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AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN IN FOCUS The opening of the Fatal Box

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AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN IN FOCUS

The opening of the Fatal Box

Author

John Karkazis

Ever Excelling
SeberExcellens

October 2021
 2

CONTENTS

Key Points
1. THE RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC PROFILE OF AFGHANISTAN AND OF THE KEY STATE
ACTORS IN THE REGION
1.1 Religious profiles of the key state actors in the Region
1.2 Ethnic profiles of key state actors in the Region
2. IDEOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL INFLUENCES EXERTED ON AFGHANISTAN BY
PAKISTAN, IRAN AND TURKEY
3. DESTABILIZATION AND REGIME COLLAPSE
4. THE EMERGING HUMANITARIAN CRISIS
5. THE GROWING WAVE OF PROTESTS AND THE RE-EMERGING TALIBAN TERROR
6. THE FIGHT FOR PANJSHIR
7. TALIBAN'S NEW GOVERNMENT
8. PROFILES OF THE SUPREME LEADER OF THE ISLAMIC EMIRATE AND THE MEMBERS
OF THE NEW TALIBAN GOVERNMENT
8.1 Hibatullah Akhundzada
8.2 Mullah Mohammad Akhud
8.3 Mullah Abdul Baradar
8.4 Sirajuddin Haqqani
8.5 Mullah Mohammed Yaqoob
8.6 Amir Khan Muttaqi
9. RUSSIA – AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS
10. RUSSIA - PAKISTAN RELATIONS
11. RUSSIA - INDIA RELATIONS
12. GEOPOLITICAL PURSUITS OF RUSSIA, USA, INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN THE REGION
(AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN) IN THE CASE OF AN ISRAELI ATTACK ON IRAN AND A
REGIME CHANGE THERE
12.1 The issue of re-emergence of a Russia-Iran-India “Northern Alliance”
13. IRAN – AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS
13.1 Bilateral trade during 2001 - 2020
13.2 Bilateral trade in 2021
14. THE EMERGING AXIS OF GEOPOLITICAL UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION AGAINST
IRAN AND ITS VULNERABILITIES
15. BRICS
16. SANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION
17. QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE
References
Appendix 1. Azerbaijan – Israel relations
Appendix 2. Ankara – Tehran confrontational relationship

ABBREVIATIONS

AJ: aljazeera.com
SF: southfront.org
RW: republicworld.com
BM: bulgarianmilitary.com
NRF: National Resistance Force
IEA: Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
MEI: Middle East Institute (USA)
 3

KEY POINTS

The strongest ideological and social influences on Afghanistan are exerted by Iran, mainly on the basis of ethnic
origin (approximately 80% of Afghan people have an Iranian origin) and secondary on the basis of religious
denomination (7-30% of Afghan people are Shia). Specifically, Iran exerts strong influence on the
predominantly Shia Hazaras who represent the third largest ethnic group in Afghanistan.

The prospect of an Israeli attack on Iran in the near future act as a powerful accelerator of geopolitical and
security events in the Region, determining to a considerable degree Afghanistan's internal affairs and also the
plans and reactions of the key international actors (USA, India, Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey) for
Afghanistan and the surrounding countries. Following an Israeli attack (which is expected to take place at a
massive scale combined with destabilizing actions) the expected destabilization of Iran will automatically and
greatly enhance existing similar processes in Afghanistan.Among the factors contributing to the destabilization
of Taliban regime the most important one is evidently the viability/strengthening of Northern Alliance and its
military wing NRF a fact well understood by the key actors in Afghanistan, especially those openly (Pakistanis)
or covertly supporting the mullah's regime.

UN warned that Afghanistan is at risk of 'total breakdown' and its special envoy for Afghanistan urged Security
Council to release assets frozen overseas to avoid economic and social collapse. Also, UNDP (United Nations
Development Programme) said that humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan demands urgent action since the country
is on the brink of universal poverty that due drought, COVID-19 pandemic and political upheaval could reach
the level of 97 percent.

Under the pressure of growing protests Taliban started to resort to their old methods of terror enforcing in this
way the elements of destabilization in their country. In the case of a growing and unchecked support and
territorial gains for NRF it is expected that Taliban terror (with the support of their allies) will reach
unprecedented levels.

According to Hall, sources in the US Central Command informed Fox News that the Pakistani military supported
the Taliban with combat drones, helicopters and special forces. “The Pakistani military are assisting the Taliban
offensive in Panjshir – Including 27 helicopters full of Pakistani Special Forces, backed up by Pakistani drone
strikes,” Hall wrote on Twitter without elaborating.

On 9/9/21 NRF spokesman Ali Nazari said on CNN that NRF controls 60-65% of Panjshir Province territory and
continues its armed resistance against Taliban.

Also, on 4/9/21 AJ reported that Mullah Baradar promised an 'inclusive' government in an interview with it. One
cannot exclude the possibility that Baradar, being a moderate politician, could have in mind the formation of an
inclusive government but later hardliners as Haqqani forcefully rejected it.On 6/9/21 Taliban announced the new
government of Afghanistan led by Mahammad Hasan Akhud. All members of the cabinet are Pashtun. They are also
pro-Pakistani except for Baradar and possibly Muttaqi, the only moderate members of it. Women were excluded
from the cabinet.

Akhundzada (the supreme leader of IAE) is considered as a hardliner and pro-Pakistani. According to western
sources. Akhund (prime minister) is primarily a political person exerting strong influence on Taliban's religious
affairs and much less on military ones.

Following strong American pressures, Baradar (deputy prime minister) was released from the custodian
imprisonment in Pakistan and moved to Qatar where he was appointed head of Taliban's political office
overseeing the troop withdrawal agreement with the US. The support to Baradar was most probably the result of
Washington's worries regarding the suffocating control of Islamabad on the Taliban regime and its aim to balance
it with a pro-Iranian leading figure.Time magazine gave an overall assessment of Baradar by including him on
15/9/21 in the list of the"100 Most Influential People in 2021".

Haqqani (minister of the Interior) is considered as pro-Pakistani. He is an advocate of extremely radical

practices, like beheadings and suicide bombings, that paved his path towards the ministry of interior. Yaqoob
(minister of defense) is considered as moderate personality, supporter of peace and pro-Saudi having, as
rumored, ties with the Saudi regime as well as with the former government of Afghanistan. Muttaqi (minister of
Foreign Affairs) is considered a moderate politician/
 4

Following the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 by NATO and the USA and throughout the period 2001-2020
(Karzai and Ghani regimes) Russian - Afghan relations were more or less good with Russia investing in business
and cultural programs and offering financial and military support to the Afghan government.

On the other hand the Russia-India relations have the greatest strategic depth among SCO members that rather
easily absorb such tribulations at least in the short term. In the long term the emerging AUKUS will most
probably try its best to attract India (and there are indications on that) among other aims to weaken SCO. Thus, in
the long term it is probable that such tribulations will be less manageable but in any case India will not abandon
SCO despite the wishful thinking of some analysts or key actors.

During the Cold War India and Soviet Union developed a strong strategic relationship (military, economic and
diplomatic) which was further enhanced, this time between Russia and India, after the dissolution of the latter. To
give emphasis to this relationship both countries term it as a “special and privileged strategic partnership”.
Furthermore, the very good relations between the leaders of the two countries, Putin and Modi, contributed much
to the steady growth of this partnership. According to Ranjan Mathai, former foreign secretary of India, the
viability and strength of this relationship is based upon the following major factors: political, defense, anti-
terrorism and nuclear cooperation.

Israel rightfully expects that a massive attack against Iran will destabilize its regime leading to the opening of the
‘pandora box’ for both Iran and Afghanistan: (a) collapse if it and (b) its territorial disintegration probably
through intervention of foreign powers (Kurdish Peshmerga towards NW Iran and Russian advance towards NE
Iran or/and the central provinces of Afghanistan populated mainly by anti-Taliban Hazaras). In the context of the
above scenario one cannot exclude completely the possibility of a joint Russian-Indian invasion (with Tajik
assistance) of Afghanistan from their military bases in southern Tajikistan. On the other hand such an invasion
will certainly meet the fierce reaction of Pakistan since its encirclement by Indian forces from east and west will
most certainly cross the Islamabad red lines.

The invasion and occupation of Afghanistan (justified on geopolitical and security grounds but with no clear and
communicable objectives) for 20 years was the decision of US ‘deep state’ and of powerful lobbying centers
acting mainly on the part of Israel. On geopolitical grounds this unprecedented intervention seems to serve two
strategic objectives: (a) to create a state-barrier under the American control that will stop any long term and
covert plans of Russia to advance towards the Indian Ocean and (b) to guard and check from the east Iranian’s
emerging nuclear ambitions.Despite the significance of the above objectives both for NATO, Washington and
Israel, it was the enormous economic, military and political cost of occupation that weighted more in favor of the
abandonment of Afghanistan by the Americans. Furthermore, the over reliance on corrupted political and
military elites further augmented this cost whereas the inability of corrupted Afghan military leaders and their
disorganized military units resulted in the quick victory of the ideologically highly inspired Taliban. It is
interesting to note at this point the objection of London to the abandonment of Afghanistan by Washington. The
British have the best geopolitical ‘view’ of the Region extending to all aspects of it (military, economic, social
and ideological). This ‘view’ developed during a long period of time during which Britain was the occupier and
ruler of major parts of the Region. Since British objections seem to ignore or downgrade the enormous
occupation cost, borne mainly by USA, it is the longtime Russian and the recent Chinese threats that most
probably weighted most for them.

One cannot also exclude the possibility the Americans (having acquired during the last 20 years in depth
knowledge of every aspect of Afghanistan and its surrounding powers) did not abandon last August the country
as a defeated power. They rather did it assessing that, in the light of an Israeli attack on Iran, the country will be
disintegrated quickly introducing a complex system of conflicts among Russia, Pakistan and India that (they
expected) would weaken SCO cohesion, drawing at the same time India closer to AUCUS.

Karkazis et al (2020) argued that in the case of an Israeli attack on Iran and destabilization of its regime Russia
will move quickly and decisively to establish a sphere of influence in Iran, possibly through a geopolitical
understanding with Israel.

According to a RW report (18/7/21) Jaishankar and the foreign ministers of seven other nations, including China
and Russia, met at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Tajikistan where he stressed that
confronting extremism and terrorism should be a key purpose of the grouping which is seen as a counterweight to
the US-led NATO military alliance. The revival of the Northern Alliance was theoretically possible. But it needs
charismatic and respected leaders”.
 5

On 20/8/21 BM, a European news agency known to be well informed on Russian affairs, raised the question of a
Russian military interference in Afghanistan reporting the following: “Is Russia preparing to strike Afghanistan?
Many Russian journalists are asking such questions after sources on the Russian website Aviapro noticed the
deployment of Tu-22M3 bombers on the border with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, or Turkmenistan.
BulgarianMilitary.com reminds us that in the last month the Russian Federation carried out a series of exercises
near the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan

During the period 2001 – 2020 and despite the deterioration of USA – Iran relations (mainly due to emerging
nuclear ambitions of the latter) Karzai government was engaged in cordial relations with Tehran. In the context
of this relation Iran heavily contributed to the reconstruction of the country with most of the contributions
directed (for obvious political reasons) to ethnic Hazaras and Tajik communities. As it is obvious, Washington
was developing serious concerns over the above increasing Iranian influence on Afghanistan. As a result pro-
American news agencies, politicians and experts started to circulate rumors for an ongoing Iran-Pakistan
conspiracy to weaken the Karzai government. It is characteristic the report of the news agency ‘Pathwok Afghan
News Reflecting the Truth’, under the title “Iran – Pakistan out to weaken Afghanistan, MPs told” concluding
that “Pakistani and Iranian spies have joined hands to weaken the Karzai government by killing Afghan elders
and trying to disrupt the current system, senior security officials told parliamentarians on Sunday”.

On the other hand, the emerging powerful anti-Iranian axis has certain inherent vulnerabilities that may
surprisingly and seriously disrupt the plans of Israel and Turkey. All these vulnerabilities are associated with
the Russian unknown decision variable in the Caucasian and Syrian fronts (mainly in the former) which
are alarmingly enhanced by the nuclear ambitions of Turkey and its anti-Russian policies in Ukraine and
Crimea. The recent USA-Russia top-level dialogue, provoked mainly by the prospect of the enormous
regional geopolitical and security earthquake shakes that will follow an Israeli attack on Iran, most
probably contains secret elements emanating among other factors by their opposition to Israel’s war
plans. The Russian unknown factor could be also activated in the case of a serious violation of the military
balance between Greece and Turkey and/or the violations of the red lines of the former by the Blue
Homeland pursuits. Note at this point that for a long period of time, according to polls, the Greeks were
much more in favor of Russia than the USA.

The forthcoming Israeli attack on Iran will most probably open the Fatal Jar (Pandora’s Box) with the
timelessness of the realities behind this mythical jar being astonishing. There is a controversy about the contents
of this jar with some arguing that they have a positive effect on mankind (through the painful realization of
wrong attitudes and decisions) and others that they have a punishing effect.

Mark Atteberry in his book “The Samson Syndrome: What You Can Learn from the Baddest Boy in the Bible”,
makes an interesting psychological analysis of the realities behind the Samson myth and the Samson Syndrome
stressing the following: “Why do some strong men fail while others succeed? Like the biblical character Samson,
all strong men—those who are successful, influential, self-confident, aggressive, or widely respected—face
twelve tendencies that can lead to sin and even personal tragedy”. By putting in the place of the word “men”
the word “people” one can identify the Samson myth together with the menace of nuclear weapons as the
main contents of the Fatal Jar in its present deciphered form.
 6

1. THE RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC PROFILE OF AFGHANISTAN AND OF THE

KEY STATE ACTORS IN THE REGION
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghanistan

1.1Religious profiles of the key state actors in the Region

AFGHANISTAN Islam, over 99%: Sunni, 70-90% Shia: 7-30%

Pew Research Center: 90% 7%
Michael Izady*1: 70% 30%
*1: Izady, Michael (2002–2017). "Chapter 1: Religious Composition of Afghanistan". Gulf2000.columbia.edu.

PAKISTAN Islam, approx. 96% Sunni, 85-90% Shia, 10-15%

Sunni: Hanafi Islamic School of Law, Shia: Twelver Islamic Law School
The freedom of religion is guaranteed by the constitution

IRAN Islam, over 99%, Sunni, 4-8% Shia, 90-95%

Source: CIA Factbook
Shia: Twelver Islamic Law School, Sunni: mainly Kurds and Balochs

TURKEY Islam, over 99% Sunni, 90% Shia, 10%

Shia: Alevism and Twelver included

TAJIKISTAN Islam, 98% Sunni, 95% Shia, 3%

Source: U.S. State Department release

1.2 Ethnic profiles of key state actors in the Region

AFGHANISTAN

Pashtun 50%, Iranian ethnic group

religion: Sunni (majority), Shia (minority), language: Pashto, eastern Iranian
location: southern Afghanistan Kabul included
Tajik 25-39%, Iranian ethnic group
religion: Sunny (85%), Shia (5%), language: Persian
location: northern and northeastern Afghanistan
Hazaras 10-20%, most probably of Turkic/Mongolian descent
religion: Shia (majority), Sunni (significant minority), language: Hazaragi (Persian
dialect)
location: central Afghanistan including the Hajarajat mountainous region
Uzbek 9%, Turkic ethnic group
religion: predominantly Sunni, language: Turkic
location: northern Afghanistan
Turkmen 3%, Turkic ethnic group
religion: predominantly Sunni, language: Turkic
Baloch 2%, Iranian ethnic group
religion: predominantly Sunni, language: Indo-Iranian
location: southern Afghanistan
 7

PAKISTAN
Pakistanis identify themselves predominantly according to religious denomination

- Punjabis 45%, Indo-Aryan ethno-linguistic group, Sunni 97%, northeastern Pakistan

- Pashtun 15%, Iranian ethnic group, predominantly Sunni, northwestern Pakistan
- Sindhis 14%, Indo-Aryan ethnic group, predominantly Muslims with a Hindu minority
(12%),southeastern Pakistan

IRAN
- Persians 65%, Indo-Iranian ethnic group, predominantly Shia, Persian (Farsi) language
- Ajerbaijanis 16%, predominantly of Iranian origin and Shia denomination, Turkic-speaking,
northwestern Iran
- Kurds 7-10%, Iranian ethnic group with strong presence of Sunni and Shia denominations,
Kurdish language, western and northwestern Iran
- Lurs 6%, Iranian ethnic group, predominantly Shia, Luri and Persian language, western and
southwestern Iran
- Baloch 2%, Iranian ethnic group, predominantly Sunni, Indo-Iranian language, southeastern
Iran

TAJIKISTAN
Tajiks 84%, Iranian ethnic group
Uzbeks 12%, Turkic ethnic group

2. IDEOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL INFLUENCES EXERTED ON AFGHANISTAN

BY PAKISTAN, IRAN AND TURKEY

The strongest ideological and social influences on Afghanistan are exerted by Iran, mainly on
the basis of ethnic origin (approximately 80% of Afghan people have an Iranian origin) and
secondary on the basis of religious denomination (7-30% of Afghan people are Shia).
Specifically, Iran exerts strong influence on the predominantly Shia Hazaras who represent
the third largest ethnic group in Afghanistan.

Turkey, a country with its people being predominantly of Sunni denomination and Turkish
origin, can exert significant influences, both on the basis of religious denomination and ethnic
origin, on Afghanistan with 70-90% of its people being Sunni and 22-32% of them having a
Turkic origin.

Tajikistan can exert significant influence on the Tajiks of Afghanistan which represent the
second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan accounting for 25-39% of population.
 8

Also Pakistan, a predominantly Muslim country of Sunni denomination, can exert significant
ideological influences on Afghanistan.

3. DESTABILIZATION AND REGIME COLLAPSE

The following widely accepted factors (especially in synergy with each other) could
contribute (in varying degrees) to the destabilization of Afghanistan's regime:

- Humanitarian crisis
- Non-inclusive synthesis of government
- Massive demonstrations against Taliban regime
- Old undemocratic and terror practices of Talibanto encounter civil resistance
- Imposing serious obstacles in the freedom of press
- Absence of security and the rule of law
- The inability to check/eliminate ISIS threat and above all
- The viability and strengthening of Northern Alliance and its National Resistance Front

Note that at the end of August 2021 the Islamic State in Khorasan Province claimed the worst
attack in Afghanistan since the Taliban returned to power (AJ:30/8/21). Regarding the ISIS
threat I. Al-Marashi commented in AJ that the threat of ISKP in Afghanistan has been
underestimated and the Islamic State’s Afghan affiliate could derail Taliban efforts to
establish security and stable rule (AJ: 27/8/21).

Accordingto Haroun Rahimi (assistant professor of law at the American University of

Afghanistan) the Afghans will not embrace Taliban governance unless it is centred on the rule
of law (AJ: 30/8/21).

Regarding the freedom of press Afghan journalists begin an uncertain chapter under Taliban
rule and the arising question is whether to stay or leave, after Afghan Taliban – known for its
curbs on media – sweeps to power (AJ: 7/9/21).

By going back to failed governance practices Taliban run the danger of fueling a dangerous
synergy of an endogenous social unrest and serious international reactions. According to
scholar A. T. Kuru "The Taliban takeover of Afghanistan perpetuates a paradigm of failed
 9

governance in the Muslim world based on a centuries-old alliance between Islamic scholars
and the state that explains underdevelopment in many Muslim-majority states and
authoritarianism in most.The takeover also highlights that, in a twist of irony, a majority of
competitors for Muslim religious soft power, leadership of the Muslim world, and the ability
to define Islam have as much in common as they have differences" (SF: 7/9/21).

The prospect of an Israeli attack on Iran (an almost certain prospect for several analysts,
Karkazis 2021) in the near future act as a powerful accelerator of geopolitical and security
events in the Region, determining to a considerable degree Afghanistan's internal affairs and
also the plans and reactions of the key international actors (USA, India, Russia, China,
Pakistan, Iran and Turkey) for Afghanistan and the surrounding countries. Following an
Israeli attack (which is expected to take place at a massive scale combined with destabilizing
actions) the expected destabilization of Iran will automatically and greatly enhance existing
similar processes in Afghanistan.

Among the factors contributing to the destabilization of Taliban regime the most important
one is evidently the viability/strengthening of Northern Alliance and its military wing NRF a
fact well understood by the key actors in Afghanistan, especially those openly (Pakistanis) or
covertly supporting the mullah's regime. Consequently these actors in coordination with the
Taliban regime will try their best to weaken NRF and especially to ‘neutralize’ its charismatic
leader, Ahmed Massoud. RW reported (9/9/21) on this issue the following.: "Highlighting
Pakistan's plot in Afghanistan, the Northern Resistance Forces in a statement to Republic
Media Network on Thursday said that the Imran Khan-led administration wants both
Ahmad Massoud and Amrulla Saleh 'dead'. In the statement given to the channel, the
resistance force added that presently Ahmad Massoud and Amrulla Saleh were putting up
in an 'undisclosed location' in Afghanistan and were 'safe', and underlined the need to
protect them. The statement comes at a time when there are reports that the leaders have
fled the war-torn country". Since Pakistanis (and possibly Turks) employ in Afghanistan
high-tech UAV's capable of rather easily locating possible ground and air movements of
NRF's leader, the latter one to avoid detection and 'neutralization' (especially this period) is
not expected to hide himself in the highlands of Panjshir but rather has found a much safer
hiding location such as Farkhor Air Base of India in Tajikistan near the borders with
Afghanistan. Farkhor Air Base accommodates a squadron of Mig 29 fighter bombers and
 10

several Mi-17 helicopters capable of reaching the central parts of Panjshir Province in an hour
approximately (corresponding geodetic distance approx. 250 km, see map 1).

MAP 1. Farkhor Air Base (source: googlemaps)

The next most important destabilization factors are (a) the issue of "inclusiveness" of Taliban
government and (b) the way the regime encounters social unrest and demonstrations.

The Qataris, who retain close ties with Iran and have a deep and wide understanding and
knowledge of the geopolitical and ideological elements and intricacies of Afghanistan and the
surrounding countries, with the moral and other support of the West and especially of USA
and Turkey, the last days try desperately to build bridges between Afghanistan and the West
and above all to persuade Taliban leaders to follow a more inclusive approach in tackling the
strategic issues of governance and security. With reference to this issue Qatar warned that
isolating Taliban could lead to more instability with Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al
Thani saying security and socioeconomic progress depend on engagement with Taliban (AJ:
31/8/21). On the other hand, a characteristic example of the American support of Qatar's
initiatives is the fact that US praised Qatar’s ‘extraordinary support’ in Afghan evacuations
with the secretary of state saying ‘no country has done more than Qatar’ during US military
withdrawal and civilian exodus(AJ: 7/9/21).
 11

We expect that in a second round of (lower status) ministerial appointments the Taliban
regime will be more inclusive in order to encounter international concernsand to ease its
international funding and aid. Indicative of the above is the visit of Qatar’s foreign minister in
Kabul on 13/9/21, the first visit of a foreign high level official after regime's change.

4. THE EMERGING HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

International donors including the World Bank and European Union froze funding shortly
after Taliban takeover (AJ: 30/8/21)

UN warned that Afghanistan is at risk of 'total breakdown' and its special envoy for
Afghanistan urged Security Council to release assets frozen overseas to avoid economic and
social collapse (AJ, 10/9/21). In particular, UN chief Antonio Guterres said almost half of the
Afghan population needs urgent aid to survive after Taliban takeover (AJ: 31/8/21).

Also, UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) said that humanitarian crisis in
Afghanistan demands urgent action since the country is on the brink of universal poverty that
due drought, COVID-19 pandemic and political upheaval could reach the level of 97 percent
(AJ, 9/9/21).

Aid agencies warn that Afghan healthcare system faces ‘potential collapse’ and there is a call
for funding as thousands of health centres and NGOs face closure affecting millions of
Afghans (AJ: 7/9/2021). There exist growing concerns for a humanitarian crisis in Panjshir
Province as Taliban claim victory with a resident of the holdout Afghan province saying
shops and medical facilities face shortages amid media blackout (AJ: 6/9/21). It is reported
that hundreds of families flee fighting between Taliban and resistance forces for the control of
final holdout province (AJ: 3/9/2021)

As a result of the growing security and humanitarian crisis thousands of Afghans cross into
Pakistan, fleeing the Taliban (AJ: 2/9/21).
 12

5. THE GROWING WAVE OF PROTESTS AND THE RE-EMERGING TALIBAN

TERROR

On 2/9/21 AJ reported that Herat women protested against Taliban over the right to work.
About 60-80 women demonstrated in Herat city demanding Taliban’s commitment on
women’s empowerment.

On 4/9/21 AJ reported that women marched in Kabul to demand role in Taliban government.
Protesters said Taliban used pepper sprays and tear gas to disperse them as they tried to reach
the presidential palace.

On 6/9/21 BM reported that Taliban killed (maimed, dismembered) in a prison one of the
symbols of Salafism in Afghanistan, priest Mawlawi Abu Obaidullah Mutawakkil.

On 7/9/21 AJ reported that hundreds of Afghans took to Kabul’s streets calling for ‘freedom’
and chanting of anti-Pakistan slogans as the Taliban cements power.

On 8/9/21 AJ reported that Taliban announced a new government on Tuesday amid protests
from Afghans over women’s rights and free speech

Under the pressure of growing protests Taliban started to resort to their old methods of terror
enforcing in this way the elements of destabilization in their country. In the case of a growing
and unchecked support and territorial gains for NRF it is expected that Taliban terror (with
the support of their allies) will reach unprecedented levels.

On 9/9/21 AJ reported that a Taliban armed group turned violent during a protest intimidating
journalists, despite their free-press pledge with journalists accusing Taliban of torture.

On 10/9/21 BM reported that dozens of children killed during Taliban ethnic cleansing in
Panjshir Province. In particular, Ali Nazari, a spokesman for the NRF, said the Taliban was
carrying out ethnic cleansing in Panjshir Province and called on the international community
to intervene. “The Taliban have expelled thousands of people from Panjshir. They are
carrying out ethnic cleansing and the world is still watching and ignoring this
situation,” Nazari wrote on Twitter. “We call on the international community to end these
war crimes,” he added.
13
 14

6. THE FIGHT FOR PANJSHIR

On 19/8/21 RW reported among other the following: "Amid a complete takeover of

Afghanistan by the Taliban, a resistance force, led by Afghanistan's former First Vice
President Amrullah Saleh and Ahmad Massoud, son of late Northern Alliance commander,
Ahmad Shah Massoud, is gathering strength in Panjshir Valley. The flag of the ‘Northern
Alliance’ or the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan has been hoisted for the
time since 2001 in Panjshir valley. Taliban have not ever entered Panjshir Valley as it always
fought against the Islamist insurgents under Ahmad Shah Massoud's command until 2001.
Both Saleh and Massoud have called on Afghans to join the resistance against Taliban"

On 21-22/8/21 DW reported that Northern Alliance troops captured Banu District in Baghlan
Province and Pol-e-Hesar District in Kabul Province. The Tajiki and Hazara's communities of
Afghanistan, with a strong presence in Panjshir and Baghlan Provinces, are among the most
active supporters of NRF.

On 25/8/21 DW reported that a delegation of 40 members of the Taliban met with the
resistance forces in Panjshir for negotiations. However, the result of the talks is unclear.

On 26/8/21 DW reported Tajikistan airdrops weapons for Ahmad Massoud's Northern

Alliance adding that Tajikistan is the first country in the world to support Ahmad Massoud
against the Afghan Taliban.

On 29/8/21 DW reported that India decided to help Ahmad Masoud in Panjshir Valley against
Afghan Jangjus of pro-Pakistan mullah Ghani.

On 30/8/21 DW reported that Northern Alliance forces smashed Taliban killing 85 and
capturing 7 Talibanis in Andarab District of Banglah Province with this development coming
a couple of days after 'caretaker' President Amrullah Saleh asserted that the Taliban rule in
the country 'won't last long. On 1/9/21 DW reported that Northern Alliance claimed to have
killed 350, and captured 40 Talibanis whereas on 2/9/21 it reported that Massoud’s men killed
over 50 Taliban fighters in Panjshir.

RW, SF and other sources reported that during the period August 19 - September 2 the NRF
victoriously advancedin the highlands of Panjshir Province and parts of the Baghlan
 15

Provincesmashing an ill-prepared Taliban's counter attack. At the same time NRF called on
Afghan people to join forces by organizing/participating in demonstrations against the
Taliban. The people mainly of Kabul and also Herat responded to the call by participating in
massive demonstrations with women playing a leading role in them. Furthermore, NRF
announced that Tajikistan and India are supporting their campaign. For obvious reasons these
announcements were not validated by other official (Russian or Tajik) sources.

On 2/9/21 DW reported that Ahmad Massoud and Amrullah Saleh claimed that the terrorist
organisation Al-Qaeda has joined hands with the Taliban to fight against the Panjshir
resistance.

On 3/9/21 BM reported that anti-Taliban opposition forces were fighting fierce battles with the
Taliban in the Afghan province of Panjshir, bulgarianmilitary.com has learned, citing field
sources. According to the latest information from the military intelligence in the region, four
areas under the influence of the Taliban have already been liberated from the opposition
forces.

On 4/9/21 Pakistani Intelligence Services chief visited Kabul. Besides the officially disclosed
information regarding his visit, it is very probable that Pak. Intel. chief equipped Taliban with
much needed information regarding NRF and the foreign actors supporting it. This hypothesis
is justified to a large degree by the fact that Taliban started their final massive campaign
against NRF immediately after this visit. In the following 5 days (Sep.4 - Sep. 8) Taliban
succeeded in capturing Panjshir Valley (suffering great losses) but not the highlands of
Panjshir Province extending right and left of the main highway crossing the Valley from SW
to NE.
 16

On 4/9/21 AJ reported that the Taliban appeared determined to snuff out the Panjshir
resistance before announcing who will lead the country. On the same day RW reported that in
a massive victory for the Northern Alliance, the Ahmad Massoud and Amrullah Saleh army
on Saturday blew up a mountain passage in the Danah area in a bid to stop the Taliban
from breaching the Panjshir Province- Afghanistan's last holdout against the insurgent
group. Following the blast, the terrorists of the Taliban were captured in the in Dasht-e-
Rivet area, and the resistance forces claim to have killed 200 of them. They further claim
to have seized the defense equipment left behind by them.

On 5/9/21 RW reported that Taliban were retreating from Panjshir, 1000 terrorist trapped. On
the same day AJ reported that Ahmad Massoud, head of NRF, said he welcomes proposals for
a negotiated settlement to end fighting in Panjshir Valley and also that Panjshir forces claim
hundreds of Taliban captured.

On 6/9/21 AJ reported that Taliban claimed victory in Panjshir with the group’s spokesman
saying it has taken control of the last holdout province, but opposition forces pledge to
continue fight.

On 6/9/21 RW reported the following: "Hours after Taliban claimed victory in Panjshir, the
leader of National Resistance Front of Afghanistan, Ahmad Massoud, called on
Afghanistan to rally against the Islamist group across the country. In his first audio
message after the Taliban's declaration of victory, Massoud said that the resistance forces
are still fighting against the Taliban in Panjshir and that the group's claim of victory is far
from true. He declared a national uprising against the Taliban and asked Afghans to resist
Taliban by whatever means they could. He also asked Taliban fighters to repent and join
the resistance. Ahmad Massoud has asked the international community to aid the Afghan
resistance forces against Taliban. He said despite Taliban's strong military power, the
resistance will continue. Watch this video for Massoud's full speech".

On 7/9/21 RW reported that a Pakistani chopper bombed Northern Alliance spokesperson

Fahim Dashty in Panjshir and also that NRF claimed air attack at Taliban positions killing
many militants.
 17

On 8/9/21 SF reported that the Pakistani military had taken part in the Taliban’s offensive
against resistance forces in the northeastern Afghan province of Panjshir according to Fox
News foreign correspondent Benjamin Hall.According to Hall, sources in the US Central
Command informed Fox News that the Pakistani military supported the Taliban with combat
drones, helicopters and special forces. “The Pakistani military are assisting the Taliban
offensive in Panjshir – Including 27 helicopters full of Pakistani Special Forces, backed up by
Pakistani drone strikes,” Hall wrote on Twitter without elaborating.SF reported also the
following: "The Taliban imposed control of Panjshir on September 6 following a quick battle
with resistance forces, which didn’t fight back much. The last day of fighting in Panjshir saw
the death of Fahim Dashty, a spokesman for the resistance, and General Abdul Wudod Zara, a
commander of the resistance and nephew of late Afghan leader Ahmed Massoud. The Taliban
claimed that they were both killed in clashes with its fighters. However, sources in the
resistance said that the two were killed in Pakistani drone strikes.

The whereabouts of resistance leader Ahmed Massoud Jr. remains unknowns. The other key
figure of the resistance former Vice President of Afghanistan Amrullah Saleh has reportedly
taken refuge in Tajikistan. Resistance forces refused to acknowledge defeat. Massoud said
that his force, drawn from the remnants of the regular Afghan army as well as local militia
fighters, was still fighting. The reports of a direct Pakistani involvement in the battle of
Panjshir were not surprising. As the battle was heating up in the mountainous province, head
of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence arrived in Kabul supposedly to discuss issues related
to the “peace and stability” of Afghanistan.

On 9/9/21 SF reported that NRF's spokesman Ali Nazari said on CNN that resistance forces in
control 60-65% of Panjshir Province territory.“All strategic positions in Panjshir are under
our control. We have made a tactical withdrawal from the main road,” he added..According
to Nazari, the Taliban suffered heavy casualties in battles with resistance forces. He also
assured that in the near future the Panjshir will be “completely cleansed” of the Taliban.

On 9/9/21 RW reported that the NRF, which failed to defend the Panjshir Valley against the
Taliban, will create a parallel govt soon. An NRF spokesperson has said that the group will
establish a transitional democratic and legitimate government in Afghanistan. According to
local reports, Ahmad Massoud has released a statement calling the Taliban govt
“illegitimate”. A NRF spokesperson said that Massoud and Saleh are still in the country and
 18

are safe. On the same day DW reported the following: "High-level officials in the previous
government, including Vice President Amrullah Saleh and Defense Minister Bismillah
Khan, have taken refuge in Panjshir, pledging to continue the fight against the Taliban
from its sanctuary. In southern Tajikistan, hundreds of ethnic Tajiks have volunteered to
join the anti-Taliban coalition forming in Afghanistan’s Panjshir Valley".

On 9/9/21 RW, based on Afghan sources, raised the following question: "Did Russia airstrike
Panjshir Valley?" adding that Russian military aircraft have been spotted on the border.The
question arises as to who gave a befitting reply to the Taliban, the terror group. Tajikistan's
name tops the speculation by many Afghan journalists. Because Ahmed Masood is said to be
in Tajikistan these days. At the same time, when the Taliban captured Afghanistan, many
Afghan army soldiers, fighter jets, managed to get out of here and reach Tajikistan.

On 9/9/21NRF spokesman Ali Nazari said on CNN that NRF controls 60-65% of Panjshir
Province territory and continues its armed resistance against Taliban (map 2).

MAP 2. NRF presence in Panjshir Province (source: googlemaps)

 19

On 10/9/21 SF reported that the Taliban had killed Roohullah Saleh, brother of former afghan
vice president Amarullah Saleh, in the northeastern province of Panjshir. Roohullah was
reportedly ambushed by Taliban fighters in the district of Rukha as he was attempting to flee
Panjshir towards the capital Kabul.On the same day SF reported Indian media claimed
Pakistan air-force struck Panjshir Valley to assist the Taliban in fighting the Resistance Front.

7. TALIBAN'S NEW GOVERNMENT

On 27/8/21 AJ reported that Taliban sources disclosed that the government will include leaders
from all ethnicities and tribal backgrounds. This disclosure, if not coming from Mullah Baradar,
was probably a staged one to establish a positive climate in the interior of the country and also
abroad in a critical period for the consolidation of Taliban's rule in the country.

On 2/9/21 AJ reported that former Taliban political bureau chief, Sayed Muhammad Tayyab
Agha, also urged group to form an inclusive government.

Also, on 4/9/21 AJ reported that Mullah Baradar promised an 'inclusive' government in an

interview with it. One cannot exclude the possibility that Baradar, being a moderate politician,
could have in mind the formation of an inclusive government but later hardliners as Haqqani
forcefully rejected it.

On 6/9/21 Taliban announced the new government of Afghanistan led by Mahammad Hasan
Akhud. All members of the cabinet are Pashtun. They are also pro-Pakistaniexcept for
Baradar and possibly Muttaqi, the only moderate members of it. Women were excluded from
the cabinet.

On 8/9/21 AJ reported that China welcomed the new Taliban government whereas West
expressed concerns.

On 8/9/21 BM reported the following: "The Taliban’s Afghan government is unlikely to be

automatically recognized by Russia, it must demonstrate that it is ready to follow the country’s
civilized path of development". Also, the head of the Committee on International Affairs at the
Federation Council Vladimir Jabarov stated the following:
 20

“Automatic recognition of the new government is hardly possible. This should show in practice
how ready it is to defend freedom, to carry out the civilized development of the country”.

On 9/921 AJ reported the Iranian government has not directly criticized the Taliban for its
interim cabinet, but has signaled concern.

On 20/9/21 SF reported that India wants QUAD to get more involved in Afghanistan. Also that
"The US has announced the Quad’s first-ever Leaders’ Summit to take place at Washington D.C.
on September 24. Last Friday, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Collective
Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) held summit meetings at Dushanbe, Tajikistan. India was
represented in the latter occasion and shall be in the former also. Currently Taliban-controlled
Afghanistan and its evolving situation and regional security implications is a major topic in both
summits. The Quad and the Taliban being mentioned in the same paragraph in many analyses
and news pieces, however, is something new".

On 23/9/21 AJ reported that the Turkish President said the Taliban lacking ‘inclusive,
encompassing leadership’ and that Ankara is willing to work with Taliban if the armed group
formed a more encompassing government.

On 26/9/21 AJ reported thatItaly rules out recognising a Taliban government in Afghanistanand

that Italy’s FM urges foreign governments to prevent financial collapse that would result in a
massive flow of migrants. It also reported also that Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said
that it is essential Afghanistan’s new Taliban rulers keep their ‘promises’.

The new Cabinet

Mullah Mohammad Hasan Akhud, acting Prime Minister

Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, acting Deputy Prime Minister
Sirajuddin Haqqani, acting Minister of Interior
Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob, acting Minister of Defense
Amir Khan Muttaqi, acting Minister of Foreign Affair
 21

8. PROFILES OF THE SUPREME LEADER OF THE ISLAMIC

EMIRATE AND THE MEMBERS OF THE NEW TALIBAN
GOVERNMENT

8.1 Hibatullah Akhundzada

- He was born in the Kandahar Province and he is a Pashtun.

- After the Soviet invasion his family migrated to Quetta in the Balochistan province of
Pakistan where he followed Islamic seminar at one of the famous madrassas there. Later he
actively participated in the armed resistance against the Soviets in Afghanistan.
- In the first Taliban government he was appointed deputy head of the Supreme Court and
later he was appointed instructor at the prestigious Jihadi Madrassa in Afghanistan operating
under the supervision of Mullah Omar.
- Following the fall of Taliban government in 2001 he was appointed Chief Justice of the
Sharia Courts of the IEA, advisor to Mullah Omar and a senior member of Taliban's powerful
Council of the Leaders (Quetta Shura).
- On 2016 he was appointed Supreme Leader of the IEA with Mullah Yaqoob and Sirajuddin
Haqqani serving as his deputies.
- In the period 2012-2020 two attempts were made to assassinate Akhundzada, both in
Pakistan (Balochistan, one in Quetta).
- Following the fall of Kabul to Taliban in August 2021 he ordered the release of all political
detainees from all prisons of Afghanistan, ISIL and al-Qaeda members included, and also
ordered the strict application of sharia in the country. Akhundzada disappeared for a while
producing rumors that either he was assassinated or he was kept under the protection of
Pakistany Army.
- He is considered as a hardliner and pro-Pakistani.

8.2 Mullah Mohammad Akhud

- He is 70 years old.
- He is a Pashtun descending, according to Al Jazeera, from Ahmad Shah Durrani,
the founder of the Durrani Empire in 1747. He was born (according to UN Security Council)
in the tribal Kandahar Province in central Afghanistan populated mainly by Pashtuns but with
a strong presence of Baloch, Hazaras and Tajiks.
 22

- He studied in various madrassas of Afghanistan following radical Islamic seminars.

- He was a close associate of Mullah Omar, the founder of Taliban movement.
- He served as the foreign minister and deputy prime minister in the first Taliban government
(1996-2001). Then he served as the head of Taliban's powerful leadership council Quetta (or
Rabbari) Shura.
- At the beginning of September 2021 he was appointed acting prime minister of the IEA.
- According to western sources (BBC and US Institute for Peace) Akhund is primarily a
political person exerting strong influence on Taliban's religious affairs and much less on
military ones. He was one of the few Taliban leaders that did not participate in the Soviet-
Afghan War. He is also considered by American think tanks (MEI) as pro-Pakistani

8.3 Mullah Abdul Baradar

- He is 52 years old.
- He is coming from a tribal group of Pashtun, born in the Province of Uruzgan, in central
Afghanistan, populated mainly by Pashtun but with a strong presence of (mainly pro-Iranian)
Hazaras and with record levels of opium poppy crops that Karzai government failed to
eradicate. Several Taliban leaders coming from this province cooperated with the Karzai
government, one of them serving as governor of the Province.
- He fought side-by-side with Mullah Omar against the Soviets, becoming then his deputy and
co-founder of the Taliban movement. His surname 'Barader', meaning 'Brother", was given to
him as a 'nom de guerre' by Mullah Omar. Later was also known by the honorific title of
"Mullah".
- He held senior positions in the Taliban government during the period 1996-2001.
- After the collapse of Taliban government in 2001 Baradar was appointed head of the
organization Quetta Shura in Pakistan becoming the de facto leader of the Taliban. On the
other hand, coming from a province where Taliban leaders developed reconciliation policies
with Afghanistan's new regime, together with a small group of Taliban members, he entered
into secret negotiations with Karzai aiming at promoting a peace deal and recognition of his
regime without the involvement of Pakistan. The powerful Pakistani secret services took
notice of Baradar's secret pursuits and Islamabad ordered his imprisonment in 2010.
- Following strong American pressures, Baradar was released from the custodian
imprisonment in Pakistan and moved to Qatar where he was appointed head of Taliban's
 23

political office overseeing the troop withdrawal agreement with the US. The support to
Baradar was most probably the result of Washington's worries regarding the suffocating
control of Islamabad on the Taliban regime and its aim to balance it with a pro-Iranian leading
figure. Indicative of these worries are among other a paper of MEI (author V. Kaura, 10/9/21)
titled "The Pakistani stamp on the Taliban cabinet". The author argues that "The selection of
the interim Afghan government led by Mullah Hasan Akhund has the unmistakable stamp of
Pakistan’s security establishment. Islamabad has always wanted the international community
to believe that the Taliban are a nationalistic Pashtun force that has a legitimate claim to rule
the country, but the manner in which the new government has been announced is a testament
to the fact that the Taliban are also a proxy force for Pakistan". The above worries and
concerns were also depicted in a MEI seminar organized in November 2021 under the title
"What are Pakistan's aims at Afghanistan?" and the following working questions/themes:
How relevant currently is the concept of “strategic depth”? What kind of regime would
Pakistan prefer in Kabul? What is the nature of Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban and
how much influence does it exercise over the insurgency’s political wing? How important to
the course of the Afghan conflict today are Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan?
- On February 2021 Baradar, heading a Taliban delegation, visited Tehran and had a meeting
with the Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif. It is, most probably, that this event enhanced his pro-
Iranian profile adding fuel to the mounting disagreements with the other pro-Pakistani Taliban
leaders.
- During the process of formation of the new Taliban government he was involved in serious
disagreements and conflicts with other, mainly pro-Pakistani, Taliban leaders among them the
hardcore radical Islamist Haqqani. He then disappeared for a while from the political scene,
after having moved to his stronghold Kandahar (to avoid possibly an assassination attempt).
- At the beginning of September 2021 he was appointed first deputy prime minister of the
IEA.
- Time magazine gave an overall assessment of Baradar by including him on 15/9/21 in the
list of the"100 Most Influential People in 2021".

8.4 Sirajuddin Haqqani

- He was born sometime between 1973 and 1980

 24

- Haqqani is a Pashtun and son of the famous Taliban commander Jalaluddin Haqqani who
took a leading part in the war against the Soviets and who also was the founder and first
leader of the Haqqani Network, a guerrilla insurgent group being a semi-autonomous offshoot
of Taliban designated by US as a "terror group".
- From an early age he developed close ties and contacts with Pakistan. During his childhood
he stayed in North Waziristan, a province of western Pakistan bordering with Afghanistan.
Later he attended Darul Uloom Haqqania Deobandi, the famous Islamic seminar in the
Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan.
- At the beginning of September 2021 he was appointed acting minister of the interior.
- He is considered as pro-Pakistani.
- He is an advocate of extremely radical practices, like beheadings and suicide bombings, that
paved his path towards the ministry of interior.

8.5 Mullah Mohammed Yaqoob

- He is 31 years old
- Yaqoob is a Pashtun and son of the famous founder Taliban movement Mullah Omar.
- As with the case of Haqqani, from an early age he developed close ties with Pakistan,
receiving religious education in various madrassas in Karachi.
- In 2016, he was appointed head of the powerful Taliban military commission and member of
Rahbari Shura (the Taliban's powerful decision-making council) and also second deputy of
Hibatullah Akhundzada, the supreme commander of the IEA.
- At the beginning of September 2021 he was appointed acting minister of defense.
- He is considered as moderate personality, supporter of peace and pro-Saudi having, as
rumored, ties with the Saudi regime as well as with the former government of Afghanistan.

8.6 Amir Khan Muttaqi

- He is 51 years old.
- He is probably a Pashtun, born in the mostly tribal province of Helmand in southern
Afghanistan bordering with Pakistan. The predominant ethnic group of the province is the
Pashtun with Balochis representing a significant minority.
- During the first government of Taliban (1996-2001) he served as the minister of culture and
 25

information and also as a minister of education. Some years later he was appointed
representative of Taliban government in the UN led talks on Afghanistan.
- Later he was appointed by Taliban member of the peace commission and negotiation team
and was dispatched to Qatar together with Baradar to hold talks with US.
- After the fall of Kabul to the Taliban it was reported that Muttaqi was holding talks with
non-Taliban politicians, among them Abdullah Abdullah (chairman of the High Council for
National Reconciliation) and Karzai. Also he held (finally failed) talks with NRF for a
peaceful settlement of hostilities in the Province of Panjshir.
- At the beginning of September 2021 he was appointed acting minister of foreign affairs.
- He is considered as a moderate politician.
9. RUSSIA – AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS

The Russian-Afghan relations exhibited during the last forty years extreme ups and downs.
Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979. The Soviet-Afghan War lasted for 10 years and
awakened the fears of the West (mainly of British and Americans) regarding Russia's descent
into the warm seas, in this case into the Indian Ocean. According to Brown (2013) the
motivations for the Soviet invasion were based on the following two main reasons:
-A longstanding Russian foreign policy focusing on security through expansionism and the
establishment of physical barriers in the form of buffer states, a policy having similarities with
the old British policies in the Region.
-To interrupt Chinese and American efforts to establish a greater political influence in
Afghanistan.

In order to achieve a viable control of the country and as sign of good will and ideological
solidarity to the marxist regimes of Karmal (1979-1986), being possibly an ethnic Tajik and of
Najibullah (1986-1992), being an ethnic Tajik, the Soviets supported them with the
unprecedented $800 million.

Being influenced by the above serious geopolitical concerns of the West, Pakistan also
developed fears regarding a possible Sovietinvasion of Pakistani Balochistan to reach Indian
Ocean. To encounter this grave prospect Pakistan asked for the assistance of Saudi and the
USA (CIA) which funneled huge amounts of funds and equipment to Afghan mujahideen
fighters through the powerful Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence Agency (ISI) which also
 26

trained 90.000 Afghans during the period 1978-1990. As a result the Soviets withdrew from
Afghanistan in 1989 but continued to support Najibullah regime.

During the following two Afghan civil wars (1992 – 1996 and 1996 – 2001) the Taliban
(probably with American support) intervened in Central Asia and Russia itself by supporting
Chechen rebels and providing a sanctuary for terrorist groups active there. To encounter this
threat Russia provided military assistance to the Afghan Northern Alliance against the
Taliban. Note that the Afghan civil war was fought between Islamic State or Northern
Alliance (confined after the capture of Kabul by the Taliban to the northern provinces of the
country) and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan ruled by the Taliban. Northern Alliance was
recognized by most of international community and the Islamic Emirate only by Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan and UAE.

Following the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 by NATO and the USA and throughout the
period 2001-2020 (Karzai and Ghani regimes) Russian - Afghan relations were more or less
good with Russia investing in business and cultural programs and offering financial and
military support to the Afghan government.

10. RUSSIA - PAKISTAN RELATIONS

Main source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan%E2%80%93Russia_relations

During the last 30 years the Russia - Pakistan relations have acquired a strategic depth
enhanced by their participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

Their relations speeded up after the collapse of Soviet Union in 1990 and following the visit
of a high level economic delegation to Moscow headed by the prime minister of Pakistan
Benazir Bhutto.

Their bilateral trade exhibited a sharp increase during the period 2000-2010. In 2010 Pakistan
and Russia established Russian–Pakistan Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and
Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation to further enhance their multi-facet
relationship. Russia is currently financing the enormous energy project, the CASA-1000,
transmitting power generation from Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan to Pakistan,
 27

strengthening in this way the bonds between central Asia members of SCO and Pakistan.
According to Stephen Blank, a senior analyst of the Institute of Strategic Studies, in the period
2010-2011, Russia and Pakistan had covertly developed geopolitical and strategic relations,
most probably aiming at encountering the re-emerging Taliban threat due to the problematic
and rapidly weakening American control in Afghanistan and the prospect of NATO
withdrawal from it (APP [November 8, 2011]. "Pakistan, Russia to go for FTA, currency swap
agreement". Tribune Express).

During the period 2010-2016 the military cooperation between Moscow and Islamabad was
steadily increasing (not necessarily inside SCO) with Russia taking precautions not to offend
India, a country having delicately balancing relations with Pakistan. Indicative of that were the
comments of the Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia Sergey Ryabkov in 2015 that Islamabad
and Moscow military cooperation does not negatively impact Russia's ties with India since
Moscow-Islamabad relations were improving in other sectors. The military cooperation
between Moscow and Islamabad was further enhanced with the participation of the two
countries in joint military exercises in 2015 and 2016 which caused disappointment and
reactions on the part of New Delhi despite the fact that India feels free to participate in other
geopolitical organizations such as QUAD appearing to be antagonistic from some points of
view with SCO. On the other hand the Russia-India relations have the greatest strategic depth
among SCO members that rather easily absorb such tribulations at least in the short term. In
the long term the emerging AUKUS will most probably try its best to attract India (and there
are indications on that, section 12) among other aims to weaken SCO. Thus, in the long term it
is probable that such tribulations will be less manageable but in any case India will not
abandon SCO despite the wishful thinking of some analysts or key actors (Mohan, 2021).
Another factor contributing to the extensive and rapidly improving relations between Moscow
and Islamabad is the autocratic characteristics of their leaderships that is supported also by the
citizens of the two countries who prefer a strong ruler over democracy according to a poll
contacted in 2013 by Washington Post. The above profiles exhibit strong differences as
compared to the profile of Indian leadership which is more democratic.

11. RUSSIA - INDIA RELATIONS

During the Cold War India and Soviet Union developed a strong strategic relationship
(military, economic and diplomatic) which was further enhanced, this time between Russia
 28

and India, after the dissolution of the latter. To give emphasis to this relationship both
countries term it as a “special and privileged strategic partnership”. Furthermore, the very
good relations between the leaders of the two countries, Putin and Modi, contributed much to
the steady growth of this partnership. According to Ranjan Mathai, former foreign secretary of
India, the viability and strength of this relationship is based upon the following major factors:
political, defense, anti-terrorism and nuclear cooperation. Following the above trend the
bilateral trade exhibited an unprecedented growth from $9 bil.in 2017 to a projected $30 bil. in
2025. Besides that, India is the second largest market for the Russian defense industry. The
epitome of this partnership is the trade agreements between the two countries promoted in the
context of a nuclear agreement signed by them in 2009 the most important being the
construction by Russia of 16 nuclear reactors in India till 2030, with their cost reaching $45
bil. Evidently this relationship of the two big nuclear powers create serious concerns on the
part of Washington. Under the influence of the wishful thinking of Washington regarding this
hot geopolitical issue some analysts and think tanks reach to rather negative conclusions
regarding the future of Russian-Indian relationship. A characteristic example is the paper titled
“Are Indo-Russian Ties the Next Casualty of Great-Power Shifts? The fall of Kabul may have
widened the rift between New Delhi and Moscow” written by Raja Mohan (2021) under the
umbrella of Foreign Policy magazine. Mohan concludes in the above paper: “This Indian
strategy is not about non-alignment or multi-alignment, as many would be tempted to
conclude, but rather an unapologetic pursuit of an interest-based foreign policy. It is a strategy
that is no longer defensive about a growing partnership with the United States and the West
that will be on full display this month”.

12. GEOPOLITICAL PURSUITS OF RUSSIA, USA, INDIA AND

PAKISTAN IN THE REGION (AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN) IN THE
CASE OF AN ISRAELI ATTACK ON IRAN AND A REGIME CHANGE
THERE

Karkazis (2021) analyzed in depth the Iranian-Israeli nuclear conflict and the role and
capabilities, in such a conflict, of Iranian ballistic missiles and the Israeli anti-missile systems
concluding that the case of a nuclear Iran constitutes an existential threat for Israel. Our
assessment regarding this issue is that with the highest probability Israel will attack Iran in the
near future with the only strategic issue left open being if this attack will combine also nuclear
weapons or not. Israel rightfully expects that a massive attack against Iran will destabilize its
 29

regime leading to the opening of the ‘pandora box’ for both Iran and Afghanistan: (a) collapse
if it and (b) its territorial disintegration probably through intervention of foreign powers
(Kurdish Peshmerga towards NW Iran andRussian advance towards NE Iran or/and the central
provinces of Afghanistan populated mainly by anti-Taliban Hazaras, map 3). In the context of
the above scenario one cannot exclude completely the possibility of a joint Russian-Indian
invasion (with Tajik assistance) of Afghanistan from their military bases in southern
Tajikistan. On the other hand such an invasion will certainly meet the fierce reaction of
Pakistan since its encirclement by Indian forces from east and west will most certainly cross
the Islamabad red lines.

MAP 3. The possibility of an invasion of Afghanistan from the north

The invasion and occupation of Afghanistan (justified on geopolitical and security grounds
but with no clear and communicable objectives) for 20 years was the decision of US‘deep
state’ and of powerful lobbying centers acting mainly on the part of Israel. On geopolitical
grounds this unprecedented intervention seems to serve two strategic objectives: (a) to create a
state-barrier under the American control that will stop any long term and covert plans of
Russia to advance towards the Indian Ocean and (b) to guard and check from the east
Iranian’s emerging nuclear ambitions. Despite the significance of the above objectives both
for NATO, Washington and Israel, it was the enormous economic, military and political cost
of occupation that weighted more in favor of the abandonment of Afghanistan by the
Americans. Furthermore, the over reliance on corrupted political and military elites further
augmented this cost whereas the inability of corrupted Afghan military leaders and their
disorganized military units resulted in the quick victory of the ideologically highly inspired
 30

Taliban. It is interesting to note at this point the objection of London to the abandonment of
Afghanistan by Washington. The British have the best geopolitical ‘view’ of the Region
extending to all aspects of it (military, economic, social and ideological). This ‘view’
developed during a long period of time during which Britain was the occupier and ruler of
major parts of the Region. Since British objections seem to ignore or downgrade the enormous
occupation cost, borne mainly by USA, it is the longtime Russian and the recent Chinese
threats that most probably weighted most for them.

The American intervention in Afghanistan seemed to lack from the beginning clear-cut
objectives that could be easily communicated and understood by other state and non-state
actors in the Region. For example, regarding Washington’s announcement that U.S. forces in
Afghanistan will desist from combat missions in 2013, leaving the burden of those
operations to U.S. special and elite forces and to trained Afghan forces, Blank (2012)
commented that “This decision has caused great turbulence in NATO and throughout
Central Asia, adding that the Central Asian governments continue to warn that their
security problems will grow in the wake of the U.S. and NATO withdrawal. Yet these
governments, along with Russia, Iran, China, and Pakistan, also oppose any long-term U.S.
strategic presence in Afghanistan or Kyrgyzstanat the base at Manas”. In his concluding
remarks the author stressed the following: “This Administration and its successors must
de-cide whether or not Central Asia is truly important to U.S. interests and policies,
and if so, what the threats to those interests are and how they may be countered
effectively. Then and only then, can we afford in the future to deploy the enormous
resources, both tangible and intangible, at our disposal to advance those interests.
However, if our rhetoric points one way and our actions in another direction, nobody
will be fooled except our own policymakers and analysts”.

One cannot also exclude the possibility the Americans (having acquired during the last 20
years in depth knowledge of every aspect of Afghanistan and its surrounding powers) did not
abandon last August the country as a defeated power. They rather did it assessing that, in the
light of an Israeli attack on Iran, the country will be disintegrated quickly introducing a
complex system of conflicts among Russia, Pakistan and India that (they expected) would
weaken SCO cohesion, drawing at the same time India closer to AUCUS. The Americans
enhanced in an indirect and highly innovative way their strategic pursuits for India and SCO
through a very interesting inclusion, in the conclusions of QUAD recent summit (Sep. 2021 in
 31

the White House) of the following statement: “Quad partners will organize their work by
launching a Quad Shipping Taskforce and will invite leading ports, including Los Angeles,
Mumbai Port Trust, Sydney (Botany), and Yokohama, to form a network dedicated to
greening and decarbonizing the shipping value chain. The Quad Shipping Task Force will
organize its work around several lines of efforts and aims to establish two to three Quad low-
emission or zero-emission shipping corridors by 2030”. Evidently, the Mumbai Port Trust,
represents a “small piece of cheese in the mousetrap” that will gradually distance India from
China’s new Silk Road mega-plans along the highly strategic Euro-Asiatic Rimland, by
creating the “Green-Shipping Network”, a parallel and highly competitive road to Chinese
‘Belt and Road Action Plan’.
(https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/fact-sheet-quad-leaders-summit/)

Regarding the issue of participation of India in the AUCUS there exist conflicting signals. For
example, Abhijit Singh, in article in the Hindu (25/9/21) titled “India is not a bystander in the
AUKUS saga” says that observers in New Delhi profess mixed feelings — some joy for
Australia, but more commiseration with France.
(https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/india-is-not-a-bystander-in-the-aukus-saga/article36659188.ece).

On the other hand Hindustan Times reported on 1/10/21 that according to Australia PM India is
positive about AUKUS
(https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/aukus-complements-quad-embraced-by-india-japan-morrison-101633000169054.html)

Karkazis et al (2020) argued that in the case of an Israeli attack on Iran and destabilization of
its regime Russia will move quickly and decisively to establish a sphere of influence in Iran,
possibly through a geopolitical understanding with Israel. In the case of a civil war in Iran, the
Russian army may intervene militarily in the northern part of the country (considerable
Russian army forces have already taken positions across the Iranian borders) and
Peshmerga/PMOI forces may invade the western part of it with the aim to ‘clear’, under
international inspection, Iran from dangerous nuclear installations and to help establishing
democracy in the country. After all the Russians have a history of interventions in this country
and know well the whereabouts there, at least in the northern part of it.

Note at this point that Russia has a military base in Tajikistan, near its capital Dushanbe (201st
military base), having the following strength: Men: 6,000–7,000, Tanks: 96, Armored
 32

personnel carriers: 300, Artillery pieces: 54, Other vehicles: 1100, Helicopters: 8, Ground
attack aircraft: 5 (source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_201st_Military_Base).

12.1 The issue of re-emergence of a Russia-Iran-India “Northern Alliance”

On 18/7/21 RW speculated on this issue reporting the following: “One question that has
emerged among Indian policy watchers is whether the Northern Alliance, an anti-Taliban
military front led by the Tajik and other Afghan ethnic minority groups, can be revived. The
alliance was supported by Russia, Iran and India after its inception in 1996 and remained a
pocket of resistance in northern Afghanistan until it disbanded in 2001. Indian external affairs
minister S Jaishankar’s visit to Iran and Russia last week fueled such speculations. On
Wednesday Jaishankar and the foreign ministers of seven other nations, including China and
Russia, met at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Tajikistan where he stressed
that confronting extremism and terrorism should be a key purpose of the grouping which is
seen as a counterweight to the US-led NATO military alliance. The revival of the Northern
Alliance was theoretically possible. But it needs charismatic and respected leaders”.

On 21/7/21 commenting on Russian military exercises in the Region (seen as a possible

precursor of the revival of Northern Alliance) RW reported the following: “Russia will send
troops to the Tajik-Afghan and Uzbek-Afghan borders to conduct two consecutive exercises
announced by the Russian Defense Ministry, Defence24 reports. Their goal is to understand
how the parties to the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a post-Soviet military union,
will deal with a potential military threat from the Afghan border”.

On 20/8/21 BM, a European news agency known to be well informed on Russian affairs,
raised the question of a Russian military interference in Afghanistan reporting the following:
“Is Russia preparing to strike Afghanistan? Many Russian journalists are asking such
questions after sources on the Russian website Aviapro noticed the deployment of Tu-22M3
bombers on the border with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, or Turkmenistan. BulgarianMilitary.com
reminds us that in the last month the Russian Federation carried out a series of exercises near
the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. In addition to bombers, the Russian
Federation sent thousands of troops, heavily armored vehicles, and support equipment during
 33

military exercises”. The same news agency on 30/8/21, raised again the same question
reporting the following: “About 300 Russian troops and more than 60 pieces of equipment
have been transferred to Kyrgyzstan for CSTO Rubezh-2021 maneuvers, the Central Military
District [CMD] said on Monday, learned BulgarianMilitary.com. “Up to 300 servicemen and
more than 60 pieces of equipment will be attracted by the Russian contingent,” the statement
said. The maneuvers in Kyrgyzstan will take place against the backdrop of the escalating
situation in Afghanistan, where the Taliban movement has come to power”.

One could argue that the above speculations are reinforced by the following comments of
president Putin:
- Putin saidUS achieved ‘zero’ in Afghanistan and that the 20-year occupation resulted in
‘sheer tragedies and losses’ for Washington and the Afghan people” (AJ, 1/9/21) and
- Putin, treading carefully with the hardline group (considered still by Moscow as a ‘terrorist’
group) hopes the Taliban will be ‘civilised’ and open to dialogue (AJ, 3/9/21).

On 22/8/21 RW raised again the above issue in a report titled “Can India support Northern
Alliance to counter Taliban? Strategic significance of Farkhor air base”.

On 9/9/21 RW, based on Afghan sources, raised the following question: "Did Russia airstrike
Panjshir Valley?" adding that Russian military aircraft have been spotted on the border. The
question arises as to who gave a befitting reply to the Taliban, the terror group. Tajikistan's
name tops the speculation by many Afghan journalists adding that Ahmed Masood is said to
be in Tajikistan these days. At the same time, when the Taliban captured Afghanistan, many
Afghan army soldiers and fighter jets, managed to get out of here and reach Tajikistan.
Furthermore, on 9/9/21 president Putin, during the 13th BRICS video conference Summit
chaired by prime minister Modi, said: “The US and its withdrawal from Afghanistan has
led to a new crisis and it is still unclear how this will effect regional and global security.
International community will have to clear out all the mess,” he added. He also expressed
concern for the uprise in terrorism and drug trafficking from the current situation in
Afghanistan” (AJ, 9/9/21).

13. IRAN – AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS

Main source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghanistan%E2%80%93Iran_relations
 34

During the period 1989 to date Iran together with Pakistan exerted the highest ideological
influence on Afghanistan conducting mainly covert military and political interventions in it.
During most of this period the interests of Iran were in a collision course with Pakistani, Saudi
and American interests in the country. Shia’s (mainly Hazaras) and ethnic Tajiks (of Persian
origin) are Iran’s main ideological, military and political allies in Afghanistan being located in
the central (Hazaras) and in the northern (Tajiks) provinces of it.

During the period 1989 – 1992 (Karmal and Najibullah regimes) Iran supported the People’s
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) against the mujahideen who were trained at that
time by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and USA. According to Rubin (2013) "Iran saw the Soviet-
backed Kabul government as the main force blocking the takeover of Afghanistan by Sunni
Wahhabi parties backed by these three countries [Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United
States]. Although it continued to support Shia parties politically, it did not support their
making war on the Najibullah government”.

During the period 1992 – 2001 of Taliban rule in Afghanistan and as a result of the harsh
treatment of Afghan minorities (especially the pro-Iranian Hazaras) and the Mazar-i Sharif
massacre of Iranian diplomats in 1998 Iran came into a collision course with the Taliban and
started supporting Northern Alliance and the Afghan Resistance Forces dominated mainly by
Tajiks.

During the period 2001 – 2020 and despite the deterioration of USA – Iran relations (mainly
due to emerging nuclear ambitions of the latter) Karzai government was engaged in cordial
relations with Tehran. In the context of this relation Iran heavily contributed to the
reconstruction of the country with most of the contributions directed (for obvious political
reasons) to ethnic Hazaras and Tajik communities. As it is obvious, Washington was
developing serious concerns over the above increasing Iranian influence on Afghanistan. As a
result pro-American news agencies, politicians and experts started to circulate rumors for an
ongoing Iran-Pakistan conspiracy to weaken the Karzai government. It is characteristic the
report of the news agency ‘Pathwok Afghan News Reflecting the Truth’, under the title “Iran
– Pakistan out to weaken Afghanistan, MPs told” concluding that “Pakistani and Iranian spies
have joined hands to weaken the Karzai government by killing Afghan elders and trying to
disrupt the current system, senior security officials told parliamentarians on Sunday”. The
meeting in Tehran of presidents of Iran and Afghanistan (Rouhani and Ghani) in 2015 gave
 35

newimpetus to the above conspiracy rumors of a double game of Iran in the country (under the
nose of USA and NATO?) with open support of Karzai and Ghani governments and the
supply and training of the Taliban insurgents (“Afghan Senate: Iran and Russia are supporting
Taliban”, Z. Masood, Al Arabiya News 8/12/2016).
 36

13.1 Bilateral trade during 2001 - 2020

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghanistan%E2%80%93Iran_relations

Trade between the two nations has increased dramatically since the overthrow of the Taliban
government in late 2001. Iran and Afghanistan plan on building a new rail line connecting
Mashhad to Herat. In 2009, Iran was one of the largest investor in Afghanistan, mainly in the
construction of roads and bridges as well as agriculture and health care. Afghanistan is a
major opium producer. Afghanistan produces 90% of world's heroin. Some of these drugs are
smuggled into Iran and from there to European countries (mainly Germany.Afghanistan and
Iran have been persuaded to cooperate with each other in reciprocal beneficial ways due to
worsening economic conditions, according to the international news magazine ‘The
Diplomat’.

13.2 Bilateral trade in 2021

Source: Tehran Times, 23/8/21. https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/464208/Trade-between-Iran-Afghanistan-getting-back-to-normal

According to Rouhollah Latifi, Iran Customs Administration spokesman, the trade between
the two sides, which had declined 15 percent over the past two months, is now back to normal
levels. “Considering the recent conflicts in Afghanistan, the weight of Iran-Afghanistan trade
declined 15 percent, however, the latest statistics show that the trade has reached about 1,300
trucks per day by August 21,” Latifi said.

Following the recent unrest in Afghanistan, Iran’s exports to the country had fallen
significantly and Iranian exporters were looking for alternative markets to replace the
neighboring country.

Afghanistan accounted for 11 percent of Iran's total non-oil exports in the first quarter of the
current Iranian calendar year (March 21-June 21), during which the country imported 296,000
tons of agricultural and food products worth $134 million from Iran. Tomatoes, apples,
potatoes, sweets, and fruit juice concentrate were the top exported items to the neighboring
country. Afghanistan imported about $8 billion worth of non-oil goods in 2020, of which $2.3
billion came from Iran; this indicates that one-third of the country's needs were supplied by
the Islamic Republic.
37
 38

14. THE EMERGING AXIS OF GEOPOLITICAL UNDERSTANDING AND

COOPERATION AGAINST IRAN AND ITS VULNERABILITIES

The Israeli plans to attack Iran have a powerful impact on Israel – Turkey relations. These
relations appear to be superficially conflicting but in reality a (covert for the moment)
rapprochement is on the making with for-runners being the intelligence establishments of the
two countries. The element of covertness is necessary (for the moment) for the following
reasons:
- protect mainly the Greece-Israel strategic relationship which nonetheless is not ttime-tested
and also
- to protect Armenia – Israel relations being recently in a delicate equilibrium with Armenia
nonetheless showing its goodwill towards Israel by moving in 2007 its embassy from Tel-
Aviv to Jerusalem.

It is the current geopolitical realities in the Region that guide the above rapprochement. The
prospect of a defeat of Iran in the forthcoming war will leave Turkey as the undisputable
leader of the Muslim World offering Ankara enormous geopolitical gains. As it is evident, the
above prospect brings Turkey closer to the anti-Iranian axis which dangerously encircles the
state of Mullahs from the south by Abraham Accords forces, from the north by Azerbaijan
and Turkey and from the east by Pakistan. In the above geopolitical and military alignment
Russia is the powerful unknown decision variable that for the moment retains a very shaky
and short term equilibrium in its relations with Israel and Turkey. Consequently the above
uncertainty in many scenarios is tackled as an antagonistic force to the emerging anti-Iranian
axis. In the context of the above considerations, the presence of Turkish forces in northern
Syria is a safeguard for Turkey against the Russian-Kurdish-Iranian synergic threat on its
southern borders and also a safeguard for Israel against the Russian and Iranian pursuits
threatening Israel from the north. Furthermore, the powerful and brotherly relationship
between Azerbaijan and Turkey (having acquired during the last decades an unprecedented
strategic depth) is further enhancing the Israel – Azerbaijan anti-Iranian axis. It is of interest
to note at his point, that the alleged covert plans (see appendix 1) of Israel to use the terrain of
Azerbaijan as a base of anti-Iranian operations (intelligence or offensive ones) led Iran to
organize military drills near its borders with Azerbaijan and the immediate response of two
brother states (Azerbaijan and Turkey) to organize counter military drills in the other side of
the borders.
 39

Conclusively, the above factors forcing Turkey closer and closer to the anti-Iranian axis, are
also determining its policies in Afghanistan where, in close cooperation with its ally Pakistan,
is working to establish a barrier against the Russian, Indian, Iranian and Tajik pursuits in the
country. These Turkish pursuits are profoundly pleasing Israelis, British and Americans
offering Ankara the chance for important exchange of favors (mainly against Greece) in the
western front with (expected) main covertly exchanged favor being the weakened reaction of
Israel and USA towards the Blue Homeland pursuits in eastern Mediterranean, something that
would greatly displease Greece.

On the other hand, the emerging powerful anti-Iranian axis has certain inherent vulnerabilities
that may surprisingly and seriously disrupt the plans of Israel and Turkey. All these
vulnerabilities are associated with the Russian unknown decision variable in the
Caucasian and Syrian fronts (mainly in the former) which are alarmingly enhanced by
the nuclear ambitions of Turkey and its anti-Russian policies in Ukraine and Crimea.
The recent USA-Russia top-level dialogue, provoked mainly by the prospect of the enormous
regional geopolitical and security earthquake shakes that will follow an Israeli attack on Iran,
most probably contains secret elements emanating among other factors by their opposition to
Israel’s war plans. The Russian unknown factor could be also activated in the case of a
serious violation of the military balance between Greece and Turkey and/or the violations of
the red lines of the former by the Blue Homeland pursuits. Note at this point that for a long
period of time, according to polls, the Greeks were much more in favor of Russia than the
USA.

14.1 The Fatal Jar (Pandora’s Box) and the Samson myth

The forthcoming Israeli attack on Iran will most probably open the Fatal Jar with the
timelessness of the realities behind this mythical jar being astonishing. There is a controversy
about the contents of this jar with some arguing that they have a positive effect on mankind
(through the painful realization of wrong attitudes and decisions) and others that they have a
punishing effect.
 40

Mark Atteberry in his book “The Samson Syndrome: What You Can Learn from the Baddest
Boy in the Bible”[1], makes an interesting psychological analysis of the realities behind the
Samson myth and the Samson Syndrome stressing the following: “Why do some strong men
fail while others succeed? Like the biblical character Samson, all strong men—those who are
successful, influential, self-confident, aggressive, or widely respected—face twelve tendencies
that can lead to sin and even personal tragedy”. By putting in the place of the word “men”
the word “people” one can identify the Samson myth together with the menace of
nuclear weapons as the main contents of the Fatal Jar in its present deciphered form.
[1]https://www.amazon.com/Samson-Syndrome-Learn-Baddest-Bible/dp/0849921945

15. BRICS
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BRICS

BRICS is the acronym used to associate the following five major emerging economies: Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa. BRICS combined population, land surface and GDP
(PPP) account for 41.5%, 26.7% and 32% of world’s population, land surface and GDP (PPP)
respectively.

The last summit of BRICS took place in New Delhi on 9/9/21. The following declaration item
(item 23) dealt with the Afghanistan issue:
“23. We follow with concern the latest developments in Afghanistan. We call for refraining
from violence and settling the situation by peaceful means. We stress the need to contribute to
fostering an inclusive intra-Afghan dialogue so as to ensure stability, civil peace, law and
order in the country. We condemn in the strongest terms the terrorist attacks near the Hamid
Karzai Kabul International Airport that resulted in a large number of deaths and injuries. We
underscore the priority of fighting terrorism, including preventing attempts by terrorist
organizations to use Afghan territory as terrorist sanctuary and to carry out attacks against
other countries, as well as drug trade within Afghanistan. We emphasize the need to address
the humanitarian situation and to uphold human rights, including those of women, children
and minorities”.

16. SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

 41

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a Eurasian political, economic and security
alliance consisting of the following eight member states: China, India, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Iran is an upcoming member of SCO
and Afghanistan an observer member of it.

The last summit of SCO took place in Dushanbe (capital of Tajikistan) on 16-17/9/21.
Summarizing the works of Dushanbe summit and commenting on them Marina Omelicheva
(Italian Institute for International Political Studies) wrote the following:“SCO members
committed to building consensus and pooling effort toward resolving the situation in
Afghanistan in ways that serve mutual interests of Kabul and its neighbors. The SCO has also
pledged to reinvigorate its regional anti-terrorism institutions to prevent the spread of the
“three evil forces” of terrorism, separatism and extremism into the territories surrounding
Afghanistan. Notwithstanding these pledges, the SCO’s internal divisions and mistrust among
its members will prevent the organization from fulfilling its role as a vehicle for multilateral
cooperation and a contributor to peace and reconstruction in Afghanistan. At best, the SCO
will offer a limited diplomatic platform for coordinating its members’ counterterrorism
responses. At worse, it will become a tool for legitimizing the Taliban rule in Afghanistan”.

17. QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quadrilateral_Security_Dialogue

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue , also known as QUAD, is a strategic dialogue on

political, military and economic issues between the United States, India, Japan and Australia.
QUAD us widely viewed as a response to increased Chinese economic and military power,
and the Chinese government responded to the Quadrilateral dialogue by issuing formal
diplomatic protests to its members.

The last summit of QUAD took place in Washington on 24/9/21.

References
 42

Brown, James D. J. (1 January 2013). ”Oil Fueled? The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan",
Post-Soviet Affairs. 29 (1): 56–94

Blank, S. (2012). “Central Asian Perspectives on Afghanistan After the US Withdrawal”,

Afghan Regional Forum No. 2, Elliott School for International Affairs, The George
Washington University

Rubin, Barnett R. (2013). “Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror”, New
York, NY: Oxford University Press. p. 34. ISBN 9780199791125.

Karkazis, J., Siousiouras, P. and Kostopoulos, D. (2020), “Russia's strategic geopolitical

pursuits”, Middle East Forum, Issue 15

Karkazis, J. (2021). “The approaching Middle East Armageddon and the vulnerabilities of
anti-ballistic missile systems”, Working Paper, Strategic Reports (Defense and Security
Series)
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/354952695_THE_APPROACHING_MIDDLE_EAST_ARMAGEDD
ON_AND_THE_VULNERABILITIES_OF_ANTI-BALLISTIC_MISSILE_SYSTEMS

Omelicheva, M.Y. (2021). ‘The Sanghai Cooperation Organization and Afghanistan: Old Fears,
Old Barriers to Counterterrorism Cooperation’, Italian Institute for International Political Studies
(ISPI)
https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazioni-ricercatore/31399
 43

APPENDIX 1

Azerbaijan – Israel relations

Main source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Azerbaijan%E2%80%93Israel_relations

Israel and Azrbaijan developed during the last 30 years a strategic relationship extending to
trade, security and defense, cultural and educational sphere. The Israeli military has been a
major provider of battlefield aviation, artillery, anti-tank, and anti-infantry weaponry to
Azerbaijan, with the Israeli company Aeronautics Defense Systems Ltd announcing it
would build a factory in Baku. In 2012, Israel and Azerbaijan signed an agreement
according to which state-run Israel Aerospace Industries would sell $1.6 billion in drones
and anti-aircraft and missile defense systems to Azerbaijan. On the other hand Azerbaijan
is Israel’s largest oil supplier.

Indicative of the good relations between the two countries are the warm comments of
president Aliyev for the Jewish community of Azerbaijan with Yevda Abramov (deceased
member of the national assembly of Azerbaijan and a mountainous Jew) being a leading
contributor to these relations. Note that Azerbaijan has a strong and active Jewish
community numbering 30.000 people a considerable part of them being mountainous Jews
established there 1500 years ago as descendants of Persian Jews (appendix 1).
Some analysts consider that both Israel and Azerbaijan see Iran as an existential threat.
Azerbaijan fears Iranian Islamist influence, but Iran fears Azerbaijan, too, as up to 18 million
Iranians are ethnic Azeris.
On February 2012, Iran rebuked Azerbaijan for allegedly aiding anti-Iranian activities by
Israel's Mossad intelligence agency.[1] A few weeks later Azerbaijan arrested 22 people in a
suspected Iranian plot against Israeli and US targets in Azerbaijan.[2] In March 2012, the
magazine Foreign Policy reported that the Israeli Air Force may be preparing to use
the Sitalchay Military Airbase, located 500 km (340 miles) from the Iranian border, for air
strikes against the nuclear program of Iran.[2]

[1]. "Iran rebukes Azerbaijan for allegedly aiding Israel's Mossad". Haaretz. February 12, 2012. Archived
from the original on March 17, 2012. Retrieved March 18, 2012.
[2]. Perry, mark (March 28, 2012). "Israel's Secret Staging Ground". Foreign Policy. Archived from the
original on March 31, 2012. Retrieved March 29, 2012.
 44

THE MOUNTAINOUS JEWS

Their origins are most probably related to the tribe of Juhuri living in the mountainous region
of Central Iran. Juhuris were famous warriors and horse-back riders having formed bandits.
Their religion and their bandit activities were the main reasons to be persecuted by Persians.
Following their persecution the majority of them moved to Caucasus mountain areas
exercising their old professions and habits. Some of them were established in Dagestan in the
shores of Caspian Sea becoming fishermen and a kind of pirates. Following new persecutions
they moved to Azerbaijan and Circassian regions (around the shores of eastern Black Sea from
Sochi to river Pseu) where they mixed with Kabardians (the main tribe of Circassians) and
Albanians (coming either from Albanian Caucasus or from migrants from the Balkans).
Originally the Kabardians were Christianized and speaking a kind of proto-Hellenic language
but then they were Islamized. Coming from a mixture of religion backgrounds (Christianity,
Islam, Jewish) many of them were rather agnostic following superficially the Muslim faith.
 45

APPENDIX 2

Ankara – Tehran confrontational relationship

The last two years the Turkey – Iran relations are in a course of constant deterioration mainly
due to Ankara’s deepening geopolitical and ideological antagonism with Tehran and its gradual
alignment with the anti-Iranian axis. Israel, applying innovative policies, takes full advantage of
the above antagonism. The following articles present in a characteristic way the above Ankara’s
pursuits.

NEW/LINES MAGAZINE 24/2/21

The Coming Turkish-Iranian Confrontation. A rising cold war between two regional powerhouses
is inevitable, by Kamran Bokhari
https://newlinesmag.com/argument/the-coming-turkish-iranian-confrontation/

In his concluding remarks the author stresses the following: “The relationship between Turkey
and Iran makes it hard to see the burgeoning competition. The perception of a Turkey-Iran
alignment is often reinforced by frequent diplomatic overtures, bilateral agreements, and the
support of some allies against seemingly common adversaries. There is often talk in policy circles
about the need to roll back Iranian influence in the region. But the question is who will lead this
effort, as Iran and its proxies will not be dislodged from the Arab world without the involvement
of an external force. Certainly, the United States does not want to commit to another major
military campaign, especially not in the Middle East. Israel is only concerned with making sure
the Iranians do not get too comfortable to where they threaten the Jewish state. That leaves
Turkey as the only power with both the intent and capability to confront the Iranians. It may not
happen for a while, but it is inevitable”.

YENI SAFAK 2/10/2020

Ibrahim Karagul
Turkey is a global power. Now it’s time for Azerbaijan to rise. Iran backing Armenia! What’s
Tehran afraid of?, by Ibrahim Karagul
https://m.yenisafak.com/en/columns/ibrahimkaragul/turkey-is-a-global-power-now-its-time-for-azerbaijan-to-rise-iran-backing-armenia-whats-
tehran-afraid-of-2047610

With this article the author rises critical questions regarding the defensive attitude of Iran and its
backing of Armenia, the arch enemy of Azerbaijan with which Ankara has a brotherly strategic
relationship. The aim is to prepare the public opinion for the forthcoming distancing of Ankara
from the Astana Accords.

YENI SAFAK 11/3/21

The new ‘Eastern front’ with Iran and the collapse of the Arab alliance. Saudi Arabia needs
Turkey!, by Ibrahim Karagu
https://m.yenisafak.com/en/columns/ibrahimkaragul/the-new-eastern-front-with-iran-and-the-collapse-of-arab-alliance-saudi-arabia-needs-
turkey-204779

Starting
From the very start of the article the author discloses the new anti-Iranian agenda of Ankara
using a rhetoric question: “In my previous column, I spoke about the Pope’s Iraq visit, its
symbols, his meeting with Ayatollah Sistani, and asked whether a “new Eastern front is being
established” with Iran against Turkey, provoking Iran’s fear especially after the Karabakh war.
View publication stats

46

With this article the controversial author and master of ideological and geopolitical propaganda
aims at manipulating the public opinion against Iran and in favor of a rapprochement with Saudi
Arabia, serving in this way the new geopolitical agenda of Ankara.