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Turkish transformation and the Soviet Union: navigating through the Soviet
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DOI: 10.1080/00263206.2016.1237356

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ISSN: 0026-3206 (Print) 1743-7881 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fmes20

Turkish transformation and the Soviet Union:

navigating through the Soviet historiography on
Kemalism

Vahram Ter-Matevosyan

To cite this article: Vahram Ter-Matevosyan (2016): Turkish transformation and the Soviet
Union: navigating through the Soviet historiography on Kemalism, Middle Eastern Studies, DOI:
10.1080/00263206.2016.1237356

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MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2016.1237356

Turkish transformation and the Soviet Union: navigating

through the Soviet historiography on Kemalism
a,b
Vahram Ter-Matevosyan
a
Department of Turkish Studies, Institute for Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Armenia,
Yerevan, Armenia; bDepartment of Political Science and International Affairs, American University of Armenia,
Yerevan, Armenia

The making of transnational history of Kemalism

In the 1920–30s Turkey was in the spotlight. Many countries in the West, for instance,
Germany, France, Britain and the US, and many nations in the East followed the domestic
transformations in Turkey and the evolution of the Kemalist system of thought. For the
last couple of years, there has been an upsurge of scholarly interest in the transnational
history of Kemalism. In 2011 the French Institute of Anatolian Studies hosted a workshop,
which aimed to discuss that particular topic.1 The participants examined different local
and international configurations of Kemalism by bringing perspectives from Bulgaria,
Albania, Iraq, Cyprus, Egypt and Bosnia. A few studies since then started to use the term
transnational history of Kemalism.2
In 2014 a few studies added new perspectives to that problem. Stefan Ihrig analyzed
how the right-wing movements, mass media and politicians (particularly Adolf Hitler) of
the post-First World War Germany perceived the Kemalist transformation.3 Ihrig argues
that Hitler and the Nazi press used the Turkish example to boost the post-war national
confidence and morale of Germans. The right wing German press of the Weimer Republic
sought commonalities and parallels (anti-Western, anti-Entente, anti-Greek and so on)
between Turkey and Germany and potential lessons that Germany could draw from the
Turkish tactics.4 In addition, the nationalist German press was full of overexcitement, fasci-
nation, admiration and praise for the Turkish success, ‘Turkish methods’, ‘Turkish solu-
tions’, for Mustafa Kemal and, even for Ismet Ino €n€
u.5 Again, in 2014, Pınar Dost-Niyego
6
published a study, which pursued a similar objective as Ihrig’s, i.e. international percep-
tion of Kemalism and its leader. Her study discussed how through looking at Turkey and
Atatu €rk, the French observers of the 1920s and 1930s, were able to see their own country,
or the idea they have of it. She also discussed how the search for new ideological land-
marks entailed fascination with Atatu €rk, which was posed as a ‘good dictator’.
Roger Trask discussed the Turkish modernization course in the interwar period as it was
seen by the American diplomats, missionaries, educators and traders among others.7 Simi-
larly, between 2006 and 2009, Rıfat Bali prepared for publication a series of books entitled
‘US Diplomatic Documents on Turkey’, where he compiled invaluable analyses of US diplo-
mats about different facets of the Turkish transformation between the 1920s and 1930s as

CONTACT Vahram Ter-Matevosyan termatevosyan@aua.am

© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 V. TER-MATEVOSYAN

well as the 1950s.8 Although the publications of both Trask and Bali provided first-hand
insights of various observers about the achievements and challenges of the Turkish repub-
lic, they offered little understanding about the American perspectives on ideological layers
of the Kemalist transformation in the period under consideration.
There have also been a few studies depicting the considerable influence that Mustafa
Kemal and his modernization project had on many countries in the East: China, India, and
many nations in the Muslim world.9 Various observers from these states closely followed
the making of Turkey and reported their views and interpretations in different journals,
books, and periodicals. If approached from this (Eastern) perspective, the recent study
(2014) of Naeem Qureshi, a historian from Pakistan, is noteworthy as he provided a
detailed account on the profound implications the Kemalist movement and Mustafa
Kemal had for Indian Muslims.10 Among other topics in the book, he discussed how two
prominent pan-Islamic and pro-Turkish leaders of Indian Muslims, Muhammad Iqbal and
Mohammmad Ali Jinnah, were able to strengthen the image of Mustafa Kemal and Turkey
in India in the 1920s and 1930s and present them as models of emulation, inspiration, imi-
tation for Muslims living there. He also analyzed various writings (among them poetry,
newspaper reports, pamphlets) in Urdu on Atatu €rk and Turkey, which were ‘very informa-
tive and analytical, and provides a deeper analysis of the contemporary Turkish scene’.11
Qureshi’s book is one of the rare cases where the Kemalist reforms and its perceptions are
discussed from ‘non-Western’ perspectives. Therefore, it is a helpful examination to
develop another, yet quite important, aspect of transnational perceptions of Kemalism.
These studies are either incorporated in the historiography of Kemalism or are in the
process of becoming part it. The common denominator of the abovementioned studies of
Ihrig, Dost-Niego, and Qureshi lies in the fact that they have explored mostly positive per-
ceptions of Kemalism in respective countries. Hence, their studies offered quite small, if
any, critical insights on how Kemalism was perceived as an ideological project and how it
evolved. Therefore, adding the Soviet perspective into the transnational history of Kemal-
ism, which had other motivations and objectives for following it, will broaden our under-
standing of the problem.

Why bother with the Soviet perspectives on Kemalism?

While interpretations of Kemalism in both the West and the Soviet Union reflected the
respective ideologies of these Cold War rivals, as well as the state of their relations with
Turkey, the Soviet analysts’ particular contribution had a few distinctive features. From the
outset, Soviet Russia, then the Soviet Union, were hopeful that in the face of Kemalist Tur-
key they would obtain a loyal ally in the fight against the West and in the pursuit of
exporting Communism to the Muslim world. Although disappointed in both of them, the
Soviet Union followed the ideological evolution in Turkey quite closely and was even able
to produce the traces of conceptualization of Kemalism – albeit for the purposes of
domestic interpretation – much earlier than the Kemalist elite did.12 Hence, throughout
the 1920s, the Soviet literature on Turkey was replete with efforts to interpret, analyze and
frame the Turkish development model within a frame of Kemalism.
In contrast to many Western observers of Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s, whose analy-
ses and insights about the Kemalist transformations were mainly descriptive and often-
times sympathetic (by using adjectives like New, Reborn, and Ascending), the Soviet
 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 3

commentators’ views and interpretations were noticeably different. In spite of the omni-
present class analysis, Marxist methodology and vocabulary in the studies, they managed
to provide a thorough analysis of Turkish transformation. They were able to discuss several
dimensions of social and political processes, cultural and economic reforms as well as
ideological undertakings in a consistent way, a feature which was either largely absent in
the Western observations of the early Turkish Republic or was not clearly highlighted. The
debates and competition within the Soviet scholars and as well as ups and downs in bilat-
eral relations and geopolitical rivalry made the USSR observers of Turkey continuously fol-
low the developments there. The observations of Soviet scholars went beyond mere
reporting, as they were able to discuss intricacies of the Kemalist transformations in
greater detail.
Since the early 1920s the Communist regime hoped to turn South Asia and the Near
East into the Soviet spheres of influence, replacing Britain as the principal power in the
region. In this regard, O’Connor distinguishes the central role that Georgii Chicherin, the
Commissar of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (PCFA) from 1918 to 1930,
played in considering Turkey, as well as Persia and Afghanistan, ‘as a potential bulwark of
defense for the Soviet Russia against the Western nations’.13 O’Connor also claims that the
Soviet Union planned to form a defensive alliance with these three states and establish ‘a
cordon of states’ and a buffer zone against the renewed Western intervention. Based on
that intention, the Soviet Union signed treaties with three of these states within a three
week period in February and March 1921. A few years later, the treaties with these coun-
tries were supplemented with more treaties of neutrality, nonaggression, and nonpartici-
pation in hostile associations and agreements directed against the third party.14 O’Connor
is correct to observe clear patterns in Soviet policy vis-a-vis these states. However, his
argument that the Soviet Union, and particularly Chicherin, were successful in preventing
the Western influence is debatable. Speaking of common traits of three treaties signed in
the 1921, Stephen White notes that they were generally accompanied by expressions of
solidarity and friendship in the face of a common enemy, British imperialism. Afghanistan,
Iran and Turkey, however avoided committing themselves to the principles of Soviet social
order.15 This does not imply, however, that treaties explicitly referred to the British imperi-
alism. The introduction of the Moscow treaty between Russia and Turkey (16 March 1921)
noted that both states acknowledged ‘the existing solidarity between them to fight
against imperialism’.16
In the 1920–30s the USSR was pursuing its foreign policy objectives through many
institutions. However, two stood out – the Narodnij Kommissariat Inonstrannih Del (PCFA)
and the Comintern (Communist International). In the initial years, the PCFA went through
radical structural transformations and many of its former working approaches were radi-
cally revised. The size and objectives of foreign missions also changed. In the 1920s the
USSR’s mission abroad, which included diplomatic, commercial and other personnel, were
rather large in comparison to those of other countries. For instance, in 1924 the Soviet
Union’s embassy in Ankara had 84 staff members, which included 46 diplomatic and con-
sular employees, while 38 belonged to the trade delegation.17 It was the fourth largest
Soviet mission abroad after England, Germany and Latvia, which signified the importance
that Turkey had for the Soviet government.
Spreading of the socialist revolution to Europe and Asia was institutionalized with
the creation of Comintern, the new association of working class parties. This became an
4 V. TER-MATEVOSYAN

important tool in the hands of the Soviet leaders for internationalizing revolutionary
agitation and propaganda. To the Soviet leadership, it seemed inevitable that the peoples of
the East and West would look for leadership and support to the Soviet state to replace the
imperialist state system. Chicherin was particularly hopeful that the convergence of diplo-
macy, revolution, financial and military support, when dealing with Near Eastern, Central
Asian and Far Eastern nations should lead to the spread of socialist revolution in the West.18
In 1940 Bruce Hopper argued that the PCFA was there ‘to placate other governments,
and the Comintern to promote the overthrow of the same governments, the Bolsheviks
were able over the years to create for themselves a position of special privilege in world
politics, in which the right hand could deny responsibility for the left’.19 This quote of Hop-
per illustrates complexities of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy in the first two decades of
its existence. Aimed at internationalization of the revolution, the Comintern became an
influential policy tool in the hands of the Soviet leaders. Many Comintern field agents
were employed by the Soviet Union foreign missions abroad providing them both cover
and channel for communication, as PCFA’s diplomatic courier service was at their disposal
too.20 The Comintern created a huge network of academic, research, propaganda and
mass media institutions, which defined the shape of the USSR’s relations with other coun-
tries. The Comintern’s publications followed closely the decisions made by the Comintern
congresses and tried to follow their resolutions as closely as possible.
Oftentimes, however, the functions and spheres of interest of these two institutions
overlapped, whereas, in certain instances it was done on purpose. It is known that in the
beginning years of the revolution, there was a visible uncertainty on how to proceed with
the goal of spreading the revolution. Ulbricks argues that the Soviet diplomats saw the
Comintern as ‘a great source of embarrassment for the Soviet diplomats’ as it undermined
the relationship between the missions and the government to which it was accredited. He
also claimed that the diplomats understood quite early that the world revolution was not
imminent, which meant to protect the Soviet state by diplomatic means.21 For Chicherin,
the overlap was particularly concerning in the cases of Germany and Turkey, as he looked
at them as ‘anchors of his foreign policy in Europe and Asia respectively’ and, therefore,
expressed his most vehement opposition to the Comintern activities, which could damage
diplomatic relations with these countries.22 Even though Ulbricks brings more evidence to
prove that both Chicherin and Litvinov, his deputy and successor, and many others, were
against Comintern, the latter continued its existence until 1943.
At the very outset the USSR was interested in having a close sense of radical domestic
transformations in Turkey. For them, the Kemalist transformations had many shades and
facets, though. Some interpretations may lead us to think that the authors were either ill-
informed or were pursuing divergent objectives. In reality, clearly observable ups and
downs of Soviet approaches towards Kemalism not only reflected the complexities of
bilateral relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union, but they also resonated with the
ambiguities and contradictions in Soviet foreign and domestic policies. For instance,
despite incessant persecutions of communists in Turkey, the Communist leadership was
supporting Kemalist Turkey. During the Twelfth congress of the Communist Party held in
1923, Nikolay Bukharin, a leading member of the Communist party leadership and a close
confidant of Lenin, claimed that Turkey was still playing a ‘revolutionary role’, insofar as it
was undermining the world imperialist system.23 However, Soviet observers, particularly
 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 5

since 1927, did not have the liberty of interpretational experiments and could not move
too much away either from the Soviet foreign policy or from the Communist Internation-
al’s objectives. Those who deviated from that line paid dearly.
Lenin’s death in 1924 resurfaced the debate between left and right within the Commu-
nist Party regarding the future of the world revolution. The main proponent of the ‘perma-
nent revolution’ around the world, Lev Trotsky, argued that world revolution was essential
for the survival of socialists. Whereas, the party wing led by Stalin, adopted ‘socialism in
one country’ slogan and acknowledged the unlikely perspective of the world revolution in
the immediate future and concentration on the domestic social-political affairs instead.24
After 1927, the left wing was sidelined and crashed, after Stalin was able to consolidate
his power and eliminate his opponents.25 These changes are instrumental in explaining
the shifts in the USSR policy and rhetoric towards Turkey.
The closer analysis also reveals that the Soviet Union, paradoxically enough, was
interested in seeing Kemalism both succeeding and failing. There are a few reasons to
explain this inconsistency. The Soviet leadership did not conceal its disappointment
concerning the fact that Turkey did not appreciate the Soviet assistance to Turkey dur-
ing the War of Independence as much as the Soviet leaders expected. Moreover, Tur-
key took a different path of development much different to what the Soviet leaders
were hoping for. On the other hand, by the end of the 1920s, the Soviet leaders were
expecting to see strong anti-regime movements in Turkey, which would lead the agrar-
ian revolution and be able to topple the Kemalist government. Therefore, there are all
the indications to suggest that the Soviet Union was motivated to monitor the Kemalist
transformations closely in order to achieve the following strategic objectives: under-
stand the social and political implications of Kemalist reforms, benefit from any oppor-
tunities that could arise, secure Turkey’s neutrality, reduce any anti-Soviet activities and
keep that critical country in check by engaging with it. The Soviet Union’s policies in
achieving these objectives changed repeatedly according to international and regional
political circumstances.
Against this background, the paper argues that Turkey’s Westernization paradigm
has heavily influenced the historiography of Kemalism and shaped most of its domi-
nant interpretations. The incorporation of ‘non-Western’, in this case, Soviet perspec-
tives in the studies of Kemalism, will, therefore, expand and deepen our understanding
of the history of Republican Turkey. Since the early 1920s, different intellectual schools
of thought and research institutions in the Soviet Union as well as Communist party
functionaries and diplomats closely observed the domestic power relations in Turkey.
Their perspectives and insights, which were predominantly critical, have developed
particular interpretations of Kemalism, which were driven not only by the concepts of
Marxism-Leninism but also by geopolitics. The Soviet analysts’ special contribution to
the ongoing discussion of Kemalism’s core meaning, its virtues and shortcomings, was
to recognize early on the class-based nature of the urban–rural/elite–feudal split within
Turkey that: (1) constrained broad acceptance of Kemalism during the period under
consideration; (2) limited its capacity to acquire the broad legitimacy that its advocates
sought in society at large, and (3) foreshadowed the religious turn of politics, first
manifest in the 1950s, and subsequently dominant under various conservative political
parties.
6 V. TER-MATEVOSYAN

Contextualizing the Soviet literature on Kemalism

A bibliography compiled by Abraham Bodurgil in 1974 assembled books and articles
about the first two decades of the Republic.26 A decade later, a three-volume The Bibliog-
raphy of Atat€ urk and his Reforms published by the Ministry of National Education of Turkey
listed all the studies, which were published before 1981.27 In 1985, Kemal Karpat men-
tioned the existence of 7010 books and articles that contained valuable information and
insights about Atat€ urk’s personality, ideas, visions, and his reforms.28 However, it is highly
unlikely that Karpat or previous bibliographers counted non-Western, more particularly,
Soviet sources.
In spite of peculiarities of the Soviet scholarship in humanities and social sciences
Oriental Studies was certainly a thriving discipline in the Soviet Union.29 Turkish Studies,
or Turkology, as a part of the Oriental Studies, continuously carried out research related to
different aspects of Turkish history, politics and social processes. The study of Turkish ideo-
logical transformation was no exception. For instance, in 1979, the Institute of Scientific
Information of Social Sciences (Institut nauchnoj informatsii po obshestvennim naukam) of
the Soviet Academy of Sciences published a reference book entitled ‘Kemalism’.30 It was
‘For Official Use’ (Dlya sluzhebnogo pol’zovanija) only and contained around 450 titles and
brief annotations of books, which were published in Turkish, Bulgarian, Polish, French and
English between 1930 and 1976. The entries were mainly about Atatu €rk as well as ideolog-
ical, political and economic developments and cultural reforms in Turkey. Three years
later, in 1982, the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences published
‘A bibliography on Turkey’31 which was the extended version of the earlier collection pub-
lished in 1959. It had around 18,000 entries in Russian (mainly books, articles, reports) pub-
lished between 1917 and 1975 and covered different aspects of Turkish history, culture,
literature, geography, economy, politics and so on. Among various topics concerning the
Soviet-Turkish bilateral relations, Turkish Communists and geopolitics, the Bibliography
contained hundreds of publications on Atat€ urk and his reforms. More importantly for this
research, it also contained a bibliography of the books, reports, and articles covering the
ideological construction of the Kemalist Turkey and the Soviet interpretations of it.
Based on the critical reading of Cold War history and Turkish-Soviet relations, one may
speculate a set of different reasons that can explain the lack of interest on the part of Turk-
ish and Western scholars to explore the Soviet perspective on Kemalism – dominance of
the Marxist and Leninist ideologies in Soviet interpretations, incompatibility of research
methodologies, importance of other more pressing topics and the like. Instead, the West-
ern and Turkish academia extensively used academic contributions of Soviet scholars
when discussing the formative years of the Turkish Republic or the issues of bilateral rela-
tions, the Soviet Union’s assistance to Turkey in the 1920-1930s and in the 1960s and
1970s, as well as questions related to trade, cooperation, and geopolitics.32 This back-
ground, by no means, implies that Kemalism became systematic academic sub-discipline
in the field of Turkish studies in the Soviet Union. Just the contrary, it is enough to state
that except for one short survey published in 1974, which is looked at in more detail
below, neither Kemalism nor its interpretations have ever been thoroughly studied within
the limits of a single research study. The bulk of the Soviet observations pertaining to
Kemalism covered the first two decades of the ideological transformations in Turkey,
which resumed, albeit hesitantly and sporadically, only in the 1960-70s just to synthesize
 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 7

the previous research. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet observers approached Kemalism
by examining the evolution and application of some its key principles, mainly – national-
ism, populism, laicism, etatism. This is to suggest that the Soviet observers also were not
particularly interested in presenting their findings on Kemalism to the Western academia.
The Soviet press and academic periodicals in 1920s and 30s also closely followed
domestic transformations in Turkey.33 A number of periodicals of the time shed light on
the Soviet official, popular, academic and journalistic perceptions of Kemalism in Turkey.
Some of those periodicals were the mouthpieces of the Communist party (Za Partiju (For
the Party), Kommunisticheskij Internacional (Communist International), Revolyutsija I nasio-
nal’nost’ (Revolution and Nationality), Bol’shevik (Bolshevik), Revolyucionij Vostok (Revolu-
tionary East), ‘Krasnaja Nov' (Red New), Blizhnij Vostok (Near East), Sputnik Komunista
(Companion of the Communist), others belonged to different government agencies, for
instance, (Mezhdunarodnaja zhizn’ (International Life)) was a semi-scholarly journal pub-
lished by the PCFA. Other periodicals belonged to Universities and the Academies of Sci-
ences of Soviet Republics (Novij Vostok (New East), Narody Aziji I Afriki (Nations of Asia and
Africa), Azija I Afrika Segodnya (Asia and Africa Today) or even literary unions (Zvezda Vos-
toka (Star of the Orient)), hence, opinions, statements and arguments presented suppos-
edly could not divert much from the official policy line. It needs to be added that, given
the nature of the Communist regime’s strict censorship, belonging of these journals to the
institutions mentioned above was mostly formal, since all of them had to strictly follow
the party doctrinal line. It needs to be mentioned that the doctrinal transformations of the
Communist party affected the fate of these journals and the contributing authors.
Even though the Soviet historians, observers and reporters of Turkey in the 1920s and
1930s, closely followed the official Communist party line, one can also easily observe
some outright differences of approaches. The majority of Soviet observers were openly
critical of Turkey’s domestic reforms and foreign policy initiatives considering them as
non-genuinely revolutionary and failing to meet the demands of its society.34 While a few
others, for instance, Anatolij Miller, who produced scholarly works under the nickname
Mel’nik too (English translation for Miller), was openly sympathetic towards the Kemalist
cause and domestic reforms in Turkey,35 which made some circles in the Soviet Union
coin him a ‘Turkophile’.36 The significance of Mel’nik/Miller’s analysis lies in the fact that
he studied Turkey while being in the diplomatic service between 1920 and 1938. By the
time he left the PCFA, he was the Head of the First Eastern department. After the PCFA, he
kept consulting the PCFA and continued to study Turkey until he passed away in 1973.37
Already in the late 1920s and early 1930s, along with consolidation of Stalinist power,
one could observe manifestations of cleavages, extensive internal debates and discussions
among the Soviet observers concerning various aspects of the Kemalist development par-
adigm. They published reviews in the academic journals and harshly criticized each other
for failing to understand the different aspects of Kemalism. Instances of mutual criticism,
coining the opponents ‘bourgeoisie orientalists’, who allegedly borrowed the ‘imperialist
interpretations’ when studying Kemalist Turkey, were widespread. In this sense, Boris Pla-
tonov, with a number of publications in Blizhnij Vostok (Near East) and Ziya Feridov, with
his publications in Revolucionnij Vostok (Revolutionary East), clearly stand out. Represent-
ing the ‘new school’ of Orientalists, they harshly criticized prominent scholars of the previ-
ous decade for failing to approach Kemalism in accordance with the Soviet ideological
interpretations.
8 V. TER-MATEVOSYAN

Based on the study of Soviet historiography one can propose a few distinct stages of
Kemalist studies in the Soviet Union. In the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s the
domestic political, social, cultural and economic transformations in Turkey were in the
Soviet spotlight. In this period different faces, principles and facets of Kemalism and its
ideological components were widely presented and discussed in the orientalist school of
the Soviet Union. During the first two decades, the Soviet observers published a few
dozen reports, articles, and books. Understandably, not all of them were dedicated to the
political, socio-cultural or ideological reforms in Turkey, as their primary concerns were
mainly about making sense of Turkish foreign policy orientations, maintaining Turkey’s
neutrality towards the Soviet Union, capitalizing on the assistance that the Soviet Union
provided to the Kemalists during the war of independence and understanding the pros-
pects of class-based struggle or potential of the anti-imperialist revolution. It is through
comparison and study of these multidimensional views that one gets a coherent sense of
Soviet changing attitudes towards Kemalism and its associated complexities. Another
minor, but interesting aspect of the period is that some of the key observers of the period
(Irandoust, Gurko-Kryazhin), who made important contributions to the studies of Turkish
history, published similar stories about Persia too, which had identical titles as the ones
covering Turkey.38
However, beginning from the mid-1930s until the late 1950s the Soviet interest
towards ideological and domestic transformations in Turkey largely changed. One of the
reasons for that was the proliferation of racist and radical-nationalist trends and move-
ments in Turkey, which were commonly referred to in the Soviet media as fascists. Some-
times, the ruling regimes were also described as fascistic too.39 One of the reasons for the
decline of interest towards Kemalism as an ideological construct and a guiding philosophy
of Turkey was the deterioration of bilateral relations. The Soviet actors were mostly inter-
ested in Turkey’s position during the Second World War and in the international geopoli-
tics. The confrontational tone between two states affected the scholarly works too.
In the 1960s and 1970s, in parallel to the efforts of normalizing relations, there was an
upsurge of interest towards Turkey in the National Academies of the Union Republics of
the Soviet Union (mainly in Caucasian republics, Russia, Ukraine). Most of these studies
praised the Soviet-Turkish relations paying little or no attention to the complexities of the
1930s and 1950s.40 In this period, a few Soviet historians and intellectuals revisited the
study of Kemalism to discuss the consequences of political, social and cultural reforms in
the earlier decades. The limited number of publications focused on the need to reexamine
Kemalism and reconsider some of the earlier views on the founding years of the Turkish
republic.41 In 1974 Esmeralda Gasanova, a historian from Azerbaijan’s Academy of Scien-
ces, who studied Kemalism deeper than the other Soviet historians, delivered a paper dur-
ing an international conference in Romania, where she looked at the level of study of
Kemalism in the Soviet Union.42 It was the first effort by a Soviet historian to provide a
brief survey (within seven pages) of the historiography of Kemalism in the Soviet Union.
Without going much into details, she provided a concise description of a few works by
Soviet Turkologists of the 1920s (Pavlovich, Gurko-Kryazhin, Astakhov, Youst, Butayev,
Irandoust, Mel’nik) who viewed the origins and the evolution of the Kemalist thought. She
highlighted the fact that although those scholars did not examine the ideological layers
of Kemalism per se, however, they viewed the early Kemalism as the ‘anti-imperialist fea-
ture of national-liberation movement of Turkey’ and shared ‘a set of ideas about the
 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 9

ideological platforms of the Kemalist revolution’.43 Speaking of the evolution of the Kem-
alist perception in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, she mentions only the name of Abil Ali-
mov and concludes that in that decade Kemalism was perceived either as ‘a development
pathway of Turkey’ or ‘the combination of six principles of the RPP’.44 She concludes her
short paper by noting that in the 1960s ‘the concept of Kemalism appears to be a syno-
nym of national bourgeoisie ideology on the Turkish foundation’.45 Gasanova’s paper,
albeit important in many respects, followed the Soviet historiographical vocabulary and
failed to consider socio-political layers of Kemalism, which were widely discussed in the
works of other Soviet scholars that she failed to mention. She was also quite selective
when depicting the mainstream authors, as a result, many observers of Turkey, whose
research were mainly critical of Kemalism, were not mentioned. Besides, other than men-
tioning the works of Alimov and Miller, she does not mention other Soviet scholars who
dealt with Kemalism in the 1930 and 1940s. When naming the Soviet scholars who
worked on Kemalism in the 1960-70s (Yeremeev, for instance), she mentioned also two of
her own publications. Interestingly enough, in addition to the one published in 1968,
which dealt mainly with the ideological origins of Kemalism, the other one has no rela-
tions with Kemalism. However, she presented only the shortened version of the title with-
out mentioning ‘in the period of Young Turks, 1908-1914’, which gives a wrong
impression that her earlier published book was also about Kemalism.46 Thus, in the 1960s
and 1970s, even though (or perhaps, because) there was an increase of leftist movements
in Turkey, the interest in Kemalism and ideological transformations associated with it
were somehow transformed.47
In the 1960–70s, despite unyielding dominance of Marxism-Leninism48 over the social
sciences, the Soviet scholarship on Turkey looked academically more mature than in the
previous decades and was better contextualized within the worldwide academic research
on Turkey and Kemalism. For instance, in the 1960s, a number of Soviet scholars tried to
put their research into a wider perspective by examining the existing gaps in the
research on Turkey. For instance, in 1963, Miller claimed that there was not a reliable,
balanced and helpful biography of Atat€ urk, which would use the existing literature and
produce good research on him. He was particularly critical of the fact that most of the
existing research of ‘democratic Western European and American authors’ presented
only the ‘Westernism’ of Atat€ urk and prescribing to him political ideas that he never
believed in. Instead, the Soviet orientation of Atatu €rk, he noted, was ignored or down-
played.49 To better present Atat€ urk to the Soviet people, Miller published another book
with Atatu €rk speeches and statements in 1966,50 which came with his foreword. The
gap that Miller pointed out in his critique is only one side of the problem, as it needs to
be added that the perspective of Soviet scholars and observers also were largely left out
in studying both Atat€ urk and his political principles.
The incorporation of the Soviet sources into the study of Kemalism requires a few clari-
fications. It needs to be underlined that Soviet perspectives reflected not only observa-
tions made from a distance but they were also based on hands-on experience resulting
from interactions and cooperation with people from Turkey. In the 1920s and until the
mid-1930s there were extensive projects between Turkey and the Soviet Union in many
areas. Exchange of visits, mainly from Turkey to the Soviet Union, were occurring in differ-
ent spheres which included education, academia, sports and the arts. Soviet specialists
provided technical assistance to many industrial development projects, which were either
10 V. TER-MATEVOSYAN

run with Soviet assistance and supervision or initiated by the Turkish government. Soviet
observers – party functionaries, reporters and scholars – interacted with Turkish scholars
and intellectuals. Some of them visited Turkey, lived there and had the chance to see the
results of political and social transformations. Despite ups and downs of relations, officials
from both countries visited each other quite regularly in the first two decades and later in
the 1960s and 1970s.
As far as the relationship between official and academic sources are concerned, two
more points should be clarified. They have to do with the power relations among the
Communist Party, PCFA and the Communist International, also known as Comintern or the
Third International. As mentioned, in the 1920s and 30s, there were instances of conflicts
between these institutions, which, in turn, was reflected in the reports and articles pre-
pared by each of them. Quite often the PCFA and the scholars cooperating with it were
critical of the Comintern and those scholars, which followed the Comintern line at the
expense of the official policy directives. Analysis of the Soviet sources reveals many exam-
ples to support that pattern.
The next clarification has to do with the relationship between the scholars and the
Communist party. Until 1926-27 most of the Soviet observers of Turkey were able to dem-
onstrate some degree of independence in their interpretations of Kemalism, hence, cer-
tain differences between official and academic assessments of Kemalism. However, since
the mid-1920s, the situation has changed and a clearly discernible pattern emerged. In
the regime of total, institutional censorship, self-censorship, and terror (particularly until
mid-1950s), most of the statements, articles, reports and books, pursued plainly noticeable
ideological interests and followed the official Communist party course, which was meant
to trace the class-based nature of the Turkish transformation and retain Turkey as a
friendly nation and if possible revive its anti-imperialist tendencies and use them against
the West. In addition to it, the overarching Marxist-Leninist methodology imposed on
humanities and social sciences visibly constrained the intellectual space of many Soviet
scholars. As a result, they had to employ Marxism-specific vocabulary in most of their anal-
yses. These features notwithstanding, many of the Soviet observers were able to provide
remarkably accurate and helpful analysis of Turkish domestic affairs. In addition, the Soviet
observers followed domestic politics, power relations and ideological transformations in
Turkey from early on and in a consistent manner, therefore, they could clearly identify the
making, development and transformation of Kemalism.

Emergence of identical interpretations: Stalin’s view on Kemalism

The year of 1927 marked an important watershed in the efforts of Soviet observers of
Turkey. Starting from that year, it was easy to observe a noticeable change in approaches
and interpretations of Kemalism. In different ways, the meaning and significance of Kem-
alism have changed. Moreover, there was a deepening of polarization within the observ-
ers of Turkey too, between ‘new’ and ‘old’ schools of Oriental Studies. Two of the possible
reasons to explain this change of attitude had to do with Stalin’s final consolidation of
power and the emerging role of Bolshevik intelligentsia. The year 1927 also signified the
starting year of Stalin’s dictatorship.51 Purges against ‘leftist opposition’ visibly strength-
ened Stalin’s power. The Bolshevik intelligentsia too became more involved in the trans-
formation of the intellectual life by undermining and attacking the non-party, traditional
 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 11

and ‘bourgeois’ intelligentsia and specialists.52 This process allowed party ideologues to
elaborate more rigid interpretation of the party ideology by imposing strict confines of
Marxist theory on social sciences.
Academia could not be left unaffected. Michael David-Fox, who studied the Bolsheviks’
educational and academic reforms in the 1920s, singled out three institutions which
shaped and championed the Marxist science most intensively: (a) Sverdlov Communist
University, to become a preeminent party institution to inject a new communist and
everyday lifestyle in communist students; (b) the Institute of Red Professors, was set to cre-
ate Communist professors, and (c) the Communist Academy, aimed to produce Bolshevik
scholars trained in the Marxist methodology.53 The assault against the old school was
mostly led by the last two. The ‘Red professorship’ and Bolshevik scholars closely followed
the hard-line radicalism of Mikhail Pokrovskij, ‘the head of the Marxist historical school
of the USSR’, David Riazanov, the head of the Institute of Marx and Engels, Andrei Bubnov,
the head of the Agitation-Propaganda department, and many other leading Bolshevik
ideologues, who immensely contributed to the process of making ‘… Marxism, Marxology
a privileged discipline’.54 In addition to these three central institutions, more than 70
research institutes were established in the 1920s aiming to organize the science. The Bol-
shevik intellectuals at the Communist Academy were particularly uncomfortable with the
200-year old Academy of Sciences, the most prestigious scientific institution, which
enjoyed wide privileges by the Communist party and the government. Until the late
1920s, many prominent ‘bourgeois academicians’ managed to stay independent and not
to become members of the Communist party.55
The new research methods affected Oriental studies too. By the mid-1920s, there were
a few major centres of Oriental Studies in the USSR located in Leningrad, Moscow, Tash-
kent, Baku and elsewhere. The journals and books published in these centres covered a
wide range of problems and, by the end of the 1920s, they became visibly influenced by
the growing orthodox Marxism. In 1927 the Scientific Research Association was created at
the Stalin Communist University of the Toilers of the East, widely known either as KUTV
(Kommunisticheskij universitet trudjashhihsja Vostoka) or Stalin School. The same year it
launched a publication of a periodical, Revoljucionnyj Vostok (Revolutionary East), which
became the mouthpiece of the Marxist revisionist school of the Soviet Orientalists and
aimed to become the central periodical in the field. Faculty members of KUTV published
articles in the pages of the ‘Revolutionary East’ and fiercely criticized those Soviet Oriental-
ists, mainly prominent scholars, who started their careers even before the arrival of Bolshe-
viks and who allegedly deviated from the Marxist methods of research and embraced
bourgeois ideology.56 Moreover, it became utterly critical of publications in the journal
Novij Vostok (New East), which was the journal of (All) Russian Academic Association of Ori-
entalists (RAAO), founded in 1921. The other no less important factor was that the head of
the RAAO, Mikhail Pavlovich, passed away in 1926, which was followed by the significant
decline of the role that RAAO played in the Soviet Orientalist school. Not being able to
oppose the heavy criticism of the party hard-liners, the Novij Vostok was closed down in
1930. Of course, this does not suggest that the Novij Vostok ignored the Communist
regime of the Soviet Union. It was created by them and had to serve them. As discussed
above, the publications in this journal looked at the political transformations in the East
through the prism of class analysis and Marxist methodology, however, sometimes, they
followed a journalistic genre of mere reporting. The Novij Vostok was also widely known
12 V. TER-MATEVOSYAN

abroad. However, the emerging radical party mainstream apparently observed insufficient
loyalty or inadequate attachment of the ‘classical Orientalists’ to the Marxist methodology
in studying the problems in the East.57
In 1930 the RAAO ceased to exist as it was merged with the newly established Associa-
tion of the Marxist-Orientalists at the Communist Academy. This association took a more
radical stance towards Oriental studies than the Academic Research Association of the
KUTV. It studied the economics and politics of the Eastern nations, new pathways of
National-revolutionary movements, and class struggle related topics. It published a few
journals, but the one pertinent to Turkey was Revoljucija i nacional’nosti (Revolution and
Nationalities).58 Thus, the frontal attack of the new orientalists not only marginalized the
‘old school’ of Turkologists, but also noticeably influenced the quality of the newly emerg-
ing articles and research.
A landmark event occurred in May 1927 when Stalin met with the faculty and students
of the Sun Yat-Sen Communist University of the Toilers of China in Moscow. The Comin-
tern created that university in 1925 for attracting and educating Chinese Communists and
revolutionaries. He opened the meeting by noting that he had previously received only
10 questions and would answer them during 2–3 hours allocated to that meeting. Hence,
he shared thoughts and insights which were not born on the spot but reflected his
thought-out approaches. The sixth question was as follows: ‘Is a Kemalist revolution possi-
ble in China?’. The question itself and the answer to it triggered a lengthy discussion in
the Soviet academia. For our analysis here it is important to quote Stalin’s definition of
Kemalism: ‘The Kemalist revolution is a revolution from above, of the national mercantile
bourgeoisie, which was created during the struggle against the foreign imperialists and,
in its further development, was directed essentially against peasantry and workers, against
the very possibilities of an agrarian revolution.’59 Three months later, on 1 August 1927,
again, when comparing the cases of Turkey and China, Stalin talked about the Kemalist
revolution by elaborating on its stage of development: ‘The characteristic feature … of
the Turkish revolution (Kemalists), is that it is stuck in the ‘first step’, in the first phase of its
development, the phase of the bourgeois-liberation movement, without even trying to
proceed to the second phase of its development – the phase of the agrarian revolution.’60
The Soviet historiography immediately picked up these definitions and approaches to
Kemalism that Stalin made within a few months. Almost all the books and articles pub-
lished afterwards made sure to incorporate Stalin’s words in their studies and not to devi-
ate from them. Some expressions from his formulations (for instance, ‘revolution from
above’, ‘bourgeois-revolution’ nature or being ‘against workers and peasants’) were con-
stantly quoted and cited to describe Kemalism. Some of these approaches persisted as
long as the Soviet Union existed.

Conclusion
The Soviet Union’s changing priorities towards Turkey and its regime also shaped its inter-
pretations of Kemalism. The Soviets started to use the term with clearly discernible ideo-
logical connotations long before it was done in Turkey and elsewhere. There was also a
clearly visible policy line to constantly revisit Kemalism and adjust its interpretations
according to emerging circumstances. Until 1927, various Soviet observers benefitted
from a relatively limited freedom of research and used different approaches to
 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 13

conceptualize Kemalism. However, the rise of Bolshevik intellectuals and Stalin’s interpre-
tations of Kemalism were the defining factors for the emergence of uniform interpreta-
tions. Employing Marxist vocabulary on concepts of history, capitalism, class struggle and
revolution did not impede the Soviet observers from identifying inherent problems of the
Kemalist development model. Based on that, the Soviet observers were one of the first for-
eigners to note that, among many policy deficiencies, modernizing reforms of Kemalism
failed to penetrate rural Turkey and engage with the population there. As a result, accord-
ing to them, Kemalism remained elitist and urban-centred, creating a gap which impover-
ished the village by creating cultural and social barriers for its development. Based on that
assumption, they noticed early enough that Kemalism did not enjoy a grassroots support
as rural Turkey remained conservative and entrenched in feudal or outdated social
structures.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

ORCID
Vahram Ter-Matevosyan http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2212-0391

Notes
1. Conference program. Paris. Workshop Towards a transnational history of Kemalism Beyond Tur-
key. 2011. http://www.ifea-istanbul.net/index.php?optionDcom_k2&viewDitem&idD1390:work
shop-towards-a-transnational-history-of-kemalism-beyond-turkey-08-09-12-2011&ItemidD286&langDtr
2. For instance, Erdal Kaynar used it in his review of Stefan Ihrig’s book. Erdal Kaynar. ‘Review of
Stefan Ihrig’s ‘Atat€ urk in the Nazi Imagination’, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts. International Journal of Turkish Studies Vol.21 (1–2). (2015), pp.227–9.
3. Stefan Ihrig, Atat€ urk in the Nazi Imagination, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard Univer-
sity Pres, 2014).
4. Ibid. 49.
5. Ibid. 113.
6. Pınar Dost-Niyego, Le Bon Dictateur: L’image de Mustafa Kemal Atat€ urk en France (1923-1938)
(Istanbul: Libra Yayınevi, 2014).
7. Roger Trask, The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914-1939 (Minneap-
olis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1971).
8. ‘Turkish Students’ Movements and the Turkish Left in the 1950’s – 19600 s’, ‘US Diplomatic Docu-
ments on Turkey’ series, 2006, presented and annotated by Rıfat N. Bali, Istanbul, The Isis Press;
‘The Turkish Cinema in The Early Republican Years’, ‘US Diplomatic Documents On Turkey’ series,
2007, presented and annotated by Rıfat N. Bali, Istanbul, The Isis Press; ‘Family Life In The Turk-
ish Republic Of The 19300 s’, A Study by G. Howland Shaw, ‘US Diplomatic Documents On Turkey’
Series, 2007, presented and annotated by Rıfat N. Bali, Istanbul, The Isis Press; ‘New Documents
On Atat€ urk: Atat€
urk as Viewed Through the Eyes Of American Diplomats’ Foreword by Andrew
Mango, ‘US Diplomatic Documents On Turkey’ series, 2007, presented and annotated by Rıfat
N. Bali, Istanbul, The Isis Press; ‘The First Ten Years Of The Turkish Republic Thru The Reports Of
American Diplomats’, ‘US Diplomatic Documents On Turkey’ series, 2009, presented and anno-
tated by Rıfat N. Bali, Istanbul, The Isis Press; ‘Sports And Physical Education In Turkey In The
19300 s’, ‘US Diplomatic Documents On Turkey’ series, 2009, presented and annotated by Rıfat
N. Bali, Istanbul, The Isis Press.
14 V. TER-MATEVOSYAN

9. Ali Kazancigil, ‘Anti-emperialist Bag € unc€

imsızlık Ideologisi ve Uç€ u D€ unya Ulusçulug u Olarak
Kemalizm’, in M. Belge (ed.), Kemalizm: Modern Turkiye’de Siyasi D€ uş€
unce. cilt 2 (Istanbul: Iletişim,
2001), pp. 235–46.
10. Naeem Qureshi, Ottoman Turkey, Atat€ urk, and Muslim South Asia: Perspectives, Perceptions, and
Responses (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2014).
11. Qureshi, (2014), p.184.
12. Vahram Ter-Matevosyan, ‘Kemalism and Communism: From Cooperation to Complication’, Turk-
ish Studies Vol.16 (4) (2015), pp.510–26.
13. Timothy Ed. O’Connor, Diplomacy and Revolution: G. V. Chicherin and Soviet Foreign Policy Affairs,
1918-1930 (Ames. Iowa State University Press, 1988), pp.135, 142.
14. O’Connor, (1988), pp.143, 145.
15. Stephen White. ‘Soviet Russia and the Asian Revolution, 1917-1924’, Review of International
Studies Vol.10 (3) (1984), p.220.
16. Dogovor mezhdu Rossiej i Turtsiej, 16 marta, 1921 g. Dokumenty vneshnej politiki SSSR. Tom 3
[Treaty between Russia and Turkey, 16 March 1921: USSSR Documents on Foreign Policy] (Mos-
cow: Gospolitzdat, 1959), pp.597–604.
17. Teddy Uldricks, Diplomacy and Ideology: The Origins of Soviet Foreign Relations, 1917-1930 (Lon-
don: SAGE Publications, 1979), p.112.
18. O’Connor (1988), pp.144–9.
19. Bruce Hopper, ‘Narkomindel and Comintern: Intruments of World Revolution’, Foreign Affairs
Vol.19 (1) (1940), p.738.
20. Uldricks (1979), p.157.
21. Uldricks (1979), pp.157–8.
22. Jon Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1994), p.50.
23. Twelfth congress of the RKP (b), Minutes. Moscow. 1968, pp.47–8. cited in White (1984), p.230.
24. David Priestland, Stalinism and the Politics of Mobilization: Ideas, Power, the Terror in Inter-war
Russia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp.177–8.
25. B€ulent Go€kay, Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920-1991: Soviet Foreign Policy, Turkey and Com-
munism (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), pp.36–7.
26. Abraham Bodurgil, Atat€ urk and Turkey: A Bibliography, 1919-1938 (Washington: Library of Con-
gress, Near East Section, Orientalia Division, 1974).
27. Muzaffer Go €kman, Atat€ urk ve Devrimleri Tarihi Bibliyografyası [Bibliography of the History of
Atat€ itimi Basimevi, 1981–1983).
urk and His Reforms], cilt 3. (Istanbul: Milli Eg
28. Kemal Karpat, ‘The Personality of Atat€ urk’ (Review of The Immortal Atat€ urk: A Psychobiography
by Vamik D. Volkan; Norman Itzkowitz)’, The American Historical Review Vol.90 (4) (1985), p.894.
29. It needs to be stressed that since the 1890s Oriental Studies in Russia became the second larg-
est area of research after Slavic Studies. The scholarly works of Victor Rozen and his students
(Vaislii Bartol’d, Nikolai Marr, Sergei Ol’denburg, Fedor Shcherbatskoi) widely contributed to the
development of Russian and Soviet Oriental Studies. For a detailed discussion of the develop-
ment of Oriental Studies in Russia see Tolz Vera, Russia’s own Orient: The Politics of Identity and
Oriental Studies in the late Imperial and Early Soviet Periods (Oxford, New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2011).
30. Ozherel’eva Z. (compiler). Kemalizm (Ukazatel’ Inostrannih knig 1930-1976 gg. (Po fondam biblio-
tek Moksvi, Leningrada i Baku)) [Kemalism (Index of Foreign Books 1930-1976 (Based on the Fonds
of Libraries of Moscow, Leningrad and Baku)] (Moscow: Institute of Scientific Information for
Social Sciences, National Academy of Sciences, 1979).
31. Bibliografija Turtsii (1917-1975) [Bibliography on Turkey (1917-1975)], Collected by Sverchev-
skaja A., and Cherman T. Edited by A. Shamsutdinov (Moscow: Nauka, 1982).
32. Harish Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia 1917-1927: A Study of Soviet Policy towards Turkey, Iran and
Afghanistan (Geneva: Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1966), ch., 4, 5; Vladi-
mir Danilov, ‘Kemalism and World Peace’, in Erg€ un Ozb€ ud€un and Ali Kazancigil (eds.), Atat€ urk: A
Founder of a Modern State, 2nd ed. (London: Hurst and Company, 1997), pp.103–26; A. Mel’nik,
Turtsija [Turkey] (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Social’no-Jekonomicheskoe Izdatel’stvo, 1937); S.
 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 15

Kuznecova, Ustanovlenie sovetsko-tureckih otnoshenij: K 40-letiju Moskovskogo dogovora mezhdu

RSFSR i Turtsiej [Establishing Soviet-Turkish Relations: The Fortieth Anniversary of the Moscow
Treaty between RSFSR and Turkey] (Moskva: Izdatel’stvo Vostochnoj Literatury, 1961); P. Moi-
seev, Ju. Rozaliev, K istorii sovetsko-tureckih otnoshenij [Towards the history of the Soviet-Turkish
Relations] (Moskva: Gospolitizdat, 1958); A. Miller, Kratkaja Istorija Turtsii [A Short History of Tur-
key] (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoj literatury, 1948); Emel Akal, Mustafa
Kemal, Ittihat Terakki ve Bolşevism Milli M€ ucadelenin Başlangıcında (Istanbul: Iletişim Yayıncılık,
2012); Igor’ Chernikov, V interesakh mira i dobrososedstva: (O sov.-tur. otnoshenijakh v 1935-1970
gg.) [In the interest of peace and friendly-neighboring relations: About Soviet-Turkish relations
1935-1970] (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1977); Go €kay, 2006.
33. € a Turkish researcher, published a short book with excerpts and photo-
Recently, Rasim Ors,
copies from Soviet newspapers (2 newspapers and 3 journals) of the 1920s. His objectives was
to present to the Turkish readers how the birth of the Turkish Republic and the character of
Mustafa Kemal were covered in the Soviet Union through pictures and cartoons. See Rasim Dir-
€ Rus Basininda Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Atat€
sehan Ors, urk (Istanbul: Devrim Yilları, 2010).
34. P. Kitaygorodskij, ‘Zametki o Kemalistskoj Turtsii: Prichini Pobedi Nacional’noj Revoljucii v Turtsii
[Notes on the Kemalist Turkey: The Causes of the Victory of the National Revolution in Turkey]’,
Bol’shevik (18) (1927), pp.41–50.
35. See, for instance, Anatolij Mel’nik, ‘Pjat’ let respublikanskoj Turtsii [Five years of Republican Tur-
key]’, Mezhdunarodnaja zhizn' (11) (1928), pp.6–11.
36. M. Lazarev, ‘Yubilej [Anniversary]’, in Ot Stambula do Moskvi: Sbornik statei v Chest’ 100-letija pro-
fesora A. F. Millera [From Istanbul to Moscow: Collection of articles dedicated to the 100th anniver-
sary of Professor A. F. Miller] (Moscow: Muravej, 2003), p.18. For the criticism of Miller’s scholarly
works by the Soviet scholars in the period between 1940s and 60s, see Boris Potskhveria, ‘Chor-
nije dni A. F. Millera [Black Days of A. F. Miller]’, in Ot Stambula do Moskvi: Sbornik statei v Chest’
100-letija profesora A. F. Millera [From Istanbul to Moscow: Collection of articles dedicated to the
100th anniversary of Professor A. F. Miller] (Moscow: Muravej, 2003), pp.23–30.
37. For a detailed analysis of Anatolij Miller’s bio and scholar works see M. Lazarev (2003), pp.11–22.
38. Irandoust, Zametki o smene rezhima v Persii [Notes on the Change of Regime in Persia], Novij
Vostok Vol.15 (1926); Gurko-Kryazhin. Kratkaja istoriya Persiji [Short History of Persia] (Moscow,
1925).
39. V. Krimskij, ‘Panturkisti – fashistskaja agentura [Pan-Turkists: Fascist Agents in Turkey]’, Bol’shevik
Vol.10–11 (1944), pp.79–85; Ivan Samilovskij, Turtsija – votchina Wall-Strita [Turkey – Patrimony
of the Wall Street.] (Moscow: GosPolitIzdat, 1952); Anna Tveritinova, ‘Ot natsional-shovinizma k
nacional-predatel’stvu’ [From National-chauvinism to national treachery]’, Zvezda Vostoka Vol.8
(79) (1953), pp.70–87; G. Akopyan, ‘Turtsija - Votchina Amerikanskogo Imperializma [Turkey - a
patrimony of the American Imperialism]’, Propanagist i Agitator Vol.14 (1951), pp.23–31.
40. Igor’ Chernikov, V interesakh mira i dobrososedstva: (O sov.-tur. otnoshenijakh v 1935-1970 gg.) [In
the interest of peace and friendly-neighboring relations: About Soviet-Turkish relations 1935-
1970] (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1977).
41. Esmeralda Gasanova. ‘Ob ideologicheskih osnovah kemalizma i ih sovremennom tolkovanii v
Turtsii [On the ideological foundations of Kemalism and their contemporary interpretations in
Turkey]’, Narody Azii i Afriki Vol.3 (1968), pp.24–35; Dmitrij Yeremeyev, ‘Kemalizm i pantjurkizm
[Kemalism and Pan-Turkism]’, Narody Azii i Afriki Vol.3 (1963), pp.58–60.
42. Esmeralda Gasanova, ‘Voprosy ideologii kemalizma v trudah sovestkih uchenyh [Questions of
the ideology of Kemalism in the works of the Soviet scholars]’, in Doklady i soobshhenija sov. del-
egacii. III Mezhdunar. s"ezd po izucheniju stran Jugo-Vostochnoj Evropy, Buharest, 4-10 sentjabrja, 9
p. Moscow. 1974.
43. Gasanova (1974), p.2.
44. Ibid. p.6.
45. Ibid. p.7.
46. Esmeralda Gasanova, Ideologija burzhuaznoj nacionalizma v Turtsii v period mladoturok, 1908-
1914 gg. [Ideology of bourgeoisie-nationalism in Turkey in the Period of Young Turks, 1908-
1914] (Baku: Publication of National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijani SSR, 1966).
 16 V. TER-MATEVOSYAN

47. I. Alibekova, Gosudarstvenii kapitalizm v Turtsii [State Capitalism in Turkey] (Moscow, 1966).
48. John Kautsky argues about the importance of looking at Marxism and Leninism as two distinct
ideologies. The author of this research shares that approach, however, the using of the Marxist-
Leninist concept in this study, implies that it follows the dominant Soviet interpretation of it,
which saw no much difference between them. John H. Kautsky, Marxism and Leninism, not
Marxism-Leninism: An Essay in the Sociology of Knowledge (London: Greenwood Press, 1994).
49. Miller (1963), pp.66–7.
50. Kemal Atat€ urk, Izbrannye rechi i vystuplenija [Selected Speeches and Statements], ed. Andrei
Miller (Moscow: Progress, 1966).
51. Bruce Pauley, Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini: Totalitarianism in the Twentieth Century (Malden: Wiley
Blackwell, 2015), p.20.
52. Priestland (2007), pp.166–7, 177.
53. Michael David-Fox. Revolution of the Mind: Higher Learning Among the Bolsheviks, 1918-1929
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997), p.9.
54. Cited in David-Fox (1997), p.205.
55. David-Fox. 1997. 204. For a more detailed account on the difficult relations between the Soviet
Academy of Sciences and the Communist party as well as on the purges and seizure of aca-
demic structure see Loren Graham, The Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party,
1927-1932 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).
56. Margarita Ivanova, Introduction to the Regional Studies: From the History of the Soviet Oriental
Studies (Tomsk: Tomsk Pedagogical Unvirsity, 2006), p.13.
57. Ivanova (2006), pp.10–14.
58. Ivanova (2006), pp.14–15.
59. Iosif Stalin, Beseda so Studentami Universiteta Imeni Sun Yat-Sena 13 maja, 1927 g [Discussion
with the Students of the Sun Yat-Sen University, 13 May 1927] (pp.559–81) was first published
in Iosif Stalin ‘Revolucija v Kitaje i oshibki oppozicii’ [Revolution in China and the mistakes of
the opposition]. Moscow-Leningrad: GosIzdat. 1927. It was published again in Iosif Stalin. Ob
oppozitsii: Stat’i i rechi 1921-1927 [About the opposition: Articles and speeches 1921-1927] (Mos-
cow-Leningrad: GosIzdat, 1928), p.273.
60. Iosif Stalin. Mezhdunarodnoye Polozhenije i oborona SSSR (Rech’ na Zasedanii Ob"edinennogo Ple-
numa CK i CKK 1 avgusta 1927 g.) [International Situation and the Defence of the USSR (Speech
at the United Session of the CC and CCC, 1 August 1927] (pp.637–80) in Iosif Stalin. Ob oppozitsii:
Stat’i i rechi 1921-1927 [About the opposition: Articles and speeches 1921-1927] (Moscow-
Leningrad: GosIzdat, 1928), p.649.

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