Ataman Görgülü No:20220401007

Maritime Transportation and Management Engineering

Grounding of container ship M/V Leda Maersk

Otago Harbour/New Zealand,10 June 2018

I. General Informations About Ship

a) The Leda Maersk is a fully cellular container ship, registered in Denmark and
operated by Maersk Line A/S (Maersk). The ship was operating on a regular
service between Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand as a Liner type
ship.

b) The vessel departed Lyttelton on 9 June 2018 bound for Port Chalmers. The
coastal passage to the Otago Harbour pilot station was routine, the weather was
fair and the ship had no reported defects. The vessel’s arrival draft was 10.8
metres on an even keel

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II. Narrative

a) At 17.20 on 10 June, the Leda Maersk arrived at the Port Otago pilot station.
The master, the chief officer and the cox was on the bridge.

b) The pilot embarked the ship at 17.35 The pilot was carrying a portable pilot unit
as known PPU. The pilot set up the PPU and then exchanged information with the
master. The pilot explained each item on the Port Otago master/pilot exchange
form, which included: the planned inward transit of the Lower Otago Harbour;
the berthing plan; the use of tugs; and the manoeuvring characteristics of the
Leda Maersk.

c) The pilot encouraged the bridge team to challenge them if they had any concerns
with the piloting and explained that the ship’s crew were still responsible for
monitoring the ship’s progress against the passage plan. PPU and ECDIS passage
plans were similar and ship has to stay near the centre of the narrow channel this
is the critic point of this accident, but there were subtle differences in the radius
of the turns in the channel.

d) The pilot saw that the ship was quite close to the port-side beacons and
mentioned this to the master. The master then realised that the ship had
probably run aground, and stopped the engine.

e) The pilot radioed the tugs and gave instructions for them to pull the Leda Maersk
back into the centre of the channel. With the aid of the ship’s bow thruster17, the
tugs were able to pull the ship clear of the seabed and the pilot repositioned the
Leda Maersk to mid-channel.

f) The ship was rounding the final bend in the channel before reaching its berth,
when a combination of factors caused it to deviate from the planned track in the
centre of the channel, and ground on the left channel bank. Nobody was injured
and damage to the ship was confined to scraping of the paintwork on the hull.

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Maritime Transportation and Management Engineering

III. Reasons of Grounding

a) One of the main reason of grounding is deviating from the narrow channel
as known as planned track is bridge team’s navigation style. They all using
visual cues outside the ship, rather than fully using the electronic
navigation aids, all of which clearly showed the ship deviating from the
centre of the channel.

b) Of course another main reason of grounding is the depth of water(2.6

metre) was shorter than the vesell’s draft(10.8 metre).

IV. Bibliography

https://www.taic.org.nz/sites/default/files/inquiry/documents/MO-2018-
203%20Final.pdf

https://www.offshore-energy.biz/investigation-leda-maersk-grounded-as-crew-
did-not-use-electronic-navigation-tools/

https://www.taic.org.nz/inquiry/mo-2018-203

https://shipsandports.com.ng/why-leda-maersk-ran-aground-in-new-zealand-
investigation/
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Maritime Transportation and Management Engineering

Collision between Ulysse

and CSL Virginia
28 kilometres northwest of Cape Corsica/France 7 October 2018

I. General Informations About Ships

A. Ulysse

 The Ulysse is a Ro-Ro Cargo that was built in 1997 (25 years ago)
and is sailing under the flag of Tunisia.

 Her carrying capacity is 17907 Gross Tonnage. Her length overall

(LOA) is 162.3 meters and her width is 25.8 meters. The ship is
equipped with two radars, an X band and an S band The X band
radar has an unstable image, it is out of service.

 The ULYSSE is managed by the Tunisian State company COTUNAV,

which equips six ro-ro ships on the Tunisia-France and Tunisia-
Italy lines. The vessel is inspected annually as part of Port State
Control.

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Maritime Transportation and Management Engineering

B. CSL Virginia

 CSL VIRGINIA is a Container ship built in 2005 by HYUNDAI It's

gross tonnage is 54592 tons.

 The CSL VIRGINIA belongs to the “Duraven Shipping Company Ltd

of Cyprus” and is technically managed by the “Cyprus Sea Lines Co
Ltd”, which manages many container ships and bulk carriers.

II. Crews

A. Ulysse

 The crew is made up of Tunisian sailors. At the time of the accident, the crew
numbered thirty-nine, including eight members of the restaurant staff.
Supernumerary officers are on board to reinforce the crew due to the current
annual inventory, carried out by six auditors present on board for a few days

B. CSL Virginia

 The crew is made up of twenty-four sailors, including five students, all of whom
are Filipinos.

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Maritime Transportation and Management Engineering

III. Accident

 The accident occurred north of Cape Corsica, 11 miles from the entry into the
precautionary zone of the Cape Corsica and 16.5 miles to the west of the entry to
the cape. The place of the accident is in particular on the Genoa - Corsica canal
road and at the limit of the Cape Corsica and Agriate marine natural park.

 The CSL VIRGINIA is at anchor, starboard anchor line in the water, heading
almost west, at 263° according to the data recorded in the VDR(voyage data
recorder) at the time of the accident.

 The Tunisian sailors indicated that they were up to date with their medical
fitness check. The ULYSSE approaches the CSL VIRGINIA abeam starboard at an
almost perpendicular angle. Under the effect of the shock and the overpressure,
the fuel oil contained in fuel compartment 3 starboard was thrown into the hold
of the CSL VIRGINIA as well as onto the bow of the ULYSSE until it reached its
bridge windows.

 The hold empties very quickly; in a few minutes most of the fuel contained in the
fuel bunker is discharged into the sea

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IV. Conclusions

 The collision on October 7 at 7:02 a.m. was the result of a major lack of
watchkeeping on the ULYSSE, combined with a legal but misguided
mooring position and without careful monitoring of the surrounding
traffic by the CSL VIRGINIA.

 On board the ULYSSE, the failure to watch is based on the officer of the
watch's lack of involvement before the collision. The lack of watch could
not be overcome by the helmsman(cox), who had gone on a patrol and
was absent from the bridge

 In the watch position adopted, seated on the starboard side facing an out
of service radar, placed just in front of him, the officer on watch was
deprived of information allowing him to understand the situation.
However, the use of the other radar on the port side, in motion, would
have provided him with all the elements allowing him to judge the critical
situation. The watch and the related procedures on the two vessels were
little or not respected. The COLREG convention has not been applied as it
should.

 In addition, his standby position, which was too low, did not allow him to
see the horizon correctly.

 The watch and the related procedures on the two vessels were little or not
respected. The COLREG convention has not been applied as it should

 The human element is the preponderant factor at the origin of the

accident, with a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities linked to the
function of shift supervisor. A phenomenon of lassitude, linked to the
duration of embarkation, certainly played a role in the involvement of the
watch officers of the two ships.

 The personal use of the mobile telephone took precedence, on board the
two vessels, over the exercise of the duty of shift supervisor, leading to a
lack of monitoring of the surface situation.

 Furthermore, as the area is located on the high seas, no information was

given to ships transiting near the unusual anchorage point chosen by CSL
VIRGINIA.

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Maritime Transportation and Management Engineering

V. What I Learn

 The use of the mobile phone can totally monopolize the watch officer by
diverting him from the day before.

 The COLREG agreement does not exempt you from keeping watch at anchor.

 Unregulated and unprohibited anchorage on the high seas is not adequate.

Indeed, maritime routes and traffic must be taken into account when
choosing an anchorage point on the high seas outside the restricted areas,
in particular near traffic separation schemes.

VI. Bibliography

https://www.nautilusint.org/en/news-insight/news/watchkeeper-error-
blamed-for-ulysse-and-csl-virginia-collision/

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336560036_Automatic_Collision_Av
oidance_Manoeuvres_for_Surface_Ships

https://wwz.cedre.fr/en/Resources/Spills/Spills/CSL-Virginia

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u2GS9YLrwzA&ab_channel=BEAMER

https://www.bea-mer.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/beamer-
fr_csl_virginia_-_ulysse__fr-en 2018.pdf

https://www.offshore-energy.biz/report-string-of-human-errors-caused-
collision-between-ulysse-and-csl-virginia/

https://www.emsa.europa.eu/newsroom/latest-
news/download/7310/4830/23.html