Module 3 Geotechnical Hazards

Design Evaluation Assessment
for Natural Gas Transport

Systems
Module 3
Geotechnical Hazards
I am indebted to Dr Alex Baumgard and Mark Leir and Gerry Ferris (BGC Engineering )
and Moness Rizkalla Via Plus for the use of some of the material in this presentation
Alan Murray 2017 1

Outline
Pipeline materials
Working Stress Design
Where are we? Geotechnical Considerations
Limit States Design

Regulatory Oversight of Strain Based Design
Alan Murray 2017 2

Module Objectives
❖ To describe some of
the most common
types of geohazards;
and
❖ How these geohazards
can be considered
during pipeline design.
What we will learn in this Module:
Objective : To obtain a good understanding of the methods

used to design a pipeline to accommodate loads caused by
pressure , temperature and ground movement.
We will learn:
The three principal Geohazards for a pipeline
Some geotechnical design requirements in the Pipeline standards
Simple methods for determining slope stability
Methods for monitoring slope movement
Alan Murray 2017 4

Geohazards Module Outline
Where are we?
1. Geohazards
2. Pipeline Standards
3. Considering Geohazards
in Routing and Design
4. Monitoring Geotechnical
Hazards
5. Mitigating Geotechnical
Hazards
5 Alan Murray 2017

Potential Geotechnical Hazards
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Slope Instabilities
The Head of a Rotational Slip

Rockfalls from steep slopes
after heavy rainfall
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1. Geohazards
3 Categories of Geohazards:
• Hydrotechnical
• Geotechnical
• Seismic
Geohazards are dynamic, are usually
time dependent and have varying
levels of activity depend on the activity
of the trigger, for example:
• Seismicity
• Precipitation
• Temperature
• Human Activity SE British Columbia
1. Geohazards –
Hydrotechnical
Hydrotechnical Hazards
• “Appreciable Channelized Flow”
• Includes rivers, creek, streams,
channels
• Not including lakes, ponds, NPS 24” - Río Bonda
standing water
NOTE In Canada we do not have a
common definition of a water body
5 Subclasses:
• Scour
• Degradation
• Bank Erosion NPS 20 Río Gaira ( Magdalena)
• Encroachment Loss of Cover and Pipe Spanning
• Avulsion
1. Geohazards –
Hydrotechnical
Rivers/Creeks are Dynamic
width, depth, slope, meander = Fn [flow, sediment load]

(dependent variables) (independent variables)
Change one of the variables and one or more of the others

will change too!
Alan Murray 2017 10

. Geohazards – Hydrotechnical
• Floods/Scour at watercourse crossings do result in pipeline
failure, but at a low rate
• In Alberta in 2012 an oil pipeline failed in a large waterway

with recreational / drinking water impacts
• Flood warning was issued by the government but no actions

taken.
• Note: ~25 pipelines on the same watercourse (no failures),
flood warnings were issued for ~100 watercourses (no
failures), no failure for previous larger floods
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1. Geohazards – Hydrotechnical
Scour
– Local deepening of channel (scour holes)
– Caused by obstructions that re-direct and concentrate
flow
Alan Murray 2017 12

Vortex Induced Vibration
• VIV in free spanning pipelines is driven by vortex shedding (DNV-RP-F105)
- Eddies created by water flow normal to the free span
- When shedding frequency is close to natural frequency of free span, vibration
and shedding ‘lock in’ at the natural frequency and the pipeline fails in fatigue
- Calculate the ‘lock in’ at different velocities.
OD = 6", 2.0m/s, wt = 3.96mm
1.00E+06
Imagem
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
Image
1.00E+03
Critical Span Length (~ 6.9 m)
1.00E+02
Fatigue life [years]
1.00E+01
1.00E+00 In-Line
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Cross Flow
1.00E-01
1.00E-02
1.00E-03
Fatigue Life = 0.01 year
1.00E-04
1.00E-05
1.00E-06
Span length [m]
Alan Murray 2017 13
Stream Network
Site Visit
1. Identifies 1. Measure depth of
watercourse cover, bankfull width
crossings and gradient
2. Determine
discharge rates of
2. Collect site-specific
floods characteristics
Return Period (year)
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Degradation 2011
– General lowering of the channel bed

– Usually in response to a decrease in sediment supply or
increase in flow velocity
Arrow Creek, Chetwynd, BC 2009
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Bank Erosion
• Lateral channel
migration at
crossings
• Often occurs at the
outside of
meanders
Freeman East Tributary, Swan Hills, AB

1. Geohazards –
Hydrotechnical
Encroachment
– Lateral channel migration where pipelines run
parallel to water flow
– Often occurs at the outside of meanders
Bear River, Cynthia, AB Bear River, Cynthia, AB
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Avulsion
• Sudden abandonment of one channel
and shift to another
• Caused by flooding and debris flows
Squamish, BC
Debris Flow
• Common in mountainous
terrain
• Very rapid, channelized
fluidized mixture of soil, rock,
and debris
• Capable of extreme scour
and unpredictable channel
avulsion
• The entire fan is the hazard
• Pipeline must be protected
within the entire fan
Yale, BC
1. Geohazards – Presence of
Typically 1 crossing every:
Average 5 km
BC 3 km
Alberta 6 km
Wyoming + Montana 8 km
• Hydrotechnical hazard sites are

generally more common (7x) and
more active than geotechnical or
seismic hazard sites
Vernon, BC
• Channel Degradation 57 %
• Bank Erosion 18 %
• Scour 16 %
• Encroachment 5%
• Avulsion 4%
90% of pipeline exposures/impacts are caused by hydrotechnical
hazards. Vernon, SC BC, Canada
Bank erosion is responsible for most of the exposed pipelines.

1. Geohazards – Geotechnical
• Involve soil, rock,
slopes, water, gravity
Many Subclasses:
• Earth, rock and debris
slides
• Rock fall
• Surface water erosion
• Groundwater erosion
Grand Forks, SE BC
Tension Cracks
showing shallow
instability
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Earth Slide
• Landslides involving mostly soil
• Can occur catastrophically or
slowly
• Pipelines crossing or adjacent to
slopes >15 degrees in wet
climates with silt and clay soils
are most vulnerable.
• Human activity previous
incidents or highly intense
precipitation are common
triggers
Fort Nelson, NE BC, Canada
Rock Slide
• Landslides involving mostly rock
• Can occur catastrophically or
slowly (Rock Creep)
• Pipelines crossing mountains in
wet climates with unfavorable
structural geology or bedrock
types are most vulnerable
Terrace, NW BC, Canada

Rock Fall
• Landslides involving bouncing
and rolling rocks
• Requires:
• slope
• fractured rock
• bouldery soils
• Occur catastrophically
• Pipelines below >20 m high
vertical slopes with depth of
cover less than 1 m are most
vulnerable Southern Bolivia
Surface Water Erosion
• Uncontrolled surface water
eroding the RoW
• Requires:
• Long slope,
• Erodible soils,
• Uncontrolled surface water
• Occurs suddenly
Ashcroft, SC British
• Pipeline RoWs in a dry crossing Columbia
of loose silts and sands with
ineffective surface water control
are most vulnerable
Groundwater Erosion
• Generally Requires:
• Slope, but can happen
on relatively flat terrain
• Erodible soils or rock,
• Uncontrolled
groundwater
• Occurs gradually
• Pipelines crossing silt or
Fernie, SE BC
sandy soils in mountainous
or hilly terrain with water
sources nearby are
particularly vulnerable
% of sites including:
• Surface Water Erosion 40%
• Earth and Debris Slides 30%
• Earth Creep (settlement) 15%
• Rock Fall 5%
10% of pipeline exposures/impacts are caused by geotechnical
hazards
Geotechnical hazards sites are generally less common (7x less)
than hydrotechnical hazard sites
Chase, SC BC, Canada

1. Geohazards – Seismic
Seismic Hazards
Generally driven by:
• plate tectonics
• distance to epicenter,
and
• bedrock and structural,
and surfical geology
2 Common Subclasses:
• fault rupture
• lateral spreading
Denali Fault, Alaska, Nov. 2002

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Fault Rupture
• Fault displacement at ground
surface, pipe ruptures at the
boundary between displaced and
undisplaced soil .
Lateral Spreading
• Loss of strength in loose, saturated
soils during earthquakes
Northwest Territories, Canada
• Occurs on low angle slopes often
at river banks.
• Soil mass moves laterally into an
open space dragging the pipeline
with it
• Pipeline rupture can occur at
boundary between stationary and
displaced soil
Bihar Earthquake, India 1934
Lateral Spreading
Nigata Earthquake, Japan 1964
Spatial Frequency of
Geohazards
• Mountainous Terrain
• Hydrotechnical – 1 site every 3 km (2 miles)
• Geotechnical – 1 site every 10 km (6 miles)
• Plains Terrain
• All Terrain
Alan Murray 2017 34

Significance of Geohazards
• Annual Frequency of Pipe Exposure and Failure from
Geohazards
• Average 2 new exposed pipes per year for every 1000 km of
pipeline (1 every 300 miles)
• Annual frequency of failure from geohazards per 1000 km of
pipeline is approximately 0.02 (1 every 50 years per 1000 km)
• So, for a 500 km pipeline.....operators should expect...
• An inventory of approximately 170 hydrotechnical and 25
geotechnical hazards
• About 1 new pipeline exposure/impact each year
• A pipeline failure from geohazards every 100 years….
Alan Murray 2017 35

1: Geohazards – Q & A
1. What are the three types of geohazards?

2. What geohazard type is typically the most frequent
along a pipeline?
3. Which geohazard type typically causes most pipeline
exposures?
4. What age of faults should require a detailed
investigation and special pipeline design?
Alan Murray 2017 36

Where are we?
1. Geohazards
Hazards
Hazards
37 Alan Murray 2017

2. Pipeline Standards – Significance of
Geohazards
US Gas Pipeline Failures by Cause
Ground Movement
Other
Quite rare occurrences in benign 13%
8%
terrain so Geohazards are generally
considered to have a low probability
of occurrence and pipeline operators
do not believe they can do anything
Corrosion
to prevent them …. 24%
Outside / Third Party

36%
Construction / Material
14%
Operator Error
US DOT-OPS Gas Transmission Data 1984-2007 4%
Onshore steel pipelines > 2” (50 mm) diameter
2. Pipeline Standards – Pipeline Failures
… but they cause relatively more ruptures!
European EGIG Natural Gas

Transmission Data
1970-2010
Alan Murray 2017 39

2. Pipeline Standards – Pipeline Failures
Low Frequency but High Consequences = Medium to High Risk
Consequences (and therefore risk) is often greater for geohazards:
• Proportionally more ruptures from geohazards
• In difficult terrain, they are the leading cause of failure
• Remote site access = difficult and costly repairs/clean-up
• Geohazards often occur during or after heavy rains = challenging
access
• Often near rivers = high environmental consequences
• Hazard often remains after pipeline is repaired
• Fortunately, geohazards are less likely to cause injury/death
Alan Murray 2017 40

2. Common Pipeline
Standards
• 4 major onshore pipeline Standards
discuss geohazards:
• USA (ASME B31)
• 31.4 Hydrocarbon and Liquid
Pipelines - 2009
• 31.8 Natural Gas Pipelines -2010
• Canada (Z-662) – 2015
• European (ISO16708)
• In the US the Code of Federal
Regulations CFR 192 and 195 apply
rather than B31
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2. Pipeline Standards- General
• All of the standards discuss geohazards as component
issues, not as standalone items as is the case for
corrosion, welding etc.)
B31.8
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2. Pipeline Standards –
Environmental / Occasional and
Accidental Loads
– In all the standards, geotechnical loads are either
considered as:
– Environmental or Occasional Loads
– Transient Loads
– Environmental or occasional loads are typically
considered as long-term in that they can act in
combination.
– River Scour
– Effect of increased overburden weight following a
large rock slide
– Liquefaction, lateral spreading and earthquake
induced landslides
Alan Murray 2017 43

2. Pipeline Standards – Accidental
Loads
– Accidental loads are typically considered
temporary and are only applied in combination to
the base (or constant) loading condition.
– Earthquake forces
– Increased drag on a free-span during a flood event
– Impact from an individual rock fall
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Some Simple Design Procedures
Alan Murray 2017 45

Slope Stability
• On most hillslopes large quantities of soil and
sediment are moved over time by the actions of air,
water, and ice, often under the direct influence of
gravity. The form a hill slope movement takes is
dependent on the various geomorphic processes
acting on it . The hillslope system receives inputs of
solar radiation, precipitation, solid and dissolved
substances from the atmosphere, and
unconsolidated sediment derived from the
weathering of bedrock.
Alan Murray 2017 46

Slope Stability
• The internal strength of the hill slope system
varies according to the nature of the materials
making up the slope. Slopes composed of
loose materials, like sand and gravel, derive
their internal strength from frictional
resistance which depends on the size, shape,
and arrangement of the particles. Slopes
consisting of clay particles obtain their
internal strength from particle cohesion which
is controlled by the availability of moisture in
the soil. Too much moisture breaks the
cohesive bonds and can turn a solid slope into
a river of mud.
• Rock slopes generally have the greatest
internal strength
Alan Murray 2017 47

Slope Stability
• Many factors can trigger a slope failure. One of the most
common is prolonged or heavy rainfall. Rainfall can lead to
mass movement through three different mechanisms. Often
these mechanisms do not act alone. The saturation of soil
materials increases the weight of slope materials which then
leads to greater gravitational force. Saturation of soil
materials can reduce the cohesive bonds between individual
soil particles resulting in the reduction of the internal
strength of the lslope. Lastly, the presence of bedding planes
in the hillslope material can cause material above a
particular plane below ground level to slide along a surface
lubricated by percolating moisture.
Alan Murray 2017 48

Slope Stability
Materials can move on a hillside through the development of slope instability.
Under these conditions, failure of the slope material can occur on a
range of time scales. Some types of mass movement involve rather rapid,
spontaneous events. Sudden failures tend to occur when the stresses exerted
on the slope materials greatly exceed their strength for short periods of time.
Slow failures often occur when the applied stresses only just exceed
the internal strength of the hill slope system.
Translational Slips
Movement occurs predominantly along more or less planar
or gently undulatory surfaces and is frequently structurally
controlled by discontinuities and variations in shear strength
between layers of bedded deposits
Rotational Slips
movement results from forces that cause a turning moment
about a point above the centre of gravity of the section.
The surface of rupture concaves upwards
Alan Murray 2017 49
Slope Stability
• The sources of the stresses and strength acting within
hillslope materials are gravity and internal friction
respectively.
• A major source of stress is the gravitational force.
• The magnitude of this force is related to the angle of the
slope and the weight of hillslope sediments and rock. The
following equation models this relationship:
F = W sin Ø
• where F is gravitational force, W is the weight of the material
occurring at some point on the slope, and Ø is the angle of
the slope.
Alan Murray 2017 50

Earthquakes
Earthquakes are another mechanism that can trigger

mass movement. The seismic waves produced by the
earthquake vibrates the slope materials causing
failure by increasing the downward stress or by
decreasing the internal strength of the slope
sediments through particle movement. The simplest
way of including seismic effects is to perform a limit
equilibrium analysis where the forces induced by the
earthquake accelerations are treated as a horizontal
force.
Alan Murray 2017 51
Failure Criteria and Shear Strength
Alan Murray 2017 52

Method of slices
• Consider the geometry of the trial slip
circle shown in the diagram. The
slipping mass is divided into slices and
these are numbered 1, 2, 3, etc, for
ease of identification. For a potential
slip circle, the factor of safety against
slip is given by:
•This solution tends to give a conservative value for the factor of safety, of
•between 5 and 20%.
Alan Murray 2017 53
The shear strength of the soil is a function of
the normal stress :
t = c' + s' tan f'
• an = the positive or negative dip angle of the tangent line at the centre of
the slice base (unit: degrees).
•
f' = angle of friction in terms of effective stress (unit: degrees).
•
c' = cohesion in terms of effective stress (unit: kN/m²).
•
Ln = base length of a slice (unit: m).
•
run = pore pressure ratio for slice.
•
Wn = vertical load due to the slice (unit: kN)
•
Alan Murray 2017 54

Pipe Soil Interaction
Alan Murray 2017 55

Free body Diagram of Planar slide
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Keeping the Pipeline Ditch dry is very Important
Diagonal Berm Pattern

Alan Murray 2017 57
“ Herringbone” Berm Pattern
Alan Murray 2017 58
Slope Stability
Slip circle analysis
(method of slices)
can be used to
determine likely failure surf
and hence
safe burial depth
for pipe.
The undrained shear streng
and density of
the soil is needed for
the analysis
Alan Murray 2017 59

Failure Criteria and Shear Strength
Alan Murray 2017 60

Method of slices
• Consider the geometry of the trial slip
circle shown in the diagram. The
slipping mass is divided into slices and
these are numbered 1, 2, 3, etc, for
ease of identification. For a potential
slip circle, the factor of safety against
slip is given by:
•This solution tends to give a conservative value for the factor of safety, of
•between 5 and 20%.
Alan Murray 2017 61
The shear strength of the soil is a function of
the normal stress :
t = c' + s' tan f'
• an = the positive or negative dip angle of the tangent line at the centre of
the slice base (unit: degrees).
•
f' = angle of friction in terms of effective stress (unit: degrees).
•
c' = cohesion in terms of effective stress (unit: kN/m²).
•
Ln = base length of a slice (unit: m).
•
run = pore pressure ratio for slice.
•
Wn = vertical load due to the slice (unit: kN)
•
Alan Murray 2017 62

Pipe Soil Interaction
Alan Murray 2017 63

Free body Diagram of Planar slide
Alan Murray 2017 64

2. Pipeline Standards– Geohazard
Topics
• The standards require consideration of geohazards in both the
design/construction phases as well as in operations
• They do not however recognise the continuity of the issues from
design that can continue into operations
• Key geohazard topics discussed in the Codes:

1. Depth of Cover
2. Water Crossings
3. Ground Movement
4. Seismicity
Alan Murray 2017 65

2. Pipeline Standards - Depth of
Cover
In each of the Codes, the minimum DoC is
specified for design in a table
CSA Z662
Alan Murray 2017 66

2. Pipeline Codes - Water
Crossings
• Water crossings are explicitly mentioned in each of the DoC
tables.
– However all have clauses indicating that other factors
need to be considered. DoC is specified as the design not
the operational minimum
CSA Z662
Alan Murray 2017 67

2. Pipeline Standards - Water
Crossings
CSA
Z662 -15
B31.8
Alan Murray 2017 68

2. Pipeline Standards - Water
CSACrossings
Z662-15
• No specified inspection
interval
Alan Murray 2017 69

2. Pipeline Standards - Slope
Stability
CSA Z662 -15
Alan Murray 2017 70

2. Pipeline Standards -
Seismicity
DNV OS-F101
Alan Murray 2017 71

2. Pipeline Standards -
Seismicity
CSA Z662-15
Alan Murray 2017 72

2. Pipeline Standards– CSA
Z662 – Annex N
• Annex N pertains to pipeline integrity management
systems.
• Provides a method for documenting all forms of risk to a
pipeline once it becomes operational.
• Many jurisdictions have made Annex N mandatory
including the NEB , BC OGC and AER.
Alan Murray 2017 73

2. Pipeline Standards– CSA
Z662 – Annex N
Alan Murray 2017 74

2. Pipeline Standards – CSA
Z662 – Annex N
Alan Murray 2017 75

2. Pipeline Standards – ASME
B31.8S
– Supplement S Managing
System Integrity of
Pipelines
– Similar in principle to CSA
Z662 Annex N
– Considers geohazards as
“Weather-Related and
Outside Force Threats
(Earth Movement, Heavy
Rains Or Floods, Cold
Weather, Lightning)
Alan Murray 2017 76

2. Pipeline Standards –
Conclusions
– Geohazards are less prevalent than many other failure
methods, but lead to proportionally more ruptures.
– All codes recognise that geohazards exist and require
that they be accounted for in design (but do not cover
explicitly how).
– Newer codes are moving towards or have already
mandated that some form of integrity management
program needs to be adopted that incorporates
geohazards (e.g. Annex N or B31.8S).
– Once geohazards are recognised some codes require
that mitigation or monitoring be undertaken.
Alan Murray 2017 77

Where are we?
1. Geohazards
Hazards
Hazards
78 Alan Murray 2017

3.Geohazard Identification
During Routing
Staged approach helps define and maintain project scope and
manage client expectations
Iterative approach due to multiple stakeholders, so
Geohazard input is required at all Stages
The goals at all Stages are to:
• steer the pipeline around, over, and under geohazards OR
• design for them
• provide accurate geohazard information to support the
estimation of construction costs and support environmental
permitting
Alan Murray 2017 79

3.Pipeline Routing – 4 Stages
Final Engineering
Map/Drawing
Class Corridor Design (Cost Tasks Goals/Deliverables
Scale
Width Estimates)
Scoping •Office study only

1. Route Regional: •Landform classification
•Define start, end and
Appraisal Pre-Feasibility map/table
1:25,000 to ≤ 10 km “pass” points
•Identify potential
Pre-FEED, FEL1 •Collect published maps
($10,000s) 1:500,000 geohazard “showstoppers”
(± 50%) and imagery
Conceptual •Acquire new satellite

2. Route Medium: imagery and airphotos •Build a terrain map and
Selection Feasibility
1:10,000 to ≤ 500 m •Conduct helicopter, geohazard/crossing
Pre-FEED, FEL2 vehicle, and ATV field inventory
($100,000s) 1:25,000
(± 30%) reconnaissance
•Acquire new airphotos
3. Route and LIDAR •Prepare typical basic
Definition Large: Basic
•Conduct subsurface engineering drawings at
1:2,500 to ≤ 100 m FEED, FEL3 investigations, 1:25 to 1:250 scale
($1,000,000s) 1:10,000 (± 15%) instrumentation, and
monitoring
•Start RoW and •Develop special crossing
4. Route Detailed: Detailed centerline survey designs
Optimization •Conduct slope stability •Create access, grading,
1:500 to ≤ 50 m (± 5%) and scour analysis trenching, dewatering,
($100,000s) 1:2,500 •Continue geohazard sediment control plans
monitoring •Define centerline
Alan Murray 2017 80

3.Pipeline Routing – Stage 1 –
Route Appraisal
< 10 km wide
corridor
Alan Murray 2017 81

3.Pipeline Routing – Stage 2
≤ 500 m wide corridor
Avoid “show-stoppers”
Minimize exposure to geohazards
Identify sections requiring detailed
investigations
Alan Murray 2017 82

3.Pipeline Routing – Stage 3 –
Route Definition
Alan Murray 2017 83

3. Pipeline Routing – Q & A
Ideally, what Stage should your new
pipeline project be at if you:
• were considering buying LiDAR topographic data?
• had a defined pipeline centerline?
• had a geohazard inventory?
• had construction cost estimates accurate to ± 15%?
• had basic engineering designs of select watercourse crossings?
• had not reviewed the route in the field?
• had > 2 corridors?
• required it to be operational in 3 years?
Alan Murray 2017 84

Where are we?
1. Geohazards
2. Pipeline Codes
4. Managing Geotechnical
Hazards
Hazards
85 Alan Murray 2017

4. Managing Geotechnical Hazards
So you have a high or very high likelihood of impact geotechnical

hazard – What’s next?
– Step 1: Characterize the Hazard
– Step 2: Estimate and Evaluate the Risk
– Step 3: Decide on an Action
• Monitoring
• Mitigation
Alan Murray 2017 86

4. Managing Geotechnical Hazards –
Characterising the Hazard
– Size – large
– Velocity – slow
– Mechanism - rock slide, toppling?
– Trigger – very steep slope, groundwater?
– Impact on pipe – high
– Impact on people - low
– Consequences to pipe – rupture?
– Access - difficult.
Alan Murray 2017 87

Estimating Risk
Risk = Probability x Consequence
= P(H) x P(S) x P(T) x V x E
Where, P(H) = probability of hazard occurring,
P(S) = probability of spatial impact
P(T) = probability of temporal impact,

usually P(T) = 1
V = vulnerability (degree of damage)
E = replacement cost of pipeline
Alan Murray 2017 88
Estimating Probability
• Probability of the hazard Probability
Indices
occurring can be evaluated as a Likelihood Descriptions Range
Event can reasonably be
subjective index or with a (semi) expected to occur at least once A Very Likely >0.9
per year
quantitative assessment Event typically occurs every few
years B Likely 0.1 to 0.9
• Can incorporate: Moderate chance of event

occurring w ithin the lifetime of a C Moderate 0.01 to 0.1
• Temporal probability 40 yr facility
Event unlikely to occur w ithin the
• Spatial impact lifetime of a 40 yr facility D Unlikely 0.001 to 0.01
• Probabilities can be different for Event very unlikely to occur

w ithin the lifetime of a 40 yr E Very Unlikely 0.0001 to 0.001
differing objects being impacted facility
Event is possible but is extremely
unlikely to occur w ithin the F Extremely Unlikely <0.0001
• People, vehicles lifetime of a 40 yr facility
• In-place assets
Estimating Consequence
6 5 4 3 2 1
Indices
Incidental Minor Moderate Major Severe Catastrophic
Minor w orkforce Workforce lost- Workforce long- Workforce Multiple Multiple
injury; no public time accident; no term disability; fatality; serious w orkforce w orkforce
Safety impact public impact minor public public injury fatalities (<10); fatalities (>10);
injury public fatality multiple public
fatalities
Insignificant Localized short- Localized long- w idespread long- Widespread Loss of a
term impact; term impact; term impact; impact; not significant
Environment recovery w ithin recoverable recoverable recoverable portion of a
days or w eeks w ithin the lifetime w ithin the lifetime w ithin the lifetime valued species
of the project of the project of the project
Negligible; no Some asset loss; Serious asset Major asset loss; Severe asset Total loss of
business minimal business loss; up to 1 day up to 1 w eek loss; up to 1 asset; >1 month
Economic interruption; interruption; business business month business business
<$10,000 <$100,000 interruption; interruption; interruption; interruption;
<$1M <$10M <$100M >$100M
Negligible impact Slight impact; Local publicity; National publicity; International May threaten
recoverable recoverable temporary publicity; long- corporation's
Reputation w ithin days w ithin w eeks (w eeks to term (years) loss survival
months) loss of of market share
market share
Alan Murray 2017 90

Evaluating Risk
Risk Evaluation and Response
VH Very High Risk is imminent; short-term risk reduction required; long-term risk
reduction plan must be developed and implemented
H High Risk is unnacceptable; long-term risk reduction plan must be developed

and implemented in a reasonable time f rame. Planning should begin
immediately
M Moderate Risk may be tolerable; more detailed review required; reduce risk to As
Low As Reasonably Practicable
Likelihood Descriptions and Indices
(Likelihood of Negative Outcome) L Low Risk is tolerable; continue to monitor and reduce risk to As Low As
Reasonably Practicable
Probability VL Very Low Risk is broadly acceptable; no f urther review or risk reduction required
Indices
Likelihood Descriptions Range
Event can reasonably be
expected to occur at least once A Very Likely >0.9 M H H VH VH VH
per year
Event typically occurs every f ew
years B Likely 0.1 to 0.9 L M H H VH VH
Moderate chance of event
occurring w ithin the lif etime of a C Moderate 0.01 to 0.1 L L M H H VH
40 yr f acility
Event unlikely to occur w ithin the
lif etime of a 40 yr f acility D Unlikely 0.001 to 0.01 VL L L M H H
Event very unlikely to occur
w ithin the lif etime of a 40 yr E Very Unlikely 0.0001 to 0.001 VL VL L L M H
f acility
Event is possible but is extremely
unlikely to occur w ithin the F Extremely Unlikely <0.0001 VL VL VL L L M
lif etime of a 40 yr f acility
6 5 4 3 2 1
Indices
Incidental Minor Moderate Major Severe Catastrophic
Consequence Descriptions and Indices
Minor w orkf orce Workf orce lost- Workf orce long- Workf orce Multiple Multiple
injury; no public time accident; no term disability; f atality; serious w orkf orce w orkf orce
Safety impact public impact minor public public injury f atalities (<10); f atalities (>10);
injury public f atality multiple public
f atalities
Insignif icant Localized short- Localized long- w idespread long- Widespread Loss of a
term impact; term impact; term impact; impact; not signif icant
Environment recovery w ithin recoverable recoverable recoverable portion of a
days or w eeks w ithin the lif etime w ithin the lif etime w ithin the lif etime valued species
of the project of the project of the project
Negligible; no Some asset loss; Serious asset Major asset loss; Severe asset Total loss of
business minimal business loss; up to 1 day up to 1 w eek loss; up to 1 asset; >1 month
Economic interruption; interruption; business business month business business
<$10,000 <$100,000 interruption; interruption; interruption; interruption;
<$1M <$10M <$100M >$100M
Negligible impact Slight impact; Local publicity; National publicity; International May threaten
recoverable recoverable temporary publicity; long- corporation's
Reputation w ithin days w ithin w eeks (w eeks to term (years) loss survival
months) loss of of market share
market share
Alan Murray 2017 91

Risk Control
Pre-mitigation risk
Risk $ Mitigation
Costs $
goal
Tolerable Costs to achieve

acceptable level
Residual of risk
Risk
Alan Murray 2017 92

Select an Action…
Inspections, Monitoring, or Mitigation?
• Inspect from the air or from the ground
• Monitoring with instruments to quantify effect on pipe
• Shut down the hazard
• Protect the Pipe
• (Re)move Hazard
• (Re)move Pipe
• Do Nothing
Alan Murray 2017 93

Monitoring Instruments
– Part of a site specific investigation
– Variety of tools to quantify effect of hazard on pipe
• Surface Monitoring Network (ground surface)
• Extensometers or tilt plates (ground surface)
• Settlement plates (ground surface)
• Slope inclinometers (ground subsurface)
• Pore pressure transducers / standpipes (ground
subsurface)
• Strain gauges (on the pipeline)
• Inline Inspection Tools (ILI) - Geopig
Alan Murray 2017 94

Monitoring Instruments (cont'd)
• Surface Monitoring Network
• Allow for periodic
measurements to be taken at
numerous locations
• Low technology – low cost
• Provide quantitative values
rather than subjective
assessments
• Can make comparisons over
different years and with
different staff
Blue River, BC, Canada
4.METHODS OF LANDSLIDE
INVESTIGATION AND MONITORING
Landslide Measurement Effects of Ground
▪ Visual Review Movement Measurement
▪ Surficial
▪ Strain Gages
▪ Total Station Surveying
▪ GPS Surveying ▪ Vibrating Wire
▪ InSAR Surveying ▪ Fiber optics

▪ Slope Extensometers
▪ GeoPig® Monitoring
▪ Subsurface
▪ Slope Inclinometers ▪ Initial pass
▪ Subsequent passes
Alan Murray 2017 96

SURVEYING (Common to Total Station
and GPS)
Must have monuments
set up for both methods. Smooth steel bars
–base station(s) on Base station

stable ground
–monuments on the
landslide
Stable
Typically use a base Ground
station and driven
smooth steel bars or Landslide
another frost resistant
monument in landslide
area. In both methods, the monuments are
surveyed at selected intervals of time.
Alan Murray 2017 97
Soil Strainmeter
Typical applications include:

Monitoring horizontal strain on embankment and
slopes
Monitoring tension cracks in earth structures.
Alan Murray 2017 98

Soil Strainmeter
• The soil strainmeter employs a potentiometer and a

rod mounted between two anchors to monitor
horizontal movements of the surrounding soil.
These components are linked together so that
movement of one anchor relative to the other
causes a change in the output of the potentiometer.
The initial reading of the strainmeter is used as a
datum. Subsequent readings are compared to the
datum to calculate the magnitude, rate, and
acceleration of movement.
Alan Murray 2017 99

Slope Extensometers
• Generally defined as an installation that
runs along the surface of the slide (typically
parallel to the direction of movement).
• Measures the overall deformation along
the total length of the slide.
• Particularly useful when slides suddenly
flow or move rapidly when an alarm is
required
Alan Murray 2017 100

Slope Extensometers (Principle)
Wire is not
anchored behind Next Slide
Zero expansion wire main scarp of slide
run through a flexible
PVC pipe on surface
of slide. PVC Pipe is
staked to slide surface.
LANDSLIDE
Wire is anchored at
toe of slide
If the slope moves
Pipeline
there will be some
bulking (volume
expansion of ground)
Slope Extensometers
Example of Installation behind
main scarp of slide
Installation Pulley Switch to
trigger alarm
(cont’d) •Light
•Siren
•Phone alert
Zero-
•Other
Expansion
wire
Measurement
Scale
Flexible PVC
pipe Weight
Stake
Stand
Stable Ground
Slope Extensometers
Monitoring installation
Anchor
This is what a monitoring
installation would look like
installed on the slope Alan Murray 2017 103
Slope Inclinometers (Basics)

SLOPE INCLINOMETERS (Installation)

SLOPE INCLINOMETERS (Installation)
Grouting Ground
equipment:
Grout
Grout fills annular
space between SI
SI pipe
pipe and borehole
walls Alan Murray 2017 106
Monitoring Instruments)
Slope Inclinometers

• Can be installed as part of a
slope inclinometer system.
• Provides indication of
settlement or heave.
• Portable system.
• Magnetic targets are anchored to the ground around either

a PVC pipe, standpipe or inclinometer casing.
• Probe is lowered down hole and buzzes when it passes the
magnet. Depth is read off of the tape.
• Datum magnet is installed in stable ground (typically at
base of borehole.
Slope Inclinometers (Pipe Configuration)
Assumed direction of
The probe is passed
slide movement
along the A direction
groves. Note most
A0
new probes have two
sets of accelerometers
in them oriented at
180 degrees;
Milled
therefore, do not have
groves
to pass probe in B B180 B0
direction groves

A180
SLOPE INCLINOMETERS (Probes)
SI probe: runs down A 2 sets of

direction groves in SI Accelerometers
pipe. in here (A and B
directions)

SLOPE INCLINOMETERS (DATA)
Three Main Types of Plots
Cumulative displacement: Shows the cumulative
displacements of the hole profile when compared to
the initial reading profile
Incremental displacement: Shows the incremental
change at each measuring interval. As an example,
will see a spike at the slip surface if moving.
Velocity plot (aka Time Plot): Shows a plot of
displacement vs. time plot for a specific increment
within an SI. Alan Murray 2017 111
SLOPE INCLINOMETERS (DATA)
Cumulative Displacement Incremental Displacement
Generally represents changes in profile of Good for determining depth of slip surface
SI pipe (surface of rupture)
Alan Murray 2017 Same depth 112

SLOPE INCLINOMETER (DATA)
VELOCITY PLOTS
Measures the difference between

No movement
displacements at two selected points,
lower point is stable ground, upper
point is above surface of rupture 113
Alan Murray 2017
STRAIN GAGES (Vibrating Wire)
Strain Gage Strain Sensor
Readout Box gage
spot
welded
to pipe
Strain gage
Strain gage
sensor

Settlement Cells
A settlement cell consists of a liquid reservoir, liquid-filled tubing, and the settlement cell,
which contains a pressure transducer. One end of the tubing is connected to the settlement
cell, which is embedded in fill or installed in a borehole. The other end of the tubing is
connected to the reservoir, which is located away from the construction area.
The transducer measures the pressure created by the column of liquid in the tubing. As the
transducer settles with the surrounding ground, the height of the column is increased and
the settlement cell measures higher pressure.

• Photo of remote station
Central data collection

centre and weather
station

Where are we?
1. Geohazards
2. Pipeline Codes
Hazards
Hazards
117 Alan Murray 2017

5. Mitigating Geohazards –
Select an Action…
Inspections, Monitoring or
Mitigation?
• Inspect from the air or from the
ground
• Monitoring with instruments to
quantify effect on pipe
• Stop or slow down the hazard
• Protect the Pipe
• (Re)move Hazard
• (Re)move Pipe
• Do Nothing
reducing the Hazard
Reduce the likelihood of occurrence (activity)
by:
– External Support
• Unloading the slope crest
• Supporting the slope toe
– Internal Support:
• bolts, anchors, walls, piles, geosynthetics, etc.
– Minimize effect of the trigger:
• Control the surface water
• Control the groundwater
• Remove the human impact

5. Mitigating Geohazards – reducing the
Hazard)
Unloading the
slope crest to
reduce the
driving forces.
Tucuman, Argentina

Hazard
Supporting
slope toe to
increase the
resisting forces.
Salmo, SE BC

– Detailed Analysis of Mitigation Options

– Slope stability analysis conducted on current
conditions and on mitigation alternatives

• Construction Drawings Developed

• Construction drawings developed based on results from
detailed analysis

Hazard(cont'd)
Creston, SE British Columbia
Controlling surface water

. Herringbone Berm Pattern
Figure 2-15. Diagonal Berm Pattern
7. Mitigating Geohazards

7. Mitigating Geohazards

Hazard
Manage groundwater flow with a ditch plug

Protecting the Pipe
• Rock fall nets
• Rip rap (rock)
• Heavy walled pipe
• Sleeves
Vancouver Island, SW BC, Canada

Protecting the Pipe (cont'd)
Rock fall nets
• Useful where ditch is narrow and slope stabilization is cost prohibitive
Fraser Canyon, SW BC, Canada

Concrete apron
Concrete coated pipe,

Squamish, SW BC, Canada
Naramata, SC BC, Canada

Sleeves - to reduce drag on the pipe if the ground moves
Mackenzie, BC, Canada Rock Shield, to protect pipe from dents

Move the Pipe
• Remove the pipeline from
the path of the hazard by:
• Increasing the horizontal
separation from the hazard
• HDD or deep burial
• Re-route the pipe ?
• Expose and support the
pipe
• Aerial crossing
Restore the RoW
• Increase the lateral
distance from the pipeline
to the hazard.
• Restore accessibility to
sites located further along
the RoW that would be
isolated if the geohazard
was not managed.
GRS Wall, Fernie, BC

Gabions and Soil Reinforcement
Move the Pipe (cont'd)
HDD and deep burial to avoid geohazards

Move the Pipe (con’t)
Exposed and support pip on
skids or rollers
Above ground Supports in an unstable earth zone
Telkwa Pass, NW BC, Canada

5. Mitigating Geohazards - Aerial
Crossings
139
Alan Murray 2017
Do Nothing
“Do nothing” or “status quo” is an acceptable

method of risk management for geotechnical
hazards provided the risks (probability x
consequences) are understood and considered
acceptable by the pipeline operator.

8. Conclusions - Geohazards
– 3 main geohazards classes – hydrotechnical,
geotechnical and seismic
– Geohazards are dynamic.
• Their frequency of occurrence and affect on the
pipeline varies from season to season
– Regular inspection of hazard sites is required to
maintain good pipeline integrity
– Geohazards have a low to medium frequency of
occurrence but pose a high risk to the pipeline.

8. Conclusions -
Standards
– All pipeline Standards recognise that geohazards exist.
– Newer standards are moving towards or have already
mandated that some form of integrity management
program needs to be adopted that incorporates
geohazards.
– Most standards require that multiple loading scenarios
are evaluated during design.
– Once geohazards are recognised some standards
require that mitigation or monitoring be undertaken.

8. Conclusions – Pipeline
Routing
– A staged framework is required to ensure the
pipeline project proceeds as efficiently and
economically as possible
– Geohazards need to be assessed in Stages 1
and 2 of the project to ensure that no
embarrassing and expensive re-routes are
required later.
– Avoiding geohazards is the best solution,
especially in the long term.

8. Conclusions – Geohazards
Managment Program
– Helps operations allocate resources to
geohazards that need the most attention
– Creating an audit trail prevents hazard sites
from “falling through the cracks”
– Proactivity is critical - hazards are identified
managed before an incident occurs
– Characterise the hazard and its effect on
the pipe before acting
– There are other options besides mitigation

Geotechnical, Risk, and
Pipeline References
• Australian Geomechanics Society, Subcommittee on Landslide Risk
Management, 2000, “Landslide Risk Management Concepts and
Guidelines”, Australian Geomechanics, p 49-92.
• Canadian Standards Association, 1997, CAN/CSA-Q850-97, Risk
Management: Guidelines for Decision-Makers.
• Cavers, D., 1998. Use of surface pipeline segments to mitigate slide
problems on the Fort Nelson natural gas mainline. IPC 1998 ASME , New
York, pp 151-158.
• Cornforth, D.H. 2005, Landslides In Practice: Investigation, analysis and
remedial/preventative options in soils, John Wiley and Sons New York 596p
• Hengish, J. V. et al. 2004. A systematic approach for mitigating geohazards
in pipeline design and construction. Proc. IPC 2004, 5th International
Pipeline Conference, ASME, New York.

Pipeline References
• IPLOCA 2009. Onshore Pipelines, The Road to Success. Volume 1.
International Pipeline and Offshore Contractors Association. 376 p
• Keaton, J.R. and Gailing, R. W. 2004. Monitoring slope deformation with
quadrilaterals for pipeline risk management. Proc. IPC 2004, 5th
International Pipeline Conference, ASME, New York.
• Leir, M., 2009. Geohazard integrity management program for onshore
pipelines. Proceedings, 9th Rights-of-Way Symposium, Utility Arborist
Association.
• Leir, M. 2004. Bridging the gap between field operations and risk
management, Proceedings, Terrain and Geohazard Challenges Facing
Onshore Pipelines, Thomas Telford, London.
• Leir, M., Reed, M, and Yaremko, E., 2004. Field inspection module for
hydrotechnical hazards. Proc. IPC 2004, 5th International Pipeline
Conference, ASME, New York.

Pipeline References
• Leir, M.C., and Reed, M, 2002. Natural hazard database application – A tool
for pipeline decision makers. Proc. IPC 2002, 4th International Pipeline
Conference, ASME New York
• Marshall, R.G. and Ruban, T. F. 1983, Geotechnical aspects of pipeline
construction in Alberta. Canadian Geotechnical Journal, Vol. 20 pg 1-10.
• Muhlbauer, W.K. 2004. Pipeline Risk Management Manual, 3rd edition,
Elsevier, Oxford UK, 395 p.
• Nyman, D.J., Lee, M. E., Audibert, J. M.E. 2008. Mitigating geohazards for
international pipeline projects: Challenges and lessons learned. Proc. IPC
2002, 7th International Pipeline Conference, ASME New York.
• Oswell, J. 2002. Geotechnical aspects of northern pipeline design and
construction. Proc. IPC 2002, 4th International Pipeline Conference, ASME
New York
• Popescu, M., 2001. A suggested method for reporting landslide remedial
measures. Bulletin of Engineering Geology and the Environment, 60: pp 69-74.

Pipeline References
• Porter, M., Reale, R., Marcuz, G., and Savigny, K.W. 2006. Geohazard risk
management for the Nor Andino gas pipeline. Proc. IPC 2006 6th
International Pipeline Conference, ASME, New York
• Porter, M, and Savigny, K.W., 2002, Natural Hazard and Risk Management
for South American Pipelines, Proc. IPC 2002, 4th International Pipeline
Conference, ASME, New York.
• Savigny, K.W., Porter, M., Chen, J., Yaremko, E., Reed, M., and Urquhart,
G., 2002, Natural Hazard and Risk Management for Pipelines, Proc., IPC
2002, 4th International Pipeline Conference, ASME, New York.
• Turner, A.K. and Schuster, R.L., (eds.), Landslides, Investigation and
Mitigation, Transportation Research Board Special Report 247, National
Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.
• Wise, M.P., G.D. Moore, and D.F. VanDine (editors). 2004. Landslide risk
case studies in forest development planning and operations. British
Columbia Ministry of Forests Resources Branch, Victoria, B.C. Land
Management Handbook., No. 56.

Module 3 Geotechnical Hazards

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Module 3 Geotechnical Hazards

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Design Evaluation Assessment

for Natural Gas Transport

Alan Murray 2017 1

Where are we? Geotechnical Considerations

Limit States Design

Alan Murray 2017 2

Objective : To obtain a good understanding of the methods

Alan Murray 2017 4

5 Alan Murray 2017

The Head of a Rotational Slip

Alan Murray 2017 7

width, depth, slope, meander = Fn [flow, sediment load]

Change one of the variables and one or more of the others

Alan Murray 2017 10

• In Alberta in 2012 an oil pipeline failed in a large waterway

• Flood warning was issued by the government but no actions

Alan Murray 2017 11

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– General lowering of the channel bed

Arrow Creek, Chetwynd, BC 2009

Alan Murray 2017 15

Freeman East Tributary, Swan Hills, AB

Bear River, Cynthia, AB Bear River, Cynthia, AB

Alan Murray 2017 17

• Hydrotechnical hazard sites are

Bank erosion is responsible for most of the exposed pipelines.

Alan Murray 2017 23

Terrace, NW BC, Canada

Chase, SC BC, Canada

Denali Fault, Alaska, Nov. 2002

Alan Murray 2017 31

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1. What are the three types of geohazards?

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37 Alan Murray 2017

Outside / Third Party

European EGIG Natural Gas

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Earthquakes are another mechanism that can trigger

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Diagonal Berm Pattern

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• Key geohazard topics discussed in the Codes:

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