When the repeal is absolute the offense ceases to be criminal.

People vs. Tamayo (61 Phil. 225)

Facts: The accused was prosecuted for and convicted of a violation of an ordinance. While the case was
pending appeal, the ordinance was repealed by eliminating the section under which the accused was
being prosecuted.

Ruling: The repeal is absolute. Where the repeal is absolute, and not a reenactment or repeal by
implication, the offense ceases to be criminal. The accused must be acquitted.

But repeal of a penal law by its reenactment, even without a saving clause, would not destroy criminal
liability. (U.S. vs. Cuna, 12 Phil. 241)

When the new law and the old law penalize the same offense, the offender can be tried under the old
law.

U.S. vs. Cuna (12 Phil. 241)

Facts: The accused was charged with selling opium in violation of Act No. 1461 of the Philippine
Commission. During the pendency of the case, Act No. 1761 took effect repealing the former law, but
both Act No. 1461 and Act No. 1761 penalize offenses against the opium laws.

Ruling: Where an Act of the Legislature which penalizes an offense repeals a former Act which penalized
the same offense, such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the courts of jurisdiction
to try, convict, and sentence offenders charged with violations of the old law prior to its repeal.

The penalty prescribed by Act No. 1761 is not more favorable to the accused than that prescribed in Act
No. 1461, the penalty in both Acts being the same.

When the repealing law fails to penalize the offense under the old law, the accused cannot be convicted
under the new law.
 People vs. Sindiong and Pastor

(77 Phil. 1000)

Facts: The accused was prosecuted for neglecting to make a return of the sales of newspapers and
magazines within the time prescribed by certain sections of the Revised Administrative Code. Said
sections of the Revised Administrative Code were repealed by the National Internal Revenue Code which
does not require the making of return of sales of newspapers and magazines.

Ruling: The court loses jurisdiction where the repealing law wholly fails to penalize the act denned and
penalized as an offense in the old law. The accused, charged with violations of the old law prior to the
repeal, cannot be legally prosecuted after such repeal.

The provisions of said sections of the Revised Administrative Code were not reenacted, even
substantially, in the National Internal Revenue Code.

A person erroneously accused and convicted under a repealed statute may be punished under the
repealing statute.

The accused was charged with having failed to pay the salary of Cabasares whom he employed as
master fisherman in his motor launch from June 26 to October 12, 1952. He was convicted under Com.
Act No. 303, which was repealed by Rep. Act No. 602, approved on April 16, 1951, and became effective
120 days thereafter. The subject-matter of Com. Act No. 303 is entirely covered by Rep. Act No. 602 with
which its provisions are inconsistent. It was held that the fact that the offender was erroneously accused
and convicted under a statute which had already been repealed and therefore no longer existed at the
time the act complained of was committed does not prevent conviction under the repealing statute
which punishes the same act, provided the accused had an opportunity to defend himself against the
charge brought against him. (People vs. Baesa, C.A., 56 O.G. 5466)

A new law which omits anything contained in the old law dealing on the same subject, operates as a
repeal of anything not so included in the amendatory act.

T he Agricultura l Land Reform Code supersede d the Agricultural Tenancy Law (except as qualified in
Sections 4 and 35 of the Code). The Code instituted the leasehold system and abolished share tenancy
subject to certain conditions indicated in Section 4 thereof. It is significant that Section 39 is not
reproduced in the Agricultural Land Reform Code whose Section 172 repeals
"all laws or part of any law inconsistent with" its provisions. Under the leasehold system, the prohibition
against pre-threshing has no more raison d' etre because the lessee is obligated to pay a fixed rental as
prescribed in Section 34 of the Agricultural Land Reform

Code, or the Code of Agrarian Reforms, as redesignated in R.A. No. 6389 which took effect on
September 10, 1971. Thus, the legal maxim, cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex (the reason for the law
ceasing, the law itself also ceases), applies to this case. (People vs. Almuete, 69 SCRA 410)