Asian Affairs

ISSN: 0306-8374 (Print) 1477-1500 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/raaf20

Asean countries in political and economic

perspectives

Ji Guoxing

To cite this article: Ji Guoxing (1987) Asean countries in political and economic perspectives,
Asian Affairs, 18:2, 157-166, DOI: 10.1080/03068378708730264

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03068378708730264

Published online: 24 Aug 2007.

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 ASEAN COUNTRIES IN POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
JI GUOXING
The author is a Senior Fellow at the Shanghai Institute for International
Studies, People's Republic of China. He worked as Research Associate at
the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, from
July 1985 to September 1986. This paper was written for the second joint
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conference between these two Institutes, which was held at Berkeley 15-18
September 1986.

ASEAN COUNTRIES achieved spectacular economic successes and attained

political stability during the last two decades, but have met with new
problems since 1985, with economic decadence emerging, political insta-
bility on the increase, and economic and political structural fragility ever
more perceptible. At present they are all in periods of political and eco-
nomic transition. Whether they will have smooth transitions within the
next few years, with economic difficulties surmounted, certain growth
rates maintained, and political stability prolonged, has been a topic of
common concern.

Problems and Causes

Since the 1960s ASEAN countries have pursued an economic develop-
ment strategy of achieving economic plurality and high growth through
industrialization, and have won remarkable results. The proportion of
their industry in the national economy has been upgraded by a big
margin, with the development of manufacturing industry particularly out-
standing; unitary economic structure has been greatly changed; their eco-
nomic growth rate has been first on the list among the world's developing
countries; and all have been classified as "middle-income economies" by
the World Bank. For example, Singapore had set up by the 1970s
technology-intensive and capital-intensive industries with refineries, elec-
tronics, electric appliances, ship-repairing and ship-building as the main-
stay. Malaysia has built up such new industries as electronics, electric
appliances, refineries, and iron and steel, with its export of semiconductors
in first place in the world. Thailand has shifted from the initial develop-
ment of import-substitute industries to export-oriented industries, and has
been engaged in the production and export of labour-intensive industries
such as clothing, electronics, furniture and shoe-making. The Philippines
has established numerous export-oriented industrial projects and pro-
cessing areas. Indonesia has developed her oil and gas industry, making it
the main source of financial income.
However, since 1985 ASEAN countries one after another have experi-
enced economic recession, with exports shrinking, economic growth rate
 158 ASEAN COUNTRIES IN PERSPECTIVES
declining, enterprises going bankrupt, and unemployment rates rising. For
example, Singapore's GDP in 1985 registered a decline of 1-8%; its budget
deficit for fiscal 1985 was around SS1-254 billion; and unemployment
among Singaporean workers rose to 4-9% at the end of 1985, the highest
level since the early 1970s.1 Malaysia's economic growth in 1985 was
5-2% down from the previous year's 7-6%.2 The Philippines' GNP
growth in 1985 showed a 4% decline, following a 5% decline in 1984; its
per capita income in 1985 declined some 14% since 1983; and its total
exports in 1985 were estimated to decrease 14-15%, and the trade deficit
for 1985 to be $700 million.3 Thailand's economic growth declined to 4%
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compared with an annual average of 7% in the 1960s and 1970s.4 In

Indonesia, the number of workers laid off in 1985 rose 8.9% from 1984 to
35,125; and 27-8% of the 1-8 million workers who entered the labour
market in 1985 failed to find employment.5 Revenue and expenditure in
these countries has also deteriorated, with Indonesia and the Philippines
among the ten largest debtor countries in the world.
The primary cause of economic recession in ASEAN countries is their
economies' heavy dependence on foreign countries. Due to their stress on
development of export-oriented industry, their economies are easily
affected when the developed countries fall into long-term economic stag-
nation, when trade protectionism gains ground, and when foreign invest-
ments and export requirements decrease. Their economies are affected
particularly by the US and Japan because of their immense dependence on
US and Japanese markets. Take electronics for example; the strong
demand in 1984 for electronic components and computer accessories in
world markets, especially in the US, stimulated respectively a 10.1% and
12% increase in manufacturing production in Singapore and Malaysia;
and the decline in demand for computers in US market since 1985 has hit
the Singaporean and Malaysian electronic industry. Trade protectionist
measures in US and Japan have also severely affected the textile and light
industry exports of these countries. The recent US pronouncement on
abrogation of duty-free import preferences of multiple goods from
developing countries has made the trade environment more unfavourable
to ASEAN countries. Besides, external dependence is also manifested in
dependence on neighbouring countries, particularly in Singapore. The
resort by neighbouring countries to direct trading by-passing Singapore
has harmed Singapore's economy. The introduction of exit taxes by
Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, and the introduction by Malay-
sia of a 50% tax on goods bought by residents and brought in. from
Singapore,6 has been very damaging to Singapore. Singapore is the
second largest investor after Japan in Malaysia, concentrating on food
manufacturing, transport equipment, textiles and clothing. The shrinkage
of Singapore's economy naturally reduces its investment in Malaysia.
The second cause for the ASEAN economic recession is that the basic
structure of production and export of primary products in these countries
(Singapore not included) has not been changed. When the supply of
primary products exceeds demand in world markets, with downward
prices and worsening trade conditions, they are victims. Rubber, palm oil,
 ASEAN COUNTRIES IN PERSPECTIVES 159
and tin are Malaysia's chief exports. In October 1985 when the world
rubber price fell 10% below the previous year, the palm oil price dropped
41%, and the London Metal Exchange suspended tin business, almost
resulting in the collapse of the tin market, Malaysia's economy was severe-
ly hurt. Rice is Thailand's chief export. In recent years as Asian countries
have had good rice harvests, and traditional Thai export markets such as
India and Indonesia have become self-sufficient in rice production, the
demand for Thai rice in world market has declined; and with developed
economies such as US participating in rice competition, Thailand has
been beset with difficulties in rice export.
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The third cause for the recession is that the slump of world oil price
since early 1986 has immeasurably reduced foreign exchange earnings by
ASEAN oil-producing countries. Seventy per cent of Indonesia's export
revenue comes from oil and natural gas; twenty per cent of Malaysia's
government revenue comes from oil export; and Brunei depends heavily
on oil as well. Singapore, though without oil resources, ranks third in
world oil refining, and its petrochemical industry has been harmed.

Economic Prospects
In the face of economic recession in ASEAN countries, there are
roughly three different perceptions of ASEAN's economic prospects over
the next few years. First, in view of the quick recovery of the US and
Japanese economies and of ASEAN's strong capability for surmounting
difficulties, their economies may enter into another period of prosperity in
the next few years, and be restored to the economic development level of
the prosperous years. This is an optimistic perspective. Second, because
the US and Japanese economies will find it difficult to rise up again, and
ASEAN's difficulties at this time are unusual, ASEAN's prosperous times
are gone once and for all. This is a pessimistic perspective. The third
perspective is that the US and Japanese economies will recover to a
certain extent, and that the ASEAN countries will overcome their diffi-
culties to a certain degree, maintain a certain economic growth, and
remain one of the dynamic areas in the world. This middle ground
between optimism and pessimism, seems to adhere more closely to the
facts and to be more realistic.
To estimate ASEAN economic prospects, one must first have an
appropriate appraisal of developed economies, especially that of the US.
The western capitalist economy has now been in the stage of long-wave
recession, neither able to resurge nor recess continuously, but making an
undulating advance. Both recessions and resurgences are on a small scale,
for short periods, and with shortened cyclicity. Western capitalism has
entered into a long-wave recession since the economic crisis of 1973, and
might not get out of it until the end of this century. The general trend is
low growth, with annual GNP growth around 3%. The US is projected to
reach 3%, but not below 2%. Japan might reach 4%. Although the US
policies of high exchange and high interest rates two years ago attracted
foreign capital and stimulated economic development (the growth rate in
 160 ASEAN COUNTRIES IN PERSPECTIVES
1984 was 6-6%), it has also made itself a net debtor nation, with a foreign
debt of $1,000 billion. The heavy debt caused by high exchange and high
interest rates have seriously affected the US economy. It would be difficult
for the US to have a 1984-type growth within the next few years. Export-
oriented ASEAN economies mainly dependent on the US market will find
it hard to benefit from the US.
Second, one must have an appropriate appraisal of the difficulties
confronting ASEAN at this time. The difficulties, though not
insurmountable, can not be easily overcome within a short time. All
ASEAN countries are in economic transition, and are making adjust-
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ments. But one needs to see whether they can undergo the transition
smoothly.
As in the case of Singapore, besides dependence on foreign countries,
policy errors are partial reasons. Singapore has pursued policies of high
wage, high tax and high cost in an attempt to eliminate labour-intensive
industries. The wage bill increased more than 10% a year between 1979
and 1984 when annual productivity gains averaged 4-6%,7 i.e. wages
increased at more than twice the productivity rate, resulting in high-cost
products and incompetence in comparison with South Korea, Taiwan,
Hong Kong, and other areas. Moreover, since 1979 in order to promote
mechanization, automation, and computerization, Singapore has begun
" the Second Industrial Revolution " to develop technology-intensive and
knowledge-intensive industries in an effort to become the high tech centre
in Southeast Asia and to provide service to the world high tech develop-
ments. But because its scientific and research institutions are lacking.in
ability to make a big breakthrough in high tech, and because the world
high tech industry is in a depressed state for the time being, Singapore has
not been able to hold its ground in high tech markets while it has yielded
its original low-cost markets to South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan.
This concept, though good, has been put into practice at a too rapid pace.
Now Singapore is adopting emergency measures to reduce wages, taxes,
and production costs, and to encourage private investment. The measures
stipulate a wage freeze for two years, and a wage cut in the third year if
there are no improvements; a reduction in personal income taxes, lower-
ing the maximum rate on a graduated scale from 40% to 33%; and an
increase of property-tax rebate of 50% of tax payable from the current
30%. In the short term, these measures may help, but are unlikely to be
enough for another era of prosperity. As to the development of high tech,
the Singaporean authorities still regard it as "the key to future
prosperity". Although the depression in the US electronics industry is
temporary, automation is being developed in many countries, the demand
for computers is far from being saturated, and microelectronics is prom-
ising, it is difficult for Singapore successfully to occupy the high tech
market. The economic transition in Singapore is taking place at a time of
great world economic uncertainty. If the transition takes longer than
expected, it is hard to expect Singapore's economy to achieve bigger
growth figures over the next few years.
 ASEAN COUNTRIES IN PERSPECTIVES 161
In other ASEAN countries, economic structural problems are con-
spicuous. With weak economic bases, they depend on exports of primary
products, and on exports of textile and electronics products as well. A
comparatively long period is needed to change this situation. Now they
stress the improvement of primary product processing, innovations in the
manufacturing industry, and multiple economic development. Making use
of local resources, their rubber, food, metallurgical and petrochemical
industries will be greatly expanded. Malaysia is putting emphasis on the
manufacturing industry, whose output share is expected to increase from
today's 19-1% to 20-5% in 1990 to make commodity manufactures first in
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export, with oil, gas, and agricultural produce receding to second and
third. Thailand is developing its eastern areas to set up many heavy and
basic industrial projects, and expanding such consumer goods industries
as paper-making, fertilizer, refinery, rubber, cement and agricultural
machinery to serve domestic markets. Indonesia plans to develop new
industries such as shipbuilding, electronics, and aircraft assembly besides
the industries mainly using local materials. With respect to measures, they
all stress the utilization of domestic private capital. Malaysia has pro-
claimed a lessening of state intervention and control of economic activities
so as to "liberalize" financial activities, and Indonesia has decided to
loosen financial control and to promote the development of private
economy. Moreover, more openness to foreign investment is indicated.
The Malaysian government intends further to woo foreign investors, dras-
tically cutting back 30% restrictions on foreign equity ownership that
were intended to increase bumiputra holdings. The ASEAN countries
have adjusted their economic targets as well. Malaysian. Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamad announced a sobering four-year blueprint for
Malaysian development (the Fifth Plan) that forsees slower growth and
estimates the economy expanding at only 3% a year.8 With oil revenues
based on estimates of S25 per barrel in 1986, without expecting a slump of
below $15 a barrel, Indonesia has had to slash its budgets, cutting billions
of dollars from projects.
Therefore, within the next 3-5 years, under the conditions of long-term
recession facing the developed economies, it is impossible for the ASEAN
countries, despite their arduous efforts, to regain the growth rate of 1960s
and 1970s (annual increases in GNP between 6-5-7.5%, and sometimes
over 8%), and to bring forth "another prosperity"; but because of their
vitality and adaptability, they are estimated not to decline to the 2-3%
low growth rate. The probability is the maintenance of a medium growth
rate between 3-5%, and an undulate advance along with the world
economy.

Political Prospects
ASEAN countries are now in political transition. There are different
perspectives as well in their political future. The optimistic perspective is
 162 ASEAN COUNTRIES IN PERSPECTIVES
that the stability of ASEAN countries, which has lasted for more than
twenty years, will continue to exist, and that no turmoil will take place.
People of this view underestimate the factors of instability. The pessimistic
perspective is that unstable domestic factors in ASEAN countries are
increasing, and that the period of political stability has gone. People with
this view lack confidence particularly in Corazon Aquino's new govern-
ment in the Philippines, regarding it as an " uncertainty ". The third per-
spective calls for a comprehensive analysis of the situation, taking into
consideration both the stabilizing forces and existing unstable factors -
both optimistic and pessimistic - so as to strive for a better future and
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comparative stability through strengthening the democratic process.

Political forces in ASEAN countries are now regrouping. The rising
middle class demands greater representation in the government. The voice
of the masses for democratization and liberalization is increasing. New
political parties have been formed one after another in quest of partici-
pation in government and political affairs.
Singapore is reported to have " an emerging politicized, articulate, and
critical population".9 They are critical of the government for too much
intervention, and have made public their criticism of government policies.
Two members of opposition parties (Worker's Party and Democratic
Party) were elected to the parliament for the first time in the 1980 election.
In the December 1984 general election, the support of the masses for the
ruling People's Action Party was reduced to 62-9% from 75-5% in 1980,
marking the opening of greater political debate and competitive policies.
Small businesses in Singapore employ 240,000 workers which account for
one-fifth of the work force. Being unable to compete with the government
companies, multinational corporations, and larger establishments and full
of sentiments of dissatisfaction, they are "potential bases for opposition
rallying ".
In Malaysia, several new parties have been founded, one of which is
the "Malaysian Nationalist Party" with its leaders drawn from the
middle class. The opposition Parti Islam (PAS) has been revamped, and in
an effort to rule Malaysia eventually and set up an Islamic state, " looks
not only to the Muslim congregation for support, but also to potential
sympathizers among non-Muslims".10 It has set up particularly the
Chinese Consultative Committee to win the confidence of Malaysia's 31%
Chinese population. Within the United Malays National Organization
(UMNO), the dominant partner in the 11-component ruling coalition, the
National Front, the gaps have emerged between its leaders and 1-25
million members, and, moreover, the rift between its vice-president Musa
Hitam and its president Mahathir Mohamad was brought into the open
in February 1986. Musa resigned from the deputy premiership in the
government while retaining the vice-presidency in UMNO, and is pre-
pared to have a trial of strength with Mahathir in the UMNO congress to
be held in June 1987. In state governments under the federal government,
centres of political forces are changing. In the state of Sabah, the Parti
Bersatu Sabah (PBS) came to power in the April 1985 election, winning 25
 ASEAN COUNTRIES IN PERSPECTIVES 163
of 48 seats contested. The then incumbent Berjaya, which had ruled the
state for nine years, dropped from 41 to 6, and the other contestant, the
United Sabah National Organization (USNO), secured 16 seats. The PBS
victory meant the emergence of the sole state government in the federation
not under Muslim rule. The two Muslim parties, Berjaya and USNO,
stirred up disturbances and demonstrations, including bomb blasts
among the masses in an attempt to topple the PBS rule. The federal
government stepped in to exert pressure and to persuade PBS to have
"some measure of power-sharing" with the other two parties.11 The result
is that in the re-election of May 1986, PBS swept back into office with a
landslide victory, winning 38 of the 48 elected seats. USNO and Berjaya
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lost further seats due to the voters' anger over their "terror tactics".
Mahathir at last preferred not to embroil the federal government in the
state's affairs. The state of Sarawak has also grown restless of late. The
leadership of chief minister Taib Mahmood has been challenged by those
who broke away from the ruling PBB.
In Thailand, new centres of power are emerging in addition to the
army, the palace and the bureaucracy. Most of them belong to the middle
class and use the slogan " public political participation ". The parliamen-
tary by-election in 1985 saw voter turnouts that were exceptionally low,
because "the public had lost faith in and enthusiasm for the existing
political parties".*2 In the contest for the governorship of Bangkok in
1985, Maj. Gen. Chamlong won as an independent candidate while the
other candidates of political parties all failed as a result of the public's
negative perceptions of existing parties and public criticism of vote-
buying. Following defeat in the by-election, Kukrit Pramoj resigned as
leader of the Social Action Party, and Siddhi Savetsila, deputy leader of
the party, took over as caretaker " to improve the party's deteriorating
public support". In the general election of 27 July, 1986, 16 political
parties fielding 3,800 candidates participated, with the result that not a
single party won more than half the seats, and none could form an inde-
pendent cabinet. The seven parties which combined to constitute the
majority have agreed to form a coalition government with Prem Tinsula-
nond as prime minister.
With the approach of Indonesia's general election in 1987, the political
parties bill was passed in February 1985, requiring that all political parties
adopt Pancasila13 as their sole principle and that parties can differ only in
their programmes, not in their principles. This means the non-
governmental factions, the United Development Party and Indonesian
Democratic Party, will lose their religious identities and will be unable to
form opposition forces. Muslim politicians have been resisting it most
strongly. The situation in Indonesia is not very stable. Bombings and
incendiary attacks have often occurred. Several incidents took place in
1985, such as the destruction by fire of the Metro shopping centre in
Jakarta's Chinatown, the blaze gutting the headquarters of Radio Repub-
lik Indonesia, and the engulfing in flames of 60 buildings in a Jakarta
commercial district. As a result many radical Islamic leaders were put on
 164 ASEAN COUNTRIES IN PERSPECTIVES
trial. To warn off subversive opposition after the Bank Central Asia bom-
bings, the government tried many prominent Islamic and retired military
figures for alleged links.
In Brunei, there have been increased demands for a more representa-
tive government and for concessions by the monarchy. The monarchy is
apprehensive of a recurrence of another 1962-style revolt by the Party
Raakyat Brunei, but has given in under pressure and relaxed the ban on
political parties. In 1985 it approved the formation of the Brunei National
Democratic Party (BNDP), hoping that the BNDP would strike a balance
between the demands of an absolute monarchy and total democracy. The
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BNDP urged the government to hold a general election. The government

agreed to hold one in 1987, but it is anticipated that the monarchy will
stop short of giving even a simple majority to the people's representatives
in the State Assembly.
The result of regrouping of political forces possibly leads to a change
of political power, as in the case of the Philippines. The political crisis in
the Philippines lasted for 30 months, from the assassination of Senator
Aquino in August 1983 to the ousting of Marcos and the takeover of the
presidency by Mrs. Corazon Aquino in February 1986. Since the new
government came to power, the general orientation has been good. The
political corruption in Marcos's time has been curbed, the economy
improved, and the peso strengthened. The stock market is reviving and
investor confidence is returning. The government is setting about solving
the problem of starvation and unemployment. The Philippine economy,
which has declined continuously for 3 years, is projected to move upward
in this fourth quarter. But problems left over by Marcos are piled up. It is
certainly no easy job for a newly formed government to change the whole
situation. Interest payments on the Philippines' $26 billion foreign debt
left over by Marcos now gobble up half the country's export earnings;
two-thirds of the Philippines' 54 million people live in the countryside,
70% of whom live below the Philippine^ poverty line ($1,000 a year per
family) and 60% of the work force either does not have a job or does not
have enough work. It takes time to improve these conditions. Besides,
though Marcos fled, the foundation he laid for his rule still exists, and his
men remain in the army and in the executive. Mrs. Aquino has retired
dozens of Marcos' loyalist generals, but Marcos is still influential among
colonels. On July 6, 1986, an anti-government rebellion took place in the
Manila Hotel in which a minority of officers were involved. In Mindanao,
though the leading warlord gave up office, he still controls a private army
and its guns, wields power and claims fealty to Marcos. Mrs. Aquino,
though in power, does not have the political organization to carry out her
tasks. Local elections would not do, since many officials have their own
political apparatus that seem to ensure their reelection. So in analyzing
the Philippine political situation, we have to look at both the achieve-
ments and problems, to be neither optimistic nor pessimistic, neither
thinking that the crisis is over nor regarding it as an uncertainty.
There are other factors, in addition, affecting political stability in
ASEAN countries. They are: the problem of succession, particularly in
 ASEAN COUNTRIES IN PERSPECTIVES 165
Singapore and Indonesia; the problem of corruption in leading circles and
government officials in some countries; and the problem of racial dis-
crimination and unequality.
To sum up, the enhancement of the democratic process during the
period of political transition is the key to maintaining political stability for
ASEAN countries. Only by enhancing the democratic process, enlarging
governmental representation, increasing delegates from all social strata
(especially the middle class), and overcoming corruption, can peace and
political stability be attained.
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Prospects for Sino-ASEAN Relations

The ASEAN countries are China's close neighbours. China values the
development of its relations with them. To strive for an international
environment of peace, China needs the friendship and cooperation of
other countries, especially that of ASEAN countries. The promotion of
friendship between China and ASEAN countries is beneficial not only to
China's four modernizations and peace and stability in the Asian-Pacific
region, but also to the growth of ASEAN countries. ASEAN countries
have experiences in economic construction, which China can use for refer-
ence; China is a huge market, which may spur the development of
ASEAN countries. Political cooperation between China and ASEAN
countries is a mighty factor for stability in the Asian-Pacific region.
Some obstacles still exist in the process of developing Sino-ASEAN
relations. Some ASEAN countries, Indonesia in particular, regard China
as a " threat" to this day. They hold that politically China has the inten-
tion to dominate Southeast Asia, and constitutes " the long-term threat"
to their political stability; and that economically China's four moderniza-
tions will increase the competition with them for exports and markets,
weaken international capital investment in their countries, and constitute
" the main threat" to their economic development.
These perceptions are based on a complete misunderstanding.
Politically speaking, China's basic policies are opposition to hegemonism,
the maintenance of peace and stability in the Asian-Pacific region and in
the world, and the promotion of human progress. The development of
friendly and good-neighbourly relations with Southeast Asian countries is
China's long-term strategy. China has no intention of establishing its
spheres of influence, of interfering in internal affairs of other countries, nor
of dominating Southeast Asia. The relationship between China and
Southeast Asian communist parties is one of morality just as is the
relationship between China and other communist parties. The Chinese
Communist Party will neither interfere in the internal affairs of foreign
parties, nor make use of its relations with foreign parties to interfere in the
internal affairs of the country concerned. The Chinese government has
consistently advocated that international relations should take the five
principles of peaceful coexistence14 as guidance, and should not be based
on the similarity and difference of social system and ideology. Experience
 166 ASEAN COUNTRIES IN PERSPECTIVES

shows that countries with different social systems can coexist well if they
observe the five principles; and that countries with the same social system
can come into confrontation and even serious conflicts if they do not
observe the five principles. In view of this, it makes no sense to be involved
in changing the social system of another country. So it is groundless to
regard socialist China as a " long-term " threat to ASEAN countries.
Economically speaking, China's four modernizations might to a
certain extent bring about competition with ASEAN countries in respect
of export and foreign investment, but on the other hand they will increas-
ingly complement the trade in commodities with ASEAN countries, with
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each supplying what the other needs. China is an enormous market, and
its market capacity will grow with progress in four modernizations and
with the rise of the people's purchasing power, thus offering vast fields for
its trade with other countries. Economic complementation will even
surpass economic competition. Besides, competition itself will spur one to
produce better products, and bring about advance and development. No
matter whether China participates or not, international competition is an
objective existence. China's participation only adds one more competitive
partner.
There are great potentialities for the development of Sino-ASEAN
relations. The prospects for the bilateral political and economic coopera-
tion are good. But because of the time needed to dispel misunderstanding
and to establish mutual trust, the development of relations will be gradual
and step-by-step. Now China and Malaysia have agreed to expand further
direct trade and enlarge the volume of trade, and China and Indonesia
have begun to engage in direct trade. The general tendency is fine. China
wishes to establish stable and durable friendly cooperation with ASEAN
countries as soon as possible.
NOTES:
1. The Asian Wall Street Journal, Weekly, March 10,1986, p. 4.
2. Asian Survey, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, Feb. 1986, p. 151.
3. Ibid. 2, p. 135, 136.
4. The Asian Wall Street Journal, Weekly, March 17, 1986, p. 11.
5. Ibid. 4, January 6, 1986, p. 12.
6. Asian Survey, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, Feb. 1986, p. 164.
7. South, Oct. 1985, p. 156.
8. The Asian Wall Street Journal, Weekly, March 31, 1986, p. 18.
9. Asian Survey, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, Feb. 1986, p. 158.
10. Far Eastern Economic Review, May 29, 1986, p. 16.
11. Ibid. 10, p. 15.
12. Asian Survey, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, Feb. 1986, p. 176.
13. The five principles of Pancasila are: belief in one god, humanitarianism, national
unity, democracy, and social justice.
14. The five principles of peaceful coexistence are: mutual respect for each other's terri-
torial sovereignty and integrity, non aggression, non interference in each other's internal
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.