Abbas vs Abbas, G.R. No.

183896, January 30, 2013

GR No. 183896, January 30, 2013

Abbas vs Abbas
 
Facts: This is a case filed by Syed Azhar Abbas, petitioner, for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Gloria Goo-Abbas on the ground of absence of marriage license, as provided for in
Article 4 of the Family Code.
Syed and Gloria were married in Taiwan on August 9, 1992. When they arrived in the Philippines on
December 1992, a ceremony was conducted between them solemnized by Rev. Mario Dauz and
witnessed by Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez and Mary Ann Ceriola. Present also is Felicitas Goo, mother-in-
law of Syed. During the ceremony, he and Gloria signed a document. Syed claim that he did not
know the nature of the ceremony until Gloria told him that it was a marriage.

In the marriage contract of Syed and Gloria, it is stated that Marriage License No 9969967, issued at
Carmona, Cavite was proven by the MCR being issued to other couple.

 
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Syed and Gloria is valid.
Ruling:          No. As the marriage of Syed and Gloria was solemnized on January 9, 1993, the Family
Code is the applicable law, particularly Articles 3, 4 and 35 (3).
Article 3 provides the formal requisites of marriage. Article 4 provides the effects of the absence of
the essential and formal requisites. And Article 35, Paragraph 3 provides that those marriages which
are solemnized without a license are void from the beginning in exception to those covered by the
preceding chapter.

Gloria failed to present actual marriage license or copy relied on the marriage contract and
testimonies to prove the existence of the said license.

Thus, the marriage of Syed and Gloria is void ab initio.

2. Lasanas vs People, GR 159031, June 23, 2014

CASE DIGEST
NOEL A. LASANAS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 159031 June 23, 2014

Facts:On February 16, 1968,2 Judge Carlos B. Salazar of the Municipal Trial Court of San Miguel, Iloilo
solemnized the marriage of accused Noel Lasanas and Socorro Patingo without the benefit of a
marriage license. The records show that Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any affidavit of
cohabitation to excuse the lack of the marriage license. On August 27, 1980, Lasanas and Patingo
reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious ceremony before Fr. Rodolfo Tamayo at the San Jose
Church in Iloilo City. They submitted no marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation for that
purpose. Both ceremonies were evidenced by the corresponding marriage certificates. In 1982,
Lasanas and Patingo separated de facto because of irreconcilable differences.

On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with Josefa Eslaban in a religious ceremony
solemnized by Fr. Ramon Sequito at the Sta. Maria Church in Iloilo City. Their marriage certificate
reflected the civil status of the accused as single. On July 26, 1996, the accused filed a complaint for
annulment of marriage and damages against Socorro in the RTC in Iloilo City, which was docketed as
Civil Case No. 23133 and raffled to Branch 39 of the RTC. The complaint alleged that Socorro had
employed deceit, misrepresentations and fraud in securing his consent to their marriage; and that
subsequent marital breaches, psychological incompatibilities and her infidelity had caused him to
suffer mental anguish, sleepless nights and social humiliation warranting the award of damages.

In October 1998, Socorro charged the accused with bigamy in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Iloilo City. After due proceedings, the accused was formally indicted for bigamy under the
information filed on October 20, 1998 in the RTC, viz: That on or about the 27th day of December,
1993 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, Noel
Lasanas being previously united in a lawful marriage with Socorro Patingo and without the said
marriage having been legally dissolve (sic) or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with Josefa Eslaban.

In the meanwhile, on November 24, 1998, the RTC (Branch 39) rendered its judgment in Civil Case
No. 23133 dismissing the accused’s complaint for annulment of marriage, and declaring the
marriage between him and Socorro valid and legal,

On October 30, 2000, the RTC (Branch 38) rendered its assailed decision in Criminal Case No. 49808,
disposing thusly: 
WHEREFORE, finding accused NOEL LASANAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
BIGAMY punishable under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 

Decision of the CA Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA, insisting that the RTC
thereby erred in finding that he had legally married Socorro despite the absence of the marriage
license, affidavit of cohabitation and affidavit of the solemnizing officer.

Issues: W/N that the RTC and the CA incorrectly applied the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, asserting that the civil law rule embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a
judicial declaration of nullity before one could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in
this purely criminal prosecution; that even if Article 40 of the Family Code was applicable, he should
still be acquitted because his subsequent marriage was null and void for being without a recorded
judgment of nullity of marriage, as provided in Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family
Code; that, consequently, an essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e. that the subsequent
marriage be valid, was lacking; and that his good faith and lack of criminal intent were sufficient to
relieve him of criminal liability.

Ruling:The appeal lacks merit.This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is correct in
all respect.

Based on the findings of the CA, this case has all the foregoing elements attendant. 

The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the absence of a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage between the accused and Socorro. The requirement of securing a
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage prior to contracting a subsequent marriage is found in
Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit: 

Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n) 

The reason for the provision was aptly discussed in Teves v. People:

x x x The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked
for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. The
Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted what is now
the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed
to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.

In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection
of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the
judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be
charged with bigamy. 

In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required
before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous
marriage, reprehensible and immoral.

The accused’s defense of acting in good faith deserves scant consideration especially because the
records show that he had filed a complaint for the annulment of his marriage with Socorro prior to
the institution of the criminal complaint against him but after he had already contracted his second
marriage with Josefa. But even such defense would abandon him because the RTC (Branch 39)
dismissed his complaint for annulment of marriage after the information for bigamy had already
been filed against him, thus confirming the validity of his marriage to Socorro. Considering that the
accused’s subsequent marriage to Josefa was an undisputed fact, the third element of bigamy was
established. Nonetheless, he submits that his marriage to Josefa was invalid because of lack of a
recorded judgment of nullity of marriage. Such argument had no worth, however, because it was he
himself who failed to secure a judicial declaration of nullity of his previous marriage prior to
contracting his subsequent marriage. In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals the Court has explained that
"[s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for
bigamy.

There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal
liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State's penal laws on bigamy completely
nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling
throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on August 29,
2002; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

3. Republic v Tampus, GR 214243, March 16, 2016

FACTS: Respondent Nilda B. Tampus was married to Dante L. Del Mundo on November 29, 1975.
Three days thereafter, or on December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the AFP, left respondent, and
went to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. The couple had no children. Since then, Nilda heard no
news from Dante. She tried everything to locate him, but her efforts proved futile. On April 14, 2009,
she filed before the RTC a petition to declare Dante as presumptively dead for the purpose of
remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three (33) years without any kind of
communication from him, she firmly believes that he is already dead. ISSUE: W/N Dante should be
declared presumptively dead RULING: NO. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be
obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 4119
of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death: (1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4)
consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger
of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present
spouse wishes to remarry; (3) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is
dead; and (4) that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee. The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse
to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent
spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances,
the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As
such, the mere absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of any news
that such absentee spouse is still alive, failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence
under the Civil Code would not suffice. In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance,
she tried to locate him by making inquiries with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his
whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not know where to find him. Other than making said
inquiries, however, Nilda made no further efforts to find her husband. She could have called or
proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request information about her husband, but failed to do so.
She did not even seek the help of the authorities or the AFP itself in finding him. Considering her
own pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP on a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of
his disappearance, she could have inquired from the AFP on the status of the said mission, or from
the members of the AFP who were assigned thereto. To the Court's mind, therefore, Nilda failed to
actively look for her missing husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find him by asking
Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict standard and degree of diligence
required to create a "well-founded belief of his death.

4. Republic v Molina, G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

FACTS: Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 and begot a son. After a year of
marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father
since 1) he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his
money; 2) he depended on his parents for aid and assistance; and 3) he was never honest with his
wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them. When Reynaldo was
relieved from his job, Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family. In October 1986 the
couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged. In March
1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City. A few
weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them. Reynaldo
admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that
their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting
on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some
of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle
their finances. On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a
social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did
not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. RTC declared the
marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied
the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: W/N psychological
incapacity on the part of Reynaldo has been established HELD: The marriage between Roridel and
Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing
of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must
exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilities and duties due to
some psychological illness. Reynaldo’s action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such
characteristics that would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by
Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not
shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the
expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility
which is not considered as psychological incapacity. 8 Guidelines (Psychological Incapacity) 1. The
burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. 2. The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. 3. The incapacity must be
proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. 4. Such incapacity must also
be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable 5. Such illness must be grave enough
to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. 6. The
essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. 7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. 8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.

5. Antonio vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, Mar. 10,2005

FACTS:

Antonio and Reyes first got married at Manila City Hall and subsequently in church on December 8,
1990. A child was born in April 1991 but died 5 months later.  Antonio could no longer take her
constant lying, insecurities and jealousies over him so he separated from her in August 1991. He
attempted reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in
November 1991. Only after their marriage that he learned about her child with another man.

He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void under Article
36 of the Family Code.

The trial court gave credence to Antonio's evidence and thus declared the marriage null and void.

Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision.  It held that the totality of evidence presented
was insufficient to establish Reyes' psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the
1997 Molina case had not been satisfied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Antonio has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36
of the Family Code and, generally, under the Molina guidelines.

RULING:
Yes. The petitioner, aside  from his own testimony, presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist
who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and
corroborated his allegations on his wife's behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity.

The factual findings of the trial court are deemed binding on the SC, owing to the great weight
accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent
had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. Her fantastic
ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-
believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning
and significance to her marriage.

The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines:

First, that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his
wife;
Second, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified that was sufficiently proven by experts, and was clearly explained in the trial court's
decision;
Third, that she fabricated friends and made up letters before she married him prove that her
psychological incapacity was have existed even before the celebration of marriage;
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive
clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent;
Fifth, that she being an inveterate pathological liar makes her unable to commit the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust, and respect.
Sixth, that the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage
was annulled by the Catholic Church. However, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts,
and not of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that Antonio tried to reconcile with her but her
behavior remains unchanged.

6. Te vs Te, GR No. 161793, Feb. 13, 2009

FACTS: Edward Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering
organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then initially attracted to
Rowena’s close friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court
Rowena. That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and respondent, a
freshman. In March 1996, or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward
that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence,
however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their
travel money and she, purchasing the boat ticket. However, Edward’s P80,000.00 lasted for only a
month. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house
and Edward to his parents’ home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him,
threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s
place. On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25
years old, and she, 20. The two then continued to stay at her uncle’s place where Edward was
treated like a prisoner—he was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed
Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave Rowena. After a month, Edward escaped from
the house of Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from Rowena and
her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him. In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to
Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live with his parents, she said that it was
better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways. On January 18, 2000, Edward filed a
petition before the RTC for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of her
psychological incapacity. ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. HELD: The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months.
They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in
June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality
disorder (to make everyday decisions without advice from others, and allows others to make most of
his important decisions), and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder
(her disregard in the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without
remorse, and her tendency to blame others, impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in
manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide). There is no
requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by
a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity.
7. Republic v CA, G.R. No. 159594, November 12, 2012

Facts: Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor
of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The couple was not blessed with a child due to Catalinas hysterectomy following her
second miscarriage. On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage,
citing Catalinas psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations. Catalina did not
interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her share in the conjugal house and lot located
in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan. After conducting an investigation, the public prosecutor determined that
there was no collusion between Eduardo and Catalina. Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house
without his consent; that she engaged in petty arguments with him; that she constantly refused to give in to
his sexual needs; that she spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of doing the household
chores and caring for their adopted daughter; that she squandered by gambling all his remittances as an
overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home in 1997 to live with Bobbie
Castro, her paramour.

Issue: Whether or not the acts of Catalina constitute psychological incapacity.

Held: No. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability
to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or
neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself
to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education
of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse
failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she
must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals, we decreed that psychological incapacity should refer to a mental incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as those enumerated in Article 68 of
the Family Code and must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In an effort to
settle the confusion that may arise in deciding cases involving nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, we then laid down the following guidelines in the later ruling in Molina, viz:

 The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity.
 The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36
of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
 The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage.
 Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
 Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes.
 The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
 parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
 Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
 The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state.

The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and
unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making
its own factual finding on what happened in this case. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does
not lie in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the
courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his
conclusion is founded.

It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying
with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondents personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal
or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from
incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

8. Yuk Ling Ong vs CA, G.R. No. 206653, 25 Feb. 2015

Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong (petitioner), a British-Hong Kong national, and respondent Benjamin Co (respondent),
a Filipino citizen, were married on October 3, 1982.

Sometime in November 2008, petitioner received a subpoena from the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) directing her to appear before the said agency because her permanent residence visa was
being subjected to cancellation proceedings. Reportedly, her marriage with respondent was nullified by the
court.

When petitioner appeared before the BID, she was furnished with the copies of the following documents: (1)
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed; (2) Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring
the marriage between petitioner and respondent as void ab initio; and (3) their marriage contract with the
subject decision annotated thereon. Petitioner was perplexed that her marriage with respondent had been
declared void ab initio.

The above documents showed that on April 26, 2001, respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity on
the ground of psychological incapacity before the RTC

Respondent indicated that petitioner’s address was 23 Sta. Rosa Street, Unit B-2 Manresa Garden Homes,
Quezon City. On July 29, 2002, the RTC issued summons. In his Server’s Return, process server Rodolfo Torres,
Jr. stated that, on August 1, 2002, substituted service of summons with the copy of the petition was effected
after several futile attempts to serve the same personally on petitioner. The said documents were received by
Mr. Roly Espinosa, a security officer.

Petitioner alleged that first, respondent committed extrinsic fraud because he deliberately indicated a wrong
address to prevent her from participating in the trial; second, jurisdiction over her person was not acquired
because of an invalid substituted service of summons as no sufficient explanation, showing impossibility of
personal service, was stated before resorting to substituted service of summons; third, the alleged substituted
service was made on a security guard of their townhouse and not on a member of her household; and fourth,
she was not psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations.

Petitioner argues that there was an invalid substituted service of summons. The process server’s return only
contained a general statement that substituted service was resorted to “after several futile attempts to serve
the same personally,” without stating the dates and reasons of the failed attempts.

In his Comment, filed on July 9, 2014, respondent contended that the server’s return satisfactorily stated the
reason for the resort to a substituted service of summons on August 1, 2002; and it was improbable that
petitioner failed to receive the summons because it was sent to the same address which she declared in this
present petition.

Issue: Whether or not the Trial Court validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

Held: Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant's
voluntary appearance in court. If the defendant does not voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can be
acquired by personal or substituted service of summons as laid out under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court.

The landmark case of Manotoc v. CA (Manotoc) thoroughly discussed the rigorous requirements of a
substituted service of summons, to wit:

(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service

For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally
serve the summons within a reasonable period of one month which eventually resulted in failure to prove
impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two
different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that
impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return

The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted
personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly
narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to
locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all
other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify
substituted service.

 (3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is
of legal age, what the recipient's relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the
significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least
notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described in
the Return of Summons.

The server’s return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the process server to
personally serve the summons on petitioner. The server simply made a general statement that summons was
effected after several futile attempts to serve the same personally. The server did not state the specific
number of attempts made to perform the personal service of summons; the dates and the corresponding time
the attempts were made; and the underlying reason for each unsuccessful service. He did not explain either if
there were inquiries made to locate the petitioner, who was the defendant in the case. These important acts
to serve the summons on petitioner, though futile, must be specified in the return to justify substituted
service.

The server’s return did not describe in detail the person who received the summons, on behalf of petitioner. It
simply stated that the summons was received “by Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient age and discretion, the
Security Officer thereat.” It did not expound on the competence of the security officer to receive the
summons.
Given that the meticulous requirements in Manotoc were not met and there was an invalid substituted service
of summons. The decision in Civil Case must be declared null and void.

The stricter rule in substituted service of summons was meant to address "the numerous claims of
irregularities in substituted service which have spawned the filing of a great number of unnecessary special
civil actions of certiorari and appeals to higher courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and wasteful legal
expenses." Although the decision in Civil Case was promulgated as early as December 11, 2002, the Court must
strike it down for lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. The favorable judgment enjoyed by
respondent cannot be categorized as a genuine victory because it was fought against an adversary, who was
ignorant of the existing dispute. Whatever prize bestowed upon the victor in such a void decision must also be
undone. Respondent, if he wishes to pursue, must start from scratch and institute his action for declaration of
nullity again; this time with petitioner fully aware and ready for litigation.
9. Ablaza v Republic, G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010

On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a
petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949
between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The case was docketed as Special
Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between Cresenciano
Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated
without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby
rendering the marriage void ab initio  for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He
insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled
him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him
a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the
marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to
the marriage being void ab initio.
MAIN ISSUE: Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the
marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code 
COURT’S RULING:
Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy
or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for
that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice
to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of
nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be
construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a
marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval, the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be
benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law
that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. Thus,
only the party who can demonstrate a “proper interest” can file the action. Interest within the
meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere
incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is
dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the
estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother
like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to
succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article
1003 of the Civil Code.
Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of
the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the deceased’s
estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior
determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or
illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano’s surviving heir. Such prior
determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.
10. Rosanna L. Tan-Andal Vs. Mario Victor M. Andal (G.R. No. 196359. May 11, 2021

In 1995, Rosanna Tan and Mario Victor Andal married each other. They were blessed with one child.
However, even before their marriage, Rosanna already observed Mario to be extremely irritable and
moody. Earlier in their marriage, Rosanna also observed Mario to be emotionally immature,
irresponsible, irritable, and psychologically imbalanced. Rosanna later learned that Mario was a drug
addict. Due to his erratic behavior, Rosanna caused Mario to be confined in a drug rehab center
twice. Mario’s irresponsibility even caused the closure of their family business. Mario also exposed
their daughter to his drug use. In December 2000, fed up with Mario, Rosanna chose to live
separately from him. In August 2003, Rosanna filed a petition to have her marriage with Mario be
declared void on the ground that Mario was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations.

To prove her case, she presented a psychologist (Dr. Fonso Garcia) who, after interviewing Rosanna,
Rosanna’s daughter, and Rosanna’s sister, concluded that Mario was psychologically incapacitated to
perform essential marital obligations. Dr. Garcia did not interview Mario as the latter, despite
invitation, refused an interview. In her assessment, Dr. Garcia found Mario to be suffering from
Narcissistic Antisocial Personality Disorder.

In May 2007, the trial court voided the marriage between Rosanna and Mario as it ruled that
Rosanna was able to prove her case. The Court of Appeals however reversed the trial court on the
ground that the findings of Dr. Garcia was unscientific and unreliable because she diagnosed Mario
without interviewing him.

On appeal, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to revisit the Molina Guidelines and the
other nullity cases decided by the Supreme Court after Molina.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Rosanna and Mario is void.

HELD: Yes. Dr. Garcia’s expert testimony is given due weight. HOWEVER, the Supreme Court
declared, among others, that in psychological incapacity cases, expert testimony is NOT a
requirement.

Below is the Supreme Court’s new set of guidelines in determining the existence of psychological
incapacity:

1. The burden of proof in proving psychological incapacity is still on the plaintiff. The Supreme Court
however clarified that the quantum of proof required in nullity cases is clear and convincing
evidence which is more than preponderant evidence (ordinary civil cases) but less than proof beyond
reasonable doubt (criminal cases). This is because marriage is presumed valid and in this jurisdiction,
a presumption can only be rebutted with clear and convincing evidence.

2. Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be
proven through expert testimony. There must be proof, however, of the durable or enduring
aspects of a person’s personality, called “personality structure,” which manifests itself through clear
acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. The spouse’s personality structure must make it
impossible for him or her to understand and, more important, to comply with his or her essential
marital obligations. Proof of these aspects of personality need not be given by an expert. Ordinary
witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage
may testify on behaviors that they have consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated
spouse.

3. Incurable, not in the medical, but in the legal sense; incurable as to the partner. Psychological
incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a
situation where the couple’s respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic
that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage.

4. As to gravity, it must be shown that the incapacity is caused by a genuinely serious psychic
cause. It is not necessary that it must be shown that the psychological incapacity is a serious or
dangerous illness BUT that “mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts” are excluded. The psychological incapacity cannot be mere “refusal, neglect, or
difficulty, much less ill will.”

5. Juridical antecedence. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration
of the marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

6. Essential marital obligations are not limited to those between spouses. Hence, those covered by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.

7. The decisions of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the
Philippines has persuasive effect on nullity cases pending before secular courts. Canonical decisions
are, to reiterate, merely persuasive and not binding on secular courts. Canonical decisions are to
only serve as evidence of the nullity of the secular marriage, but ultimately, the elements of
declaration of nullity under Article 36 must still be weighed by the judge.

SUMMARY: Psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of dysfunctionality that show a lack of

understanding and concomitant compliance with one’s essential marital obligations due to
psychological causes. It is not a medical illness that has to be medically or clinically identified; hence,
expert opinion is not required. As an explicit requirement of the law, the psychological incapacity
must be shown to have been existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage, and is caused by
a durable aspect of one’s personality structure, one that was formed before the parties married.
Furthermore, it must be shown caused by a genuinely serious psychological cause. To prove
psychological incapacity, a party must present clear and convincing evidence of its existence.

The Supreme Court also emphasized that in voiding ill-equipped marriages, courts are not really
violating the inviolability of marriage as a social institution which is enshrined in no less than the
Constitution. Courts should not hesitate to declare such marriages void solely for the sake of their
permanence when, paradoxically, doing so destroyed the sanctity afforded to marriage. In declaring
ill-equipped marriages as void ab initio, the courts really assiduously defend and promote the
sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution. The foundation of our society is thereby made
all the more strong.
1. Abbas vs Abbas, G.R. No. 183896, January 30, 2013

2. Lasanas vs People, GR 159031, June 23, 2014

3. Republic v Tampus, GR 214243, March 16, 2016

4. Republic v Molina, G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

5. Antonio vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, Mar. 10,2005

6. Te vs Te, GR No. 161793, Feb. 13, 2009

7. Republic v CA, G.R. No. 159594, November 12, 2012

8. Yuk Ling Ong vs CA, G.R. No. 206653, 25 Feb. 2015

9. Ablaza v Republic, G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010

10. Rosanna L. Tan-Andal Vs. Mario Victor M. Andal (G.R. No. 196359. May 11, 2021)