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Beyond dualism: Stability and change as a duality

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姝 Academy of Management Review
2010, Vol. 35, No. 2, 202–225.

BEYOND DUALISM: STABILITY AND CHANGE

AS A DUALITY
MOSHE FARJOUN
York University

To survive and prosper, organizations must reconcile stability, reliability, and exploi-
tation with change, innovation, and exploration. These imperatives and the mecha-
nisms that support them are generally seen as incompatible and mutually exclusive.
I present an alternative: a duality view in which stability and change are fundamen-
tally interdependent—contradictory but also mutually enabling. This view revisits
several enduring ideas about stability and change and offers theoretical and prag-
matic opportunities to dissolve and transcend their paradoxical relationship.

Capitalism demands that companies be inno-
vative, flexible, and responsive to change while
performing reliably and consistently. It presents
uncertainty, novelty, and unpredictability—
conditions that can foil the best plans and upset
existing orders (Knight, 1921; Schumpeter, 1942).
It also requires stability, regularity, and predict-
ability so that actors can understand and trust
the settings of investment, purchase, savings,
and production and so that transactions are
profitable (Biggart & Beamish, 2003).
This dual search for stability and change per-
vades all forms of organizing (Weick, 1979: 136)
and constitutes a central paradox of administra-
tion (Thompson, 1967: 150). It has long fascinated
management scholars (March 1991; March & Si-
mon, 1958; Nelson & Winter, 1982) and continues
to fuel research (e.g., Adler et al., 2009; Gupta,
Smith, & Shalley, 2006). This tension permeates
social and economic life and the daily behavior
of stakeholders, social collectives, and individ-
uals, and it challenges firms in turbulent envi-
ronments (e.g., Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). It also
encapsulates questions of order and freedom,
evolution and revolution, and routine and nov-
elty that are fundamental to all sciences and
I presented earlier versions of this paper at York Univer-
sity and at the Fourth Organization Studies Workshop in
Pissouri, Cyprus. I thank the participants of these seminars
for their valuable feedback. I am also grateful to Paul Adler,
Michael Cohen, Yuval Deutsch, Eileen Fischer, William Jack-
son, Rekha Karambayya, Eldad Kollenscher, Michael Lubat-
kin, Alfred Marcus, Christine Oliver, Andy Van de Ven, Mary
Waller, and Eleanor Westney for helping improve this paper.
Finally, I appreciate the guidance and support of associate
editor Roy Suddaby and the thoughtful comments of the
three anonymous reviewers.
202
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professions dealing with institutions and adap-
tive systems (Ashby, 1960; Axelrod & Cohen,
2000; Campbell, 1969; Dewey, 1922; Holland, 1992;
Levinthal, 1997; March & Olsen, 1995; Schum-
peter, 1942).
The apparent paradox of stability and change
arises because the concepts are usually defined
as opposites and, by implication, separate
(Poole & Van de Ven, 1989). Adopting this con-
vention, in most organizational theories schol-
ars have maintained that stability and change,
and the practices, processes, and forms that
support them, are largely incompatible and mu-
tually exclusive. A prime example is the famil-
iar trade-off in organizations between exploita-
tion and exploration (March, 1991). But the story
has been told in many other ways. Contingency
theories stress that bureaucracy’s rational prac-
tices and intolerance for exceptions (Weber,
1947) work well for specialized tasks in stable
settings, whereas more organic structures may
be required for dynamic and nonroutine tasks
(Burns & Stalker, 1961). Evolutionary models
stress the balance between selective retention
and variation (Campbell, 1969). Models of tech-
nological and economic change maintain that
static efficiency and specialization could not co-
exist with the dynamic efficiency required for
innovation (Abernathy, 1978; Schumpeter, 1942).
In institutional (e.g., DiMaggio, 1988; Zucker,
1988) and ecological (Hannan & Freeman, 1984)
models this idea exists as tension between the
orderly and constraining nature of institutions
and organizations’ adaptability. In transaction
cost (Williamson, 1985) and business strategy
(e.g., Ghemawat, 1991) models it is present as a
conflict between commitment and flexibility.
2010 Farjoun
My main difficulty with this established view
is not so much its central thesis but its one-
sidedness. The literature implicitly recognizes
that stability and change jointly contribute to
organizational effectiveness, and researchers
have recently explored some of their comple-
mentarities (e.g., Feldman & Pentland, 2003;
Levinthal & Rerup, 2006; Zollo & Winter, 2003).
Nevertheless, the view of these imperatives as
separate and opposing remains dominant in
theoretical and empirical research and as a
guide for practice (e.g., Benner & Tushman, 2003;
Gupta et al., 2006; He & Wong, 2004; O’Reilly &
Tushman, 2008). This dualistic view has brought
tremendous benefits to the field of organizations
and has inspired models of learning, design,
and transformation. However, as some have ob-
served, it has perhaps become too restrictive to
capture the complexity of the subject matter (Co-
hen, 2007a; Lewis, 2000).
To redress this imbalance, I construct an al-
ternative conceptualization of stability and
change not as a dualism but as a duality. Bor-
rowed from philosophy, the term duality has no
official definition. Following Jackson (1999), I use
it to denote the twofold character of an object of
study without separation. Duality resembles du-
alism in that it retains the idea of two essential
elements, but it views them as interdependent,
rather than separate and opposed. Consistent
with duality, I maintain that stability and
change are fundamentally interdependent—
both contradictory and complementary. I ex-
plore in particular how these elements, while
conceptually distinct, are mutually enabling
and a constituent of one another. Consequently,
my aim is to offer a plausible way to supple-
ment, not supplant, what has become almost a
default perspective.
In developing the duality view, I draw on sev-
eral theoretical and empirical observations that
appear less consistent with the prevailing dual-
istic view. These suggest that stability often pre-
supposes flexibility and change (Bateson, 1972),
and reliability requires variation (Weick & Rob-
erts, 1993). Mirroring this, bureaucracies can be
remarkably flexible (Adler, Goldoftas, & Levine,
1999), and limits can be liberating (Dewey, 1922)
and instrumental for innovation (Dougherty &
Takacs, 2004). However, these observations are
far from mere curiosities peripheral to the estab-
lished view and too fragmented to challenge it;
indeed, I see them as integral to a duality per-
203
spective—a perspective that makes them intel-
ligible.
My main departure from the prevailing view
and recent challenges to it (e.g., Levinthal &
Rerup, 2006; Sutcliffe, Sitkin, & Browning, 2004)
helps reconcile these puzzling observations. It
lies in explicitly recognizing that stability and
change both can be outcomes, objectives, and
performances, as well as underlying mecha-
nisms—processes, practices, and forms. There-
fore, attaining stable, low-variance outcomes
such as reliability often requires variation-
inducing mechanisms, and attaining high-
variance outcomes such as innovation often re-
quires stable mechanisms. To develop this
intuition, I use a less restrictive concept of sta-
bility than that used in dualism. Still associated
with variance reduction, continuity, and predict-
ability (e.g., Stinchcombe, 1959: 84), reliability
and stability can mean static efficiency and ri-
gidity, outcomes generated by stable and con-
straining mechanisms. However, in their more
dynamic sense they can also be viewed as long-
term efficiency and robustness against failure
and persistent perturbations (e.g., Klein, 1977;
Wildavsky, 1991), and they therefore require
variation to sustain. Similarly, one can view sta-
ble mechanisms as institutions and stress the
restraints they impose on thought and action but
still recognize them as enabling (e.g., Adler &
Borys, 1996). Thus, I argue that under different
assumptions that preserve its essence, stability
can be both an outcome and a medium of
change.
KEY CONCEPTS AND CONVENTIONS
The concepts of dualism and duality are part
of a time-honored tradition in social science
(e.g., Abbott, 2001; Bourdeau, 1977; Dewey, 1917;
Elias, 1991; Giddens, 1984) and organization the-
ory (e.g., Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Orlikowski,
1992). As the simplest form of categorization, the
first defining feature of dualism is doubleness:
analysis proceeds by identifying two basic ele-
ments, such as knowledge and practice or mar-
kets and hierarchies. Dualism usually shows a
clear-cut and decisive contrast, a well-defined
boundary, and no overlap. This often becomes
synonymous with opposition and potential con-
flict. To be effective, a dualism must be compre-
hensive; it can have no middle or external
204 Academy of Management Review
ground and often rests on mutually exclusive
and exhaustive classes (Jackson, 1999).
In contrast, social theorists who invoke dual-
ity (e.g., Elias, 1991; Giddens, 1984) can maintain
conceptual distinctions without being commit-
ted to a rigid antagonism or separation. Con-
sider Giddens’ “duality of structure,” in which
structures can be reproduced only through the
actions of agents, and agents come into exis-
tence only within a structured environment. Du-
ality as interpreted by Giddens pulls structure
and agency closer and stresses their interde-
pendence without merging them (Jackson,
1999).1
To develop my arguments, I draw on several
domains, such as design (Simon, 1996) and reli-
ability (Landau, 1969), and multiple levels of
analysis. To bring more focus to the discussion,
I refer throughout to the exploitation-exploration
model (March, 1991), arguably one of the most
elaborate and influential models of stability
and change (Gupta et al., 2006). Consistent with
the model, I associate stability and underlying
mechanisms mainly with continuity, reliability,
predictability, low variance, and regularity, and
I associate change with variation, adaptability,
new knowledge, flexibility, and innovation.
These concepts of stability and change are also
implicit in the tensions between such things as
routine and search (Nelson & Winter, 1982), effi-
ciency and innovation (Abernathy, 1978), and
commitment and flexibility (e.g., Ghemawat,
1991). Similar to March (1991, 1995) and March
and Olsen (1995) , I recognize that these tensions
do not necessarily convey the same meaning
but regard them as variants of the broader sta-
bility-change dichotomy. Furthermore, concep-
tualizing change as exploration tends to defo-
calize concerns of politics, leadership, and
culture addressed in other models (e.g., Petti-
grew, 1985). Nevertheless, the model provides a
1
An equally robust tradition uses the concept of “para-
dox” to denote contradictory yet interrelated elements that
seem logical in isolation but irrational when appearing si-
multaneously (Lewis, 2000). Unlike paradox, dualism is often
used to discuss concepts such as thought and action that are
separate but not necessarily antithetical. Furthermore, du-
ality is but one of several strategies to deal with paradox
(Poole & Van de Ven, 1989). Its focus on synthesis and inter-
dependence makes it a particularly attractive means to con-
vey my arguments and is consistent with the ideas of prag-
matists, system thinkers, and institutional theorists on
which I draw.
April
prism through which to view key questions on
change, such as how it is affected by perfor-
mance (Greve, 2005) and whether it is episodic or
continuous (e.g., Feldman & Pentland, 2003) and
can coexist with stability (e.g., O’Reilly & Tush-
man, 2008).
Next, I briefly summarize the model and use it
to illustrate the prevailing dualistic view.
THE PREVAILING VIEW: STABILITY AND
CHANGE AS A DUALISM
Under the exploitation-exploration model, to
survive and prosper organizations must balance
the exploitation of current knowledge, routines,
and capabilities with the exploration of new
options, the search for new knowledge, and in-
novation (Holland, 1992; March, 1991). Closely
related to stability (March, 1995), exploitation
relates to economists’ notions of static efficiency
and stability (Schumpeter, 1942), selection and
low variance (March, 1994: 41), and retention,
repetition, and consistency (Levinthal & March,
1993). It is associated with continuation of direc-
tion, local refinements and extensions of exist-
ing competencies, technologies and paradigms,
and reliability of experience, and it flourishes in
stable, predictable settings. Exploration is
closely related to change (March, 1995), variabil-
ity, flexibility (Miner, 1994), and new directions
(March, 1991); is associated with innovation and
dynamic, long-term efficiency (Schumpeter,
1942); and suits dynamic and ambiguous set-
tings. Its signature is experimentation, variety
in experience, substitution, and adaptiveness
(Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1994: 41; March
& Olsen, 1995). The two imperatives must be
balanced, because a system that overexploits
and specializes in the short run may excel in a
way that is obsolete or inferior, while a system
that specializes in exploration would not benefit
from experience. Therefore, an organization
must engage in sufficient exploitation to ensure
its current viability but must devote enough en-
ergy to exploration to secure its future (March,
1991).
This model illustrates two defining charac-
teristics of the dualistic view. First, it casts
stability and change mainly as separate and
antithetical. While it acknowledges their
complementarities, it largely views exploita-
tion and exploration as inherently inconsis-
tent (Gupta et al., 2006). Similar to evolutionary
2010 Farjoun
models in which the success of one process—
that is, reproduction and retention— constitutes
a failure of the other—that is, variation (Camp-
bell, 1969), the model describes an intertemporal
trade-off between mutually exclusive learning
modes that compete for attention and other
scarce resources. Furthermore, the model
thrives on other clear-cut, idealized dichotomies
such as failure and success and predictability
and unpredictability, and it assumes self-
reinforcing tendencies that tip organizations to
the extremes (March, 1994, 2006).
Second, the model assumes a tight associa-
tion between stability (change) manifested as
mechanisms and stability (change) manifested
as outcomes. Exploitation requires routinization,
discipline, control, commitment, risk aversion,
and tightening slack, while exploration involves
experimenting, risk taking, openness, and loose
discipline and is stimulated by failure (March,
1996: 280). Each internally consistent configura-
tion of forms, practices, and mindsets is largely
incongruent with the other and supports mainly,
or only, a similar—stability or change— out-
come. Thus, formalization and control are gen-
erally assumed to promote reliability and pre-
dictability and to impede search. In contrast,
experimentation and variation are assumed to
promote innovation but generally to reduce re-
liability (Miner, 1994) and efficiency (Abernathy,
1978).
These implicit premises of dualism tend to
favor particular theoretical and pragmatic solu-
tions. For example, the notion that one mecha-
nism, such as routines (Feldman & Pentland,
2003), can enhance both stability and change
seems alien to dualism because it implies a
positive-sum, synergistic relationship. Simi-
larly, key dualistic solutions to the paradox of
administration suggest that organizations man-
age stability and change in separate units (Ben-
ner & Tushman, 2003; Christensen, 1997) and,
when conditions change, shift from one config-
uration to another (Burgelman, 2002; Tushman &
Romanelli, 1985).
AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW: STABILITY AND
CHANGE AS A DUALITY
Viewed as a duality, stability and change,
while conceptually distinct, are no longer sepa-
rate but, rather, are interdependent and poten-
tially compatible—mutually enabling and a
205
constituent of one another. I do not assume a
tight mapping of mechanisms and outcomes.
Rather, mechanisms can be two-sided: they gen-
erally support the same kind of outcomes as
dualism, but not exclusively. Specifically, vari-
able mechanisms such as diversity and experi-
mentation not only enable change and innova-
tion but also are instrumental in maintaining
stability, particularly amid persistent perturba-
tions. Conversely, stable mechanisms and insti-
tutions such as routines and control, while still
supporting stable outcomes, also promote
adaptability, innovation, and exploration. Con-
sequently, attaining one type of outcome re-
quires some elements of the other.
Figure 1 reflects these differences. It presents
four different relationships between stability
and change based on their manifestation as out-
comes or mechanisms.2 Quadrants 1 (Q1) and 4
(Q4) show the conventional, one-dimensional
dualistic opposition and the implicit association
of mechanisms and outcomes: stability (vari-
ability) in mechanisms mainly supports out-
comes of the same kind and undermines their
converse. Consistent with the familiar model, I
call these quadrants “exploitation” and “explo-
ration.” The other two quadrants, the mainstay
of the duality view, present stability as an out-
come of change (Q2) or its medium (Q3).3
The classification accomplishes several
things: it establishes how stability and change
each require the other (Q2 and Q3); it directs
attention to analogous and conjoint mecha-
nisms potentially underlying both outcomes;
and it colors organizations, indirectly and inev-
itably, as more complex, multidimensional, lay-
ered, and temporal entities. Finally, it recog-
nizes that stability and change are both
antithetical and complementary.
I use the classification as a roadmap and
progress from specific relationships to their con-
nections. Based on my discussion of Q1 and Q4,
2
I view the relationships as coexisting and in constant
flux; therefore, the different quadrants do not represent pure
types. Furthermore, consistent with Dewey (1922), I assume
that “mechanisms” and “outcomes” exist in a complex, re-
ciprocal relationship and their designation can change from
one context to another. Finally, rather than suggesting sharp
binary distinctions, dimensions in the classification repre-
sent underlying continua.
3
Throughout the discussion I use the terms exploitation
and exploration in the conventional sense (e.g., March, 1991),
and I use Q1 and Q4 to refer to the corresponding quadrants.
206 Academy of Management Review April

FIGURE 1
Classification of Stability and Change Relationships

Q1 Q2 Mechanisms
(processes, practices, forms)
Oppositional
Stability Change
Habits, routines, institutions, discipline, tight Search, mindfulness, redundancy, openness,
Complementary coupling, limits, commitments, control, and preoccupation with failure, imagination, and
low variance variety
Q3 Q4
Q1. Exploitation Q2. Change enables stability
Selected manifestations: Selected manifestations:
Continuity, low • Control reduces variation • Redundancy and loose coupling increase
variance, • Standardized routines and formalization reliability
Stability predictability, lead to efficiency and undermine • Moderate experimentation mitigates drastic
regularity, innovation failures
Outcomes and reliability • Commitment and specialization enhance • Doubt and mindfulness foster security and
(performances, reliability and reduce adaptability continuity
objectives)
Q3. Stability enables change Q4. Exploration
Adaptability, Selected manifestations: Selected manifestations:
Change high variance, • Control enables design and invention • Redundancy and loose coupling promote
innovation, and • Routines and formalization help manage flexibility and innovation
flexibility the nonroutine • Experimentation promotes adaptability and
• Commitment and specialization enhance undermines reliability
adaptability • Doubt stimulates discovery and change

I establish the key manifestations of duality, in
the next section discussing how variable mech-
anisms enable stability (Q2) and in the follow-
ing section discussing how stable mechanisms
enable adaptability and exploration (Q3). After
this I offer some extensions and scope condi-
tions. In the last section I discuss the paper’s
main contributions.
HOW CHANGE AND VARIATION ENABLE
STABILITY
High-Reliability Systems
To establish how organizations use variable
mechanisms to enable stability, I consult the
literature on economic change (e.g., Klein, 1977)
and the literature on complex adaptive systems
(e.g., Ashby, 1960), but I draw extensively from
studies of high-reliability organizations. Nu-
clear power plants (e.g., Perin, 2004), space shut-
tles (Vaughan, 1996), and aircraft carriers (e.g.,
Weick & Roberts, 1993) manage working condi-
tions continuously and effectively, even those
that are extremely hazardous, volatile, and un-
predictable, and they deal with constant sur-
prises (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). They therefore
offer a unique window for studying low-vari-
ance outcomes in dynamic settings, rather than
the stable conditions where they are usually
theorized (March, 1991). In these dynamic con-
texts stability is not self-sustaining but, rather,
requires internal variation and effort; it is al-
ways tentative and requires explanation.
A common concern in the high-reliability or-
ganizations and related literature is system re-
liability. To some reliability means constancy of
service; to others it means the safety of core
activities and processes. Increasingly, it means
both anticipation and resilience—the ability to
plan for shocks and to absorb and rebound from
them to provide services safely and continu-
ously (Roe & Schulman, 2008: 5). I use this
broader meaning of reliability because it does
not conflate high-reliability outcomes with pro-
cess attributes, particularly the absence of trial
and error (Rochlin, 1993). Furthermore, it can ap-
ply to a variety of threats, such as disease, scan-
dal, financial fraud, and competition (e.g.,
Sheffi, 2005), and to a variety of organizations,
both private and public. It also can apply to
systems, technologies, and networks (Axelrod &
Cohen, 2000; Perrow, 1999; Wildavsky, 1991), in-
cluding computer and social networks, airlines,
parcel delivery companies, hospitals, military
organizations, software systems, drug compa-
nies, economies, banks, intelligence services,
and even circuses and busy restaurants.
Several studies have shown that high-reli-
ability organizations use extensive discipline
and rules (Schulman, 1993) but rely on a surpris-
2010 Farjoun
ing amount of variation, redundancy, and imag-
ination (e.g., Klein, 1998; Roe & Schulman, 2008;
Weick & Roberts, 1993). Such findings cannot be
easily interpreted from the traditional dualistic
perspective, for two reasons. First, these variance-
inducing practices usually characterize enter-
prises concerned with innovation, entrepreneur-
ship, and art—in short, exploratory organizations.
Second, standard accounts of reliability often see
it as premised on variation-reducing mechanisms,
such as routines and institutionalization (Hannan
& Freeman, 1984). To understand these findings
and establish how change enables stability, two
different meanings of reliability and stability
must be recognized.
Reliability and Stability: Static and Dynamic
Conceptions
In operations management and engineering,
reliability is usually defined as the consistency
over time of the performance of a product or
service and the duration of its functioning
within a tolerated band of performance (Slack,
Chambers, & Johnson, 2004: 602). Accordingly,
the smaller a system’s performance variance
and the longer the system is sustained without
failure, the more reliable it is. Organization the-
orists generally adopted this conception when
singling out reliability as a distinctive compe-
tence of organizations over ad hoc collectivities
(Hannan & Freeman, 1989: 72–75). In most cases
they associated reliability with low variance
and consistent performance— diametrically
opposed to variation and innovation almost by
definition.
However, at the risk of overstating their differ-
ences, it appears that, over time, reliability as-
sumed two distinct meanings (e.g., Sitkin, 1992).
One meaning, reflected in Q1, associates reli-
ability closely with short-term or static effi-
ciency (March, 1991; Schumpeter, 1942), which
often leads to inertia and stagnation (e.g., Han-
nan & Freeman, 1989). Exemplified by the classic
concept of a learning curve (e.g., Argote, Beck-
man, & Epple, 1990), such reliability tends to
involve effortless, subconscious, and semi-
automatic activation of successful formulas
(March 1996: 280; Nelson & Winter, 1982). It is
founded on experiential learning based on feed-
back and reinforcement, along with the exploi-
tation of existing routines, particularly in highly
repetitive and stable settings (Louis & Sutton,
207
1991). Finally, it is fostered when organizations
and individuals adhere to strict limits; use con-
trol processes that minimize variations, errors,
slack, and initiative; and conform to a constrain-
ing bureaucracy (Adler & Borys, 1996).
In its second, less familiar meaning, reliabil-
ity connotes long-term stability, safety, and ro-
bustness, usually in the face of persistent per-
turbations (e.g., Klein, 1977; Roe & Schulman,
2008; Wildavsky, 1991). This meaning, most
closely associated with Q2, still preserves the
essence of the concept. However, as some have
observed, even though reduced variation and
error remain central to both forms of reliability,
their presence can be a highly misleading indi-
cator for the underlying processes (Weick, Sut-
cliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). Maintaining low out-
come variation and staying on track in dynamic
conditions require much more effort, resources,
and variety than achieving the same level of
reliability in more stable, predictable settings.
Therefore, unlike its meaning in the exploita-
tion-exploration model, reliability in this context
is diametrically opposed to efficiency (and much
closer to flexibility and exploration): whereas
efficiency requires homogeneity, specialization,
nonredundancy, and standardization, reliability
requires diversity, duplication, overlap, and a
varied response repertoire (Landau & Chisholm,
1995: 68; La Porte & Consolini, 1991). Efficiency
fosters short-term stability. However, to the ex-
tent that it drives out redundancy and variation,
it makes systems vulnerable to a major failure
when strongly perturbed and, thus, unstable
and less dynamically efficient (Reason, 1997;
Schumpeter, 1942).
These two meanings can be attributed to dif-
ferences in the more fundamental concept of
stability. In the dualistic view stability provides
short-term advantages but is passive, rigid, and
incompatible with change (e.g., Hannan & Free-
man, 1989). However, stability can still connote
continuity and low variance, but instead of im-
plying fixity or rigidity, it can manifest adapta-
tion (Ashby, 1960). Bateson’s image of an acrobat
on a wire captures these contrasting meanings:
To maintain the ongoing truth of his basic
premise (“I am on the wire”), he must be free to
move from one position of instability to another,
i.e., certain variables such as the position of his
arms and the rate of movement of his arms must
have great flexibility, which he uses to maintain
the stability of other more fundamental and gen-
208 Academy of Management Review
eral characteristics. If his arms are fixed or par-
alyzed (isolated from communication), he must
fall (1972: 498).
Similarly, in an electrical grid control room, low
variance in the balance between load and gen-
eration might reflect flexibility, improvisation,
and even virtuosity in the development of strat-
egies to cope with rapidly shifting grid condi-
tions (Roe & Schulman, 2008).4
Against this backdrop, I establish three ways
in which variation enables stability: redun-
dancy and loose coupling, experimentation, and
mindfulness.
Enhancing Reliability Through Variable Parts:
Redundancy and Loose Coupling
Attaining reliability in stable and predictable
settings is often premised on tightly coupled
systems with little or no slack, unifinality, and
invariant sequences (Perrow, 1999). Implicit is
the conventional dualistic belief that stable out-
comes only require stable mechanisms: system
reliability is achieved by eliminating slack and
using infallible parts. Reliability theorists have
argued instead that perfected parts can fail and,
particularly in tightly coupled systems such as
international finance and nuclear plants, can
lead to a global failure (e.g., Landau, 1969).
Therefore, a major insight in studies of orga-
nizations and technological and economic sys-
tems is that redundancy built into a system in its
constituent parts, roles, and relationships can
make it reliable, even though each part may be
unreliable or variable (Landau, 1969; Wildavsky,
1991). When a variable in a loosely coupled sys-
tem is disturbed, the disturbance will tend not to
ramify or will spread slowly (Glassman, 1973).
As Simon’s (1996) watchmakers parable shows,
hierarchical systems built on stable sub-
systems, redundancy, and modularity can re-
store their stability after interruption better than
can their equally complex nonhierarchical
counterparts.
4
An active view of stability can also be found outside the
high-reliability literature: in discussions of institutions and
order (e.g. Nelson, 2007; North, 2005; Zucker, 1988), routines
(Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Nelson & Winter, 1982), persis-
tence (Jansen, 2004), and network stability (Kilduff, Tsai, &
Hanke, 2006). The distinction between static and dynamic
forms of stability and reliability is well established (Klein,
1977; Sitkin, 1992; Wildavsky, 1991).
April
Multifinality better copes with dynamic set-
tings by giving loosely coupled systems a better
chance to improvise responses and therefore in-
corporate shocks, failures, and pressure for
change without destabilization (Perrow, 1999).
For example, online user-produced encyclope-
dias, such as Wikipedia, and the development of
the Linux operating system illustrate how loose
coupling and redundancy enable stability: di-
verse, loosely coupled, and independent sources
of evaluation and feedback facilitate error detec-
tion through overlap and enhance error correction
through duplication (Wildavsky, 1991). Therefore,
while diversity allows innovation and exploration
(Campbell, 1969), it also protects against common
shocks and enables reliability (Axelrod & Cohen,
2000; March & Simon, 1958).5
The principle of attaining global reliability
through unreliable parts is also illustrated in what
Weick and Roberts (1993) call “heedful interrelat-
ing,” in their study of navy aircraft carriers. In
systems characterized by distributed cognition, no
individual has all relevant information and would
constitute an “unreliable” element in isolation.
Consequently, some knowledge overlap through
such means as communication and handoff rou-
tines can help individuals identify potential prob-
lems and solutions and address breakdowns in
the fault lines between interdependent activities.
In sum, redundancy and loose coupling increase
reliability because they enable learning and de-
tection and correction of multiple small failures.
Premised on variety, excess, and duplication, they
allow both stability and adaptability (Landau,
1969).
Moderate Experimentation: Failing Less
(Painfully) by Failing More
Experimentation is the second means by
which variability or change may enhance sta-
5
In some cases redundancy can increase the risk of fail-
ure—for example, warning devices can make a system more
complex and opaque (Perrow, 1999). However, when effec-
tively used, redundancy can benefit stability in several
ways: it allows cellular phones and other technical networks
to function continuously, it allows companies to respond
quickly to supply/demand imbalances (Sheffi, 2005), and it
enables multiunit organizations and competitive systems to
lose a part without destabilization. Financial and relational
reserves were found to enhance resilience and stable per-
formance in airlines’ responses to the September 11 terrorist
attacks (Gittel, 2003).
2010 Farjoun
bility. Actors in human systems discover better
ways of doing things primarily by trial and er-
ror, where trials or exploratory deviations are
variations in established methods (Romanelli,
1999). Despite the general advantages of trial
and error, students of high-reliability organiza-
tions have traditionally argued that it is inap-
propriate in these settings. To reduce the risk
and cost of catastrophic failure, these organiza-
tions strive to perform error free. Nevertheless,
recognition is growing that, in some conditions,
trial and error, experimentation, and risk taking
can be instrumental for long-term stability and
reliability (Axelrod & Cohen, 2000; La Porte &
Consolini, 1991; Sitkin, 1992; Wildavsky, 1991).
For example, in their study of the California
electrical grid system, a classic high-reliability
organization, Roe and Schulman (2008) stress
that, when confronted with persistent problems,
reliability professionals need to experiment. In
the words of a grid operations engineer, “I like
pushing systems to the margins, but not an inch
beyond” (2008: 143). And as Edmondson, Bohmer,
and Pisano (2001) point out, since problem find-
ing, crucial to hospitals and other high-reliabil-
ity organizations, often means that individuals
admit fallibility, it requires interpersonal risk
taking.
The seemingly strange and counterintuitive
role of failure in enhancing safety and reliabil-
ity is best articulated in Wildavsky’s (1991) path-
breaking work. He argued that trial-and-error
risk taking, rather than risk aversion, is the pref-
erable strategy for securing safety. Without tri-
als there are no new errors, but also no new
experience and, hence, no learning. Trial and
error expands the menu of response options and
promotes resilience—learning from adversity
how to do better—while avoiding the restric-
tions that encourage the continuation of haz-
ards. Therefore, in the long run systems can fail
less, meaning in less drastic and painful ways,
not by avoiding failure but by actively and in-
telligently engaging in small or quasi-failures.
Even in organizations where the specter of ca-
tastrophe makes failure difficult to routinize, it
is essential that large-scale problems be re-
duced to more manageable levels so as to per-
mit experimentation (Weick, 1984).
Although learning from failure is not univer-
sal (e.g., Baumard & Starbuck, 2005; Perrow,
1999), it benefits organizations in general and
high-reliability organizations in particular in
209
several ways. Failure draws attention to poten-
tial problems, stimulates the search for solu-
tions, provides small doses of experience for
discovering unpredictable uncertainty, and of-
fers a clear motivation to change (e.g., Sitkin,
1992). Although large failures provide invalu-
able lessons, they are painful and rare. Small
failures, such as near collisions in airline traffic
and those that are intelligently designed, often
contain early warning signs that, if detected and
addressed, may help prevent catastrophes (Ed-
mondson et al, 2001; Starbuck & Farjoun, 2005;
Vaughan, 1996).
Other domains provide additional evidence of
the stability-enhancing benefits of experimenta-
tion and exploratory deviation. In a classic eth-
nographic study of bureaucracy, Stinchcombe
(1974) documented how creative problem solving
and innovations were necessary to avoid a
breakdown and to maintain smooth and contin-
uous operation at a steel plant. Recent studies of
learning curves, a standard mark of exploitation
(March, 1991), show similar benefits of explor-
atory deviations. Both experimental studies
(e.g., Schilling, Vidal, Ployhart, & Marangoni,
2003) and field studies (Weirsma, 2007) have
demonstrated that when individuals occasion-
ally engage in related but not identical tasks,
their learning rates are steeper than when they
repeat the same task. Similarly, reflecting on his
experience as a chess player, former world
champion Kasparov (2008) argues that breaking
habits and venturing into other and even unre-
lated domains can foster efficiency. Exploratory
deviation and “learning from something else”
provide insight through association, opportuni-
ties to renew scarce attention resources, richer
cues for learning, and a more varied problem-
solving repertoire. Viewing them as distractions
is myopic, for they add breadth that can in the
long run lead to greater efficiency, exploitation,
skill development, and depth.
Mindfulness: Fostering Security and Continuity
by Encouraging Doubt
Mindfulness is the third way in which vari-
ability enables stability. Trial and error and in-
telligent experimentation are often less feasible
or desirable in some high-risk ventures, tightly
coupled technological systems, and strategic
decisions. Consequently, instead of repeating
what seemed to work or reacting after failure,
210 Academy of Management Review
organizations focus on how to avoid, obviate,
remove, or circumvent failure (Petroski, 2006).
They experiment cognitively and vicariously,
using offline mental processes (Gavetti &
Levinthal, 2000), counterfactual thinking, contin-
gency plans and drills, after-action reviews, and
learning from others’ failures. They augment
feedback-based control and learning processes
with anticipatory feed-forward processes (Schul-
man, 1993). Finally, to deal with the unfamiliar,
high-reliability organizations and high-respon-
siveness teams blend a lot of imagination and
fantasy (Klein, 1998) with responsiveness and im-
provisation (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Weick et al.,
1999). These practices allow organizations to
maintain the traditional role of experimentation
and failure in generating variety and new knowl-
edge but use other less risky means, thus, to para-
phrase Popper, letting their theories die in their
stead (1979: 90).
The concept of mindfulness originally associ-
ated with creativity, flexibility, problem solving,
and entrepreneurial behavior (Langer, 1989) is
central to many of these practices. In the termi-
nology of high-reliability theory, mindfulness
encompasses a configuration of cognitive and
operational practices, such as preoccupation
with failure, reluctance to simplify interpreta-
tions, sensitivity to operations, commitment to
resilience, and deference to expertise (e.g.,
Weick et al., 1999). As I use the term—in refer-
ence to generative and predominantly cognitive
processes (e.g., Levinthal & Rerup, 2006)—
mindfulness includes active differentiation and
refinement of existing distinctions, creation of
new discrete categories out of continuous
streams of events, and a nuanced appreciation
of context and alternative ways to deal with it
(Langer, 1989). Unlike mindlessness, mindful-
ness requires a variety of stimuli and includes
openness to new information and appreciation
of multiple interpretations and perspectives.
Through sensitivity to errors and the capacity to
engage in a flexible range of behaviors, mind-
fulness makes it easier for individuals to cope
with surprises and nonroutine events through
both anticipation and adaptive reaction. As
Pentland and Reuter (1994) showed in their study
of software support hot lines, it takes mindful
variety to manage the unexpected and to assure
stable high performance.
Central to mindfulness, and reminiscent of
“deinstitutionalization” (Oliver, 1992), is a par-
April
ticular questioning attitude and conscious cog-
nitive disposition against taking things for
granted. Weick et al. (1999) explained that mind-
fulness is a persistent mindset that, to counter
complacency, admits the possibility that any fa-
miliar event is known imperfectly and can in-
volve novelty. As Roe and Schulman (2008) have
observed, operators constantly look for the abnor-
mal. In the words of an engineer, “Something oc-
curred and my brain says it shouldn’t happen; if it
is counterintuitive, then I get concerned” (2008:
123). This ongoing wariness is expressed in active,
continuous revisiting and revision of assump-
tions, rather than in hesitant action, and appears
in such forms as conceptual slack (Schulman,
1993), skepticism, and double checking (Weick et
al., 1999). It lets people live by the book without
being willing to die by it (Rochlin, 1993: 24).
Doubt is particularly activated by novelty and
the constant and inevitable encounters with
anomalies, surprises, and interruptions that ac-
company routine work. These discontinuities, of-
ten too minor to break the system, may still jolt
attention, trigger sensemaking and inquiry
(Weick, 1995), and stimulate an abduction process
that creates an imagined world where this doubt
can be resolved (Peirce, 1931–1958). In her study of
the nuclear power industry, Perin captured the
significance of this mindset: “The principle of
command and control to assure safe shutdown
depends on the principle of doubt and discovery to
identify the impediments” (2004: 214).
In sum, to increase their long-term stability,
systems and organizations, particularly those
facing persistent perturbations, combine rules,
discipline, and routines with a remarkable vari-
ety: they enhance reliability through unreliable
or variable parts, fail less by failing more, and
increase security by encouraging doubt and
alertness. Even with such practices, a system
may not be able to respond to some qualitative
changes outside a certain range and, thus,
allow the rigidity associated with exploitation
to sneak back in (Ashby, 1960). Nevertheless,
as high-reliability organizations researchers
have argued, this variety spurs second-order
learning (Argyris & Schön, 1978), allows orga-
nizations to deal with the inconceivable, and
even enables them to reorganize in the midst
of operations (e.g., Bigley & Roberts, 2001;
Weick et al., 1999).
2010 Farjoun
HOW STABILITY ENABLES CHANGE AND
ADAPTABILITY
If it is necessary in Q2 to peer through appar-
ent stability to find the underlying variety that
enables it, in systems that generate and sustain
adaptability one uncovers regularities and con-
tinuities in what seems highly variable and di-
vergent (Q3). As I will show, in its various forms,
adaptability is supported by a considerable
amount of structure and a number of stable
mechanisms, as well as a surprising degree of
formalization and strict controls.
A consistent research finding is that innova-
tive firms, while using many variation-enhanc-
ing practices, also use control systems exten-
sively (Simons, 1995) and rely on highly
disciplined and rigid specifications to guide
their innovation processes (Cusumano, 1991;
Dougherty, 2006). In addition, Bigley and Rob-
erts’ (2001) study of incident command systems,
along with other studies of high-responsiveness
operations (Klein, Ziegert, Knight, & Xiao, 2006),
shows how these flexible organizations benefit
from bureaucracy while avoiding some of its
major weaknesses. These findings cannot be
easily interpreted from a dualistic perspective:
discipline and formalization are traditionally
associated with efficiency and reliability out-
comes (Weber, 1947) and with exploitation
(March, 1991), whereas exploratory outcomes are
often associated with few or no limits and little
structure. A key to this puzzle and to the follow-
ing discussion lies in divergent conceptions of
institutions and limits and, to some degree, of
routines and bureaucracy.
Institutions and Limits As Enabling
By shaping human interaction and promoting
order, stability (Selznick, 1957), and reliability
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984), mechanisms tradi-
tionally associated with static stability, such as
methods and rules, can be fruitfully viewed as
institutions. In this broader sense they can be
variously seen as orderly, stable, socially inte-
grating patterns (Jepperson, 1991; Selznick, 1992:
232), routines (Levitt & March, 1988), or rules of
the game (North, 2005). As institutions, these pro-
cesses, forms, and practices combine aspects of
retention and selection that are often insepara-
ble in practice. Rooted in habit (Dewey, 1922),
institutions convert lessons and inferences into
211
rules that limit actions and behavior, constrain
choice, and even make some alternatives un-
imaginable (DiMaggio, 1988).
However, in both their retention and selection
functions, institutions constrain but also enable.
They are based on commitments and choices
(Barnard, 1938; Selznick, 1992), restrain freedom
of thought and action, and, when reproduced
(often subconsciously), tend to reduce flexibility
and adaptation (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Han-
nan & Freeman, 1984; Heiner, 1983). Yet by serv-
ing as higher-level premises, fostering legiti-
macy and trust, and constituting enabling
frameworks for emergent action, they can also
reduce uncertainty, facilitate adaptation, and
regularize innovation (Giddens, 1984; Nelson,
2007; North, 2005). Therefore, to see institutions
mainly as constraints, as is implicit in the dual-
istic perspective, is to detract from their role in
supporting and sustaining variety and adapt-
ability.
This constraining role of institutions is rela-
tively well recognized, but much less familiar is
the critical enabling and adaptive function of
limits. Dewey captures this function well: “It is
reasonably obvious that organization may be-
come a hindrance to freedom. . . . At the same
time, it must be admitted that there is no effec-
tive or objective freedom without organization”
(1922: 306).
Rational behavior in organizations takes
place within—and because of— clearly speci-
fied limits, and in their absence anarchy reigns
(e.g., Barnard, 1938; Farjoun & Starbuck, 2007;
March & Simon, 1958). Rules preserve group au-
tonomy and freedom (Perrow, 1986: 21–22), and
limits supply security and consistency and pro-
vide reference for improvement. Like a car’s
brakes, which enable faster rather than slower
driving, policies and boundary systems are pre-
requisites for organizational freedom and entre-
preneurial behavior (Simons, 1995: 41).
I build on the notion of institutions and limits
as enabling to establish how, paradoxically, in-
dividuals use discipline in design and inven-
tion, organizations routinize the nonroutine, and
specialization fosters adaptability.
Design and Invention As Disciplined
Imagination
Studies have shown that individual problem
solving in such domains as puzzles, engineer-
212 Academy of Management Review
ing, and architecture is not random or blind but,
rather, highly selective and guided by progress
toward a goal (Holland, 1992). Individuals solv-
ing problems rely on lessons retained as rules of
thumb or heuristics to select which paths to try
first and which leads are promising. In addition,
stable configurations, or modules, such as pro-
vided by subproblems solved previously, pro-
vide new building blocks for further construc-
tion and greatly reduce the need for trial and
error, thereby economizing on cognition (Newell
& Simon, 1972). Frequently used ideas become
taken for granted, and their stability serves as
premises for other ideas (Bateson, 1972: 274). In
this way less mindful and habitual behavior
frees up resources to deal with nonroutine tasks
(Simon, 1997: 100). Engineering illustrates the
role of selectivity in problem solving: knowledge
draws from scientific principles but relies
heavily on rules of thumb, informed guesses,
routines, and norms built up through engineer-
ing education and real-world experience (Vin-
centi, 1990). Similarly, studies of artists, musi-
cians, and poets show that much creativity
works mainly within existing conventions and
traditions (Sawyer, 2006).
The essence of design is the invention of new
artifacts (Simon, 1996). Studies of design in di-
verse areas particularly demonstrate that the
effective generation of ideas, a variance-
inducing process, surprisingly relies on vari-
ance-reducing processes such as failure reduc-
tion and cybernetic control. Scientists maintain
steady progress toward better theories through
a process of disciplined imagination in which
guided and consistent selection reduces errors
and unwanted deviations (Campbell, 1969; Pop-
per, 1959; Weick, 1989), and they even use stan-
dard procedures to exploit surprises (Klahr &
Simon, 1999). Similarly, theories of design and
architecture suggest that to achieve a good fit of
form one must employ a negative process of
neutralizing the incongruities that cause misfit
(Alexander, 1964) and that the development of
new artifacts follows from recognizing and re-
ducing the failures of existing ones (Petroski,
1992).
These observations do not diminish the role of
insight, trial and error, affect, and serendipity in
creative problem solving. Yet they offer relief
from the dualistic imagery of habit/routine and
problem solving/search as largely distinct and
opposed responses and show how discipline
April
and selection not only lead to inertia but also
allow adaptability.
Routinizing the Nonroutine
Stability also enables change by routinizing
the nonroutine. The organizational literature
has two important parallels to the disciplined
nature of creative problem solving: the familiar
notion of institutionalized innovation and the
observation that organizations use routines to
deal with nonroutine and unexpected situations.
As many scholars of innovation have recog-
nized, innovative outcomes are seldom a prod-
uct of individual genius but, rather, require a
collective and systematic approach (Dougherty,
2006; Schumpeter, 1942). By reducing uncer-
tainty, promoting coordination, and channeling
energy in productive directions, institutions—
normative, regulatory, and cognitive— help
guide, promote, and systematize the innovation
process and allow its reproduction and effi-
ciency over time, thereby producing sustained
progress (Kuhn, 1970; Nelson, 2007).
Although they may not always succeed, orga-
nizations regularly attempt to systematize their
innovations (March, 2006). They recombine exist-
ing routines and specialties (e.g., Nelson & Win-
ter, 1982) by using cross-functional mechanisms
and knowledge management systems. They in-
stitutionalize their experimentation and devel-
opment processes (e.g., Lovas & Ghoshal, 2000)
and reward playfulness, informality, and skunk
works— unapproved projects—to encourage un-
planned variation (Miner, 1994). They routinely
probe the future and use transition routines to
link sequential development projects (Brown &
Eisenhardt, 1997). They use control systems and
incentives to guard against excessive experi-
mentation (Simons, 1995). And they foster inno-
vation through selection mechanisms such as
competition among project teams (Kidder, 1981)
or individuals (Boudreau, Lacetera, & Lakhani,
2008).
The role of institutions appears to go beyond
fostering incremental change and innovation
(e.g., Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Giddens, 1984).
As Murmann and Frenken (2008) argue, the oc-
currence of innovations that are radical in their
consequences does not rule out reliance on sta-
ble and incremental processes. Research on the
Fosbury Flop high-jump technique (Goldenberg,
Lowengart, Oreg, & Bar-Eli, in press), the devel-
2010 Farjoun
opment of wireless communication technology
(Levinthal, 1998), and the Toyota organization
(Adler et al., 2009; Osono, Shimizu, Takeuchi, &
Kyle, 2008) shows how following stable pro-
cesses and persisting within a given trajectory
can have a nonlinear effect that leads to new
and radical trajectories. Even when some ele-
ments of creativity and innovation are difficult
to standardize and institutionalize, stable prac-
tices and elements— defined more broadly to
include habits, routines, limits, and stable
blocks and embedded in enabling bureaucra-
cy— can still facilitate breakthrough innova-
tions. Pixar’s use of postmortem analyses (Cat-
mull, 2008) and IDEO’s use of detailed brain-
storming techniques and recombination of
stable solutions (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997) illus-
trate how firms famous for bringing about radi-
cal innovations, often in a systemic way, also
use structured enabling practices.
Routines and stable processes and habits also
foster flexibility and enable organizations to
deal with the unexpected. For example, Bigley
and Roberts (2001) showed that incident control
systems used structuring mechanisms, con-
strained improvisation, and cognitive manage-
ment methods in emergencies. These mecha-
nisms allowed them to capitalize on the control
and efficiency benefits of bureaucracy and to
attain reliability, but also to react quickly and
effectively, expand and contract, and change
their strategic orientation. Klein et al.’s (2006)
study of extreme action teams and Moynihan’s
(2008) study of a crisis response network also
showed how roles and standard operating pro-
cedures helped organizations respond to novel
and uncertain situations.
To foster adaptability through stable routines,
organizations use a surprisingly high degree of
formalization. Contrary to common wisdom, in-
novative firms often use rather strict controls
and rigidly scripted activities that allow better
codification, replication, and generation of
knowledge (Simons, 1995; Zollo & Winter, 2003).
Similarly, firms like UPS insist on having tight
procedures to empower local managers to im-
provise and solve problems in novel ways. Adler
et al. (1999) showed how Toyota uses mecha-
nisms such as metaroutines, job enrichment,
switching, and partitioning, allowing it to be
flexible as well as efficient and capable of both
first- and second-order learning. Along with
norms of trust and collaboration, the rigid spec-
213
ification of activities is what makes flexibility
and creativity possible.
Thus, when used effectively, bureaucracy,
control systems, and formalization can be en-
abling and can facilitate nonroutine work, in-
cluding radical innovation (Adler et al., 2009:
109) and fast and flexible adaptation (Simons,
1995). In enabling bureaucracy, procedures can
allow employees to deal more effectively with
inevitable contingencies and interruptions that
then become learning opportunities (Adler &
Borys, 1996). These institutions capitalize on in-
dividuals’ capability to follow an existing trajec-
tory and hold it in suspense (e.g., Emirbayer &
Mische, 1998), and to attend, at the same time, to
both routine and nonroutine tasks (Victor, Boyn-
ton, & Stephens-Jahng, 2000). Rather than limit
freedom, standardized processes can provide a
frame to put ideas into practice and guide
sensemaking (Avadikyan, Llerena, Matt, Rozan,
& Wolff, 2001; Zollo & Singh, 2004). As Stinch-
combe (2001) argued, although formality does
not always work, the ability of formalized sys-
tems such as architectural plans, scientific par-
adigms, and organizations to correct themselves
and keep up with the reality they are meant to
govern can make them remarkably flexible and
successful.
Adaptability Through Specialization and
Commitment
Finally, from the dualistic view, commitments,
specialization, and focus lead to efficiency, ex-
ploitation, and competitive advantage; they also
may become maladaptive when environments
change (Ghemawhat, 1991; Leonard-Barton,
1992; March, 1991). Can these variance-reducing
practices also enable innovation and flexibility?
Here Kierkegaard’s poet protagonist elo-
quently contrasts his rotation method with the
alternative of drifting along and continually
changing his field of interest:
But this [rotation] method defeats itself: it is plain
endlessness. . . . My method does not consist in
such a change of field, but rather resembles the
true rotation method in changing the crop and the
mode of cultivation (rather than the field). Here I
have the principle of limitation, the only saving
principle in the world. The more you limit your-
self, the more fertile you become in invention
(quoted in Weschler, 1982: 69, from Kierkegaard,
1959: 287–288).
214 Academy of Management Review
This illustrates two ways variance-reducing
practices enable change. First, making a com-
mitment in one facet of life channels behavior
and frees up attention and resources to deal
more flexibly with other aspects (Barnard, 1938;
Dewey, 1922: 311). For example, specialization in
skills and resources paradoxically enables
firms to develop a more varied set of products
(e.g., Farjoun, 1994; Gort, 1962). Similarly, the
modern notion of dynamic capabilities com-
bines commitment to higher-level capabilities
or regularized action patterns with versatility,
innovation, and renewal at the lower levels of
routines, resources, and products (e.g., Teece,
2007; Winter, 2003). Second, boundaries serve as
catalysts, not only constraints. They focus atten-
tion, which can motivate and stimulate the dis-
covery of solutions (e.g., Gibbert & Valikangas,
2004). They also provide the background allow-
ing experienced scientists to detect puzzles that
may trigger a change to a new paradigm (Kuhn,
1970). As Dougherty and Takacs (2004) found,
innovative new-product teams used boundaries
more effectively than their less innovative coun-
terparts. Their reliance on organizational prior-
ities and clear role expectations fostered team
play and provided a clearly defined space to
avoid distraction from other teams.
In sum, stable mechanisms, institutions, and
limits enable change and adaptability in many
ways. They provide needed certainty and legit-
imacy. They supply stable building blocks for
further recombination. They channel search to
better uses by removing unwanted variations
and limiting opportunism. They supply the
background and memory for identifying the un-
expected—a trigger for problem solving and po-
tential change. Finally, they allow the transfer
of scarce attention and resources from routine to
nonroutine tasks.
THEORETICAL EXTENSIONS
So far, and for simplicity, I have discussed
each stability-change relationship— or quad-
rant in the classification—independently. In re-
ality, however, organizations include different
relationships at the same time. In this section I
first discuss other complementarities, particu-
larly the parallels between long-term reliability
(stability) (Q2) and sustained innovation
(change) (Q3). I then examine how the comple-
mentarities between stability and change (Q2
April
and Q3) can be reconciled with their tensions
(Q1 and Q4).
Other Complementarities: The Compatibility of
Reliability and Innovation
Rather than being independent, stable prac-
tices that enable innovation and change (Q3)
intertwine with variation-based mechanisms
that underlie stability (Q2), often within a single
organization. For example, standardized rou-
tines and habits help institutionalize alertness
and problem-solving practices that enable sta-
ble performance (Adler et al., 2009: 108; Weick et
al., 1999). Stability and change also feed one
another diachronically—in an ongoing dialectic
process of renewal and dynamic interplay. For
example, depth and specialization allow
breadth, which can then support specialization.
The previous discussion also calls attention to
less appreciated parallels between sustained
innovation (change) and long-term reliability
(stability). Scholars of both technological
change and reliability have hinted at this, argu-
ing, for example, that in contrast to a static and
rigid society, a rapidly progressing one—
innovative, learning, improvisational, and en-
trepreneurial—will at the same time be safer
and more resilient (Klein, 1977; Wildavsky, 1991).
Without overstating the compatibility of these
two manifestations of stability and change, I
underscore three overlooked parallels: in mech-
anisms, in contexts, and in objectives.
First, up to a point, similar mechanisms en-
able both reliability and innovation. Organiza-
tions concerned with reliability and dynamic
efficiency and those promoting innovation and
adaptability exhibit features of learning organi-
zations, such as trust, empowerment, and vari-
able structures. Loose coupling and diversity al-
low more experimentation, but they also
increase the margins for error, better withstand
shocks, and enable quick recovery through im-
provisation. Modular and redundant systems
tend to be more stable and adaptable (Landau,
1969; Simon, 1996). Finally, a discovery orienta-
tion and learning generated through actual or
mental experimentation can reveal potential
sources of failure and, thus, can increase safety
and innovation.
Second, theories of reliability and innovation
highlight their compatible contexts. High-
reliability organizations manage working con-
2010
ditions continuously and effectively while deal-
ing with continual surprises (Bigley & Roberts,
2001). Similarly, economic and technological
change models describe organizations that gen-
erate innovation regularly as dynamically sta-
ble and their environments as predictably un-
predictable, combining steady progress and a
constant beam of profit opportunities to be
seized with the inherently random nature of nov-
elty (Klein, 1977: 12; Knight, 1921). Therefore, both
bodies of literature describe hybrid environ-
ments, not only predictable, as in exploitation,
and not only unpredictable, as in exploration.
Third, reliability and innovation have close
affinities as goals. Safety goals tend to be long
term and more vaguely measured and removed
from the bottom line than efficiency goals; as a
result, they are more vulnerable from a resource
allocation and motivation standpoint (Reason,
1997), just as innovation goals are (March, 1991).
Both goals deal with symmetric adaptive func-
tions—in one case, defense, protection, and ro-
bustness against threats, and in the other, gen-
eration of novelty, migration to new niches, and
the capturing of opportunities. These parallels
in goals distance sustained innovation and re-
liability from short-term exploitation and static
efficiency and establish them as two central and
mirror images of long-term adaptability.
Dualism and Duality: A Partial Reconciliation
The prior discussion also raises the question
of how the contradictory and complementary re-
lationship of stability and change can be recon-
ciled. A good starting point to address this is
duality’s uncoupling of mechanisms and out-
comes. As I showed, the accepted understand-
ing of certain mechanisms may not fully capture
their richness and potency. Bureaucracies, insti-
tutions, routines, formalization, and controls are
two-sided— both constraining and enabling
(Adler & Borys, 1996; Feldman & Pentland, 2003;
Simons, 1995). Conversely, redundancy, diver-
sity, experimentation, and mindfulness can fos-
ter innovation and flexibility but also can confer
stability (Landau, 1969; Weick et al., 1999; Wil-
davsky, 1991). While prevalent, this double-
sided quality may not be universal. For exam-
ple, certain means such as trial and error may
be more appropriate for exploration outcomes
than for reliability, while other less risky mech-
anisms such as mental experimentation may
Farjoun 215
enable both stability and change outcomes.
Therefore, a first scope condition for duality lies
in the specific features of the mechanism in
question.
Second, whether a particular practice or form
has one effect or another is likely to depend on
individuals’ problem finding, sensemaking, and
interpretation; a rigid restraint to one may be
another’s license to be creative. The way indi-
viduals frame a situation may depend on
whether they adopt a “control” or “learning” ori-
entation (Sutcliffe et al., 2004) for their particular
roles and the purpose or strategy toward which
they contribute. Under these different condi-
tions, alertness, for example, may be used by
entrepreneurs to identify novel opportunities
and by reliability operators to preempt a failure.
A third and crucial contingency is the way
organizations implement mechanisms. For ex-
ample, identified with particular process man-
agement and quality assurance techniques, sta-
ble practices can stifle innovation (e.g., Benner
& Tushman, 2003). However, as Adler et al. (2009:
111) point out, these tendencies may be attrib-
uted to inferior administrative technologies
rather than seen as inevitable consequences of
disciplined processes. As I previously dis-
cussed, the innovation literature and reliability
literature list several cognitive and structural
conditions that differentiate between less and
more effective organizations. Particularly, to be
effective a practice must be embedded in sup-
porting organizational cultures, reward sys-
tems, and infrastructures (e.g., Adler et al., 1999;
Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Dougherty & Takacs,
2004; Osono et al., 2008; Weick et al., 1999).
Fourth, effects may differ across contexts.
When organizations operate in stable contexts,
focus on short-term efficiency, fully control their
environment or are fairly insulated from its per-
turbations, and engage in simple and repetitive
tasks in settings such as mass production and
high precision, they may attain static efficiency
solely through tight controls, mindless repeti-
tion, and narrowness. At the other end—in un-
certain, dynamic, complex, nascent, and ambig-
uous environments—trial and error, redundancy,
openness, and more fluid organizational solu-
tions may be largely appropriate. The duality
view is less likely to be fitting for these polar
conditions.
In contrast, in more hybrid settings stability
and change are likely to be mutually enabling
216 Academy of Management Review
and constituent. These settings feature simulta-
neously strong and potentially orthogonal pres-
sures for stability and innovation and a blend of
predictability and unpredictability (e.g., Far-
joun, 2007). Despite their differences, complex
organizations such as navy aircraft carriers
(Weick & Roberts, 1993), high-tech firms (Brown
& Eisenhardt, 1997), emergency operations (Big-
ley & Roberts, 2001), and innovative car manu-
facturing plants (Adler et al., 1999) pursue reli-
ability and adaptability goals simultaneously,
even if not equally. This blend pushes organiza-
tions to embrace greater internal variation,
openness, and mindfulness and, at the same
time, to stabilize their internal variation, institu-
tionalize their innovation, and regularize their
flexibility. These hybrid conditions are particu-
larly likely to hold in dynamic and competitive
settings with rapid innovation, recurrent nov-
elty, frequent discontinuities, or a high risk of
failure, such as pharmaceutical companies,
software development companies, business net-
works, and security operations. They are likely
to be prevalent in settings that blend routine
and novelty, such as in knowledge-based and
professional organizations, news and fashion
companies, book publishing, and habitual
entrepreneurs.
Finally, the relative strength of conflicting
and complementary effects may also depend on
how they are nested in space and time. Stability
and change interrelate at different levels; how-
ever, logic suggests that the more a system or an
organization is complex, multidimensional, and
nested (e.g., Glassman, 1973; Simon, 1996), the
more room it allows for complementarities (e.g.,
Abbott, 2001). In contrast, stability and change
are likely to be more conflicting when these
elements appear within the same level (e.g., or-
ganizational task), dimension (e.g., technology),
or moment. Similarly, stability and change are
likely to exhibit more conflict in the short run
and be more complementary in the long run. The
short run presents resource constraints and op-
portunity costs that are more likely to force a
choice between competing alternatives. In the
long run and with potentially more resources,
conflict is likely to be reduced.
DISCUSSION
The central argument of this paper is that
stability and change are not separable and only
April
conflicting, but, rather, they are fundamentally
interdependent. Particularly, while I acknowl-
edge the underlying distinctions and eminent
tension of dualism, I establish the many comple-
mentarities of stability and change. Drawing on
substantial empirical evidence in a wide range
of domains and at different levels of analysis, I
show how variable practices can contribute to
stability in outcomes and how stable practices
can enable variable outcomes. Furthermore, sta-
bility and change rest on commonly similar
practices and, in their respective manifestations
as reliability and innovation, have several over-
looked parallels. Overall, this paper suggests
that prevailing dualistic dichotomies are over-
drawn; viewed as a duality instead, stability is
both the outcome and medium of change, and
the two gradate and fold into one another.
In the following I focus on three main contri-
butions of this paper: revisiting existing ideas
about stability and change, offering opportuni-
ties to dissolve and transcend their paradoxical
relationship, and exploring new common and
middle grounds.
Revisiting Existing Ideas and Models
This paper revisits several enduring ideas
about stability and change: bureaucracies are
not hostile to innovation and flexibility, formal-
ization does not necessarily undermine search,
redundancy and deviations can keep things on
track, risk taking can foster safety and stability,
and discipline can enable adaptability. Duality
makes it possible for organizations to merge
routine with novelty, redundancy with (dynamic)
efficiency, and narrowness with openness. It
shows how variation can help constrain and
how selection and retention can enable. Famil-
iar notions such as stability, formalization, and
limits become strange. Strange notions— how
failure enhances reliability, how breadth en-
hances depth— become intelligible and famil-
iar. This view helps us move a step toward de-
veloping “the conceptual models and overall
vision by which we can make comprehensible in
thought what we experience daily in reality”
(Elias, 1991: 7).
Collectively, these observations do not neces-
sarily converge on one dominant view of orga-
nizations as rigid and myopic or more mindful
and inventive. Rather, they identify areas where
accepted notions of mechanisms and outcomes
2010 Farjoun
are not as clear-cut and need to be qualified and
refined. In this respect my argument is consis-
tent with those of others who have questioned
the dualistic view of stability and change (e.g.,
Cohen, 2007a) and challenged its key variants
(e.g., Adler et al., 1999; Powell, Koput, & Smith-
Doerr, 1996). It follows others who have intro-
duced new understandings of existing concepts
and relationships (e.g., Landau, 1969); re-
examined enduring beliefs about classical phe-
nomena such as risk taking (Wildavsky, 1991),
creativity (Sawyer, 2006), and formalization
(Stinchcombe, 2001); and revisited behavioral
microfoundations such as routines and habits
(Cohen, 2007b; Feldman & Pentland, 2003).
While consistent with these precedents, my
approach departs from other challenges to du-
alism (e.g., Levinthal & Rerup, 2006; Sutcliffe et
al., 2004) in explicitly dissociating mechanisms
and outcomes that have become synonymous.
As Abbott (2001) recognized, breaking affinities
can be a powerful mechanism for knowledge
change in social science. This analytic device
moves away from a one-dimensional represen-
tation, uncovers the double-sided nature of
practices and their conjoint operation, and con-
tributes to identifying a broader range of
complementarities. Additionally, in developing
my arguments I avoid relying on ad hoc con-
cepts and use instead emerging understandings
and increasingly accepted theoretical building
blocks. The concepts I use preserve the essence
of stability yet recognize it as provisional and
requiring flexibility (Cohen, 2007b; Tsoukas &
Chia, 2002), and they allow institutions to be
both constraining and enabling (e.g., North,
2005). I recognize that adding a dimension or a
meaning makes duality more complex than du-
alism. However, in the trade-off between purity
and realism, this price is worth paying. Further-
more, the introduction of a new dimension, level,
intermediary, and meaning is inescapable in
the construction of dualities (e.g., Elias, 1991;
Giddens, 1984).
The duality view offers particular implica-
tions for the exploitation-exploration model, a
fellow traveler of my discussion. To a large de-
gree the beauty and influence of this model
stem from its dualistic tendencies and simplic-
ity. However, as some have suggested, taking
this intuitively appealing and compelling model
to its extremes may obscure how exploitation
and exploration intertwine in the messy world of
217
practice (e.g., Powell et al., 1996). Therefore, I join
others who shed light on potential complemen-
tarities in the model (e.g., Adler & Borys, 1996;
Zollo & Winter, 2003) and also identify several
opportunities to extend it.
First, I question the model’s built-in tendency
to associate particular organizational arrange-
ments with specific outcomes and perfor-
mances. In doing so I allow the possibility that,
rather than driving out exploration, processes
and practices originally associated with exploi-
tation, such as control, method, and narrowness,
might also be crucial to outcome variability and
to the production of new, even radical, knowl-
edge. Conversely, variable processes such as
experimentation may in fact increase reliability.
Therefore, rather than opposing one another, el-
ements of exploitation and exploration poten-
tially enable each other.
Second, duality suggests that the model may
be too crude to fully capture the middle, com-
mon, and exterior grounds that exist in reality.
Organizations concerned with high reliability
and dynamic efficiency attend to performance
outcomes such as close calls that lie between
failure and success. Moreover, they use mecha-
nisms such as cognitive exploration and abduc-
tion and learn from others’ failures—methods
that are not entirely exploration or exploitation
but, nevertheless, generate important new
knowledge.
Third, a key linkage in the model is between
performance and subsequent change and learn-
ing (e.g., Greve, 2005). Given performance feed-
back, exploitation is reinforced by successes,
whereas exploration is often triggered by actual
failure (e.g., Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992; March,
1991). My earlier discussion suggests that these
predictions may not be as clear-cut. To attain
persistence, continuity, and efficiency, organiza-
tions rely on history-dependent learning pro-
cesses based on reinforcement and feedback
(Levitt & March, 1988) and build on successes,
but particularly in dynamic settings they rely
considerably on feed-forward processes and
contemplate potential, not only actual, failure.
Conversely, innovation and change, frequently
triggered by failure, also require the stable rou-
tines and skills that successes generate. There-
fore, successes and failures and their grada-
tions provide complementary opportunities for
learning and contribute to both stability and
change outcomes.
218 Academy of Management Review
More generally, duality refines the original
model by suggesting that while in the short run
organizations need to ensure sufficient exploita-
tion and efficiency, they must attend to both
long-run exploration and reliability. Given that
short-term exploitation and long-term adapt-
ability have self-reinforcing tendencies, balanc-
ing them may be difficult (March, 1991). But it
may not be as difficult if we also recognize the
countervailing symbiotic influences that duality
uncovers. These forces can, in the longer run,
pull stability and change closer together.
Offering a Unique Take on the Paradox
The paper’s second contribution lies in offer-
ing opportunities to dissolve and transcend the
paradoxical relationship between stability and
change. Duality’s unique take on the paradox
can best be appreciated when viewed against
alternative approaches. Poole and Van de Ven
(1989) distinguished four analytically different
modes: (1) accept and use the paradox construc-
tively, (2) separate the horns of the paradox to
different locations or levels, (3) temporally sep-
arate the two imperatives, and (4) advance new
conceptions. Whereas the first three approaches
accommodate the paradox, only the fourth truly
dissolves or supersedes the opposition. Gid-
dens’ (1984) duality of structure illustrates the
last category, because by introducing a new
conception, it transcends the dualistic view of
structure and action.
Dualistic solutions such as specialization, am-
bidexterity, and punctuated equilibrium change
rely on the first three approaches (e.g., Gupta et
al., 2006). Duality suggests instead that stability
and change in different units and hierarchical
levels may intertwine and depend on common
practices and that rather than negating and dis-
placing one another, they can mutually rein-
force each other in a process of renewal. These
ideas offer different possibilities for organiza-
tional design, organizational transformation
and renewal, and institutional change.
Organizational design. The dualistic assump-
tion that stability and change require different
processes, mindsets, and routines (Benner &
Tushman, 2003; Christensen, 1997; March, 1996:
280) often leads to organizational design solu-
tions that separate these imperatives across lev-
els and locales. A prominent solution is ambi-
dextrous organization, in which structural
April
configurations are managed separately and co-
ordinated through shared mechanisms such as
a unifying vision (e.g., O’Reilly & Tushman,
2008).
While this solution has its merits, the duality
view casts doubts on organizations’ ability to
separate elements of stability and change so
neatly. Individuals engaged in routine tasks ex-
ercise some degree of experimentation, and
those engaged in creative tasks use routines to
some degree. Similarly, innovative units include
considerable structure and controls, and units
concerned with reliability embrace some varia-
tion and redundancy. Furthermore, when some
cognitive, operational, and structural mecha-
nisms are commonly similar, it is possible to
create novel positive-sum solutions. For exam-
ple, to foster reliability and innovation simul-
taneously, organizations can use common
practices as a basis for knowledge transfer
and sharing, cross-training, and centraliza-
tion. Studies have shown that by using an
enabling bureaucracy and capitalizing on ad-
ministrative and technological innovations,
Toyota has shifted the envelope of efficiency
and flexibility combinations in ways that in-
crease both (Osono et al., 2008).
Models of transformation and renewal. Con-
sistent with dualism, the punctuated equilib-
rium model resolves the tension between stabil-
ity and change through temporal separation. In
this model, when environments change, organi-
zations switch configurations mainly through
radical and comprehensive revision of struc-
tures and capabilities (Gersick, 1991; Tushman
& Romanelli, 1985). However, modeling change
as largely replacing stability in discrete moves
risks losing the simultaneous quality of these
elements.
The duality perspective offers instead two dif-
ferent and mutually reinforcing models of re-
newal that are more continuous, endogenous,
and dialectic and that may be more suitable to
unpredictable and fast-changing environments.
In one approach, stressed in Q2, high-reliability
organizations suppress tendencies toward iner-
tia through learning, doubt, and alertness and a
built-in capacity to respond to changes as they
occur (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Drawing on a
different tradition (e.g., Nelson & Winter, 1982;
Schumpeter, 1942), a complementary approach
to combating inertia, noted in Q3, highlights
stable mechanisms such as simple rules (Eisen-
2010
hardt & Martin, 2000), dynamic capabilities
(Teece, 2007), and continuous product innovation
(Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995). Often interlaced in
practice, these alternatives to the punctuated
equilibrium model are consistent with models of
change as continuous (Brown & Eisenhardt,
1997; Pettigrew, 1985), endogenous (Feldman &
Pentland, 2003), dialectic (e.g., Van de Ven &
Poole, 1994), and layered (Cooper, Hinings,
Greenwood, & Brown, 1996), and they are much
more difficult to construct within most dualistic
frameworks (Orlikowski, 1992). Layering in par-
ticular enables organizations to use internal
and external continuities and commitments as
anchors for introducing more drastic changes.
By partly renegotiating some structural ele-
ments while leaving others intact, organiza-
tions can overcome the difficulties of wholesale
replacement.
Models of institutional change. This discus-
sion has important parallels in models of insti-
tutional change. Echoing ecological arguments
that change occurs through selection and re-
placement, early institutional models main-
tained that most change originates outside in-
stitutional channels and in punctuated leaps
(e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This stance
proved highly productive, but it also confined
institutional theory mainly to explaining stabil-
ity and persistence (e.g., Powell, 1991). Particu-
larly, it left unresolved the paradox of “embed-
ded agency”— how and which actors in and
conditioned by institutions can envision, and
then impose, alternative futures (e.g., Holm,
1995).
Duality offers several implications. First, it re-
sists the tendency implicit in institutional mod-
els of exogenous and punctuated change to
draw sharp distinctions between periods of sta-
sis and change (Thelen, 1999), and it lends itself
better to alternative, more endogenous, and di-
alectic models (Farjoun, 2002; Seo & Creed, 2002;
Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). In this other
tradition institutionalization can undermine
change but also enable and trigger it (e.g.,
Kraatz & Block, 2008; Leblebichi, Salancik, Co-
pay, & King, 1991). Second, rather than focusing
on only large exogenous shocks such as regula-
tory changes, duality draws attention to the
power of anomalies, contradictions, and “mini”
crises that accompany and can challenge insti-
tutionalization and continuity. Even as they ad-
here to prevailing institutions, embedded indi-
Farjoun 219
viduals are likely to use ordinary sensemaking
processes (Powell & Colyvas, 2008), to be well
aware of potential limitations and “failures,”
and even to experiment with alternative solu-
tions. If so, the real impediments for institu-
tional transformation may have less to do with
actors’ blindness to problems and solutions and
more to do with their motivation, power, and
capacity to act.
As this discussion shows, duality-informed so-
lutions provide new modeling opportunities to
dissolve and overcome the paradox of stability
and change. By stressing stability and change
as interrelated, mutually enabling, and overlap-
ping in space and time, such solutions enable
organizations to retain some of the benefits of
bureaucracy and anarchy without committing to
all their liabilities, and they foster renewal
while limiting the pains of comprehensive
change.
Exploring New Common and Middle Grounds
A final contribution of this paper lies less in
bringing stability and change together and
more in its potential to integrate their respective
theoretical disciplines and communities of prac-
tice. Along these lines, the paper fuses different,
less conventional, and sometimes disconnected
domains of inquiry and levels of analysis. It
establishes their common premises, contrasts
them with dualism, and shows how and when
they can coexist with it. This synthetic approach
to constructing theory and dualities in particu-
lar reflects the complex and nested nature of
stability and change and provides multiple in-
sights into how they interrelate.
My approach shares continuities with the in-
tellectual heritage of systems thinkers (e.g.,
Bateson, 1972), institutionalists (e.g., Selznick,
1957), and pragmatists (Dewey, 1922) who used a
duality lens. This tradition has shown duality’s
power to generate novel and more subtle mod-
els of structure and action (e.g., Giddens, 1984),
adaptation and selection (Levinthal, 1991), cog-
nition and experimentation (Gavetti &
Levinthal, 2000), technologies (Orlikowski, 1992),
routines (Feldman & Pentland, 2003), bureaucra-
cies (Adler & Borys, 1996), and institutions (e.g.,
North, 2005). While I do not rely on these prece-
dents in particular, their influence is clear. My
argument shares with them a questioning of
rigid dichotomies and either/or approaches,
220 Academy of Management Review
along with a deep interest in richer phenomeno-
logical accounts that transcend paradox; are
more continuous, fuzzy, and reciprocal; and ex-
plore both figure and ground.
Consistent with this tradition, I bring together
more closely two sets of literature that often
progress on different tracks: that concerned with
risk taking, innovation, and entrepreneurship
and that concerned with reliability, risk reduc-
tion, institutions, and stability. Particularly, I
uncover important and less explored parallels
in the mechanisms, contexts, and objectives un-
derlying reliability and innovation. This does
not mean that high-reliability organizations
should engage in innovation and that innova-
tive organizations should be mainly concerned
with reliability. The coupling of these alterna-
tive forms is useful for some purposes but may
be dangerous for others. However, as recent
studies (e.g., Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Dougherty &
Takacs, 2004) have begun to explore, the tradi-
tional division of labor should not obscure their
positive sum potential. After all, unlike settings
where the only concern is precise reproduction,
organizations in both situations deal with risk
and deviation from routine. Breakthroughs and
breakdowns are two sides of the same distribu-
tion, and protection and innovation are mirror
images of broader adaptive problems. This sym-
metry leads software security firms to hire ex-
hackers and explains why entrepreneurs can
compete successfully with former employers
and why criminals and cops sometimes trade
places.
The discovery of unexpected connections pro-
vides aesthetic benefits and can lead to new
implications (Weick, 1989). It can bring together
distinct disciplines that deal with the forefront
of organizational challenges in turbulent envi-
ronments yet often compete for the same pool of
resources and are confined by organizational
silos and specialized communities. These dis-
ciplines can commonly explore issues such as
how variations and surprises develop, inter-
act, and diffuse; how individuals notice and
respond to anomalies in contexts of reliability
and discovery; and what group, organization-
al, and interorganizational settings make
these responses more effective. A major step
toward further integration is recognizing that, at
the core, the novelty that firms face— often the
same discontinuity—presents both threats (e.g.,
Sheffi, 2005; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001) and oppor-
April
tunities (Denrell, Fang, & Winter, 2003; Knight,
1921).
My analysis opens numerous opportunities for
research. First, even though this paper goes be-
yond examples like Toyota to look at such sys-
tems as high-reliability organizations, movie
studios, and design firms, future research may
need to explore other carefully chosen empirical
sites, such as drug and software development
and news organizations, where pressures for in-
novation and reliability are equally strong. To
explore how organizations combine stability
and change, future studies should compare ef-
fective and ineffective configurations within
and across different quadrants in the classifica-
tion, and should use fine-grained field studies
that uncover the inner operations of modern pro-
duction lines and research labs.
Second, we need more longitudinal and his-
torically grounded studies. Complementing the
focus on specific breakthroughs and large
breakdowns, such studies can better explore the
contributions of the many surprises, setbacks,
and minor discontinuities that precede them;
can better uncover the combined role of failures,
successes, and their varieties in fostering stabil-
ity and change; and can reveal the implicit and
explicit ways in which organizations shift from
one stability-change relationship to another.
Longitudinal research can also help develop
more refined models of renewal and discern the
conditions in which relying on stable mecha-
nisms is beneficial or detrimental to transforma-
tions.
Finally, future research should be better at-
tuned to time horizons, multiple dimensions,
and implementation and should uncover other
potentially important contingencies. It should
avoid rigid preconceived dichotomies, allow for
both positive and negative interactions between
exploitation and exploration, and consider both
figure and ground.
Conclusion
In its various formulations the dual search for
stability and change is fundamental to organi-
zations, individuals, systems, and institutions. It
provides a common platform for addressing di-
verse issues such as habit and creativity, struc-
ture and agency, and order and freedom, and it
propels major theories, debates, and pragmatic
solutions. The literature on organizations and
2010
the literature on daily discourse usually view
stability and change as separate, antithetical,
and paradoxical. This is understandable: dis-
tinctions bring order and underlie organization,
dichotomies facilitate learning, and simple con-
trasts are powerful and essential to scientific
progress. The risk is that antinomies become
entrenched and either/or approaches become fa-
vored over complexity (Abbott, 2001). Whether
we lack the language (e.g., Thompson, 1967) or
whether our imagination is impoverished (Adler
& Borys, 1996)— or both—the results are the
same: theories are often inadequate to capture
organizational reality. Rethinking the relation-
ship between stability and change is therefore
important not only because of dualism’s grip on
the way we study organizations and guide their
practice but because, like other dualisms, it may
blind us to the possibilities (e.g., Cohen, 2007a).
This paper does some of this rethinking and
presents some of these possibilities. It estab-
lishes that stability and change are not para-
doxical; they need not be mutually exclusive or
interfering but can enable each other. It also
shows the potential fruits of this reconceptual-
ization: revisiting several enduring ideas about
stability and change and exploitation and ex-
ploration, providing opportunities to transcend
the paradox of administration and the models it
inspires, and exploring new common and mid-
dle grounds.
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Moshe Farjoun (mfarjoun@schulich.yorku.ca) is an associate professor of strategic

management at the Schulich School of Business, York University, Toronto. He received
his Ph.D. from Northwestern University. His research interests include adaptation and
change of organizations, institutions and complex systems, cognition and problem
solving, and strategy making and evolution in dynamic contexts.
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