LESSONS LEARNED FROM INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

ID: AS/021/2019 Allision with Anchored vessel in Zhoushan Inner Anchorage

Incident Description One of our capsize bulk carriers had an allision with another anchored vessel, while
(What happened): drifting at Zhoushan anchorage.
The berthing pilot was booked for 0415 LT. Vessel arrived pilot boarding grounds at
0158 LT, earlier than the pilot boarding time so it was decided to drift off the pilot
boarding ground in the Xiazhimen southern anchorage (Zhoushan Inner anchorage).
Master handed over the con to the OOW (2/O) with the Duty A/B on the helm and left
the Bridge, with the instruction to call him at 0330LT or if the distance comes down to
5 to 6 cables from anchored vessel.

Radar screenshot at 0158LT

The OOW used the M/E & helm as required to maintain a distance of >0.6 nm from
the anchored vessel whilst stemming the current which was flowing in a SE’ly
direction.
While drifting, as the vessel was found to be getting closer to pilot boarding ground,
the OOW tried to turn the vessel away from pilot boarding ground. However once
current was broad on, she started drifting rapidly towards anchored vessel, which was
at 0.6 cable distance. OOW called Master at around 0325LT and in spite of evasive
maneuvers, at 0333 LT vessel made contact with anchored vessel.

QHSE-5 (Rev 0) 26-Feb-2019 Page 1 of 4

 LESSONS LEARNED FROM INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

Radar screenshot at 0325LT

Radar screenshot at 0332LT

QHSE-5 (Rev 0) 26-Feb-2019 Page 2 of 4

 LESSONS LEARNED FROM INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

The vessel due to the contact sustained damage to its Aft peak tank, steering gear
side shell , Stbd side life boat davit, Stbd life raft deployment area , Stbd gangway
supports and few steps were damaged. As per under water inspection report, one of
the propeller blade was damaged and the remaining three blades had minor
deformations.

Photos:

Potential Outcome The damaged suffered could have been more severe and could have resulted in
(What else could flooding of one or more compartments and/or possible oil pollution.
have gone wrong):
Immediate Causes: 1. Incorrect Navigation or Ship handling: The Bridge team did not appreciate the
effect of currents in the region. Due to the strong currents, the small engine
movements were ineffective to steer clear of the anchored vessel. As the hull
came abeam to the current, the steerage was ineffective and the vessel lost
the momentum due to which the vessel started drifting sideways on to the
anchored vessel. Even after the bridge team realised that the desired course
was not being achieved and the vessel was drifting on to the other vessel, no
bold action was undertaken to prevent a close quarter situation from
developing and the engines were put on Full Ahead / Navigational Full Ahead
very late for the vessel to gather momentum and clear the anchored vessel.

QHSE-5 (Rev 0) 26-Feb-2019 Page 3 of 4

 LESSONS LEARNED FROM INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

Root / Basic Causes: 1. Poor risk awareness or perception of risk: The vessel arrived at the inner
anchorage near the Pilot Boarding grounds, over two hours prior to the pilot
boarding time and the Master considered it safe for the vessel to drift in the
anchorage rather than anchor, which was contrary to the advice given by the
agent who had recommended to shift to Xiazhimen anchorage while awaiting
pilot. drift of the vessel changed.
The Pilot boarding ground lies 1.5 NM west of the anchorage and Master
considered it safe to hand over the con to second officer and going to his
cabin to take rest leaving instructions with second officer to maintain the
vessel on the current position by giving small movements.
2. Inadequate experience: The anchorage is exposed to strong currents. As per
the Admiralty sailing directions ‘Tidal streams up to 4.5 knots may be
experienced’ at the Xiazhimen anchorage (Zhoushan Inner anchorage). As
per Admiralty Tide Tables the currents were setting 136 degrees at a rate of
2.5 Knots at the time of the incident. The second officer did not have sufficient
experience to carry out proper ship handling under these circumstances.
Corrective/Preventive Action
Measures: 1. Briefing of the bridge team with regards to the incident and bridge
procedures was carried out.
2. Bridge Team Members to undergo Simulator based training on BRM &
Large vessel handling especially in strong current conditions.
3. Fleet and Training centers to be informed about the accident and lessons
learnt.
Key Message: Vessel should preferably go to anchor when awaiting pilot boarding and avoid drifting
especially in areas where the currents are strong. The con should not be handed over
to an inexperienced OOW when in areas subject to strong currents and/or heavy
traffic.
Lessons Learned: 1. When maneuvering in areas of high current, bold engine movements are
necessary to effect desired maneuvering.
2. When intending to turn across current, it is necessary to stem the current and
develop headway prior executing a tight turn.
3. Vessel should not drift in areas of strong currents, if anchoring is possible.
4. Con must not be handed over to an inexperienced OOW.
Team engagement /  What are the likely consequences of this incident?
discussion topics  Have you experienced similar incident? What were the causes?
 How can similar incidents be prevented?
 Which behaviors should we pay attention to so that similar incidents can be
avoided?

QHSE-5 (Rev 0) 26-Feb-2019 Page 4 of 4