1.1.

Introduction
The paper offers a background on the analysis of state capture as an obstacle to
democratic consolidation in Africa. This paper contains a statement of the
problem, research objectives and questions as well as the significance of the
study. The last part of the paper covers the outline of the thesis.

1.2 Background
1.2 1 Democratic consolidation
For a majority of nations in Africa, Eastern and Central Europe, the last ten (10)
years of the twentieth century have been the start of political transition. Since
their advent from post-liberation movements, political parties have transformed
the congenital colonial administration (Richter & Wunsch, 2020:41). Just like the
post-Soviet nations, the transition involved economic and political exchanges.
Prior to adopting the liberal market economies and multiparty democracy in
1990, many states in Africa tried out socialism after their liberation. In the decade
that followed, states began the transition from communism to democracy and a
liberal market economy (Marandici, 2020:61). In the course of this transition,
states adopted a variety of strategies and timelines that resulted in different
political and economic trajectories. In recent years, the democratic development
and economic growth experienced from the 1990s have started flagging and,
trusting in the elected leadership (democratic consolidation) (Prelec, 2020:167).

According to Amoako Addae (2021:8), such democratic consolidation occurs

when each contending political group accepts both informal and formal laws in
the determination of which person gets what, the place, and processes of getting
that share. In such context, opposition political parties appear as the privileged
players of such a democratization stage. However, the weakness in opposition
political parties has generally halted democratic consolidation in several
countries, mainly African (Shoesmith, 2020:167). Democratic consolidation in
Africa suffers from a decreasing democratic interspace as well as poorly
organized and fragmented opposition political parties. Moliki (2020:105) stressed
that whereas the political parties are good associates of democratic courses, the
current trends suppose they are merely focused on the occupation of the bottom
levels of a democratization process.
Whereas the start of independence in several Africa nations in the 1960s and
1950s steered political liberties and freedom, it did not occasion financial
prosperity (Grenade, 2020:495). As such, African nations hailed the third
democratisation wave of and end of the 1989 Cold War as the second type of
liberation. The hope for African nations was that economic progress on the
continent would spring from the consolidation of democracy. Ogbenika and
Omondiale (2020:12) observe that, nonetheless, democracy in many African
countries has not proceeded to the expected phase of democratic consolidation
due to several challenges that the article outlines. Haynes (2020:12) suggests
that despite the political instability in Africa, the continent seeks to increase their
investment collection because the unbalanced political situation is not hostile to
foreign direct investment (FDI).

Political establishments in African nations create necessary conditions for

needed chaos, that is, means the stronger person (political organisations and
government authorities) employs to keep hold of power (Idowu & Mimiko,
2020:1). Therefore, the strong persons do not succeed at confining the political
setting but similarly interfere with public service, military and parastatal
recruitments (Udeuhele, 2020:2). To completely protect a leader, such
authoritarian governments, politicians and institutions interfere in operations of
public service by forming parallel forces intended to counterweight the regular
operations and correspondingly establish a presidential safeguard (Siachiwena,
2020:94). The success to consolidate democracy, create political stability and
avoid corruption requires greater institutional and political openness.

1.2.2 State capture

Pirro and Della Porta (2021:433) insists that while political levels of competition
have determined the democratic governments for over thirty years across the
globe, not every transitional nation has however developed sovereign institutions
that are safeguarded by strong constitutions and capability to protect against
power excesses . The power and quality of the political opposition to advocate for
democracy remain desired far beyond prevailing borders, mainly a polyarchy.
Resultantly, open-market structures and multiparty elections have failed to
deliver democracy consolidation (Adetayo, 2020:371). Nations experiencing
democratic transitions are predominantly susceptible to manipulation of illegal
political backing intended to weaken the society’s democratic pillars, capture
parties and politicians, media and journalists, as well as important state
establishments like regulatory agencies, police, legislature, judiciary and
executive (Breuer & Oswald Spring, 2020:314). World Bank’s researchers, Joel
Hellman, Daniel Kaufman and Geraint Jones have defined such time as state
capture (Raballand & Rijkers, 2021:4).

Nwozor, Olanrewaju, Ake, Aleyomi and Lawal (2021:11) insist that the state
capture concept is not the ordinary political influence of powerful people groups,
but a type of meta-corruption, particularly by the corporate intention and
concerns of shaping a nation’s regulatory framework. In such circumstances,
power or control moves from government officials and the citizens to non-state
interests and the authorities are obliged to represent (Nwozor, Olanrewaju, Ake,
Aleyomi & Lawal, 2021:18). According to Jones, Kaufmann and Hellman, State
capture comprises three key components, that is, a transitional nation (timing), a
centralised economy, sturdy political leaders and comparatively weak
accountability institutions (context), the captors or actors (often commercial
interests) as well as the state institutions (captured). On the other hand,
behaviour, constitution, and attitude are three key features of democratic
consolidation. Behaviour involves no political parties or groups attempting to
overthrow democratic rule while attitude means, the public believing all political
changes must happen within the frameworks of current democracy. Constitution
is that resolution of every political conflict is within specific procedures,
institutions and laws of new political arrangement (Adetayo, 2020:371).

The contemporary state capture concept comprises the corporations as principal

agents who are outside the nation like foreign investors, political parties or local
businesses which are proxies like the Central European oligarch headed parties
(Sparks, 2020:327). Rybář (2020:215) insists that state capture also happens
when the incumbent political party develops commercial interests that initially
may be developed to pay for the electoral expenditures of the party. The practice
is regularly in the one-party-dominant political system of African nations.
Longhurst (2020:67) states that the businesses attain promotion through the
ability of the party to direct and control state authority or resources, particularly
on occasions where the party’s supremacy over a nation’s political arrangement
enables it to appoint its supporters in vital positions of civil service. The
businesses of the political party then end up within themselves instead of the
entities formed to back political activities (Račić, 2021:39).

A bulk of African countries are holding a sixth to the eighth multiparty election
between 2018 and 2020, mainly Botswana, Namibia, Mozambique, South Africa,
Algeria, Zimbabwe and Rwanda (Grafton & Williams, 2020:484). Whereas
democratic consolidation requires institutional enticements and the quality of
participation to attract a merged phase of democracy, the governance of such
nations is by political parties emerging from the liberation activities and enjoying
sustained authority since their independence. For instance, Tanzania’s Chama
Cha Mapinduzi has since 1995 and switched to multiparty elections, enjoyed
continuous re-election in each election. Uganda has had three key attempts at
multiparty politics, that is the 1960s, 1980s as well as the current regime that
started in 2005. The National Resistance Movement has since 2005 won the
multiparty election with Museveni preserving a 30-year reign on power. Gevisser
(2019) contends that while the opposition political parties are gaining some
support for numerous reasons in a majority of such African nations, their
endeavours remain inadequate to depose the prevailing political parties.

Investment firms that are owned by political parties are key activities in
Zimbabwe, Mozambique, South Africa, Angola and Namibia. One key instance of
state capture is in Mozambique where the Vodaphone / Vodacom, a multinational
cellphone business, established a domestic subsidiary yet the investment law of
Mozambique required partnership with resident firms. Vodacom Mozambique lent
one (1) USD million to Emotel representatives, the commercial branch of the
ruling political party Frelimo to enable Emotel to buy the needed three percent
(3%) shareholding in the Vodacom Mozambique company. Vodacom later
partner with Whatana and Intelec, two local businesses owned by Graça Machel
(former first lady) and Armando Guebeza (former president) (Turner, Mathieson
and Doward 2017). Such instances of ruling political parties deriving profitable
benefits by influence and control over businesses licenses as well as entry
regulations of foreign investments is an indication of the capture of larger
projects and goals with the public interest (Khemani, 2019).
Ambarwati (2021:29) insists that government officials and agencies are often
pushed into serving narrower sectional objectives once the political parties start
operating their own commercial interests. Angola is an example of how
politicians create regulatory systems that facilitate their accumulation. In 2002,
Angola enacted a national secrecy law that criminalised disclosure of financial
data about matters like exploitation of oil proceeds. Bribena (2021:67) states that
this is a crude instance of altering basic laws to safeguard corporate benefits
linked to leading politicians because the government never accounted for 4
billion US dollars of oil proceeds attained in 1996 and 2002 as reported in
government expenditures by the Treasury (Sparks, 2020:328). The amount is
roughly the same for Angola’s expenses on social welfare. Therefore, while
African nations secure lasting capital needs or huge business for their people,
the funding or support is conditioned to supporting concerns like protection of
foreign (white) employees or investment in public industries. The big businesses
influence national government, mostly through their political arrangement instead
of direct cronyism or access (Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State
Capture, 2021).

According to Sparks (2020:327), such instances as state capture because

particular commercial groups shape the legislations and rules of trade given
access to government power and the ruling party. Regardless of the higher risk,
the flexibility such a small electorate affords is an instrument for state capture,
through resource curse and corruption (Shadabi & Adkisson, 2021:246). Through
particularistic stalemates and policy commitments, the political elite has the
capacity to create foreign investor creditability in communities with a restrictive
electorate, and increase the probability of state capture in foreign domestic
investment (FDI). The tenure “state capture,” therefore, comprises corruption as
well as collusion between the commercial agents and government. State capture
consists of the formation or shaping of basic rules, laws, regulations and decrees
of government using non-transparent and private illicit payments to the public
officials (Tyburski, Egan & Schneider, 2020:111).

Longhurst (2020:4) find that state capture by the economic leaders results in a
fractional “reform equilibrium’ wherein authorities stall every extensive
macroeconomic adjustment. State capture occasions distorted macroeconomic
institutions and policies yet they possess have a secondary and adverse impact
on the nation’s inflows of FDI (Prelec, 2020:167). The growing definition of
corruption and failure to describe the motives and means of state resource
misappropriation in Africa has resulted in re-emerging interest in concepts like
state capture (Sadie & Patel, 2020:3). The narrative of state capture in contrast
to corruption has today, emerged and attained momentum in Africa (Sidley,
2021). In South Africa, the Public Protector release a “State of Capture” report in
2016 to highlight the escalating political scandals as well as leak several
incriminating emails between famous political representatives and the Gupta
family (Engel, 2021:267). Since then, researchers in Africa have picked growing
interest in the analysis of state capture’ consequences, mainly in South African
state s (Tsele, 2021:477).

Jacob Zuma’s presidency was marred with diverting of public funds for individual
gain, a key crisis in South Africa that resulted in the tenure ‘state capture’ formed
part of the national lexicon (Rapanyane, 2021:270). South Africans remain
reluctant to pass democratic consolidation ’s two-turnover test by Samuel
Huntington (Lertchoosakul, 2021:65). Civil society members, researchers and
academics have indicated that for a better societal transformation, nations like
South Africa are experiencing silent coups in the attempt to remove the ruling
political party from the position of leading authority (Bester & Dobovšek,
2021:73). The presidency of Jacob Zuma (2009 to 2018) alarmed South Africans
of the nation’s continued political confusion, including the current president
Ramaphosa who faintly defined it as nine (9) wasted years or time of darkness
(Olver, 2020:345). Under President Zuma, an extensive network of unethical
procurement that involved high-level public officials, politicians, and corporate
associates occurred both in national and municipality governments as well as
across the nation’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Ries, 2020:473). Powerful
people steadily pursued the weakening and destabilization of institutions
intended to check abuses.

A majority of the scepticism on the quality of democracy in South Africa has

similarly centred on easing electoral wins by the ruling political party African
National Congress (ANC). South Africa lacks the heart of democracy, that is, the
elite race for people support because a majority of people voters are devoted to
the ANC political party (Gibbs, 2021:51). Besides the assault on institutions of
legal and political accountability in South Africa posing an existential danger on
the nation’s democracy, it is inflicting considerable collateral harm on the nation’s
fragile society and economy (Cedras, 2021:64). Bowman (2020:395) indicates
that the probable approximations of direct costs of state capture at the second
term of Zuma put the price tag at over 100 US billion, that is, practically four
months’ worth of the projected 2018 gross domestic product (GDP).

Predominantly dreadful consequences are flowing from the failures of Eskom, a

state-owned electricity institution. Mismanagement is resulting in chronic gaps in
capacity, generation as well as interim coal supply disruptions (Jalloh, 2021). The
central bank of South Africa indicated that regardless of the immense investment
of public funds, state capture has caused the nation to record fewer capacities of
electricity generation by 2019 than a decade earlier (Hope 2020:294). Put
differently, state capture is wiping out almost a third of the nation’s over 1.2 USD
billion gross domestic product; effectively annihilating four (4) months of South
Africans’ productivity and labour, including hawkers, the minority workers and
boardroom competitors (Merten, 2019). Whereas state capture remains nothing
new to South Africa, the current recipients of corruptible public tenders are
merely replacing earlier groups of influential white-owned firms that relished in
similar kinds of relations with officials and politicians (Urbaniak & Khorommbi,
2020:61). This study focuses on the analysis of state capture as an obstacle to
democratic consolidation in Africa notwithstanding the transitional statuses of
African nations.

1.3 Problem statement

Many countries in Africa are struggling with the deepening and institutionalization
of democracy, dealing efficiently and completely with public authority impunities,
particularly impunities linked with human rights violations and abuse of power. In
South Africa, President Cyril Ramaphosa has recently indicated that there are
differences in opinion amongst ANC’s national executive committee divisions and
structures on the existence, form and extent of state capture as well as the
needed solutions. Nations like Angola and Zimbabwe are registering increased
biasing of public policies for systematic favouring of certain corporations or
businesses over others, while states like Kenya and Uganda are deliberately
weakening state‘s mechanisms of law enforcement to fight corruption.

In addition to the characteristic corruption in Africa that involves particular

politicians accepting side-payments for favoured treatment in the outsourcing of
contracts, small deals or license payments there, many international corporations
now influence the nature of legislative processes in Africa. Africa’s political
parties and actors are permitting such influence for individual gain. As such,
there is growing commodification of the entire policy-making construction of
African governments by politicians. A majority of African states that have been
deemed to have strong democratic consolidation like Ghana, Zambia, Uganda,
Kenya and South Africa are characterised by deprived political opposition. As
such perceived assessments are that such parties are not operational beyond
the holding of elections. In contrast to prevailing as institutions for achieving
democratic consolidation, political parties in Africa are now vehicles or avenues
for public officials and authorities to contest and re-attain leadership. Such
phenomenon and practice have revolved democracy in Africa to relatively exist
as the synonymous to organising elections short of looking past the abilities of
government and political parties in strengthening democracy.

A majority of past analysis and literature on state capture has mostly focused on
post-communist nations in Latin America and Eastern Europe, underrepresenting
Africa literature. Due to the recent international and national focus on South
Africa and the commission of inquiry into state operations and Zuma's dealings
with private entities using state facilities, this study analyzed state capture as an
obstacle to democratic consolidation in Africa.

1.7 Aim of the study/ purpose statement

The aim of this study is to analyse state capture as an obstacle to democratic
consolidation in Africa

1.8 Research objectives

The main research objectives include the following;

 To indicate how state capture is an obstacle to democratic consolidation in

Africa;
  To identify the implications of state capture as an obstacle to democratic
consolidation in Africa; and
 To make recommendations on resolving state capture and democratic
consolidation in Africa.

1.7 Research questions

The main research question for this study is: Why is state capture an obstacle to
democratic consolidation in Africa?

The sub-questions below are intended to comprehensively resolve the main

research question above.

 How is state capture an obstacle to democratic consolidation in Africa?

 What are the implications of state capture as an obstacle to democratic
consolidation in Africa?
 What are the most suitable recommendations to resolving state capture
and democratic consolidation in Africa?

1.9 Significance of the study

The study adds to prevailing literature on state capture and democratic
consolidation in Africa. For government authorities and political parties, this study
scrutinises the concepts of democratic consolidation and state capture in Africa
and the relationship between both concepts. the other significance of this study
is that it explores the implications of state capture to democratic consolidation in
Africa. For the researchers and academicians, this study endeavours to develop
the most suitable strategies to resolve state capture and improve democratic
consolidation in African nations. The study makes the argument for purposive
scrutiny of how opposition political parties and the public can endure beyond the
circle of election as institutions of democracy. Accordingly, the general conviction
is that improvement of transparency, outreach, and internal democracies creates
strong, and accountable state institutions, as well as stable political parties.

1.9. Report outline

The study comprises the following chapters.

Chapter One: Introduction

The chapter contains a background on the analysis of state capture as an
obstacle to democratic consolidation in Africa. This chapter also indicates the
research objectives, problem statement as well as significance of the study.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

The chapter contains a review of current literature on how state capture is an

obstacle to democratic consolidation in Africa as well as the implications of state
capture as an obstacle to democratic consolidation in Africa. the chapter also
covers the most suitable strategies for resolving state capture and democratic
consolidation in Africa.

Chapter Three: Research methodology

The chapter presents the methods, processes and approach for collecting data
on analysing state capture as an obstacle to democratic consolidation in Africa .
This chapter indicates the data collection instruments, the sampling techniques
as well as the data analysis instruments that the study adopted.

Chapter Four: Data findings, analysis and presentation

This chapter presents and discusses the main findings from the gathered data on
the analysis of state capture as an obstacle to democratic consolidation in Africa .

Chapter Five: Conclusion and Recommendations

The chapter has a summary of the main findings on the research topic. This
chapter similarly contains a conclusion on the analysis of state capture as an
obstacle to democratic consolidation in Africa. The last section of this chapter
covers recommendations and areas of future studies on state capture and
democratic consolidation in Africa.

1.10 Conclusion
This chapter offers a background on the research topic. The chapter establishes
that there is a shortage in interest aggregation, political socialization and policy
formulation articulation in Africa. The differing and attitude failure amongst
government and political parties to enable political mobilization and recruitment
has made state capture an obstacle to democratic consolidation in African. The
following chapter covers the literature review on the research topic.
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