To Be A Leader in Maritime Education and Training

Part A
1. www.nautinst.org on mariners’ alerting and reporting scheme (MARS)
201127 allision with wharf during unberthing
201134 miscommunication causes near grounding; is the pilot acts as an adviser to
the master?
201146 master-pilot cooperation
201150 collision during approach to anchorage
201169 unplanned deviation led to grounding
201172 anchor cable ran out due to misleading instruction
201173 grounded when trying to avoid fishing vessel

201001 grounded on spoil ground. What is a spoil ground?

What is the difference between a dumping and spoil ground?
201011 near collision in deep water route. What is a deep water route?

www.maib.gov.uk Safety Digest 01/15

Case 5 Gone With the Wind

www.maib.gov.uk Safety Digest 02/2015

Case 1 Rule 13
Case 3 Blind pilotage
Case 4 Changing the plan alters the risk
Case 9 No pitch = no steering

www.maib.gov.uk Safety Digest 01/14

Case 1 Who is in control?
Case 4 BTM
Case 10 Bridge team communications – or lack of

www.maib.gov.uk Safety Digest 02/14

Case 1 Ship that went bump in the night
Case 2 Lookout! Teamwork is vital
Case 4 ‘Weather’ or Not to Fit Storm Shutters - Don’t Let it Dampen Your Day
Case 7 Mustn’t forget
Case 9 Manoeuvring on (or over) the limit

www.maib.gov.uk Safety Digest 01/13 Case 2 on master’s responsibilities!

Case 3 BTM
Case 8 Bollard pull
Case 10 Just because he is the master ……..

www.maib.gov.uk Safety Digest 02/13

Case 4 Ready or not – I’m crossing
Case 6 Port helm, starboard turn
Case 10 Know your limits

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www.maib.gov.uk Safety Digest 01/12 Case7 They Didn’t Bank on That Happening
Safety Digest 02/2012 Case 2 Fatal Towing Accident - Are You Properly Prepared?

www.maib.gov.uk Safety Digest 01/11

Case 1 Close encounters of the “Aframax” kind
Case 2 Different interpretations
Case 5 STS run-in, no margin for error
Case 7 ECDIS-assisted grounding
Case 10 Early release led to early demolition

www.maib.gov.uk Safety Digest 02/11

Case 11 are they in or are they out
Case 13 assumptions and interaction strike again
Case 14 a lack of planning gets the master carried away
Case 15 mind the gap

Read on the lessons learnt

2. Does an offshore support vessel (OSV) require a passage plan to shift berth?
MAIB 02/2009 Case 1 No room for mistakes

MAIB August 15/2011Platform supply vessel (PSV) Skandi Foula contact with OMS
Resolution in Aberdeen

(– on shifting berth)
OSV Far Swan collision with barge in Western Australia

√ Noumea in New Caledonia to Pohang,Korea

Distance 4 225nm in 11 days
Neither the 3rd. Officer nor the master realized that from 1800 hours fix, the track will
pass over Tench Island in the South Pacific. Planning of the passage was done on
ECS and paper charts. Master was due to signed-off in Korea.
Beluga Revolution grounded at 2210 hours in a westward setting south equatorial
Current and tropical showers, which blurred the radar image.

Departed on 26 April at 1800 hours

On 30 April 2010 from 2100 – 2200 hours, Master took over the watch from OOW
2200 hours, plotted the vessel’s GPS position on the navigational chart!
At the time of grounding gyro was 330° and the track was 322°

√ Sichem Osprey 10 Feb 2010

At 3.55 am, the first officer arrived on the bridge to take the watch over from the
2nd.officer and went to the starboard radar display as usual.
At 3.56 am (10.56 am at the UTC radar display clock), he saw a plotted radar echo at
11.05 miles (target TT1013). The 2nd officer told him it was presumably a cloud.
Then the 1st Officer sat on a stool in the starboard fore corner of the bridge to smoke
a cigarette and to drink a first coffee. Radar and ECDIS starboard displays were out
of his field of view.

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√ Oliva 16 March 2011

……. Just after 0400, the second mate noticed a large defined echo on the
radar screen, about five nautical miles and passing clear down on the vessel’s port
bow. The second mate assumed that it was either rain clouds or an iceberg; he
thought that the vessel was within the limits of icebergs according to the routing chart
he has seen. At 0410, the second mate made another call to the chief mate as he
had not arrived on the bridge. The chief mate arrived on the bridge at 0420.

Bulk carrier Common Spirit struck the berth whilst alongside on 29 July 2012

Seagate & Timor Stream collision (March 2012) off Dominican Republic but assisted
by the USCG
The master replaced the watch-keeper and was busy sending messages. On the
other vessel, Chief Officer wrongly assessed crossing as overtaking situation. VDR
not saved!

You may also like to browse through the following publications:

- Passage planning practice (2006), Witherbys
- Passage planning principles (2006), Witherbys

3. www.iumi.com on the latest marine statistics by International Insurance of Marine

Insurance
Collision/contact and grounding contribute about 24% each for all serious and total
loss cases between 2006 and 2010.What percentage does machinery contribute?

What are the principles of BRM?

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www.standard-club.com
Standard Safety – Navigation September 2009.What are the 10 issues raised?
Standard Safety Anchoring October 2008.What are the 7 examples given?

www.standard-club.com A master’s guide on berthing 2nd. edition

p 3 check on the golden rules of berthing
p13 on the approach speed and control while slowing
Focus only on passage planning.

“Poor standard of teamwork” – read Attilio Ievoli: second officer was reluctant to
question the master’s authority p24

No pre-sailing briefing was conducted

A parallel indexing technique was not in use
The responsibility for position fixing was not defined and the method of position fixing
was inadequate
Contrast of cultures was significant?

The vessel’s mobile phone was in use on the bridge before the accident

Contrary to company instructions, echo sounder alarm was set to zero, and the echo
sounder trace was not functioning

The vessel did not report the grounding to the coastguard

Going against the company SMS!. www.maib.gov.uk Attilio Ievolli

Passing arrangements at chocked point – collision between Tor Dania and Amenity
What was the plan? Were they following the agreed plan?

Read Norvantes grounding at Karumba port. www.atsb.gov.au

2nd. Officer was not confidence with pilot navigation but did not raise his doubt.
Earlier he raised his concern about the ship’s position and was taken lightly by the
pilot.

Anatoki collision- human factors and Bridge Resource Management (BRM)

www.taic.org

www.atsb.gov.au Van Gogh – a shared plan not followed

pilot suspected bridge team countermanded his orders

www.maib.gov.uk Sichem Melbourne contact with mooring structures

www.atsb.gov.au Dampier Spirit – Vessel was moored to CALM buoy off FPSO
during cyclone season. Vessel was experiencing
25 knots winds with 2.5m waves. No night
orders were written by the master.

www.bsu-bund.de M.V Gabriel – officer falled asleep in the last 30 minutes prior
grounding

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To Be A Leader in Maritime Education and Training

Aurora (about 140m length) steered by auto-pilot during overtaking

manoeuvre (vessel of about the same size) by the pilot in fog
patches and passing 2 on-coming exceptionally large container
vessels. Due to restricted visibility, both vessels were assisted by
shore-based radar pilotage. Log book and bridge bell book
contained no entries from the time leaving the lock up to the
collision. No night orders were written.

www.dma.dk Gotland Carolina/Conti Harmony collision - in fair weather, broad

daylight and with a good visibility. Both OOWs were busy with non-
navigational work and did not maintain proper lookout.

4. Are we allowed to use illegal copies of ECS? How about using personal hand-held
GPS for navigation? Check www.maib.uk Lerrix grounded in Oct 2005

Do you allow the pilot to use Pilot Portable Unit (PPU) on your vessel?

How was it possible for Pride of Canterbury to run aground on a charted wreck?
The electronic chart system (ECS) was not approved!
Except the master, officers had not undergone any generic training in the use of
ECDIS. The master went for the manufacturer’s own in-house training

No doubt that ECDIS is an invaluable asset to both passage planning and monitoring
of the passage itself. Navigators must be aware of the need to properly utilize the
functions contain within it.
It is a system designed to assist OOW to make informed decisions and is not a
substitute for good seamanship.
www.britanniapandi.com Britannia Risk Watch volume 16 July 2009

ECDIS is merely an aid to navigation and should never be used as a substitute for
good seamanship.

What does it means by type-approved ECDIS operating with up-to-date electronic

navigation chart (ENC) and with appropriate back-up?

What are the characteristics of ENC?

What happened on CFL performer? The safety contour alarm was set at 30m but
the alarm did not sound because …………

Watch vector is an important feature within ECDIS and if it has not been activated
then many of the associated electronic chart alarms will not be active.

The use of inappropriate scale had mislead the officer on the vessel’s ukc.

How about LT Cortesia which was aground off Varne on 02 January 2008?

Ro-ro passenger vessel Dieppe ran aground off the approaches to Newhaven while
using ECS. However the echo sounder was not being use. Previously Sardinia Vera
ran aground at the same location.

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To Be A Leader in Maritime Education and Training

CSL Thames aground on 6 August 2011 while navigating with ECDIS.

…… ran aground after the third officer had altered the vessel’s course to
starboard of the planned track to avoid another vessel. He did not notice that
the alteration would take CSL Thames into shallow water, and the audio alarm
on the electronic chart display and information system (ECDIS) that should
have alerted him to the impending danger was inoperative. Further, the
master’s and other watchkeepers’ knowledge of the vessel’s ECDIS was
insufficient and therefore no-one within the bridge team questioned the absence
of the ECDIS audio alarm, or recognized that the system’s safety contour setting
was inappropriate for the planned voyage.

Disasters at sea (Titanic to Exxon Valdez)by Capt. Richard A.Cahill 1992

P 213 on Exxon Valdez

5. www.maib.gov.uk √ Alam Pintar alleged tempering with VDR

www.atsb.gov.au Astor data was not saved in VDR

www.dma.dk Karin Schepers

Repeated unanswered called by VTS and pilot. Once aground pilot boarded the
ship and noticed the chief officer was fast asleep.
No entries made on the rest hours since last few days.

www.bsu-bund.de M.V Frisia Rotterdam & M.V. Cleantec collision

No VDR information is available from both vessels

Fatal accident involving Ocean Jasper in Oct 2007.She left the scene without
providing assistance. Master aged 57 and had command experience since 1992.

Voyage Data Recorder

In addition to bridge audio, a voyage data recorder (VDR) is capable of recording
such items as time, vessel heading and speed, gyrocompass, alarms, very high
frequency (VHF)radiotelephone communications, radar, the echo-sounder, wind
speed and direction, and rudder/engine orders and responses.

When the TSB attempted to download the BBC Steinhoeft’s VDR data following the
occurrence, the VDR was found to have ceased functioning the day before the
occurrence on 30 March 2011 at approximately 1600 Coordinated Universal Time
(UTC). Consequently, no data from the time of the occurrence were available to the
investigators when the remote storage module was analyzed at the TSB laboratory.

On 1 April 2011, a manufacturer representative checked the VDR and found that the
data process unit (DPU) fan was operational but that the filter was clogged.
Furthermore, the data management module (DMM) had shut down, its fan was not
operational, and the battery was completely discharged.

The VDR manufacturer’s installation and maintenance manual indicates that it is

essential that proper airflow be maintained within the DPU through the fan system. 9
To ensure this, the fan filter needs to be cleaned every 3 months. Crew members
were not able to provide a copy of this manual at the time of the attempted data
retrieval.

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To Be A Leader in Maritime Education and Training

Monarch of the seas grounding on Proselyte reef, Netherlands Antilles

15 December 1998, resulting in major damage, no loss of life and minor pollution.
Master had 24 years sea experience + 2 years 8 months as master and had been
onboard for 8 months.

6. Riskwatch Feb 2012 MSC Prestige & Samco Europe

Can we navigate in restricted visibility with defective radar?

Read the collision between Nordsee and Poole Scene
The master had sailed since 1963 and took command since 1983. Sailed as the
master on Nordsee in the last 15 years. Whilst the skipper on Poole Scene had 20
years experience. or

Stena Nautica collision www.havkom.se where the ARPA was non-functional for
the previous 10 days on the other vessel.

Traffic was periodically fairly heavy and several avoidance manoeuvres were
executed. Later, traffic thinned out with few fishing boats in the vicinity.
The second mate was used to close situations – owing to often heavy traffic. He
considered himself to have the situation completely under control and was all time
prepared to take various steps

After the collision, OS asked about the watertight doors but nobody answered.

Read on the chaos during evacuation. The Marine Evacuation System(MES) slide
twisted and the platform turned up-side down.
It took 20 minutes to evacuate all 94 passengers and 20 crew. 11 crew remained on
board.

Rescue of persons – from MRCC logbook?

Costa Concordia official report by Ministry of Infrastructures & Transport (MIT)

Discuss on the evacuation process

At 0140, the master was in his cabin and heard a loud thud on the hull. Officer told
him, it could be the wave. Later, he said it was an unlit floating object. How is this
possible with a proper radar watch? Read Skania incident www.bsu-bund.de

SY Deern collided with unknown vessel that fled from the scene. It involved one
fatality.

Tinto www.havkom.se Collision due to improper radar look-out

Visit www.chirp.co.uk/main/Maritime.htm
MFB 12 p 2 on radar and parallel indexing

www.maib.gov.uk collision between M.V Scot Explorer and F.V. Dorthe Dalsoe
What are the lessons learnt?

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To Be A Leader in Maritime Education and Training

23 January 2003 M.V Ville D’Orion at 0445 SMT(Pusan bound for LA USA) in open
sea 225nm NNW of Hawaii, visibility 0.5nm, suspected that they had rammed
something in the rain. Speed about 9 – 9.4 knots course 140°. Wind SW 6 – 7 Bf
Guard zone alarm was switched off because it gave off acoustic and optical alarm as
soon as rain cloud or a high wave came into range
Radar ranges used were 3 to 6nm
Course recorder malfunctions. ECS data was not secured either.
Calls on vhf channels were unanswered

11 January 2014 Rickmers Dubai collided with un-lit barge being towed. At 0154
hours whilst in the SW lane of TSS off Dover. No look-out, rely solely on AIS
information. Vessel did not take note of the safety broadcasts at 0140 hours. Master
was not informed of the collision. C/O relief the watch at 0300 hours. During C/O
watch at 0356 hours, vessel was instructed to leave the TSS, anchor and wait for
further instructions.

7. A product tanker Qian Chi exploded while at Brisbane anchorage in Jan 2011.
Request for helicopter assistance (for 3 crew members) was denied by VTS.

At this time, Brisbane and the surrounding area was receiving heavy rainfall and
consequent flooding.

Ship’s crew should remain vigilant to safety even when conducting repeated or
seemingly simple tasks. Personnel need to consult equipment documentation and
pay increased care and attention when undertaking unfamiliar tasks. To support that
process, equipment documentation needs to be comprehensive and accurate.

Ship’s crew should also understand the importance of providing immediate and
appropriate first aid to injured persons, especially burn victims. Burn injuries should
always be immediately cooled, under clean, cold running water, for at least
10 minutes.

After the explosion, electrician, engine cadet and third engineer went to the political
officer’s cabin to seek medical attention.

8. Iron Spencer www.atsb.gov.au

A shipmaster had difficulty in maintaining the ship position while picking-up pilot by
helicopter.

9. The Electronic Chart (2011)3rd. edition, Hecht, Berking, Butttgenbach, Jonas &
Alexander
pp 184 – 189 the burden of paper chart
pp 193 – 203 safety issues: benefits and risks

Safety at Sea International (SASI) August 2010

p 10 on obstacles to ECDIS adoption
- Junior crew members tend to meddle with system settings
- If you make one wrong setting, you get lots of permanent false alarms
- System is useless without familiarization training
- Many versions of ECDIS which makes it difficult and costly to train crew
- The cost of ECDIS and training is huge

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To Be A Leader in Maritime Education and Training

10. Bridge Team Management (2004), Nautical Institute

pp 76 – 78 definitions on ECDIS or

Passage planning principles (2006), Witherbys

pp 13 ~ 18 passages planning with ECDIS or

From paper charts to ECDIS – a practical voyage plan by the Nautical Institute
p 5 on the identified positive aspects of ECDIS
p15 system management
p17 zone of confidence (ZOC)

Refer to www.ukpandi.com
ECDIS; navigational and claim issues

Bulletin 753 - 04/11 - Reporting of ECDIS anomalies - Worldwide

Part 1;introduction on ECDIS mandatory requirements
Part 2;a key to safe operation
Part 3;legal implications

Refer to www.standard-club.com ECDIS- understanding the future of navigation

MSN28/2008 on ECDIS
MIN 405 Training for ECDIS as Primary Means of Navigation
MN15/2010 by AMSA

MSC 232(82) in 2006 ADOPTION OF THE REVISED PERFORMANCE

STANDARDS FOR ELECTRONIC CHART DISPLAY AND INFORMATION
SYSTEMS (ECDIS)

A.817 (19) for ECDIS installed before 01 January 2009

No doubt that ECDIS is an invaluable asset to both passage planning and monitoring
of the passage itself. Navigators must be aware of the need to properly utilize the
functions contain within it.
It is a system designed to assist OOW to make informed decisions and is not a
substitute for good seamanship.
www.britanniapandi.com Britannia Risk Watch volume 16 July 2009

ECDIS is merely an aid to navigation and should never be used as a substitute for
good seamanship.

What does it means by type-approved ECDIS operating with up-to-date electronic

navigation chart(ENC) and with appropriate back-up?

What are the characteristics of ENC?

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To Be A Leader in Maritime Education and Training

In your spare time you are encourage to surf the following web pages to gather information
about the lessons learnt or advice from the articles. It will not be tested during examination
however it will help you to have a better understanding with regards to current issues
affecting safety of navigation. These references provide a convenient starting point for
personal commitment for the maintenance of professional standard required for a
shipmaster.
11. www.mcga.gov.uk/c4mca/285.pdf
Electronic charts – the use of risk assessment methodology when operating ECDIS
in the raster chart display system (RCDS) mode

www.he-alert.org
ALERT_12 06/2006 Negligent of incompetent – a need for due diligence
ALERT _23 05/2010 human failings include ………………..

www.nautinst.org/alert/index.html
ALERT 4 07/2004 p 6... Sudden collapse on the bridge

www.simsl.com on Sea Venture newsletters www.ifsma.org on newsletters

www.britanniapandi.com on Risk Watch newsletters

www.swedishclub.com on Swedish Club letters

Loss prevention – collisions and groundings 2011: what are the main areas of
concern?
Triton 01/2011 pp 22-23 six steps towards improved safety

www.londonpandi.com on Stop Loss bulletins

www.skuld.com on Beacon
issue 191 2008 on Dangerous minds – rogue behaviour

www.nepia.com on Signals newsletters

www.gard.no sharing knowledge & preventing loss

www.standard-club.com on Standard Safety bulletins

Your controllable pitch propeller (CPP) breakdown during critical stage of the
passage: do you know its default position?

Focus only on passage planning.

It will be good if you can browse through the following articles:

Seaways January 2004 – good watch-keeping practice by Captain Roger Syms

FNI
What are the fundamentals that can be adopted on board our vessels?

Seaways November 2004 – over the limit by George Lang FNI

What are the current issues affecting safe navigation of vessels?

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To Be A Leader in Maritime Education and Training

Seaways April 2003 – The Admiralty nautical chart by Peter Jones UK Hydrographic
Office
What are the salient points regarding nautical charts?

What is an ‘air boom’?

Riskwatch No. 4 Nov 2008 p4

Fouled propellers, is it due to lack of passage planning?

Riskwatch No. 4 Nov 2008 p6

Passing off a seismic survey vessel with 6nm unlit danger, is it possible?
Riskwatch No. 3 Nov 2009 p4

Seaways October 2010 – new directions in pilot passage planning pp 22 - 23

Seaways December 2011 – Straits of Malacca safety and GPS jamming p22

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To Be A Leader in Maritime Education and Training

Part B

Q1. Notes on radar p16 Q5 (use 12’ scale)

Course 103º T at 10 knots
Time (hrs) bearing (T) range (nm)
1630 228.5º 6.5’
1636 228º 5.75’
1642 227º 5.0’

Is there any risk of collision?

Initial target course/speed =?
Initial CPA = ?

Initial target course/speed =082ºT X 16.0kn

Initial CPA = 0.6nm

At 1652 hrs the target alters course to port by 20º (062ºT) find the new CPA and TCPA
(1.4’ 1711 hrs)

P15 Q4
Q2. Course 182º T at 16 knots
Time (hrs) bearing (R) range (nm)
2040 348º 14.0’
2046 349º 11.3’
2052 350º 8.6’

At 2055 hrs the target alters course to starboard by 35º, find the new CPA and TCPA
New CPA is 1.2’ and TCPA is 2111 hours

P17 Q8 (Use 6’ range scale)

Q3. Course 060º T at 6 knots
Time (hrs) bearing (T) range (nm)
0340 341º 6.0’
0346 341° 5.1’
0352 341º 4.2’

Find
i. the CPA and TCPA
ii. the course and speed of the target
iii. the new CPA and TCPA if at 0400 hours the target reduces speed to 6 knots
iv. the CPA and TCPA if at 0416 hours the target resumes her original speed

Answer

i. CPA 0.0 mile (collision), TCPA 0420 hours

ii. Target course 124°T, speed 10 knots
iii. New CPA 1.15 miles and TCPA 0427hours
iv. CPA 0.65 miles and TCPA 0426 hours

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Q4. The following observations were made by own vessel steering 060T at 10 knots

Time (hrs) True Bearing (T) Range (nm)

1500 114.5 11.2

1512 113.5 9.2
1524 112.5 7.2
1536 110 5.3

At 1536 hours own vessel altered course 50°to starboard, the vessel being steadied on this
course at 1542 hours.

Find the new CPA range and time

New CPA is 2.7 miles and TCPA is 1554 hours

Q5. Course 310º T at 15 knots (LG p 26 q4)

Observed the echoes of a light-vessel

Time (hrs) bearing (R) range (nm)

0900 346º 10.0’
0906 340º 8.6’
0912 332º 7.4’

1. Find set and rate of the tide (Use head-up display mode)
2. You require to keep the light-vessel 2nm to your port side:
- CTS if action is taken at 0912 hrs
- CTS if action is taken at 0924 hrs

(set 032°T at 5 knots, CTS 278°T & 260°T)

set 082°R CTS 328°R Initial CMG and SMG of own vessel (329°T x 17’)

Q6. (LG p27 Q5)

Own ship steaming 010°T at 12 knots, the following observations of target were made:

Time (hrs) Bearing (T) Range (nm)

0700 084° 5.5’
0703 084° 4.85’
0706 084° 4.25’

At 0710 hours, master of own ship ordered a course alteration to 050°T. If the turning time
i.e. performance delay is known to be 3 minutes,

Find the new CPA and its TCPA. (0.9’ 0722 hrs)

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6. While on a course of 040°T at 6 knots, a target was observed on the radar screen as
follows:

Time (hours) Bearing (T) Range (nm)

1600 060° 7.0
1606 060° 6.0
1612 059.5° 5.0

At 1615 hours, own ship’s engine was stopped. If a ‘head reach’ of 0.6’ is expected in 15
minutes, predict the new CPA.

(1.8nm) Please refer to the LG p21 q 7……..use 6’ range scale

7. The following were observed by own vessel on 000°T x 20 knots:

0700 hours 069°T x 6.8’
0706 hours 069°T x 5.4’
0712 hours 069°T x 4.0’

Use true motion display and find the target course, speed, CPA & TCPA
What is the situation, crossing or overtaking?

318°T 19.5kn nil 0729hours

Aspect R70°

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Rendezvous

Q1. Your ship receives a message from ship “ A “ that she requires assistance. She gives
her position and states that she will remain on course 090°T at 6 knots. The plot shows
her to bear 030°T from your ship’s position and 200nm off. Your maximum speed is
20 knots. Find the followings:

a ) Course to reach “ A “ in minimum time

b ) Time taken to rendezvous
c ) Distance steamed to reach “ A “
d ) Time to pick-up “ A “ on radar at a range of 20nm.

Q2. You have established contact with vessel “ A “ that requires medical assistance.
She bears 210°T ,125nm off and is steering 255°T at 15knots. It is agreed
that a rendezvous should take place during daylight in 10- hour time that
“ A “ will maintain her course but at reduced speed. Own vessel speed is 18 knots.

Find :
a ) Speed reduction required by “ A “
b ) Course to steer to assist “ A “at agreed time

Q1.
Own ship course to steer = WO = 045.5°T

Rate of approach = OA = 16.2 knots

Time taken to rendezvous = 200 / 16.2
(with the vessel) = 12H20.4M

Distance to steam = Time to rendezvous x speed

= 12H20.4M x 20
= 246.7nm

Distance to steam before pick-up by radar @20’

= 200 – 20
= 180nm

time taken when vessel ‘ A ‘ will be picked-up@20’ range on radar

= 180 / 16.2
= 11H 07M

Q2. Speed reduction = 8.8 kn

W’O’ = 226°T

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Search patterns

Q1
The search datum is 9nm west of an island
Visibility is 5nm and the search object is a 15-person life-raft
N’ly wind

Using expanding square search pattern, plot the P.I of the island to facilitate the search

Q2
Man-overboard (Use 3’ range scale)
The search radius is 2nm
E’ly wind
Using sector search (VS) pattern, plot the P.I for the datum (buoy)

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