Operationalizing Incrementalism: Measuring the Muddles

Author(s): John J. Bailey and Robert J. O'Connor

Source: Public Administration Review , Jan. - Feb., 1975, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb.,
1975), pp. 60-66
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public Administration

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60

Operationalizing Incrementalism:
Measuring the Muddles

John J. Bailey and Robert J. O'Connor, Georgetown University

T he concept of incrementalism as developed * Incrementalism has been employed as a general

in the literature on policy making and budgeting
overpromises and underdelivers in terms of de-
scriptive precision and explanatory usefulness. We
direct our critique to the problems, apparently
unarticulated although surely sensed by analysts,
in defining operationally the meaning of in-
crementalism in describing patterns of budgeting.
More specifically, we shall demonstrate that in-
crementalism is used to characterize not only a
method of decision making but also a quite broad
range of budgetary outputs, and that this looseness
in usage has blinded students to significant aspects
of allocative decision making.
The confusion surrounding the use of in-
crementalism in budgetary studies may be related
to the adaptation of the concept from the more
general interpretations of decision making. The
utility of adopting incrementalism seems obvious:
budgeting, after all, clearly fits the conditions of
complexity, limited information, multiple actors,
and imperfect agreement on ends. However, in
effecting the transition of incrementalism from the
general to budgeting, ambiguities inherent in the
concept were incorporated as well.
Dahl and Lindblom
For present purposes, we may begin with the
seminal contribution on policy making by Robert
Dahl and Charles Lindblom. In Politics, Economics
and Welfare, we find the idea of gradations
alism is one of several methods of policy making,
between rational decision making, incrementalism,
and calculated risks.
... Incrementalism is a method of social action that takes
existing reality as one alternative and compares the
probable gains and losses of closely related alternatives by consequences of his actions. The stress here is on
concept to describe policy making, but several dif-
ficulties have arisen in its application to budgeting.
Specifically, analysts have not distinguished between
bargaining processes and incremental results or out-
puts (i.e., small changes from a given base). Rather, it
is assumed that bargaining processes necessarily pro-
duce incremental outputs. This assumption in turn has
created a second difficulty: the lack of specific criteria
to distinguish incremental from nonincremental out-
puts. The work of several authors is examined to
illustrate the logical and analytical problems en-
countered when the distinction between process and
output is not observed. Generally, scholars have
slighted data in their own work indicating evidence of
nonincremental outputs. Illustrative budgetary data
are provided to demonstrate the incidence of ap-
parently nonincremental budgetary outputs and the
obvious need to refine further the concept for
empirical research.
making relatively small adjustments in existing reality, or
making larger adjustments about whose consequences
approximately as much is known as about the con-
sequences of existing reality, or both. Where small
increments will clearly not achieve desired goals, the
consequences of large increments are not fully known,
and existing reality is clearly undesirable, incrementalism
may have to give way to calculated risk. Thus, scientific
methods, incrementalism and calculated risks are on a
continuum of policy methods.'
From this it is apparent that: (1) increment-
(2) the incremental method may produce both
small and large increments, and (3) the distinction
between large increments and calculated risks is to
be found in the decision maker's knowledge of the

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OPERATIONALIZING INCREMENTALISM 61

We shall survey the contributions of several

methods of problem solving. In subsequent discus-
sions of incrementalism, however, the notion of in the field of budgeting to show that a
scholars
calculated risks on this continuum is de- linkage has been built into theory that does not
emphasized, and attention is focused on the quite fit or do justice to empirical data. Specifical-
distinctions between incrementalism and rational ly, the use of incrementalism as a descriptive
comprehensive analysis. It should be noted as wellconcept leads to an assumption that bargaining
that calculated risks does not appear as a signifi- processes tend to produce outputs which are small
cant concept in analyses of budgetary decisionchanges from existing base. Evidence adduced to
making. show that participants negotiate from a given base
A subsequent general statement on policy is assumed to be evidence of "incrementalism,"
making by Lindblom extends this reasoning. even when the "increments" subject to bargaining
Policy makers do not attempt comprehensive are quite large. Therefore, operational definitions
of non-incrementalism are avoided or tend to shift
analysis. Rather, analysis is simplfied by examining
"... only those relatively few alternatives that from one analysis to another and even within the
represent small or incremental changes from exist- same work by a single author. This, we suggest is
ing policies."2 However, the mechanisms of seriali- because attention focuses on potentially separate
ty, remediality, and feedback allow the decision but theoretically linked aspects of incrementalism.
maker continually to readjust policies at the
margin through a series of approximations. In- Wildavsky
crementalism as used in this context focuses on
the individual's strategy for coping with com- Aaron Wildavsky explicitly interrelates process
plexity and the costs of anlaysis. and outputs in budgeting. In his Politics of the
To be distinguished from incrementalism inBudgetary Process he sees the process to be clearly
incremental. Officials need to simplify, satisfice,
Lindblom's usage is partisan mutual adjustment,
and rely on feedback to cope with the budget. As
which describes bargaining, negotiations, and per-
suasion, through which individuals interact to an additional aid to calculation, incrementalism is
stressed.
produce policy.3 The idea basically is that indi-
viduals, reasoning incrementally, enter into bar-
Budgeting is incremental, not comprehensive. The begin-
gaining over policy, or the process of partisan
ning of wisdom about an agency budget is that it is almost
mutual adjustment.4 It should be noted thatnever
a actively reviewed as a whole every year in the sense
clear normative theme underlying these concepts of
is reconsidering the value of all existing programs as
compared to all possible alternatives. Instead, it is based
Lindblom's interest in demonstrating the super-
on last year's budget with special attention given to a
iority of incrementalism and partisan mutual narrow range of increases or decreases. Thus, the men
adjustment over rational comprehensive decisionwho make the budget are concerned with relatively small
making. increments to an existing base. Their attention is focused
Lindblom finds a ready application for incre- on a small number of items over which the budgetary
battle is fought.6
mentalism and partisan mutual adjustment in U.S.
federal budgeting. Here, perhaps, is the origin of Here Wildavsky argues that not only a limited
the confusion inherent in the concept: "The number of alternatives are considered, but that
incremental method is characterized by its practi- they involve relatively small adjustments from an
tioner's preoccupation with: (1) only that limited existing base. This, we would suggest, is not a
set of policy alternatives that are politically necessary link: A limited set of alternatives could
relevant, these typically being policies only in- be considered with some quite large increases and
crementally different from existing policies ...." decreases from the given base among that limited
Incremental, then, is used at the outset to denote set. A limitation in the number of alternatives
both the method of decision making and the considered need not imply a restriction on their
policies which are the outputs of such a method. size.
Lindblom's usage of incremental to mean both Wildavsky analyzes the strategies and percep-
"small or incremental changes from existing poli- tions of the participants and does show interac-
cies" and "a limited set of policy alternatives" tions quite similar to Lindblom's notion of mutual
leads us to examine the assumed linkages between adjustment. To illustrate his argument, Wildavsky
(1) individual decision making, (2) partisan mutual draws on data from Richard Fenno which depict
adjustment, and (3) particular budgetary outputs. the annual percentage modifications in the obliga-

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62 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

tional authority granted by the House Appropria-

weaken an agency. There can be little doubt, then,
tions Committee. The data indicate that a third of
the 444 cases show modifications of 5 per cent or
less. Slightly more than half of the cases vary in
the range of 10 per cent. This means that slightly
less than half fluctuate over 10 per cent per year, a
level which might be considered evidence of
non-incrementalism. But apparently to include
more cases, Wildavsky states that three-quarters of
the cases vary within 30 per cent or less. Yet we
would question the inclusion of a 30 per cent
variation as incremental (i.e., marginal) adjust-
ments. It appears to us that such a rate cannot be
that the adjustments are fairly small in the
bargaining stage (except for the 23 per cent of the
cases which were cut or raised more than 10 per
cent). Nevertheless, we would restate our point on
the relationship assumed between process and
output. In principle, it is possible for an agency to
request a staggering increase, 50 per cent for
example, but cut by 10 per cent, and emerge with
a still quite large increase of 40 per cent. The
example conforms to Fenno's criteria of "in-
cremental bargaining," but can the output usefully
be termed incremental?

considered incremental without doing severe dam- In examining the annual rates of growth of the
age to the utility of the concept. At a 30 per cent agencies, Fenno finds that 53 per cent of the
rate of annual increase, for example, an agency agencies fall within a 0-10 per cent range. Obvious-
would more than double its base in three years. ly, using this range to define incremental growth
Wildavsky identified the existence of simplified would mean that 47 per cent of the cases would be
calculations and bargaining in the budgetary non-incremental. However, and this illustrates the
process and therefore expected incremental out- problem of shifting criteria, Fenno then proposes
puts (i.e., marginal adjustments). This in turn led to raise the cut-off to 20 per cent, thereby
him to use highly permissive criteria for 0 to 30 including almost three-quarters of the agencies as
per cent change as defining incremental outputs. having grown at incremental rates.8 This flexibility
This broad usage demonstrates the importance of on Fenno's part occurs despite his earlier state-
recognizing that non-incremental outputs can ment that even a 5 per cent shift is meaningful for
emerge from bargaining processes, and that the an agency. If such is the case, then on what
criteria for incremental versus non-incremental grounds can one double the range which is
adjustments should be clearly stated. considered to be incremental? This, of course,
relates to our basic criticism that the criteria are
Fenno left inexplicit because again the analyst is assuming
that the bargaining processes which occur when
Richard Fenno, in his influential work on the the Appropriations Committee cuts agency esti-
House Appropriations Committee, pursues a similarmates, will necessarily produce "incremental" out-
logic. Fenno uses two measures of change in the puts (i.e., small adjustments).
federal budget: (1) the relationships between Fenno then considers the growth rates of the
agency requests and congressional appropriations, agencies over a 16-year period and finds that 12 of
and (2) the change in appropriations granted a the 36 agencies grew at more than a 10 per cent
given agency from one year to the next.7 He rate. We would infer, therefore, that one-third of
obtains different results according to the measure the agencies are growing at higher than a clearly
used. It would seem to us that a case can be made incremental rate. It should also be noted that
for considering the within-year relationship be- Fenno's research design excludes from considera-
tween agency requests and appropriations as the tion agencies which had not been in existence over
bargaining process that produces the budgetarythe entire 16 years. Thus innovations in govern-
output, but the bargaining process should be mental programs (another series of ostensibly
distinguished from the output itself. We wouldnon-incremental phenomena), such as NASA, are
define the annual percentage change in appropria-effectively excluded.9
tion as the output. From this perspective, we find Fenno concludes that the House Appropria-
that as part of the bargaining process, the House tions Committee's "... decisions are mainly in-
Appropriations Committee cuts the agencies' re- cremental-whether measured by the relation of
quests 74 per cent of the time. Slightly over budget estimates to appropriations or by the
three-quarters of the reductions are within a 10 relation of appropriations to last year's appropria-
per cent range. This range, Fenno argues, is highlytions."1 0 Clearly, there is a bargaining pattern in
significant, because cuts of even 5 per cent canthe process by which the output is reached, but it

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OPERATIONALIZING INCREMENTALISM 63

Sharkansky seems to be aware of the non-

does not follow that we can explain the outputs
without some recognition of a significant inci-
incremental outputs, but he analyzes the data in
dence of non-incremental adjustments. Again,relation
the to his interest in why some agencies ask
bargaining process has been confused with patterns
for and receive more than other agencies. While he
does react to the evidence of non-incremental
of budgetary outputs, and the analytical criteria
outputs, he apparently sees no reason to re-
for distinguishing between incremental and non-
examine incrementalism as a concept. The data, he
incremental remain vague, shifting, and flexible.
argues, substantiate previous studies. "The reluc-
Sharkansky tance of the governor and the legislature to
support an acquisitive agency in the short term
Ira Sharkansky follows Aaron Wildavsky's argu- reveals the conservative bias that is built into
ment quite closely with respect to state budgetary incremental budgeting." 14 "In the short term"
processes. In an analysis of the requests of 592 here refers to the legislature's appropriation as a
state agencies in 19 states, he concentrates pri- percentage of the agency's request. As such it is
marily on the correlates of agency budgetary best seen as part of the bargaining process. If the
success. Among the questions he raises is whether agency came in quite high and was cut severely by
actors in the budgetary process respond to the the legislature, this would be termed a short-run
sheer size of budgetary requests or to the size of lack of success in this logic. But the agency,
the percentage change from the base. He finds through a high bid, might still be left with a
that:
substantial increase over the previous year.
It is a combination of incrementalism and legislative Sharkansky finds that agencies that request little
dependence that shapes the budgets of major agencies. or no increase are not cut, but:
Both the governor and the legislature respond to the
agencies' request for increments above the present expen- Those seeking large increases suffer tht greatest reduc-
ditures, and their response serves to minimize budget tions. Yet an acquisitive strategy appears to be a
growth. 1 prerequisite of substantial budget increase. It is a rare
Note that this defintion does not refer to the occurrence for the governor or legislature to provide an
agency with a sum larger than it had requested. In part,
size of the increments. The budgets of agencies
this is a function of incremental budgeting.1 5
that requested a 53 per cent increase, and emerged
from the legislature with a 39 per cent increase Here the analyst sees non-incremental outputs
(the case of Goergia), would-by this defini-
but persists in casting them in incremental terms.
tion-be incremental. In this usage, even a mas- Since there is evidence of mutual adjustment (the
sively increased agency bid, if it is then cut by ahigh initial request and subsequent cuts) the
given percentage, is incremental. Further, Sharkan-tendency is to expect incremental results. But a
sky considers the agencies aggregated by state.high initial bid and a mutual adjustment process
Thus, we do not see the even greater variationscan produce non-incremental results.
which presumably will occur within states, within
and among the agencies, across fiscal years.1 2 Dye
Reviewing Sharkansky's findings, in the 19
states, the agencies' requests range from 15 per Unfortunately, it appears that incrementalism
cent to 53 per cent over their current operating has expanded to the point where it is an open-
expenditures; the governors' cuts vary from 4 perended concept, explaining everything with little
cent to 31 per cent. Sharkansky does not discuss rigor. Thomas Dye, in Understanding Public
the range of the final appropriations, but from his Policy, makes incrementalism serve a new purpose.
data we note a range of 1 per cent to 39 per cent"The incremental nature of the federal govern-
over current expenditures. This is substantial ment's budget is revealed in figures showing the
variation, expecially since the units of analysis are percentage of federal expenditures going to various
the states' agencies aggregated and averaged. programs over the years."16 He concludes that
Within-state variation would undoubtedly be little change has occurred because the relative
greater. In short, there is ample evidence for rankings of federal outlays by function have
non-incremental outputs: over half the states remained stable. Thus Dye sees incremental change
average 11 per cent increases or greater for their as that which does not disturb the distribution of
agencies.13 funds by existing functional categories. Since two

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64 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

or three functions account for the major portion If the data are then regrouped in categories of
of the budget, it is highly unlikely that significant
incremental outputs, as in Table II, the problem
shifts in the relative ranking will take place. The
becomes clearer. We shall define adjustments in
effective result of this definition is to exclude the range of 0-10 per cent as incremental; modifi-
non-incremental change. Further, this interpreta-cations in the range of 11-30 per cent, we shall
tion adds an additional burden to a concept define as intermediate; and variations over 30 per
already badly stretched to describe and explaincent, we shall consider to be non-incremental.
several different phenomena. Since we have already established the point that
We shall provide data to demonstrate the approximately half of the Wildavsky-Fenno cases
plausibility of our working hypothesis that a fall outside our conception of incremental, we
mutual adjustment process may produce a broad may proceed to examine the other cases.
range of budgetary outputs. The evidence per- In regard to actual U.S. federal expenditures,
suades us that the concept incrementalism needs the data suggest that a major portion of the
rethinking and that a more careful usage is inoutputs is incremental. We would call attention,
order. Our intent in analyzing data on budgetaryhowever, to the rather substantial percentage of
outputs is simply to illustrate our argument. Data
outputs, about one-third, which fall in the gray
on expenditures by the U.S. federal government, area of intermediate, and we would emphasize that
Virginia, and Colombia are grouped in Table I in the percentage of cases in our non-incremental
the percentage categories suggested by Wildav-
category is not insignificant.
sky.17 The figures used by Wildavsky refer to According to the data provided by Ira Sharkan-
initial congressional appropriations, while data onsky,' 8 Virginia conforms rather well to an "incre-
the other cases are in terms of departments,mental" process of budgeting. In analyzing the
agencies, and ministries. outputs, however, we find that the major portion

TABLE I
VARIATIONS IN INCREMENTAL OUTPUTS: SOME COMPARISONS

Annual Per Cent Modifications:

0-5% 6-10% 11-20% 21-30% 3140% 41-50% 51-100% 101+%

*Congressional Appropriations
Wildavsky-Fenno 33.6 18.9 20.9 11.5 4.7 3.4 5.4 1.6
(N = 444)
**U.S. Federal Expenditures,
1961-1971 28.3 20.8 24.1 8.0 2.8 3.8 8.0 5.2

(N = 212)
***Colombia Central Government
Expenditures, 1961-1971 13.3 9.4 19.2 15.3 12.9 7.5 14.9 7.5
(N = 255)
****Virginia State Expenditures,
1967-1970 18.8 15.9 39.1 13.0 2.9 2.9 5.8 1.5

(N = 69)

*Percentages are calculated from Table 2-1, p. 14, The Polit

changes in appropriations for 37 domestic bureaus over a 1
**Percentages are calculated from Statistical Abstract of
(Table 613). They represent annual percentage changes in
and judiciary.
** *Percentages are calculated from Informe financiero of the Contraloria General de la Republica for the years 1961-1971.
They represent annual percentage changes in expenditures by organization unit, including legislative branch, judiciary, and
debt service.

****Comptroller's Report, State of Virginia, for the years 1967-1970.

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OPERATIONALIZING INCREMENTALISM 65

TABLE II incremental outputs corresponds roughly with the

DISTRIBUTION OF CASES AMONG U.S. findings, there is a comparatively larger
CATEGORIES OF INCREMENTAL OUTPUTS grouping of non-incremental adjustments. These
findings illustrate the broad range of budgetary
Incre- Inter- Non- outputs that do occur empirically, despite the
mental mediate incremental ubiquity of bargaining processes.1 9 Our procedure
(0-10%) (11-30%) (31% +) underscores an additional point. As the U.S. moves
closer to a Latin-style "double digit" level of
Wildavsky-
Fenno
inflation, analysis focusing on budgetary outputs
52.5% 34.2% 15.2%
must consider more explicitly and systematically
U.S. Federal the effects of inflation on spending.
Expendi- To summarize, where public budgeting involves
tures 49.1% 32.1% 19.8% (1) a series of actors separated institutionally, as in
an executive and legislature, or within an executive
Virginia 34.7% 52.1% 13.1%
branch; and (2) a sequence of decisions, in which
Colombia 22.7% 34.5% 42.8% the cues from one actor serve as the baseline for

Colombia another's decision, the process is incremental (that

(adjusted
for infla-
43.9% 25.9% 30.2%
tion)
of cases falls in the intermediate area of 11-30 per
cent adjustments, while the minority would be
considered incremental. A slightly smaller percen-
tage of cases than at the federal level might be
termed non-incremental.
One might object to the inclusion of Colombia
in this analysis because it is "not comparable."
The response should be obvious: If incrementalism
is to be a useful descriptive concept, it should be
applicable in comparative research. Comparative
analysis, as the students of U.S. state politics have
amply demonstrated, is a fruitful method in
formulating and testing generalizations.
In the Colombian case, the great bulk of
adjustments falls in the intermediate and non-
incremental categories. This case illustrates our
argument most clearly. Despite the fact that about
77 per cent of the cases exceed our criterion of
incremental (indeed, 43 per cent of the fluctu-
ations are greater than 30 per cent), there is
absolutely no basis, given the lack of specific
criteria in the budgeting literature and the con-
fusion of outputs with the existence of bargaining
processes, for distinguishing between the patterns
found in Colombia and Virginia. Moreover, this is
not entirely a consequence of the high inflation
rates characteristic of Latin America. As shown in
Table II, when an adjustment is made for inflation,
the Colombian results more nearly resemble those
of the United States and Virginia, but with an
interesting difference. While the proportion of
is, as used in the budgeting literature). When
incremental is thus defined as bargaining, we are
aware of no empirical case of a budgetary process
which is non-incremental. Further, the working
assumption has been that the products of bargain-
ing are incremental outputs. If this is accepted as
true by definition, then incrementalism as a
descriptive concept is simply not useful. Indeed,
the interesting question concerns the range of
outputs from bargaining processes and the linkages
between non-incremental outputs and the pro-
cesses which generate them.
We are suggesting, then, a reorientation of the
research strategy to measure gradations of budget-
ary outputs, and to define what levels of adjust-
ments may be considered non-incremental. If this
tack is taken, the linkage between levels of outputs
and their origins in the bargaining process might be
explored. In turn, this line of questioning might
indicate subpatterns and subprocesses which have
been overlooked under the general rubric of
"incremental budgeting."
At a minimum, we suggest that the distinctions
between processes and outputs be more clearly
drawn in analyzing budgeting. It may prove useful
to limit incrementalism as a concept to describe
only the individual's intellectual response to com-
plexity, or to characterize the bargaining process,
and to develop or adapt new concepts to distin-
guish patterns of budgetary outputs. But the
overall range of budgetary outputs should be
carefully studied to fashion a useful typology of
outputs so that the interesting theoretical linkages
between patterns of spending and the processes
associated with them might be explored more
systematically.

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66 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

Notes

1. Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, Politics, Eco-
nomics and Welfare (New York: Harper and Row,
1953), p. 82.
2. Charles E. Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy
(New York: MacMillan, 1965), p. 144.
3. Ibid., ch. 6, 9.
4. Tangentially, the questions might be raised: Are
incrementalism and partisan mutual adjustment
necessarily linked? Does the existence of bargaining
necessarily imply that all actors have made their
calculations incrementally, rather than through
systematic analysis? The recent history of PPB
would suggest that bargaining and analysis may
occur simultaneously.
5. Charles E. Lindblom, "Decision-Making in Taxation
and Expenditures" (1961), reprinted in Robert T.
Golembiewski (ed.), Public Budgeting and Finance:
Readings in Theory and Practice (Itasca, Ill.: F.E.
Peacock Publishers, 1968), p. 296.
6. Aaron Wildavsky, Politics of the Budgetary Process
(Boston: Little Brown, 1964), p. 15.
7. Richard Fenno, The Power of the Purse (Boston:
Little Brown, 1966), p. 352.
8. Ibid., p. 354.
9. Ibid., p. xxiv.
10. Ibid., p. 410.
11. Ira Sharkansky, "Agency Requests, Gubernatorial
Support, and Budget Success in State Legislatures,"
American Political Science Review, Vol. 62 (Decem-
ber 1968), p. 1222.
12. For a study which examines within-agency variations
in spending, see Peter B. Natchez and Irvin C. Bupp,
"Policy and Priority in the Budgetary Process,"
American Political Science Review, Vol. 67, No. 3
(September 1973), pp. 951-963.
13. Sharkansky, op. cit., Table I, p. 1223. Rufus
Browning, for example, analyzes two different state
agencies, one of which has grown at the rate of 11
per cent and the other at a rate of 40 per cent, and
discusses the correlates of these differential rates of
growth, in "Innovative and Non-Innovative Decision
Processes in Government Budgeting," reprinted in
Ira Sharkansky (ed.), Policy Analysis in Political
Science (Chicago: Markham, 1970), pp. 304-334.
14. Sharkansky, op. cit., p. 1231.
15. Ibid.
16. Thomas Dye, Understanding Public Policy (Engle-
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 215.
17. Wildavsky, Politics of the Budgetary Process, Table
2-1, p. 14.
18. Sharkansky, "Agency Requests," Table I, p. 1223.
19. It would take us rather far afield to describe the
nature of the bargaining process in the Colombian
case. See James L. Payne, Patterns of Conflict in
Colombia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968),
ch. 12, and John J. Bailey, "Public Budgeting in
Colombia: Disjoined Incrementalism in a Dependent
Polity," LADAC Occasional Papers, Series 2, No. 10
(Austin: Institute of Latin American Studies, Univer-
sity of Texas, 1974), pp. 9-13.

CONTRIBUTORS IN THIS ISSUE

DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM is an assistant professor of
(Continued from p. ii)
political scinece at the University of Vermont. He is the
Southern California and is currently serving as a Senior
author of Federal Service and the Constitution and other
Fullbright Scholar at the University of Madrid. Hestudies
is thedealing with public personnel administration and
co-author of Modern Public Administration and has the constitutional position of public employees.
recently completed a book on public personnel adminis-
tration. FRANCIS E. ROURKE is professor of political science at
Johns Hopkins University. He is the author of Secrecy
ROBERT J. O'CONNOR is assistant professor of govern-
andhis
ment at Georgetown University. He is completing Publicity: Dilemmas of Democracy, Bureaucracy,
Ph.D. in political science at Stanford University. Politics, and Public Policy, and other books on policy and
administration.
THEODORE POISTER is assistant professor of public
administration at the Institute of Public Administration, ROBERT SALOSCHIN is chairman of the Justice Depart-
The Pennsylvania State University. He holds an M.P.A.ment's Freedom of Information Committee and has been
and Ph.D. in Social Science from Syracuse University and an attorney in the Department's Office of Legal Counsel
has research and consulting experience in urban transpor-since 1958. He has also served in other federal agencies
tation planning. and in private practice, and as a leader in various civic
organizations.
HAROLD C RELYEA is an analyst with the Congres-
sional Research Service, Library of Congress. He is a DONALD C STONE, present at the birth of ASPA and
member of the ASPA Committee on Public Policy the Society's president in 1950-51, is dean emeritus of the
Affecting Public Administration. The views expressed Graduate
in School of Public and International Affairs,
his article are solely the author's. University of Pittsburgh.

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1975

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