Vol.

XXXI-XXXII ISSN 0973-9386 2014

INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES: THE COLD WAR AND POST COLD WAR DYNAMICS
NATIONAL SECURITY & DEFENCE REFORMS
MARITIME DIMENSIONS OF INDIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY
AFGHANISTAN: WHY TALIBAN WON’T SUCCEED?
EMERGING INDIA IN ASIA PACIFIC
EMERGING TRENDS INNORTH–EAST REGION OF INDIA: IN SEARCH OF PEACE AND STABILITY
CYBER REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT ON TERRORISM
DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND INDIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY
PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN SECURITY: THE INDIAN CONTEXT
MARITIME SECURITY IN INDIA’S NEIGHBOURHOOD AND INDIAN OCEAN RIM-ASSOCIATION FOR
REGIONAL COOPERATION (IOR-ARC)
CYBER THREATS AND INDIA’S SECURITY
PIPELINE POLITICS AND INDIA’S ENERGY SECURITY
INDIAN OCEAN AND ITS STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE
MYANMAR’S MILITARISED DEMOCRACY AND ITS IMPACT ON INDIA-MYANMAR RELATIONS
WOMEN IN PEACE AND CONFLICT: TOWARDS A PARADIGM CHANGE IN SOUTH ASIA
IMPLICATIONS OF CENTRAL ASIAN SECURITY ON INDIA’S SECURITY SCENARIO
WATER SECURITY IN SOUTH ASIA: ISSUES AND CONCERNS FOR INDIA
ETHNIC GROUPS AND ARMED CONFLICT IN INDIA’S MANIPUR

D
ARTMENT OF DEFENCE & STRATEGIC STUDIES

UNIVERSITY OF ALLAHABAD, ALLAHABAD, INDIA
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 Indian Journal of Strategic Studies
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Prof. Dilip Mohite
Maj. Gen. P N Tripathi
Prof. Hari Saran
Prof. Jagmohan Meher
Muhammad Zubair
Prof. Sanjeev Bhadauria
Dr. Nand Kishor Kumar
Prof. Prashant Agarwal
Gp. Cpt. R. K. Singh
Dr. Shri Niwas Mani Tripathi
Dr. Biswajit Mohapatra
Dr. Pradeep Kumar Yadav
Dr. Shilpa G Bagul
Dr. Bharti Das
Lt. Col. Mohinder Pal Singh Lt Col Mohinder Pal Singh, D.Phil. candidate,
Nidhi Shendurnikar-Tere
Neeta
Prabhavit Dobhal
Dr. Shivendra Shahi
CONTRIBUTORS
Former Professor & Head, Department of Political
Science, MS University of Baroda, Baroda (Guj.).
Research Fellow, MGG Vishwavidyalaya,
Chitrakoot (MP).
Professor, Dept. of Defence and Strategic Studies,
DDU Gorakhpur University, Gorakhpur (U.P.).
Prof. Jagmohan Meher, a 2013-14 Fulbright-Nehru
Senior Research Fellow at Indiana University
Bloomington & Head, Department of Political
Science, National Defence Academy, Pune.
Ph. D. candidate at Indiana University,
Bloomington (USA).
Professor & Head, Dept. of Defence & Strategic
Studies, Central University of Allahabad,
Allahabad (U.P.)
Associate Professor (Retd.), Dept. of Political
Science, National Defence Academy, Pune,
(Maharashtra).
Professor, Department of Defence & Strategic
Studies, Central University of Allahabad,
Allahabad (U.P.)
Group Captain, Indian Air Force and Former
Research Associate, United Services Institution
of India, New Delhi.
Associate Professor, Dept. of Defence &
Strategic Studies, DDU Gorakhpur University,
Gorakhpur (U.P.).
Faculty Member, International Relations, North-
Eastern Hill University, Shillong
Associate Professor, Defence and Strategic
Studies, DDU Gorakhpur University, Gorakhpur
(U.P.).
Independent Researcher, Bhopal (M.P.).
Associate Professor, Dept. of Defence & Strategic
Studies, Central University of Allahabad,
Allahabad (U.P.).
Department of Defence and Strategic Studies,
Central University of Allahabad (U.P.).
Senior Research Fellow (UGC-SRF), Dept. of
Political Science, The MS University of Baroda,
Baroda (Guj.).
Assistant Professor, Centre for National Security
Studies, Central University of Jammu, Jammu.
UGC-JRF Research Scholar, Dept. of Defence and
National Security Studies, Panjab University,
Chandigarh.
Project Fellow, (UGC) Department of Defence &
Strategic Studies, Central University of
Allahabad, Allahabad (U.P.).
 ISSN 0973-9386

INDIAN
JOURNAL OF
STRATEGIC STUDIES
(A Refereed Journal)

VOLUME XXXI-XXXII

2014

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE & STRATEGIC STUDIES

UNIVERSITY OF ALLAHABAD
ALLAHABAD, INDIA
Afghanistan: Why Taliban Won’t Succeed? 81

Afghanistan: Why Taliban Won’t Succeed?

Prof. Jagmohan Meher* &
Muhammad Zubair**
In the aftermath of and in response to 9/11, the United States invaded
Afghanistan in October 2001 in order to dismantle, disrupt and destroy Al-
Qaeda and the ruling Taliban regime that had provided sanctuary to the
former. After 13 years of protracted war, the US mission has finally come to
an end with the flag-lowering ceremony at the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization’s (NATO) combat headquarters in Kabul on 9th of December
2014. The end of US mission also marked the beginning of the training and
support role of the 13,000-strong residual force (including 10,800 US troops),
which will be withdrawn by end-2016. In the meantime, however, two
remarkable developments have gained grounds in this war-torn country.
First, even after such a prolonged war, the Taliban, backed by Pakistan,
remains a threat to the security, stability and survival of the Afghan state.
And secondly, President Barak Obama has authorised remaining US forces
to carry out operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in addition to
providing combat and air support to Afghan forces. Given such a volatile
situation, questions are being raised whether the Taliban, who still remain
undefeated, will overpower the international forces and Afghanistan army
and police, and once again takeover Afghanistan.
Answer to such questions is dependent on many factors, including the
outcome of current efforts for reaching at a negotiated peace settlement
with the Taliban, the institutional capacity of Afghan National Army and
Police to fight the Taliban insurgency on sustainable basis, political stability
inside Afghanistan, long term and sustainable International security and
economic commitment to Afghanistan, concerted regional efforts aiming at
the stability of Afghanistan and above all change in Pakistan’s strategic policy
towards Afghanistan.

The Prospects of Negotiated Peace Settlement with Taliban

The most important factor having direct bearing on the above question
is the outcome of the ongoing efforts of Afghanistan and United States for a
negotiated peace settlement with the Taliban. The ideal scenario would be

* Prof. Jagmohan Meher, a 2013-14 Fulbright-Nehru Senior Research Fellow at Indiana University
Bloomington, is Head of the Department of Political Science, National Defence Academy, Pune.
** Muhammad Zubair is a Ph. D. candidate at Indiana University Bloomington (USA).
82 Jagmohan Meher & Muhammad Zubair

that the Taliban stop fighting and agree to some power-sharing formula
within the framework of the Afghan constitution. However, the past 35 years
show that Afghanistan has been shaped by repeated failures of efforts at
sustainable negotiated political settlement.1 Given the situation on the
ground, the present efforts do not seem to make an exception to this well-
established rule.
There are two particular reasons why there is no chance of success of
current efforts at negotiated settlement. One, the Taliban is a formidable
fighting force that remains undefeated and interprets the withdrawal of the
international forces from Afghanistan in 2014 as their defeat. With boosted
morale, Taliban do not need or have any incentive to negotiate peace at this
stage and their eyes are fixed on the prize of capturing Kabul.2 That explains
why the Taliban representatives were very explicit at the opening ceremony
of their office in Doha3 about continuing their war with Afghan and
international forces and at the same time throwing around feelers of their
intention to start negotiations with the United States. The Taliban could
read the writings on the wall that the Americans would not wait to get out
of Afghanistan. They are very confident and their objective is not to share a
piece of pie with the Afghan government but to have all of it.4
Secondly, the only parties directly involved in luring the Taliban into a
negotiated settlement or trying to control the outcome of such negotiations
are Afghanistan, the United States and Pakistan. And due to mutual mistrust
and suspicions, the three countries do not appear to be on the same page
with regard to the modus operandi, objectives and terms of holding such talks
with the Taliban. The Taliban do not recognize the Kabul government as a
legitimate party to negotiate with. Their members involved in talks in Qatar
publically rejected U.S calls for direct engagement with the Afghan
government as “pointless”.5
The US took the initiative of opening an office for the Taliban in Doha
in June 2013 in order to facilitate negotiations with the Taliban for a peaceful
settlement. However, the Taliban took the opportunity as a propaganda coup
and hoisted a white flag from their 1996-2001-rule in Afghanistan, sang an
anthem and put a plaque on the outside wall of the compound that read
“Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”, the name of their former government.
These acts of the Taliban were met with vehement opposition from the then
President Hamid Karzai who saw it as undermining of his authority as
President of Afghanistan and questioning the legitimacy of Afghanistan as
a state. He immediately announced the cancellation of ongoing crucial talks
over a US-Afghan bilateral security agreement. It is doubtful if the Taliban
really want to negotiate even with the US. It appears that the Taliban are
Afghanistan: Why Taliban Won’t Succeed? 83

using the process of negotiation as a pretext for their de jure recognition as a

legitimate party. Their policy of negotiation and fighting at the same time is
in stark contrast to the declared policy of the United States that requires
them to stop fighting, cut ties to Al-Qaida, and abide by the Afghan
constitution.6
Pakistan also seems to be frustrated with Afghanistan and the United
States for bypassing it at times or carrying on the process of negotiation
with the Taliban on its back. Pakistan wants a major share in peace
negotiations and insists on widening the circle of negotiating parties by
including Haqqani Network and Gulbulddin Hikmatyar’s Hiz-e-Islami in
addition to the Afghan Taliban under Mullah Umar.7 But at the same time,
Pakistan does not want the circle to be wide enough to include the regional
players particularly India and rather questions the viability of a regional
framework for settlement in Afghanistan.8 Pakistan has expressed its
frustration by endorsing but still standing aloof from the Doha peace process
and also by sabotaging the negotiation process being carried out by United
States and Afghanistan by keeping important Taliban leaders in safe custody
and releasing them only in piecemeal. Afghanistan leadership has constantly
accused Pakistan of sabotaging the Afghanistan initiated reconciliation
process.9
The process of negotiation, being carried out by Afghanistan and the
United States, is uncoordinated, unstructured, non-inclusive and driven by
mutual suspicion. Very important regional countries like India, Russia,
China, Iran and the Central Asian republics are excluded from the process
altogether. These countries also have high stakes in the stability of
Afghanistan and share the fear that the withdrawal of international forces
from Afghanistan might precipitate a destabilizing return of the Taliban or
result in Afghanistan’s next civil war. The lasting peace would, therefore,
require far more structured negotiations under the auspices of the UNO
that would give the process legitimacy and inclusiveness. Unfortunately
that hasn’t happened so far nor does it appear that it will.10

Prospects of Taliban’s Takeover

Assuming that no negotiated peace settlement is reached with the
Taliban and they continue their war with Afghan forces even beyond 2014,
which is the most likely scenario, it is still highly unlikely that the Taliban
would be able to militarily role back over Afghanistan and retake Kabul, as
they did in 1994 – the Taliban might still be capable of causing widespread
disruption though.11 There is a marked difference between the 1994 and
2015 Afghanistan. The situation in Afghanistan today is by no means ideal
but it is quite different and improved.
84 Jagmohan Meher & Muhammad Zubair

The unanimous agreement amongst the delegates of Afghan Loya Jirga,

(Traditional grand assembly of delegates representing the Afghan people)
urging the Afghan president to sign bilateral security agreement is indicative
of the fact that there is no support for the Taliban regime amongst the Afghan
people. This again makes the 1990s different from the present situation in
Afghanistan. Taliban ran over Afghanistan in the 1990s because the people
of war-ravaged country wanted peace at any cost. But having tasted the
brutalities of the ultra-conservative Sunni regime, the Afghan people would
never trade what they have with yet another Taliban regime.
Three elections have strengthened the roots of democracy in the country.
The conditions of women, religious minorities and Muslim sects have
considerably improved in comparison to what was their situation under
the Taliban regime and there is spectacular improvement and increase in
women’s education. The Taliban have nothing of this sort to offer and Afghan
people would never let all these gains go away.
There is no anarchy in Afghanistan at present as it prevailed after the
fall of President Najibullah’s government in the early 1990s and the ensuing
war amongst the former Mujahideen warlords. Afghanistan’s institutions
were completely destroyed, the Afghan state had itself collapsed and the
only law that prevailed was that of might being right. It was due to the
death and destruction spreading over 15 years of war that made the Afghan
people welcome the Taliban without any resistance in 1996. The Taliban
were seen as a glimmer of hope and the Afghan people expected that they
would bring stability and peace to their war torn country. The Taliban were
revered as “the selfless seekers of divine knowledge”. The Taliban capitalized
on this deep local tradition to become a political force. As the Taliban
demonstrated their willingness and ability to restore order and peace, people
flocked around them in droves.12
Now Afghan society has changed over the last decade. It has a working
constitutional government and people have tasted political empowerment
through three major elections. There is a vibrant and dynamic media,
companies, businesses and shopping malls. Afghanistan has regular army,
police, government ministries and public offices. The Taliban are still capable
of launching spectacular attacks but are largely dependent on hit-and-run
tactics. They are no match for Afghan National Army (ANA) in frontal attacks
and holding positions. In fact, ANA and police have had secured not one,
but three national elections, and very instrumental in stopping or minimizing
the impact of countless numbers of attacks throughout the country — even
in Kabul. The government is weak, the elections have been controversial,
the officials are corrupt and the businesses evade taxes – there is no doubt
Afghanistan: Why Taliban Won’t Succeed? 85

about all this. But it is still not 1994 situation when none of these were on
the ground and the country was torn by civil war.13
In the 1990s the Taliban stood for all things that the Afghan people
wanted, i.e., peace, stability, restoration of law and order, and above all
stoppage to war. Today’s Taliban stand for all the wrong things. Before
Talibans’ fall in 1996 the Afghan people suffered a lot at their hands. The
Taliban destroyed the economy and social fabric of Afghan society. They
treated women, religious minorities and Muslim sects dreadfully. Today’s
Afghanistan, with all its shortcomings, is still something that Afghans would
not trade with what the Taliban’s have to offer.
Even after the collapse of the USSR in 1990, the government of President
Najibullah held for a few years but ultimately fell only because of the
stoppage of fuel supply and other resources from the former Soviet Union
that were required for keeping Afghan forces in fighting mode. Afghanistan
became isolated economically and politically in the international arena and
had become a small fry with negligible value in the new global politics
overshadowed by the falling of the Berlin Wall, the Soviet disintegration
and world’s focus moving to the former Soviet states, Eastern Europe, Central
Asia and other erstwhile socialist states.
Today the situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the region is such
that even after the withdrawal of international combat forces in 2014,
Afghanistan would not be abandoned and left to its own. This time the
stakes of many countries are involved in the stability of Afghanistan. The
world cannot ignore the consequences of abandoning Afghanistan in the
1990s – the establishment of a harsh medieval conservative Islamic regime
harboring Al-Qaeda and other forces that threatened the stability of regional
countries and world peace. Terrorism has shifted security paradigms and
redefined response strategies across the globe.14 The world cannot allow
the establishment of the Islamic Afghani Emirate that would become the
epicenter of terrorism once again.
One significant aspect of the state of Taliban movement in Afghanistan
is that they no longer bear resemblance to the spiritual movement of the
1990s. Many of them are criminals, who have used the Taliban brand to
further their lucrative businesses in the opium trade, commodity smuggling,
kidnappings and robberies. A former American ambassador to Afghanistan
recently said, “The old Taliban leadership is aging, and they have lost their
ability to exert command and control from Pakistan. They lost credibility
with younger fighters, but also their grasp of day-to-day combat.”15 This is
also the reason of their battlefield losses to the western military campaigns
in the last few years. Another important aspect of the movement is that
86 Jagmohan Meher & Muhammad Zubair

scores of the midlevel Taliban commanders were killed and replaced in the
last decade, leaving a young and more hardened set of field leaders in their
place with less connection to the leadership of Mullah Omar, the reclusive
leader of the movement. Many of them differ in their perceptions and
ideologies, leading to the internal dissonance on policy issues and fighting
capabilities. Thus the fragmentation among the Taliban ranks also shows
that the fundamentalist militia is unlikely to make a big headway in the
near future.

US and Regional Interests in Stability of Afghanistan

It is clear that unlike in the 1990s, almost all important international
and regional powers are deeply interested in the peace and stability of
Afghanistan. Afghanistan and the USA have hammered out the Bilateral
Security Agreement (BSA) that has provided the legal framework for the
stationing of some 13000 international troops beyond 2014. The US has
authorized a more expansive mission for the American military in 2015 than
originally planned. President Obama’s new orders would put American
troops right back into ground combat by allowing them to carry out missions
against the Taliban and other militants and permit American jets and drones
to support Afghan military missions.16 Afghanistan’s new President Ashraf
Ghani has also lifted the ban on night raids imposed by his predecessor,
Hamid Karzai, which could push American troops into direct fighting with
the Taliban.
China and Russia have openly supported the US-Afghan agreement.
India and Afghanistan have already signed a strategic defense pact under
which the former has undertaken to train officer cadre of Afghan National
Army and provide other defense assistance to Afghanistan. China is also
currently involved in the training of 300 Afghan Policemen. There have been
talks in Beijing between Chinese and Indian officials to discuss their interests
in post-American Afghanistan.17
Foreign ministers of Russia, China and India had a joint meeting in
November 2013 where they discussed the situation in Afghanistan in the
post-2014 and termed it as the “greatest concern” for the region and
demanded “additional measures” from the international community to
prevent escalating threats in the war-torn country while agreeing to enhance
counter terrorism cooperation in Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS)
under Shanghai Cooperation Organization.18 The Iranian government is in
the process of re-evaluating the country’s Afghan policy. There is expected
to be a major shift in Iran’s policy towards Afghanistan in the post-US
withdrawal situation. Given Iran’s policy of supporting the Northern Alliance
Afghanistan: Why Taliban Won’t Succeed? 87

in its war against the Taliban regime in 1990s, it is expected that Iran would
never want a hard-line Sunni regime of Taliban taking over Afghanistan
once again and becoming a proxy for Saudi Arabia - its archenemy.
China sees stability in Afghanistan as vital for its economic and strategic
interests. The Taliban take over could endanger its existing and future
economic and business investments in Afghanistan. China has already
bought a 30 years lease in copper deposits at Mes Aynak for 3 billion dollars.
China has always remained concerned about the ideological influence of
Jihadi groups like East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in its largest
and Muslim-majority province Xingjian that borders both Afghanistan and
Pakistan. China can face the fallout of a chaotic Afghanistan in the form of
extremism in Xingjian.19 China has publicly shown its concerns about the
presence of ETIM’s headquarter in the tribal areas of Pakistan, which was
forced to ban ETIM, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Islamic
Jihad Union (IJU) under Chinese pressure. Chinese officials believe that these
groups, stationed in Pakistan tribal areas, are involved in extremist and
insurgent activities in Xingjian.20 Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan will be
seen by China as a precursor to rising extremism in Xingjian as well as
threatening its economic interests in Afghanistan.
India is so far the biggest investor in Afghanistan’s development and
that explain why India is the most popular country amongst Afghan people.
India has both economic interest and strategic interest in the stability of
Afghanistan. The victory of Talibans in Afghanistan is very much likely to
result in the escalation of violence in Kashmir. This had happened at the
end of jihad against the USSR in 1989 in Afghanistan when the jihadi forces
found a new battle in Kashmir and turned their guns against India with the
support of Pakistan Army.21
Though having remained the biggest supporter of Taliban, Pakistan
will not have free hand and latitude as it had it in the 1990s. Many
stakeholders are closely watching each and every move that Pakistan is
making. There is a likelihood of major change in Pakistan’s policy towards
the Taliban in the post-2014 Afghanistan, especially after the 16 December
2014 nation-wide grief and rage that followed the massacre of 150 students
and their teachers by the Pakistani Taliban militants at an army-run school
in Peshawar. The Peshawar tragedy also forced Pakistan ban 12 terrorists’
organizations and execute several terrorists linked to Afghanistan war.22
The formation of military courts to counter terrorism by amending the
Pakistani constitution will certainly constrain the free movements of terror
groups across the Durand Line on Pak-Afghan border. This apart, there still
exist powerful forces in Pakistan who would not like Kabul to be run over
88 Jagmohan Meher & Muhammad Zubair

by the Taliban because that would very likely embolden the Pakistani Taliban,
who have virtually taken over the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, to
further expand their area of direct control and influence inside Pakistan.23
The Talibans’ take over in Afghanistan would present exactly the same
problems to Pakistan that it has been trying to prevent through its notorious
‘strategic depth policy’. Instead of Pakistan gaining strategic depth inside
Afghanistan, Taliban would most likely gain strategic depth inside Pakistan.
Pakistan would never want a reverse sanctuary for Pakistani Taliban in
Afghanistan.24 The best end game for Pakistan is not a 100% Taliban victory
as that would result into empowerment of Pakistani Taliban.25 Analysts
suggest that Islamabad is pushing for a power sharing arrangement in which
the Taliban will control the eastern and southern provinces in Afghanistan.26
At the least, Pakistan would want a coalition government where it could
play the Taliban card in order to neutralize India.

Conclusion
It is observed that despite their different and at times conflicting
national foreign policies, almost all international and regional players,
including NATO countries, India, Russia, Central Asian Republics, Iran and
China have convergence of interests in the stability of Afghanistan and none
of these countries would want reemergence of the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan. Pakistan is the only exception. However, mere consensus would
not be enough. Further concrete steps by the international community would
be needed to ensure stability in Afghanistan.
There is hardly any likelihood of a peace settlement in Afghanistan
through negotiations with the Taliban – especially the way they were being
conducted till the recent past. As noted above, Taliban is a formidable and
undefeated force whose morale is high with the knowledge that the world’s
most powerful forces could not defeat it. From their safe houses in Pakistan,
they have been launching spectacular attacks against the Afghan and
International forces without any break and target killing Afghan Peace
Council members. But, there is no chance for the Taliban to run over
Afghanistan in the post-2014 as it did in the 1990s. However, if international
actors and regional powers fail to stop Pakistan’s support to the Taliban
insurgents and they keep on operating from their sanctuaries in and getting
logistical support from Pakistan, then their sporadic attacks would continue
adding to the instability and the Taliban might also establish their influence
in eastern and southern Afghanistan. But it is difficult to visualize that
Taliban would simply roll over Kabul after the international combat forces
left Afghanistan in 2014.
Afghanistan: Why Taliban Won’t Succeed? 89

Notes & References

1. International Crisis Group (ICG) Asia Report No. 221, Talking About Talks:
Toward A Political Settlement In Afghanistan, 5
2. C. Raja Mohan, Pakistan’s Taliban Proxy and Afghan Power Sharing, at http://
www.indianexpress.com/news/pakistans-taliban-proxy-and-afghan-power-
sharing/1137648/
3. The Doha office was established as a result of initial contacts between US,
German, Qatari and Taliban officials in 2010. It was intended to serve as a
platform for confidence-building measure such as prisoner swaps and,
eventually, talks. See Shashank Joshi, Talking to Taliban: Protecting India’s long
term Interests in Afghanistan, at http://www.caravanmagazine.in/print/3969
4. Marc A. Thiesssen, The Taliban is Playing Obama, at http://
articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-24/opinions/40157352_1_taliban-
leaders-the-taliban-u-s-embassy; also see Ahmad K. Majidyar, The Danger of
Talking With the Taliban, at http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/06/
28/the-danger-of-talking-with-the-taliban/
5. ICG Asia Report No. 221, Talking About Talks: Toward A Political Settlement In
Afghanistan, 3
6. Shashank Joshi, Talking to Taliban: Protecting India’s long term Interests in
Afghanistan, at http://www.caravanmagazine.in/print/3969
7. Frederic Grare, Is Pakistan’s Behavior Changing, at http://
carnegieendowment.org/2013/01/30/is-pakistan-s-behavior-changing/f76i
8. United States Institute of Peace, PEACEBRIEF, Pakistan, The United States and
the End Game in Afghanistan: Perceptions of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Elite, at
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/PB100.pdf
9. Christope Jaffrelot, On Kabul, Take a Wider View, at http://
www.indianexpress.com/news/on-kabul-take-a-wider-view/1160153/
10. ICG Asia Report No.221, Talking About Talks: Toward A Political Settlement In
Afghanistan, i, 1. Also see Karzai Seeks Pakistani help in Taliban Peace Talks, at
http://www.dw.de/karzai-seeks-pakistani-help-in-taliban-peace-talks/a-
17051671
11. William Dalrymple, A Deadly Triangle: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, at http:/
/www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2013/deadly-triangle-afghanistan-
pakistan-india-c; also see Michael Kugelman quoted in Taliban ‘unlikely to
retake power’ in Afghanistan, at http://www.dw.de/taliban-unlikely-to-retake-
power-in-afghanistan/a-17085772
12. Tahir Mehdi, Why the Taliban Won’t Succeed in Afghanistan now, at http://
dawn.com/news/1048279/why-the-taliban-wont-succeed-in-afghanistan-now
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. As quoted in Azam Ahmed, “Unruly Factions Hurt Taliban’s Bid to Capture
Afghan Hearts, and Territory,” The New York Times, 02 January 2015.
90 Jagmohan Meher & Muhammad Zubair

16. See the Editorial Board comments, “Backsliding in Afghanistan”, The New
York Times, 06 December 2014.
17. William Dalrymple, A Deadly Triangle: Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, 12 at
http://www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2013/deadly-triangle-
afghanistan-pakistan-india-c
18. Afghanistan, Counter-Terrorism Dominate Russia-India-China Meeting: http://
economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/afghanistan-
counter-terrorism-dominate-russia-india-china-meeting/articleshow/
25565787.cms
19. Afrasiab Khattak, Afghan Transitions and Scenarios, at http://tribune.com.pk/
story/633274/afghan-transitions-and-scenarios/
20. Pakistan Bans Three Extremist Outfits, on Orders From China, at http://
tribune.com.pk/story/621400/pakistan-bans-three-extremist-outfits-on-
orders-from-china/
21. Michael Kugelman quoted in Taliban ‘unlikely to retake power’ in Afghanistan,
at http://www.dw.de/taliban-unlikely-to-retake-power-in-afghanistan/a-
17085772
22. Omer Farooq Khan, “Pak bans Hafiz’s JuD, Haqqani network,” The Times of
India, 16 January 2015, p. 13.
23. Frederic Grare, Is Pakistan’s Behavior Changing, at http://
carnegieendowment.org/2013/01/30/is-pakistan-s-behavior-changing/f76i
24. Ismail Khan, KP Document Warns of US Withdrawal Fallout, at http://dawn.com/
news/1031650/kp-document-warns-of-us-withdrawal-fallout; also see
William Dalrymple, A Deadly Triangle: Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, 12 at
http://www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2013/deadly-triangle-
afghanistan-pakistan-india-c
25. Marvin G. Weinbaum, Pakistan’s Best Bet in Afghanistan, at http://
afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/04/pakistans_best_bet_in_afghanistan
26. C. Raja Mohan, Pakistan’s Taliban Proxy and Afghan Power Sharing, at http://
www.indianexpress.com/news/pakistans-taliban-proxy-and-afghan-power-
sharing/1137648/
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