and several other members of the Provincial Special Operation Group based in
Burgos, San Marcelino, Zambales proceeded to Masinloc. They coordinated with the
members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Masinloc and sought the
assistance of Barangay Captain Rey Barnachea of Baloganon, Masinloc for the
enforcement of the search warrant. Barangay Captain Barnachea accompanied the
police officers to Purok Yakal, Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc, the place mentioned
in the search warrant. On their way to Purok Yakal, SPO1 Buloron saw Estrella sitting
on a rocking chair located about 2 meters away from a hut owned by Narding Estella,
the latter's brother, and being rented by Estrella's live-in partner, named Eva. They
approached Estrella and introduced themselves as police officers. They showed
Estrella the search warrant and explained the contents to him. SPO1 Buloron asked
Estrella if indeed he had in his possession prohibited drug and if so, to surrender the
same so he would deserve a lesser penalty. While inside the hut, Estrella surrendered
to the team 2 cans containing dried marijuana fruiting tops. One can contained 20
bricks of fruiting tops. The team searched the hut in the presence of Estrella and his
live-in partner. They found a plastic container under the kitchen table, which
contained 4 big bricks of dried marijuana leaves and a .38 caliber revolver with four
live ammunitions. The team seized the prohibited drug, the revolver and ammunitions.
The team seized and signed a receipt for the seized items. Barangay Captain
Barnachea and SPO1 Edgar Bermudez of the Masinloc Police Station also signed the
receipt as witnesses. SPO1 Buloron and his companions arrested Estrella and brought
him to San Marcelino, Zambales. The defense, however, alleged otherwise and
claimed that on 20 November 1996 between 10:30 and 11:00 a.m., while Estrella was
talking with his friends Rael Tapado and Victor de Leon at a vacant lot just outside the
house of Camillo Torres and about 70 meters away from his house, a group of men
approached them. The group introduced themselves as policemen and told them that
they were looking for Antonio Estella because they have a search warrant issued
against him. Estrella identified himself to them. The policemen inquired from Estrella
as to where his house is located and Estrella told them that his house is located across
the road. The police did not believe him and insisted that Estrella's house is that house
located about 5–8 meters away from them. Estrella told the policemen to inquire from
the Barangay Captain Barnachea as to where his house is and heard the latter telling
the policemen that his house is located near the Abokabar junk shop. After about half
an hour, the policemen went inside the house nearby and when they came out, they
had with them a bulk of plastic and had it shown to Estrella. They photographed
Estrella and brought him to their office at San Marcelino, Zambales. Estella was
investigated at San Marcelino, Zambales where he informed the police officers of the
fact that the house they searched was occupied by Spouses Vicente and Fely
Bakdangan. Still, Estrella was charged for possession of prohibited drugs and
unlicensed firearms. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales (Branch 69), in
Criminal Case RTC 2143-I and on 25 August 1998, found Estrella guilty of violating
Section 8, Article II of RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua. The 8.320 kilograms of dried marijuana was ordered confiscated
in favor of the government, and the Sheriff was directed to deliver the subject
marijuana to the Dangerous Drugs Board for its proper disposition. On the other hand,
Estrella was acquitted from the charge of violation of PD 1866 The .38 caliber
revolver without serial number and 4 live ammunitions, subject of the offense, were
however ordered delivered to any authorized representative of the Philippine National
Police, Firearms and Explosives Division, Camp Crame, Quezon City. Estrella
appealed said decision.
Issue:
Whether the search undertaken inside the hut — during which the incriminating
evidence was allegedly recovered — was legal.
Held:
There is no convincing proof that Estrella indeed surrendered the prohibited drug,
whether voluntarily or otherwise. In fact, the testimony of Prosecution Witness
Barnachea clouds rather than clarifies the prosecution's story. Given this backdrop, the
police authorities cannot claim that the search was incident to a lawful arrest. Such a
search presupposes a lawful or valid arrest and can only be invoked through Section 5
(Arrest without warrant; when lawful), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which provides that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When
an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above,
the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 Rule 112."
Never was it proven that Estrella, who was the person to be arrested, was in
possession of the subject prohibited drug during the search. It follows, therefore, that
there was no way of knowing if he had committed or was actually committing an
offense in the presence of the arresting officers. Without that knowledge, there could
have been no search incident to a lawful arrest. Assuming arguendo that appellant was
indeed committing an offense in the presence of the arresting officers, and that the
arrest without a warrant was lawful, it still cannot be said that the search conducted
was within the confines of the law. Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are
governed by Section 12 (Search incident to lawful arrest), Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that "A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute
proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant." However, the scope
of the search should be limited to the area within which the person to be arrested can
reach for a weapon or for evidence that he or she can destroy. The prevailing rule is
that the arresting officer may take from the arrested individual any money or property
found upon the latter's person — that which was used in the commission of the crime
or was the fruit of the crime, or which may provide the prisoner with the means of
committing violence or escaping, or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the
case. The purpose of the exception in Chimel v. California is to protect the arresting
officer from being harmed by the person being arrested, who might be armed with a
concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach.
The exception, therefore, should not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its
purpose. Herein, searched was the entire hut, which cannot be said to have been
within Estrela's immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of that
which may be considered to be incident to a lawful arrest.
People vs. Libnao [GR 136860, 20 January 2003]
Facts:
On August 1996, intelligence operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation on suspected drug
dealers in the area. They learned from their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri,
Tarlac and a companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a
month in big bulks. On 19 October 1996, at about 10 p.m., Chief Inspector Benjamin
Arceo, Tarlac Police Chief, held a briefing in connection with a tip which his office
received that the two drug pushers, riding in a tricycle, would be making a delivery
that night. An hour later, the Police Alert Team installed a checkpoint in Barangay
Salapungan to apprehend the suspects. Witness SPO1 Marlon Gamotea, PO3 Florante
Ferrer and SPO3 Roberto Aquino were assigned to man the checkpoint. At about 1:00
a.m. of the following day, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a passing
tricycle. It had two female passengers seated inside, who were later identified as
Agpanga Libnao and Rosita Nunga. In front of them was a black bag. Suspicious of
the black bag and the two’s uneasy behavior when asked about its ownership and
content, the officers invited them to Kabayan Center 2 located at the same barangay.
They brought with them the black bag. Upon reaching the center, PO3 Ferrer fetched
Barangay Captain Roy Pascual to witness the opening of the black bag. In the
meantime, the two women and the bag were turned over to the investigator on duty,
SPO3 Arthur Antonio. As soon as the barangay captain arrived, the black bag was
opened in the presence of Libnao, Nunga, and personnel of the center. Found inside it
were 8 bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags and covered with newspaper. The leaves
were suspected to be marijuana. To determine who owns the bag and its contents,
SPO3 Antonio interrogated the two. Nunga stated that it was owned by Libnao. The
latter, in turn, disputed this allegation. Thereafter, they were made to sign a
confiscation receipt without the assistance of any counsel, as they were not informed
of their right to have one. During the course of the investigation, not even close
relatives of theirs were present. The seized articles were later brought to the PNP
Crime Laboratory in San Fernando, Pampanga on 23 October 1996. Forensic Chemist
Daisy P. Babu conducted a laboratory examination on them. She concluded that the
articles were marijuana leaves weighing eight kilos. Libnao and Nunga were charged
for violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. On 19 November 1998, the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 65, Tarlac City, found Libnao and Nunga guilty. For their conviction, each
was sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
two million pesos. Libnao appealed.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless search and seizure made upon Libnao and Nunga was
reasonable.
Held:
The constitutional guarantee (in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution) is not
a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates only against
"unreasonable" searches and seizures. Searches and seizures are as a rule unreasonable
unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the
fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between
persons and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with
power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants and warrants of arrest. Be that as it
may, the requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out
of a search and seizure is not absolute. There are certain familiar exceptions to the
rule, one of which relates to search of moving vehicles. Warrantless search and
seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of
securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out
of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in
such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the
vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made
it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances
known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains as item,
article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction. The warrantless
search herein is not bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac Police Intelligence Division
had been conducting surveillance operation for three months in the area. The
surveillance yielded the information that once a month, Libnao and Nunga transport
drugs in big bulks. At 10:00 pm of 19 October 1996, the police received a tip that the
two will be transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle. Surely, the two were
intercepted three hours later, riding a tricycle and carrying a suspicious-looking black
bag, which possibly contained the drugs in bulk. When they were asked who owned it
and what its content was, both became uneasy. Under these circumstances, the
warrantless search and seizure of Libnao’s bag was not illegal. It is also clear that at
the time she was apprehended, she was committing a criminal offense. She was
making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in violation of Article II, Section 4
of R.A. No. 6425. Under the Rules of Court, one of the instances a police officer is
permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught
committing a crime in flagrante delicto.
People v. Musa [GR 96177, 27 January 1993]
Facts:
On 13 December 1989, the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) in Zamboanga City
conducted surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga
City. Information received from civilian informer was that this Mari Musa was
engaged in selling marijuana in said place. The Narcom agent (Sgt. Ani) was able to
buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00, which was turned over to the
Narcom office. The next day, a buy-bust was planned with Sgt. Ani being the poseur-
buyer. NARCOM teams proceeded to the target site in 2 civilian vehicles. Ani gave
Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa returned to his house and gave Ani 2
newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. The signal to apprehend Musa was
given. The NARCOM team rushed to the location of Ani, and a NARCOM officer
(Sgt. Belarga) frisked Musa but did not find the marked money. The money was given
to Musa’s wife who was able to slip away. Later, Belarga found a plastic bag
containing dried marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. Musa was placed under
arrest and was brought to the NARCOM office. One newspaper- wrapper marijuana
and the plastic bag containing more marijuana was sent to the PC Crime Laboratory,
the test of which gave positive results for the presence of marijuana. On the other
hand, Mari Musa alleged that the NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian clothes, got
inside his house without any search warrant, neither his permission to enter the house.
The NARCOM agents searched the house and allegedly found a red plastic bag whose
contents, Mari Musa said, he did not know. He also did not know if the plastic bag
belonged to his brother, Faisal, who was living with him, or his father, who was living
in another house about ten arms-length away. Mari Musa was handcuffed and was
taken to the NARCOM office where he was joined by his wife. Musa claimed that he
was subjected to torture when he refused to sign the document containing details of
the investigation. The next day, he was taken to the fiscal‘s office to which he was
allegedly made to answer to a single question: that if he owned the marijuana. He
allegedly was not able to tell the fiscal that he had been maltreated by the NARCOM
agents because he was afraid he might be maltreated in the fiscal's office. Mari Musa
was brought to the City Jail. Still, an information against Musa was filed on 15
December 1989. Upon his arraignment on 11 January 1990, Musa pleaded not guilty.
After trial and on 31 August 1990, the RTC Zamboanga City (Branch XII) found him
guilty of selling marijuana in violation of Article II, Section 4 of RA 6425. Musa
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the contents of the red plastic bag found in the kitchen may be admitted as
evidence as evidence acquired incidental to a lawful arrest.
Held:
Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make
a search upon the person of the person arrested. An officer making an arrest may take
from the person arrested and money or property found upon his person which was
used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might
furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which
may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause. Hence, in a buy-bust operation
conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked
money found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without
arrest and search warrants. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a
suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include
the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the "plain view"
of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented as evidence. When the discovery of the evidence did not
constitute a search, but where the officer merely saw what was placed before him in
full view, the warrantless seizure of the object was legal on the basis of the "plain
view" doctrine and upheld the admissibility of said evidence. The "plain view"
doctrine, however, may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate
seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of
defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is
not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes
across an incriminating object. What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the
police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of
which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.
The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for
another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused —
and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they
have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a
general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at
last emerges. The "plain view" doctrine neither justify the seizure of the object where
the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the
object. Thus, the exclusion of the plastic bag containing marijuana does not, however,
diminish, in any way, the damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by
the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation of Article II,
Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. By virtue of the testimonies of Sgt.
Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by Musa to Sgt. Ani,
among other pieces of evidence, the guilt of Musa of the crime charged has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals [GR 121917, 12 March 1997]
Facts:
At about 8:00 p.m. of 26 October 1992, Enrique Manarang and his compadre Danny
Perez were inside the Manukan sa Highway Restaurant in Sto. Kristo, Angeles City
where they took shelter from the heavy downpour that had interrupted their ride on
motorcycles along Mac Arthur Highway. While inside the restaurant, Manarang
noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero, running fast down the highway prompting him
to remark that the vehicle might get into an accident considering the inclement
weather. Immediately after the vehicle had passed the restaurant, Manarang and Perez
heard a screeching sound produced by the sudden and hard braking of a vehicle
running very fast, followed by a sickening sound of the vehicle hitting something.
Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and immediately saw the vehicle
occupying the edge or shoulder of the highway giving it a slight tilt to its side.
Manarang, being a member of both the Spectrum, a civic group and the Barangay
Disaster Coordinating Council, decided to report the incident to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) of Angeles City. He took out his radio and called the Viper, the
radio controller of the PNP of Angeles City. By the time Manarang completed the call,
the vehicle had started to leave the place of the accident taking the general direction to
the north. Manarang went to the location of the accident and found out that the vehicle
had hit somebody. Manarang asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back
to the restaurant, rode on his motorcycle and chased the vehicle. During the chase he
was able to make out the plate number of the vehicle as PMA 777. He called the Viper
through the radio once again reporting that a vehicle heading north with plate number
PMA 777 was involved in a hit and run accident. SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda of
Mobile 3 were able to intercept the vehicle by cutting into the latter's path forcing it to
stop. SPO2 Miranda went to the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 and instructed
its driver to alight. The driver rolled down the window and put his head out while
raising both his hands. They recognized the driver as Robin C. Padilla. SPO2 Miranda
told Padilla to alight to which Padilla complied. Padilla was wearing a short leather
jacket such that when he alighted with both his hands raised, a gun tucked on the left
side of his waist was revealed, its butt protruding. SPO2 Borja made the move to
confiscate the gun but Padilla held the former's hand alleging that the gun was covered
by legal papers. SPO2 Borja disarmed Padilla and told the latter about the hit and run
incident. Padilla, however, arrogantly denied his misdeed and, instead, played with the
crowd by holding their hands with one hand and pointing to SPO2 Borja with his right
hand saying "iyan, kinuha ang baril ko." Because Padilla's jacket was short, his
gesture exposed a long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in his back right pocket.
SPO Mercado saw this and so when Padilla turned around as he was talking and
proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado confiscated the magazine from Padilla. Suspecting
that Padilla could also be carrying a rifle inside the vehicle since he had a magazine,
SPO2 Mercado prevented Padilla from going back to his vehicle by opening himself
the door of Padilla's vehicle. He saw a baby armalite rifle lying horizontally at the
front by the driver's seat. It had a long magazine filled with live bullets in a semi-
automatic mode. He asked Padilla for the papers covering the rifle and Padilla
answered angrily that they were at his home. SPO Mercado modified the arrest of
Padilla by including as its ground illegal possession of firearms. SPO Mercado then
read to appellant his constitutional rights. The police officers brought Padilla to the
Traffic Division at Jake Gonzales Boulevard where Padilla voluntarily surrendered a
third firearm, a pietro berreta pistol with a single round in its chamber and a magazine
loaded with 7 other live bullets. Padilla also voluntarily surrendered a black bag
containing two additional long magazines and one short magazine. Padilla was
correspondingly charged on 3 December 1992, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions ([1] One .357
Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with 6 live ammunitions; [2] one M-
16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with 4 long and 1 short magazine with
ammunitions; [3] one .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and 8
ammunitions; and [4] Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber
revolver." ) under PD 1866. The lower court then ordered the arrest of Padilla, but
granted his application for bail. During the arraignment on 20 January 1993, a plea of
not guilty was entered for Padilla after he refused, upon advice of counsel, to make
any plea. Padilla waived in writing his right to be present in any and all stages of the
case. After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered judgment dated 25
April 1994 convicting Padilla of the crime charged and sentenced him to an
"indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum". Padilla filed his notice of
appeal on 28 April 1994. Pending the appeal in the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor-
General, convinced that the conviction shows strong evidence of guilt, filed on 2
December 1994 a motion to cancel Padilla's bail bond. The resolution of this motion
was incorporated in the appellate court's decision sustaining Padilla's conviction.
Padilla received a copy of this decision on 26 July 1995. On 9 August 1995 he filed a
"motion for reconsideration (and to recall the warrant of arrest)" but the same was
denied by the appellate court in its 20 September 1995 Resolution. On 28 September
1995, Padilla filed the petition for review on certiorari with application for bail
followed by two "supplemental petitions" filed by different counsels, a "second
supplemental petition" and an urgent motion for the separate resolution of his
application for bail.
Issue:
Whether the firearms and ammunition confiscated during a warrantless search and
seizure, especially the baby armalite, are admissible as evidence against Robin Padilla.
Held: The 5 well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property
is valid, are as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized
under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2)
Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present
in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by
the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent, and (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search; (3) Search of a moving vehicle. 49 Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially
when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; (4)
consented warrantless search; and (5) customs search. In conformity with the trial
court's observation, it indeed appears that the authorities stumbled upon Padilla's
firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as it is
commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. The
seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for
they came within "plain view" of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the
revolver and magazine tucked in Padilla's waist and back pocket respectively, when he
raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the
confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the
policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying
horizontally near the driver's seat. Thus it has been held that "When in pursuing an
illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the police officers should
happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not
precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the
guilty person and the taking of the corpus delicti. Objects whose possession are
prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are subject to seizure even
without a warrant." With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing
assorted magazines, Padilla voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This latter
gesture of Padilla indicated a waiver of his right against the alleged search and
seizure, and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from assailing any
purported defect. Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of
an active search done by the authorities on the person and vehicle of Padilla, their
seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a search
incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected, the
police may undertake a protective search of the passenger compartment and containers
in the vehicle which are within Padilla's grabbing distance regardless of the nature of
the offense. This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be
searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody or area of immediate control and
(ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest. The products of that search are
admissible evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule. Another justification is a
search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In connection therewith, a warrantless
search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the
motorist is a law-offender (like Padilla with respect to the hit and run) or the contents
or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the
proceeds of some criminal offense.
People vs. Valdez [GR 129296, 25 September 2000]
Facts:
At around 10:15 a.m. of 24 September 1996, SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the
police force of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya, received a tip from an unnamed informer
about the presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by Abe Valdez y Dela
Cruz at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. The prohibited plants were
allegedly planted close to Valdez's hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief
of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his
operatives to verify the report. The team was composed of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay,
SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2
Alfelmer I. Balut. Inspector Parungao gave them specific instructions to "uproot said
marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same." At approximately 5:00 a.m. the
following day, said police team, accompanied by their informer, left for the site where
the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from
the nearest barangay road, the police operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by
their informant. The police found Valdez alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded
to look around the area where Valdez had his kaingin and saw 7 five-foot high,
flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from Valdez's hut.
PO2 Balut asked Valdez who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the
latter admitted that they were his. The police uprooted the 7 marijuana plants, which
weighed 2.194 kilograms. The police took photos of Valdez standing beside the
cannabis plants. Valdez was then arrested. One of the plants, weighing 1.090
kilograms, was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for analysis. Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime
Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon microscopic examination of said plant,
she found cystolitic hairs containing calcium carbonate, a positive indication for
marijuana. She next conducted a chemical examination, the results of which
confirmed her initial impressions. Valdez alleged otherwise. He claims that at around
10:00 a.m., 25 September 1996, he was weeding his vegetable farm in Sitio Bulan
when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know. He was asked to go
with the latter to "see something." This unknown person then brought Valdez to the
place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from
his nipa hut. 5 armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front of the
hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing
there. When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and
told him to admit ownership of the plants. Valdez was so nervous and afraid that he
admitted owning the marijuana. The police then took a photo of him standing in front
of one of the marijuana plants. He was then made to uproot 5 of the cannabis plants,
and bring them to his hut, where another photo was taken of him standing next to a
bundle of uprooted marijuana plants. The police team then brought him to the police
station at Villaverde. On the way, a certain Kiko Pascua, a barangay peace officer of
Barangay Sawmill, accompanied the police officers. Pascua, who bore a grudge
against him, because of his refusal to participate in the former's illegal logging
activities, threatened him to admit owning the marijuana, otherwise be would "be put
in a bad situation." At the police headquarters, Valdez reiterated that he knew nothing
about the marijuana plants seized by the police. Still, on 26 September 1996, Valdez
was charged for the cultivation and culture of the 7 fully grown marijuana plants. On
15 November 1996, Valdez was arraigned and, with assistance of counsel, pleaded not
guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued. On 18 February 1997, the
Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case
3105, found Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 9 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659), and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. Hence, the automatic review by
the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the seizure of the marijuana plants was made pursuant to warrantless search
and seizure, based on the “plain view” doctrine.
Held:
The Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried
on the strength of a judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is deemed
"unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and
seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should
be excluded. Such evidence shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding. Herein, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination of the existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the police
officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least 1 day to obtain a warrant to search
Valdez's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The place where the
cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the information in their
possession, they could have convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify
the issuance of a warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and
apprehended the accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours and
inconvenient to them. We need not underscore that the protection against illegal
search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are
searches allowed without warrants. The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of
Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-handedness of
law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions. The Court finds
no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that it should apply the "plain
view" doctrine. For the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present: (a)
a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; and (c) the evidence
must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search. Herein, the police officers first located the marijuana plants
before Valdez was arrested without a warrant. Hence, there was no valid warrantless
arrest which preceded the search of Valdez's premises. The police team was
dispatched to Valdez's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited flora.
The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not
inadvertent. Also, upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area"
before they could spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not
"immediately apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana
plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain
view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.
Arizona v. Hicks [480 US 321, 3 March 1987]
Facts:
On 18 April 1984, a bullet was fired through the floor of Hicks' apartment, striking
and injuring a man in the apartment below. Police officers arrived and entered Hicks'
apartment to search for the shooter, for other victims, and for weapons. They found
and seized three weapons, including a sawed-off rifle, and in the course of their search
also discovered a stocking-cap mask. One of the policemen, Officer Nelson, noticed
two sets of expensive stereo components, which seemed out of place in the squalid
and otherwise ill-appointed four-room apartment. Suspecting that they were stolen, he
read and recorded their serial numbers - moving some of the components, including a
Bang and Olufsen turntable, in order to do so - which he then reported by phone to his
headquarters. On being advised that the turntable had been taken in an armed robbery,
he seized it immediately. It was later determined that some of the other serial numbers
matched those on other stereo equipment taken in the same armed robbery, and a
warrant was obtained and executed to seize that equipment as well. Hicks was
subsequently indicted for the robbery. The state trial court granted Hicks' motion to
suppress the evidence that had been seized. The Court of Appeals of Arizona
affirmed. It was conceded that the initial entry and search, although warrantless, were
justified by the exigent circumstance of the shooting. The Court of Appeals viewed
the obtaining of the serial numbers, however, as an additional search, unrelated to that
exigency. Both courts - the trial court explicitly and the Court of Appeals by necessary
implication - rejected the State's contention that Officer Nelson's actions were justified
under the "plain view" doctrine of Coolidge v. New Hampshire. The Arizona Supreme
Court denied review, and the State filed this petition.
Issue:
Whether the policeman’s actions come within the purview of the Fourth Amendment.
Held:
The policeman's actions come within the purview of the Fourth Amendment. The
mere recording of the serial numbers did not constitute a "seizure" since it did not
meaningfully interfere with Hicks’ possessory interest in either the numbers or the
stereo equipment. However, the moving of the equipment was a "search" separate and
apart from the search that was the lawful objective of entering the apartment. The fact
that the search uncovered nothing of great personal value to Hicks is irrelevant. The
"plain view" doctrine does not render the search "reasonable" under the Fourth
Amendment. The policeman's action directed to the stereo equipment was not ipso
facto unreasonable simply because it was unrelated to the justification for enteringthe
apartment. That lack of relationship always exists when the "plain view" doctrine
applies. In saying that a warrantless search must be "strictly circumscribed by the
exigencies which justify its initiation," Mincey was simply addressing the scope of the
primary search itself, and was not overruling the "plain view" doctrine by implication.
However, the search was invalid because, as the State concedes, the policeman had
only a "reasonable suspicion" - i. e., less than probable cause to believe - that the
stereo equipment was stolen. Probable cause is required to invoke the "plain view"
doctrine as it applies to seizures. It would be illogical to hold that an object is seizable
on lesser grounds, during an unrelated search and seizure, than would have been
needed to obtain a warrant for it if it had been known to be on the premises. Probable
cause to believe the equipment was stolen was also necessary to support the search
here, whether legal authority to move the equipment could be found only as the
inevitable concomitant of the authority to seize it, or also as a consequence of some
independent power to search objects in plain view. The policeman's action cannot be
upheld on the ground that it was not a "full-blown search" but was only a "cursory
inspection" that could be justified by reasonable suspicion instead of probable cause.
A truly cursory inspection - one that involves merely looking at what is already
exposed to view, without disturbing it - is not a "search" for Fourth Amendment
purposes, and therefore does not even require reasonable suspicion. This Court is
unwilling to create a subcategory of "cursory" searches under the Fourth Amendment.
People vs. Compacion [GR 124442, 20 July 2001]
Facts:
Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police informant that Armando Compacio y
Surposa was growing and cultivating marijuana plants, SPO1 Gilbert L. Linda and
SPO2 Basilio Sarong of the 6th Narcotic Regional Field Unit of the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) of the Bacolod City Detachment conducted a surveillance of
the residence of Compacion who was then the barangay captain of barangay
Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental on 9 July 1995. During the said
surveillance, they saw 2 tall plants in the backyard of Compacion which they
suspected to be marijuana plants. SPO1 Linda and SPO2 Sarong reported the result of
their surveillance to SPO4 Ranulfo T. Villamor, Jr., Chief of NARCOM, Bacolod
City, who immediately formed a team composed of the members of the Intelligence
Division Provincial Command, the Criminal Investigation Command and the Special
Action Force. Two members of the media, one from DYWF Radio and another from
DYRL Radio, were also included in the composite team. On 12 July 1995, the team
applied for a search warrant with the office of Executive Judge Bernardo Ponferrada
in Bacolod City. However, Judge Ponferrada informed them that he did not have
territorial jurisdiction over the matter. The team then left Bacolod City for San Carlos
City. They arrived there around 6:30 p.m., then went to the house of Executive Judge
Roberto S. Javellana to secure a search warrant. They were not able to do so because it
was nighttime and office hours were obviously over. They were told by the judge to
go back in the morning. Nonetheless, the team proceeded to barangay Bagonbon and
arrived at the residence of Compacion in the early morning of 13 July 1995. SPO4
Villamor knocked at the gate and called out for Compacion. What happened thereafter
is subject to conflicting accounts. The prosecution contends that Compacion opened
the gate and permitted them to come in. He was immediately asked by SPO4 Villamor
about the suspected marijuana plants and he admitted that he planted and cultivated
the same for the use of his wife who was suffering from migraine. SPO4 Villamor
then told him that he would be charged for violation of Section 9 of RA 6425 and
informed him of his constitutional rights. The operatives then uprooted the suspected
marijuana plants. SPO1 Linda conducted an initial field test of the plants by using the
Narcotics Drug Identification Kit. The test yielded a positive result. On 15 July 1995,
the plants were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory,
Bacolod City Police Command, particularly to Senior Inspector Reah Abastillas
Villavicencio. Senior Inspector Villavicencio weighed and measured the plants, one
was 125 inches and weighed 700 grams while the other was 130 inches and weighed
900 grams. Three (3) qualitative examinations were conducted, namely: the
microscopic test, the chemical test, and the thin layer chromatographic test. All
yielded positive results. On his part, Compacion maintains that around 1:30 a.m. on 13
July 1995 while he and his family were sleeping, he heard somebody knocking outside
his house. He went down bringing with him a flashlight. After he opened the gate, 4
persons who he thought were members of the military, entered the premises then went
inside the house. It was dark so he could not count the others who entered the house as
the same was lit only by a kerosene lamp. One of the four men told him to sit in the
living room. Some of the men went upstairs while the others went around the house.
None of them asked for his permission to search his house and the premises. After
about 20 minutes of searching, the men called him outside and brought him to the
backyard. One of the military men said: "Captain, you have a (sic) marijuana here at
your backyard" to which Compacion replied: "I do not know that they were (sic)
marijuana plants but what I know is that they are medicinal plants for my wife" who
was suffering from migraine. After he was informed that the plants in his backyard
were marijuana, the men took pictures of him and themselves. Thereafter, he was
brought inside the house where he and the military men spent the night. At around
10:00 a.m., they brought him with them to the city hall. Compacion saw that one of
the 2 service vehicles they brought was fully loaded with plants. He was later told by
the military men that said plants were marijuana. Upon arrival at the city hall, the men
met with the mayor and then unloaded the alleged marijuana plants. A picture of him
together with the arresting team was taken with the alleged marijuana as back drop.
Soon thereafter, he was taken to Hda. Socorro at the SAF Headquarters. A criminal
complaint for violation of Section 9 of RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659 was filed
against Compacion. On 2 January 1996, the trial court convicted Compacion of the
crime charged, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00.
Issue:
Whether Compacion's right against unreasonable search and seizure was violated.
Held:
Sections 2 and 3 [2], Article III of the 1987 Constitution are safeguards against
reckless, malicious and unreasonable invasion of privacy and liberty. A search and
seizure, therefore, must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise,
such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the
constitutional provision. Evidence secured thereby, i.e., the "fruits" of the search and
seizure, will be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding." The
requirement that a warrant must be obtained from the proper judicial authority prior to
the conduct of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There are several
instances when the law recognizes exceptions, such as when the owner of the premises
consents or voluntarily submits to a search; when the owner of the premises waives
his right against such incursion; when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when
it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws; when it is made on
automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration
laws; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view; when it involves a "stop and
frisk" situation; when the search is under exigent and emergency circumstances; or in
cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire,
sanitary and building regulations. In these instances, a search may be validly made
even without a warrant. Herein, the search and seizure conducted by the composite
team in the house of accused-appellant was not authorized by a search warrant, It does
not appear either that the situation falls under any of the above mentioned cases.
Consequently, Compacion's right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly
violated. As a general rule, objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right
to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure without a warrant. It is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Thus, the
following elements must be present before the doctrine may be applied: (a) a prior
valid intention based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence
must be immediately apparent; and (d) "plain view" justified were seizure of evidence
without further search. Here, there was no valid warrantless arrest. They forced their
way into Compacion's premises without the latter's consent. It is undisputed that the
NARCOM agents conducted a surveillance of the residence of Compacion on 9 July
1995 on the suspicion that he was growing and cultivating marijuana when they
allegedly came in "plain view" of the marijuana plants. When the agents entered his
premises on 13 July 1995, their intention was to seize the evidence against him. In
fact, they initially wanted to secure a search warrant but could not simply wait for one
to be issued. The NARCOM agents, therefore, did not come across the marijuana
plants inadvertently when they conducted a surveillance and barged into Compacion's
residence. As held in People v. Musa, the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to
launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general
exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view"
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against
the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
Hence, Compacion is acquitted of the crime to which he was charged.
Roldan vs. Arca [GR L-25434, 25 July 1975]
Facts:
On 3 April 1964, Morabe, De Guzman & Company filed with the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Manila a civil case (56701) against Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio
N. Roldan, Jr., for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI which had been seized
and impounded by the Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy. On 10
April 1964, the company prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction with
the CFI, but said prayer was denied. On 28 April 1964, the CFI set aside its order of
10 April 1964 and granted the company's motion for reconsideration praying for
preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, the company took possession of the vessel
Tony Lex VI from the Philippine Fisheries Commission adn the Philippine Navy by
virtue of the said writ. On 10 December 1964, the CFI dismissed Civil Case 56701 for
failure of the company to prosecute as well as for failure of the Commission and the
Navy to appear on the scheduled date of hearing. The vessel, Tony Lex VI or Srta.
Winnie however, remained in the possession of the company. On 20 July 1965, the
Fisheries Commissioner requested the Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels Tony Lex
VI and Tony Lex III, also respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged
violations of some provisions of the Fisheries Act and the rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder. On August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats were actually
seized for illegal fishing with dynamite. Fish caught with dynamite and sticks of
dynamite were then found aboard the two vessels. On 18 August 1965, the Fisheries
Commissioner requested the Palawan Provincial Fiscal to file criminal charges against
the crew members of the fishing vessels. On 30 September 1965, there were filed in
the CFI of Palawan a couple of informations, one against the crew members of Tony
Lex III, and another against the crew members of Tony Lex VI — both for violations
of Act 4003, as amended by Commonwealth Acts 462, 659 and 1088, i.e., for illegal
fishing with the use of dynamite. On the same day, the Fiscal filed an ex parte motion
to hold the boats in custody as instruments and therefore evidence of the crime, and
cabled the Fisheries Commissioner to detain the vessels. On October 2 and 4,
likewise, the CFI of Palawan ordered the Philippine Navy to take the boats in custody.
On 2 October 1965, the company filed a complaint with application for preliminary
mandatory injunction (Civil Case 62799) with the CFI of Manila against the
Commission and the Navy. Among others, it was alleged that at the time of the seizure
of the fishing boats in issue, the same were engaged in legitimate fishing operations
off the coast of Palawan; that by virtue of the offer of compromise dated 13
September 1965 by the company to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, the numerous violations of the Fishery Laws, if any, by the crew members
of the vessels were settled. On 18 October 1965, Judge Francisco Arca issued an order
granting the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and issued the
preliminary writ upon the filing by the company of a bond of P5,000.00 for the release
of the two vessels. On 19 October 1965, the Commission and the Navy filed a motion
for reconsideration of the order issuing the preliminary writ on 18 October 1965 on
the ground, among others, that on 18 October 1965 the Philippine Navy received from
the Palawan CFI two orders dated October 2 and 4, 1965 requiring the Philippine
Navy to hold the fishing boats in custody and directing that the said vessels should not
be released until further orders from the Court, and that the bond of P5,000.00 is
grossly insufficient to cover the Government's losses in case the two vessels, which
are worth P495,000.00, are placed beyond the reach of the Government, thus
frustrating their forfeiture as instruments of the crime. On 23 November 1965, Judge
Arca denied the said motion for reconsideration. The Commission and the Navy filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain Judge
Arca from enforcing his order dated 18 October 1965, and the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction thereunder issued.
Issue:
Whether the Fisheries Commissioner and the Navy can validly direct and/or effect the
seizure of the vessels of the company for illegal fishing by the use of dynamite and
without the requisite licenses.
Held:
Section 4 of Republic Act 3512 approved on 20 March 1963 empowers the Fisheries
Commissioner to carry out the provisions of the Fisheries Act, as amended, and all
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, to make searches and seizures
personally or through his duly authorized representatives in accordance with the Rules
of Court, of "explosives such as dynamites and the like; including fishery products,
fishing equipment, tackle and other things that are subject to seizure under existing
fishery laws"; and "to effectively implement the enforcement of existing fishery laws
on illegal fishing." Paragraph 5 of Section 4 of the same Republic Act 3512 likewise
transferred to and vested in the Philippine Fisheries Commission "all the powers,
functions and duties heretofore exercised by the Bureau of Customs, Philippine Navy
and Philippine Constabulary over fishing vessels and fishery matters." Section 12 of
the Fisheries Act, otherwise known as Republic Act 4003, as amended, prohibits
fishing with dynamites or other explosives which is penalized by Section 76 thereof
"by a fine of not less than P1,500.00 nor more than P5,000.00, and by imprisonment
for not less than one (1) year and six (6) months nor more than five (5) years, aside
from the confiscation and forfeiture of all explosives, boats, tackles, apparel, furniture,
and other apparatus used in fishing in violation of said Section 12 of this Act." Section
78 of the same Fisheries Law provides that "in case of a second offense, the vessel,
together with its tackle, apparel, furniture and stores shall be forfeited to the
Government." The second paragraph of Section 12 also provides that "the possession
and/or finding, of dynamite, blasting caps and other explosives in any fishing boat
shall constitute a presumption that the said dynamite and/or blasting caps and
explosives are being used for fishing purposes in violation of this Section, and that the
possession or discover in any fishing boat or fish caught or killed by the use of
dynamite or other explosives, under expert testimony, shall constitute a presumption
that the owner, if present in the fishing boat, or the fishing crew have been fishing
with dynamite or other explosives." Under Section 78 of the Fisheries Act, as
amended, any person, association or corporation fishing in deep sea fishery without
the corresponding license prescribed in Sections 17 to 22 Article V of the Fisheries
Act or any other order or regulation deriving force from its provisions, "shall be
punished for each offense by a fine of not more than P5,000.00, or imprisonment, for
not more than one year, or both, in the discretion of the Court; Provided, That in case
of an association or corporation, the President or manager shall be directly responsible
for the acts of his employees or laborers if it is proven that the latter acted with his
knowledge; otherwise the responsibility shall extend only as far as fine is concerned:
Provided, further, That in the absence of a known owner of the vessel, the master,
patron or person in charge of such vessel shall be responsible for any violation of this
Act: and Provided, further, That in case of a second offense, the vessel together with
its tackle, apparel, furniture and stores shall be forfeited to the Government." Under
Section 13 of Executive Order 389 of 23 December 1950, reorganizing the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine Navy has the function, among others, "to
assist the proper governmental agencies in the enforcement of laws and regulations
pertaining to Fishing. Section 2210 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by
PD 34 of 27 October 1972, authorized any official or person exercising police
authority under the provisions of the Code, to search and seize any vessel or air craft
as well as any trunk, package, bag or envelope on board and to search any person on
board for any breach or violation of the customs and tariff laws. Herein, when the
Philippine Navy, upon request of the Fisheries Commissioner, apprehended on August
5 or 6, 1965 the fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI, otherwise known
respectively as Srta. Agnes and Srta. Winnie, these vessels were found to be without
the necessary license in violation of Section 903 of the Tariff and Customs Code and
therefore subject to seizure under Section 2210 of the same Code, and illegally fishing
with explosives and without fishing license required by Sections 17 and 18 of the
Fisheries Law. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and air crafts for
violations of the customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional
requirement of a search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought before such warrant
could be secured; hence it is not practicable to require a search warrant before such
search or seizure can be constitutionally effected. The same exception should apply to
seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws: They are usually equipped with
powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or
Coast Guard.
People vs. Gatward [GRs 119772-73, 7 February 1997]
Facts:
At about 3:30 p.m. of 30 August 1994, U Aung Win, a Passenger of TG Flight 620 of
the Thai Airways which had just arrived from Bangkok, Thailand, presented his
luggage, a travelling bag for examination to Customs Examiner Busran Tawano, who
was assigned at the Arrival Area of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in
Pasay City. U Aung Win also handed to Tawano his Customs Declaration 128417
stating that he had no articles to declare. When Tawano was about to inspect his
luggage, U Aung Win suddenly left, proceeding towards the direction of Carousel 1,
the conveyor for the pieces of luggage of the passengers of Flight 620, as if to retrieve
another baggage from it. After having inspected the luggages of the other incoming
passengers, Tawano became alarmed by the failure of U Aung Win to return and
suspected that the bag of U Aung Win contained illegal articles. The Customs
Examiner reported the matter to his superiors. Upon their instructions, the bag was
turned over to the office of the Customs Police in the NAIA for x-ray examination
where it was detected that it contained some powdery substance. When opened, the
bag revealed two packages containing the substance neatly hidden in between its
partitions. Representative samples of the substance were examined by Elizabeth
Ayonon, a chemist of the Crime Laboratory Service of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) assigned at the Arrival Area of the NAIA, and by Tita Advincula, another
chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, and found to be
positive for heroin. The two chemists concluded that the entire substance, with a total
weight of 5,579.80 grams, contained in the two packages found in the bag of U Aung
Win, is heroin. A manhunt was conducted to locate U Aung Win. At about 7:45 p.m.
of the same date, Rey Espinosa, an employee of the Lufthansa Airlines, notified the
commander of the NAIA Customs Police District Command that a certain Burmese
national by the name of U Aung Win appeared at the check-in counter of the airline as
a departing passenger. Immediately, a team of law enforcers proceeded to the
Departure Area and apprehended the accused after he had been identified through his
signatures in his Customs Declaration and in his Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation Arrival Card. Customs Examiner Tawano also positively identified U
Aung Win as the person who left his bag with him at the Arrival Area of the NAIA.
During the investigation of U Aung Win, the agents of the Customs Police and the
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) gathered the information that U Aung Win had a
contact in Bangkok and that there were other drug couriers in the Philippines.
Following the lead, a team of lawmen, together with U Aung Win, was dispatched to
the City Garden Hotel in Mabini St., Ermita, Manila, to enable U Aung Win to
communicate with his contact in Bangkok for further instructions. While the police
officers were standing by, they noticed two persons, a Caucasian and an oriental,
alight from a car and enter the hotel. U Aung Win whispered to Customs Police
Special Agent Edgar Quiñones that he recognized the two as drug couriers whom he
saw talking with his contact in Bangkok named Mau Mau. The members of the team
were able to establish the identity of the two persons as Nigel Richard Gatward and
one Zaw Win Naing, a Thailander, from the driver of the hotel service car used by the
two when they arrived in the hotel. It was gathered by the law enforcers that Gatward
and Zaw Win Naing were scheduled to leave for Bangkok on board a KLM flight. On
31 August 1994, operatives of the NAIA Customs Police mounted a surveillance
operation at the Departure Area for Gatward and Zaw Win Naing who might be
leaving the country. At about 7:45 p.m., Special Agent Gino Minguillan of the
Customs Police made a verification on the passenger manifest of KLM Royal Dutch
Airlines Flight 806, bound for Amsterdam via Bangkok, which was scheduled to
depart at about 7:55 p.m. He found the name "GATWARD/NRMR" listed therein as a
passenger for Amsterdam and accordingly informed his teammates who responded
immediately Customs Police Captain Juanito Algenio requested Victorio Erece,
manager of the KLM airline at the NAIA, to let passenger Gatward disembark from
the aircraft and to have his checked- in luggage, if any, unloaded. The manager
acceded to the request to off-load Gatward but not to the unloading of his check-in
bag as the plane was about to depart and to do so would unduly delay the flight.
However, Erece made an assurance that the bag would be returned immediately to the
Philippines on the first available flight from Bangkok. Upon his disembarkment.
Gatward was invited by the police officers for investigation. At about 3:00 p.m. of 1
September 1994, Gatward's luggage, was brought back to the NAIA from Bangkok
through the Thai airways, pursuant to the request of Erece. Upon its retrieval, the law
enforcers subjected the bag to x-ray examinations in the presence of Gatward and
some Customs officials. It was observed to contain some powdery substance. Inside
the bag were two improvised envelopes made of cardboard each containing the
powdery substance, together with many clothes. The envelopes were hidden inside the
bag, one at the side in between a double-wall, the other inside a partition in the
middle. Upon its examination by Chemists Ayonon and Advincula pursuant to the
request of Police Senior Inspector John Campos of the NARCOM, the powdery
substance contained in the two cardboard envelopes, with a net weight of 5,237.70
grams, was found to be heroin. Nigel Richard Gatward was charged with violating
Section 4 of Republic Act 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (transporting);
while U Aung Win was charged for transgressing Section 3 of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 (importing). Gatward pleaded not guilty of the charge when arraigned,
while U Aung Win pleaded guilty of the crime charged upon his arraignment. On 3
March 1995, the trial court found both guilty of the crime charged.
Issue:
Whether Gatward’s and U Aung Win’s suitcases may be searched without warrant.
Held:
While no search warrant had been obtained for that purpose, when Gatward checked
in his bag as his personal luggage as a passenger of KLM Flight 806 he thereby agreed
to the inspection thereof in accordance with customs rules and regulations, an
international practice of strict observance, and waived any objection to a warrantless
search. His subsequent arrest, although likewise without a warrant, was justified since
it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of the heroin in his bag, or in
flagrante delicto. The conviction of U Aung Win is likewise unassailable. His
culpability was not based only upon his plea of guilty but also upon the evidence of
the prosecution, the presentation of which was required by the lower court despite said
plea. The evidence thus presented convincingly proved his having imported into this
country the heroin found in his luggage which he presented for customs examination
upon his arrival at the international airport. There was, of course, no showing that he
was authorized by law to import such dangerous drug, nor did he claim or present any
authority to do so.
People vs. Johnson [GR 138881, 18 December 2000]
Facts:
Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow, and a
resident of Ocean Side, California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was
naturalized as an American on 16 June 1968 and had since been working as a
registered nurse, taking care of geriatric patients and those with Alzheimer's disease,
in convalescent homes in the United States. On 16 June 1998, she arrived in the
Philippines to visit her son's family in Calamba, Laguna. She was due to fly back to
the United States on July 26. On July 25, she checked in at the Philippine Village
Hotel to avoid the traffic on the way to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next day, 26 June 1998. At around 7:30 p.m.
of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA
departure area. Her duty was to frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and
check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods, and explosives. When
she frisked Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United States via Continental
Airlines CS-912, she felt something hard on the latter's abdominal area. Upon inquiry,
Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just
undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the
explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile,
saying "Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po iyon." She was directed to take
Johnson to the nearest women's room for inspection. Ramirez took Johnson to the rest
room, accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Embile stayed outside. Inside the
women's room, Johnson was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her
stomach was and Johnson gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez
then asked her "to bring out the thing under her girdle." Johnson brought out three
plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over to Embile, outside the women's room.
The confiscated packs contained a total of 580.2 grams of a substance which was
fount by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu." Embile took Johnson and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and
Security Office (1st RASO) at the arrival area of the NAIA, where Johnson's passport
and ticket were taken and her luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her personal
belongings were itemized. Johnson was charged for the possession of 3 plastic bages
of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, weighing a total of 580.2
grams; a violation of §16 of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by RA
7659. On 14 May 1999, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay City, found
Johnson guilty and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Johnson appealed.
Issue:
Whether the extensive search made on Johnson at the airport violates her right against
unreasonable search and seizure.
Held:
The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under
custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of tie 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person: (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just
been committed and person to be arrested has committed it; and xxx." The
circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused falls in either paragraph (a) or (b)
of the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial
investigation is far from being accurate. The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized
from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to
airport security procedures. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure
clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a
lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures.
With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased
security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely
pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are
routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of
suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are.
There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through
airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are
subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would
be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to
routine airport procedures. The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus
been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence
against Johnson. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant,
was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of "shabu" in her
person in flagrante delicto.
People vs. Suzuki [GR 120670, 23 October 2003]
Facts:
Sometime in November 1993, the PNP Narcotics Command issued a directive to all
Chiefs of Narcotics Regional Field Units to cover all domestic airport terminals within
their respective areas of responsibility, following reports that drug trafficking is
prevalent in domestic airports; and to coordinate with local airport authorities and the
PASCOM. In the morning of 12 April 1994, Hedishi Suzuki and Takeshi Koketsu,
both Japanese nationals, entered the pre-departure area of the Bacolod Airport
Terminal. Suzuki was bound for Manila via flight 132 of the Philippine Airlines and
was carrying a small traveling bag and a box marked “Bongbong’s piaya.” At the pre-
departure area, upon the advice of Corazon Sinosa, a civilian personnel of the
PASCOM, Suzuki proceeded to the “walk- through metal detector,” a machine which
produces a red light and an alarm once it detects the presence of metallic substance or
object. Thereupon, the red light switched on and the alarm sounded, signifying the
presence of metallic substance either in his person or in the box he was carrying. This
prompted PO3 Rhodelin Poyugao of the Police Aviation Security Command
(PASCOM) to frisk him bodily. Finding no metallic object in his body, PO3 Poyugao
picked up the box of piaya and passed it through the machine. Again, the machine was
activated. PO3 Poyugao then ordered Suzuki to go to the hand-carried luggage
inspection counter where several PASCOM and NARCOM personnel were present.
SPO1 Arturo Casugod, Sr. requested Suzuki to open the box. He appeared tense and
reluctant and started to leave, but SPO1 Casugod called him. Eventually he consented,
saying in faltering English, “open, open.” SPO1 Casugod opened the box and found
therein 18 small packs, 17 of which were wrapped in aluminum foil. SPO1 Casugod
opened one pack. Inside were dried fruiting tops which looked like marijuana. Upon
seeing this, Suzuki ran outside the pre-departure area but he was chased by PO3
Poyugao, SPO1 Gilbert Linda of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) and Donato
Barnezo of the PASCOM. They apprehended Suzuki near the entrance of the terminal
and brought him to the PASCOM office. They also brought Takeshi and his wife,
Lourdes Linsangan, to the office, being suspects as conspirators with Suzuki in drug
trafficking. Lourdes asked permission to call Atty. Silvestre Tayson. When he arrived,
the police apprised Suzuki of his constitutional rights. Meanwhile, SPO1 Casugod
weighed the contents of the box and inventoried the same. The total weight of the
suspected marijuana fruiting tops was 1.9 kilograms or 1,900 grams. He then drafted a
“confiscation receipt” which Suzuki, upon the advice of Atty. Tayson, refused to
acknowledge. SPO1 Casugod turned over Suzuki to SPO1 Linda for investigation.
Subsequently, Suzuki and his companions were brought to the prosecutor’s office for
inquest and placed under the custody of C/Inspector Ernesto Alcantara at the
NARCOM office. The box with its contents was brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory. P/Inspector Rea Abastillas Villavicencio, the forensic chemist of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, conducted three tests on the
specimen samples which proved positive for marijuana. Suzuki was charged with
unlawful possession of marijuana, a prohibited drug, in violation of the Dangerous
Drug Act. Suzuki entered a plea of not guilty, and trial followed thereafter. The
Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Bacolod City in Criminal Case 94-16100 convicted
Hedishi Suzuki of illegal possession of marijuana, defined and penalized under
Section 8, Article II of RA 6525, as amended, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of death and to pay a fine of P10,000,000.00. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue:
Whether the PASCOM has the authority to inspect luggages or hand-carried bags.
Held:
The Police Aviation Security Command (PASCOM) is the implementing arm of the
National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking (NACAH), which is a creation of
Presidential Letter of Instruction (LOI) 399, dated 28 April 1976. On 18 February
1978, a Memorandum of Understanding among the Secretary of National Defense, the
Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communication, the Secretary of
Justice, the Director General, National Intelligence and Security Authority and the
Secretary of Finance was signed. Under the said Memorandum of Understanding the
then AVSECOM (now PASCOM) shall have the following functions and
responsibilities: (1) Secure all airports against offensive and terroristic acts that
threaten civil aviation; (2) Undertake aircraft anti-hijacking operations; (3) Exercise
operational control and supervision over all agencies involved in airport security
operations; (4) Take all necessary preventive measures to maintain peace and order,
and provide other pertinent public safety services within the airports; xxx.
Based upon the Memorandum of Understanding, pursuant to President LOI
399, in relation to RA 6235, the PASCOM had the legal authority to be at the Bacolod
Airport, Bacolod City and to inspect luggages or hand-carried bags. This is not the
first time that the Court recognize a search conducted pursuant to routine airport
security procedure as an exception to the proscription against warrantless searches. In
People vs. Canton, and People vs. Johnson, the Court validated the search conducted
on the departing passengers and the consequent seizure of the shabu found in their
persons. Clearly, the PASCOM agents have the right under the law to conduct search
of prohibited materials or substances. To simply refuse passengers carrying suspected
illegal items to enter the pre-departure area is to deprive the authorities of their duty to
conduct search, thus sanctioning impotence and ineffectivity of the law enforcers, to
the detriment of society. It should be stressed, however, that whenever the right
against unreasonable search and seizure is challenged, an individual may choose
between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent
to the search or seizure. Here, Suzuki voluntarily gave his consent to the search
conducted by the PASCOM agents.
Terry vs. Ohio [392 US 1, 10 June 1968]
Facts:
Martin McFadden, a Cleveland police detective, on a downtown beat which he had
been patrolling for many years, observed two strangers (Terry and Richard Chilton)
on a street corner. He saw them proceed alternately back and forth along an identical
route, strolling down Huron Road, pausing to stare in the same store window, which
they did for a total of about 24 times. Each completion of the route was followed by a
conference between the two on a corner, at one of which they were joined by a third
man (Katz) who left swiftly. Suspecting the two men of "casing a job, a stick- up," the
officer followed them and saw them rejoin the third man a couple of blocks away in
front of a store. The officer approached the three, identified himself as a policeman,
and asked their names. The men "mumbled something," whereupon McFadden spun
Terry around, patted down his outside clothing, and found in his overcoat pocket, but
was unable to remove, a pistol. The officer ordered the three into the store. He
removed Terry's overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered the three to face the wall
with their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and
seized a revolver from Chilton's outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands
under the outer garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which
might have been a weapon), or under Terry's or Chilton's outer garments until he felt
the guns. The three were taken to the police station. Terry and Chilton were charged
with carrying concealed weapons. The defense moved to suppress the weapons.
Though the trial court rejected the prosecution theory that the guns had been seized
during a search incident to a lawful arrest, the court denied the motion to suppress and
admitted the weapons into evidence on the ground that the officer had cause to believe
that Terry and Chilton were acting suspiciously, that their interrogation was
warranted, and that the officer for his own protection had the right to pat down their
outer clothing having reasonable cause to believe that they might be armed. The court
distinguished between an investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and between a "frisk" of
the outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for evidence of crime. Terry
and Chilton were found guilty, an intermediate appellate court affirmed, and the State
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that "no substantial constitutional
question" was involved.

Issue:
Whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him
to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest.
Held:
The Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, "protects people, not places,"
and therefore applies as much to the citizen on the streets as well as at home or
elsewhere. The issue in this case is not the abstract propriety of the police conduct but
the admissibility against petitioner of the evidence uncovered by the search and
seizure. The exclusionary rule cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products of
legitimate and restrained police investigative techniques; and this Court's approval of
such techniques should not discourage remedies other than the exclusionary rule to
curtail police abuses for which that is not an effective sanction. The Fourth
Amendment applies to "stop and frisk" procedures such as those followed here.
Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has "seized" that person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. A
careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing in an attempt to find
weapons is a "search" under that Amendment. Where a reasonably prudent officer is
warranted in the circumstances of a given case in believing that his safety or that of
others is endangered, he may make a reasonable search for weapons of the person
believed by him to be armed and dangerous regardless of whether he has probable
cause to arrest that individual for crime or the absolute certainty that the individual is
armed. Though the police must whenever practicable secure a warrant to make a
search and seizure, that procedure cannot be followed where swift action based upon
on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat is required. The reasonableness of
any particular search and seizure must be assessed in light of the particular
circumstances against the standard of whether a man of reasonable caution is
warranted in believing that the action taken was appropriate. The officer here was
performing a legitimate function of investigating suspicious conduct when he decided
to approach Terry and his companions. An officer justified in believing that an
individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed may,
to neutralize the threat of physical harm, take necessary measures to determine
whether that person is carrying a weapon. A search for weapons in the absence of
probable cause to arrest must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies of the
situation. An officer may make an intrusion short of arrest where he has reasonable
apprehension of danger before being possessed of information justifying arrest. The
officer's protective seizure of Terry and his companions and the limited search which
he made were reasonable, both at their inception and as conducted. The actions of
Terry and his companions were consistent with the officer's hypothesis that they were
contemplating a daylight robbery and were armed. The officer's search was confined
to what was minimally necessary to determine whether the men were armed, and the
intrusion, which was made for the sole purpose of protecting himself and others
nearby, was confined to ascertaining the presence of weapons. Herein, Officer
McFadden patted down the outer clothing of Terry and his two companions. He did
not place his hands in their pockets or under the outer surface of their garments until
he had felt weapons, and then he merely reached for and removed the guns. He did not
conduct a general exploratory search for whatever evidence of criminal activity he
might find. Thus, the revolver seized from Terry was properly admitted in evidence
against him. At the time McFadden seized Terry and searched him for weapons,
Officer McFadden had reasonable grounds to believe that Terry was armed and
dangerous, and it was necessary for the protection of himself and others to take swift
measures to discover the true facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized.
The policeman carefully restricted his search to what was appropriate to the discovery
of the particular items which he sought. Each case of this sort will, of course, have to
be decided on its own facts. Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may
be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of
the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is
entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence
against the person from whom they were taken.
People v. Solayao [GR 119220, 20 September 1996]
Facts:
On 9 June 1992, CAFGU members, headed by SPO3 Nino, were conducting an
intelligence patrol to verify reports on the presence of armed persons roaming around
the barangays of Caibiran. In Baragay Onion, they met the 5-man group of accused
Nilo Solayao, who was also wearing a camouflage uniform. His companions, upon
seeing the government agents, fled. SPO3 Niño told Salayao not to run away and
introduced himself as "PC," after which he seized the dried coconut leaves which the
latter was carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally
known as "latong." When he asked Salayao who issued him a license to carry said
firearm or whether he was connected with the military or any intelligence group, the
latter answered that he had no permission to possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Niño
confiscated the firearm and turned him over to the custody of the policemen of
Caibiran who subsequently investigated him and charged him with illegal possession
of firearm. Salayao did not contest the confiscation of the shotgun but averred that this
was only given to him by one of his companions, Hermogenes Cenining, when it was
still wrapped in coconut leaves, which they were using the coconut leaves as a torch.
Salayao’s claim was corroborated by one Pedro Balano. On 15 August 1994, the RTC
of Naval Biliran (Branch 16) found Salayao guilty of illegal possession of firearm
under Section 1 of PD 1866 and imposed upon him the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. The trial court,
having found no mitigating but one aggravating circumstance of nighttime, sentenced
accused- appellant to suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua with the accessory
penalties provided by law. Salayao appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the search upon Solayao, yielding the firearm wrapped in coconut leaves, is
valid.
Held:
Nilo Solayao and his companions' drunken actuations aroused the suspicion of SPO3
Niño's group, as well as the fact that he himself was attired in a camouflage uniform
or a jungle suit and that upon espying the peace officers, his companions fled. It
should be noted that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to
verify reports that armed persons were roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. The
circumstances are similar to those obtaining in Posadas v. Court of Appeals where this
Court held that "at the time the peace officers identified themselves and apprehended
the petitioner as he attempted to flee, they did not know that he had committed, or was
actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions.
They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did not know
what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a
warrant." As with Posadas, the case herein constitutes an instance where a search and
seizure may be effected without first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to
"stop and frisk" Solayao when his companions fled upon seeing the government
agents. Under the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have
procured a search warrant first. Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. Nor was there error on the part
of the trial court when it admitted the homemade firearm as evidence.
Manalili v. CA [GR 113447, 9 October 1997]
Facts:
At about 2:10 p.m. of 11 April 1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the
Kalookan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street,
Kalookan City, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. The policemen were Pat.
Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas and a driver named Arnold Enriquez was
driving a Tamaraw vehicle which was the official car of the Police Station of
Kalookan City. The surveillance was being made because of information that drug
addicts were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. Upon reaching
the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their vehicle. They then
chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The
male person was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying
manner. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached
him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked the male
person what he was holding in his hands. The male person tried to resist. Pat. Romeo
Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said male person had in his hands.
The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same.
Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed marijuana
residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents. The male person was
then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Headquarters and
was turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for investigation. Pat. Espiritu also
turned over to Cpl. Tamondong the confiscated wallet and its suspected marijuana
contents. The man turned out to be Alain Manalili y Dizon. On 11 April 1988,
Manalili was charged by Assistant Caloocan City Fiscal E. Juan R. Bautista with
violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act 6425. Upon his arraignment on 21
April 1988, Manalili pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. With the agreement of the
public prosecutor, Manalili was released after filing a P10,000.00 bail bond. After trial
in due course, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 124, acting as a
Special Criminal Court, rendered on 19 May 1989 a decision convicting appellant of
illegal possession of marijuana residue. Manalili remained on provisional liberty.
Atty. Benjamin Razon, counsel for the defense, filed a Notice of Appeal dated 31 May
1989. On 19 April 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal and affirmed the trial
court. The appellate court denied reconsideration via its Resolution dated 20 January
1994. Manalili filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether a search and seizure could be effected without necessarily being preceded by
an arrest.
Held:
In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular
designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate
him, and pat him for weapon(s). In allowing such a search, the interest of effective
crime prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in
appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest.
What justified the limited search was the more immediate interest of the police officer
in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he was dealing was not
armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him. It did
not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain
advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure,
excused only by exigent circumstances. In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is
that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant;
otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, gives this guarantee. This right,
however, is not absolute. The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five
recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: "(1)
search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain
view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right
against unreasonable search and seizure." In People vs. Encinada, the Court further
explained that in these cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable
cause as the essential requirement. Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another
exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court
of Appeals, the Court held that there were many instances where a search and seizure
could be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which was
stop-and-frisk. To require the police officers to search the bag only after they had
obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much too late under the
circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a
suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status
quo while obtaining more information, rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and
allow a crime to occur. Herein, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed
during their surveillance that Manalili had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk
along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information was a
popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-
Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was
characteristic of drug addicts who were "high." The policemen therefore had sufficient
reason to stop Manalili to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such
investigation, they found marijuana in his possession. The search was valid, being
akin to a stop-and-frisk.
Malacat vs. Court of Appeals [GR 123595, 12 December 1997]
Facts:
On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb threats reported
seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police
Force of the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was on
foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon
Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They
chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of
three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the
Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with "their eyes moving
very fast." Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and
observed both groups for about 30 minutes. The police officers then approached one
group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu
caught up with and apprehended Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized,
inasmuch as allegedly the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza
Miranda, Yu saw Malacat and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade). Upon searching
Malacat, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside the latter's "front waist
line." Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan
from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Malacat and Casan were then
brought to Police Station 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the grenade
and thereafter gave it to his commander. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade
he allegedly recovered from Malacat. On 30 August 1990, Malacat was charged with
violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1866. At arraignment on 9 October 1990,
petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of not guilty. Malacat denied
the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several
other police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was
once again searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade only in court
when it was presented. In its decision dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15
February 1994, the trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of Malacat
was akin to a "stop and frisk," where a "warrant and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest" and "whose object is either to maintain the
status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information";
and that the seizure of the grenade from Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The
trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives
under Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less than
17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more than
30 years of Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed a
notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme Court. However, the
record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR 15988). In its
decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Manalili
filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of “stop and
frisk.”
Held:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in
order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant,
subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under the
circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in
flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit"
arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1)
customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain
view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop
and frisk." The concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful
arrest must not be confused. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of
the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their
allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search. Here, there could have been no valid
in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of
personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act,
on the part of Malacat, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being
committed or was going to be committed. Plainly, the search conducted on Malacat
could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest. On the other hand, while
probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that
mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must
exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant
the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-
and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may,
under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and
(2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police
officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed
with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer. Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid:
First, there is grave doubts as to Yu's claim that Malacat was a member of the group
which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days earlier. This claim is neither
supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer
who allegedly chased that group. Second, there was nothing in Malacat's behavior or
conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his
eyes were "moving very fast" — an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu
and his teammates were nowhere near Malacat and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus
presumably dusk. Malacat and his companions were merely standing at the corner and
were not creating any commotion or trouble. Third, there was at all no ground,
probable or otherwise, to believe that Malacat was armed with a deadly weapon. None
was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the
front waistline" of Malacat, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and
Malacat, any telltale bulge, assuming that Malacat was indeed hiding a grenade, could
not have been visible to Yu. What is unequivocal then are blatant violations of
Malacat's rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the
Constitution.
Florida vs. J.L. [000 US 98-1993, 28 March 2000]
Facts:
On 13 October 1995, an anonymous caller reported to the Miami-Dade Police that a
young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was
carrying a gun. There is no audio recording of the tip, and nothing is known about the
informant. Sometime after the police received the tip, two officers were instructed to
respond. They arrived at the bus stop about 6 minutes later and saw 3 black males
"just hanging out [there]." One of the three, J. L., was wearing a plaid shirt. Apart
from the tip, the officers had no reason to suspect any of the three of illegal conduct.
The officers did not see a firearm, and J. L. made no threatening or otherwise unusual
movements. One of the officers approached J. L., told him to put his hands up on the
bus stop, frisked him, and seized a gun from J. L.'s pocket. The second officer frisked
the other two individuals, against whom no allegations had been made, and found
nothing. J. L., who was at the time of the frisk "10 days shy of his 16th birth[day],"
was charged under state law with carrying a concealed firearm without a license and
possessing a firearm while under the age of 18. He moved to suppress the gun as the
fruit of an unlawful search, and the trial court granted his motion. The intermediate
appellate court reversed, but the Supreme Court of Florida quashed that decision and
held the search invalid under the Fourth Amendment.
Issue:
Whether the anonymous tip is sufficient basis to conduct “stop and frisk” upon the
person of J.L.
Held:
In Terry v. Ohio (392 US 1 [1968]), it was held that "where a police officer observes
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience
that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may
be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior
he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his
own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area
to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him." Herein, the officers'
suspicion that J. L. was carrying a weapon arose not from any observations of their
own but solely from a call made from an unknown location by an unknown caller.
Unlike a tip from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and who can
be held responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated, "an anonymous tip
alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity." The tip
herein lacked the moderate indicia of reliability. The anonymous call concerning J. L.
provided no predictive information and therefore left the police without means to test
the informant's knowledge or credibility. That the allegation about the gun turned out
to be correct does not suggest that the officers, prior to the frisks, had a reasonable
basis for suspecting J. L. of engaging in unlawful conduct: The reasonableness of
official suspicion must be measured by what the officers knew before they conducted
their search. All the police had to go on in this case was the bare report of an
unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun
nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about J. L The
requirement that an anonymous tip bear standard indicia of reliability in order to
justify a stop in no way diminishes a police officer's prerogative, in accord with Terry,
to conduct a protective search of a person who has already been legitimately stopped.
On the other hand, an anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability of the kind
contemplated in Adams (Adams v. Williams, 407 US 143 [1972]) and White
(Alabama v. White, 496 US 325) does not justify a stop and frisk whenever and
however it alleges the illegal possession of a firearm.
Papa vs. Mago [GR L-27360, 28 February 1968]
Facts:
Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department,
acting upon a reliable information received on 3 November 1966 to the effect that a
certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be
released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on
two trucks, and upon orders of Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly
deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate 1 of the
customs zone. When the trucks left gate 1 at about 4:30 p.m. of 4 November 1966,
elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at
the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks, consisting of nine
bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police.
Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the
policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry No. 147-
5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and
their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Manila a petition "for mandamus with restraining order or
preliminary injunction (Civil Case 67496), praying for the issuance of a restraining
order, ex parte, enjoining the police and customs authorities, or their agents, from
opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return of
the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary
damages in their favor. On 10 November 1966, Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an
order ex parte restraining Ricardo Papa (as Chief of Police of Manila) and Juan Ponce
Enrile (as Commissioner of Customs) in Civil Case 67496. However, when the
restraining order was received by Papa. et. al., some bales had already been opened by
the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila
Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of Remedios Mago.
Under date of 15 November 1966, Mago filed an amended petition, including as party
defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt. Martin
Alagao of the Manila Police Department. At the hearing on 9 December 1966, the
lower court, with the conformity of the parties, ordered that an inventory of the goods
be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the representatives of the claimant of
the goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti- Smuggling Center of the Manila
Police Department. On 23 December 1966, Mago filed an ex parte motion to release
the goods, alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any
article of prohibited importation, the same should be released as per agreement of the
parties upon her posting of the appropriate bond that may be determined by the court.
On 7 March 1967, the Judge issued an order releasing the goods to Mago upon her
filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00. On 13 March 1967, Papa, on his own
behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the goods
under bond, upon the ground that the Manila Police Department had been directed by
the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination
of the seizure proceedings. Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for
reconsideration, and alleging that they had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, Papa, et. al. filed the action for prohibition and certiorari
with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.
Held: The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been
deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the
enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, and
it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable
property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed
under customs and tariff laws. He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk,
envelope or other container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect
the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to
law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably
suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. It cannot be doubted,
therefore, that Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and
seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to
demand assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter
has the legal duty to render said assistance. This was what happened precisely in the
case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the two
trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was
given authority by the Chief of Police to make the interception of the cargo. Martin
Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any
search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not
require said warrant herein. The Code authorizes persons having police authority
under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search
any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also
to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or
envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced
into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant
in said cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said
"dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or
justice of the peace." Except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons
exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure
without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. Herein, Martin Alagao
and his companion policemen did not have to make any search before they seized the
two trucks and their cargo. But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the
effect that no search warrant would be needed under the circumstances obtaining
herein. The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed
as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other
structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of
a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not
practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Having declared that the
seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in question was
in accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired
jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and
tariff laws, to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
People vs. CFI Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City [GR L-41686, 17 November 1980]
Facts:
One week before 9 February 1974, the Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center
(RASAC) was informed by an undisclosed Informer that a shipment of highly dutiable
goods would be transported to Manila from Angeles City on a blue Dodge car.
Spurred by such lead, RASAC Agents Arthur Manuel and Macario Sabado, on said
date and upon order of the Chief of Intelligence and Operations Branch, RASAC-
MBA, Col. Antonio Abad, Jr., stationed themselves in the vicinity of the toll gate of
the North Diversion Road at Balintawak, Quezon City. At about 6:45 a.m. of the same
day, a light blue Dodge car with Plate 21-87-73, driven by Sgt. Jessie Hope who was
accompanied by Monina Medina approached the exit gate and after giving the toll
receipt sped away towards Manila. The RASAC agents gave a chase and overtook
Sgt. Hope's car. Agent Sabado blew his whistle and signaled Sgt. Hope to stop but the
latter instead of heeding, made a U-turn back to the North Diversion Road, but he
could not go through because of the buses in front of his car. At this point, the agents
succeeded in blocking Sgt. Hope's car and the latter stopped. Manuel and Sabado who
were in civilian clothes showed their identification cards to Hope and Medina and
introduced themselves as RASAC agents. The Agents saw 4 boxes on the back seat of
the Dodge and upon inquiry as to what those boxes were, Sgt. Hope answered "I do
not know." Further, Hope and Medina were asked where they were bringing the
boxes, to which Medina replied that they were bringing them (boxes) to the Tropical
Hut at Epifanio de los Santos. Agent Sabado boarded the Dodge car with Hope and
Medina while Agent Manuel took their own car and both cars drove towards Tropical
Hut making a brief stop at the Bonanza where Agent Manuel called up Col. Abad by
telephone. Arriving at the Tropical Hut, the party, together with Col. Abad who had
joined them waited for the man who according to Monina Medina was supposed to
receive the boxes. As the man did not appear, Col. Abad "called off the mission" and
brought respondents and their car to Camp Aguinaldo arriving there at about 9:00 a.m.
An inspection of Sgt. Hope's car at Camp Aguinaldo yielded 11 sealed boxes, 4 on the
rear seat and 7 more in the baggage compartment which was opened on orders of Col.
Abad. On the same order of the intelligence officer, the boxes were opened before the
presence of Hope and Medina, representatives of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
Bureau of Customs, P.C., COSAC and photographers of the Department of National
Defense. The contents of the bozes revealed some "4,441 more or less wrist watches
of assorted brands; 1,075 more or less watch bracelets of assorted brands," supposedly
untaxed. As consequence, thereof, ASAC Chairman General Pelagio Cruz requested
the Bureau of Customs to issue a Warrant of Seizure and Detention against the articles
including the Dodge car. The Collector of Customs did issue the same on 12 February
1974. It was admitted, however, that when the apprehending agents arrested
respondents and brought them together with the seized articles to the ASAC Office in
Camp Aguinaldo, the former were not armed with a warrant of arrest and seizure. In
conjunction with the Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued by the Collector of
Customs, seizure proceedings were instituted and docketed as Seizure Identification
14281 against the wrist watches and watch bracelets pursuant to Section 2530 (m) —
1 of the Tariff and Customs Code, and Seizure Identification No. 14281-A against the
Dodge car pursuant to Section 2530(k) of the same Code. On the other hand, Hope
and Medina disclaimed ownership of the seized articles. Ownership was instead
claimed by one Antonio del Rosario who intervened in the proceedings. Hope claimed
that at the time of apprehension, he had no knowledge of the contents of the boxes,
and granting that he had such knowledge, he never knew that these are untaxed
commodities; that he consented to transport said boxes from Angeles City to Manila
in his car upon request of his girl friend Monina as a personal favor; that he was not
present when the boxes were loaded in his car nor was he ever told of their contents
on the way. On the part of Monina Medina, she testified that what she did was only in
compliance with the agreement with Mr. Del Rosario to transport the boxes and
deliver them to a certain Mr. Peter at the Tropical Hut who will in turn give her the
contracted price; that Mr. Del Rosario did not reveal the contents of the boxes which
she came to know of only when the boxes were opened at Camp Aguinaldo. As there
was not enough evidence to controvert the testimonies of respondents and the
narration of claimant Antonio del Rosario, the Collector of Customs issued his
decision in the seizure cases on 1 April 1975 declaring that the seized articles
including the car are not subject of forfeiture. Meanwhile, on 14 March 1974, after the
requisite preliminary investigation, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, finding the
existence of a prima facie case against Hope and Medina, filed Criminal Case Q-3781
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City). Upon arraignment on 23 April
1974, respondents pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced on 28 January 1975 and while
the prosecution through its first witness, Agent Macario Sabado, was adducing as
evidence the pictures of the 11 boxes containing the assorted watches and watch
bracelets, the defense counsel objected to the presentation of the pictures and the
subject articles on the ground that they were seized without the benefit of warrant, and
therefore inadmissible in evidence under Section 4(2), Article IV of the New
Constitution. After the parties have argued their grounds in their respective
memoranda, the trial court issued the order of 20 August 1975 declaring that the
alleged smuggled articles and the pictures taken of said items as inadmissible in
evidence. The prosecution's motion for reconsideration was denied on 30 September
1975. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari which was treated as a special civil
action in the Supreme Court's Resolution of 5 May 1976.
Issue:
Whether the search and seizure made on the boxes in the blue Dodge car was valid,
even after the Collector of Customs declared the seized articles not subject to
forfeiture.
Held:
It is not accurate to say that the Collector of Customs made no findings that the
articles were smuggled. In fact, what the Collector stated was that the prosecution
failed to present the quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant the forfeiture of the
subject articles. In a general sense, this does not necessarily exclude the possibility of
smuggling. The decision of the Collector of Customs, as in other seizure proceedings,
concerns the res rather than the persona. The proceeding is a probe on contraband or
illegally imported goods. The importer or possessor is treated differently. The fact that
the administrative penalty befalls on him is an inconsequential incidence to criminal
liability. By the same token, the probable guilt cannot be negated simply because he
was not held administratively liable. The Collector's final declaration that the articles
are not subject to forfeiture does not detract his findings that untaxed goods were
transported in Hope and Medina's car and seized from their possession by agents of
the law. Whether criminal liability lurks on the strength of the provision of the Tariff
and Customs Code adduced in the information can only be determined in a separate
criminal action. Hope and Medina's exoneration in the administrative cases cannot
deprive the State of its right to prosecute. But under our penal laws, criminal
responsibility, if any, must be proven not by preponderance of evidence but by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. As enunciated in the leading case of Papa vs. Mago, in the
exercise of the specific functions, the Code does not mention the need of a search
warrant unlike Section 2209 which explicitly provides that a "dwelling house may be
entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge (or justice of the peace),
upon sworn application showing probable cause and particularly describing the place
to be searched and person or thing to be seized." Aware of this delineation, the Court
in that case expressed the considered view that "except in the case of the search of a
dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect
search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws." The
rationale of the Mago ruling was nurtured by the traditional doctrine in Carroll v.
United States 6 wherein an imprimatur against, constitutional infirmity was stamped
in favor of a warrantless search and seizure of such nature as herein. On this stable
foundation, the warrantless seizure did not violate Article IV, Section 3 of the 1973
Constitution, which finds origin in the Fourth Amendment of the American
Constitution.
Whren v. United States [ 517 US 806 (No. 95-5841), 10 June 1996]
Facts:
On the evening of 10 June 1993, plainclothes vice- squad officers of the District of
Columbia Metropolitan Police Department were patrolling a "high drug area" of the
city in an unmarked car. Their suspicions were aroused when they passed a dark
Pathfinder truck with temporary license plates and youthful occupants waiting at a
stop sign, the driver looking down into the lap of the passenger at his right. The truck
remained stopped at the intersection for what seemed an unusually long time--more
than 20 seconds. When the police car executed a U-turn in order to head back toward
the truck, the Pathfinder turned suddenly to its right, without signalling, and sped off
at an "unreasonable" speed. The policemen followed, and in a short while overtook the
Pathfinder when it stopped behind other traffic at a red light. They pulled up
alongside, and Officer Ephraim Soto stepped out and approached the driver's door,
identifying himself as a police officer and directing the driver, James L. Brown, to put
the vehicle in park. When Soto drew up to the driver's window, he immediately
observed two large plastic bags of what appeared to be crack cocaine in Michael A.
Whren's hands. Whren and Brown were arrested, and quantities of several types of
illegal drugs were retrieved from the vehicle. They were charged in a four-count
indictment with violating various federal drug laws, including 21 U. S. C. Section(s)
844(a) and 860(a). At a pretrial suppression hearing, they challenged the legality of
the stop and the resulting seizure of the drugs. They argued that the stop had not been
justified by probable cause to believe, or even reasonable suspicion, that they were
engaged in illegal drug-dealing activity; and that Officer Soto's asserted ground for
approaching the vehicle--to give the driver a warning concerning traffic violations--
was pretextual. The District Court denied the suppression motion, concluding that "the
facts of the stop were not controverted," and "[t]here was nothing to really
demonstrate that the actions of the officers were contrary to a normal traffic stop."
Whren and Brown were convicted of the counts at issue here. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the convictions, holding with respect to the suppression issue that,
"regardless of whether a police officer subjectively believes that the occupants of an
automobile may be engaging in some other illegal behavior, a traffic stop is
permissible as long as a reasonable officer in the same circumstances could have
stopped the car for the suspected traffic violation."
Issue:
Whether the seizure involving possession of drugs valid, when the vehicle was
stopped due to a violation of the traffic code.
Held:
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police,
even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a "seizure" of
"persons" within the meaning of this provision. An automobile stop is thus subject to
the constitutional imperative that it not be "unreasonable" under the circumstances. As
a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police
have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. It is of course true
that in principle every Fourth Amendment case, since it turns upon a "reasonableness"
determination, involves a balancing of all relevant factors. With rare exceptions not
applicable here, however, the result of that balancing is not in doubt where the search
or seizure is based upon probable cause. analysis involved searches or seizures
conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to an individual's privacy or
even physical interests --such as, for example, seizure by means of deadly force,
unannounced entry into a home, entry into a home without a warrant, or physical
penetration of the body. The making of a traffic stop out-of-uniform does not remotely
qualify as such an extreme practice, and so is governed by the usual rule that probable
cause to believe the law has been broken "outbalances" private interest in avoiding
police contact. Herein, the officers had probable cause to believe that Whren and
Brown had violated the traffic code. That rendered the stop reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, the evidence thereby discovered admissible.
People vs. de Gracia [GR 102009-10, 6 July 1994]
Facts:
The incidents took place at the height of the coup d'etat staged in December, 1989 by
ultra-rightist elements headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of
the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the Government. At that time, various
government establishments and military camps in Metro Manila were being
bombarded by the rightist group with their "tora-tora" planes. At around midnight of
30 November 1989, the 4th Marine Battalion of the Philippine Marines occupied
Villamor Air Base, while the Scout Rangers took over the Headquarters of the
Philippine Army, the Army Operations Center, and Channel 4, the government
television station. Also, some elements of the Philippine Army coming from Fort
Magsaysay occupied the Greenhills Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. On 1
December 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division, National Capital
Region Defense Command, was on board a brown Toyota car conducting a
surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office located at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue
(EDSA) in Quezon City, together with his team composed of Sgt. Crispin Sagario,
M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino, one S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt. Ramos.
The surveillance, which actually started on the night of 30 November 1989 at around
10:00 p.m., was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report received by the division
that said establishment was being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a
communication command post. Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the
vehicle around 10 to 15 meters away from the Eurocar building near P. Tuazon Street,
S/Sgt. Henry Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to conduct his surveillance on
foot. A crowd was then gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-going
bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo. After a while a group of 5 men disengaged
themselves from the crowd and walked towards the car of the surveillance team. At
that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated in front, saw the approaching group and
immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the car and leave the area. As they passed by
the group, then only 6 meters away, the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and
fired at the team, which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right
thigh. Nobody in the surveillance team was able to retaliate because they sought cover
inside the car and they were afraid that civilians or bystanders might be caught in the
cross-fire. As a consequence, at around 6:30 a.m. of 5 December 1989, searching them
composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao as team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt.
Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion under one Col. delos
Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate 6
cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different
calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col.
Matillano which is located at the right portion of the building. St. Oscar Obenia, the
first one to enter the Eurocar building, saw Rolando De Gracia inside the office of
Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. De Gracia was
the only person then present inside the room. A uniform with the nametag of Col.
Matillano was also found. As a result of the raid, the team arrested de Gracia, as well
as Soprieso Verbo and Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar building.
They were then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and
ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No search warrant was secured by the
raiding team because, according to them, at that time there was so much disorder
considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces
and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from
the fact that the courts were consequently closed. The group was able to confirm later
that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr. Gutierrez and that de Gracia is
supposedly a "boy" therein. de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for
illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for
attempted homicide (Criminal Cases Q-90-11755 and Q-90-11756, respectively),
which were tried jointly by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103.
During the arraignment, de Gracia pleaded not guilty to both charges. However, he
admitted that he is not authorized to posses any firearms, ammunition and/or
explosive. The parties likewise stipulated that there was a rebellion during the period
from November 30 up to 9 December 1989. On 22 February 1991, the trial court
rendered judgment acquitting de Gracia of attempted homicide, but found him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance
of rebellion and sentenced him to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. De Gracia
appealed.
Issue:
Whether the military operatives made a valid search and seizure during the height of
the December 1989 coup d’etat.
Held:
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were
not armed with a search warrant at that time. The raid was actually precipitated by
intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior
to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the
surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building.
When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open
the door despite the requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break
into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is
definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and
ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The
presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be
justifiably or even colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and
disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of
the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces.
The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the
building and houses therein were deserted. Under the foregoing circumstances, the
case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search.
In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this
case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was
consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore,
under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for
and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on
5 December 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such
urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed
with.
Valmonte vs. de Villa [GR 83988, 24 May 1990]
Facts:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was
activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General
Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area
of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective
territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere
conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital
Region. 1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Ricardo C. Valmonte and
the Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Right (ULAP) filed a petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order witht the
Supreme Court, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila
or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in
the alternative, to direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation
of checkpoints, for the protection of the people. They aver that, because of the
installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being
harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and
vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or
at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear
for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply
officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in
cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur
Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the
checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air.
Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints
where he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check- up without a court order
or search warrant. They further contend that the said checkpoints give Gen. Renato de
Villa and the National Capital Region District Command a blanket authority to make
searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the
Constitution. In the Supreme Court's decision dated 29 September 1989, Valmonte’s
and ULAP’s petition for prohibition, seeking the declaration of the checkpoints as
unconstitutional and their dismantling and/or banning, was dismissed. Valmonte and
ULAP filed the motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration of said decision.
Issue:
Whether checkpoints serve as a blanket authority for government officials for
warrantless search and seizure and, thus, are violative of the Constitution.
Held:
Nowhere in the Supreme Court's decision of 24 May 1990 did the Court legalize all
checkpoints, i.e. at all times and under all circumstances. What the Court declared is,
that checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as
where the survival of organized government is on the balance, or where the lives and
safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed and installed by
the government. Implicit in this proposition is, that when the situation clears and such
grave perils are removed, checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain.
Recent and on- going events have pointed to the continuing validity and need for
checkpoints manned by either military or police forces. Although no one can be
compelled, under our libertarian system, to share with the present government its
ideological beliefs and practices, or commend its political, social and economic
policies or performance; one must concede to it the basic right to defend itself from its
enemies and, while in power, to pursue its program of government intended for public
welfare; and in the pursuit of those objectives, the government has the equal right,
under its police power, to select the reasonable means and methods for best achieving
them. The checkpoint is evidently one of such means it has selected. Admittedly, the
routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist's right to "free
passage without interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a
brief detention of travellers during which the vehicle's occupants are required to
answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a
visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's
right against unreasonable search. These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed
area, are even less intrusive. Further, vehicles are generally allowed to pass these
checkpoints after a routine inspection and a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and
extensively searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable
belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the
contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. By the same
token, a warrantless search of incoming and outgoing passengers, at the arrival and
departure areas of an international airport, is a practice not constitutionally
objectionable because it is founded on public interest, safety, and necessity. Lastly, the
Court's decision on checkpoints does not, in any way, validate nor condone abuses
committed by the military manning the checkpoints. The Court's decision was
concerned with power, i.e. whether the government employing the military has the
power to install said checkpoints. Once that power is acknowledged, the Court's
inquiry ceases. True, power implies the possibility of its abuse. But whether there is
abuse in a particular situation is a different "ball game" to be resolved in the
constitutional arena. In any situation, where abuse marks the operation of a
checkpoint, the citizen is not helpless. For the military is not above but subject to the
law. And the courts exist to see that the law is supreme. Soldiers, including those who
man checkpoints, who abuse their authority act beyond the scope of their authority
and are, therefore, liable criminally and civilly for their abusive acts.
Aniag vs. Commission on Elections [GR 104961, 7 October 1994]
Facts:
In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections scheduled on 11 May
1992, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued on 11 December 1991
Resolution 2323 ("Gun Ban"), promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying
and transporting of firearms or other deadly weapons, on security personnel or
bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations,
and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election period.
Subsequently, on 26 December 1991 COMELEC issued Resolution 2327 providing
for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and
transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot
checkpoints. On 10 January 1992, pursuant to the "Gun Ban," Mr. Serapio P. Taccad,
Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Representatives, wrote Congressman Francisc B. Aniag
Jr., who was then Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan requesting the return of
the 2 firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Upon being advised of
the request on 13 January 1992 by his staff, Aniag immediately instructed his driver,
Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from his house at Valle Verde and return
them to Congress. Meanwhile, at about 5:00 p,.m. of the same day, the Philippine
National Police (PNP) headed by Senior Superintendent Danilo Cordero set up a
checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex some 20 meters away from its entrance.
About 30 minutes later, the policemen manning the outpost flagged down the car
driven by Arellano as it approached the checkpoint. They searched the car and found
the firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a bag in the trunk of the
car. Arellano was then apprehended and detained. He explained that he was ordered
by Aniag to get the firearms from the house and return them to Sergeant-at Arms
Taccad of the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the police referred Arellano's case
to the Office of the City Prosecutor for inquest. The referral did not include Aniag as
among those charged with an election offense. On 15 January 1992, the City
Prosecutor ordered the release of Arellano after finding the latter's sworn explanation
meritorious. On 28 January 1992, the City Prosecutor invited Aniag to shed light on
the circumstances mentioned in Arellano's sworn explanation. Aniag not only
appeared at the preliminary investigation to confirm Arellano's statement but also
wrote the City Prosecutor urging him to exonerate Arellano. He explained that
Arellano did not violate the firearms ban as he in fact was complying with it when
apprehended by returning the firearms to Congress; and, that he was Aniag's driver,
not a security officer nor a bodyguard. On 6 March 1992, the Office of the City
Prosecutor issued a resolution which, among other matters, recommended that the
case against Arellano be dismissed and that the "unofficial" charge against Aniag be
also dismissed. Nevertheless, on 6 April 1992, upon recommendation of its Law
Department, COMELEC issued Resolution 92-0829 directing the filing of information
against Aniag and Arellano for violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), of BP 881 otherwise
known as the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Sec. 32 of RA 7166; and Aniag to
show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an elective position,
pursuant to COMELEC Resolution 2327, in relation to Secs. 32, 33 and 35 of RA
7166, and Sec. 52, par. (c), of BP 881. On 13 April 1992, Aniag moved for
reconsideration and to hold in abeyance the administrative proceedings as well as the
filing of the information in court. On 23 April 1992, the COMELEC denied Aniag's
motion for reconsideration. Aniag filed a petition for declaratory relief, certiorari and
prohibition against the COMELEC.
Issue:
Whether the search of Aniag’s car that yielded the firarms which were to be returned
to the House of Representatives within the purview of the exception as to the search of
moving vehicles.
Held:
As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by an
appropriate authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside from a search incident to a
lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles and
the seizure of evidence in plain view, as well as the search conducted at police or
military checkpoints which we declared are not illegal per se, and stressed that the
warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. As there was no evidence to show that the
policemen were impelled to do so because of a confidential report leading them to
reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description furnished by their
informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special
strike forces. Nor was there any indication from the package or behavior of Arellano
that could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen. Absent such justifying
circumstances specifically pointing to the culpability of Aniag and Arellano, the
search could not be valid. The action then of the policemen unreasonably intruded into
Aniag's privacy and the security of his property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the
Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained in violation of Aniag's right against
warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding.
People vs. Escano, Usana and Lopez [GR 129756-58, 28 January 2000]
Facts:
On 5 April 1995 and during a COMELEC gun ban, some law enforcers of the Makati
Police, namely, PO3 Eduardo P. Suba, PO3 Bernabe Nonato, SPO4 Juan de los
Santos, and Inspector Ernesto Guico, were manning a checkpoint at the corner of
Senator Gil Puyat Ave. and the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX). They were
checking the cars going to Pasay City, stopping those they found suspicious, and
imposing merely a running stop on the others. At about past midnight, they stopped a
Kia Pride car with Plate TBH 493. P03 Suba saw a long firearm on the lap of the
person seated at the passenger seat, who was later identified as Virgilio Usana. They
asked the driver, identified as Julian D. Escaño, to open the door. P03 Suba seized the
long firearm, an M-1 US Carbine, from Usana. When Escaño, upon order of the
police, parked along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., the other passengers were searched for more
weapons. Their search yielded a .45 caliber firearm which they seized from Escaño.
The three passengers were thereafter brought to the police station Block 5 in the Kia
Pride driven by PO3 Nonato. Upon reaching the precinct, Nonato turned over the key
to the desk officer. Since SPO4 de los Santos was suspicious of the vehicle, he
requested Escaño to open the trunk. Escaño readily agreed and opened the trunk
himself using his key. They noticed a blue bag inside it, which they asked Escaño to
open. The bag contained a parcel wrapped in tape, which, upon examination by
National Bureau of Investigation Forensic Chemist Emilia A. Rosaldos, was found
positive for hashish weighing 3.3143 kilograms. Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry C. Lopez,
together with Julian D. Escaño, were charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 64, in Criminal Case 95-936 with violation of Section 4, Article
II of Republic Act 6425, as amended. Escaño and Usana were also charged in
Criminal Cases 95-937 and 95-938 with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition in violation of Presidential Decree 1866. The cases were consolidated and
jointly tried. In its Decision of 30 May 1997, which was promulgated on 17 June
1997, the trial court convicted Escaño, Lopez and Usana in Criminal Case 95-936,
Escaño in Criminal Case 95-937, and Usana in Criminal Case 95-938. Escaño filed on
19 June 1997 a Notice of Appeal, but on 16 July 1997, he filed a Manifestation and
Withdrawal of Appeal, which was granted by the trial court in its Order of 17 July
1997. Usana and Lopez filed a Notice of Appeal on 30 June 1997, manifesting therein
that they were appealing to the Supreme Court and to the Court of Appeals.
Considering the penalties imposed, the decision in Criminal Case 95-936 was
appealed to the Supreme Court, while the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the
appeal from Criminal Case 95-938. In its Order of 30 June 1997, the trial court gave
due course to the appeal and ordered the transmittal of the record in Criminal Case 95-
936 to the Supreme Court and the record of Criminal Case 95-938 to the Court of
Appeals. Accordingly, it is only the appeal from the judgment in Criminal Case 95-
936 that is before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the search conducted on Escano’s car is illegal, and whether the evidence
acquired therein would be sufficient to convict Lopez and Usana for possession of
illegal drugs.
Held:
The Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by
the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists
are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on
motorists' right to "free passage without interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a
rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicle's
occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as
violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine
checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. The checkpoint herein
conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC. The
COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were
limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which
such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would
know that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs.
The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights
of the accused against illegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were
merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such as those whose windows are
heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were carrying guns. At best they
would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop, without opening
the car's doors or subjecting its passengers to a body search. There is nothing
discriminatory in this as this is what the situation demands. Despite the validity of the
search, the Court cannot affirm the conviction of Usana and Lopez for violation of RA
6425, as amended. The following facts militate against a finding of conviction: (1) the
car belonged to Escaño; (2) the trunk of the car was not opened soon after it was
stopped and after the accused were searched for firearms; (3) the car was driven by a
policeman from the place where it was stopped until the police station; (4) the car's
trunk was opened, with the permission of Escaño, without the presence of Usana and
Lopez; and (5) after arrival at the police station and until the opening of the car's
trunk, the car was in the possession and control of the police authorities. No fact was
adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in the trunk of the car. Their
having been with Escaño in the latter's car before the "finding" of the hashish
sometime after the lapse of an appreciable time and without their presence left much
to be desired to implicate them to the offense of selling, distributing, or transporting
the prohibited drug. In fact, there was no showing that Usana and Lopez knew of the
presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the same before it was
seized.
Camara vs. Municipal Court of the City and Country of San Francisco [387 US
523, 5 June 1967]
Facts:
On 6 November 1963, an inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San
Francisco Department of Public Health entered an apartment building to make a
routine annual inspection for possible violations of the city's Housing Code. The
building's manager informed the inspector that Camara, lessee of the ground floor,
was using the rear of his leasehold as a personal residence. Claiming that the
building's occupancy permit did not allow residential use of the ground floor, the
inspector confronted Camara and demanded that he permit an inspection of the
premises. Camara refused to allow the inspection because the inspector lacked a
search warrant. The inspector returned on November 8, again without a warrant, and
Camara again refused to allow an inspection. A citation was then mailed ordering
Camara to appear at the district attorney's office. When Camara failed to appear, two
inspectors returned to his apartment on November 22. They informed Camara that he
was required by law to permit an inspection under 503 of the Housing Code. Camara
nevertheless refused the inspectors access to his apartment without a search warrant.
Thereafter, a complaint was filed charging him with refusing to permit a lawful
inspection in violation of 507 of the Code. Camara was arrested on December 2nd
released on bail. When his demurrer to the criminal
complaint was denied, Camara filed the petition for a writ of prohibition in a
California Superior Court alleging that he was awaiting trial on a criminal charge of
violating the San Francisco Housing Code by refusing to permit a warrantless
inspection of his residence, and that a writ of prohibition should issue to the criminal
court because the ordinance authorizing such inspections is unconstitutional on its
face. The Superior Court denied the writ, the District Court of Appeal affirmed, and
the Supreme Court of California denied a petition for hearing.
Issue:
Whether Camara can validly refuse the inspection of his dwelling by the Division of
Housing Inspection.
Held:
The Fourth Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused to permit a
warrantless code-enforcement inspection of his personal residence. The basic purpose
of the Fourth Amendment, which is enforceable against the States through the
Fourteenth, through its prohibition of "unreasonable" searches and seizures is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
governmental officials. With certain carefully defined exceptions, an unconsented
warrantless search of private property is "unreasonable." Administrative searches of
the kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment, that such searches when authorized and conducted without a
warrant procedure lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment
guarantees to the individual, and that the reasons put forth in Frank v. Maryland and in
other cases for upholding these warrantless searches are insufficient to justify so
substantial a weakening of the Fourth Amendment's protections. Contrary to the
assumption of Frank v. Maryland, Fourth Amendment interests are not merely
"peripheral" where municipal fire, health, and housing inspection programs are
involved whose purpose is to determine the existence of physical conditions not
complying with local ordinances. Those programs, moreover, are enforceable by
criminal process, as is refusal to allow an inspection. Warrantless administrative
searches cannot be justified on the grounds that they make minimal demands on
occupants; that warrants in such cases are unfeasible; or that area inspection programs
could not function under reasonable search-warrant requirements. Probable cause
upon the basis of which warrants are to be issued for area code- enforcement
inspections is not dependent on the inspector's belief that a particular dwelling violates
the code but on the reasonableness of the enforcement agency's appraisal of conditions
in the area as a whole. The standards to guide the magistrate in the issuance of such
search warrants will necessarily vary with the municipal program being enforced.
Nothing here is intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even without a warrant, that
the law has traditionally upheld in emergency situations. On the other hand, in the
case of most routine area inspections, there is no compelling urgency to inspect at a
particular time or on a particular day. Moreover, most citizens allow inspections of
their property without a warrant. Thus, as a practical matter and in light of the Fourth
Amendment's requirement that a warrant specify the property to be searched, it seems
likely that warrants should normally be sought only after entry is refused unless there
has been a citizen complaint or there is other satisfactory reason for securing
immediate entry. Similarly, the requirement of a warrant procedure does not suggest
any change in what seems to be the prevailing local policy, in most situations, of
authorizing entry, but not entry by force, to inspect. Herein, Camara has been charged
with a crime for his refusal to permit housing inspectors to enter his leasehold without
a warrant. There was no emergency demanding immediate access; in fact, the
inspectors made three trips to the building in an attempt to obtain Camara's consent to
search. Yet no warrant was obtained and thus appellant was unable to verify either the
need for or the appropriate limits of the inspection. No doubt, the inspectors entered
the public portion of the building with the consent of the landlord, through the
building's manager, but the City/County does not contend that such consent was
sufficient to authorize inspection of Camara's premises. Assuming the facts to be as
the parties have alleged, camara had a constitutional right to insist that the inspectors
obtain a warrant to search and that appellant may not constitutionally be convicted for
refusing to consent to the inspection. It appears from the opinion of the District Court
of Appeal that under these circumstances a writ of prohibition will issue to the
criminal court under California law.
In RE: Umil, Umil vs. Ramos [GR 81567, 9 July 1990]
Roque vs. de Villa [GR 84581-82]
In RE: Anonuevo. Anonuevo vs. Ramos [GR 84583-84]
In RE: Ocaya. Ocaya vs. Aguirre [GR83162]
In RE: Espiritu. Espiritu vs. Lim [GR 85727]
In RE: Nazareno. Nazareno vs. Station Commander of Muntinlupa Police
Station [GR 86332]
Facts:
[GR 81567] On 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the
Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a
member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot
wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon
verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital
records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA
liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or
on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of
this verification, Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the
CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Dural
was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood
of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the 2 CAPCOM soldiers seated inside
the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot. As a consequence
of this positive identification, Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who
conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of
"Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority." (Criminal Case
C-30112; no bail recommended). On 15 February 1988, the information was amended
to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original
information, was still unidentified. Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for
habeas corpus was filed with the Supreme Court on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando
Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9
February 1988 and Fidel V. Ramos, Maj. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon
Montano, and Brig. Gen. Alexander Aguirre filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February
1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February 1988. On 26 February 1988,
however, Umil and Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against
them, and they were accordingly released.
Issue:
Whether Dural can be validly arrested without any warrant of arrest for the crime of
rebellion.
Held:
Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the 2
CAPCOM soldiers nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense
for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without
warrant is unjustified. However, Dural was arrested for being a member of the New
Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a
continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be
said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults
against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. The arrest of persons
involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing
non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in
the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of
immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore,
need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the
determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a
judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously,
the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing
persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other
milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture
is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of
society and its government and duly constituted authorities.
People vs. Sucro [GR 93239, 18 March 1991]
Facts:
On 21 March 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was
instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan)
to monitor the activities of Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi
that Sucro was selling marijuana. As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat.
Fulgencio positioned himself under the house of a certain Arlie Regalado at C.
Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a
chapel. Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio saw Sucro enter the chapel, taking something which
turned out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart found inside the
chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie
Borromeo. After a while Sucro went back to the chapel and again came out with
marijuana which he gave to a group of persons. It was at this instance that Pat.
Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported the activity going on P/Lt. Seraspi
instructed Pat. Fulgencio to continue monitoring developments. At about 6:30 P.M.,
Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later identified as
Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with Sucro. At that point, the team of P/Lt Seraspi
proceeded to the area and while the police officers were at the Youth Hostel at
Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and Sucro. P/
Lt. Seraspi and his team caught up with Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and
Maagma Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical Center. Upon seeing the police, Macabante
threw something to the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. When
confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from Sucro in front
of the chapel. The police team was able to overtake and arrest Sucro at the corner of
C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of
marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante. The
teabags of marijuana were sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, at Camp
Delgado, Iloilo City for analysis. The specimens were all found positive of marijuana.
Sucro was charged with violation of Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Upon arraignment, Sucro, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "not guilty" to the
offense charged. Trial ensued and a judgment of conviction was rendered, finding
Sucro guilty of the sale of prohibited drug and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment, and pay a fine of P20,000, and costs. Sucro appealed.
Issue:
Whether the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently, whether
the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.
Held:
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances
where arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states that "A peace
officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it;" An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an
officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when
the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created
thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. The failure of the police officers to
secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge acquired from the
surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search
warrant. What is paramount is that probable cause existed. Still, that searches and
seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. Among the
exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule
126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. Herein, police
officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had
earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused. Under the circumstances
(monitoring of transactions) there existed probable cause for the arresting officers, to
arrest Sucro who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize the contraband. Thus, as
there is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance with the
requirements of a warrantless arrest; ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest
are admissible in evidence.
People vs. Go [GR 116001, 14 March 2001]
Facts:
On 22 October 1992, at around 10:00 p.m., SPO1 Mauro Piamonte and SPO3 Candido
Liquido, members of the Intelligence and Follow-up Unit of the Calamba Police, went
to the police outpost at Crossing, Calamba, Laguna, to follow up an intelligence report
that methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, a regulated drug, was being supplied
there. Police civilian agent Ronnie Panuringan arrived and reported to them that he
saw Luisito Go, also known as "King Louie", enter the Flamingo Disco House with
two women. Panuringan said that he spotted a gun tucked in Go's waist. Together, the
three policemen proceeded to the Flamingo, which was located about a hundred
meters away from the outpost. When they arrived at the Flamingo, the police officers
informed the owner that they were conducting an "Operation Bakal," whereby they
search for illegally possessed firearms. The owner allowed them in and told a waiter
to accompany them. They went up to the second floor of the disco. The waiter turned
on the lights, and the police officers saw Go and his lady companions seated at a table.
They identified themselves and asked Go to stand up. When the later did so, the
policemen saw the gun tucked in his waist. SPO1 Piamonte asked for the license of
the gun, but Go was unable to produce any. Instead, Go brought out the driver's
license of a certain Tan Antonio Lerios. SPO1 Piamonte confiscated the gun, which
was later identified as a 9mm Walther P88, Serial Number 006784, with a magazine
containing 10 rounds of live ammunition. Go was invited to the police precinct for
questioning. On the way out of the disco, Go asked permission to bring his car, which
was parked outside. The police officers accompanied Go to his car, a Honda Civic
with license plate number TCM-789. Through the windshield, SPO3 Liquido noticed
a Philippine National Police identification card hanging from the rearview mirror. He
asked Go if he was a member of the PNP, and he said no. The police officers asked
Go for his driver's license and the registration papers of the vehicle, but he was unable
to produce them. When Go opened the door, SPO3 Liquido took the ID card and
found that the same belonged to SPO4 Zenaida Bagadiong. The police officers saw
pieces of glass tooters and tin foils on the backseat and floor of the car. They asked Go
why he had these items, but he did not say anything. Instead, Go suggested that they
talk the matter over, and intimated that he had money. SPO3 Liquido replied that they
should talk at the police headquarters. Go took out an attaché case from the car and
opened it. There were two black clutch bags inside. Go opened the first bag, which
contained shiny white substance wrapped in cellophane. The second bag contained
P120,000.00 in cash. The police officers brought Go to the police station. When they
arrived at the precinct, they turned over the attaché case together with the two black
clutch bags to the investigator. The investigator found eight cellophane bags
containing granules suspected to be shabu in one of the clutch bags. When the attaché
case was opened, the police officers found that it also contained three glass tooters, tin
foils, an improvised burner, magazines and newspapers. Consequently, two
Informations were filed against Go before the Regional Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna, Branch 34 (Criminal Case 3308-92-C, for violation of Article III of RA 6452
or the Dangerous Drugs Act; and Criminal Case 3309-92-C, for violation of PD 1866)
After a joint trial, the lower court rendered judgment convicting Go in the two
criminal cases, and sentencing him in Criminal Case 3308-92-C to a penalty of
imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day to 12 years and a fine of P12,000.00; and in
Criminal Case 3309-92-C to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. Go
appealed his conviction in Criminal Case 3309-92- C directly to the Supreme Court
(GR 116001). On the other hand, Go brought his appeal of the judgment in Criminal
Case 3308-92-C before the Court of Appeals. In an Amended Decision dated 21
February 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed Go's conviction but modified the
penalty imposed by the trial court by sentencing him, in addition to imprisonment of 6
years and 1 day to 12 years, to pay a fine of P6,000.00, citing Section 8 of RA 6425,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Go filed the petition for review
(GR 123943). The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
Issue:
Whether Go was legally arrested without warrant for illegal possession of firearms
and illegal drugs.
Held:
The constitutional proscription, that no person shall be arrested without any warrant of
arrest having been issued prior thereto, is not a hard-and-fast rule. The Rules of Court
and jurisprudence recognize exceptional cases where an arrest may be effected
without a warrant. Among these are when, in the presence of a peace officer, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been committed, and the
arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it. Herein, the police saw the gun tucked in Go's waist when he
stood up. The gun was plainly visible. No search was conducted as none was
necessary. Go could not show any license for the firearm, whether at the time of his
arrest or thereafter. Thus, he was in effect committing a crime in the presence of the
police officers. No warrant of arrest was necessary in such a situation, it being one of
the recognized exceptions under the Rules. As a consequence of Go's valid
warrantless arrest, he may be lawfully searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant, as provided in Rule 126, Section 12. This is a valid search incidental to the
lawful arrest. The subsequent discovery in his car of drug paraphernalia and the
crystalline substance, which was later identified as shabu, though in a distant place
from where the illegal possession of firearm was committed, cannot be said to have
been made during an illegal search. As such, the seized items do not fall within the
exclusionary clause, which states that any evidence obtained in violation of the right
against warrantless arrest cannot be used for any purposes in any proceeding. Hence,
not being fruits of the poisonous tree, so to speak, the objects found at the scene of the
crime, such as the firearm, the shabu and the drug paraphernalia, can be used as
evidence against appellant. Besides, it has been held that drugs discovered as a result
of a consented search is admissible in evidence.
People vs. de Guzman [GR 117952-53, 14 February 2001]
Facts:
Prior to the arrest of Danilo de Guzman, the Police Chief Inspector of the Cavite
Philippine National Police Command issued an Order of Battle listing the names of
the suspected drug pushers in Cavite City. Included therein was the name of de
Guzman. In response to the said directive, the Noveleta Police Station assigned SPO1
Arnel Cuevas to conduct surveillance at the Villamar Beach Resort. On 18 October
1992, SPO1 Arnel Cuevas spotted Danilo de Guzman at the Villamar Beach Resort,
but the latter stayed for only 30 minutes. Subsequently, he learned that De Guzman
was engaged in a drug sale that day and reported the same to headquarters. Pursuant to
his report, the Chief of Intelligence of their station, SPO2 Rowell Tendero, instructed
him to continue his surveillance of said beach resort with the hope of catching de
Guzman. On 26 October 1992, at around 9:00 p.m., de Guzman returned to Villamar
Beach Resort with companion Edsel Martin. They rented one of the resort cottages. 15
minutes later, SPO1 Cuevas climbed the ladder which he perched on the concrete wall
of the cottage. He, then, peeped through the window of the cottage and saw Danilo
and Edsel seated face to face while using shabu. He also saw on top of the table 3
plastic bags of shabu, a weighing scale and other drug related paraphernalia. SPO1
Cuevas hurriedly descended the ladder and hailed a tricycle and instructed the driver
to inform SPO2 Tendero to proceed to Villamar Beach Resort immediately. Shortly,
SPO2 Tendero, along with other police officers, arrived at the beach resort. However,
instead of rushing to the cottage of De Guzman and Martin, the police officers decided
to wait for them to come out of the cottage. SPO1 Cuevas explained that they did this
so as not to forewarn the two of their presence. Otherwise, the two might simply flush
the shabu down the toilet bowl and destroy the evidence. The police officers waited
the whole night for De Guzman and Martin to come out of the cottage. Finally, De
Guzman came out at around 7:40 a.m. the next day. SPO2 Tendero nabbed him upon
seeing that his waist was bulging with a gun. While Police Officer Vedar held De
Guzman, SPO2 Tendero went up the cottage to check on Martin. SPO2 Alfaro and
SPO3 Benavise, accompanied by a chambermaid and a boy from the resort, also went
up with him. Inside the cottage, the same paraphernalia which the witness saw the
night before were found, namely, 3 plastic bags of shabu, a plastic scoop, a burner, a
lighter, several empty rolled aluminum foils, 3 pieces of tooter, rubber band, several
pieces of paper, a black clutch bag containing a disposable lighter, 2 forceps, a pair of
scissors, a knife and a key holder with a knife, filter, sandpaper, electric plug, pocket
electronic weighing scale. De Guzman was brought to the police station for
questioning and detention. The police officers were without warrants of arrest or
search warrants at the time of the arrests and seizure of evidence. As the operation was
conducted largely during nighttime, the police officers were unable to secure the
necessary warrants for fear of leaving the place of surveillance. Subsequent forensic
examination by Felicisima Francisco of the National Bureau of Investigation showed
that the substance seized was indeed methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu
weighing 299.5 grams. In Criminal Case 39-94, De Guzman and Martin, the latter is
still at large, were charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). In Criminal Case 40-94, de Guzman was
charged with violation of Section 1, PD 1866 (Unlawful Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition). De Guzman was arraigned on 22 February 1993 with the assistance of
his counsel de officio. He pleaded "not guilty" to both charges. On 22 August 1994,
the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch 17, found de Guzman guilty of
violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic Act 6425 and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P50,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Furthermore, the trial court found him guilty of
violation of Section 1, Presidential Decree 1866 and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 20 years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay the costs in both instances. De Guzman
appealed.
Issue:
Whether de Guzman’s arrest and the subsequent seizure of drug paraphernalia inside
de Guzman’s cottage were legal even without issued warrants for those purposes.
Held:
The police officers' manner of conducting de Guzman's arrest was not tainted with any
constitutional infirmity. Despite word from their fellow officer, SPO1 Cuevas, that he
saw De Guzman sniff "shabu", they resisted the first impulse to storm the rented
cottage which could have caused them to seriously disregard constitutional
safeguards. Instead, the police officers waited for the needed opening to validly arrest
de Guzman. To their minds, it would be the arrival of drug buyers. As the situation
would have it, the arrest was necessitated by the presence of de Guzman with a gun
obviously tucked in his pants. Rule 113, Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court provides
that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." In this jurisdiction, the mere
possession of a firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended
to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition is a criminal offense
under PD 1866. De Guzman was caught by the police officers in flagrante delicto
while carrying a firearm without the necessary permit or license. Clearly, it was in
violation of PD 1866, Section 1, at the time of the arrest. Necessarily, the search
conducted immediately after De Guzman's arrest was valid. Rule 126, Section 12 of
the Rules of Court provides that "a person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant. The legal parameters of this rule limit its
application to instances when the search is made contemporaneous to the arrest and
within a permissible area of search." In this case, it was impossible for the police
officers to obtain a search warrant as they were merely on surveillance, and to do so
might abort any possible illegal activity that was taking place. Any attempt at leaving
the place may cause them to lose sight of the accused-appellant altogether. Second,
their presence in the area was not planned as they acted purely on a tip given by a
fellow officer. Further, there was not enough opportunity to obtain a warrant of arrest
or a search warrant as the surveillance was conducted from 10:00 p.m. up to 7:00 a.m.
The search conducted immediately after de Guzman was apprehended was made more
necessary by the presence of his companion inside the cottage which was just a few
steps away from where he stood. The presence of de Guzman's companion posed a
danger to the police officers' life and limb, hence, it became necessary for them to
locate him. Upon entry at the rented cottage, the police officers saw the shabu and
drug- related paraphernalia scattered on top of the table. Jurisprudence allows the
seizure of personality despite absence of warrant under the "plain view doctrine," so
long as the area of search is within the immediate control of the arrested person and
that the object of the search was open to the eye, as in the present case.
People vs. Gerente [GR 95847-48, 10 March 1993]
Facts:
At about 7:00 a.m. of 30 April 1990, Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo Echigoren
and Totoy Echigoren, allegedly started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in
Gerente's house which is about 6 meters away from the house of Edna Edwina Reyes
who was in her house on that day. She overheard the three men talking about their
intention to kill Clarito Blace. She testified that she heard Fredo Echigoren saying,
"Gabriel, papatayin natin si Clarito Blace." Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente
carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00 p.m. of the same day. Reyes
allegedly witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito
Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a
piece of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block
on the victim's head. Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a place behind the
house of Gerente. At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the
Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a
mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was
brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The
cause of death was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object.
Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and
Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took
place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two
roaches of marijuana. They were informed by Reyes that she saw the killing and she
pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito. The policemen
proceeded to the house of Gerente, who was then sleeping. They told him to come out
of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked
Gerente and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in
cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for
examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana. Only Gerente was
apprehended by the police. The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, are still at
large. On 2 May 1990, two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against him for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of RA
6425, and for Murder. When arraigned on 16 May 1990, Gerente pleaded not guilty to
both charges. A joint trial of the two cases was held. On 24 September 1990, the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, found Gerente guilty
of Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act 6425 and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for a term of 12 years and 1 day, as minimum, to 20 years, as
maximum; and also found him guilty of Murder for which crime he was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. . Gerente appealed.
Issue:
Whether the police officers have the personal knowledge of the killing of Blace to
allow them to arrest, and the subsequent searchly Gerente’s person, without the
necessary warrant.
Held:
The search of Gerente's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his
possession were valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest.
Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that
"A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When,
in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it;" The policemen arrested Gerente only some 3 hours after Gerente and
his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they
inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood
and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The
eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and
pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances,
since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts
indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest
Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a
warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did. The search conducted
on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid
arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court
which provides that "A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant." The frisk and search of Gerente's person upon his arrest
was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves,
for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless
he is first disarmed.
People vs. Sinoc [GR 113511-12, 1 July 1997]
Facts:
On 20 September 1991, at about 6:00 a.m., Isidoro Viacrusis, manager of Taganito
Mining Corporation, was motoring from the company compound (at Taganito, Claver,
Surigao del Norte) to Surigao City. He was riding on a company vehicle, a Mitsubishi
Pajero (DFX-397), driven by Tarcisio Guijapon. As Viacrusis and Guijapon were
approaching the public cemetery of Claver, they were stopped by several armed men.
The latter, identifying themselves as members of the New People's Army (NPA),
boarded the Pajero and ordered Guijapon to proceed. When they reached Barobo,
Surigao del Norte, the armed men ordered Viacrusis and Guijapon to alight, led them,
their hands bound behind their back to a coconut grove some 6 meters from the road,
and after making them lie face down on the ground, shot them several times. Viacrusis
miraculously survived. The driver, Guijapon, was not as lucky; he died on the spot. At
about 7 a.m. the following day, a secret informant (known as a "civilian asset") named
Boyet reported to the police Station at Monkayo, Davao del Norte that the stolen
("carnapped") "Pajero" was parked behind the apartment of a certain Paulino Overa at
the Bliss Housing Project at Poblacion, Monkayo. On instructions of the Station
Commander, a police team went to the place. They saw the "Pajero" and, their initial
inquiries having yielded the information that the man who had brought it there would
return that morning, posted themselves in such a manner as to keep it in view. Some 3
hours later, at about 10:30 a.m., they saw a man approach the "Pajero" who, on seeing
them, tried to run away. They stopped him. They found out that the man, identified as
Danilo Sinoc of Surigao del Norte, had the key of the "Pajero," and was acting under
instructions of certain companions who were waiting for him at the Star Lodge at
Tagum, Davao del Norte. Riding on the recovered "Pajero," the police officers
brought Sinoc to the Star Lodge only to discover that his companions were no longer
there. They later turned over Sinoc to the 459th Mobile Force, together with the
"Pajero." Sinoc, Vicente Salon @ "Dodong," Benjamin Espinosa @ "Benji," Jaime
Jornales @ "James," Victorino Delegencia @ Jun-Gren," and one Roger Doe @
"Ram" (at large) were charged on 23 January 1992. Only Sinoc and Vicente Salon
were arraigned, on 14 July 1992, the other accused being then at large. Assisted by
their respective counsel, both Sinoc and Salon entered pleas of not guilty and were
thereafter jointly tried. On 7 October 1993, the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City,
Branch 30, found Sinoc guilty beyond reasonable doubt in two cases jointly tried: one,
of the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder (under Article 267 in relation
to Articles 248 2 and 48 3 of the Revised Penal Code) — in Criminal Case 3564; and
the other, of the complex crime of kidnapping with frustrated murder (under Articles
267, 248, 6 4 and 48 of the same Code) — in Criminal Case 3565. In each case, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed on him. Salon, on the other hand was
acquitted inasmuch as conspiracy was not proven. Sinoc appealed.
Issue:
Whether the police officer had personal knowledge of the crime Sinoc committed to
allow them to arrest the latter without a warrant of arrest.
Held:
The law provides that an arrest without warrant may be licitly effected by a peace
officer, inter alia. "When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it." There is no question that the police officers in this case were aware that an offense
had just been committed; i.e., that some 12 hours earlier, a "Pajero" belonging to a
private company had been stolen ("carnapped") and its driver and passenger shot, the
former having died and the latter being on the verge of death. Nor is there any doubt
that an informer ("asset") had reported that the stolen "Pajero" was at the Bliss
Housing Project at Monkayo. It was precisely to recover the "Pajero" that a team
composed of SPO1 Michael Aringo and "joint elements of 459 PNP MFC and
Moncayo Police Station led by Insptr Eden T. Ugale," went to that place and, on
taking custody of the "Pajero," forthwith dispatched a radio message to "Higher
Headquarters" advising of that fact. There is no question either that when SPO1
Aringo and his companions reached the place where the "Pajero" was parked, they
were told by Paulino Overa, owner of the apartment behind which the vehicle was
parked, that the man who had brought the "Pajero" would be back by 12:00 noon; that
the person thus described did in fact show up at about 10:00 A.M., and was
immediately identified by Overa as "the one who rode on that car 'Pajero;'" just as
there is no question that when the police officers accosted him, Sinoc had the key to
the stolen "Pajero" and was in the act of moving toward it admittedly to take
possession of it (after having arrived by bus from Tagum together with another
suspect, "Ram"). Sinoc's link to the stolen vehicle (and hence to the kidnapping and
killing accompanying its asportation) was thus palpable. The foregoing circumstances
left the police officers no alternative save to arrest Sinoc and take possession of the
"Pajero." His arrest without warrant was justified; indeed, it was in the premises the
officers' clear duty to apprehend him; their omission to do so would have been
inexcusable.
People vs. Baula [GR 132671, 15 November 2000]
Facts:
On 13 December 1995, at around 8:00 p.m., Jupiter Caburao, allegedly decided to
follow his mother, Patrocinia Caburao, who had earlier left their house at Barangay
Siwasiw West, Sual, Pangasinan, to settle her due obligations at a store, about 1 1/2
kilometers away, owned by a certain Brigida Tumamang. While traversing the road
towards the store, Jupiter allegedly noticed a commotion near the creek about 10
meters away from him. He allegedly focused his flashlight towards the direction
where he heard the commotion and
saw Crisanto Baula and Danilo Dacucos in the act of hacking a person who was lying
on the ground, while Robert Baula and Ruben Baula stood as lookouts. The assault
allegedly lasted for about 4minutes. The Baulas and Dacucos allegedly fled but not
before they had threatened Jupiter with death if he were to divulge the incident to
anyone. Jupiter went near the lifeless body of the victim who turned out to be his own
mother. Her head and face sustained four hacking wounds, two of which damaged her
brain tissues. Jupiter rushed home and brought his niece and nephew to the house of a
neighbor for their safety. For fear of reprisal from the Baulas, et. al. and believing that
the police would be able to solve the gory killing on their own, Jupiter did not reveal
the damage to either his relatives or the police. About 2:00 a.m. of 14 December 1995,
the police authorities, led by SPO4 Fermin Mirande, went to the locus criminis, and
took pictures of the body of the victim. The investigation revealed that before the
victim was killed, she had been to Brigida Tumamang's store; that the Baulas, et. al.
were also at the store having a drinking spree; that the victim left the store between
7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m., and that, 15 minutes later, the Baulas, et. al. also left. SPO4
Mirande, with several policemen, repaired to the respective houses of accused-
appellants. The policemen asked Ruben Baula and Crisanto Baula for the clothing
they wore on the night of the murder. Ruben Baula gave his bloodstained pair of short
pants, and Crisanto Baula turned over his bloodstained polo shirt. The policemen next
went to the hut of Danilo Dacucos. Inside the hut, the group found hanging on the wall
a bloodstained bolo. The bloodstained pair of short pants, polo shirt and bolo, together
with the victim's dried blood samples, were sent on the same day to the National
Bureau of Investigation, Dagupan City Branch Office, for forensic examination. The
results of the examination disclosed that the bloodstains found in the bolo, the
bloodstains on the polo shirt and the bloodstains on the pair of short pants had the
same type "O" blood as that of the victim. On 7 August 1996, Crisanto Baula, Ruben
Baula, Robert Baula and Danilo Dacucos were charged with murder before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan. When arraigned, the
accused all entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. Trial shortly thereafter
ensued. The Baulas, et. al. denied their involvement in Patrocinia’s killing. The trial
court rendered its judgment on 17 November 1997, convicting Baula, et. al. of the
crime charged, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to
pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of Patrocinia Caburao (a) 50,000.00 for the death
of Patrocinia Caburao; (b) P15,000.00 for funeral expenses; (c) moral damages of
P75,000.00; and (d) to pay proportionally the costs. Baula, et. al. appealed.
Issue:
Whether the Baulas can be arrested without warrant for the killing of Petrocinia
Caburao, and whether seizures can be effected pursuant to such arrests.
Held:
The proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures is not absolute, and the
Court has had occasions to rule that a warrantless search and seizure of property is
valid under certain circumstances. There can, for instance, be a lawful warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rules 126 of the
Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; or seizure of evidence in "plain view,"
its elements being extant; or search of a moving vehicle; or consented search; or
customs search. The situation here in question, however, can hardly come within the
purview of any of the established exceptions. In a warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest, the arrest itself must have to be effected under the circumstances
enumerated by law. One such case is when an offense has in fact just been committed,
and the peace officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it. Danilo Dacucos, Crisanto Baula and Ruben Baula were not
being arrested at the time that the bloodstained bolo, polo shirt and short pants were
allegedly taken from them but were just being questioned by the police officers
conducting the investigation about the death of Patrocinia Caburao. The investigating
officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed
the crime. Being in no position to effect a warrantless arrest, the police officers were
thus likewise barred from effecting a warrantless search and seizure. The police
officers acted on a mere suspicion that Baula, et. al. could be responsible for the
commission of the crime and only because of their being at the store where the victim
was last seen. Mere suspicion cannot satisfy the requirement of probable cause which
signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is
guilty of the offense with which he can be charged. An illegal search cannot be
undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by that
search. The Court finds it less than credible the stance of the prosecution that the polo
shirt and short pants have been voluntarily given. An alleged consent to a warrantless
search and seizure cannot be based merely on the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty. This presumption by itself, cannot prevail against the
constitutionally protected rights of an individual, and zeal in the pursuit of criminals
cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors.
People vs. Cubcubin [GR 136267, 10 July 2001]
Facts:
At about 3:30 a.m. of 26 August 1997, Sgt. Rogel, desk officer of the Cavite City
police station, received a telephone call that a person had been shot near the cemetery
along Julian Felipe Boulevard in San Antonio, Cavite City. For this reason, a police
team, composed of SPO1 Malinao, Jr., PO3 Rosal, PO3 Estoy, Jr., PO3 Manicio, and
SPO3 Manalo, responded to the call and found Henry P. Piamonte slumped dead on
his tricycle which was then parked on the road. Police photographer Fred Agana took
pictures of the crime scene showing the victim slumped on the handle of the tricycle.
PO3 Rosal testified that a tricycle driver, who refused to divulge his name, told him
that Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin Jr. and the victim were last seen together coming out of
the Sting Cafe, located in San Antonio near the gate of Sangley Point, Cavite City,
about a kilometer and a half away from the crime scene. Forthwith, PO3 Rosal and
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. went to the cafe and talked to Danet Garcellano, a food
server/waitress in Sting Cafe. Garcellano described Cubcubin as a lean, dark-
complexioned, and mustachioed man who had on a white t-shirt and brown short
pants. Armando Plata, another tricycle driver, told PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr.
that Garcellano's description fitted a person known as alias "Jun Dulce." Armando
Plata, who knew where Cubcubin lived, led PO3 Rosal, SPO1 Malinao, Jr., and
Prosecutor Lu to Cubucubin's house in Garcia Extension, Cavite City. The policemen
knocked on the door for about 3 minutes before it was opened by a man who answered
the description given by Danet Garcellano and who turned out to be Cubcubin. The
police operatives identified themselves and informed him that he was being sought in
connection with the shooting near the cemetery. Cubcubin denied involvement in the
incident. PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked permission to enter and look
around the house. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said that upon entering the house, he noticed a
white t-shirt, bearing the brand name "Hanes" and the name "Dhenvher" written in the
inner portion of the shirt's hemline, placed over a divider near the kitchen. Upon close
examination, he said that he found it to be "bloodied." When he picked up the t-shirt,
two spent .38 caliber shells fell from it. PO3 Rosal stayed with Cubcubin while he
conducted a search. They then took the t-shirt and the two bullet shells. SPO1
Malinao, Jr. then asked Cubcubin to go with them to Sting Cafe for purposes of
identification. There, Cubcubin was positively identified by Danet Garcellano as the
victim's companion. The police investigators asked Cubcubin where the fatal gun was.
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said Cubcubin refused to tell him where he hid the gun so he
sought the latter's permission to go back to his house to conduct a further search.
Thereupon, SPO1 Malinao, Jr., accompanied by Prosecutor Lu, PO3 Estoy, Jr., PO3
Manicio, SPO3 Manalo, and PO3 Rosal, proceeded thereto. Inside the house, they saw
Cubcubin's 11- year old son Jhumar. PO3 Estoy, Jr. found on top of a plastic water
container (drum) outside the bathroom a homemade Smith and Wesson caliber .38
revolver (six shooter), without a serial number. He found the gun loaded with five live
bullets. PO3 Estoy, Jr. said that he inscribed his initials "RDE" (for Raymundo D.
Estoy) on the cylinder of the gun with the use of a sharp object. While PO3 Estoy, Jr.
was conducting the search, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. and PO3 Rosal stayed with Cubcubin in
the sala. The .38 caliber gun, the white "Hanes" t-shirt, and the two spent .38 caliber
shells were all photographed. Cubcubin was then taken to the police station, where he
was photographed along with the things seized from him. Cubcubin was charged for
the crime of murder. On 5 October 1998, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite
City, found Cubcubin guilty of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
death. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue:
Whether there was "probable cause" for PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr., the
arresting officers, to believe that Cubcubin committed the crime, to allow them to
conduct the latter's warrantless arrest.
Held:
Rule 113, §5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that "A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another." Under §5(b), two conditions must concur for a warrantless
arrest to be valid: first, the offender has just committed an offense and, second, the
arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it. It has been held that "personal
knowledge of facts' in arrests without a warrant must be based upon probable cause,
which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." Herein, the arrest of
Cubcubin was effected shortly after the victim was killed. There was no "probable
cause, however, for PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr., the arresting officers, to
believe that Cubcubin committed the crime. The two did not have "personal
knowledge of facts" indicating that Cubcubin had committed the crime. Their
knowledge of the circumstances from which they allegedly inferred that Cubcubin
was probably guilty was based entirely on what they had been told by others, to wit:
by someone who called the PNP station in San Antonio, Cavite City at about 3:30 a.m.
of 26 August 1997 and reported that a man had been killed along Julian Felipe
Boulevard of the said city; by an alleged witness who saw Cubcubin and the victim
coming out of the Sting Cafe; by Danet Garcellano, waitress at the Sting Cafe, who
said that the man last seen with the victim was lean, mustachioed, dark-complexioned
and was wearing a white t-shirt and a pair of brown short pants; by a tricycle driver
named Armando Plata who told them that the physical description given by
Garcellano fitted Cubcubin, alias "Jun Dulce" and who said he knew where Cubcubin
lived and accompanied them to Cubcubin's house. Thus, PO3 Rosal and SPO1
Malinao, Jr. merely relied on information given to them by others. Be that as it may,
Cubcubin cannot now question the validity of his arrest without a warrant. The records
show that he pleaded not guilty to the charge when arraigned on 11 November 1997.
Cubcubin did not object to the arraignment, and thus has waived the right to object to
the legality of his arrest. On the other hand, the search of Cubcubin's house was illegal
and, consequently, the things obtained as a result of the illegal search, i.e., the white
"Hanes" t-shirt, two spent shells, and the .38 caliber gun, are inadmissible in evidence
against him. It cannot be said that the .38 caliber gun was discovered through
inadvertence. After bringing Cubcubin to the Sting Cafe where he was positively
identified by a waitress named Danet Garcellano as the victim's companion, the
arresting officers allegedly asked Cubcubin where he hid the gun used in killing the
victim. According to SPO1 Malinao, Jr., when Cubcubin refused to answer, he sought
Cubcubin's permission to go back to his house and there found the .38 caliber revolver
on top of a plastic water container outside the bathroom. Thus, the gun was purposely
sought by the police officers and they did not merely stumble upon it. Nor were the
police officers justified in seizing the white "Hanes" t-shirt placed on top of the
divider "in plain view" as such is not contraband nor is it incriminating in nature
which would lead SPO1 Malinao, Jr. to conclude that it would constitute evidence of a
crime. Contrary to what SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said, the t-shirt was not "bloodied" which
could have directed his attention to take a closer look at it. From the photograph of the
t-shirt, it is not visible that there were bloodstains. The actual t-shirt merely had some
small specks of blood at its lower portion. Furthermore, there is no evidence to link
Cubcubin directly to the crime.
People vs. Rodrigueza [GR 95902, 4 February 1992]
Facts:
[Prosecution] At around 5:00 p.m. of 1 July 1987, CIC Ciriaco Taduran was in their
headquarters at the Office of the Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Bagong Ibalon,
Legaspi City, together with S/Sgt. Elpidio Molinawe, CIC Leonardo B. Galutan and
their commanding officer, Major Crisostomo M. Zeidem, when a confidential
informer arrived and told them that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited
drugs in Tagas, Daraga, Albay. Major Zeidem formed a team to conduct a buybust
operation, which team was given P200.00 in different denominations to buy
marijuana. These bills were treated with ultraviolet powder at the Philippine
Constabulary Crime Laboratory (PCCL). Sgt. Molinawe gave the money to Taduran
who acted as the poseur buyer. He was told to look for a certain Don, the alleged
seller of prohibited drugs. Taduran went to Tagas alone and, while along the road, he
met Samuel Segovia. He asked Segovia where he could find Don and where he could
buy marijuana. Segovia left for a while and when he returned, he was accompanied by
a man who was later on introduced to him as Don Rodrigueza. After agreeing on the
price of P200.00 for 100 grams of marijuana, Don halted a passing tricycle driven by
Antonio Lonceras. He boarded it and left Taduran and Segovia. When he came back,
Don gave Taduran "a certain object wrapped in a plastic" which was later identified as
marijuana, and received payment therefor. Thereafter, Taduran returned to the
headquarters and made a report regarding his said purchase of marijuana. Based on
that information, Major Zeidem ordered a team to conduct an operation to apprehend
the suspects. In the evening of the same date, CIC Galutan and S/Sgt. Molinawe
proceeded to Regidor Street, Daraga, Albay and arrested Rodrigueza, Antonio
Lonceras and Samuel Segovia. The constables were not, however, armed with a
warrant of arrest when they apprehended the three accused. The arrests were brought
to the headquarters for investigation. Thereafter, agents of the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) conducted a raid in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza, Don's father.
Taduran did not go with them. During the raid, they were able to confiscate dried
marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe, among others. The search, however, was not
authorized by any search warrant. The next day, Jovencio Rodrigueza was released
from detention but Don Rodrigueza was detained. [Defense] Don Rodrigueza, on the
other hand, claimed that on said date he was in the house of his aunt in San Roque,
Legaspi City. He stayed there overnight and did not leave the place until the next day
when his brother arrived and told him that their father was taken by some military
men the preceding night. Rodrigueza went to Camp Bagong Ibalon and arrived there
at around 8:00 a.m. of 2 July 1987. When he arrived, he was asked if he knew
anything about the marijuana incident, to which question he answered in the negative.
Like Segovia, he was made to hold a P10.00 bill and was brought to the crime
laboratory for examination. From that time on, he was not allowed to go home and
was detained inside the camp. He was also tortured in order to make him admit his
complicity in the alleged sale of marijuana. On 10 July 1987, Don Rodrigueza,
Samuel Segovia and Antonio Lonceras, for possession of 100 grams of marijuana
leaves and for selling, in a buy-bust operation, said 100 grams of dried marijuana
leaves for a consideration of P200.00. During the arraignment, all the accused pleaded
not guilty to the charge against them. The Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City,
Branch 10, found Don Rodrigueza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act 6425, as
amended) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P20,000.00 and costs. The court, however, acquitted Segovia and Lonceres.
Rodrigueza appealed.
Issue:
Whether the time of Don Rodrigueza’s arrest is material in determining his culpability
in the crime charged.
Held:
As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must generally be
authorized by a search warrant duly issued by the proper government authority. True,
in some instances, the Court has allowed government authorities to conduct searches
and seizures even without a search warrant. Thus, when the owner of the premises
waives his right against such incursion; when the search is incidental to a lawful
arrest; when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws; when it is
made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or
immigration laws; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view; or in cases of
inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and
building regulations, a search may be validly made even without a search warrant.
Herein, however, the raid conducted by the NARCOM agents in the house of Jovencio
Rodrigueza was not authorized by any search warrant. It does not appear, either, that
the situation falls under any of the aforementioned cases. Hence, Rodrigueza's right
against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated. The NARCOM agents
could not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the
situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had
already been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to
conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily could, have first secured a
search warrant during that time. Further, the inconsistencies made by prosecution
witnesses give more credibility to the testimony of Don Rodrigueza. While it is true
that Rodrigueza's defense amounts to an alibi, and as such is the weakest defense in a
criminal prosecution, there are, nonetheless, some evidentiary aspects pointing to the
truth in his testimony. Firstly, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest corroborates his testimony
that he was not among those who were arrested on the night of 1 July 1987. His co-
accused Segovia also testified that Rodrigueza was not with them when they were
apprehended by the NARCOM agents. Hence, Rodrigueza is acquitted of the crime
charged, due to the failure of the prosecution to establish its cause.
Go vs. Court of Appeals [GR 101837, 11 February 1992]
Facts:
On 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro
Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Rolito Go y Tambunting entered Wilson St.,
where it is a one- way street and started traveling in the opposite or "wrong" direction.
At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., Go's and Maguan's cars nearly
bumped each other. Go alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his
car. Go then boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant
was able to take down Go's car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at
the scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live
ammunition for a 9mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land Transportation Office
showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go. The following day, the police
returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect had come from;
they were informed that Go had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the
shooting. The police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by Go
from the cashier of the bake shop. The security guard of the bake shop was shown a
picture of Go and he positively identified him as the same person who had shot
Maguan. Having established that the assailant was probably Go, the police launched a
manhunt for Go. On 8 July 1991, Go presented himself before the San Juan Police
Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was
accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to
the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively identified Go as the
gunman. That same day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide
against Go with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed Go, in the
Presence of his lawyers. that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary
investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code. Go refused to execute any such waiver. On 9 July 1991, while
the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information could be filed
in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s). Accordingly, on 11
July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide,
filed an information for murder before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was
recommended. At the bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified that no
preliminary investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute and
sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. In the
afternoon of 11 July 1991, Go's counsel filed with the prosecutor an omnibus motion
for immediate release and proper preliminary investigation, alleging that the
warrantless arrest of Go was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been
conducted before the information was filed. On 12 July 1991, Go filed an urgent ex-
parte motion for special raffle in order to expedite action on the Prosecutor's bail
recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo
(Branch 168, RTC of Pasig City), who, on the same date, approved the cash bond
posted by Go and ordered his release. Go was in fact released that same day. On 16
July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to
conduct preliminary investigation and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in
the court be suspended. On the said date, the trial court issued an Order 9 granting
leave to conduct preliminary investigation and cancelling the arraignment set for 15
August 1991 until after the prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary
investigation. On 17 July 1991, however, the Judge motu proprio issued an Order, (1)
recalling the 12 July 1991 Order which granted bail: petitioner was given 48 hours
from receipt of the Order to surrender himself: (2) recalling and cancelling the 16 July
1991 Order which granted leave to the Prosecutor to conduct preliminary
investigation: (3) treating Go's omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary
investigation dated 11 July 1991 as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July
1991. On 19 July 1991, Go filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
before the Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order. Go also moved for
suspension of all proceedings in the case pending resolution by the Supreme Court of
his petition: this motion was, however, denied by Judge Pelayo. On 23 July 1991, Go
surrendered to the police. By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, the Supreme Court
remanded the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to the Court of
Appeals. On 16 August 1991, Judge Pelayo issued an order in open court setting Go's
arraignment on 23 August 1991. On 19 August 1991, Go filed with the Court of
Appeals a motion to restrain his arraignment. On 23 August 1991, Judge Pelayo
issued a Commitment Order directing the Provincial Warden of Rizal to admit Go into
his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same date, Go was arraigned. In view,
however, of his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court entered for him a plea of not
guilty. The trial court then set the criminal case for continuous hearings on 19, 24 and
26 September; on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22 November
1991. On 27 August 1991. Go filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of
Appeals. On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus.
The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, on the one hand, and the
petition for habeas corpus, upon the other, were subsequently consolidated in the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution
denying Go's motion to restrain his arraignment on the ground that motion had
become moot and academic. On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case
commenced. On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated
decision dismissing the 2 petitions on the grounds that Go's warrantless arrest was
valid and Go's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity attending his
arrest, among others. On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more
witnesses at the trial. Go's Counsel also filed a "Withdrawal of Appearance" with the
trial court, with Go's conformity. On 4 October 1991, Go filed the present petition for
Review on Certiorari. On 14 October 1991, the Court issued a Resolution directing
Judge Pelayo to held in abeyance the hearing of the criminal case below until further
orders from the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether Go was arrested legally without warrant for the killing of Maguan, and is
thus not entitled to be released pending the conduct of a preliminary investigation.
Held:
Go's warrantless "arrest" or detention does not fall within the terms of Section 5 of
Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that "A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be created has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section
7." Go's "arrest" took place 6 days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting"
officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time Go
had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected 6 days after the
shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been
committed" within the meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the "arresting"
officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that Go was the gunman
who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived
from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting -- one stated that Go
was the gunman another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate
number which turned out to be registered in Go's wife's name. That information did
not, however, constitute "personal knowledge." It is thus clear to the Court that there
was no lawful warrantless arrest of Go within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It
is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112 is also not applicable. Indeed, Go was not
arrested at all. When he walked into the San Juan Police Station, accompanied by two
(2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did
not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the implication
he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a
crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor,
the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine
whether there was probable cause for charging Go in court for the killing of Eldon
Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceeded under the erroneous
supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required Go to waive the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a
preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for Go was entitled to a
preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any
conditions. Moreover, since Go had not been arrested; with or without a warrant, he
was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the
preliminary investigation.
People vs. Calimlim [GR 123980, 30 August 2001]
Facts:
Lanie S. Limin was 14 years old and had been living with the family of Kagawad
Manny Ferrer and Cresencia Ferrer for the past 3 years. On the night of 2 April 1995,
she was left alone in one of the two houses of the Ferrers since her usual companions,
the sons of Manny and Cresencia, were out for the night (disco). The Ferrers were in
the other house about 15 meters away. At around 11:30 P.M., she was awakened when
she heard somebody, later identified as Manuel Calimlim y Muyano, enter her room.
Calimlim immediately poked a knife at the left side of her neck and said "Accompany
me because I killed my wife." She was then dragged to the pig pen, about 8-9 meters
away from the place where she slept. Afterwards, she was again forcibly taken back to
her room, then to her cousin's room and to the kitchen. In each of these places,
Calimlim forcibly had sexual intercourse with her while he poked a knife against her
neck. According to Limin, she first recognized Calimlim while they were in the
kitchen when she was able to remove the cloth covering his face. She stated that she
knew Calimlim because she had seen him always following her whenever she went to
school. Limin claimed that she did not struggle nor shout nor resist because she was
afraid that appellant might kill her. After the fourth intercourse, Calimlim threatened
that he would kill her if she reported the incidents. Despite the threat, she told her
cousin, Manicris Ferrer, who then reported the matter to Dr. Nancy Quinto who lived
nearby. The rapes were reported to the station of SPO1 Mario Suratos by Kagawad
Ferrer. Dr. Ricardo Ferrer conducted the physical examination on Lanie, and found
that there was minimal vaginal bleeding and there were lacerations in the hymen, the
positions of which were at 9:00 o'clock, 6:00 o'clock and 3:00 o'clock, all fresh,
indicating that there were insertions within the past 24 hours. There was also a whitish
vaginal discharge which was found positive for spermatozoa. Manuel Calimlim
denied the accusations. Calimlim was charged in 4 informations for rape in Criminal
Cases U-8525, 8638 to 8640. On 17 November 1995, the Regional Trial Court, First
Judicial Region, Branch 46, Urdaneta, Pangasinan found Calimlim guilty of 4 counts
of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death, to pay the offended party the
amount of P50,000.00 as damages, and to pay the costs, in each of the cases. Hence,
the automatic review.
Issue:
Whether Calimlim may raise the illegality of the warrantless arrest conducted against
him, especially as the arrest was made a day after the crime was committed.
Held:
Calimlim avers that his arrest violated Section 5 of Rule 113, 40 since his arrest was
made one day after the crime was committed, but without any judicial warrant,
although the police had ample time to get one. This he claims is also in violation of
Article III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution. But here it will be noted that Calimlim entered a
plea of not guilty to each of the informations charging him of rape. Thus, he had
effectively waived his right to question any irregularity which might have
accompanied his arrest and the unlawful restraint of his liberty. This is clear from a
reading of Section 9 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
provides that "the failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash
before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a
motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver
of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a),
(b), (g) and (i) of section 3 of this Rule." Given the circumstances of his case, the
exceptions do not apply here and the Court is constrained to rule that Calimlim is
estopped from raising the issue of the legality of his arrest. Moreover, the illegal arrest
of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. The defense's claim of warrantless
arrest which is illegal cannot render void all other proceedings including those leading
to the conviction of Calimlim, nor can the state be deprived of its right to convict the
guilty when all the facts on record point to his culpability.
People vs. Enrile [GR 74189, 26 May 1993]
Facts:
At about 6:30 p.m. of 25 October 1985, a buy-bust team composed of Pat. Jaime
Flores and Pat. Wilson Rances of the Quezon City Police Anti-Narcotics Unit was
dispatched to entrap Rogelio Abugatal at Roosevelt Avenue in San Francisco del
Monte, Quezon City. The plan was made on the strength of a tip given by Renato
Polines, a police informer, who was himself to pose as the buyer. On that occasion the
policemen saw Polines hand over to Abugatal the marked money representing
payment for the mock transaction. Abugatal left with the money and returned 10
minutes later with a wrapped object which he gave Polines. The two policemen then
approached Abugatal and placed him under arrest, at the same time confiscating the
wrapped object. Subsequent laboratory examination revealed this to be marijuana with
flowering tops weighing 22 grams. Upon prodding, Abugatal led the policemen to a
house at 20 De Vera Street, also in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, where he
called out for Antonio Enrile. Enrile came out and met them at the gate. Abugatal
pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana, whereupon the policemen
immediately arrested and frisked him. They found in the right front pocket of his
trousers the marked money earlier delivered to Abugatal. At the police headquarters,
Abugatal signed a sworn confession. Enrile refused to make any statement pending
consultation with a lawyer. Antonio Enrile y Villaroman and Rogelio Abugatal y
Marquez were charged for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act by the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. The RTC, after trial and on 14 February 1986, found Enrile and
Abugatal guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced them to life imprisonment
and a fine of P30,000.00. Both appealed. Abugatal, however, was killed in an
attempted jailbreak and thus the appeal is dismissed as to him.
Issue:
Whether the mark money found in Enrile’s possession, pursuant to a warrantless
arrest, search and seizure, provide for his criminal culpability.
Held:
It was Abugatal who was allegedly caught red-handed by the policemen as he sold the
marijuana to Polines. Enrile was not even at the scene of the entrapment at that time.
Abugatal said he did lead the policemen to Enrile's house where he pointed to Enrile
as the source of the marijuana. Even assuming this to be true, that circumstance alone
did not justify Enrile's warrantless arrest and search. Under Rule 113, Section 5, of the
Rules of Court, a peace officer or a private person may make a warrantless arrest only
under any of the following circumstances: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraphs (a) and (b) are clearly inapplicable. Paragraph (b) is also not in point
because the policemen who later arrested Enrile at his house had no personal
knowledge that he was the source of the marijuana. According to the policemen
themselves, what happened was that they asked Abugatal who gave him the marijuana
and were told it was Enrile. It was for this reason that they proceeded to Enrile's house
and immediately arrested him. What the policemen should have done was secure a
search warrant on the basis of the information supplied by Abugatal and then, with
such authority, proceeded to search and, if the search was fruitful, arrest Enrile. They
had no right to simply force themselves into his house on the bare (and subsequently
disallowed) allegations of Abugatal and bundle Enrile off to the police station as if he
had been caught in flagrante delicto. The discovery of the marked money on him did
not mean he was caught in the act of selling marijuana. The marked money was not
prohibited per se. Even if it were, that fact alone would not retroactively validate the
warrantless search and seizure.
210 People vs. Pasudag [GR 128822, 4 May 2001]
Facts:
On 26 September 1995, at around 1:30 p.m., SPO2 Pepito Calip of the PNP Sison,
Pangasinan, went to Brgy. Artacho to conduct anti -jueteng operations. He urinated at
a bushy bamboo fence behind the public school. About 5 meters away, he saw a
garden of about 70 square meters. There were marijuana plants in between corn plants
and camote tops. He inquired from a storekeeper nearby as to who owned the house
with the garden. The storeowner told him that Alberto Pasudag y Bokang owned it.
SPO2 Calip went to the Police Station and reported to Chief of Police Romeo C.
Astrero. The latter dispatched a team (composed of SPO2 Calip, SPO3 Fajarito, SPO3
Alcantara and PO3 Rasca) to conduct an investigation. At around 2:30 p.m., the team
arrived at Brgy. Artacho and went straight to the house of Pasudag. SPO3 Fajarito
looked for Pasudag and asked him to bring the team to his backyard garden which was
about 5 meters away. Upon seeing the marijuana plants, the policemen called for a
photographer, who took pictures of Pasudag standing beside one of the marijuana
plants. They uprooted 7 marijuana plants. The team brought Pasudag and the
marijuana plants to the police station. On 17 December 1996, 4th Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Pangasinan Emiliano M. Matro filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Pangasinan, Urdaneta an Information charging Pasudag with violation of RA 6425,
Sec. 9. On 10 February 1997, the trial court arraigned the accused. He pleaded not
guilty. Trial ensued. The Regional Trial Court, Pangasinan, Branch 46, Urdaneta
found Pasudag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal cultivation of marijuana and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00, without
subsidiary penalty and other accessories of the law. Pasudag appealed.
Issue:
Whether time was of the essence to uproot and confiscate the marijuana plants.
Held:
As a general rule, the procurement of a search warrant is required before a law
enforcer may validly search or seize the person, house, papers or effects of any
individual. The Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable." Any evidence obtained in
violation of this provision is inadmissible. Herein, the police authorities had ample
opportunity to secure from the court a search warrant. SPO2 Pepito Calip inquired as
to who owned the house. He was acquainted with marijuana plants and immediately
recognized that some plants in the backyard of the house were marijuana plants. Time
was not of the essence to uproot and confiscate the plants. They were three months old
and there was no sufficient reason to believe that they would be uprooted on that same
day. With the illegal seizure of the marijuana plants, the seized plants are inadmissible
in evidence against Pasudag.
People vs. Aminnudin [GR L-74860, 6 July 1988]
Facts: Idel Aminnudin y Ahni was arrested on 25 June 1984, shortly after
disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 p.m., in Iloilo City. The PC
officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and
finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for
investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later
taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana
leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him.
Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also
been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the
charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving
her after a "thorough investigation." The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only
against Aminnudin, who was eventually convicted, and
sentenced to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00.
Issue:
Whether there was ample opportunity to obtain a warrant of arrest against Aminnudin,
for alleged possession and transport of illegal drugs.
Held:
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the
prosecution, that they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the
bag he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had earlier received from
a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in
Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they received the
tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest (this was the declaration of the chief
of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr.), another two weeks and a third "weeks
before June 25." There was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge
after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the
averments of the government, Aminnudin was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime
about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest
allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked
to dispense with the obtention of the warrant. The present case presented no urgency.
From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least
two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The
vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information
they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause,
indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made
to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC
lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own
authority that "search warrant was not necessary."
People vs. Plana [GR 128285, 27 November 2001]
Facts:
On 23 September 1994, at around 10:30 a.m., Felix Lagud was walking at the feeder
road in Barangay Cobe, Dumarao, Capiz. He just came from his farm in Alipasyawan,
Dumarao and was on his way home to Poblacion Ilawod. A movement at about 50
meters to his left side caught his attention. He saw 3 persons who seemed to be
wrestling. He came nearer so he would be able to see them more clearly. From about a
distance of 20 meters, he saw the 3 men holding a girl while another man was on top
of her. The girl was being raped and she was later stabbed. Frightened that the
assailants would see him, Lagud ran away. He intended to go straight home but when
he passed by the house of Porferio Haguisan, the latter invited him for a "milagrosa."
Lagud obliged and stayed at the house of his "kumpare" until 2:00 a.m. On 26
September 1994, the victim, Helen Perote, was found dead by her brother and the
police in Brgy. Cobe, Dumarao, Capiz. The body was in prone position and was
already in an advance state of decomposition. Lagud identified Antonio Plana (@
"Catong"), Edgardo Perayra and Rene Saldevea as the three men who were holding
the girl while their fourth companion was raping her. At the time of the incident, he
did not yet recognize the fourth man who was on top of the girl. However, when he
saw Plana, et. al. at the municipal hall where they were brought when they were
arrested on 26 September 1994, he identified the fourth man to be Richard Banday.
On the other hand, per the post mortem examination conducted by Dr. Ricardo Betita,
Rural Health Officer of Cuartero, Capiz, the victim sustained the following injuries:
(1) Clean edges stab wound 2x5 cm left anterior chest; (2) Avulsion with irregular
edges wound 8x12 cm middle chest area; (3) Avulsion of the nose and upper lip
portion/area; (4) Clean edges wound or stab wound 2x5 cm epigastric area; (5) Clean
edges stab wound 2x5 cm left hypogastric area; (6) Clean edges stab wound 2x5 cm
hypogastric area; (7) Clean edges stab wound 2x5 cm left posterior upper back; (8)
Clean edges stab wound 2x5 cm mid upper portion of the back; (9) Clean edges stab
wound 2x5 cm left posterior back level of 8th ribs; (10) Clean edges stab wound 2x5
cm left back level of left lumbar area; (11) Clean edges wound 2x5 cm middle low
back area; (12) Clean edges wound 2x5 cm right low back area at level of lumbar
area; (13) Clean edges wound 2x5 cm left gluteal area near the anus; (14) Vagina:
Introitus can easily insert 2 fingers/Hymen with laceration 3 and 9 o'clock (old
laceration) and on the state of decomposition; and that the most probable cause of
death was massive hemorrhage or blood loss secondary to multiple stab wounds.
According to Dr. Betita, the victim died more than 72 hours already before the police
authorities found her body. An information was filed against Plana, et. al. for the
crime of rape with homicide before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15 of Roxas City
(Criminal Case 4659). At their arraignment, Plana, et. al. pleaded not guilty. On 23
November 1996, after due trial, a judgment was rendered by the trial court finding
Plana, et. al. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide. The
trial court imposed upon them the supreme penalty of death, and ordered them to pay
jointly and severally the heirs of the victim, Helen Perote, P25,000.00 as actual
damages and P50,000.00 as civil liability. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in not censuring the actuation of the police authorities in
detaining Plana, et. al. without benefit of Court filed information nor judicial order of
detention as well as violation of their constitutional rights during their so-called
custodial invitation and interrogation.
Held:
Plana, et. al. already waived their right to question the irregularity, if any, in their
arrest. They respectively entered a plea of "not guilty" at their arraignment. By so
pleading, they submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect
in their arrest, for the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over
their persons.
People vs. Conde [GR 113269, 10 April 2001]
Facts:
On 25 May 1992 at about 8:00 A.M., Apollo Romero was home sitting by the window
and drinking coffee when he saw 4 men in Santolan Street block the path of 2 Indian
nationals (bombay) on a motorcycle. Oscar Conde y Lutoc poked a gun at the two
Indians while his three companions (Alejandro Perez Jr. y Carsillar, Allan Atis y Abet,
and another unidentified man) approached and stabbed the Indians. Atis took the
goods which were being sold by the two Indians on installment. After the stabbing, the
four men fled from the crime scene towards Mabolo Street. PO3 Rodencio Sevillano
of the Intelligence and Investigation Division (IID) of the PNP, Kalookan City
investigated the incident. On 30 May 1992, the police arrested Conde, Perez and Atis.
Police recovered the weapons used in the robbery, when Felicidad Macabare, Conde's
wife, went to the police station to talk to Conde. These weapons were discovered
inside her bag after a routine inspection. Sevillano admitted, however, that they did
not have a warrant of arrest when they apprehended the accused. Nor did they have a
search warrant when they inspected Felicidad's bag and when they searched the house
of a certain Jimmy where they found the stolen items. Conde, Perez and Atis were
charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. The accused entered pleas of not
guilty. On 15 December 1993 the Regional Trial Court, Branch 129, Kalookan City
found Conde, Atis and Perez guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
the accessory penalties under the law, and to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs
of each of the victims, Sukhdev Singh and Biant Singh, in the amount of P50,000.00.
Conde, et. al. appealed. However, the counsel de parte for Perez, Atty. Jose M.
Marquez, failed to file brief for Perez, prompting this Court to dismiss his appeal. The
decision of the trial court became final and executory with respect to Perez. Hence the
present appeal concerns only Atis and Conde, who filed their separate briefs.
Issue:
Whether the illegal warrantless arrest, which was waived, is sufficient cause for
setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free of
error.
Held:
The arrests of Conde, et. al. came after the lapse of 5 days from the time they were
seen committing the crime. At the time they were arrested, the police were not armed
with any warrants for their arrests. Section 5 of Rule 113, of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure 27 enumerates the instances when an arrest can be made without
warrant, namely: (a) When, in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has
in fact just been committed, and
he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person
to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. None of the above
circumstances is present herein. Conde, et. al. were merely walking along Tandang
Sora Avenue and were not committing any crime. Neither can it be said that the crime
had just been committed as 5 days had already passed from the time of the robbery
with homicide. It cannot also be said that the arresting officers had probable cause
based on personal knowledge, as PO3 Sevillano admitted that they learned about the
suspects from Apollo Romero and certain unnamed informants. Further, the lapse of 5
days gave the police more than enough time to conduct surveillance of the appellants
and apply for a warrant of arrest. Clearly, the rights of Conde, et. al., provided in Sec.
2, Art. III of the Constitution 28 were violated. Unfortunately, they did not assert their
constitutional rights prior to their arraignment. This is fatal to their case. An accused is
estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing
of the Information against him before his arraignment. When they entered their pleas
on arraignment without invoking their rights to question any irregularity, which might
have accompanied their arrests, they voluntarily submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court and the judicial process. Any objection, defect, or irregularity
attending their arrests should had been made before they entered their pleas. It is much
too late for them to raise the question of their warrantless arrests. Their pleas to the
information upon arraignment constitute clear waivers of their rights against unlawful
restraint of liberty. Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause
for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free
from error. The warrantless arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void all other
proceedings including those leading to the conviction of the appellants and his co-
accused, nor can the state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the
facts on record point to their culpability.
Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate court [GR L-69809, 16 October 1986]
Facts:
In the morning of 22 October 1975, Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon
were in the living room of Pintor's residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal
of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal
of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed
conditions, Pintor made a telephone call to Laconico. That same morning, Laconico
telephoned Eduardo A. Gaanan, who is a lawyer to come to his office and advise him
on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon
Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to the request, Gaanan went to the office
of Laconico where he was briefed about the problem. When Pintor called up,
Laconico requested Gaanan to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a
telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Gaanan heard Pintor enumerate the conditions for withdrawal of the
complaint for direct assault. 20 minutes later, Pintor called up again to ask Laconico if
he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered "Yes." Pintor then told
Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money. Pintor called up
again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then
Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel
Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted
that Pintor himself should receive the money. When he received the money at the
Igloo Restaurant, Pintor was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
Gaanan executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard Pintor demand
P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the
affidavit of Gaanan to the complaint for robbery/extortion which he filed against
Pintor. Since Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without Pintor's consent,
Pintor charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated 22 November 1982,
found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act 4200.
The two were each sentenced to 1 year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the
decision, Gaanan appealed to the appellate court. On 16 August 1984, the
Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Gaanan filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether listening in an extension telephone renders one liable under the wire-tapping
law.
Held:
There is no question that the telephone conversation between Atty. Pintor and Atty.
Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words uttered were made between one
person and another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a public. It is
also undisputed that only one of the parties gave Gaanan the authority to listen to and
overhear the caller's message with the use of an extension telephone line. Obviously,
Pintor, a member of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed the alleged demand
for an P8,000.00 consideration in order to have his client withdraw a direct assault
charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office if he knew that
another lawyer was also listening. However, an extension telephone cannot be placed
in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in
Section 1 of RA 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or
cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension herein was not installed for that
purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory
construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular
clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts. Further, our lawmakers intended to discourage, through
punishment, persons such as government authorities or representatives of organized
groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to
intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users.
Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with
the use of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or others of similar nature. An
extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements. Gaanan thus is
acquitted of the crime of violation of RA 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-
Wiretapping Act.
Katz s. United States [389 US 347, 18 December 1967]
Facts:
Katz was convicted in the District Court for the Southern District of California under
an eight-count indictment charging him with transmitting wagering information by
telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston, in violation of a federal statute (18
U.S.C. 1084). At trial the Government was permitted, over Katz's objection, to
introduce evidence of Katz's end of telephone conversations, overheard by FBI agents
who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the
public telephone booth from which he had placed his calls. In affirming his
conviction, the Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the recordings had been
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, because "[t]here was no physical
entrance into the area occupied by [the petitioner]."
Issue:
Whether the Government’s eavesdropping activities violated Katz’ privacy (while
using a telephone booth).
Held:
The Government's eavesdropping activities violated the privacy upon which Katz
justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a "search and
seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment
governs not only the seizure of tangible items but extends as well to the recording of
oral statements. Because the Fourth Amendment protects people rather than places, its
reach cannot turn on the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
enclosure. The "trespass" doctrine of Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 , and
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 , is no longer controlling. What Katz sought
to exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye - it was the uninvited
ear. He did not shed his right to do so simply because he made his calls from a place
where he might be seen. No less than an individual in a business office, in a friend's
apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection
of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays
the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he
utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution
more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in
private communication. Further, although the surveillance in this case may have been
so narrowly circumscribed that it could constitutionally have been authorized in
advance, it was not in fact conducted pursuant to the warrant procedure which is a
constitutional precondition of such electronic surveillance.
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals [GR 93833, 28 September 1995]
Facts:
A civil case for damages was filed by Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City alleging that Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office,
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a
manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy." In support of her claim, Ramirez produced a verbatim
transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses
of litigation in the amount of P610,000. 00, in addition to costs, interests and other
reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case
was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by Ramirez. As
a result of Ramirez's recording, of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly
taping the confrontation was illegal, Garcia filed a criminal case before Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit
and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and
other purposes." Ramirez was charged of violation of the said Act, in an information
dated 6 October 1988. Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, Ramirez filed a Motion to
Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, particularly a violation of RA 4200. In an order dated 3 May 1989, the trial
court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with Ramirez that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense under RA 4200; and that the violation punished by RA 4200
refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the
communication. From the trial court's Order, Garcia filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of 19 June 1989. On 9 February 1990,
the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order
of 3 May 1989 null and void. Consequently, on 21 February 1990, Ramirez filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 19
June 1990. Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Whether the party sought to be penalized by the Anti-wire tapping law ought to be a
party other than or different from those involved in the private communication
Held:
Section 1 of RA 4200 provides that "It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any
wire or cable, or by using, any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie -talkie or tape
recorder, or however otherwise described." The provision clearly and unequivocally
makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.
The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, "even a
(person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another
without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" under said provision of
RA 4200. Further, the nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the
statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information.
What RA 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording
private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere
allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by
means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of RA
4200. Furthermore, the contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section
1 of RA 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning
of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity.
In RE Laureta [GR 68635, 12 March 1987]
Facts:
In almost identical letters dated 20 October 1986, personally sent to Justices Andres
R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Isagani A. Cruz, and a fourth letter, dated 22
October 1986 addressed to Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First
Division of the Supreme Court, in a stance of dangling threats to effect a change of the
Court's adverse resolution (in GR 68635: Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. IAC being
dismissed), Eva Maravilla Ilustre/Atty. Wenceslao Laureta wrote in part that "we are
pursuing further remedies in our quest for justice under the law. We intend to hold
responsible members of the First Division who participated in the promulgation of
these three minute-resolutions in question. For the members thereof cannot claim
immunity when their action runs afoul with penal sanctions, even in the performance
of official functions; like others, none of the division members are above the law."
True to her threats, after having lost her case before the Supreme Court, Maravilla-
Ilustre filed on 16 December 1986 an Affidavit-Complaint before the Tanodbayan,
charging some Members of the Supreme Court with having knowingly and
deliberately rendered, with bad faith, an unjust, extended Minute Resolution "making"
her opponents the "illegal owners" of vast estates; charging some Justices of the Court
of Appeals with knowingly rendering their "unjust resolution" of 20 January 1984
"through manifest and evident bad faith"; and charging Solicitor General Sedfrey A.
Ordoñez and Justice Pedro Yap of the Supreme Court with having used their power
and influence in persuading and inducing the members of the First Division of the
Court into promulgating their "unjust extended Minute Resolution of 14 May 1986."
Atty. Laureta reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the press, which was
widely publicized in almost all dailies on 23 December 1986, without any copy
furnished the Supreme Court nor the members who were charged. The issue of the
Daily Express of 23 December 1986 published a banner headline reading:
"ORDONEZ, 8 JUSTICES FACE GRAFT CHARGES" thereby making it unjustly
appear that the Justices of the Supreme Court and the other respondents were charged
with "graft and corruption" when the Complaint was actually filed by a disgruntled
litigant and her counsel after having lost her case thrice in the Supreme Court. On 26
December 1986, the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) dismissed Maravilla-Ilustre's
Complaint. In the Resolution of the Supreme Court en banc, dated 20 January 1986, it
required (1) Eva Maravilla Ilustre to show cause, within 10 days from notice, why she
should not be held in contempt for her statements, conduct, acts and charges against
the Supreme Court and/or official actions of the Justices concerned, which statements,
unless satisfactorily explained, transcend the permissible bounds of propriety and
undermine and degrade the administration of justice; and (2) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta,
as an officer of the Court, to show cause, within 10 days from notice, why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him for the statements, conduct, acts and
charges against the Supreme Court and the official actions of the Justices concerned,
and for hiding therefrom in anonymity behind his client's name, in an alleged quest for
justice but with the manifest intent to bring the Justices into disrepute and to subvert
public confidence in the Courts and the orderly administration of justice.
Issue:
Whether the letters addressed to the Supreme Court justices sre matters shielded bythe
constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy.
Held:
Letters addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their
judicial functions become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for
the entire Court. The contumacious character of those letters constrained the First
Division to refer the same to the Court en banc, en consulta and so that the Court en
banc could pass upon the judicial acts of the Division. It was only in the exercise of
forbearance by the Court that it refrained from issuing immediately a show cause
order in the expectancy that after having read the Resolution of the Court en banc of
28 October 1986, Maravilla-Ilustre and Laureta would realize the unjustness and
unfairness of their accusations. Ilustre has transcended the permissible bounds of fair
comment and criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice in her
letters addressed to the individual Justices; in the language of the charges she filed
before the Tanodbayan; in her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the
Supreme Court and/or the official actions of the Justices concerned and her ascription
of improper motives to them; and in her unjustified outburst that she can no longer
expect justice from the Supreme Court. The fact that said letters are not technically
considered pleadings, nor the fact that they were submitted after the main petition had
been finally resolved does not detract from the gravity of the contempt committed.
The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used as a
shield for contemptuous acts against the Court. Also, Atty. Laureta has committed acts
unbecoming an officer of the Court for his stance of dangling threats of bringing the
matter to the "proper forum" to effect a change of the Court's adverse Resolution; for
his lack of respect for and exposing to public ridicule, the two highest Courts of the
land by challenging in bad faith their integrity and claiming that they knowingly
rendered unjust judgments; for authoring, or at the very least, assisting and/or abetting
and/or not preventing the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and malicious
charges of his client, Ilustre, notwithstanding his disclaimer that he had absolutely
nothing to do with them, which we find disputed by the facts and circumstances of
record as above stated; for totally disregarding the facts and circumstances and legal
considerations set forth in the Supreme Court's Resolutions of the First Division and
en banc, as the Tribunal of last resort; for making it appear that the Justices of the
Supreme Court and other respondents before the Tanodbayan are charged with "graft
and corruption" when the complaint before the Tanodbayan, in essence, is a tirade
from a disgruntled litigant and a defeated counsel in a case that has been brought
thrice before the Supreme Court, and who would readily accept anything but the
soundness of the judgments of the Courts concerned, all with the manifest intent to
bring the Justices of this Court and of the Court of Appeals into disrepute and to
subvert public confidence in the Courts.
People vs. Albofera [GR L-69377, 20 July 1987]
Facts:
Sometime in June or July 1980, at about 4:30 p.m., Rodrigo Esma was tending his
onion farm located in Upper Bagong Silang, Managa, Bansalan, Davao del Sur, near
the place of Romeo Lawi-an, when Alexander Albofera called him and informed him
they would run after somebody. Esma acceded. Together, Albofera and Esma
proceeded at once to the house of Lawi -an. There Lawi-an told Albofera that the
forester was around making a list of people engaged in "caingin." Whereupon,
Albofera asked Esma to join him in going after the forester. The two were able to
overtake the forester, a certain Teodoro Carancio, at the lower portion of the road.
Carancio was taken to the house of Lawi-an where several persons were already
gathered, among whom were Lawi-an, a certain alias Jun, Boy Lawi-an, and Joel
Maldan. Once inside and seated, Albofera began questioning Carancio about his
purpose in the place. Carancio replied that he was there to inspect the "caingin" as a
forester. Albofera, Romeo Lawi-an, alias Jun, Boy Lawi -an, and Joel Maldan decided
to bring Carancio to the forest some 200 meters away from Lawi-an's house. Esma did
not join the group but remained in the house of Lawi-an. Not long after the group
returned to Lawi-an's house, but without Carancio. Albofera's hands, as well as alias
Jun's hands were bloodied. After washing their hands, Albofera warned everyone,
particularly Esma, against revealing or saying anything to any person or the military.
The following day, at about 9:00 a.m., Efren Sisneros was at his farm when Lawi-an
and Jun Menez passed by and called him. When Sisneros got near the two, Lawi-an
told him that the forester was already killed and warned him not to reveal this matter
to anybody otherwise he would be killed. The threat to his life caused Sisneros to be
cautious in not reporting at once the matter to the authorities. However, in June 1981,
Sisneros finally reported the killing of that forester to his brother Margarito, a CHDF
member in Bansalan. Sisneros asked that his identity be kept secret in the meantime
pending the arrest of Albofera and Lawi-an. The police authorities arrested Albofera
on 2 July 1981. Romeo Lawi-an was subsequently arrested on 4 July 1981. Also in
July, 1981, the two, shortly after their arrest, led the police authorities to the place in
Bagong Silang where they buried the slain forester, specifically in a hilly portion near
the forest where the trees were not quite big besides a coffee plantation, where the
authorities dug and recovered the cadaver. On 2 July 1981, Albofera executed an
extra-judicial confession before the Municipal Circuit Judge, stating therein that he
was forced to join the NPA movement for fear of his life; that said group had ordered
the "arrest" of Carancio which sentenced the latter to die by stabbing. In the course of
the trial, the prosecution presented a letter written in the Visayan dialect by Alexander
Albofera, while under detention, to witness Rodrigo Esma several days before the
latter testified on 20 October 1982. After trial, the the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XVIII, Digos, Davao del Sur, in Criminal Case 184, found the circumstantial evidence
sufficient to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt of both Albofera and Lawi-
an for murder, sentenced them to death, and ordered them to indemnify the heirs of
the victim in the amount of P35,000.00 "by way of moral as well as actual damages"
in its Decision of 5 October 1984. Hence, the mandatory review.
Issue:
Whether the Albofera’s letter to Esma should be excluded as evidence in light of
alleged unwarranted intrusion or invasion of the accused’s privacy.
Held:
Section 4, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (substantially reproduced in Section 3,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution) implements another Constitutional provision on
the security of a citizen against unreasonable search and seizure. The production of
that letter by the prosecution was not the result of an unlawful search and seizure nor
was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Albofera's privacy. Albofera
admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo Esma himself, who
produced and identified the same in the course of his testimony in Court. Besides,
there is nothing really self- incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that
Esma change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera's) favor.
Furthermore, nothing Albofera stated in his letter is being taken against him in
arriving at a determination of his culpability.
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals [GR 107383, 20 February 1996]
Facts: Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. On 26 March 1982, Zulueta
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and Martin's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks,
diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from
the practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed against her husband. Dr. Martin
brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against
Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. After trial, the trial court
rendered judgment for Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the
properties described in paragraph 3 of Martin's Complaint or those further described in
the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her
behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00,
as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the
costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to
be inviolable apply even to the spouse of the aggrieved party.
Held:
The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to
be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a
"lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." The intimacies between husband
and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the
other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person,
by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law
insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by
one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is
freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what
one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.
Deano vs. Godinez [GR L-19518, 28 November 1964]
Facts:
On or about 20 March 1956, Diogenez Godinez, as a responsible public school
official, wrote a letter to the Division Superintendent of Schools, his immediate
superior officer, in essence that "Dr. Trinidad A. Deaño, as the school dentist of
Lanao, required the teachers in the field to sign blank forms indicating therein a
contribution of P20.00 which she intended to be only for the dental-medical drive,
when she knew well that the drive included the Boy Scout Rally of the district; that in
view of the above, Dr. Deaño is a carping critic, a fault finder and suspects every
teacher or school official to be potential grafters and swindlers of the medical -dental
funds; and thus the lady dentist will not be welcomed in Lumbatan district next school
year as she did more harm than good to the teeth of the patients she treated. Deaño,
assisted by her husband Manuel Deaño, filed an action for damages against Godinez
before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte based on a communication sent
by the latter as district supervisor to his immediate superior, the Division
Superintendent of Schools. Trinidad claims that, with malice aforethought and in
disregard of proper decorum and accepted administrative practices, Godinez wrote the
aforesaid communication making therein statements which are contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy, and to existing rules and regulations, thereby causing
irreparable damage to her personal dignity and professional standing, for which reason
she asks that she be paid P30,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P1,000.00 as attorney's fees for bringing the present action. Godibnez
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the letter
complained of is a privileged communication and the action has already prescribed.
The motion was upheld, and the trial court dismissed the complaint. Deano appealed.
Issue:
Whether the letter in which the alleged defamatory statements appear partake of the
nature of a privileged communication.
Held:
The doctrine of privileged communication rests upon public policy, which looks to the
free and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in
some instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.
Public policy is the foundation of the doctrine of privilege communications. It is based
upon the recognition of the fact that the right of the individual to enjoy immunity from
the publication or untruthful charges derogatory to his character is not absolute and
must at times yield to the superior necessity of subjecting to investigation the conduct
of persons charged with wrong-doing. In order to accomplish this purpose and to
permit private persons having, or in good faith believing themselves to have,
knowledge to such wrong doing, to perform the legal, moral, social duty resulting
from such knowledge or belief, without restraining them by the fear that an error, no
matter how innocently or honestly made, may subject them to punishment for
defamation, the doctrine of qualified privilege has been evolved. Herein, the
communication denounced as defamatory is one sent by Godinez to his immediate
superior in the performance of a legal duty, or in the nature of a report submitted in
the exercise of an official function. He sent it as an explanation of a matter contained
in an indorsement sent to him by his superior officer. It is a report submitted in
obedience to a lawful duty, though in doing so Godinez employed a language
somewhat harsh and uncalled for. But such is excusable in the interest of public
policy. The letter sent by Godinez being a privileged communication, it is presumed
that it was sent without malice. It being a communication sent in the discharge of a
legal duty, the writer is not liable for damages.
Waterous Drug Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
[GR 113271, 16 October 1997]
Facts:
Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corporation
on 15 August 1988. On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum from
Waterous Vice President- General Manager Emma R. Co warning her not to dispense
medicine to employees chargeable to the latter's accounts because the same was a
prohibited practice. On the same date, Co issued another memorandum to Catolico
warning her not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting the
Purchasing Department, as this would impair the company's control of purchases and,
besides she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers. As regards the first
memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that her act was
"due to negligence," since fellow employee Irene Soliven "obtained the medicines in
bad faith and through misrepresentation when she claimed that she was given a charge
slip by the Admitting Department, Catolico then asked the company to look into the
fraudulent activities of Soliven. In a memorandum 9 dated 21 November 1989,
Waterous Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro warned Catolico against the "rush
delivery of medicines without the proper documents." On 29 January 1990, Waterous
Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an irregularity involving
Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Valdez talked to Ms. Catolico
regarding the check but she denied having received it and that she is unaware of the
overprice. However, upon conversation with Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana Pharmacy
Clerk, she confirmed that the check amounting to P640.00 was actually received by
Ms. Catolico. As a matter of fact, Ms. Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she opened
the envelope containing the check but Ms. Saldana answered her "talagang ganyan,
bukas." It appears that the amount in question (P640.00) had been pocketed by Ms.
Catolico. Forthwith, in her memorandum dated 31 January 1990, Co asked Catolico to
explain, within 24 hours, her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for
additional time to give her explanation, and she was granted a 48-hour extension from
1 to 3 February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she was informed that effective 6
February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she would be placed on preventive suspension to
protect the interests of the company. In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico
requested access to the file containing Sales Invoice 266 for her to be able to make a
satisfactory explanation. In said letter she protested Saldaña's invasion of her privacy
when Saldaña opened an envelope addressed to Catolico. In a letter 15 to Co dated 10
February 1990, Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check she received
from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also averred that
the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang from an earlier incident
between her and Co's secretary, Irene Soliven. On 5 March 1990, Waterous
Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memorandum notifying Catolico of her
termination. On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a
complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal suspension. In his
decision of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair
labor practice against Waterous. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because
Waterous failed to "prove what [they] alleged as complainant's dishonesty," and to
show that any investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without just
cause and due process. He thus declared the dismissal and suspension illegal but
disallowed reinstatement, as it would not be to the best interest of the parties.
Accordingly, he awarded separation pay to Catolico computed at one-half month's pay
for every year of service; back wages for one year; and the additional sum of
P2,000.00 for illegal suspension "representing 30 days work"; for a total of
P35,401.86. Waterous seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to
set it aside. In its decision of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of
the Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for
Catolico's dismissal from her employment. and thus dismissed the appeal for lack of
merit, but modified the dispositive portion of the appealed decision by deleting the
award for illegal suspension as the same was already included in the computation of
the aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35,401.86. Their motion for
reconsideration having been denied, Waterous filed the special civil action for
certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether Waterous’ act of opening an envelope from one of its regular suppliers is
contrary to the injunction against unreasonable search and seizure and a person’s right
to privacy of communication.
Held:
In light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one's person from
interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government. The Court finds no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs.
Marti that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true that the citizens have no
recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, such an invasion gives rise to both
criminal and civil liabilities. Herein, there was no violation of the right of privacy of
communication, and Waterous was justified in opening an envelope from one of its
regular suppliers as it could assume that the letter was a business communication in
which it had an interest. However, Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due
process requires that an employee be apprised of the charge against him, given
reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed amply opportunity to be heard and
defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee so desires. Ample
opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the
employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal
representation. Although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she
was dismissed from the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her
Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was ever
conducted after the issues were joined through said letters. The Supervisor's
memorandum spoke of "evidence in [Waterous] possession," which were not,
however, submitted. What the "evidence" other than the sales invoice and the check
were, only the Supervisor knew. Catolico's dismissal then was grounded on mere
suspicion, which in no case can justify an employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not
among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of
employment; and even the dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and confidence
must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims,
caprices, or suspicion. Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee,
to which class of employees the term "trust and confidence" is restricted. Thus, the
decision and resolution of the NLRC are affirmed except as to its reason for upholding
the Labor Arbiter's decision, viz., that the evidence against Catolico was inadmissible
for having been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of
communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures, which was set aside.
Silverthorne Lumber Co. vs. United States [251 US 385, 25 January 1920]
Facts:
An indictment upon a single specific charge having been brought against Frederick
Silverthorne and his father (of Silverthorne Lumber Co.), they both were arrested at
their homes early in the morning of February 25, and were detained in custody a
number of hours. While they were thus detained representatives of the Department of
Justice and the United States marshal without a shadow of authority went to the office
of their company and made a clean sweep of all the books, papers and documents
found there. All the employes were taken or directed to go to the office of the District
Attorney of the United States to which also the books, &c., were taken at once. An
application was made as soon as might be to the District Court for a return of what
thus had been taken unlawfully. It was opposed by the District Attorney so far as he
had found evidence against Silverthorne, and it was stated that the evidence so
obtained was before the grand jury. Color had been given by the District Attorney to
the approach of those concerned in the act by an invalid subpoena for certain
documents relating to the charge in the indictment then on file. Thus the case is not
that of knowledge acquired through the wrongful act of a stranger, but it must be
assumed that the Government planned or at all events ratified the whole performance.
Photographs and copies of material papers were made and a new indictment was
framed based upon the knowledge thus obtained. The District Court ordered a return
of the originals but impounded the photographs and copies. Subpoenas to produce the
originals then were served and on the refusal of the Silverthornes to produce them the
Court made an order that the subpoenas should be complied with, although it had
found that all the papers had been seized in violation of the parties' constitutional
rights. The refusal to obey this order is the contempt alleged. The Government now,
while in form repudiating and condemning the illegal seizure, seeks to maintain its
right to avail itself of the knowledge obtained by that means which otherwise it would
not have had.
Issue:
Whether the exclusion of papers acquired in illegal search and seizure applies also
their copies.
Held:
It is that although of course its seizure was an outrage which the Government now
regrets, it may study the papers before it returns them, copy them, and then may use
the knowledge that it has gained to call upon the owners in a more regular form to
produce them; that the protection of the Constitution covers the physical possession
but not any advantages that the Government can gain over the object of its pursuit by
doing the forbidden act, to be sure, had established that laying the papers directly
before the grand jury was unwarranted, but it is taken to mean only that two steps are
required instead of one. In our opinion such is not the law. It reduces the Fourth
Amendment to a form of words. The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition
of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used
before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean that
the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is
gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others, but the
knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way
proposed. The numberous decisions, like Adams v. New York (192 U.S. 585) holding
that a collateral inquiry into the mode in which evidence has been got will not be
allowed when the question is raised for the first time at the trial, are no authority in the
present proceeding, as is explained in Weeks v. United States (232 U.S. 383). Whether
some of those decisions have gone too far or have given wrong reasons it is
unnecessary to inquire; the principle applicable to the present case seems to us plain.
It is stated satisfactorily in Flagg v. United States (233 Fed. 481, 483, 147 C. C. A.
367). In Linn v. United States (251 Fed. 476, 480, 163 C. C. A. 470), it was thought
that a different rule applied to a corporation, on the ground that it was not privileged
from producing its books and papers. But the rights of a corporation against unlawful
search and seizure are to be protected even if the same result might have been
achieved in a lawful way.
People vs. Aruta [GR 120915, 13 April 1998]
Facts:
On 13 December 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as
Benjie, that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the following
day, with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a
team composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt.
Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin. Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac,
Olongapo City at around 4:00 p.m. of 14 December 1988 and deployed themselves
near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) building along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex
gasoline station. Dividing themselves into two groups, one group, made up of P/Lt.
Abello, P/Lt. Domingo and the informant posted themselves near the PNB building
while the other group waited near the Caltex gasoline station. While thus positioned, a
Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters BGO printed on its front and
back bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 p.m. of the same
day from where two females and a male got off. It was at this stage that the informant
pointed out to the team "Aling Rosa" who was then carrying a travelling bag. Having
ascertained that Rosa Aruta y Menguin was "Aling Rosa," the team approached her
and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked "Aling
Rosa" about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former. Upon
inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic
bag marked "Cash Katutak." The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory
Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. Aruta was then brought
to the NARCOM office for investigation where a Receipt of Property Seized was
prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves. Upon examination of the seized
marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas, Pampanga,
P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a Technical Report stating
that said specimen yielded positive results for marijuana, a prohibited drug. Aruta was
charged with violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 or the Dangerous
Drugs Act. Upon arraignment, she pleaded "not guilty." Aruta claimed that
immediately prior to her arrest, she had just come from Choice Theater where she
watched the movie "Balweg." While about to cross the road, an old woman asked her
help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the road, Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingo
arrested her and asked her to go with them to the NARCOM Office. After trial on the
merits, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted and sentenced her to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Aruta appealed.
Issue:
Whether the plea of “not guilty” during Aruta’s arraigment effectly waived the non-
admissibility of the evidence acquired in the invalid warrantless search and seizure.
Held:
Articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible
as evidence pursuant to the doctrine pronounced in Stonehill v. Diokno. This
exclusionary rule was later enshrined in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot simply intrude indiscriminately
into the houses, papers, effects, and most importantly, on the person of an individual.
The constitutional provision guaranteed an impenetrable shield against unreasonable
searches and seizures. As such, it protects the privacy and sanctity of the person
himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint. Therewithal, the right of
a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or
situation which allows exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest or search
warrant must perforce be strictly construed and their application limited only to cases
specifically provided or allowed by law. To do otherwise is an infringement upon
personal liberty and would set back a right so basic and deserving of full protection
and vindication yet often violated. While it may be argued that by entering a plea
during arraignment and by actively participating in the trial, Aruta may be deemed to
have waived objections to the illegality of the warrantless search and to the
inadmissibility of the evidence obtained thereby, the same may not apply herein for
the following reasons: (1) The waiver would only apply to objections pertaining to the
illegality of the arrest as her plea of "not guilty" and participation in the trial are
indications of her voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. 32 The plea and
active participation in the trial would not cure the illegality of the search and
transform the inadmissible evidence into objects of proof. The waiver simply does not
extend this far. (2) Granting that evidence obtained through a warrantless search
becomes admissible upon failure to object thereto during the trial of the case, records
show that accused-appellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence and
objected and opposed the prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence. As held in People
vs. Barros, waiver of the non-admissibility of the " fruits" of an invalid warrantless
arrest and of a warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be presumed, if the
constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its vitality for
the protection of our people. In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM
agents not to procure a search warrant considering that they had more than 24 hours to
do so. Obviously, this is again an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous
tree," hence illegal and inadmissible subsequently in evidence. The exclusion of such
evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter
and spirit of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
People vs. Rondero [GR 125687, 9 December 1999]
Facts:
On the evening of 25 March 1994, Mardy Doria came home late from a barrio fiesta.
When he noticed that his 9-year old sister, Mylene, was not around, he woke up his
parents to inquire about his sister's whereabouts. Realizing that Mylene was missing,
their father, Maximo Doria, sought the help of a neighbor, Barangay Kagawad
Andong Rondero to search for Mylene. Maximo and Andong went to the house of a
Barangay Captain to ask for assistance and also requested their other neighbors in
Pugaro, Dagupan to look for Mylene. The group began searching for Mylene at
around 1:00 a.m. of 26 March 1994. They scoured the campus of Pugaro Elementary
School and the seashore in vain. They even returned to the school and inspected every
classroom but to no avail. Tired and distraught, Maximo started on his way home.
When he was about 5 meters away from his house, Maximo, who was then carrying a
flashlight, saw Delfin Rondero pumping the artesian well about 1 meter away.
Rondero had an ice pick clenched in his mouth and was washing his bloodied hands.
Maximo hastily returned to the school and told Kagawad Andong what he saw
without, however, revealing that the person he saw was the latter's own son. Maximo
and Andong continued their search for Mylene but after failing to find her, the two
men decided to go home. After some time, a restless Maximo began to search anew
for her daughter. He again sought the help of Andong and the barangay secretary. The
group returned to Pugaro Elementary School where they found Mylene's lifeless body
lying on a cemented pavement near the canteen. Her right hand was raised above her
head, which was severely bashed, and her fractured left hand was behind her back.
She was naked from the waist down and had several contusions and abrasions on
different parts of her body. Tightly gripped in her right hand were some hair strands.
A blue rubber slipper with a tiny leaf painted in red was found beside her body while
the other slipper was found behind her back. Half an hour later, 5 policemen arrived at
the scene and conducted a spot investigation. They found a pair of shorts under
Mylene's buttocks, which Maximo identified as hers. Thereafter, Maximo led the
policemen to the artesian well where he had seen Rondero earlier washing his hands.
The policemen found that the artesian well was spattered with blood. After the
investigation, the policemen, together with Maximo, went back to their headquarters
in Dagupan City. There, Maximo disclosed that before they found Mylene's body, he
saw Rondero washing his bloodstained hands at the artesian well. Acting on this lead,
the policemen returned to Pugaro and arrested Rondero. Some policemen took the
newly washed undershirt and short pants of Rondero from the clothesline. The
policemen brought Rondero's wife, Christine, with them to the police headquarters for
questioning. When asked about the blood on her husband's clothes, Christine told
them about their quarrel the night before. On 28 March 1994, the hair strands which
were found on the victim's right hand and at the scene of the crime, together with hair
specimens taken from the victim and Rondero, were sent to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) for laboratory examination. Meanwhile, on 30 March 1994,
Rondero was formally charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide.
Rondero pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. As to the hair specimen sent to the
NBI, comparative micro-physical examination on the specimens showed that the hair
strands found on the right hand of the victim had similar characteristics to those of
accused-appellant's, while the hair specimen taken from the crime scene showed
similar characteristics to those of the victim's. On 13 October 1995, the trial court
rendered judgment convicting Rondero of the crime of murder and sentencing him to
death. Rondero moved for reconsideration. On 10 November 1995, the trial court
issued an order modifying its earlier
decision, convicting Rondero of the crime of homicide and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead, on the ground that under Section 10 of
Republic Act 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," the penalty for homicide is
reclusion perpetua when the victim is under 12 years of age. Rondero appealed.
Issue:
Whether the hair strands, undershirt and shorts taken from Rondero are admissible as
evidence.
Held:
Under Section 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution, what is actually proscribed
is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused-
appellant and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. For
instance, substance emitted from the body of the accused may be received as evidence
in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine forced out of the mouth of the
accused may also be used as evidence against him. Consequently, although Rondero
insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for
forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for
what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence
communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress. On the other hand,
the blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from Rondero are inadmissible in
evidence. They were taken without the proper search warrant from the police officers.
Rondero's wife testified that the police officers, after arresting her husband in their
house, took the garments from the clothesline without proper authority. This was
never rebutted by the prosecution. Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as
the "fruit of the poisonous tree," evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be
used to gain other evidence because the illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence
subsequently obtained. Simply put, Rondero's garments, having been seized in
violation of his constitutional right against illegal searches and seizure, are
inadmissible in court as evidence. Nevertheless, even without the admission of the
bloodied garments of Rondero as corroborative evidence, the circumstances obtaining
against Rondero are sufficient to establish his guilt.
Aberca vs. Ver [GR L-69866, 15 April 1988]
Facts:
The case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the
rights and liberties of Rogelio Aberca, Rodolfo Benosa, Nestor Bodino, Noel Etabag,
Danilo De La Fuente, Belen Diaz-Flores, Manuel Mario Guzman, Alan Jazminez,
Edwin Lopez, Alfredo Mansos, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Joseph
Olayer, Carlos Palma, Marco Palo, Rolando Salutin, Benjamin Sesgundo, Arturo
Tabara, Edwin Tulalian and Rebecca Tulalian by various intelligence suits of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM), ordered by
General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-
terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow
disturbances in Metro Manila." Aberca, et. al. alleged that complying with said order,
elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively
issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding
party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to Aberca, et. al.; that
Aberca, et. al. were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for
some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that
Aberca, et. al. were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that
military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of
violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in
order to punish them; that all violations of Aberca, et. al.'s constitutional rights were
part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and
incriminatory statements from Aberca, et. al. and to terrorize, harass and punish them,
said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver, Col.
Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col. Gerardo B. Lantoria, Col. Galileo
Kintanar, Lt. Col. Panfilo M. Lacson, Maj. Rodolfo Aguinaldo, Capt. Danilo Pizarro,
1lt. Pedro Tango, 1lt. Romeo Ricardo, 1lt. Raul Bacalso, Msgt. Bienvenido Balaba.
Aberca, et. al. sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to P39,030.00; moral
damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00;
exemplary damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of
P3,000,000.00; and attorney's fees amounting to not less than P200,000.00. Ver, et. al.
moved to dismiss. On 8 November
1983, the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 95, through Judge
Willelmo C. Fortun presiding, issued a resolution granting the motion to dismiss. A
motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a supplemental motion for
reconsideration was filed by Aberca, et. al. on 18 November 1983, and 24 November
1983, respectively. On 15 December 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily
inhibiting himself from further proceeding in the case and leaving the resolution of the
motion to set aside the order of dismissal to Judge Lising, "to preclude any suspicion
that he (Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the] aforesaid pending motion with the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge and to put an end to plaintiffs assertion that the
undersigned has no authority or jurisdiction to resolve said pending motion." This
order prompted Aberca, et. al. to file an amplificatory motion for reconsideration
signed in the name of the Free Legal Assistance Group [FLAG] of Mabini Legal Aid
Committee, by Attys. Joker P. Arroyo, Felicitas Aquino and Arno Sanidad on 12 April
1984. In an order dated 11 May 1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising presiding,
without acting on the motion to set aside order of 8 November 1983, issued an order
declaring the order of 8 November 1983 final against Aberca, et al. for failure to move
for reconsideration nor to interpose an appeal therefrom. Assailing the said order of 11
May 1984, Anerca, et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration on 28 May 1984. In its
resolution of 21 September 1984, the court dealt with both motions (1) to reconsider
its order of 11 May 1984 declaring that with respect to certain plaintiffs, the resolution
of 8 November 1983 had already become final, and (2) to set aside its resolution of 8
November 1983 granting Ver, et. al.'s motion to dismiss. On 15 March 1985, Aberca,
et. al. filed the petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether Ver, et. al., may be held civilly liable for undertaking invalid search and
seizures, or violation of Constitutional rights or liberties of another in general.
Held:
It may be that Ver, et. al., as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were
merely responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation
2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on 27 January 1981, and
in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre-emptive strikes against alleged
communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket
license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to
disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined
in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the
land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and
allegiance at all times. Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or
employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional
rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt Ver, et. al.
from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article,
provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or
other penal statute. This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from
pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor. However, in
carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be
observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. Article 32 clearly
speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly" or "indirectly" responsible for
the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the
actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under
Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or
injury caused to the aggrieved party. By this provision, the principle of accountability
of public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and assumes a
larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his
duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to
answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally
protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people
power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the government was
callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of
human rights. While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human
rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should
nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code
makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the
transgression joint tortfeasors. Further, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus does not destroy Aberca, et. al.'s right and cause of action for damages
for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The
suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is
suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through
the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. Furthermore,
their right and cause of action for damages are explicitly recognized in P.D. No. 1755
which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to its text:
"However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-
delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving
the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest,
detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year."
Thus, even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
suspends Aberca, et. al.'s right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it
does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered
because of Ver, et. al.'s confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their
right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.
Miranda vs. Arizona [384 US 436, 13 June 1966]
Facts:
[No. 759; Miranda vs. Arizona] On 13 March 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested at
his home and taken in custody to a Phoenix police station. He was there identified by
the complaining witness. The police then took him to "Interrogation Room No. 2" of
the detective bureau. There he was questioned by two police officers. The officers did
not advise Miranda that he had a right to have an attorney present. Two hours later,
the officers emerged from the interrogation room with a written confession signed by
Miranda. At the top of the statement was a typed paragraph stating that the confession
was made voluntarily, without threats or promises of immunity and "with full
knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used
against me." At his trial before a jury, the written confession was admitted into
evidence over the objection of defense counsel, and the officers testified to the prior
oral confession made by Miranda during the interrogation. Miranda was found guilty
of kidnapping and rape. He was sentenced to 20 to 30 years' imprisonment on each
count, the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona
held that Miranda's constitutional rights were not violated in obtaining the confession
and affirmed the conviction. In reaching its decision, the court emphasized heavily the
fact that Miranda did not specifically request counsel.
[No. 760, Vignera vs. New York] Michael Vignera, was picked up by New York
police on 14 October 1960, in connection with the robbery three days earlier of a
Brooklyn dress shop. They took him to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters in
Manhattan. Sometime thereafter he was taken to the 66th Detective Squad. While at
the 66th Detective Squad, Vignera was identified by the store owner and a saleslady
as the man who robbed the dress shop. At about 3 p. m. he was formally arrested. The
police then transported him to still another station, the 70th Precinct in Brooklyn, "for
detention." At 11 p. m. Vignera was questioned by an assistant district attorney in the
presence of a hearing reporter who transcribed the questions and Vignera's answers.
This verbatim account of these proceedings contains no statement of any warnings
given by the assistant district attorney. At Vignera's trial on a charge of first degree
robbery, the detective testified as to the oral confession. The transcription of the
statement taken was also introduced in evidence. Vignera was found guilty of first
degree robbery. He was subsequently adjudged a third-felony offender and sentenced
to 30 to 60 years' imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed without opinion by the
Appellate Division, Second Department, and by the Court of Appeals, also without
opinion, remittitur amended. In argument to the Court of Appeals, the State contended
that Vignera had no constitutional right to be advised of his right to counsel or his
privilege against self-incrimination.
[No. 761, Westover vs. United States] At approximately 9:45 p. m. on 20 March 1963,
Carl Calvin Westover was arrested by local police in Kansas City as a suspect in two
Kansas City robberies. A report was also received from the FBI that he was wanted on
a felony charge in California. The local authorities took him to a police station and
placed him in a line-up on the local charges, and at about 11:45 p. m. he was booked.
Kansas City police interrogated Westover on the night of his arrest. He denied any
knowledge of criminal activities. The next day local officers interrogated him again
throughout the morning. Shortly before noon they informed the FBI that they were
through interrogating Westover and that the FBI could proceed to interrogate him.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that Westover was ever given any warning as
to his rights by local police. At noon, three special agents of the FBI continued the
interrogation in a private interview room of the Kansas City Police Department, this
time with respect to the robbery of a savings and loan association and a bank in
Sacramento, California. After two or two and one-half hours, Westover signed
separate confessions to each of these two robberies which had been prepared by one of
the agents during the interrogation. At trial one of the agents testified, and a paragraph
on each of the statements states, that the agents advised Westover that he did not have
to make a statement, that any statement he made could be used against him, and that
he had the right to see an attorney. Westover was tried by a jury in federal court and
convicted of the California robberies. His statements were introduced at trial. He was
sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run
consecutively. On appeal, the conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.
[No. 584, California vs. Stewart] In the course of investigating a series of purse-snatch
robberies in which one of the victims had died of injuries inflicted by her assailant,
Roy Allen Stewart was pointed out to Los Angeles police as the endorser of dividend
checks taken in one of the robberies. At about 7:15 p. m., 31 January 1963, police
officers went to Stewart's house and arrested him. One of the officers asked Stewart if
they could search the house, to which he replied, "Go ahead." The search turned up
various items taken from the five robbery victims. At the time of Stewart's arrest,
police also arrested Stewart's wife and three other persons who were visiting him.
These four were jailed along with Stewart and were interrogated. Stewart was taken to
the University Station of the Los Angeles Police Department where he was placed in a
cell. During the next five days, police interrogated Stewart on nine different
occasions. Except during the first interrogation session, when he was confronted with
an accusing witness, Stewart was isolated with his interrogators. During the ninth
interrogation session, Stewart admitted that he had robbed the deceased and stated that
he had not meant to hurt her. Police then brought Stewart before a magistrate for the
first time. Since there was no evidence to connect them with any crime, the police
then released the other four persons arrested with him. Nothing in the record
specifically indicates whether Stewart was or was not advised of his right to remain
silent or his right to counsel. In a number of instances, however, the interrogating
officers were asked to recount everything that was said during the interrogations.
None indicated that Stewart was ever advised of his rights. Stewart was charged with
kidnapping to commit robbery, rape, and murder. At his trial, transcripts of the first
interrogation and the confession at the last interrogation were introduced in evidence.
The jury found Stewart guilty of robbery and first degree murder and fixed the penalty
as death. On appeal, the Supreme Court of California reversed.
Issue:
Whether the written confessions made in uncounselled interrogation, with the accused
not appraised of his right to consult with an attorney and to have one during the
inerrogation, nor his right not to be compelled to incriminate himself, are not
admissible as evidence.
Held:
In No. 759, from the testimony of the officers and by the admission of the State of
Arizona, it is clear that Miranda was not in any way apprised of his right to consult
with an attorney and to have one present during the interrogation, nor was his right not
to be compelled to incriminate himself effectively protected in any other manner.
Without these warnings the statements were inadmissible. The mere fact that he
signed a statement which contained a typed-in clause stating that he had "full
knowledge" of his "legal rights" does not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver
required to relinquish constitutional rights.
Similarly in No. 760, Vignera was not warned of any of his rights before the
questioning by the detective and by the assistant district attorney. No other steps were
taken to protect these rights. Thus he was not effectively apprised of his Fifth
Amendment privilege or of his right to have counsel present and his statements are
inadmissible. In No. 761, there is nothing in the facts that Westover knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to remain silent and his right to consult with counsel
prior to the time he made the statement. At the time the FBI agents began questioning
Westover, he had been in custody for over 14 hours and had been interrogated at
length during that period. The FBI interrogation began immediately upon the
conclusion of the interrogation by Kansas City police and was conducted in local
police headquarters. There is no evidence of any warning given prior to the FBI
interrogation nor is there any evidence of an articulated waiver of rights after the FBI
commenced its interrogation. The record simply shows that the defendant did in fact
confess a short time after being turned over to the FBI following interrogation by local
police. Despite the fact that the FBI agents gave warnings at the outset of their
interview, from Westover's point of view the warnings came at the end of the
interrogation process. In these circumstances an intelligent waiver of constitutional
rights cannot be assumed. Law enforcement authorities are not precluded from
questioning any individual who has been held for a period of time by other authorities
and interrogated by them without appropriate warnings. A different case would be
presented if an accused were taken into custody by the second authority, removed both
in time and place from his original surroundings, and then adequately advised of his
rights and given an opportunity to exercise them. Lastly in No. 584, In dealing with
custodial interrogation, the Court will not presume that a defendant has been
effectively apprised of his rights and that his privilege against self-incrimination has
been adequately safeguarded on a record that does not show that any warnings have
been given or that any effective alternative has been employed. Nor can a knowing
and intelligent waiver of these rights be assumed on a silent record. Furthermore,
Stewart's steadfast denial of the alleged offenses through eight of the nine
interrogations over a period of five days is subject to no other construction than that
he was compelled by persistent interrogation to forgo his Fifth Amendment privilege.
People vs. Lugod [GR 136253, 21 February 2001]
Facts:
On 15 September 1997 at around 7:00 p.m., Helen Ramos was asleep in her house
together with her husband (Danilo Ramos) and children, Nimrod, Neres and Nairube,
the victim. Nairube slept close to her "on the upper part" of her body. At around 12:30
a.m., her husband woke her up because he sensed someone going down the stairs of
their house. She noticed that Nairube was no longer in the place where she was
sleeping but she assumed that Nairube merely answered the call of nature. Nairube's
blanket was also no longer at the place she slept but that her slippers were still there.
After three minutes of waiting for Nairube's return, she stood up and began calling out
for Nairube but there was no answer. Thereafter, she went downstairs and saw that the
backdoor of their house was open. She went outside through the backdoor to see if
Nairube was there but she was not. She found a pair of rubber slippers on top of a
wooden bench outside of her backdoor. The sole of the slippers was red while the
strap was a combination of yellow and white; said slippers did not belong to any
member of her family. Thereafter, she proceeded to the house of Alma Diaz to ask her
for help. Then, in the morning of 16 September 1997, she went to the police station to
report the loss of her child. She also reported the discovery of the pair of slippers to
SP02 Quirino Gallardo. She then went home while the police began their search for
Nairube. At around 12:30 p.m., Alma Diaz requested her to go with the searching
team. During the search, Alma Diaz found a panty which she recognized as that of her
daughter. After seeing the panty, she cried. She was thereafter ordered to go home
while the others continued the search. Thereafter, they continued the search and found
a black collared T-shirt with buttons in front and piping at the end of the sleeve
hanging on a guava twig. Alma Diaz gave the shirt to SP02 Gallardo. Loreto Veloria
informed him that the two items were worn by Clemente John Lugod when he went to
the house of Violeta Cabuhat. At around 7:00 p.m., SP02 Gallardo apprehended
Lugod on the basis of the pair of slippers and the black T-shirt. He then brought
Lugod to the police station where he was temporarily incarcerated. At first, the
accused denied that he did anything to Nairube but after he told him what happened to
the girl. Later, although he admitted to having raped and killed Nairube, Lugud
refused to make a statement regarding the same. After having been informed that the
body of Nairube was in the grassy area, Gallardo together with other members of the
PNP, the Crime Watch and the townspeople continued the search but they were still
not able to find the body of Nairube. It was only when they brought Lugod to Villa
Anastacia to point out the location of the cadaver, on 18 September 1997, that they
found the body of Nairube. On 10 October 1997, Lugod was charged for rape with
homicide. Upon arraignment, Lugod with the assistance of counsel entered a plea of
not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. On 8 October 1998, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna found Lugod guilty beyond reasonable doubt, sentenced
him to death, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Nairube Ramos the
sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death and P37,200.00 as actual damages.
Hence, the automatic review.
Issue:
Whether Lugod’s confession and subesequent act of pointing the location of the
Nairube’s body may be used against him as evidence.
Held:
Records reveal that Lugod was not informed of his right to remain silent and to
counsel, and that if he cannot afford to have counsel of his choice, he would be
provided with one. Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that he intended to
waive these rights. Besides, even if he did waive these rights, in order to be valid, the
waiver must be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently,
Lugod's act of confessing to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and killed Nairube without
the assistance of counsel cannot be used against him for having transgressed Lugod's
rights under the Bill of Rights. This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot
be disregarded or ignored no matter how brutal the crime committed may be. In the
same vein, Lugod's act in pointing out the location of the body of Nairube was also
elicited in violation of the Lugod's right to remain silent. The same was an integral
part of the- uncounselled confession and is considered a fruit of the poisonous tree.
Even if we were to assume that Lugod was not yet under interrogation and thus not
entitled to his constitutional rights at the time he was brought to the police station,
Lugod's acts subsequent to his apprehension cannot be characterized as having been
voluntarily made considering the peculiar circumstances surrounding his detention.
His confession was elicited by SPO2 Gallardo who promised him that he would help
him if he told the truth. Furthermore, when ugod allegedly pointed out the body of the
victim, SPO2 Gallardo, the whole police force as well as nearly 100 of the
townspeople of Cavinti escorted him there. Ricardo Vida stated that the townspeople
were antagonistic towards Lugod and wanted to hurt him. The atmosphere from the
time Lugod was apprehended and taken to the police station up until the time he was
alleged to have pointed out the location of the body of the victim was highly
intimidating and was not conducive to a spontaneous response. Amidst such a highly
coercive atmosphere, Lugod's claim that he was beaten up and maltreated by the
police officers raises a very serious doubt as to the voluntariness of his alleged
confession. The Vice-Mayor, who testified that when he visited Lugod in the jail cell,
he noticed that Lugod had bruises on his face, corroborated Lugod's assertion that he
was maltreated. Considering that the confession of Lugod cannot be used against him,
the only remaining evidence which was established by the prosecution is the fact that
several persons testified having seen Lugod the night before the murder of Nairube
and on several other occasions wearing the rubber slippers and black T-shirt found at
the house of the victim and Villa Anastacia respectively as well as the testimony of
Romualdo Ramos, the tricycle driver who stated that he saw Lugod in the early
morning of 16 September 1997 leaving Villa Anastacia without a T-shirt and without
slippers. These pieces of evidence are circumstantial in nature. The combination of the
above- mentioned circumstances does not lead to the irrefutably logical conclusion
that Lugod raped and murdered Nairube. At most, these circumstances, taken with the
testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, merely establish Lugod's whereabouts
on that fateful evening and places Lugod at the scene of the crime and nothing more.
Lugod was acquitted.
People vs. Del Rosario [GR 127755, 14 April 1999]
Facts:
On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m., Paul Vincent Alonzo stopped his
tricycle by the side of Nita's Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when
three women flagged him. Parked at a distance of about 1½ meters in front of him was
a tricycle driven by Joselito del Rosario y Pascual. At that point, Alonzo saw 2 men
and a woman (Virginia Bernas) grappling for possession of a bag. After taking hold of
the bag one of the two men (Ernesto "Jun" Marquez) armed with a gun started chasing
a man who was trying to help the woman, while the other snatcher ("Dodong" Bisaya)
kicked the woman sending her to the ground. Soon after, the armed man returned and
while the woman was still on the ground he shot her on the head. The bag taken by the
man was brought to the tricycle of del Rosario where someone inside (Virgilio "Boy"
Santos) received the bag. The armed man then sat behind the driver while his
companion entered the sidecar. When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase and
was able to get the plate number of the tricycle. He also recognized the driver, after
which he went to the nearest police headquarters and reported the incident. Upon
finding the name of the owner of the tricycle, SP04 Geronimo de Leon and his team
proceeded to Bakod Bayan in the house of the barangay captain where the owner of
the tricycle was summoned and who in turn revealed the driver's name and was invited
for interview. Del Rosario volunteered to name his passengers on 13 May 1996. On
the way to the police station, del Rosario informed them of the bag and lunch kit's
location and the place where the hold-uppers may be found and they reported these
findings to their officers, Capt. Biag and Capt. Cruz. After lunch, they proceeded to
Brgy. Dicarma composed of 15 armed men where a shoot-out transpired that lasted
from 1:00 to 4:00 p.m. After a brief encounter, they went inside the house where they
found Marquez dead holding a magazine and a gun. While all of these were
happening, del Rosario was at the back of the school, handcuffed by the police
because allegedly they had already gathered enough evidence against him and they
were afraid that he might attempt to escape. After the encounter, they went back to the
police station. The investigator took the statement of del Rosario on 14 May 1996, and
was only subscribed on 22 May 1996. All the while, he was detained in the police
station as ordered by the Fiscal. His statements were only signed on 16 May 1996. He
also executed a waiver of his detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the
assistance of Ex-Judge Talavera. Del Rosario, on the other hand, claimed that he was
hired for P120.00 by "Boy" Santos to drive him to a cockpit at the Blas Edward
Coliseum but was directed him to proceed to the market place to fetch "Jun" Marquez
and "Dodong" Bisaya; where the robbery homicide occurred. He claimed that the 3
men alighted and warned del Rosario not to inform the police authorities about the
incident otherwise he and his family would be harmed. Del Rosario then went home.
Because of the threat, however, he did not report the matter to the owner of the
tricycle nor to the barangay captain and the police. Del Rosario, Marquez, Santos, and
John Doe alias "Dodong" were charged with the special complex crime of Robbery
with Homicide for having robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of
P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof shot and killed her.
While del Rosario pleaded not guilty, Santos and alias "Dodong" remained at large.
Thus, only del Rosario was tried. The trial court found del Rosario guilty as co-
principal in the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, and to
pay the heirs of victim Virginia Bernas P550,000.00 as actual damages and
P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue:
Whether del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation at the
time he was “invited” for questioning at the house of the barangay captain.
Held:
Del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation. From the time
he was invited" for questioning at the house of the barangay captain, he was already
under effective custodial investigation, but he was not apprised nor made aware
thereof by the investigating officers. The police already knew the name of the tricycle
driver and the latter was already a suspect in the robbing and senseless slaying of
Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario had waived
his right to remain silent, his verbal admissions on his participation in the crime even
before his actual arrest were inadmissible against him, as the same transgressed the
safeguards provided by law and the Bill of Rights. Herein, like victim Virginia
Bernas, del Rosario too was a hapless victim who was forcibly used by other persons
with nefarious designs to perpetrate a dastardly act. Del Rosario's defense of
"irresistible force" has been substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Del
Rosario was threatened with a gun. He could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk
his life to help a stranger. A person under the same circumstances would be more
concerned with his personal welfare and security rather than the safety of a person
whom he only saw for the first time that day. On the other hand, conspiracy between
him and his co-accused was not proved beyond a whimper of a doubt by the
prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of any complicity in the crime charged.
People vs. Bolanos [GR 101808, 3 July 1992]
Facts:
The death of the victim, Oscar Pagdalian, was communicated to the Police Station
where Patrolmen Rolando Alcantara and Francisco Dayao of the Integrated National
Police (INP), Balagtas, Bulacan, are assigned. Patrolmen Alcantara and Dayao
proceeded to the scene of the crime of Marble Supply, Balagtas, Bulacan and upon
arrival they saw the deceased Pagdalian lying on an improvised bed full of blood with
stab wounds. They then inquired about the circumstances of the incident and were
informed that the deceased was with 2 companions, on the previous night, one of
whom was Ramon Bolanos who had a drinking spree with the deceased and another
companion (Claudio Magtibay) till the wee hours of the following morning, 23 June
1990. When Alcantara and Dayao apprehended Bolanos, they found the firearm of the
deceased on the chair where Bolanos was allegedly seated. They boarded Ramon
Bolanos and Claudio Magtibay on the police vehicle and brought them to the police
station. In the vehicle where the suspect was riding, "Ramon Bolanos accordingly
admitted that he killed the deceased Oscar Pagdalian because he was abusive," after
he was asked by the police if he killed the victim. Bolanos was charged for murder
before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 14, under Criminal Case
1831- M-90. The trial court, even if the alleged oral admission of Bolanos was given
without the assistance of counsel when it was made while on board the police vehicle
on their way to the police station, found Bolanos guilty of the crime charged and
imposed on him the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua (life imprisonment) and to pay the
heirs of the victim P50,000.00. The Office of the Solicitor General threafter filed a
Manifestation (in lieu of Appellee's Brief), claiming that the lower court erred in
admitting in evidence the extra-judicial confession of Bolanos while on board the
police patrol jeep.
Issue:
Whether the extra-judicial confession of Bolanos while on board the police patrol jeep
may be used to prove Bolanos’ guilt.
Held:
Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on
the way to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted,
Bolanos should have been informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III,
Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution which explicitly provides: (1) Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the service of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of this
section as well as compensation and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar
practices and their families. Considering the clear requirements of the Constitution
with respect to the manner by which confession can be admissible in evidence, and the
glaring fact that the alleged confession obtained while on board the police vehicle was
the only reason for the conviction, besides Bolanos's conviction was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt, the Court has no recourse but to reverse the subject
judgment under review.
Rhode Island vs. Innis [446 US 291, 12 May 1980]
Facts:
On the night of 12 January 1975, John Mulvaney, a Providence, Rhode Island taxicab
driver, disappeared after being dispatched to pick up a customer. His body was
discovered 4 days later buried in a shallow grave in Coventry, Rhode Island. He had
died from a shotgun blast aimed at the back of his head. On 17 January 1975, shortly
after midnight, the Providence police received a telephone call from Gerald Aubin,
also a taxicab driver, who reported that he had just been robbed by a man wielding a
sawed-off shotgun. Aubin further reported that he had dropped off his assailant near
Rhode Island College in a section of Providence known as Mount Pleasant. While at
the Providence police station waiting to give a statement, Aubin noticed a picture of
his assailant on a bulletin board. Aubin so informed one of the police officers present.
The officer prepared a photo array, and again Aubin identified a picture of the same
person. That person was Innis. Shortly thereafter, the Providence police began a
search of the Mount Pleasant area. At approximately 4:30 a.m. on the same date,
Patrolman Lovell, while cruising the streets of Mount Pleasant in a patrol car, spotted
Innis standing in the street facing him. When Patrolman Lovell stopped his car, Innis
walked towards it. Patrolman Lovell then arrested Innis, who was unarmed, and
advised him of his so-called Miranda rights. While the two men waited in the patrol
car for other police officers to arrive, Patrolman Lovell did not converse with Innis
other than to respond to the latter's request for a cigarette. Within minutes, Sergeant
Sears arrived at the scene of the arrest, and he also gave Innis the Miranda warnings.
Immediately thereafter, Captain Leyden and other police officers arrived. Captain
Leyden advised Innis of his Miranda rights. Innis stated that he understood those
rights and wanted to speak with a lawyer. Captain Leyden then directed that Innis be
placed in a "caged wagon," a 4-door police car with a wire screen mesh between the
front and rear seats, and be driven to the central police station. 3 officers, Patrolmen
Gleckman, Williams, and McKenna, were assigned to accompany Innis to the central
station. They placed Innis in the vehicle and shut the doors. Captain Leyden then
instructed the officers not to question Innis or intimidate or coerce him in any way.
The three officers then entered the vehicle, and it departed. While en route to the
central station, Patrolman Gleckman initiated a conversation with Patrolman
McKenna concerning the missing shotgun. Innis then interrupted the conversation,
stating that the officers should turn the car around so he could show them where the
gun was located. At this point, Patrolman McKenna radioed back to Captain Leyden
that they were returning to the scene of the arrest, and that Innis would inform them of
the location of the gun. At the time Innis indicated that the officers should turn back,
they had traveled no more than a mile, a trip encompassing only a few minutes. The
police vehicle then returned to the scene of the arrest where a search for the shotgun
was in progress. There, Captain Leyden again advised Innis of his Miranda rights.
Innis replied that he understood those rights but that he "wanted to get the gun out of
the way because of the kids in the area in the school." Innis then led the police to a
nearby field, where he pointed out the shotgun under some rocks by the side of the
road. On 20 March 1975, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Innis with the
kidnaping, robbery, and murder of John Mulvaney. Before trial, Innis moved to
suppress the shotgun and the statements he had made to the police regarding it. After
an evidentiary hearing at which Innis elected not to testify, the trial judge found that
Innis had been "repeatedly and completely advised of his Miranda rights." He further
found that it was "entirely understandable that [the officers in the police vehicle]
would voice their concern [for the safety of the handicapped children] to each other."
The judge then concluded that Innis's decision to inform the police of the location of
the shotgun was "a waiver, clearly, and on the basis of the evidence that I have heard,
and [sic] intelligent waiver, of his [Miranda] right to remain silent." Thus, without
passing on whether the police officers had in fact "interrogated" Innis, the trial court
sustained the admissibility of the shotgun and testimony related to its discovery. That
evidence was later introduced at Innis's trial, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty
on all counts. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, set aside
Innis's conviction. Contrary to the holding of the trial court, the appellate court
concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of waiver. Having
concluded that both the shotgun and testimony relating to its discovery were obtained
in violation of the Miranda standards and therefore should not have been admitted into
evidence, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Innis was entitled to a new trial.
Issue:
Whether Innis was "interrogated" by the police officers in violation of the former's
undisputed right under Miranda to remain silent until he had consulted with a lawyer.
Held:
The special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are required not where a
suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a suspect in custody is subjected
to interrogation. "Interrogation," as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must
reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself. The
Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to
either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term
"interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any
words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest
and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses
primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This
focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in
custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without
regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice that the
police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a
suspect thus amounts to interrogation. But, since the police surely cannot be held
accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of
interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that
they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
Herein, Innis was not "interrogated" within the meaning of Miranda. It is undisputed
that the first prong of the definition of "interrogation" was not satisfied, for the
conversation between Patrolmen Gleckman and McKenna included no express
questioning of Innis. Rather, that conversation was, at least in form, nothing more than
a dialogue between the two officers to which no response from Innis was invited.
Moreover, it cannot be fairly concluded that Innis was subjected to the "functional
equivalent" of questioning. It cannot be said, in short, that Patrolmen Gleckman and
McKenna should have known that their conversation was reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from Innis. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the
officers were aware that Innis was peculiarly susceptible to an appeal to his
conscience concerning the safety of handicapped children. Nor is there anything in the
record to suggest that the police knew that Innis was unusually disoriented or upset at
the time of his arrest. The Rhode Island Supreme Court erred, thus, in equating "subtle
compulsion" with interrogation. That the officers' comments struck a responsive chord
is readily apparent. Thus, it may be said, as the Rhode Island Supreme Court did say,
that Innis was subjected to "subtle compulsion," but that is not the end of the inquiry.
It must also be established that a suspect's incriminating response was the product of
words or actions on the part of the police that they should have known were
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. This was not established in the
present case.
People vs. Mahinay [GR 122485, 1 February 1999]
Facts:
Larry Mahinay y Amparado started working as houseboy with Maria Isip on 20
November 1993. His task was to take care of Isip's house which was under
construction adjacent to her old residence situated inside a compound at No. 4165
Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. mahinay stayed and slept in
an apartment also owned by Isip, located 10 meters away from the unfinished house.
The victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, was Isip's neighbor in Dian Street. She
used to pass by Isip's house on her way to school and play inside the compound yard,
catching maya birds together with other children. On 25 June 1995, at 8:00 a.m.,
Mahinay joined Gregorio Rivera in a drinking spree. Around 10 a.m., Mahinay, who
was already drunk, left Gregorio Rivera and asked permission from Isip to go out with
his friends. Sgt. Roberto Suni, also a resident of Dian Street, went to his in-law's
house between 6 to 7 p.m. met Mahinay along Dian Street. That same evening,
between 8 to 9 p.m., he saw Ma. Victoria standing in front of the gate of the
unfinished house. Later, at 9 p.m., Mahinay showed up at Norgina Rivera's store to
buy lugaw. Norgina Rivera informed Mahinay that there was none left of it. She
noticed that Mahinay appeared to be uneasy and in deep thought. She asked why he
looked so worried but he did not answer. Then he left and walked back to the
compound. Meanwhile, Elvira Chan noticed that her daughter, Ma. Victoria, was
missing. She last saw her daughter wearing a pair of white shorts, brown belt, a yellow
hair ribbon, printed blue blouse, dirty white panty, white lady sando and blue rubber
slippers. Mahinay failed to show up for supper that night. On the following day, 26
June 1995, at 2 a.m., Mahinay boarded a passenger jeepney driven by Fernando
Trinidad at the talipapa. Mahinay alighted at the top of the bridge of the North
Expressway and had thereafter disappeared. That same morning, around 7:30, a
certain Boy found the dead body of Ma. Victoria inside the septic tank. Boy
immediately reported what he saw to the victim's parents, Eduardo and Elvira Chan.
With the help of the Valenzuela Police, the lifeless body of Ma. Victoria was retrieved
from the septic tank. She was wearing a printed blouse without underwear. Her face
bore bruises. Back in the compound, SPO1 Arsenio Nacis and SPO1 Arnold Alabastro
were informed by Isip that her houseboy, Mahinay, was missing. At the second floor
of the house under construction, they retrieved from one of the rooms a pair of dirty
white short pants, a brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by
Elvira Chan to belong to her daughter, Ma. Victoria. They also found inside another
room a pair of blue slippers which Isip identified as that of Mahinay. Also found in
the yard, three armslength away from the septic tank were an underwear, a leather
wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a pliers positively identified by Isip as Mahinay's
belongings. These items were brought to the police station. A police report was
subsequently prepared including a referral slip addressed to the office of the
Valenzuela Prosecutor. The next day, SPO1 Virgilio Villano retrieved the victim's
underwear from the septic tank. After a series of follow-up operations, Mahinay was
finally arrested in Barangay Obario Matala, Ibaan, Batangas. He was brought to the
Valenzuela Police Station. On 7 July 1995, with the assistance of Atty. Restituto
Viernes, Mahinay executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he narrated in detail
how he raped and killed the victim. Also, when Mahinay came face to face with the
victim's mother and aunt, he confided to them that he was not alone in raping and
killing the victim. He pointed to Zaldy and Boyet as his co-conspirators. Thus, on 10
July 1995, Mahinay was charged with rape with homicide, to which he pleaded not
guilty. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision convicting Mahinay of the
crime charged, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay a total of
P73,000.00 to the victim's heirs. Hence, the automatic review.
Held: Larry Mahinay during the custodial investigation and after having been
informed of his constitutional rights with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes of
the Public Attorney's Office voluntarily gave his statement admitting the commission
of the crime. Said confession of Mahinay given with the assistance of Atty. Restituto
Viernes is believed to have been freely and voluntarily given. That accused did not
complain to the proper authorities of any maltreatment on his person. He did not even
inform the Inquest Prosecutor when he was sworn to the truth of his statement on 8
July 1995 that he was forced, coerced or was promised of reward or leniency. That his
confession abound with details known only to him. The Court noted that a lawyer
from the Public Attorneys Office Atty. Restituto Viernes and as testified by said Atty.
Viernes he informed and explained to Mahinay his constitutional rights and was
present all throughout the giving of the testimony. That he signed the statement given
by Mahinay. A lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office is expected to be watchful
and vigilant to notice any irregularity in the manner of the investigation and the
physical conditions of the accused. The post mortem findings show that the cause of
death Asphyxia by manual strangulation; Traumatic Head injury Contributory
substantiate. Consistent with the testimony of Mahinay that he pushed the victim and
the latter's head hit the table and the victim lost consciousness. There being no
evidence presented to show that said confession were obtained as a result of violence,
torture, maltreatment, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency nor that
the investigating officer could have been motivated to concoct the facts narrated in
said affidavit; the confession of the accused is held to be true, correct and freely or
voluntarily given. In his extrajudicial confession, Mahinay himself admitted that he
had sexual congress with the unconscious child. Such circumstantial evidence, besides
8 others, established the felony of rape with homicide defined and penalized under
Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11, RA 7659.
People vs. Ayson [GR 85215, 7 July 1989]
Facts:
Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at
its Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to light that he was involved in
irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an
investigation to be conducted into the matter of 9 February 1986. That investigation
was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the
Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees'
Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. On the day before the investigation,
8 February 1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a handwritten note stating the at he was
willing to settle irregularities allegedly charged against him in the amount of P76,000
(approximately) subject to conditions as may be imposed by PAL on or before 1700/9
February 1986. At the investigation of 9 February 1986, conducted by the PAL
Branch Manager in Baguio City, Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence of Station Agent
Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward
Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding of the Audit Team."
Thereafter, his answers in response to questions by Cruz, were taken down in writing.
Ramos' answers were to the effect inter alia that he had not indeed made disclosure of
the tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's findings, that the proceeds had been
"misused" by him, that although he had planned on paying back the money, he had
been prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing to settle
his obligation, and proferred a "compromise to pay on staggered basis, (and) the
amount would be known in the next investigation;" that he desired the next
investigation to be at the same place, "Baguio CTO," and that he should be
represented therein by "Shop stewardees ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that he was willing
to sign his statement (as he in fact afterwards did). How the investigation turned out is
not dealt with the parties at all; but it would seem that no compromise agreement was
reached much less consummated. About 2 months later, an information was filed
against Felipe Ramos charging him with the crime of estafa allegedly committed in
Baguio City during the period from 12 March 1986 to 29 January 1987. On
arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and trial
thereafter ensued. At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a
written offer of evidence dated 21 June 1988, which included the statement of Ramos
taken on 9 February 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, as well as his
handwritten admission given on 8 February 1986. Ramos' attorneys filed
"Objections/Comments to Plaintiffs Evidence." By Order dated 9 August 1988, Judge
Ruben Ayson (Branch 6, RTC Baguio City) admitted all the exhibits "as part of the
testimony of the witnesses who testified in connection therewith and for whatever they
are worth," except Ramos' statement of 9 February and his handwritten admission
dated 8 February. The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration. It was
denied, by Order dated 14 September 1988. The private prosecutors, in the name of
the People of the Philippines, filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing
the orders of 9 August 1988 and 14 September 1988.
Issue:
Whether the constitutional rights of a person under custodial investigation comes into
play during the administrative inquiry.
Held:
Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should
be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the
discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The
constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation did not therefore come
into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had
voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative
investigation, 9 February 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded,
the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action
subsequently filed against him, just as it is obvious that the note that he sent to his
superiors on 8 February 1986, the day before the investigation, offering to
compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous
act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda
rights" had not been accorded to Ramos. As to the danger of violation of the right of
any person against self -incrimination when the investigation is conducted by the
complaining companies or employers, it suffices to draw attention to the specific and
peremptory requirement of the law that disciplinary sanctions may not be imposed on
any employee by his employer until and unless the employee has been accorded due
process, by which is meant that the latter must be informed of the offenses ascribed to
him and afforded adequate time and opportunity to explain his side. The requirement
entails the making of statements, oral or written, by the employee under such
administrative investigation in his defense, with opportunity to solicit the assistance of
counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The employee may, of course, refuse to submit
any statement at the investigation, that is his privilege. But if he should opt to do so, in
his defense to the accusation against him, it would be absurd to reject his statements,
whether at the administrative investigation, or at a subsequent criminal action brought
against him, because he had not been accorded, prior to his making and presenting
them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be informed thereof, etc.)
which, to repeat, are relevant only in custodial investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident
that the employee's statements, whether called "position paper," "answer," etc., are
submitted by him precisely so that they may be admitted and duly considered by the
investigating officer or committee, in negation or mitigation of his liability.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Sumilang [Administrative Matter MTJ-94-
989, 18 April 1997]
Facts:
Court interpreter Felicidad Malla, who was the officer-in-charge from 1 July 1992 to
15 November 1992, took a maternity leave for 1 month (16 November 1992 to 15
December 1992) and reassumed her position on 16 December 1992, until her
resignation on 31 August 1993. On 1 September 1993, Rebecca Avanzado assumed
the position of officer in charge. It was during her tenure on 8 August 1994, that an
on-the-spot audit examination was conducted by the Fiscal Audit Division of the
Office of Court Administrator. In the course of the examination, several anomalous
transactions were discovered. One involved a manager's check deposited in the name
of Teodorico Dizon in connection with Civil Case 858, wherein Entero Villarica, on 7
August 1992 during the tenure of Malla entrusted the amount of P240,000.00 to Malla
instead of handling it over to the Clerk of Court pursuant to Supreme Court Circular
13-92. When asked to explain where the P240,000.00 was, Malla, explained that she
deposited it at the Sta. Cruz, Laguna branch of the Philippine National Bank (PNB)
but she and Judge Sumilang later withdrew it allegedly under the belief that Dizon
would demand the delivery of the money upon the termination of the case. Upon
further questioning by the examining team, however, Malla admitted that she lent the
amount of P87,000.00 to steno-reporter Edelita Lagmay, P40,000.00 to steno-reporter
Nieva Mercado, and P81,000.00 to Mrs. Sumilang, wife of Judge Sumilang. She spent
P32,000.00 for the hospitalization of her husband and the remaining balance for
personal purposes. Later on, she executed an affidavit stating that only Lagmay and
Mercado borrowed P55,000.00 and P40,000.00, respectively. On the other hand, she
used P100,000.00 for her personal needs. Upon learning that they were being
implicated in the anomalous transaction, Lagmay executed an affidavit stating that the
amount of P55,000.00 was from the personal account of Malla and not from the
P240,000.00 amount deposited before the court and such loan has already been paid.
Mercado, on the other hand, claims that the amount of P40,000.00 was borrowed only
two weeks before the audit took place, when Malla was no longer employed with the
court. Mrs. Sumilang, for her part, denied any involvement in any of the transactions.
Judge Augusto Sumilang, Felicidad Malla, Edelita Lagmay and Nieva Mercado, court
employees of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pila, Laguna were charged in a
memorandum report by the Office of Court Administrator dated 16 August 1994, for
misappropriating funds deposited by Spouses Entero Villarica and Felicidad Domingo
in Civil Case 858. On 5 October 1994, the Supreme Court issued a resolution treating
the memorandum report as an administrative complaint (Administrative Matter MTJ-
94- 989). In addition, a second complaint was lodged against Malla for removing
judicial records outside the court premises. The Court decided to include this matter in
the original complaint earlier docketed as AM MTJ-94-989 in a resolution dated 6
March 1995.
Issue:
Whether Malla's constitutional rights were violated when she signed an affidavit dated
14 September 1994 before the Office of the Court Administrator, where she admitted
her misdeed.
Held:
The constitutional provision under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may be
invoked only during "custodial investigation" or as in "custody investigation" which
has been defined as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." The investigation is defined as an "investigation conducted by police
authorities which will include investigation conducted by the Municipal Police, P.C.
(now PNP) and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government." Thus, the
Office of the Court Administrator can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement
authority contemplated in the constitutional provision. At any rate, Malla admitted
during her testimony that she received the said check from Villarica covering the
amount of P240,000.00 payable to Dizon. However, when she tried to deposit it with
the Municipal Treasurer, the latter refused because there was no order from Judge
Sumilang. Consequently, Villarica entrusted said check to her. It was at this juncture
that she used the money for personal purposes. During the investigation, Malla
repeated what she basically stated in her affidavit i.e., that she used a substantial
amount of the P240,000.00 for her personal needs. This effectively refutes whatever
pressure and coercion she claims was employed against her. By repeating her
confession in open court, Malla thereby converted it into a judicial confession.
Gamboa vs. Cruz [GR L-56291, 27 June 1988]
Facts:
On 19 July 1979, at about 7:00 a.m., Christopher Gamboa y Gonzales was arrested for
vagrancy, without a warrant of arrest, by Patrolman Arturo Palencia. Thereafter,
Gamboa was brought to Precinct 2, Manila, where he was booked for vagrancy and
then detained therein together with several others. The following day, 20 July 1979,
during the lineup of 5 detainees, including Gamboa, Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to
Gamboa and said, "that one is a companion." After the identification, the other
detainees were brought back to their cell but Gamboa was ordered to stay on. While
Bernal was being interrogated by the police investigator, Gamboa was told to sit down
in front of her. On 23 July 1979, an information for robbery was filed against
Gamboa. On 22 August 1979, Gamboa was arraigned. Thereafter, hearings were held.
On 2 April 1980, the prosecution formally offered its evidence and then rested its
case. On 14 July 1980, petitioner, by counsel, instead of presenting his defense,
manifested in open court that he was filing a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer to
Evidence. On 13 August 1980, Gamboa filed said Motion predicated on the ground
that the conduct of the line-up, without notice to, and in the absence of, his counsel
violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. On 23 October 1980,
the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIX, in Criminal Case 47622 issued
the order denying the Motion to Acquit. Gamboa filed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition, with prayer for a temporary restraining order.
Issue:
Whether Gamboa was entitled to a counsel, as part of his right in custodial
investigation, at the time he was placed in a police lineup.
Held:
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or
admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being
interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting
false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing
interrogation, for the commission of an offense. Any person under investigation must,
among other things, be assisted by counsel. Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution (similar guarantees in Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution) are
clear. They leave no room for equivocation. Accordingly, in several cases, the
Supreme Court has consistently held that no custodial investigation shall be conducted
unless it be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any
person in his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself or by anyone in his behalf, and that, while the right may be waived, the waiver
shall not be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel. However, the
police line-up (at least, in this case) was not part of the custodial inquest, hence,
Gamboa was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel.
United States vs. Wade [388 US 218, 12 June 1967]
Facts:
The federally insured bank in Eustace, Texas, was robbed on 21 September 1964. A
man with a small strip of tape on each side of his face entered the bank, pointed a
pistol at the female cashier and the vice president, the only persons in the bank at the
time, and forced them to fill a pillowcase with the bank's money. The man then drove
away with an accomplice who had been waiting in a stolen car outside the bank. On
23 March 1965, an indictment was returned against Wade, and two others for
conspiring to rob the bank, and against Wade and the accomplice for the robbery
itself. Wade was arrested on April 2, and counsel was appointed to represent him on
April 26. Fifteen days later an FBI agent, without notice to Wade's lawyer, arranged to
have the two bank employees observe a lineup made up of Wade and five or six other
prisoners and conducted in a courtroom of the local county courthouse. Each person in
the line wore strips of tape such as allegedly worn by the robber and upon direction
each said something like "put the money in the bag," the words allegedly uttered by
the robber. Both bank employees identified Wade in the lineup as the bank robber. At
trial, the two employees, when asked on direct examination if the robber was in the
courtroom, pointed to Wade. The prior lineup identification was then elicited from
both employees on cross-examination. At the close of testimony, Wade's counsel
moved for a judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, to strike the bank officials'
courtroom identifications on the ground that conduct of the lineup, without notice to
and in the absence of his appointed counsel, violated his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.
The motion was denied, and Wade was convicted. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial at which the in- court
identification evidence was to be excluded, holding that, though the lineup did not
violate Wade's Fifth Amendment rights, the lineup, held as it was, in the absence of
counsel, already chosen to represent Wade, was a violation of his Sixth Amendment
rights.
Issue:
Whether Wade was compelled to testify himself during the pretrial lineup, to which
the counsel of the accused was not given notice to.
Held:
Neither the lineup itself nor anything shown by this record that Wade was required to
do in the lineup violated his privilege against self-incrimination. The privilege
"protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or
otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature."
Compelling the accused merely to exhibit his person for observation by a prosecution
witness prior to trial involves no compulsion of the accused to give evidence having
testimonial significance. It is compulsion of the accused to exhibit his physical
characteristics, not compulsion to disclose any knowledge he might have. It is no
different from compelling Schmerber to provide a blood sample or Holt to wear the
blouse, and, as in those instances, is not within the cover of the privilege. Similarly,
compelling Wade to speak within hearing distance of the witnesses, even to utter
words purportedly uttered by the robber, was not compulsion to utter statements of a
"testimonial" nature; he was required to use his voice as an identifying physical
characteristic, not to speak his guilt. The Court held in Schmerber that the distinction
to be drawn under the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is one
between an accused's "communications" in whatever form, vocal or physical, and
"compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of `real or physical
evidence.'" The Court recognized that "both federal and state courts have usually held
that [the privilege] offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting,
photography, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court,
to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture." None of these
activities becomes testimonial within the scope of the privilege because required of
the accused in a pretrial lineup. However, the Sixth Amendment guarantees an
accused the right to counsel not only at his trial but at any critical confrontation by the
prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well determine his fate and
where the absence of counsel might derogate from his right to a fair trial. The post-
indictment lineup (unlike such preparatory steps as analyzing fingerprints and blood
samples) was a critical prosecutive stage at which respondent was entitled to the aid of
counsel. There is a great possibility of unfairness to the accused at that point, (1)
because of the manner in which confrontations for identification are frequently
conducted, (2) because of dangers inherent in eyewitness identification and
suggestibility inherent in the context of the confrontations, and (3) because of the
likelihood that the accused will often be precluded from reconstructing what occurred
and thereby obtaining a full hearing on the identification issue at trial. This case
illustrates the potential for improper influence on witnesses through the lineup
procedure, since the bank employees were allowed to see respondent in the custody of
FBI agents before the lineup began. The presence of counsel at the lineup will
significantly promote fairness at the confrontation and a full hearing at trial on the
issue of identification. Further, in-court identification by a witness to whom the
accused was exhibited before trial in the absence of counsel must be excluded unless it
can be established that such evidence had an independent origin or that error in its
admission was harmless. Since it is not clear that the Court of Appeals applied the
prescribed rule of exclusion, and since the nature of the in-court identifications here
was not an issue in the trial and cannot be determined on the record, the case must be
remanded to the District Court for resolution of these issues.
People vs. Escordial [GR 138934-35, 16 January 2002]
Facts:
At around 8 p.m. of 27 December 1996, Jason Joniega, Mark Esmeralda and Mark
Lucena were playing inside a jeepney parked in front of a boarding house owned by
Pacita Aguillon at No. 17 Margarita Extension, Libertad St., Purok Amelia 2,
Barangay 40, Bacolod City. As one of them hit his head on the rails of the jeepney, the
boys were told by a man sitting inside the jeepney to go home lest they would meet an
accident. The man was later identified by Joniega and Esmeralda as Anthony
Escordial. Living in a boarding house in front of which the jeepney was parked were
Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca, and Ma. Teresa Gellaver. While the three were
asleep, Erma was awakened by the presence of a man. The man had his head covered
with a t -shirt to prevent identification and carried a knife about four inches long.
Michelle and Teresa were awakened thereafter. The man was able to get P500.00 from
Erma and P3,100.00 from Michelle. After getting their money, the man gave a t-shirt
to Erma to blindfold Teresa and another to Michelle to blindfold Erma. He blindfolded
Michelle himself and then began touching her in different parts of her body. The man
succeeded in inserting his penis into Michelle's vagina. Although Michelle was
blindfolded and could not see, she could feel that the man had no cover on his face
when he was raping her. She felt that his chest was rough and had some scars. When
he placed her hands on his nape, she felt that it was also rough. On the other hand,
Erma claimed she was able to see through her blindfold and that she saw the man's
face because of the light coming from the lamp post outside the boarding house. After
he had finished raping Michelle, the man sat on the bed and talked to the three
women. After a while, the man told Michelle he wanted to have sex with her again.
Michelle pleaded with him, but the man threatened to call his companions and said it
would be worse for her if his companions would be the ones to rape her. He ordered
Michelle to lie on her stomach and then inserted his penis into her anus. When he was
through, he gave Michelle a blanket to cover herself and returned to her a pair of
earrings which he had taken from her. He then left, but not before warning the women
not to report the matter to anyone or he would kill them. Michelle, Erma, and Teresa
were so frightened that they were not able to ask for help until 30 minutes after the
man had left. They told their neighbor, Tiyo Anong, that a man had come to the house
and robbed them. They also called up Allan Aguillon, the son of the owner of the
boarding house, who in turn reported the incident to the police. When the policemen
arrived, they asked Michelle to describe the attacker, but she told them that she could
only identify his voice and his eyes. Accompanied by the police, the three women
looked for the man around the Libertad area, but they did not find him. Michelle,
Erma, and Teresa were taken to the police station at Bac-Up for investigation. But, at
Michelle's request, Erma and Teresa did not tell the others that Michelle had been
raped by their attacker. Upon returning home, Michelle found her aunt and uncle. She
embraced her aunt and told her about her ordeal. Michelle was again taken to the
police headquarters, where she was referred to the Women's Desk to report the rape.
They were able to go home to the house of Michelle's aunt at around 5 to 6 p.m. The
following day, P03 Nicolas Tancinco went around Margarita Extension and learned
about the children playing on the street around the time the intruder entered the
boarding house. The description of the suspect fitted that of a worker at a café called
Coffee Break Corner, about two houses away from the boarding house. On 2 January
1997, Tancinco and some companions proceeded to the Coffee Break Corner and
interviewed the security guard, who told them that a certain Fidel Hinolan owned the
café. When interviewed by Tancinco and his companions, Fidel Hinolan told them
that Escordial was his helper and that the latter had gone home on 27 December 1996
to Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental. Based on the information
furnished by Hinolan, Tancinco and his fellow police officers, Michelle Darunday,
Allan Aguillon, and Pacita Aguillon went to Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental at around 10 a.m. of 3 January 1997 and asked the assistance of the police
there to locate Escordial. PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino asked one of his colleagues at the
Pontevedra police to accompany Tancinco and his companions. They found Escordial
at the basketball court and "invited" him to go to the police station for questioning. He
was transferred to the Bacolod police station for further investigation. At the Bacolod
police station, Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and Mark Esmeralda
were asked whether Escordial was the same person they saw on the night of the
incident. They were taken one by one to the jail cell and asked to point to the person
that they had seen that night. They picked Escordial out of four people who were
inside the jail cell. Escordial was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case 97-
18117. He was also charged with robbery with rape in Criminal Case 97-18118. When
arraigned on 25 February 1997, Escordial pleaded not guilty to the charges,
whereupon the two cases were jointly tried. On 26 February 1999, the trial court
rendered a decision, finding Escordial guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Rape, the commission of which being attended by three aggravating
circumstances of (1) nighttime; (2) that the crime was committed in the dwelling of
the offended party, and (3) that craft, fraud and disguise were employed by the
accused in the commission of the crime under paragraphs 3, 6, and 14 of Article 14 of
the Revised Penal Code. The court sentenced Escordial to the maximum penalty of
death, and condemned him to pay Darunday the sum of P3,650.00, representing the
money taken by the accused; P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and the costs. Escordial appealed.
Issue:
Whether the out-of-court identification in the show up at the police station, made after
the start of the custodial investigation, may be used in court.
Held:
While it cannot be denied that Escordial was deprived of his right to be informed of
his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, he has not
shown that, as a result of his custodial interrogation, the police obtained any statement
from him – whether inculpatory or exculpatory - which was used in evidence against
him. No uncounseled statement was obtained from Escordial which should have been
excluded as evidence against him. However, Escordial was never assisted by counsel,
whether of his own choice or provided by the police officers, from the time of his
arrest in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental to the time of his continued detention at the
Bacolod police station. Although Escordial made no statement during this time, this
fact remains important insofar as it affects the admissibility of the out-of-court
identification of Escordial by the prosecution witnesses, namely, Michelle Darunday,
Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Mark Esmeralda, and Jason Joniega. As a rule, an
accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that
such is usually not a part of the custodial inquest. However, the previous cases are
different inasmuch as Escordial, having been the focus of attention by the police after
he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime, was
already under custodial investigation when these out- of- court identifications were
conducted by the police. An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in
various ways. In a show-up, the accused alone is brought face to face with the witness
for identification, while in a police line- up, the suspect is identified by a witness from
a group of persons gathered for that purpose. During custodial investigation, these
types of identification have been recognized as "critical confrontations of the accused
by the prosecution" which necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused. This is
because the results of these pre-trial proceedings "might well settle the accused's fate
and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." The Court thus ruled that any
identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for
that matter, after the start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence
against him. Herein, Escordial was identified by Michelle Darunda in a show-up on 3
January 1997 and by Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and Mark
Esmeralda in a police line-up on various dates after his arrest. Having been made
when Escordial did not have the assistance of counsel, these out-of -court
identifications are inadmissible in evidence against him. Consequently, the
testimonies of these witnesses regarding these identifications should have been held
inadmissible for being "the direct result of the illegal lineup 'come at by exploitation
of [the primary] illegality.'"
People vs. Piedad [GR 131923, 5 December 2002]
Facts:
On 10 April 1996, at around 11 p.m., Luz Lactawan left her house at No. 2 Scout
Bayoran, Barangay South Triangle, Quezon City, to follow Mateo, her husband, who
had earlier gone. As she was walking by the gate of the company compound where
they reside, she heard Fidel Piquero shouting for help because Mateo was being
mauled by a group of men. She rushed out of the compound and saw her husband
being beaten up by Niel Piedad, Richard Palma, Lito Garcia and five others. She tried
to pacify the aggressors, but was beaten herself. Luz embraced Mateo in an effort to
protect him. It was then that Niel picked up a large stone, measuring about a foot and
a half, and struck Mateo’s head with it. Then, Lito approached Mateo’s side and
stabbed him at the back, while Richard hit Mateo in the face. Mateo was rushed to the
East Avenue Medical Center where he later died because of the injuries he sustained.
Niel Piedad y Consolacion, Lito Garcia y Francisco and Richard Palma y Ider were
charged with Murder. Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial ensued thereafter. The trial court rendered a decision, finding Piedad and
Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder with no modifying
circumstances present, and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Piedad and Garcia were
likewise held solidarily liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim Mateo Lactawan in
the sum of P50,000.00. Richard Palma was acquitted on the ground of reasonable
doubt. Piedad and Garcia appealed.
Issue:
Whether the way that Piedad was identified by prosecution witnesses was suggestive
and fatally flawed; that Piedad should have been put in a police lineup instead of
being shoveled into a “confrontation” with the alleged witnesses and immediately
singled out by the police as suspects.
Held:
The claim by the defense that Piedad’s pre -trial identification was suggestive due to
the absence of a police lineup is more theoretical than real. It must be pointed out that
even before the incident, Luz Lactawan knew the accused. Fidel, on the other hand,
knew Piedad because they played basketball together. Hence, the witnesses were not
identifying persons whom they were unfamiliar with, where arguably, improper
suggestion may set in. On the contrary, when the accused were presented before the
witnesses, they were simply asked to confirm whether they were the ones responsible
for the crime perpetrated. The witnesses did not incriminate the accused simply
because they were the only ones presented by the police, rather, the witnesses were
certain they recognized the perpetrators of the crime. Besides, there is no law which
requires a police lineup before a suspect can be identified as the culprit of a crime.
What is important is that the prosecution witnesses positively identify the persons
charged as the malefactors. In this regard, the Court finds no reason to doubt the
veracity of Luz’s and Fidel’s testimony. The records show that Luz and Fidel
positively, categorically and unhesitatingly identified Piedad as the one who struck
Mateo on the head with a stone, and Garcia as the one who stabbed Mateo on the
back, thereby inflicting traumatic head injuries and a stab wound which eventually led
to Mateo’s death. Indeed, if family members who have witnessed the killing of a loved
one usually strive to remember the faces of the assailants, the Court sees no reason
how a wife, who witnessed the violence inflicted upon her husband and who
eventually died by reason thereof, could have done any less. It must be stressed that
Luz was right beside her husband when the concrete stone was struck on his head,
hence, Luz could not have mistaken the identity of the person responsible for the
attack. She was only a foot away from Piedad before the latter hit Mateo on the head.
Garcia on the other hand was identified by both Luz and Fidel as the one who was
shirtless at the time of the incident. There was light from a bulb 5 meters away from
the scene of the crime. Experience dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts
of violence committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can remember with a high
degree of reliability the identity of the criminals at any given time. Hence, the
proximity and attention afforded the witnesses, coupled with the relative illumination
of the surrounding area, bolsters the credibility of identification of Piedad, et. al.
Neither is the lack of counsel during the pre-trial identification process of Piedad, et.
al. fatal. Piedad, et. al. did not make any extrajudicial confession or admission with
regard to the crime charged. While Piedad and Garcia may have been suspects, they
were certainly not interrogated by the police authorities, much less forced to confess
to the crime imputed against them. Piedad and Garcia were not under custodial
investigation. In fact, Piedad averred during cross-examination that the police never
allowed them to say anything at the police station on the day they voluntarily
presented themselves to the authorities.
Magtoto vs. Manguera [GR L-37201-02, 3 March 1975]
Facts:
No preliminary facts are available in the body of the case. Judge Miguel M. Manguera
of the Court of First Instance (Branch II) of Occidental Mindoro (in GR L-37201-02)
and Judge Judge Onoftre A. Villaluz of the Criminal Circuit Court of Pasig, Rizal (in
GR L-37424) declarede admissible the confessions of the accused in said cases
(Clemente Magtoto in GR L-37201-02; and Maximo Simeon, Louis Mednatt,
Inocentes De Luna, Ruben Miranda, Alfonso Ballesteros, Rudolfo Suarez, Manuel
Manalo, Alberto Gabion, and Rafael Brill in GR L-37424). District Judge Asaali S.
Isnani of Court of First Instance (Branch II) of Zamboanga de Sur (in GR L-38928),
on the other hand, declared inadmissible the confessions of the accused in said case
(Vicente Longakit and Jaime Dalion), although they have not been informed of their
right to remain silent and to counsel before they gave the confessions, because they
were given before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. Petitions for certiorari were
filed with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the right to counsel and to be informed in such right, incorporated in Section
20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, applies prospectively or retroactively.
Held:
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution granted, for the first time, to a person
under investigation for the commission of an offense, the right to counsel and to be
informed of such right. And the last sentence thereof which, in effect, means that any
confession obtained in violation of this right shall be inadmissible in evidence, can
and should be given effect only when the right already existed and had been violated.
Consequently, because the confessions of the accused in GRs L-37201- 02, 37424 and
38929 were taken before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution in accordance with
the rules then in force, no right had been violated as to render them inadmissible in
evidence although they were not informed of "their right to remain silent and to
counsel," "and to be informed of such right," because, no such right existed at the
time. The argument that the second paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, which was added by Republic Act 1083 enacted in 1954, which reads that "In
every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and
shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at anytime with his
attorney or counsel," impliedly granted to a detained person the right to counsel and to
be informed of such right, is untenable. The only right granted by said paragraph to a
detained person was to be informed of the cause of his detention. But he must make a
request for him to be able to claim the right to communicate and confer with counsel
at any time. The historical background of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution shows that the new right granted therein to a detained person to counsel
and to be informed of such right under pain of his confession being declared
inadmissible in evidence, has and should be given a prospective and not a retroactive
effect. Furthermore, to give a retroactive effect to this constitutional guarantee to
counsel would have a great unsettling effect on the administration of justice in this
country. It may lead to the acquittal of guilty individuals and thus cause injustice to
the People and the offended parties in many criminal cases where confessions were
obtained before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and in accordance with the
rules then in force although without assistance of counsel. The Constitutional
Convention could not have intended such a disastrous consequence in the
administration of justice. For if the cause of justice suffers when an innocent person is
convicted, it equally suffers when a guilty one is acquitted.
People vs. Caguioa [GR L-38975, 17 January 1980]
Facts:
The Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed on 14 September 1973, in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, an information for murder against Paquito Yupo y Gonzales
(Criminal Case 146-V-73), with the case, after the raffle, being assigned to Branch
VIII, presided by Judge Eduardo P. Caguioa. Upon arraignment on 5 October 1973,
Yupo pleaded not guilty. The trial of the case then proceeded, the prosecution having
presented 6 witnesses, including the father of the deceased, Miguel Tribol, and his
common-law wife, Lydia Begnotia, who allegedly received the ante mortem statement
of the victim, Rodolfo Tribol. Then, at the hearing on 3 June 1974, the prosecution
presented Corporal Conrado Roca of the Meycauayan Police Department, before
whom a written statement of Yupo and his alleged waiver of his right to remain silent
and to be assisted by a counsel of his own choice was taken. After this witness had
identified the statement of Yupo and the waiver, he was questioned on the
incriminating answers in such statement to the police, but there was an objection on
the part of the defense counsel based on the ground of such statement being
inadmissible in evidence, as the statement was taken by the police without any counsel
assisting the accused in the investigation. Judge Caguioa sustained the objection of the
defense on the view that such judicial confession of the accused is inadmissible in
evidence for being unconstitutional, it appearing that the accused was not assisted by a
counsel when it was given. He likewise stated that such right could not be waived.
Upon his refusal to reconsider such ruling, the petition for certiorari was filed.
Issue:
Whether the right to remain silent and right to counsel during custodial investigation
may be waived.
Held:
While there could be a waiver of the rights of an accused, it must be intelligently
waived, otherwise a court's jurisdiction starting at the beginning of the trial may be
lost in the course of the proceeding. Statements made during the period of custodial
interrogation to be admissible require a clear intelligent waiver of constitutional rights,
the suspect being warned prior to questioning that he has a right to remain silent, that
any utterance may be used against him, and that he has the right to the presence of a
counsel, either retained or appointed. The prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure
the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for
the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are
devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous
opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any
questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does not make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a
right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may
waive effectuation of those rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no
questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he
does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that
he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own
does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until
he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned. Tested by
such a clear and unequivocal standard, the alleged waiver herein falls far short. Yupo
merely answered in a monosyllabic "Opo" to Corporal Conrado B. Roca of the Police
Force of Meycauayan, worded thus: "Ipinaaalam ko sa iyo na ikaw ay sinisiyasat
tungkol sa isang paglabag sa batas na iyong ginawa, bago ko ipagpatuloy ang
pagtatanong sa iyo, ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag magsalita kung ayaw mo at may
karapatan ka rin na magkaroon ng abogado na iyong gusto, at dapat mo ring mabatid
na anuman ang sabihin mo dito ay maaaring gamitin ng ayon o laban sa iyo,
magsasalaysay ka pa rin ba?" and that was all.
People vs. Tampus [GR L-44690, 28 March 1980]
Facts:
At around 10:00 a.m. of 14 January 1976, Celso Saminado, a prisoner in the national
penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Rizal and a patient in the emergency ward of the prison
hospital, went to the toilet to answer a call of nature and to fetch water. Jose Tampus y
Ponce and Rodolfo Avila, prisoners in the same penal institution, who were tubercular
patients in the hospital, followed Saminado to the toilet and, by means of their bladed
weapons, assaulted him. Tampus inflicted 8 incised wounds on Saminado while Avila
stabbed him nine times. Saminado died upon arrival at 11:00 a.m. on that same
morning in the prison hospital. After emerging from the toilet, Tampus and Avila
surrendered to a prison guard with their knives. They told the guard: "Surrender po
kami, sir. Gumanti lang po kami." The motive of the killing was revenge. Tampus and
Avila, both members of the Oxo gang, avenged the stabbing of Eduardo Rosales (also
a member of the Oxo gang) in December 1975 by a member of the Batang Mindanao
gang, a group hostile to the Oxo gang. Saminado was a member of the Batang
Mindanao gang. The officer of the day investigated the incident right away. In his
written report submitted on the same day when the tragic occurrence transpired, he
stated that, according to his on-the- spot investigation, Avila stabbed Saminado when
the latter was seated in the comfort room and his back was turned to Avila, while
Tampus stabbed the victim on the chest and neck. Two days after the killing, or on
January 16, another prison guard investigated Tampus and Avila and obtained their
extrajudicial confessions wherein they admitted that they assaulted Saminado. Tampus
and Avila were charged for murder before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati
Branch 36 (Criminal Case 18510). After trial, the court convicted Tampus for murder,
sentencing him to death and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Celso
Saminado, an indemnity of P12,000.00. In the same decision, Rodolfo Avila, the co-
accused of Tampus, was convicted of the same offense and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the same indemnity. Avila did not
appeal. (Avila was sentenced to death, together with Frankisio Aro and Pedro Lasala,
in another case, Criminal Case 1187. The death sentence is under review in GR L-
38141). The present automatic review involves Tampus' conviction.
Issue:
Whether the “custodial” investigation pursued by Lahoz, where allegedly Tampus was
not informed as to his rights to have counsel and to remain silent, negates the extra-
judicial confession made by Tampus in the killing of Saminado.
Held:
As the confession in the present case was obtained after the 1973 Constitution took
effect, section 20 of Article IV applies thereto. There is no doubt that the confession
was voluntarily made. Investigator Buenaventura de la Cuesta in taking it endeavored,
according to his understanding, to comply with section 20. Even considering that
Vivencio C. Lahoz investigated the killing two days before the confession was taken
by investigator de la Cuesta on 16 January 1976 and that allegedly during said
custodial interrogation Tampus was not informed as to his rights to have counsel and
to remain silent, Tampus and Avila had already admitted it when, after coming out of
the toilet, the scene of the crime, they surrendered to Reynaldo S. Eustaquio, the first
guard whom they encountered, and they revealed to him that they had committed an
act of revenge. That spontaneous statement, elicited without any interrogation, was
part of the res gestae and at the same time was a voluntary confession of guilt. Not
only that; the two accused, by means of that statement given freely on the spur of the
moment without any urging or suggestion, waived their right to remain silent and to
have the right to counsel. That admission was confirmed by their extrajudicial
confession, plea of guilty and testimony in court. They did not appeal from the
judgment of conviction. It is further contended that after the fiscal had presented the
prosecution's evidence and when counsel de oficio called upon Tampus to testify, the
trial court should have advised him of his constitutional right to remain silent. That
contention is not well-taken considering that Tampus pleaded guilty and had executed
an extrajudicial confession. The court during the trial is not duty-bound to apprise the
accused that he has the right to remain silent. It is his counsel who should claim that
right for him. If he does not claim it and he calls the accused to the witness stand, then
he waives that right. It should be stressed that, however, even without taking into
account Tampus' admission of guilt, confession, plea of guilty and testimony, the
crime was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence of the prosecution.
People vs. Galit [GR 51770, 20 March 1985]
Facts:
In the morning of 23 August 1917, Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a widow, was found
dead in the bedroom of her house located at Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, as a
result of 7 wounded inflicted upon different parts of her body by a blunt instrument.
More than 2 weeks thereafter, police authorities of Montalban picked up Francisco
Galit, an ordinary construction worker (pion) living in Marikina, Rizal, or suspicion of
the murder. On the following day, however, 8 September 1977, the case was referred
to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further investigation in view of the
alleged limited facilities of the Montalban police station. Accordingly, Galit was
brought to the NBI where he was investigated by a team headed by NBI Agent Carlos
Flores. NBI Agent Flores conducted a preliminary interview of the suspect who
allegedly gave evasive answers to his questions. But the following day, 9 September
1977, Francisco Galit allegedly voluntarily executed a Salaysay admitting
participation in the commission of the crime. He implicated Juling Dulay and Pabling
Dulay as his companions in the crime. Actually, Galit had been obtained and
interrogated almost continuously for 5 days, to no avail as he consistently maintained
his innocence. The investigating officers began to maul him and to torture him
physically. They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full
of human waste. With Galit's will having been broken, he admitted what the
investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the confession they prepared.
Galit was charged with the Crime of Robbery with Homicide, in an information filed
before the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal. Trial was held, and on 11 August
1978, immediately after the accused had terminated the presentation of his evidence,
the trial judge dictated his decision on the case in open court, finding Galit guilty as
charged and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty; to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the sum of P110,000.00, and to pay the costs. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue:
Whether a monosyllabic answer to a long question suffices as a voluntary admission
that may be used against the accused.
Held:
As held in Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, "At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the
duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be
shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used
against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer,
a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if
possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting
officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by
any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver
shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained
in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in
whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence." Herein, there were no
eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no state witnesses, and not
even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only evidence against
Galit is his alleged confession. A long question followed by a monosyllabic answer
does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights
under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear
questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to
the person under investigation. Galit is from Samar and there is no showing that he
understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, Galit was not permitted to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other
relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was
only about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were
allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to
counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed
reenactment, again Galit was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute
gross violations of his rights. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the
circumstances surrounding the taking of any confession, especially where the prisoner
claims having been maltreated into giving one. Where there is any doubt as to the
voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.
People vs. Bandula [GR 89223, 27 May 1994]
Facts:
On 27 January 1986, at around 10:00 p.m., 6 armed men barged into the compound of
Polo Coconut Plantation in Tanjay, Negros Oriental. The armed men were identified
by Security Guard Antonio Salva of the plantation as Aurelio Bandula, Teofilo
Dionanao, Victoriano Ejan and Pantaleon Sedigo while the two others who wore
masks were simply referred to as "Boy Tall" and "Boy Short." At gunpoint, the 2
masked men held Salva who was manning his post, disarmed him of his shotgun and
tied his hands behind his back. They then went up the house of Leoncio Pastrano,
Chief of Security and General Foreman of the plantation, hog-tied him, and divested
him of his driver's license, goggles, wristwatch and .38 cal. snubnose revolver. From
there, the 6 armed men with Salva and Pastrano in tow proceeded to the house of Atty.
Juanito Garay, Manager of the Polo Coconut Plantation. Dionanao, Ejan and Sedigo
stayed downstairs while Bandula and the two masked men with Salva and Pastrano
went up the house of Atty. Garay. After forcing their way into the house, the masked
men and Bandula ransacked the place and took with them money and other valuables.
Thereafter, the hooded men who were bringing with them Atty. Garay locked Pastrano
inside his house together with Salva. A few minutes later, Pastrano and Salva heard
gunshots coming from the direction of the gate of the compound. After succeeding in
untying themselves, Pastrano and Salva went to report the matter to the police. On
their way, they found outside the gate the lifeless body of Atty. Garay (dead with 3
gunshot wounds). On 28 January 1986, Dionanao was "picked-up for investigation"
and interrogated by Cpl. Ephraim Valles inside the Police Station in Tanjay where he
implicated accused Sedigo. The following day, on 29 January 1986, he was brought to
the Office of the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay, Atty. Ruben Zerna, where he
supposedly executed his extrajudicial confession in the presence of the latter. On 4
February 1986, upon the suggestion of another investigator, Cpl. Valles took the
Supplementary Sworn Statement of Dionanao, again in the presence of Atty. Zerna. In
his Sworn Statement, Dionanao supposedly admitted that he was with Bandula when
the latter, together with "Boy Short" and "Boy Tall," shot Atty. Garay. He added that
he was going to be killed if he did not join the group. He also said that Sedigo and
Ejan were with them that evening. Then, in his Supplementary Sworn Statement, he
implicated 3 more persons but they were not thereafter included in the Information. Pn
the other hand, Bandula was arrested on 28 January 1986, at around 6:00 a.m.,
brought to the Tanjay Police Station and there interrogated. He was investigated by
Cpl. Borromeo, Cpl. Esparicia, Cpl. Ebarso, Pat. Moso and Pat. Baldejera. In that
investigation, Bandula allegedly admitted that he together with 2 others shot Atty.
Garay with a .38 cal. revolver. At that time, there was no counsel present "because
that (investigation) was not yet in writing." Two weeks after his arrest, Bandula
allegedly gave a sworn statement in the presence of Atty. Zerna admitting his
participation in the killing of Atty. Garay. In that statement, Bandula narrated that
after "Boy Short" and "Boy Tall" shot Atty. Garay, he (Bandula) was ordered likewise
to shoot the latter which he did. Bandula, Sedigo, Dionanao and Ejan were were
charged for robbery with homicide. On 5 May 1989, after hearing 12 prosecution and
9 defense witnesses, the trial court rendered judgment finding Bandula guilty of the
crime charged. However, his 3 co-accused were acquitted "for insufficiency of
evidence."
Issue:
Whether admissions obtained during custodial interrogations requires mere counsel or
independent counsel present.
Held:
Bandula and Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no
counsel present. If at all, counsel came in only a day after the custodial investigation
with respect to Dionanao, and two weeks later with respect to Bandula. And, counsel
who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the Municipal Attorney
of Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale signs that violence was used against
Bandua. Certainly, these are blatant violations of the Constitution which mandates in
Section 12, Art. III, that (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force,
violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as
well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices,
and their families. The present case is analogous to the more recent case of People v.
De Jesus, where it was held that admissions obtained during custodial interrogations
without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the
presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution. The Constitution also
requires that counsel be independent. Obviously, he cannot be a special counsel,
public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose
interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. Granting that Atty. Zerna assisted
Dionanao and Bandula when they executed their respective extrajudicial confessions,
still their confessions are inadmissible in evidence considering that Atty. Zerna does
not qualify as an independent counsel. As a legal officer of the municipality, he
provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying
out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenance of peace
and order. It is thus seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the
defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. He is no better than a
fiscal or prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during custodial investigations.
People vs. Quidato [GR 117401, 1 October 1998]
Facts:
Bernardo Quidato, Sr. was the father of Bernardo Quidato, Jr. and Leo Quidato. Being
a widower, Bernardo lived alone in his house at Sitio Libod, Brgy. Tagbaobo,
Kaputian, Davao. He owned 16 hectares of coconut land in the area. On 16 September
1988, Bernardo, accompanied by his son, and two hired hands, Reynaldo Malita and
Eddie Malita, went to Davao City to sell 41 sacks of copra. After selling the copra,
Bernardo paid the Malita brothers for their labor, who thereafter left. Bernardo Sr. and
Bernardo Jr. went back to Sitio Libod that same day. At around 6:00 p.m. of 17
September 1988, Bernardo Jr. asked Reynaldo Malita to come to the former's house to
discuss an important matter. Upon Reynaldo's arrival at Bernardo Jr.'s house, he saw
that his brother Eddie was already there. They started drinking beer. Bernardo Jr.
thereafter proposed that they rob and kill his father. They went to Bernardo's house
only at 10:00 p.m., after the rain had stopped. Reynaldo brought along a bolo. Upon
reaching the house, Bernardo Jr. knocked on the door, asking his father to let them in.
When Bernardo opened the door, Eddie rushed in and knocked the old man down.
Reynaldo then hacked Bernardo on the nape and neck. Bernardo Jr. and Eddie
ransacked Bernardo's aparador looking for money but they found none; so, the 3 of
them left. The body of Bernardo was discovered the next day by Bernardo Jr.'s son,
who had gone there to call his Lolo for breakfast. On 27 September 1988, Leo
Quidato confronted his brother regarding the incident and learned that Reynaldo and
Eddie Malita were the ones responsible for Bernardo's death. The two were promptly
arrested by the police. Aside from arresting the latter two, however, the police also
arrested Bernardo Jr. On 29 September 1988, the Malita brothers were interrogated by
Patrolman Lucrecio Mara at the Kaputian Police Station. When Mara apprised them of
their constitutional rights, including their right to counsel, they signified their intent to
confess even in the absence of counsel. Aware that the same would be useless if given
in the absence of counsel, Mara took down the testimony of the two but refrained from
requiring the latter to sign their affidavits. Instead, he escorted the Malita brothers to
Davao City and presented them, along with their unsigned affidavits, to a CLAO (now
PAO) lawyer, Jonathan Jocom. Informed of the situation, Atty. Jocom conferred with
Reynaldo and Eddie, again advising the two of their constitutional rights. The CLAO
lawyer explained the contents of the affidavits, in Visayan, to the Malita brothers, who
affirmed the veracity and voluntary execution of the same. Only then did Reynaldo
and Eddie affix their signatures on the affidavits. On 17 January 1989, Bernardo Jr.
was charged with the crime of parricide before the Regional Trial Court of Davao. A
murder case was likewise filed against his co-accused, Reynaldo Malita and Eddie
Malita. Bernardo Jr. and the Malita brothers pleaded not guilty. The two cases were
tried jointly. The Malita brothers withdrew their "not guilty" plea during trial and were
accordingly sentences. Only Bernardo Jr.'s case was tried on merits. After due trial
and on 2 March 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Davao, Branch 4, rendered
judgment finding Bernardo Quidato, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-
principal in the offense of Parricide which falls under Article 246 (of the Revised
Penal Code), for the death of his father, Bernardo Quidato, Sr., and accordingly, was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties
provided by law and to indemnify the other heirs of Bernardo Quidato, Sr., the amount
of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs. Bernardo Jr. appealed.
Issue:
Whether an initially uncounseled extrajudicial confession, signed in the presence of a
counsel in a later day, is admissible as evidence against the accused.
Held:
The prosecution relied heavily on the affidavits executed by Reynaldo and Eddie. The
two brothers were, however, not presented on the witness stand to testify on their
extrajudicial confessions. The failure to present the two gives these affidavits the
character of hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take
the witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be
excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay. The voluntary
admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence against
his co-accused when the latter had not been given an opportunity to hear him testify
and cross-examine him. Likewise, the manner by which the affidavits were obtained
by the police render the same inadmissible in evidence even if they were voluntarily
given. The settled rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial confession without a valid
waiver of the right to counsel — that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel — is
inadmissible in evidence. It is undisputed that the Malita brothers gave their
statements to Patrolman Mara in the absence of counsel, although they signed the
same in the presence of counsel the next day. Given the inadmissibility in evidence of
Gina Quidato's (accused’s wife) testimony, as well as of Reynaldo and Eddie's
extrajudicial confessions, nothing remains on record with which to justify a judgment
unfavorable to Bernardo Jr. He was therefore acquitted.
People vs. Januario [GR 98252, 7 February 1997]
Facts:
Vicente Dilanco Pons, Santiago Cid's cousin, purportedly acting upon the instructions
of Doris Wolf, borrowed from Myrna Temporas the amount of P48,500.00 and used
the an Isuzu passenger type jeepney
(Plate DFB 550) as a collateral. The amount was given to Pons in P10,000.00 cash and
the balance in a check payable to Doris Wolf. The check was encashed as it was
cleared from Myrna Temporas' account. It bore a signature supposedly of Doris Wolf
at its back portion and a second endorsement by Pons who subsequently deposited it
in his account. On September 11, Temporas asked Pons to secure a special power of
attorney from Doris Wolf. Pons promised to comply in one or two weeks. But Pons
failed to pay the indebtedness. So, Myrna Temporas repeatedly went to his house in
Digmaan, Camarines Sur to collect the amount borrowed but Pons always promised
that he himself would go to her house to pay. Inasmuch as Pons also failed to produce
a deed of sale covering the jeepney, Temporas lodged a complaint against him for
estafa before the NBI. Meanwhile, Andrew Patriarca, Sr. reported the disappearance
of his son, Andrew, Jr., the jeepney and its driver to the police detachment in Bulihan,
Silang, Cavite and the police stations in Silang and Imus, Cavite. Two weeks after 4
September 1987, the body of 23-year-old Andrew Patriarca, Jr. was found in a
sugarcane plantation in Maguyam. His head was severed from his body. The body of
the driver, Geronimo Malibago, stepfather of Doris Wolf, the owner of the jeepney,
was recovered after the harvest of sugarcane in the plantation in Maguyam.
Malibago's widow identified the body from its clothing. Acting on the complaint, the
NBI contacted the relatives of the owner of the jeepney who went to Camarines Sur,
identified the jeepney and informed the NBI that its driver (deceased Geronimo
Malibago) and conductor (deceased Andrew Patriarca, Jr.) had been killed by
carnappers. Patriarca's widow also filed a complaint with the NBI. Upon investigation,
an NBI team led by Supervising Agent Magno Toribio found out that the carnapping
of the jeepney and the killing of Patriarca and Malibago were the "handiwork" of a
group of 4 persons named Rene Januario, Efren Canape, Eliseo Sarita alias Toto, and
Eduardo Sarinos alias Digo. The team also discovered that the jeepney was disposed
of through Cid. Januario and Canape, as well as Cid, were arrested in Camarines Sur.
The NBI then invited Pons and Temporas to shed light on the carnapping incident.
The jeepney was recovered in an auto shop with its engine partly dismantled. Upon
being informed by the NBI that the jeepney had been found, an insurance company
brought it back to Manila. From the "oral investigation" they conducted at the Naga
City NBI office on 27 March 1988, the team learned that Sarita and Sarinos took
Patriarca and Malibago inside a sugar plantation where presumably they were killed.
Because Januario and Canape volunteered that their companions were their neighbors
in Paliparan, Dasmariñas, Cavite who could be in Manila already, the NBI team
decided to take down their statements at the NBI head office in Manila. The team
traveled with Januario and Canape to Manila, arriving there at around 1:00 p.m. of 28
March 1988. At the Taft Avenue head office of the NBI, the team took the statements
of Januario and Canae one at a time. They asked Atty. Carlos Saunar, who was "just
around somewhere," to assist Januario and Canape during the investigation. Agent
Arlis Vela took the statement of Januario while Supervising Agent Toribio took that
of Canape. On 7 November 1988, an Information signed by Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Jose M. Velasco, Jr., was filed against Rene Januario and Efren Canape, and
their co-accused Santiago Cid, Eliseo Sarita @ Toto and Eduardo Sarinos @ Digo
charging them with violation of Republic Act 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Law).
Arraigned on 7 February 1989, Januario and Canape, assisted by counsel de oficio,
pleaded not guilty. On 30 May 1989, Cid, assisted by counsel de parte, likewise
entered a plea of not guilty. Sarita and Sarinos remained at large. After trial, the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch XVIII in Tagaytay City, disposing of Criminal
Case TG-1392-89, rendered judgment finding Januario and Canape guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 14, last sentence, of Republic
act 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Law, and imposed upon them the
supreme penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or life imprisonment, and ordered them to pay
jointly and severally, but separately, the heirs of their victims, namely, Geronimo
Malibago and Andrew Patriarca, Jr., the sums of: (a) P50,000.00 for moral damages;
(b) P50,000.00 for exemplary damages; (c) P25,000.00 for actual damages, and to pay
the costs of the proceeding. Januario and Canape appealed.
Issue:
Whether Saunar’s presence as counsel in the custodial investigations satisfies the
requirements of Article III, section 12 (1).
Held:
Proof of Saunar's presence during the custodial investigation of Januario and Canape
is, however, not a guarantee that their respective confessions had been taken in
accordance with Article III, Section 12 (1) of the Constitution. This constitutional
provision requires that a person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have no less than "competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice." Saunar was not the choice of Januario as his custodial investigation counsel.
Arguendo that Saunar's competence as a lawyer is beyond question, under the
circumstances described by the prosecution however, he could not have been the
independent counsel solemnly spoken of by the Constitution. He was an applicant for
a position in the NBI and therefore it can never be said that his loyalty was to the
confessants. In fact, he was actually employed by the NBI a few months after. Further,
although Saunar might have really been around to properly apprise Januario of his
constitutional right as reflected in the written sworn statement itself, the same cannot
be said about Canape. Canape was not properly informed of his constitutional rights.
Perfunctorily informing a confessant of his constitutional rights, asking him if he
wants to avail of the services of counsel and telling him that he could ask for counsel
if he so desires or that one could be provided him at his request, are simply not in
compliance with the constitutional mandate. In this case, appellant Canape was merely
told of his constitutional rights and posthaste, asked whether he was willing to
confess. His affirmative answer may not, by any means, be interpreted as a waiver of
his right to counsel of his own choice. Furthermore, the right of a person under
custodial investigation to be informed of his rights to remain silent and to counsel
implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain and to
contemplate an effective communication that results in an understanding of what is
conveyed. Canape's sworn statement, which reads and sounds so lifeless on paper,
fails to reflect compliance with this requirement. Neither does the testimony of NBI
Agent Toribio. Bearing in mind that Canape reached only the fifth grade, the NBI
agents should have exerted more effort in explaining to him his constitutional rights.
The law enforcement agents' cavalier disregard of Januario's and Canape's
constitutional rights is shown not only by their failure to observe Section 12 (1) of
Article III of the Constitution. They have likewise forgotten the third paragraph of
Section 12 of the same article which mandates that an admission of facts related to a
crime must be obtained with the assistance of counsel; otherwise it would be
inadmissible in evidence against the person so admitting.
People vs. Labtan [GR 127493, 8 December 1999]
Facts:
On 28 March 1993, at more or less 10:30 p.m. while inside a motor vehicle in the
national highway at Barangay Agusan up to the road at Camaman-an, all of Cagayan
de Oro City, Philippines, Henry Feliciano y Lagura and Orlando Labtan y Daquihon
took away, through intimdation or violence, cash amounting to P720. 00, pioneer
stereo, booster and twitters owned by and belonging to Roman S. Mercado, and a
Seiko Diver wristwatch owned by Ismael P. Ebon, all in all amounting to P10,800.00.
Later on, on or about 16 April 1993, at about 2:30 p.m., more or less, at Buntong,
Camaman- an, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, Feliciano, Orlando Labtan, and
Jonelto Labtan robbed Florentino Bolasito of P30 in cash money. In the course
thereof, Orlando and Jonelto Labtan stabbed Bolasito to death. On 23 April 1993, an
information was filed against Feliciano, Orlando Labtan, and Jonelto Labtan charging
them with robbery with homicide (as per 16 April 1993 incident). Subsequently,
another information dated 20 May 1993 was filed against Feliciano and Orlando
Labtan charging them with highway robbery (as per 28 March 1993 incident). Only
Feliciano pleaded not guilty to the two charges. Orlando Labtan had escaped the
Maharlika Rehabilitation and Detention Center in Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City
where he was detained while Jonelto Labtan has eluded arrest. The two cases were
tried together. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 25
found Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation in
the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the offended party (the heirs of Florentino Bolasito) the sum of P50,000.00
and to pay the offended party the sum of P35,000.00 representing funeral expenses
and to pay the cost. The trial court also found Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of highway robbery, and sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty
of 12 years of prision mayor as the minimum term to 14 years, 8 months of reclusion
temporal in its minimum period as the maximum term and to indemnify Roman S.
Mercado the sum of P8,000.00, representing the value of the P700.00 cash, stereo,
booster, and twitter and to indemnify Ismael Ebon the sum of P2,500.00, the value of
the Seiko Wrist watch divested from him and to pay the cost. The trial court convicted
Feliciano on the basis of his sworn statement which he repudiated during the trial.
Feliciano appealed.

Issue:
Whether the counselling of Atty. Pepito Chavez to Feliciano cured the initial lack of
counsel.
Held:
Feliciano had been denied of his right to have a competent and independent counsel
when he was questioned in the Cagayan de Oro City Police Station. SPO1 Alfonso
Cuarez testified that he started questioning Feliciano at 8:00 a.m. of 22 April 1993
regarding his involvement in the killing of jeepney driver Florentino Bolasito,
notwithstanding the fact that he had not been apprised of his right to counsel.
Feliciano had been subjected to custodial investigation without a counsel; inasmuch as
when SPO1 Cuarez investigated Feliciano, the latter was already a suspect in the
killing of jeepney driver Bolasito. Further, Atty. Chavez did not provide the kind of
counselling required by the Constitution. He did not explain to Feliciano the
consequences of his action — that the sworn statement can be used against him and
that it is possible that he could be found guilty and sent to jail. Furthermore, Atty.
Chavez’s independence as counsel is suspect — he is regularly engaged by the
Cagayan de Oro City Police as counsel de officio for suspects who cannot avail the
services of counsel. He even received money from the police as payment for his
services.
People vs. Samus [GR 135957-58, 17 September 2002]
Facts:
Guillermo Samus was a farmer, tilling and living in the land of Miguel Completo at
Barangay Niugan, Cabuyao, Laguna. The victims, 62 year old Dedicacion Balisi and
her grandson, 6 year old John Ardee Balisi, were the neighbors of Samus’ father at
San Ramon de Canlubang, Brgy. Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna. At 4:20 P.M. on 2
September 1996, Senior Police (SP) Inspector Rizaldy H. Garcia was at his office at
the 4th PNP Criminal Investigation Group Regional Office at Camp Vicente Lim in
Calamba, Laguna when he received an order from his superior to investigate the
murder of the two victims. Their office had received a telephone call from a local
barangay official informing them of the victims’ deaths. Arriving at the victims’
residence at Block 8, Lot 6 at San Ramon, Brgy. Canlubang, Calamba, Garcia and his
team conducted an investigation, making a sketch of the relative positions of the
victims, lifting fingerprints from the crime scene and taking pictures. Thereafter, an
investigation report was prepared by Garcia and signed by his superior, Colonel Pedro
Tango. The investigators likewise found a pair of maong pants, a white T-shirt, a
handkerchief and dirty slippers in the bathroom and roof of the house. A pair of
earrings worn by Dedicacion Balisi was likewise reported missing from her body by
her daughter, Nora B. Llorera. The victims’ bodies were brought to the Funeraria
Señerez de Mesa in Calamba. On that same day, Ponciano Pontanos, Jr., then a
resident of Barangay Niugan, Cabuyao and an acquaintance of Samus, happened to
meet Samus at Sammy Pacheca’s house in the same barangay where Samus asked
Ponciano to accompany him to Ponciano’s wife to pawn a pair of earrings. Ponciano’s
wife was mad at first but upon Ponciano’s prodding, gave Samus P300.00 with no
interest. The earrings were placed in a jewelry box; thereafter, Samus received another
P250.00. At 6:00 P.M. on 10 September 1996, Major Jose Pante of the Criminal
Investigation Group received information that Samus was the principal suspect in the
killing of the 2 victims and that he was sighted inside the residence of spouses Rolly
and Josie Vallejo at Barangay Macabling, Sta. Rosa, Laguna. He then formed and led
a team composed of SPO3 Galivo, Intelligence Commission Officer Casis and SPO3
Mario Bitos. Arriving at the site at past 7:00 P.M., the team, accompanied by local
barangay authorities, asked permission from the Vallejo spouses to enter the house,
which was granted. Shortly thereafter, they heard loud footsteps on the roof. Rushing
outside, they saw Samus crawling on the roof. They ordered him to stop, but he
suddenly jumped from the roof and landed hard on the ground, sustaining an injury on
his ankle and bruises on his left and right forearm. At that point, the police team
closed in on Samus who, while trembling and shaking, admitted the killings upon a
query from Rolly Vallejo. Samus was brought to the Camp Vicente Lim PNP
Investigation Office where he was informed of his constitutional rights by SPO3 Alex
Malabanan. In the morning of 11 September 1996, Samus, assisted by Atty. Arturo
Juliano, gave his statement admitting the killings. SPO3 Malabanan also took the
statements of tricycle driver Rafael Baliso, the victims’ relatives Salvacion and Mona
Balisi and witness Mary Arguelles, who saw Samus enter the house of Dedicacion
Balisi. On the same day, PNP Fingerprint Examiner Reigel Allan Sorra took
fingerprint samples from Samus. His prints exactly matched with a set of prints found
at the crime scene. Later that day, SPO3 Mario Bitos was able to recover the pawned
earrings from Ponciano who turned them over to SPO3 Malabanan. Two separate
Informations were filed on 27 November 1996, charging Samus (in Criminal Case
5015-96-C) with homicide for the death of one Dedicacion Balisi y Soriano (61 years
old), and (in Criminal Case 5016-96-C) with murder for the death of one John Ardee
Balisi y Soriano (6 years old). When arraigned on 28 May 1997, Samus, assisted by
his counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. In due course, the Regional Trial Court of
Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, found Samus guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide (Criminal Case 5015-96- C), sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of 10 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as minimum up to 20 years of
Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of
Dedicacion Balisi the amount of P50,000.00 for her death and another P50,000.00 as
and for moral and actual damages and cost of suit. The trial court also found Samus
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder (Criminal Case 5016- 96-C),
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of
John Ardee Balisi the amount of P50,000.00 for his death and another P50,000.00 as
and for moral and actual damages and cost of suit. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue:
Whether uncounselled admission are absolutely inadmissible.
Held:
After being illegally arrested, Samus was not informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel. Hence, any admission
elicited from him by the law enforcers during custodial investigation are normally
inadmissible in evidence. In their affidavits, the police officers readily admitted that
Samus was subjected to a preliminary interview. Yet, during their examination in open
court, they tried to skirt this issue by stating that it was only the media that had
questioned Samus, and that they were merely present during the interview. However,
an examination of the testimonies of the three law enforcers show the folly of their
crude attempts to camouflage inadmissible evidence. In the absence of testimony from
any of the media persons who allegedly interviewed Samus, the uncertainties and
vagueness about how they questioned and led him to his confession lead us to believe
that they themselves investigated Samus and elicited from him uncounselled
admissions. This fact is clearly shown by the Affidavits they executed on 11
September 1997, as well as by their testimonies on cross-examination. Nonetheless,
even if the uncounselled admission per se may be inadmissible, under the present
circumstances the Court cannot rule it out because of Samus' failure to make timely
objections. Indeed, the admission is inadmissible in evidence under Article III, Section
12(1) and (3) of the Constitution, because it was given under custodial investigation
and was made without the assistance of counsel. However, the defense failed to object
to its presentation during the trial, with the result that the defense is deemed to have
waived objection to its admissibility. If only Samus had made a timely objection to the
admissibility of Pontaños testimony and the picture of a pair of earrings together with
the turnover receipt, which Samus identified during his testimony, the prosecution
could have been warned of the need to present additional evidence to support its case.
To disregard unceremoniously a major portion of its case at this late stage when it can
no longer present additional evidence as substitute for that which is now claimed to be
inadmissible goes against fundamental fairness.
People vs. Gallardo [GR 113684, 25 January 2000]
Facts:
On 28 July 1991, the lifeless body of Edmundo Orizal was found in the rest house of
Ronnie Balao in Balzain, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. In an autopsy performed by Dr.
Edmundo Borja, Tuguegarao Municipal Health Officer, the victim was found to have
sustained 7 gunshot wounds in the chest, abdomen, back, left and right thighs, and two
(2) grazing wounds on the left arm and back. Investigation by the Tuguegarao police
station identified the suspects in the murder of Edmundo Orizal as Armando Gallardo
y Gander, Alfredo Columna y Correa (alias Fermin), and Jessie Micate y Orteza. The
police received information that the suspects were detained at the Camalaniugan
Police Station because of other criminal charges. So elements of the Tuguegarao
police went to the Camalaniugan Police Station in August 1991 to fetch the suspects.
Only Gallardo and Columna were in the custody of the Camalaniugan Police Station.
Gallardo and Columna were brought to the Tuguegarao Police Department. On
August 18, 1991, they were investigated by Police Investigator SPO4 Isidro Marcos,
and they gave statements admitting that they, together with Jessie Micate, killed
Edmundo Orizal. During the investigation, the dialect used was Ilocano, the native
tongue of the accused, and during the taking of the statements, Atty. Rolando Velasco
assisted them. Judge Vilma Pauig was present. She administered the oath on the jurat
of the statements. Galardo and Columna signed their statements admitting the killing
of Edmundo Orizal. On 7 November 1991, on the basis of the sworn confessions of
the accused, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan an information charging the accused with murder. On 2
December 1991, all three accused entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued. In due
course, the trial court found them guilty of murder for the treacherous killing of
Edmundo Orizal and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua and to pay in
solidum the heirs of Edmundo Orizal in the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for death
and P150,000.00 as moral damages. Gallardo, Columna and Micate appealed.
Issue:
Whether the counsel provided by the State to the accused satisfies the Constitutionlal
requirement that a competent and independent counsel be present in a custodial
investigation.
Held:
The extrajudicial confessions of the accused were given after they were completely
and clearly apprised of their Constitutional rights. A lawyer assisted them and a judge
administered their oath. while the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person
under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged
in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the
counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection
against the former's appointment during the course of the investigation and the
accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing
officer. Herein, although Atty. Velasco was provided by the State and not by the
accused themselves, the accused were given an opportunity whether to accept or not to
accept him as their lawyer. They were asked and they immediately agreed to have
Atty. Velasco as their counsel during the investigation. There is no requirement in the
Constitution that the lawyer of an accused during custodial investigation be previously
known to them. The Constitution provides that the counsel be a competent and
independent counsel, who will represent the accused and protect their Constitutionally
guaranteed rights. Further, to be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all
the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended
to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it
was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the
accused to admit something false. The counsel, however, should never prevent an
accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Herein, Atty. Velasco acted
properly in accordance with the dictates of the Constitution and informed the accused
of their Constitutional rights. Atty. Velasco assisted the accused and made sure that
the statements given by the accused were voluntary on their part, and that no force or
intimidation was used by the investigating officers to extract a confession from them.
Under rules laid by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, a confession to
be admissible must satisfy all four fundamental requirements, namely: (1) the
confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express; and (4) the
confession must be in writing. All these requirements were complied with.
People vs. Barasina [GR 109993, 21 January 1994]
Facts:
It was around 6:40 p.m. of 17 July 1988 when Fiscal Lino Mayo of Olongapo City
succumbed to a single bullet on his side of his face fired by a gunman from an
unlicensed .45 caliber firearm while the former was walking at the VIP parking lot of
the Victory Liner Compound at Caloocan City. The gun man continued walking at the
same time holding his gun with two hands trying to cock it. After walking a few
meters, the gun man tucked the gun in his right waist and began running away.
Barangay Councilman Prudencio Motos and about four other men (among them, Ruel
Ganiola and Michael Estapia, both porters) chased the gun man. When the gun man
was about to reach the LRT Station, they shouted at the policeman conducting traffic
in the area and pointed at the running man. The policeman, Pfc. Napoleon Francia,
shouted at the gun man, who stopped and raised his hands. Pfc. Francia then
confiscated a .45 cal. pistol from the gun man. Afterwards, Pfc. Francia, Councilman
Motos and others brought the gun man to the Kalookan City Police Headquarters
aboard a passenger jeep. The gun man was identified later as Elias Barasina y
Laynesa. Barasina was charged for violation of Preisdential Decree 1866 (illegal
possession of firearms). Barasina, "John Doe" and "Peter Doe" (true names, real
identities and present whereabouts of the last two mentioned accused, still unknown)
were also charge for the crime of murder. When haled to respond to the inculpations,
Barasina was indifferent in entering any plea, thus the plea of not guilty to the two
criminal charges was entered by the trial court in his behalf. In the course of the trial,
Barasina, through counsel, filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of double jeopardy,
i.e. in jeopardy of being convicted of two offenses — Murder and Illegal Possession
of Firearms. In an Order, dated 17 August 1989, the Court denied the Motion to
Quash. On trial, one of the principal defenses set up by Barasina was that he was
mauled, maltreated and forced to sign two documents by the Caloocan policemen
while he was inside a small cell inside the Caloocan City Police Headquarters. He
identified those 2 documents, the "Paalala", dated 18 July 1988, and his statement
dated 18 July 1988. He further claimed that he never read any of those documents and
that he was not assisted by any lawyer during their execution, and that he does not
know of any Atty. Abelardo Torres. He signed an Affidavit of retraction dated 22 July
1988. On 28 February 1990, the trial court found Barasina guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of (1) violation of Par. 1 of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm); and (2)
Murder, and sentenced him (1) as a result of his conviction under PD 1866 to suffer
imprisonment of 17 Years, 4 Months and 1 Day of Reclusion Temporal as minimum
to 20 Years of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and to pay the costs, and (2) as a
result of his conviction of Murder, to suffer imprisonment of 10 Years and 1 Day of
Prision Mayor, as minimum to 18 Years, 8 Months and 1 Day of Reclusion Temporal,
as maximum, and to pay the costs. The trial court also directed Barasina to indemnify
the heirs of the victim, Fiscal Lino Mayo, the amount of P61,000.00 representing the
funeral and burial expenses of the victim and the amount of P500 ,000.00 representing
the moral damages suffered by his widow and the loss of income as a result of the
victim's death at the age of 50 years. On 29 December 1992, the Court of Appeals (de
Pano, Elbiñas, Gutierrez [P], JJ.), acting on the appeal interposed by Barasina,
rendered a decision increasing the penalties imposed on Barasina to reclusion perpetua
for each of the two crimes committed. The records do not show that the case was
certified by the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 13, Rule
124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure although the records of the case were
forwarded to to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals on 11 May 1993 after the
assailed decision was promulgated on 29 December 1992. In any event, the appeal
was later accepted by the Supreme Court and Barasina was thereupon required to file
his brief following which the Solicitor General filed a brief for the People.
Issue:
Whether the admissions made in the custodial investigation attended to by Atty.
Abelardo Torres, a lawyer which Barasina did not expressly choose as counsel to
assist him therein, are inadmissible.
Held:
Section 12 (1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution dealing with the rights of a person
undergoing investigation reads "Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." The phrase "competent and
independent" and "preferably of his own choice" were explicit details which were
added upon the persistence of human rights lawyers in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission who pointed out cases where, during the martial law period, the lawyers
made available to the detainee would be one appointed by the military and therefore
beholden to the military. Yet, the apprehension of the human rights advocates then
along this line hardly inspires belief in the present inasmuch as there was no indication
below that Barasina did in fact choose Atty. Romeo Mendoza to assist him while in
the process of offering the inculpatory statements, to the exclusion of other lawyers
(The hiring of Atty. Romeo Mendoza as counsel by Barasina after the custodial
investigation appears to be an afterthought). Withal, the word "preferably" under
Section 12 [1], Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the message that
the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other
equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule
were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation will be solely in the hands
of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by
simply selecting lawyer who for one reason or another, is not available to protect his
interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by the framers of the
charter.

People vs. Morial [GR 129295, 15 August 2001]
Facts:
At 6:00 p.m. on 6 January 1996, at Benjamin Morial's house at Barangay Cagnituan,
Maasin, Southern Leyte, Gabriel Guilao (62 years old) saw Nonelito Abiñon slapped
Paula Bandibas' neck. Paula fell and was stabbed by Edwin Morial with a small,
sharp, pointed weapon. Leonardo Morial stood outside the house. Gabriel also saw
Paula Bandibas' grandson, Albert Bandibas, run towards his grandmother's garden,
and later heard the crushing sound of a stone against flesh. Abinon and the two
Morials stayed in the house for about 10 minutes after the killing the victims.
Thereafter, they departed and headed towards the nearby houses. Benjamin Morial,
Paula's common-law husband, who was in neighboring Barangay Maria Clara (7½
kilometers away from Barangay Cagnituan) when the incident took place, arrived at
Barangay Cagnituan at around 4:00 p.m. the next day. As was his wont, Benjamin
called out Paula's name when he was some 5 meters from the house. There was no
answer. Benjamin raced to the house, heading straight to the bedroom. There, he
found the clothes all topsy-turvy. The box where he and Paula hid their money was
turned upside down. Someone had ransacked their house. Benjamin moved back and
saw Paula lying on the floor with a cut in her neck. He shouted for help. Responding
to his cries, Benjamin's neighbors, including barangay kagawads Patricio Abiñon and
Rufino Guilao, rushed to his house. Benjamin asked his neighbors to help search for
Albert, who was found shortly some 50 meters from the house. Albert Bandibas laid
flat on the ground with two stones near his head. Benjamin requested Patricio to send
someone to report the incident to the police. Upon learning of Benjamin's return to
Barangay Cagnituan, Gabriel Guilao hurried to Benjamin's house. He revealed to the
grieving Benjamin that he witnessed Paula's killing and that Edwin Morial, Leonardo
Morial and Nonelito Abiñon were the perpetrators. Benjamin advised Gabriel not to
tell anyone about what he knew for fear that they would all be killed since the
Abiñons were "saturated in their place." Gabriel heeded Benjamin's advice. The police
arrived at around 10:00 p.m. SPO4 Antonio Macion, along with four other police
officers, investigated the tragedy. They found wounds in Paula Bandibas' stomach,
breast and neck. Albert Bandibas, on the other hand, had a contusion on the right side
of his head. Beside him were two stones. After examining the victims' wounds, the
police officers, along with Benjamin Morial, proceeded to the bedroom. Benjamin
informed the officers that P11,000.00 was missing from the moneybox. Other than the
cash, nothing else was missing. Outside the house, Benjamin disclosed to the officers
his three suspects, the accused in this case. He advised them, however, to bring only
Leonardo and Edwin Morial into custody and not to include Nonelito Abiñon, who
had many relatives in Cagnituan. As a former barangay captain of 22 years, he knew
that the Abiñons were "most feared" in Cagnituan. Benjamin did not tell the police
that Gabriel Guilao had witnessed the incident. The police found Edwin and Leonardo
Morial in the house of Nonelito Abiñon and invited the two to the police station,
where they were turned over to SPO4 Andres Fernandez. Leonardo Morial told SPO4
Fernandez that he had no money to pay for the services of counsel. SPO4 Fernandez
informed him that there are many lawyers in their municipality and named some of
them. Leonardo said he did not know any of the lawyers mentioned. SPO4 Fernandez
thus volunteered to obtain a lawyer for the suspect, to which Leonardo Morial
consented. SPO4 Fernandez then contacted Atty. Aguilar. At about 8:00 a.m. of 9
January 1996, Atty. Tobias Aguilar arrived. After being introduced to Leonardo
Morial, Atty. Aguilar had a short conference with him. He asked Leonardo if he was
willing to answer the questions that may be propounded by the police investigator.
Atty. Aguilar warned him that the statements that he may give might be used in
evidence against him. Leonardo said he was willing to answer the questions
voluntarily. According to Atty. Aguilar, Leonardo was bent on revealing what really
happened. Thereafter, SPO4 Fernandez conducted the investigation in Cebuano.
Midway into the investigation, after the police investigator had asked "all the material
points," Atty. Aguilar asked the investigator that he be given leave as he had a very
important engagement. The investigator agreed to the lawyer's request. Before
leaving, Atty. Aguilar asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer the questions in his
absence. He also instructed the police that, after the written confession had been
prepared, the accused and the document containing the confession should be brought
to his office for "further examination." Atty. Aguilar was in the police station for less
than thirty minutes from the start of the interrogation. At about 1:30 or 2:00 p.m.,
Leonardo and his policeman-escort arrived at Atty. Aguilar's office. Atty. Aguilar
asked the accused whether he was maltreated while he was away and examined the
suspect's body for contusions or abrasions. Leonardo told him that he was not harmed
by the police officer. The lawyer then studied the document to determine whether its
contents conformed to the answers given by the accused in his (counsel's) presence.
He propounded questions to Leonardo with reference to the document. Atty. Aguilar
asked him whether he understood its contents and whether he was willing to sign it.
Leonardo replied in the positive and signed the document in the presence of Atty.
Aguilar and the policeman-escort. Edwin Morial, Leonardo Morial (@ Carding) and
Nonelito Abiñon (@ Noly) were charged with robery with homicide. Upon
arraignment, the three accused pleaded not guilty. After trial, the Regional Trial court
rendered a decision convicting all the three accused for the crime of robbery with
homicide, as defined under Article 293 and penalized under Article 294 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code and sentenced (1) Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abiñon to suffer
the supreme penalty of death by lethal injection; and (2) Edwin Morial, due to his
minority, to suffer the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. On the civil aspect of the
case, the court held the three accused libale jointly and severally (1) to indemnify the
heirs of Paula Bandibas the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity; (2) to
indemnify the heirs of Albert Bandibas the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
(3) to indemnify complainant Benjamin Morial the amount of P20,546.00 as actual
damages for the funeral, burial and wake expenses; (4) to pay to the heirs [the]
aforementioned moral damages of P60,000.00 for each death; and (5) to restitute or
restore to Benjamin Morial the P11,000.00 amount robbed. The court also ordered
them to pay the costs. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue:
Whether Leonardo Morila’s extra-judicial confession was valid, inasmuch as the
“material points” were tackled when the counsel, Atty. Aguilar Tobias, was present.
Held:
Leonardo Morial's extra-judicial confession invalid since he was effectively deprived
of his right to counsel during the custodial investigation. An accused under custodial
interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start
thereof. SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify Atty. Aguilar's leaving by claiming that when
the lawyer left, he knew very well that the suspect had already admitted that Leonardo
and his companions committed the crime. Neither can Atty. Aguilar rationalize his
abandoning his client by saying that he left only after the latter had admitted the
"material points," referring to the three accused's respective participation in the crime.
For even as the person under custodial investigation enjoys the right to counsel from
its inception, so does he enjoy such right until its termination — indeed, "in every
phase of the investigation." An effective and vigilant counsel "necessarily and
logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client
from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating
officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession." Furthermore, Section 2(a) of
RA 7438 requires that "[a]ny person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel." The last paragraph of Section 3
of the same law mandates that "[i]n the absence of any lawyer, no custodial
investigation shall be conducted." The right of Leonardo Morial to counsel was
therefore completely negated by the precipitate departure of Atty. Tobias before the
termination of the custodial investigation. If it were true that Atty. Tobias had to
attend to matters so pressing that he had to abandon a client undergoing custodial
investigation, he could have terminated the same to be continued only until as soon as
his schedule permitted, advising the suspect in the meantime to remain silent. This he
failed to do. Appallingly, he even asked his client whether he was willing to answer
questions during the lawyer's absence. The records also disclose that Atty. Tobias
never informed appellant of his right to remain silent, not even before the custodial
investigation started. Atty. Tobias, by his failure to inform appellant of the latter's
right to remain silent, by his "coming and going" during the custodial investigation,
and by his abrupt departure before the termination of the proceedings, can hardly be
the counsel that the framers of the 1987 Constitution contemplated when it added the
modifier "competent" to the word "counsel." Neither can he be described as the
"vigilant and effective" counsel that jurisprudence requires. Precisely, it is Atty.
Tobias' nonchalant behavior during the custodial investigation that the Constitution
abhors and which this Court condemns. His casual attitude subverted the very purpose
for this vital right.That the extra -judicial confession was subsequently signed in the
presence of counsel did not cure its constitutional defects. As Leonardo Morial was
effectively deprived of his right to counsel during custodial investigation, his extra-
judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against him.
People vs. Castro [GR 106583, 19 June 1997]
Facts:
At about 5:30 p.m. of 19 March 1991, Capt. Allyn Evasco together with Sgt. Rogelio
Raguine, Sgt. Emilio de Guzman and CIC Julian Discargar formed a team for the
purpose of conducting a buy-bust operation. The team went to their target area in San
Roque, San Miguel, Pangasinan and proceeded to deploy themselves as planned. Sgt.
de Guzman who acted as poseur-buyer and civilian informer Discargar proceeded to
Victoriano Castro y Calagno's house. Sgt. Raguine, meanwhile, hid in a grassy spot
near the house. Discargar introduced Castro to Sgt. de Guzman who said that he
wanted to purchase a kilo of dried marijuana leaves. After going inside the house,
Castro emerged with a plastic bag which he handed to Sgt. de Guzman who, in turn,
paid him P600.00. After the exchange, Sgt. de Guzman made the pre-arranged signal,
indicating that the transaction was complete, by raising his right hand. Upon espying
the signal, Sgt. Raguine and the other team members approached Castro, introduced
themselves as NARCOM (Narcotics Command) agents, and arrested him. He was
thereafter brought to the San Manuel Police Station. While the arresting team went to
San Fernando, La Union for further investigation, the marijuana leaves were sent to
Camp Crame for examination where it was discovered that the actual weight of the
confiscated marijuana leaves was 930 grams. Castro was charged before the Regional
Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch 38 in an information dated 21 March 1991, for
violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972). After Castro entered a plea of not guilty, trial on the merits commenced. On 29
April 1992, the trial court rendered its decision finding Castro guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P25,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs of the proceedings. Castro appealed.
Issue:
Whether Castro’s signature on the “Receipt of Property Seized” is admissible in
evidence.
Held:
Castro's signature on the "Receipt of Property Seized" is inadmissible in evidence as
there is no showing that he was assisted by counsel when he signed the same. Since
this is a document tacitly admitting the offense charged, the constitutional safeguard
must be observed. Be that as it may, even disregarding this document, there is still
ample evidence to prove Castro's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the same having been
shown by the detailed testimonies of the law officers who took part in the buy-bust
operation.
People vs. Wong Chuen Ming [GR 112801-11, 12 April 1996]
Facts:
On 7 September 1991, at about 1:00 p.m., Philippine Air Lines (PAL) Flight PR 301
from Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in Pasay
City, Metro Manila. Among the many passengers who arrived on board said flight
were Wong Chuen Ming, Au Wing Cheung ,Tan Soi Tee, Chin Kok Wee, Lim Chan
Fatt, Chin Kin Yong, Yap Boon Ah, Chin Kong Song, Chin Kin Fah, Chai Min Huwa
and Lim Nyuk Sun. Their respective passports showed that Wong Chuen Ming and
Au Wing Cheung are the only British (Hongkong) nationals in the group while the rest
are all Malaysian nationals. Their passports also revealed that all Malaysians (except
Lim Chan Fatt) originally came from Malaysia, traveled to Singapore and Hongkong
before proceeding to Manila. Upon the other hand, Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing
Cheung, as well as Lim Chan Fatt, directly came from Hongkong to Manila. Wong
Chuen Ming, et. al. arrived in Manila as a tour group arranged by Select Tours
International Co., Ltd. Au Wing Cheung, an employee of Select Tours International
Co., Ltd. acted as their tour guide. After passing through and obtaining clearance from
immigration officers at the NAIA, the tour group went to the baggage claim area to
retrieve their respective checked-in baggages. They placed the same in one pushcart
and proceeded to Express Lane 5 which at the time was manned by customs examiner
Danilo Gomez. Au Wing Cheung handed to Gomez the tour group's passenger's
manifest, their baggage declarations and their passports. Danilo Gomez instructed the
tour group to place their baggages on the examiner's table for inspection. They were
directed to hold on to their respective baggages while they wait for their turn to be
examined. Chin Kong Song's baggage was first to be examined by Gomez. Gomez put
his hand inside the baggage and in the course of the inspection, he found 3 brown
colored boxes similar in size to powdered milk boxes underneath the clothes. The
boxes were marked Alpen Cereals and as he found nothing wrong with them, Gomez
returned them inside the baggage and allowed Chin Kong Song to go. Following the
same procedure, Gomez next examined the baggage of Wong Chuen Ming. Gomez
again found and pulled out 2 boxes of Alpen Cereals from said baggage and like in the
previous inspection, he found nothing wrong with them and allowed Wong Chuen
Ming to go. The third baggage to be examined belonged to Lim Nyuk Sun. When
Gomez pulled out another 3 boxes of Alpen Cereals from said baggage, he became
suspicious and decided to open one of the boxes with his cutter. Inside the box was a
plastic bag containing white crystalline substance. Alarmed, Gomez immediately
called the attention of Appraiser Oreganan Palala and Duty Collector Zenaida Reyes
Bonifacio to his discovery. Upon learning about the boxes containing the white
crystalline substance, Zenaida Reyes Bonifacio (Chief of the Collection Division and
Acting Duty Collector of the Customs Office at the NAIA) immediately ordered the
tour group to get their baggages and proceed to the district collector's office. Chin
Kong Song and Wong Chuen Ming, who were previously cleared by Gomez, were
also brought inside together with the rest of the group. Inside the collector's office,
Gomez continued to examine the baggages of the other members of the tour group. He
allegedly found that each baggage contained 1, 2 or 3 boxes similar to those
previously found in the baggages of Chin Kong Song, Wong Chuen Ming and Lim
Nyuk Sun. A total of 30 boxes of Alpen Cereals containing white crystalline substance
were allegedly recovered from the baggages of the 11 accused. As Gomez pulled out
these boxes from their respective baggages, he bundled said boxes by putting masking
tape around them and handed them over to Bonifacio. Upon receipt of these bundled
boxes, Bonifacio called out the names of accused as listed in the passengers' manifest
and ordered them to sign on the masking tape placed on the boxes allegedly recovered
from their respective baggages. Also present at this time were Capt. Rustico Francisco
and his men, agents of the Bureau of Customs and several news reporters. A few
minutes later, District Collector Antonio Marquez arrived with General Job Mayo and
then NBI Deputy Director Mariano Mison. Shortly after all boxes of Alpen Cereals
were recovered, Capt. Rustico Francisco, Officer in Charge (OIC) of the Philippine
National Police Narcotics Command Detachment at the NAIA, conducted a field test
on a sample of the white crystalline substance. His test showed that the substance was
indeed "shabu." Capt. Francisco immediately informed the 11 accused that they were
under arrest. Thereafter, all accused, as well as the Alpen Cereals boxes which were
placed inside a big box, were brought to Camp Crame. At Camp Crame, accused were
asked to identify their signatures on the boxes and after having identified them, they
were again made to sign on the plastic bags containing white crystalline substance
inside the boxes bearing their signatures. The examination by Elizabeth Ayonon, a
forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame,
confirmed that the white crystalline substance recovered from accused was "shabu."
The total weight of "shabu" recovered was placed at 34.45 kilograms. 11 separate
criminal informations were filed against all of the accused individually. The counsel
of Au Wing Cheung earlier filed a petition for reinvestigation and deferment of his
arraignment but the same was denied by the trial court for lack of merit. At their
respective arraignments, all accused with the assistance of their counsels, includin Au
Wing Cheung pleaded not guilty to the charge. The trial court conducted a joint and/or
consolidated trial of all the cases upon motion by the prosecution considering that the
State had common testimonial and documentary evidence against all accused. On 29
November 1991, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109 of Pasay City, found the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article III of
Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972; and sentenced each to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00. Wong Chuen
Ming and Au Wing Cheung appealed.
Issue:
Whether the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic bags
containing "shabu", are admissible in evidence.
Held:
The Court holds that the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic
bags containing "shabu", are inadmissible in evidence. A careful study of the records
reveals that accused were never informed of their fundamental rights during the entire
time that they were under investigation. Specifically, accused were not informed of
their Miranda rights i.e. that they had the right to remain silent and to counsel and any
statement they might make could be used against them, when they were made to affix
their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals while they were at the NAIA and again,
on the plastic bags when they were already taken in custody at Camp Crame. By
affixing their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic bags,
accused in effect made a tacit admission of the crime charged for mere possession of
"shabu" is punished by law. These signatures of accused are tantamount to an
uncounselled extra-judicial confession which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights
(Section 12[1][3], Article III, 1987 Constitution). They are, therefore, inadmissible as
evidence for any admission wrung from the accused in violation of their constitutional
rights is inadmissible against them. The fact that all accused are foreign nationals does
not preclude application of the "exclusionary rule" because the constitutional
guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights are given and extend to all persons, both
aliens and citizens.
Marcelo vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division) [GR 109242, 26 January 1999]
Facts:
On 10 February 1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in the Makati Central Post
Office, disclosed to his chief, Projecto Tumagan, the existence of a group responsible
for the pilferage of mail matter in the post office. Among those mentioned by Merete
were Arnold Pasicolan, an emergency laborer assigned as a bag opener in the Printed
Matters Section, and Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail sorter of the Makati Post Office.
Merete likewise described the modus operandi of the group. For this reason, Tumagan
sought the aid of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in apprehending the
group responsible for mail pilferage in the Makati Post Office. On 17 February 1989,
NBI Director Salvador Ranin dispatched NBI agents to Legaspi Village following a
report that the group would stage a theft of mail matter on that day. Tumagan
accompanied a team of NBI agents composed of Senior Agent Arles Vela and two
other agents in a private car. They arrived at Legaspi Village at about 1:00 p.m. They
stayed at the corner of Adelantado and Gamboa Streets, while two other teams of NBI
agents waited at Amorsolo Street, near the Esquerra Building. At 2:00 p.m., a postal
delivery jeep, driven by one Henry Orindai, was parked in front of the Esguerra
Building on Adelantado Street. The passengers of the postal delivery jeep were
Arnold Pasicolan, Jacinto Merete, and the driver, Henry Orindai. Pasicolan alighted
from the jeep bringing with him a mail bag. Merete stayed inside the jeep. Pasicolan
then passed through an alley between Esguerra and Montepino Buildings going
towards Amorsolo St. Upon reaching Amorsolo St., Pasicolan gave the mail bag to
two persons, who were later identified as Ronnie Romero and Lito Marcelo. The latter
transferred the contents of the mail bag (i.e., assorted mail matter) to a travelling bag.
The two then secured the bag to the back of their motorcycle. Meanwhile, the NBI
team led by agent Vela, upon seeing Pasicolan going towards Amorsolo St., moved
their car and started towards Amorsolo St. They were just in time to see Pasicolan
handing over the mail bag to Marcelo and Romero. At that point, Atty. Sacaguing and
Arles Vela arrested Marcelo and Romero. Unaware of the arrest of Romero and
Marcelo, Pasicolan went back to the postal delivery jeep and proceeded toward Pasay
Road. The NBI agents followed the postal delivery jeep, overtook it, and arrested
Pasicolan. The NBI agents brought Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero to their
headquarters. They also brought along with them the motorcycle of Romero and
Marcelo and the bag of unsorted mail found in their possession. On their way to the
NBI headquarters, they passed by the Makati Central Post Office, intending to arrest
another suspect, Redentor Aguinaldo. However, they were not able to find him there.
The unsorted mail seized from Marcelo and Romero consisted of 622 letters. The
names of the addressees were listed. They were subsequently notified by the Bureau
of Posts to claim their letters. Many of them, after proper identification, were able to
claim their letters. Some letters contained money. Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan
were asked to affix their signatures on the envelopes of the letters. They did so in the
presence of the members of the NBI Administrative and Investigative Staff and the
people transacting business with the NBI at that time. According to Director Ranin,
they required the accused to do this in order to identify the letters as the very same
letters confiscated from them. Arnold Pasicolan y Mabazza, Ronnie Romero y Santos,
and Lito Marcelo y Cruz were charged with infidelity in the custody of documents.
The case was later withdrawn and another information for qualified theft was filed
before the Sandiganbayan. On 8 March 1993, the Sandiganbayan found all the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of qualified theft.
The Sandiganbayan sentenced Pasiclon the penalty ranging from 8 years, 8 months,
and 1 day of Prision mayor, as minimum, to 13 years, 1 month, and 11 days of
reclusion temporal, as maximum; Romero and Marcelo, the penalty ranging from 7
YEARS, 4 months, and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months,
and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum, each. Marcelo filed the petition for
review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the exclusion of the admission, made through the signatures on the
envelopes, extend to the exclusion from evidence of the letters themselves.
Held:
The purpose for securing the signature of Marcelo, et. al. on the envelopes was to
authenticate the envelopes as the ones seized from him and Ronnie Romero. This
purpose and their signatures on the envelope, when coupled with the testimony of
prosecution witnesses that the envelopes seized from Marcelo were those given to him
and Romero, undoubtedly help establish the guilt of Marcelo. Since these signatures
are actually evidence of admission obtained from Marcelo and his co-accused under
circumstances contemplated in Art. III. §§12(1) and 17 of the Constitution, they
should be excluded. For indeed, Marcelo and his co-accused signed following their
arrest. Hence, they were at the time under custodial investigation, defined as
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way. Under the
Constitution, among the rights of a person under custodial investigation is the right to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice and if the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, that he must be provided with one.
However, the letters are themselves not inadmissible in evidence. The letters were
validly seized from Marcelo and Romero as an incident of a valid arrest. A ruling that
Marcelo's admission that the letters in question were those seized from him and his
companion on 17 February 1989 is inadmissible in evidence does not extend to the
exclusion from evidence of the letters themselves. The letters can stand on their own,
being the fruits of a crime validly seized during a lawful arrest. That these letters were
the ones found in the possession of Marcelo and his companion and seized from them
was shown by the testimonies of Vela and Tumagan. Indeed, Marcelo and his co-
accused were not convicted solely on the basis of the signatures found on the letters
but on other evidence, notably the testimonies of NBI agents and other prosecution
witnesses.
People vs. Andan [GR 116437, 3 March 1997]
Facts:
On 19 February 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in Concepcion Subdivision, Baliuag,
Bulacan, Marianne Guevarra, 20 years of age and a second-year student at the Fatima
School of Nursing, left her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. She was to prepare for her final examinations on 21 February 1994. Marianne
wore a striped blouse and faded denim pants and brought with her two bags containing
her school uniforms, some personal effects and more than P2,000.00 in cash.
Marianne was walking along the subdivision when Pablito Andan y Hernandez invited
her inside his house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's
grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to take her blood pressure as the old
woman was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house.
Andan then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. His
lust sated, Andan dragged the unconscious girl to an old toilet at the back of the house
and left her there until dark. Night came and Andan pulled Marianne, who was still
unconscious, to their backyard. The yard had a pigpen bordered on one side by a 6-
foot high concrete fence. On the other side was a vacant lot. Andan stood on a bench
beside the pigpen and then lifted and draped the girl's body over the fence to transfer it
to the vacant lot. When the girl moved, he hit her head with a piece of concrete block.
He heard her moan and hit her again on the face. After silence reigned, he pulled her
body to the other side of the fence, dragged it towards a shallow portion of the lot and
abandoned it. At 11:00 a.m. of the following day, the body of Marianne was
discovered. She was naked from the chest down with her brassiere and T-shirt pulled
toward her neck. Nearby was found a panty with a sanitary napkin. Marianne's
gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor Cornelio Trinidad of
Baliuag to form a crack team of police officers to look for the criminal. Searching the
place where Marianne's body was found, the policemen recovered a broken piece of
concrete block stained with what appeared to be blood. They also found a pair of
denim pants and a pair of shoes which were identified as Marianne's. Andan's nearby
house was also searched by the police who found bloodstains on the wall of the
pigpen in the backyard. They interviewed the occupants of the house and learned from
Romano Calma, the stepbrother of Andan's wife, that Andan also lived there but that
he, his wife and son left without a word. Calma surrendered to the police several
articles consisting of pornographic pictures, a pair of wet short pants with some
reddish brown stain, a towel also with the stain, and a wet T-shirt. The clothes were
found in the laundry hamper inside the house and allegedly belonged to Andan. The
police tried to locate Andan and learned that his parents live in Barangay Tangos,
Baliuag, Bulacan. On February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a police team led by Mayor Trinidad
traced Andan in his parents' house. They took him aboard the patrol jeep and brought
him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, Andan denied any
knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the police confronted him with the
concrete block, the victim's clothes and the bloodstains found in the pigpen, Andan
relented and said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed
Marianne and that he was merely a lookout. He also said that he knew where Larin
and Dizon hid the two bags of Marianne. Immediately, the police took Andan to his
house. Larin and Dizon, who were rounded up earlier, were likewise brought there by
the police. Andan went to an old toilet at the back of the house, leaned over a flower
pot and retrieved from a canal under the pot, two bags which were later identified as
belonging to Marianne. Thereafter, photographs were taken of Andan and the two
other suspects holding the bags. By this time, people and media representatives were
already gathered at the police headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation.
Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the
mayor, Andan approached him and whispered a request that they talk privately. The
mayor led Andan to the office of the Chief of Police and there, Andan broke down and
said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed
Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and media
representatives witness the confession. The mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist
Andan but since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed
and videotaped. In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media
and Andan's own wife and son, Andan confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he killed
Marianne and volunteered to show them the place where he hid her bags. He asked for
forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying he did it
because of ill-feelings against them. He also said that the devil entered his mind
because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday. After his
confession, Andan hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to help him. His
confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide. Andan
was detained at the police headquarters. The next two days, February 26 and 27, more
newspaper, radio and television reporters came. Andan was again interviewed and he
affirmed his confession to the mayor and reenacted the crime. Pablito Andan y
Hernandez alias "Bobby" was charged with rape with homicide. On arraignment,
however, Andan entered a plea of "not guilty." In a decision dated 4 August 1994, the
trial court convicted Andan and sentenced him to death pursuant to Republic Act
7659. The trial court also ordered Andan to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, P71,000.00 as actual burial expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages.
Hence, the automatic review.
Issue:
Whether Andan’s confession to the police, the mayor, and the newsmen may be
admitted as evidence against Andan.
Held:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
(1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible in evidence against him. The
exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an
unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures
where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully
apparent. The incommunicado character of custodial interrogation or investigation
also obscures a later judicial determination of what really transpired. When the police
arrested Andan, they were no longer engaged in a general inquiry about the death of
Marianne. Indeed, Andan was already a prime suspect even before the police found
him at his parents' house. Andan was already under custodial investigation when he
confessed to the police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his
constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated. His confession is
therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags recovered from Andan's
house. The victim's bags were the fruits of Andan's uncounselled confession to the
police. They are tainted evidence, hence also inadmissible. On the other hand,
however, Andan's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any
interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question Andan at all. No police
authority ordered Andan to talk to the mayor. It was Andan himself who
spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The
mayor did not know that Andan was going to confess his guilt to him. When Andan
talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his
uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights.
Andan's confessions to the media were properly admitted. The confessions were made
in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating
officer. Statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised
interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. The records show that
Alex Marcelino, a television reporter for "Eye to Eye" on Channel 7, interviewed
Andan on 27 February 1994. The interview was recorded on video and showed that
Andan made his confession willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of his wife,
child and other relatives. Orlan Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the People" on Channel
9 also interviewed appellant on 25 February 1994. Andan's confessions to the news
reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities. The
news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed Andan. They were not
acting under the direction and control of the police. They were there to check Andan's
confession to the mayor. They did not force Andan to grant them an interview and
reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his permission before
interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did Andan protest
his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all
the details in the commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his
confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and other relatives.
There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of Andan by the news reporters.
Thus, Andan's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1)
and
(3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself
with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the
relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are
primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the
individual exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken
away by government, rights that government has the duty to protect. Governmental
power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the
individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of
government and its agencies.
People vs. Endino [GR 133026, 20 February 2001]
Facts:
On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October 1991, an
emboldened Gerry Galgarin (@ Toto), uncle of Edward Endino, suddenly and without
warning lunged at Dennis Aquino and stabbed him repeatedly on the chest. Dennis'
girlfriend Clara Agagas who was with him, stunned by the unexpected attack, pleaded
to Galgarin to stop. Dennis struggled and succeeded momentarily to free himself from
his attacker. Dennis dashed towards the nearby Midtown Sales but his escape was
foiled when from out of nowhere Edward Endino appeared and fired at Dennis. As
Dennis staggered for safety, the 2 assailants fled in the direction of the airport.
Meanwhile, Dennis, wounded and bleeding, sought refuge inside the Elohim Store
where he collapsed on the floor. He was grasping for breath and near death. Clara with
the help of some onlookers took him to the hospital but Dennis expired even before he
could receive medical attention. On 18 October 1991, an Information for the murder
of Dennis Aquino was filed against Edward Endino and Gerry Galgarin and warrants
were issued for their arrest. However, as both accused remained at large, the trial court
issued on 26 December 1991 an order putting the case in the archives without
prejudice to its reinstatement upon their apprehension. On 19 November 1992, Gerry
Galgarin was arrested through the combined efforts of the Antipolo and Palawan
police forces at a house in Sitio Sto. Niño, Antipolo, Rizal. He was immediately taken
into temporary custody by the Antipolo Police. Early in the evening of the following
day, he was fetched from the Antipolo Police Station by PO3 Gaudencio Manlavi and
PO3 Edwin Magbanua of the Palawan police force to be taken to Palawan and be tried
accordingly. On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television
station where Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the interview
were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward
Endino as the gunman. According to Galgarin, after attacking Aquino, they left for
Roxas, Palawan, where his sister Langging who is Edward's mother, was waiting.
Langging gave them money for their fare for Manila. They took the boat for Batangas,
where they stayed for a few days, and proceeded to Manila where they separated, with
him heading for Antipolo. Galgarin appealed for Edward to give himself up to the
authorities. His interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening news program TV
Patrol. During trial, Galgarin disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol
and claimed that it was induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He
asserted that the videotaped confession was constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible
under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec. 12, Art. III, of the Constitution. The trial
court found Galgarin guilty of murder qualified by Treachery, sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of Dennis Aquino in the
amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as actual damages.

Issue:
Whether the ABS-CBN interview recording Galgarin’s confession is admissible as
evidence.
Held:
The interview was recorded on video and it showed Galgarin unburdening his guilt
willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not
form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media
men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he
had indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the
newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been sympathetic with him. However,
because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting one's
guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, it is prudent that trial
courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar
confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous
media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extra -judicial confessions and
place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on
television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the
accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system. It is not suggested that
videotaped confessions given before media men by an accused with the knowledge of
and in the presence of police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line between
proper and invalid police techniques and conduct is a difficult one to draw,
particularly in cases such as this where it is essential to make sharp judgments in
determining whether a confession was given under coercive physical or psychological
atmosphere. A word of counsel then to lower courts: "we should never presume that
all media confessions described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of
confession always remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined and
scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult and arduous task
for the courts to make. It requires persistence and determination in separating polluted
confessions from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to be vigilant and protective
of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution."
People vs. Ordono [GR 132154, 29 June 2000]
Facts:
On 5 August 1994, the decomposing body of a young girl was found among the
bushes near a bridge in Barangay Poblacion, Santol, La Union. The girl was later
identified as Shirley Victore, 15 years old, a resident of Barangay Guesset, Poblacion,
Santol, La Union, who 3 days before was reported missing. Post-mortem examination
conducted by Dr. Arturo Llavore, a medico-legal officer of the NBI, revealed that the
victim was raped and strangled to death. Unidentified sources pointed to Pacito
Ordoño and Apolonio Medina as the authors of the crime. Acting on this lead, the
police thereupon invited the 2 suspects and brought them to the police station for
questioning. However, for lack of evidence then directly linking them to the crime,
they were allowed to go home. On 10 August 1994, Ordoño and Medina returned to
the police station one after another and acknowledged that they had indeed committed
the crime. Acting on their admission, the police immediately conducted an
investigation and put their confessions in writing. The investigators however could not
at once get the services of a lawyer to assist the 2 accused in the course of the
investigation because there were no practicing lawyers in the Municipality of Santol, a
remote town of the Province of La Union. Be that as it may, the statements of the 2
accused where nevertheless taken. But before doing so, both accused were apprised in
their own dialect of their constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted by a
competent counsel of their choice. Upon their acquiescence and assurance that they
understood their rights and did not require the services of counsel, the investigation
was conducted with the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the Chief of Police and
other police officers of Santol, La Union, in attendance to listen to and witness the
giving of the voluntary statements of the 2 suspects who admitted their participation in
the crime. After Medina said his piece, his wife and mother suddenly burst into tears.
He then affixed his signature on his statement and so did his wife, followed by all the
other witnesses who listened to his confession. Pacito Ordoño narrated his story in the
afternoon. At the end of his narration Ordoño affixed his thumbmark on his statement
in lieu of his signature as he did not know how to write. Thereafter, Medina and
Ordoño were detained at the Santol police station. News about the apprehension and
detention of the culprits of the rape-slay of Shirley Victore soon spread that Roland
Almoite, leading radio announcer of radio station DZNL, visited and interviewed
them. In the interview, which was duly tape-recorded both accused admitted again
their complicity in the crime and narrated individually the events surrounding their
commission thereof. According to Medina, his remorse in having committed the crime
was so great but his repentance came too late. He and Ordoño hoped that the parents
of Shirley Victore would forgive them. Upon conclusion of the interview, Roland
Almoite immediately went to radio station DZNL and played the taped interview on
the air. The same interview was played again on the air the following morning and
was heard by thousands of listeners. A couple of days later, the police brought the 2
accused to the office of the PAO lawyer in Balaoan, La Union, for assistance and
counseling. In a closed-door session, PAO lawyer Oscar B. Corpuz apprised each of
the accused of his constitutional rights and, even though their confessions were
already written in their dialect, explained to them each of the questions and answers
taken during the investigation. He likewise advised them to ponder the consequences
of their confessions, leading them to defer the affixing of their second
signature/thumbmark thereon. After a week or so, the 2 separately went back to Atty.
Corpuz and informed him of their willingness to affix their signatures and
thumbmarks for the second time in their respective confessions. Once again Atty.
Corpuz apprised the 2 accused of their constitutional rights, explained the contents of
their respective statements, and finally, accompanied them to Judge Fabian M.
Bautista, MTC judge of Balaoan, La Union, who further apprised the 2 accused of
their constitutional rights and asked them if they had been coerced into signing their
confessions. They assured Judge Bautista that their statements had been given freely
and voluntarily. Upon such assurance that they had not been coerced into giving and
signing their confessions, Judge Bautista finally asked Ordoño and Medina to affix
their signatures/thumbmarks on their respective confessions, and to subscribe the
same before him. Atty. Corpuz then signed their statements as their assisting counsel,
followed by a few members of the MTC staff who witnessed the signing. Ordono and
Medina were charged for rape with homicide. On arraignment, in a complete
turnabout, the 2 accused pleaded not guilty. On 11 December 1997, the trial court
adjudged Ordoño and Medina guilty of the crime of rape with homicide attended with
conspiracy, and imposed upon each of them 2 death penalties on the basis of their
extrajudicial confessions. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue:
Whether the custodial investigation made in the presence of the municipal mayor,
parish priest, etc. and/or the taped interview containing the accused’s confessions are
admissible as evidence.
Held:
Custodial investigation began when the accused Ordoño and Medina voluntarily went
to the Santol Police Station to confess and the investigating officer started asking
questions to elicit information and/or confession from them. At such point, the right of
the accused to counsel automatically attached to them. Concededly, after informing
the accused of their rights the police sought to provide them with counsel. However,
none could be furnished them due to the non-availability of practicing lawyers in
Santol, La Union, and the remoteness of the town to the next adjoining town of
Balaoan, La Union, where practicing lawyers could be found. At that stage, the police
should have already desisted from continuing with the interrogation but they persisted
and gained the consent of the accused to proceed with the investigation. To the credit
of the police, they requested the presence of the Parish Priest and the Municipal
Mayor of Santol as well as the relatives of the accused to obviate the possibility of
coercion, and to witness the voluntary execution by the accused of their statements
before the police. Nonetheless, this did not cure in any way the absence of a lawyer
during the investigation. In the absence of such valid waiver, the Parish Priest of
Santol, the Municipal Mayor, the relatives of the accused, the Chief of Police and
other police officers of the municipality could not stand in lieu of counsel's presence.
The apparent consent of the 2 accused in continuing with the investigation was of no
moment as a waiver to be effective must be made in writing and with the assistance of
counsel. Consequently, any admission obtained from the 2 accused emanating from
such uncounselled interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding.
Securing the assistance of the PAO lawyer 5 to 8 days later does not remedy this
omission either. Although there was a showing that the PAO lawyer made a thorough
explanation of the rights of the accused, enlightened them on the possible
repercussions of their admissions, and even gave them time to deliberate upon them,
this aid and valuable advice given by counsel still came several days too late. It could
have no palliative effect. It could not cure the absence of counsel during the custodial
investigation when the extrajudicial statements were being taken. The second
affixation of the signatures/thumbmarks of the accused on their confessions a few
days after their closed-door meeting with the PAO lawyer, in the presence and with
the signing of the MTC judge, the PAO lawyer and other witnesses, likewise did not
make their admissions an informed one. Admissions obtained during custodial
investigation without the benefit of counsel although reduced into writing and later
signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution. If the
lawyer's role is diminished to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a prepared
document albeit an indication therein that there was compliance with the
constitutional rights of the accused, the requisite standards guaranteed by Art. III, Sec.
12, par. (1), are not met. The standards utilized by police authorities to assure the
constitutional rights of the accused therefore fell short of the standards demanded by
the Constitution and the law. As with the interview taken by DZNL radio announcer
Roland Almoite, the taped interview was offered to form part of the testimony of
witness Roland Almoite to whom the admissions were made and to prove through
electronic device the voluntary admissions by the 2 accused that they raped and killed
Shirley Victore. The defense objected to its acceptance on the ground that its integrity
had not been preserved as the tape could easily have been spliced and tampered with.
However, as Roland Almoite testified, it was the original copy of the taped interview;
it was not altered; the voices therein were the voices of the 2 accused; and, the defense
never submitted evidence to prove otherwise. Under the circumstances, the Court is
inclined to admit the authenticity of the taped interview. A review of the contents of
the tape as included in Roland Almoite's testimony reveals that the interview was
conducted free from any influence or intimidation from police officers and was done
willingly by the accused. Despite allegations to the contrary, no police authority
ordered or forced the accused to talk to the radio announcer. While it may be expected
that police officers were around since the interview was held in the police station,
there was no showing that they were within hearing distance nor within the vicinity
where the interview was being conducted. At most, the participation of the police
authorities was only to allow Roland Almoite to conduct an interview. The taped
interview likewise revealed that the accused voluntarily admitted to the rape-slay and
even expressed remorse for having perpetrated the crime. We have held that
statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview
are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. By analogy, statements made by
herein accused to a radio announcer should likewise be held admissible. The interview
was not in the nature of an investigation as the response of the accused was made in
answer to questions asked by the radio reporter, not by the police or any other
investigating officer. When the accused talked to the radio announcer, they did not
talk to him as a law enforcement officer, as in fact he was not, hence their
uncounselled confession to him did not violate their constitutional rights. Sections 12,
pars. (1) and (3), Art. III, of the Constitution do not cover the verbal confessions of the
2 accused to the radio announcer. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory
disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights enumerated under Sec. 12,
Art. III, are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would
lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth. In relation to this, the admissions of the accused before
the radio announcer and duly tape-recorded are bolstered and substantiated by the
findings of the NBI Medico-Legal Officer as reflected in the Autopsy Report/Post
Mortem Findings.

People vs. Guillermo [GR 147786, 20 January 2004]
Facts:
Victor Francisco Keyser, was the owner and manager of Keyser Plastic Manufacturing
Corp., with principal place of business at Sitio Halang, Lornaville, San Roque,
Antipolo City. Keyser Plastics shared its building with Greatmore Corporation, a
manufacturer of faucets. Separating the respective spaces being utilized by the two
firms in their operations was a wall, the lower portion of which was made of concrete
hollow blocks, while the upper portion was of lawanit boards. The part of the wall
made of lawanit had two large holes, which could allow a person on one side of the
wall to see what was on the other side. On 22 March 1998, Romualdo Campos, a
security guard assigned to Greatmore was on duty. At around 8:00 a.m., he saw Eric
G. Guillermo enter the premises of Keyser Plastics. Campos ignored Guillermo, as he
knew him to be one of the trusted employees of Keyser Plastics. An hour later, he saw
Victor F. Keyser arrive. Keyser checked the pump motor of the deep well, which was
located in the area of Greatmore, after which he also went inside the part of the
building occupied by Keyser Plastics. Campos paid scant attention to Keyser. Later, at
around 10:00 a.m., Campos was making some entries in his logbook, when he heard
some loud noises (“kalabugan”) coming from the Keyser Plastics area. He stopped to
listen, but thinking that the noise was coming from the machines used to make
plastics, he did not pay much attention to the sound. At around noontime, Campos was
suddenly interrupted in the performance of his duties when he saw Guillermo look
through one of the holes in the dividing wall. According to Campos, appellant calmly
told him that he had killed Victor Keyser and needed Campos’ assistance to help him
carry the corpse to the garbage dump where he could burn it. Shocked by this
revelation, Campos immediately dashed off to telephone the police. The police told
him to immediately secure the premises and not let the suspect escape, while a
reaction team was being dispatched to the scene. 10 minutes later, a team composed of
SPO4 Felix Bautista, SPO1 Carlito Reyes, and Police Aide Jovenal Dizon, Jr., all
from the Antipolo Philippine National Police (PNP) Station, arrived at the crime
scene. With them was Felix Marcelo, an official police photographer. They were
immediately met by Campos, who informed them that Guillermo was still inside the
building. The law enforcers tried to enter the premises of Keyser Plastics, but found
the gates securely locked. The officers then talked to Guillermo and after some
minutes, persuaded him to give them the keys. This enabled the police to open the
gate. Once inside, SPO4 Bautista and SPO1 Reyes immediately accosted Guillermo,
who was clad only in a pair of shorts, naked from the waist up. SPO1 Reyes then
asked him where the body of the victim was and Guillermo pointed to some cardboard
boxes. On opening the boxes, the police found the dismembered limbs and chopped
torso of Keyser. The victim’s head was found stuffed inside a cement bag. When the
police asked how he did it, according to the prosecution witness, Guillermo said that
he bashed the victim on the head with a piece of wood, and after Keyser fell, he
dismembered the body with a carpenter’s saw. He then mopped up the blood on the
floor with a plastic foam. Guillermo then turned over to the police a bloodstained,
two-foot long piece of coconut lumber and a carpenter’s saw. Photographs were taken
of the suspect, the dismembered corpse, and the implements used in committing the
crime. When asked as to his motive for the killing, Guillermo replied that Keyser had
been maltreating him and his co-employees. He expressed no regret whatsoever about
his actions. The police then brought Guillermo to the Antipolo PNP Station for further
investigation. SPO1 Carlos conducted the investigation, without apprising Guillermo
about his constitutional rights and without providing him with the services of counsel.
SPO1 Carlos requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct a post-
mortem examination on Keyser’s remains. The Antipolo police then turned over the
bloodstained piece of wood and saw, recovered from the locus delicti, to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for testing. Keyser’s death shocked the nation. Guillermo, who was
then in police custody, was interviewed on separate occasions by two TV reporters,
namely: Augusto “Gus” Abelgas of ABS-CBN News and Kara David of GMA
Channel 7. Both interviews were subsequently broadcast nationwide. Guillermo
admitted to David that he committed the crime and never gave it second thought. He
disclosed to David the details of the crime, including how he struck Keyser on the
head and cut up his body into pieces, which he placed in sacks and cartons. When
asked why he killed his employer, Guillermo stated that Keyser had not paid him for
years, did not feed him properly, and treated him “like an animal.” Both Abelgas and
David said that Guillermo expressed absolutely no remorse over his alleged misdeed
during the course of their respective interviews with him. On 23 March 1998,
Guillermo was charged by State Prosecutor Jaime Augusto B. Valencia, Jr., of
murdering his employer, Victor Francisco Keyser. When arraigned on 3 April 1998,
Guillermo, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded guilty to the charge. On 23 April
1998, however, Guillermo moved to withdraw his plea of guilty and prayed for a re-
arraignment. The trial court granted the motion and on 28 April 1998, he was re-
arraigned. Assisted by counsel de parte, he entered a plea of not guilty. The case then
proceeded to trial. After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City,
Branch 73, dated 7 March 2001 (Criminal Case 98-14724), found Eric Guillermo y
Garcia guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death. The court
also ordered Guillermo to pay the mother of the victim P50,000.00 for death
indemnity, P50,000.00 for funeral expenses, P500,000.00 as compensatory damages,
P500,000.00 as moral damages, P300,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P100,000
plus P3,000 per court appearance as attorney's fees. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue:
Whether Guillermo’s confession to the police officers, to the security guard of
Greatmore Corp., and to the newsmen are admissible as evidence.
Held:
The confession Guillermo made while he was under investigation by SPO1 Carlito
Reyes for the killing of Keyser at the Antipolo PNP Station, falls short of the
protective standards laid down by the Constitution. The investigating officer made no
serious effort to make Guillermo aware of his basic rights under custodial
investigation. While the investigating officer was aware of Guillermo’s right to be
represented by counsel, the officer exerted no effort to provide him with one on the
flimsy excuse that it was a Sunday. Despite the absence of counsel, the officer
proceeded with said investigation. Moreover, the record is bare of any showing that
Guillermo had waived his constitutional rights in writing and in the presence of
counsel. Be that as it may, however, the inadmissibility of Guillermo’s confession to
SPO1 Reyes at the Antipolo PNP Station as evidence does not necessarily lead to his
acquittal. For constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation (known, also as the
Miranda principles) do not apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited
through questioning by law enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary manner
whereby the appellant verbally admits to having committed the offense. The rights
enumerated in the Constitution, Article III, Section 12, are meant to preclude the
slightest use of the State’s coercive power as would lead an accused to admit
something false. But it is not intended to prevent him from freely and voluntarily
admitting the truth outside the sphere of such power. Herein, Guillermo admitted the
commission of the crime not just to the police but also to private individuals.
According to the testimony of the security guard, Romualdo Campos, on the very day
of the killing Guillermo called him to say that he had killed his employer and needed
assistance to dispose of the cadaver. Campos’ testimony was not rebutted by the
defense, and thus Guillermo's statements to Campos are admissible for being part of
the res gestae. Further, when interviewed on separate occasions by the media,
Guillermo not only agreed to be interviewed by the news reporters, but he
spontaneously admitted his guilt to them. He even supplied the details regarding the
commission of the crime to reporter Kara David of GMA Channel 7. The TV news
reporters were acting as media professionals when they interviewed Guillermo. They
were not under the direction and control of the police. There was no coercion for
Guillermo to face the TV cameras. The interviews also took place on several
occasions, not just once. Each time, Guillermo did not protest or insist on his
innocence. Instead, he repeatedly admitted what he had done. He even supplied details
of Keyser’s killing. As held in Andan, statements spontaneously made by a suspect to
news reporters during a televised interview are voluntary and admissible in evidence.
People vs. Gomez [GR 101817, 26 March 1997]
Facts:
On 27 February 1990, Art David, an employer of Felipe Immaculata sent the latter to
Bangkok, Thailand, to canvass ready-to-wear clothes. David and Eduardo Gomez
followed Immaculata about a week later (04 March 1990). Immaculata fetched the
two at the Bangkok Airport. Immaculata, David and Gomez proceeded to and stayed
at the Union Towers Hotel. After 2 days, they transferred to the apartment of one Lito
Tuazon where they spent the rest of their stay in Bangkok. On 14 March 1990,
Immaculata, Gomez and Aya Yupangco left Bangkok and boarded Manila-bound
flight PR-731. Immaculata and Yupangco occupied seats 2A and No. 54D. Gomez
was on the same flight. He checked-in two golfbags, and he was issued interline claim
tags PR 77-28-71 and 77-28-72. In Manila, Gomez deposited the two golfbags with
the interline baggage room for his connecting flight from Manila to San Francisco via
United Airlines ("UAL") flight 058 scheduled to depart the following morning (15
March 1990). The golfbags were kept in the transit rack baggage along with other
pieces of luggage destined for San Francisco via the UAL flight. Well before flight
time on 15 March 1990, Romeo Dumag, a customs policeman at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport ("NAIA"), was requested by Customs Collector Edgardo de
Leon to help facilitate the checking-in of Eduardo Gomez. Dumag sought from his
security officer, a certain Capt. Reyes, the latter's permission. Having received the go-
signal, Dumag accepted from De Leon the ticket and passport of Gomez. Dumag
proceeded to the UAL check-in counter. The airline's lady staff, Annabelle Lumba,
directed Dumag to first claim the passenger's items to be checked-in at the interline
baggage room. At the interline baggage room, Dumag spoke to Michael Angelo
Benipayo, a PAL employee assigned at the NAIA central baggage division and
baggage handling section, and presented the two claim tags of Gomez together with
the latter's passport and plane ticket. Convinced that Dumag had been duly authorized
to retrieve the baggage, Benipayo released, upon the approval of a customs examiner
named Nick, the two golfbags wrapped in blue cloth. To acknowledge the release,
Dumag affixed his signature to the "unclaimed baggage/transit list." PAL loader
Edgardo Villafuerte helped carry the golfbags to the UAL check-in counter. Annabelle
Lumba attached a San Francisco laser tag (UA Tag 594513 and Tag 594514) and
wrote the name "Gomez" on each side of the golfbags. She then handed to Dumag the
boarding pass and UAL plane ticket for Gomez. Dumag proceeded to Patio Manila, a
restaurant at the NAIA, where he turned over to Collector De Leon the travel papers
of Gomez. Gomez failed to board the UAL flight. The two golfbags were off-loaded
from the aircraft. At around 4:00 p.m., PAL staff Dennis Mendoza brought the
golfbags back to the check-in counter for a security check-up. The x-ray machine
showed unidentified dark masses. Alarmed, Mendoza immediately relayed the
information to Capt. Ephraim Sindico of the 801st Aviation Security Squadron of the
Philippine Air Force Security Command ("PAFSECOM") then deployed at the NAIA.
Capt. Sindico rushed to the check-in area. He instructed his men to get the golfbags
pass through the x-ray machine once again. Satisfied that something was indeed
wrong, Capt. Sindico reported the matter to Col. Claudio Cruz who ordered his men to
have the golfbags go, for the third time, through the x-ray machine. The unidentified
dark masses having been definitely confirmed, Col. Cruz ordered his men to open the
glued bottom zipper of the golfbags. The golfbags yielded 31 single packs, each with
an approximate size of 1" x 6" x 4," containing a white powder substance suspected to
be "heroin" with a total weight of 20.1159 kilograms. The examination by the
PAFSECOM personnel was witnessed by the NAIA manager, a representative of the
UAL and other customs personnel. Eduardo Gomez, a bartender, and Felipe
Immaculata, a former bus driver, were implicated in the crime of transporting 20
kilograms of heroin, estimated to be worth $40,000,000.00, contained in two golfbags.
Also charged, with having violated Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 21,
Article IV, of Republic Act 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended,
were Aya Yupangco, Art David, Lito Tuazon and Benito Cunanan, who all were able
to evade arrest. Gomez surrendered to the officer-in-charge of the then Clark Air
Force Base in Angeles City. The OIC of Clark Air Force Base turned over custody of
Gomez to the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") of the United States in Manila. The
DEA, in turn, surrendered him to the NBI. On the other hand, on 22 March 1990,
David and Immaculata left for Hongkong reportedly to get some spare parts for
David's Mercedes Benz car. In Hongkong, after buying the car spare parts, David and
Immaculata went to the U.S. Department of Justice in Hongkong. While waiting for
David, Immaculata was confronted by a group of people, who turned out to be from
the Hongkong Immigration Office, requesting for his travel papers. Immaculata was
brought in for investigation because of an expired visa, then turned over to the police
authorities and finally to the court which decreed his imprisonment. In the Hongkong
prison, Immaculata was visited by NBI agents for his implication in the "heroin" case.
He denied the accusation. Later, he agreed, without the assistance of counsel, to
execute a sworn statement at the Stanley Prison. After his prison term, Immaculata
was deported to Manila. Gomez and Immaculata entered a plea of "not guilty" to the
accusation. After trial, Gomez and Immaculata were each meted the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay a P20,000.00 fine by the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City, Branch 113 (Criminal Case 90-4717). While Gomez and Immaculata
filed separate notices of appeal to the Supreme Court from their conviction, only
Immaculata, however, filed his brief. Gomez, assisted by counsel, filed a
"manifestation of withdrawal of appeal" to which the Solicitor General interposed no
objection. The Court would only thus consider the appeal of Immaculata.
Issue:
Whether Immaculata’s un-counselled statement made in Stanley Prison in Hongkong
is admissible as evidence in the Philippines.
Held:
While the sworn statement taken from Immaculata by an NBI agent at the Stanley
Prison in Hongkong during his incarceration was not made the basis for Immaculata's
conviction by the court, a word could be said about the manner in which it was
procured. It would seem that Immaculata was merely apprised in general terms of his
constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent. He then was asked if he would be
willing to give a statement. Having answered in the affirmative, the NBI investigating
agent asked him whether he needed a lawyer. After that response, the investigation
forthwith proceeded. This procedure hardly was in compliance with Section 12(1),
Article III, of the Constitution which requires the assistance of counsel to a person
under custody even when he waives the right to counsel. It is immaterial that the
sworn statement was executed in a foreign land. Immaculata, a Filipino citizen, should
enjoy these constitutional rights, like anyone else, even when abroad.
Illinois vs. Perkins [496 US 292, 4 June 1990]
Facts:
In November 1984, Richard Stephenson was murdered in a suburb of East St. Louis,
Illinois. The murder remained unsolved until March 1986, when one Donald Charlton
told police that he had learned about a homicide from a fellow inmate at the Graham
Correctional Facility, where Charlton had been serving a sentence for burglary. The
fellow inmate was Lloyd Perkins. Charlton told police that, while at Graham, he had
befriended Perkins, who told him in detail about a murder that Perkins had committed
in East St. Louis. On hearing Charlton's account, the police recognized details of the
Stephenson murder that were not well known, and so they treated Charlton's story as a
credible one. By the time the police heard Charlton's account, Perkins had been
released from Graham, but police traced him to a jail in Montgomery County, Illinois,
where he was being held pending trial on a charge of aggravated battery, unrelated to
the Stephenson murder. The police wanted to investigate further Perkins' connection
to the Stephenson murder, but feared that the use of an eavesdropping device would
prove impracticable and unsafe. They decided instead to place an undercover agent in
the cellblock with Perkins and Charlton. The plan was for Charlton and undercover
agent John Parisi to pose as escapees from a work release program who had been
arrested in the course of a burglary. Parisi and Charlton were instructed to engage
Perkins in casual conversation and report anything he said about the Stephenson
murder. Parisi, using the alias "Vito Bianco," and Charlton, both clothed in jail garb,
were placed in the cellblock with Perkins at the Montgomery County jail. The
cellblock consisted of 12 separate cells that opened onto a common room. Perkins
greeted Charlton who, after a brief conversation with Perkins, introduced Parisi by his
alias. Parisi told Perkins that he "wasn't going to do any more time" and suggested that
the three of them escape. Perkins replied that the Montgomery County jail was "rinky-
dink" and that they could "break out." The trio met in Perkins' cell later that evening,
after the other inmates were asleep, to refine their plan. Perkins said that his girlfriend
could smuggle in a pistol. Charlton said: "Hey, I'm not a murderer, I'm a burglar.
That's your guys' profession." After telling Charlton that he would be responsible for
any murder that occurred, Parisi asked Perkins if he had ever "done" anybody. Perkins
said that he had and proceeded to describe at length the events of the Stephenson
murder. Parisi and Perkins then engaged in some casual conversation before Perkins
went to sleep. Parisi did not give Perkins Miranda warnings before the conversations.
Perkins was charged with the Stephenson murder. Before trial, he moved to suppress
the statements made to Parisi in the jail. The trial court granted the motion to suppress,
and the State appealed. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed, holding that Miranda
v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]), prohibits all undercover contacts with incarcerated
suspects that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
Issue:
Whether strategic deception may be employed by law enforcers to solicit confessions
from suspects, such as the deployment of an undercover agent posing as an inmate,
and without the need to give Miranda warnings.
Held:
Conversations between suspects and undercover agents do not implicate the concerns
underlying Miranda. The essential ingredients of a "police-dominated atmosphere"
and compulsion are not present when an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone
whom he believes to be a fellow inmate. Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic
deception by taking advantage of a suspect's misplaced trust in one he supposes to be
a fellow prisoner. As recognized in Miranda: "Confessions remain a proper element in
law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling
influences is, of course, admissible in evidence." Ploys to mislead a suspect or lull him
into a false sense of security that do not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion to
speak are not within Miranda's concerns. Miranda was not meant to protect suspects
from boasting about their criminal activities in front of persons whom they believe to
be their cellmates. Herein, Perkins had no reason to feel that undercover agent Parisi
had any legal authority to force him to answer questions or that Parisi could affect
Perkins' future treatment. Perkins viewed the cellmate-agent as an equal and showed
no hint of being intimidated by the atmosphere of the jail. In recounting the details of
the Stephenson murder, Perkins was motivated solely by the desire to impress his
fellow inmates. He spoke at his own peril. The tactic employed here to elicit a
voluntary confession from a suspect does not violate the Self-Incrimination Clause. As
held in Hoffa v. United States (385 US 293 [1966]), that placing an undercover agent
near a suspect in order to gather incriminating information was permissible under the
Fifth Amendment. The only difference between the present case and Hoffa is that the
suspect here was incarcerated, but detention, whether or not for the crime in question,
does not warrant a presumption that the use of an undercover agent to speak with an
incarcerated suspect makes any confession thus obtained involuntary. Law
enforcement officers will have little difficulty putting into practice the Court's holding
that undercover agents need not give Miranda warnings to incarcerated suspects. The
use of undercover agents is a recognized law enforcement technique, often employed
in the prison context to detect violence against correctional officials or inmates, as
well as for the purposes served here. The interests protected by Miranda are not
implicated in these cases, and the warnings are not required to safeguard the
constitutional rights of inmates who make voluntary statements to undercover agents.
People vs. Lugod [GR 136253, 21 February 2001]
Facts:
On 15 September 1997 at around 7:00 p.m., Helen Ramos was asleep in her house
together with her husband (Danilo Ramos) and children, Nimrod, Neres and Nairube,
the victim. Nairube slept close to her "on the upper part" of her body. At around 12:30
a.m., her husband woke her up because he sensed someone going down the stairs of
their house. She noticed that Nairube was no longer in the place where she was
sleeping but she assumed that Nairube merely answered the call of nature. Nairube's
blanket was also no longer at the place she slept but that her slippers were still there.
After three minutes of waiting for Nairube's return, she stood up and began calling out
for Nairube but there was no answer. Thereafter, she went downstairs and saw that the
backdoor of their house was open. She went outside through the backdoor to see if
Nairube was there but she was not. She found a pair of rubber slippers on top of a
wooden bench outside of her backdoor. The sole of the slippers was red while the
strap was a combination of yellow and white; said slippers did not belong to any
member of her family. Thereafter, she proceeded to the house of Alma Diaz to ask her
for help. Then, in the morning of 16 September 1997, she went to the police station to
report the loss of her child. She also reported the discovery of the pair of slippers to
SP02 Quirino Gallardo. She then went home while the police began their search for
Nairube. At around 12:30 p.m., Alma Diaz requested her to go with the searching
team. During the search, Alma Diaz found a panty which she recognized as that of her
daughter. After seeing the panty, she cried. She was thereafter ordered to go home
while the others continued the search. Thereafter, they continued the search and found
a black collared T-shirt with buttons in front and piping at the end of the sleeve
hanging on a guava twig. Alma Diaz gave the shirt to SP02 Gallardo. Loreto Veloria
informed him that the two items were worn by Clemente John Lugod when he went to
the house of Violeta Cabuhat. At around 7:00 p.m., SP02 Gallardo apprehended
Lugod on the basis of the pair of slippers and the black T-shirt. He then brought
Lugod to the police station where he was temporarily incarcerated. At first, the
accused denied that he did anything to Nairube but after he told him what happened to
the girl. Later, although he admitted to having raped and killed Nairube, Lugud
refused to make a statement regarding the same. After having been informed that the
body of Nairube was in the grassy area, Gallardo together with other members of the
PNP, the Crime Watch and the townspeople continued the search but they were still
not able to find the body of Nairube. It was only when they brought Lugod to Villa
Anastacia to point out the location of the cadaver, on 18 September 1997, that they
found the body of Nairube. On 19 September 1997, at around 3:30 p.m., Floro
Esguerra, the Vice-Mayor of Cavinti attended the funeral of Nairube. After the
funeral, he visited the accused in his cell. In the course of his conversation with
Lugod, Lugod allegedly confessed to the commission of the offense. On 10 October
1997, Lugod was charged for rape with homicide. Upon arraignment, Lugod with the
assistance of counsel entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. On 8
October 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna found Lugod
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, sentenced him to death, and ordered him to indemnify
the heirs of the victim, Nairube Ramos the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for
her death and P37,200.00 as actual damages. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue:
Whether Lugod’s alleged confession to the Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Cavanti can be
used against him.
Held:
The records do not support the confession allegedly made by Lugod to the Mayor and
Vice -Mayor of Cavinti. Records show that the Mayor of Cavinti did not testify in the
criminal trial. Moreover, the testimony of the Vice-Mayor with respect to the alleged
confession made by Lugod is not conclusive. From the testimony of the Vice- Mayor,
Lugod merely responded to the ambiguous questions that the Vice -Mayor
propounded to him. He did not state in certain and categorical terms that he raped and
killed Nairube. In fact, the Vice- Mayor admitted that Lugod did not tell him that he
raped and killed Nairube. In addition, the Court notes the contradiction between the
testimony of the Vice-Mayor who stated that he was alone when he spoke to Lugod
and that of SPO2 Gallardo who claimed that he was present when Lugod confessed to
the Mayor and Vice-Mayor. Considering that the confession of Lugod cannot be used
against him, the only remaining evidence which was established by the prosecution
are circumstantial in nature. The circumstances, taken with the testimonies of the other
prosecution witnesses, merely establish Lugod's whereabouts on that fateful evening
and places Lugod at the scene of the crime and nothing more. The evidence of the
prosecution does not provide a link which would enable the Court to conclude that he
in fact killed and raped Nairube.
People vs. Luvendino [GR 69971, 3 July 1992]
Facts:
On the morning of 17 January 1983, 18- year old Rowena Capcap left her home at
Deva Village, Tambak, Taguig, Metro Manila to attend classes at the University of
Manila where she was a sophomore commerce student. She would usually be home by
7:30 to 8:00 on school evenings, but on that tragic day, she would not reach home
alive. On that particular evening, her father Panfilo Capcap arriving home from work
at around 7:30 p.m., noted her absence and was told by his wife and other children
that Rowena was not yet home from school. Later, a younger brother of Rowena, sent
on an errand, arrived home carrying Rowena's bag which he had found dropped in the
middle of a street in the village. Panfilo Capcap lost no time in seeking the help of the
barangay captain of Hagonoy, Taguig. Not being satisfied with the latter's promise to
send for a "tanod" to help locate his missing daughter, Panfilo went to the Taguig
Police Station to report his daughter as missing. The desk officer there advised him
that a search party would be mounted presently. Panfilo returned home and, with the
help of some neighbors, launched a search party for the missing Rowena. The search
ended in a grassy vacant lot within the Deva Village Subdivision, only about 70 to 80
meters from the Capcap residence, where lay the apparently lifeless body of Rowena,
her pants pulled down to her knees and her blouse rolled up to her breasts. Her
underwear was blood-stained and there were bloody fingerprint marks on her neck.
Rowena, her body still warm, was rushed to a hospital in Taguig, where on arrival she
was pronounced dead. The autopsy report stated that the multiple injuries indicated
the victim had struggled vigorously with her attacker(s); that the presence of
spermatozoa showed that the victim had sexual intercourse prior to death; and that
death was due to asphyxia by manual strangulation. By 5 March 1984, an information
had been filed in the trial court charging Ernesto C. Luvendino, Cesar Borca alias
"Cesar Putol" and Ricardo de Guzman alias "Ric" with the crime of rape with murder.
Warrants of arrest were issued against all the accused but only Ernesto Luvendino was
actually apprehended; the other 2 have remained at large. It appears that Luvendino
re-enacted the events that transpired in the evening of January 17 at the crime scene,
where pictures were taken by a photographer brought by the police officers. In the
course of the demonstration, Luvendino allegedly remarked: "Inaamin ko po na
kasama ko si Cesar Borca sa pag re-rape kay Rowena." At arraignment, Luvendino
assisted by his counsel, Atty. Luisito Sardillo, pleaded not guilty and then proceeded
to trial. On 12 December 1984, the trial court rendered a decision finding Luvendino
guilty, sentencing him to death, and requiring him to indemnify the heirs of the victim
Rowena in the amount of P50,000.00 for the damages suffered as a result of her death.
Issue:
Whether Luvendino’s re-enactment of the crime may be admitted as evidence against
the accused.
Held:
The trial court took into account the testimony given by Panfilo Capcap on what had
occurred during the re-enactment of the crime by Luvendino. The re-enactment was
apparently staged promptly upon apprehension of Luvendino and even prior to his
formal investigation at the police station. The decision of the trial court found that the
accused was informed of his constitutional rights "before he was investigated by Sgt.
Galang in the police headquarters" and cited the "Salaysay" of appellant Luvendino.
The decision itself, however, states that the re-enactment took place before Luvendino
was brought to the police station. Thus, it is not clear from the record that before the
re-enactment was staged by Luvendino, he had been informed of his constitutional
rights including, specifically, his right to counsel and that he had waived such right
before proceeding with the demonstration. Under these circumstances, the Court must
decline to uphold the admissibility of evidence relating to that re-enactment.
People vs. Alicando [GR 117487, 12 December 1995]
Facts:
In the afternoon of 12 June 1994, Romeo Penecilla, father of the four year old victim
Khazie Mae, was drinking liquor with Ramil Rodriguez and Remus Gaddi in his
(Penecilla's) house at Barangay Rizal, Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo. Arnel Alicando y
Briones joined them but every now and then would take leave and return. Alicando
was living in his uncle's house some 5 arm's length from Penecilla's house. At about
4:30 p.m., Penecilla's group stopped drinking and left. At about 5:30 p.m. of that day,
Luisa Rebada saw the victim at the window of Alicando's house. She offered to buy
her "yemas" but Alicando closed the window. Soon she heard the victim crying. She
approached Alicando's house and peeped through an opening between its floor and
door. The sight shocked her — Alicando was naked, on top of the victim, his left hand
choking her neck. She retreated to her house in fright. She gathered her children
together and informed her compadre, Ricardo Lagrana, then in her house, about what
she saw. Lagrana was also overcome with fear and hastily left. Romeo Penecilla
returned to his house at 8:00 p.m.. He did not find Khazie Mae. He and his wife
searched for her until 1:00 a.m. Their effort was fruitless. Rebada was aware that the
Penecillas were looking for their daughter but did not tell them what she knew.
Instead, Rebada called out Alicando from her window and asked him the time Khazie
Mae left his house. Alicando replied he was drunk and did not know. As the sun
started to rise, another neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago went down from his house to
answer the call of nature. He discovered the lifeless body of Khazie Mae under his
house. Her parents were informed and so was the police. At 9:00 a.m., Rebada
suffered a change of heart. She informed Romeo Penecilla and his wife Julie Ann, that
Alicando committed the crime. Forthwith, Alicando was arrested and interrogated by
P03 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On
the basis of his uncounseled verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the police
came to know and recovered from Alicando's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a
pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt. Alicando was
charged with the crime of rape with homicide. On 29 June 1994, Alicando was
arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO, Department of
Justice. Alicando pleaded guilty. After Alicando's plea of guilt, the trial court ordered
the prosecution to present its evidence. It also set the case for reception of evidence
for Alicando, if he so desired. On 20 July 1994, the trial court found Alicando guilty
and sentenced him to death, and to indemnify the heirs of the offended party, Khazie
Mae D. Penecilla, the sum of P50,000.00. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue:
Whether the pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains, evidence derived
from the uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from Alicando, may
be admitted as evidence.
Held:
It is now familiar learning that the Constitution has stigmatized as inadmissible
evidence uncounselled confession or admission. Section 12 paragraphs (1) and (3) of
Article III of the Constitution provide that "Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel"; and "Any
confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible against him"; respectively. Herein, PO3 Tan did not even have the
simple sense to reduce the all important confession of Alicando in writing. Neither did
he present any writing showing that Alicando waived his right to silence and to have
competent and independent counsel. It is not only the uncounselled confession that is
condemned as inadmissible, but also evidence derived therefrom. The pillow and the
T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were evidence derived from the uncounselled
confession illegally extracted by the police from Alicando. The Court has not only
constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in Philippine jurisdiction. It has also adopted
the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase
minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v. United
States. According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have
been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived
from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a
direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect
result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed
from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on
the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain
other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence
subsequently obtained. The burden to prove that an accused
waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before making a confession
under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also the burden of the
prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is not tainted as "fruit
of the poisonous tree." The burden has to be discharged by clear and convincing
evidence.
Harris vs. New York [401 US 222, 24 February 1971]
Facts:
The State of New York charged Harris in a two-count indictment with twice selling
heroin to an undercover police officer. At a subsequent jury trial the officer was the
State's chief witness, and he testified as to details of the two sales. A second officer
verified collateral details of the sales, and a third offered testimony about the chemical
analysis of the heroin. Harris took the stand in his own defense. He admitted knowing
the undercover police officer but denied a sale on 4 January 1966. He admitted
making a sale of contents of a glassine bag to the officer on January 6 but claimed it
was baking powder and part of a scheme to defraud the purchaser. On cross-
examination, Harris was asked seriatim whether he had made specified statements to
the police immediately following his arrest on January 7 - statements that partially
contradicted his direct testimony at trial. In response to the cross-examination, Harris
testified that he could not remember virtually any of the questions or answers recited
by the prosecutor. At the request of Harris' counsel the written statement from which
the prosecutor had read questions and answers in his impeaching process was placed
in the record for possible use on appeal; the statement was not shown to the jury. The
trial judge instructed the jury that the statements attributed to Harris by the
prosecution could be considered only in passing on Harris' credibility and not as
evidence of guilt. In closing summations both counsel argued the substance of the
impeaching statements. The jury then found Harris guilty on the second count of the
indictment. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed in a per curiam opinion.
Issue:
Whether the statements made by the accused after his arrest should be absolutely
excluded, or whether such statements can be used to impeach the accused who acted
as his own witness.
Held:
Some comments in the Miranda opinion can indeed be read as indicating a bar to use
of an uncounseled statement for any purpose, but discussion of that issue was not at all
necessary to the Court's holding and cannot be regarded as controlling. Miranda
barred the prosecution from making its case with statements of an accused made while
in custody prior to having or effectively waiving counsel. It does not follow from
Miranda that evidence inadmissible against an accused in the prosecution's case in
chief is barred for all purposes, provided of course that the trustworthiness of the
evidence satisfies legal standards. In Walder v. United States (347 US 62 [1954]), the
Court permitted physical evidence, inadmissible in the case in chief, to be used for
impeachment purposes. It is true that Walder was impeached as to collateral matters
included in his direct examination, whereas Harris here was impeached as to
testimony bearing more directly on the crimes charged. There is no difference in
principle that warrants a result different from that reached by the Court in Walder.
Harris' testimony in his own behalf concerning the events of January 7 contrasted
sharply with what he told the police shortly after his arrest. The impeachment process
here undoubtedly provided valuable aid to the jury in assessing Harris' credibility, and
the benefits of this process should not be lost because of the speculative possibility
that impermissible police conduct will be encouraged thereby. Assuming that the
exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on proscribed police conduct, sufficient
deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution
in its case in chief. The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license
to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior
inconsistent utterances. The Court holds, therefore, that Harris' credibility was
appropriately impeached by use of his earlier conflicting statements.
New York vs. Quarles [467 US 649, 12 June 1984]
Facts:
On 11 September 1980, at approximately 12:30 a. m., Officer Frank Kraft and Officer
Sal Scarring were on road patrol in Queens, New York, when a young woman
approached their car. She told them that she had just been raped by a black male,
approximately six feet tall, who was wearing a black jacket with the name "Big Ben"
printed in yellow letters on the back. She told the officers that the man had just
entered an A & P supermarket located nearby and that the man was carrying a gun.
The officers drove the woman to the supermarket, and Officer Kraft entered the store
while Officer Scarring radioed for assistance. Officer Kraft quickly spotted Quarles,
who matched the description given by the woman, approaching a checkout counter.
Apparently upon seeing the officer, Quarles turned and ran toward the rear of the
store, and Officer Kraft pursued him with a drawn gun. When Quarles turned the
corner at the end of an aisle, Officer Kraft lost sight of him for several seconds, and
upon regaining sight of Quarles, ordered him to stop and put his hands over his head.
Although more than three other officers had arrived on the scene by that time, Officer
Kraft was the first to reach Quarles. He frisked him and discovered that he was
wearing a shoulder holster which was then empty. After handcuffing him, Officer
Kraft asked him where the gun was. Quarles nodded in the direction of some empty
cartons and responded, "the gun is over there." Officer Kraft thereafter retrieved a
loaded .38-caliber revolver from one of the cartons, formally placed Quarles under
arrest, and read him his Miranda rights from a printed card. Quarles indicated that he
would be willing to answer questions without an attorney present. Officer Kraft then
asked Quarles if he owned the gun and where he had purchased it. Quarles answered
that he did own it and that he had purchased it in Miami, Florida. Benjamin Quarles
was charged in the New York trial court with criminal possession of a weapon. The
trial court suppressed the gun in question, and a statement made by Quarles, because
the statement was obtained by police before they read Quarles his "Miranda rights."
That ruling was affirmed on appeal through the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether the statement, "the gun is over there," and the gun itself should be excluded
as evidence in light of the officer's failure to read Quarles his Miranda rights before
attempting to locate the weapon.
Held:
There is a "public safety" exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be
given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence, and that the
availability of that exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual
officers involved. In a kaleidoscopic situation such as the one confronting these
officers, where spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual is necessarily the
order of the day, the application of the exception which the Court recognizes should
not be made to depend on post hoc findings at a suppression hearing concerning the
subjective motivation of the arresting officer. Undoubtedly most police officers, if
placed in Officer Kraft's position, would act out of a host of different, instinctive, and
largely unverifiable motives -- their own safety, the safety of others, and perhaps as
well the desire to obtain incriminating evidence from the suspect. Whatever the
motivation of individual officers in such a situation, the Court does not believe that
the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda require that it be applied in all its rigor to a
situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for
the public safety. The Miranda decision was based in large part on the Court's view
that the warnings which it required police to give to suspects in custody would reduce
the likelihood that the suspects would fall victim to constitutionally impermissible
practices of police interrogation in the presumptively coercive environment of the
station house. The police herein, in the very act of apprehending a suspect, were
confronted with the immediate necessity of ascertaining the whereabouts of a gun
which they had every reason to believe the suspect had just removed from his empty
holster and discarded in the supermarket. So long as the gun was concealed
somewhere in the supermarket, with its actual whereabouts unknown, it obviously
posed more than one danger to the public safety: an accomplice might make use of it,
a customer or employee might later come upon it. In such a situation, if the police are
required to recite the familiar Miranda warnings before asking the whereabouts of the
gun, suspects in Quarles' position might well be deterred from responding. Procedural
safeguards which deter a suspect from responding were deemed acceptable in Miranda
in order to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege; when the primary social cost of
those added protections is the possibility of fewer convictions, the Miranda majority
was willing to bear that cost. Here, had Miranda warnings deterred Quarles from
responding to Officer Kraft's question about the whereabouts of the gun, the cost
would have been something more than merely the failure to obtain evidence useful in
convicting Quarles. Officer Kraft needed an answer to his question not simply to make
his case against Quarles but to insure that further danger to the public did not result
from the concealment of the gun in a public area. Thus, the need for answers to
questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the
prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination. The Court declines to place officers such as Officer Kraft in the
untenable position of having to consider, often in a matter of seconds, whether it best
serves society for them to ask the necessary questions without the Miranda warnings
and render whatever probative evidence they uncover inadmissible, or for them to
give the warnings in order to preserve the admissibility of evidence they might
uncover but possibly damage or destroy their ability to obtain that evidence and
neutralize the volatile situation confronting them. Here, Officer Kraft asked only the
question necessary to locate the missing gun before advising Quarles of his rights. It
was only after securing the loaded revolver and giving the warnings that he continued
with investigatory questions about the ownership and place of purchase of the gun.
The exception which the Court recognizes, far from complicating the thought
processes and the on-the-scene judgments of police officers, will simply free them to
follow their legitimate instincts when confronting situations presenting a danger to the
public safety. The Court hold that the Court of Appeals erred in excluding the
statement, "the gun is over there," and the gun because of the officer's failure to read
Quarles his Miranda rights before attempting to locate the weapon.