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Harvard-Yenching Institute

Li Ch'üan and Chinese Military Thought


Author(s): Christopher C. Rand
Source: Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Jun., 1979), pp. 107-137
Published by: Harvard-Yenching Institute
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2718814
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Li Ch'uan
and Chinese Military Thought

CHRISTOPHER C. RAND
Harvard University

S a result of archaeological finds in recent years, scholars of


Chinese intellectual history have been able to develop the area
of military thought to a greater degree than hiitherto possible. Based
on a scrutiny of newly discovered texts, including the Sun Pin ping-fa
I and Huang-ti ssu-ching _**V96, as well as a reconsideration
of long extant writings from the pre-T'ang era, we are able to dis-
cover a continuous tradition of ideas about war-its execution, moral
goals, and cosmic significance-which, without constituting the
doctrine of a single "school," had origins in contemporaneous bodies
of thought and was loosely amalgamated into a common lore.' This
is not to say that military thinking was only incidental to the develop-
ment of these main traditions. Rather, this eclectic and mostly un-
synthesized philosophy of war was subject to an independent, re-
current controversy over the proper relationship of martiality (wu A)
and civility (wen 3Z) during periods of internal or external violence.
In other words, there was an ongoing debate over whether violent
means (wu), ranging from a show of force to peremptory attack, or
nonviolent means (wen), including peaceful moral example, inten-

1 For such an analysis of military thought in the pre-Han and early Han periods, see my
unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, "The Role of Military Thought in Early Chinese Intel-
lectual History" (Harvard University, 1977).

107

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108 CHRISTOPHER C. RAND

tional yielding, and ethical suasion, or a combination of both was


proper for dealing with chaos (luan IL).2 By Former Han times these
alternative tacks had become differentiated into various patterns of
particular solutions, both major and minor, so that the history of
military thought, at least until the T'ang, consists on the whole of a
competition among these variously inflected solutions.
It should be noted that these positions on wen-wu did not become
identified with specific schools of philosophy, even though more
attention was given to war by the "Legalists" and the philosophical
Huang-Lao "school" of the late Chan-kuo and early Han periods
than by Confucianists. The emphasis was on solving a perennial social
dilemma rather than on devising a wide-ranging political ideology or
a far-flung speculative theory.
It may be helpful before considering the ideas of Li Ch'iian WT
(fl. mid-eighth century) to summarize this development of problem-
centered martial thinking. The available sources before the Chan-kuo
period indicate that martiality and civility were in Western Chou
and Ch'un-ch'iu times treated as coequal modes in conflict manage-
ment. The apparent consensus was that the use of wen or wu was
determined by the relative ability of each to preserve the state's
awesomeness (wei A), i.e., its unmanifest power to exert policy
throughout its domain. Contrary to later times, these elements were
not evaluated in moral terms, but were merely regarded as alterna-
tives for counteracting luan along a continuum ranging from violent
warfare to friendly persuasion.
Gradually this balanced treatment of wen-wu-which I call the
"syncretic" view-came into competition with other perspectives
on martiality-civility as the power of the Chou court disintegrated
and conflict became more frequent and less tractable. Recognizing
the necessity for political unification rather than a precarious
balancing of powers, a few statesmen believed the storms of the
realm could be quelled by relying chiefly on martiality (and cor-

2 In the case of the "syncretists" (described below), "ethical" suasion would encompass
clever deception and false argumentation, providing that such methods prevented un-
toward battle. The "compartmentalists," on the other hand, refused to admit these latter
interpretations of civility.
It might also be added here that the wen-wu controversy had implications for internal
law and order, in that the relative applicability of te M and hsing fIJ-analogues of wen
and wu respectively-in assuring social harmony constituted a parallel problem in Chinese
political thought.

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CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 109

relatively, agriculture) to forge a single empire. In the extant texts


this "militarist" opinion is represented only by the Shang-chun shu
j3,JR and the Han Fei Tzu 04Vf}; however, such an emphasis on
wu clearly became the driving principle of Ch'in conquest (if not
Ch'in rule) and was, therefore, at the time an influential solution
to the constant threat of war.
Thie intellectual strength of this approach, however, waned rapidly
after the beginning of the Han, when "militarism" yielded its position
to a third approach which had also germinated in the late Ch'un-
ch'iu and Chan-kuo eras. "Objectors" to warfare, such as Lao Tzu,
Yen Tzu, Confucius, Mencius, Hsiin Tzu, Sung Hsing, and Mo
Tzu, had already decried the offensive violence of their times and
had urged with varying rationales the abandonment of wu in all
but extreme circumstances. It was from among these recusants,
especially the Confucians, that another approach toward wen-wu
emerged, namely, the "compartmental," which postulated that
wen should predominate in resolving conflicts and that martiality,
the source of luan, must be strictly segregated from civility to prevent
the moral defilement of a properly wen society.
By the beginning of the Former Han, this view had gained equal
standing with the "syncretic," and advocates for the two positions
thence vied for intellectual dominance in matters of foreign policy
and internal consolidation. As the result of a complex of factors,
including a parallel debate between Huang-Lao and legalist-
Confucian advocates, changes in emperors and institutional power
relations, accelerated economic growth, and the decline of army
competence and status, the "compartmentalists" superseded the
"syncretists" by the end of the Former Han and dominated the
wen-wu controversy during most of the first and second centuries A
From the latter years of the Han until the Sui unification the ide-
ological changes become more difficult to trace because of the gradual
decrease in conclusive documentary evidence. However, judging
from the writings that do survive there seems to have been a re-
currence in varying degrees of the three perspectives that emerged in
pre-Han times.3
From this pre-imperial era, also, we find that these three major

3 Extant texts from the Latter Han to T'ang which deserve consideration as sources of
military thought include: San liueh =* and Su shu ; Wo-ch'i ching Wff (Wo-chi ching

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110 CHRISTOPHER C. RAND

solutions for conflict management were variously combined with three


minor ones, especially in the early military treatises. One-the
"ethical"-has already been mentioned in describing the "compart-
mentalists," for it drew heavily upon concepts of moral legitimacy
in the uses of war dating from the Western Chou (e.g., "righteous
troops" [i-ping AA]), and upon Confucian norms for exerting moral
force both against potential enemies and upon one's own soldiers.
The second minor solution, the "pragmatic," referred to the principles
of organization, discipline, and tactical analysis which pertain to
warfare whatever the culture. And finally there was the unique
contribution of Chinese military thought, the "metaphysical" solu-
tion, which attempted to explain the dynamics of conflict in cosmic
terms and to define the role of the ultimate protagonist-the sage-
general-in this heightened martial microcosm. According to this
perspective, which will be described more fully in our consideration
of Li Ch'iian, the ideal commander has a psychicity (shen 1P), a
supranormal intuitive power, resembling manas. This enables him to
sense and presage the arrangement and concentrations of quasi-
palpable energy (ch'i i) in martial situations, and to direct these
concentrations in combinations which will optimally resolve conflict
by preserving one's own ch'i and dissipating that of the opposition. A
significant adjunct to this latter attitude was the increasingly com-
plicated pseudoscience for divining the meaning of meteorological
and astronomical observations, which began to develop concurrently
with the earliest military treatises.
Variously linking these major and minor solutions, it is possible to
abstract a six-element matrix of development for military thinking
in China in which particular permutations were selected in certain
historical periods according to personal intellectual commitments
and objective pressures.4 One is hesitant to proclaim the validity of

Saff); Chiang Tzu fk- (Wan-chi lun , by Chiang Chi *M; T'i lun f by Tu
Shu ; Fu Tzu f4-T by Fu Hsuan f$g; Cheng lun !ES by Yuan Chun 'M; Kuei-ku
Tzu i@-+ ("Pen-ching yin-fu" *3yt@: section); Chin-lou Tzu t-f attributed to
Emperor Yuan E of the Southern Liang; Liu Tzu OFTp by Liu Chou ViJ*.
4For the sake of clarity, the words "militarist," "compartmental," "syncretic," "meta-
physical," "pragmatic," and "ethical," or variations thereof, will be enclosed in quotation
marks throughout the article, if and when they refer specifically to the elements of the
analytical matrix just described.

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CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 111

such an analytical device for the entire gamut of Chinese history,


but available texts and the generally unstructured nature of Chinese
military thought allow such an interpretation some credibility, at
least for the ancient and medieval eras. It is thus our general inten-
tion in this article to see which matrical combinations existed in the
thinking of Li Ch'iian and what he was able to contribute to military
thought under the intellectual-historical conditions of T'ang in the
mid-eighth century.
We have only a modicum of information about Li Ch'iian's life.
He apparently enjoyed a moderately successful official career, first
as vice regional commander (chieh-tufu shih titig'J{b) of Chiang-nan
jIM5 and as vice-president of the Board of Censors (yu-shih chung-ch'eng
P7i ; rank 5a) during the K'ai-yiian period (713-42), and later
as the governor (tz'u-shih gplk) of Hsien-chou {f)UJI.6 But as a result,
we are told, of offending the reigning prime minister Li Lin-fu Wt;t;
(d. 752), he was demoted in rank and thereafter became a Taoist
recluse wandering in the Sung-shan Mi1i region north of present-day
Teng-feng 1I hsien, Honan.7 He is known to have written five

5 Seat of authority at Ching-chou fu 4j~JJ'Jjq (present-day Chiang-ling pA, Hupei).


6 Located in the vicinity of the old city of Yeh a, which is forty 1i west of present-day
Lin-chang 6;, Hopei.
7 See Tu Kuang-t'ing j?*'j, comp., Shen-hsien Kan-yii chuan 7T$QA (Tao tsang a
ed., ts'e 328), 1.12b (much of account derived from T'ai-p'ing kuang-chi z;W 14).
Li's sobriquets were Ta-kuan-tzu ;zg- and Shao-shih-shan-jen j'pw'1NA, the latter
deriving from a peak in the Sung-shan region where he is said to have resided. The Ssu-k'u
ch'uan-shu tsung-mu V; e-f ([J-wen yin-shu kuan ed.], 99.13a; 146.2a) indicates
that biographical information can be found in the Chi-hsien chuan Af4{1 (attributed to
Tseng Ts'ao 0); however, the only available edition, in Shuofu R15, has no record of
Li Ch'uan. Some of the above biographical information can be found, nevertheless, in
Yun-chi ch'i-ch'ien f (Tao tsang ed., ts'e 700), 112.5b-7b.
As for obviously legendary material, in addition to the anecdotes surrounding the YFC
cited in the Yun-chi ch'i-ch'ien (loc. cit.) and elsewhere (see n. 33), the Yfin-hsiyu-i
([SP TK ed.] A. I b-2b), compiled by Fan Shu r (fl. 860), reports on Li Ch'iuan's dre
encounter with Kuei-ku Tzu and his proclivities for astrology, and also provides a tale
relating the appearance of a strange mist in the southeast corner ofTeng-chou J)I (Ching-
chou), where, it is mistakenly said, Li was governor (tz'u-shih). According to the story, Li
interprets this mist to be an omen of the appearance of a dangerous man in the empire.
Searching out all newly born children in the province, he identifies the son of a barbarian
shepherd to be a future "false emperor" (chia T'ien-tzu &X-T) and "robber of the state"
(kuo-tao Mg0), whom he nevertheless cannot bear to execute. This child grows up, we are
told, to become the infamous rebel An Lu-shan. (An abbreviated version of this legend is
found in Fen-men ku-chin lei-shih P [Shih-wan-chuan lou ts'ang-shu san-pien +M

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112 CHRISTOPHER C. RAND

works, two of which, the T'ai-poy


of T'ai-po; hereafter TPYC) and hi
iL (Commentary to the Classic of the
hereafter YFCS),8 will be considered here to demonstrate his military
thinking.9 (See Appendix for text, translation, and possible origins
of the Huang-ti yin-fu ching [Classic of the Secret Tally of the Yellow Em-
peror; hereafter YFC].)
Lacking so much of Li's biography, it is difficult to determine the
order of composition of these two tracts. A memorial of submission
(chin-piao B) for the TPYC has survived, dated 759.4.28, but its
authenticity is placed in doubt both by the long listing of titles it
attributes to Li Ch'iian, none of which are repeated in the Shen-
hsien kan-yu chuan 0[861 account, and, according to Lo Chen-yi
GMT, by the odd combination of humility and conceit in the
memorial, which is uncharacteristic both of Li Ch'iian's prose and
of chin-piao in general.10 The content of another preface (hsui A)
attributed to Li is more consistent with Li's emphasis on sageliness
and the esoteric in military strategy-there is even a quotation from
the YFC11-but the closing identity line includes an impossible date12
and a military title (Ho-tung chieh-tu shih tu-yui hou iwlA igSR@)
that is not elsewhere connected with the author.'3 We are thus un-

; , ts'e 109], 9.12a.) As Yu Chia-hsi f points out (Ssu-k'u t'i-yao pien-cheng


ft-A [Peking: K'o-hsiieh ch'u-pan she, 1958], II, 595), Li Ch'uan could not
possibly have been a governor at the time of An Lu-shan's birth.
8 As the title includes the character shu j,, the YFCS might be considered a subcom-
mentary. See Appendix and n. 42.
9 The other three works are his commentary to the Sun Tzu ping-fa = a work
on diplomatic and military history from Western Chou to T'ang T'ai-tsung's reign (627-
49), known as the K'un-wai ch'un-ch'iu Mff (submitted to the throne in 743), of which
we have only chuan 1, 4, and 5 (see Lo Chen-yu ,&T, Lo Hsueh-t'ang hsien-sheng ch'iian-chi
gtttW?, 3rd series [Taipei: Wen-hua ch'u-pan kung-ssu, 1970], V, 1679-1755);
and a lost work, Hsiang-ch'eng cho-chung t'ai chih p JUJ"
10 Lo Chen-yii, V, 1533. Yu Chia-hsi also doubts the authenticity of this memorial
(Ssu-k'u t'i-yao pien-cheng, II, 595-96).
11 From passage 2.5: "If a true gentleman seizes [the point of actuating 'thievery'], he
will strengthen his exhausted capacities; but if a petty man seizes it, he will [only] make
light of life." The quotation in the "preface" uses the character ch'ing 1 ("upset"), rather
than the character ch'ing ("make light of") which occurs in most YFC editions consulted
(see n. 47 below).
12 Fourth year of the Yung-t'ai period, which was only 765-66.
13 Also see Yul Chia-hsi (loc. cit.) for a debunking of this preface's genuineness.

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CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 113

sure when the TPYC actually appeared. Dating the YFCS is equally
problematical, the only clue being a mention in the text itself of the
An Lu-shan t#W and Shih Ssu-ming PP,, rebellions.'4 Failing to
have even a year of death for Li Ch'uian, which we might use as a
benchmark, we can only conjecture that the two works appeared
during approximately the same period (late 750's-early 760's), pro-
bably after Li Ch'iian had left public office.
This indeterminacy of dating and order of publication entails
that we approach the two compositions as atemporal documents,
seeking out differences and similarities of method and conviction, if
not a successive development of ideas. Indeed, we shall show that,
whereas there is a basically "compartmental-ethical" position in the
TPYC, the YFCS shows an attempt to bridge the gap between the
"compartmental" and the "syncretic" by means of the "metaphysi-
cal."
To begin a demonstration of these alternate attitudes of Li Ch'uian
let us cull the TPYC for the common tenets of traditional military
philosophy-especially the "metaphysical" and "ethical" elements-
that Li borrowed from his predecessors. From the first chapter of the
compilation we note the combination of rationalism and "natural-
ism" that informs the TPYC as well as earlier examples of military
thought. Repeating the Lao Tzu argument for a lack of teleological
impulse in Heaven-"Heaven and Earth are not benevolent, but
treat the myriad things as straw dogs"'-5Li Ch'uan, like many of
his forebears, called into question the importance of astral and
atmospheric divination techniques which had become a key part of
military planning.

T'ai-kung [Wang] said, "The reason why a sage is born is to rectify later ages.
Therefore he creates artful writings and extraordinary victories. The Way of
Heaven is of no benefit to warfare." Now if this is so, then whatyin-yang [effects]
does the Way of Heaven have on warfare ?1"

Enemy predispositions (ch'ing ;|) cannot be sought in the stars, nor in ghosts
and spirits, nor in divination by tortoise shell and yarrow stalk (TPYC, 2.1 la-b;
cf. 8.1a-b).

14 YFCS (Tao tsang ed., ts'e 55), A.9b.


15 Lao Tzu, 5.

16 TPYC (Mo-hai chin-hu - , ed., ts'e 98-99), 1 .2a. Cf. Wei Liao Tzu Hfg- (Wu-
ching ch'i-shu chih-chieh AN-L;SpI ed., ts'e 7), 1. lb-2b, 2.41a.

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114 CHRISTOPHER C. RAND

Rather than omens and yin-yang analysis, it is man's ability to devise


strategy in accord with Heavenly processes and moral valuations that
is paramount for victory. In other words, such observations may help
to determine the structure and circumstances of power (hsing-shih
V-) existing in a locality and therefore provide indications of the
Heavenly processes to which one must yield (TPYC, 8.12a); how-
ever, relying on these omens alone to engage an enemy will result in
success only by serendipity.

What predispositions has yin-yang with respect to man? T'ai-kung [Wang] said,
"Rely on the worthy, employ the able, and without looking for a [fortuitous] day,
your affairs will be beneficial; clarify your laws, scrutinize your statutes, and
without divining by means of tortoise shell or yarrow stalk, your affairs will be
auspicious; honor the meritorious, reward the perseverent, and without timing the
proper sacrifice, you will obtain good fortune" (TPYC, 1. Ib).

Man therefore not only recognizes objective conditions, but by virtue


of his organizing mind (hsin it>) exercises a limited initiative in detect-
ing the predispositions of his adversary and manipulating objective
conditions for his own benefit. "The ways of decline and rise are in
the mind of the ruler and in obtaining worthy men" (TPYC, 1.7a).
Though restricted by the Way of Heaven (T'ien-tao), man still re-
tains a certain independence of action in matters of war, as well as
in life generally. " 'Bravery and cowardice depend on [military]
law; victory and defeat depend on human knowledge' " (TPYC,
1.8b).
The point is elaborated upon in succeeding chapters, where human
talent is judged to be primary in achieving victory in battle. "Now
the Way ... esteems controlling other men; it does not esteem being
controlled by them" (TPYC, 1.1 Oa). Having completed a thorough
investigation of the enemy, the stratagems of actual warfare can be
executed with ease. "Cause them to go east and they will go east;
cause them to go west and they will go west. It is like drawing and
halting water; release it and it will flow; dam it and it will stop.
What worry is there in stratagems not being successful ?" (TPYC,
1.1Oa) But this is possible only by his ability to become, in some
sense, a part of other men, by his intuitive powers to recognize ob-
jective circumstances and enemy intentions and to act upon that
awareness.

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CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 115

Now in the raising of troops there are the factors of manifest form (hsing )f) and
psychicity (shen). Flags and pennons, gongs and drums depend on manifest form;
knowledge and stratagems, plans and events depend on psychicity. Battles and
victories, attacks and seizures are matters of manifest form, but their application
rests in psychicity; "voidness" and "solidity" (hsu-shih ) changes swift and
slow are achievements of psychicity, but their application rests in manifest form

Only by sensing these hsing and manipulating them by means of


strategy, without at the same time revealing one's own hsing to enemy
shen, can victory be assured. Wu-hsing 4(,, is therefore the ultimate
counterintelligence. "Battle orders have no constant circumstantial
power; one accords with the adversary to constitute an outward form.
Thus the circumstantial power of warfare reaches its acme in no
outward form...."19
Even more fundamental to this "metaphysical" view, however, is
the idea that man is capable of perceiving the periodicities of Heaven
and the benefits of Earth and employing them for limited self-in-
terest. By means of shen-the psychicity which is immanent in the
Heaven-Earth-man relationship-the sage-general may apprehend
the permutations of ch'i and take action accordingly.

The business of a general is to rectify principles with quiescence, examine the


subtle with psychicity, and employ objective things with knowledge. To see good
fortune within double-gated [enemy fortresses], and detect trouble beyond dark-
ness and obscurity-these are a [sage-] general's stratagems (TPYC, 1.7b).

Purity of psychicity is the source of knowledge; balance of knowledge is the


storehouse of the mind. When one's psychicity is pure and one's knowledge is bal-
anced, one can structure objective things.20

His action, however, is effective, that is, in his self-interest, only if it


ultimately preserves the primordial harmony of Heaven and Earth;
for actions contrary to this universal axiom only perpetuate the luan
which gave rise to the original martial circumstances. "If [the em-
ployment of] soldiers does not accord with [the Way of] Heaven,
one cannot move [them to victory]; if [the employment of] an army

17 Hsu refers to points in one's tactical configuration which are undefended or lacking
in potency; shih pertains to the converse situation.
18 TPYC, 2.9a-b. Cf. Sun Pin ping-fa (Peking: Wen-wu ch'u-pan she, 1975), pp. 121-
22; Liu t'ao , (SPTK ed.), 3.21 a-b.
19 TPYC, 2.9b, Cf. Sun Tzu ping-fa = (SPTK ed.), 6. 19b-20b, 25b-32a.
20 TPYC, 1.4a. Cf. Huang-ti ssu-ching (Ching-fa fa), strip no. 70-72, 76-77.

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116 CHRISTOPHER C. RAND

is not modeled on [the Way of] Earth, one cannot carry out punitive
expeditions; if [the employment of] attack methods does not match
[the Way of] man, one cannot be successful" (TPYC, 2.3a). In order
for conflict to be diminished, the ch'i which makes up the particular
permutation of the Heaven-Earth-man relationship must be meta-
morphosed by the psychicity of the exceptional general in such a
way that one's own concentration of ch'i is maximized while that of
one's adversary is neutralized or directed against itself. The chief
effort, therefore, is toward the conservation of preexisting or future-
desired homeostasis. Spatially this harmony of forces is ideally attained
through the least expenditure of one's ch'i; temporally it is achieved
by canalizing ch'i at certain perceived "points of actuation" (chi 0),
i.e., opportunities when ch'i may be optimally applied for conflict
resolution.
Although the "metaphysical" view of martiality receives neither
widespread stress nor complete coverage in the TPYC,21 the ideas
of potency and awesomeness, which inform all the military treatises
and are at the core of the conservationist impetus of the "metaphysi-
cal" view, are quite evident throughout. In accord with the covert
nature of martial philosophy, as Li saw it, potency precludes the
continuous manifestation of force. He drew upon the Kuo yui to il-
lustrate: "The former kings manifested their virtue, but did not
display their weapons. If weapons are stored away and only used on
timely occasions, then when they are used they will be awe-inspiring.
But if they are displayed, then they will [tend to] be overused. And
if they are overused, then they will hold no terror."22 Wu in latency
is of greater value in sustaining ch'i in homeostasis than wu in constant
prominence, for martial force has its greatest effect when applied
only at selected chi.
This notion of potency is important because it led to, or at least
reinforced, what Li saw to be the cardinal need for normative
standards in the dispensing of martiality. Battle is entered into not

21 Unlike the early military treatises and allied texts, little mention is made in the TPYC
of the principle of complementary configurations (e.g., cheng-ch'i it, hsii-shih Wl ,
strength-weakness, etc.). Cf. Sun Pin Ping-fa, pp. 119, 122; Kuei-ku Tzu (SPTK ed.), 2.:5a-
b; Sun Tzu ping-fa, 5.3a, 5a-8a; Liu t'ao, 3.2 la; Kuan Tzu * (SPTK ed.), 10.8a-b.
22 Kuoyiu (SPTK ed.), 1. la.

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CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 117

merely to conserve the uninflected ch'i which constitutes man, but to


achieve certain moral purposes. Adversaries are defined by the degree
of virtue, righteousness, "public-mindedness" (kung Xk), or "private-
mindedness" (ssu fl) they possess, and therefore victory in war, be-
sides being a function of shen-ch'i, was seen by Li and his intellectual
ancestors as a consequence of moral intent. According to this
"ethical" view, potency exists to intimidate the obstreperous, and
when necessary it is activated to maintain the purity of a morally
preferable status quo. "To lead a state's host as general, if you do
not execute the overbearing, how can you forge the potency of the
army?" (TPYC, 1. lla) When activation is deemed counterproduc-
tive, the normative force of civility, if continually demonstrated, will
be sufficient to deter violent outbreak. Hence, Li and military theorists
of the "compartmental-ethical" persuasion believed wu to be only
sparingly effectual and, as a hidden force, constantly suspect of
breeding immoral luan in an openly wen society. At best it is a lethal
solution to unavoidable conflict, as deadly to the agent as to the
cause of luan. This is the rationale both for segregating martiality,
which may be employed only in a negative mode, and for subordinat-
ing it to civility, whose intent is supported by morally positive means.
This suspicion may explain the seeming inconsistency that arises
in the TPYC, as in other treatises, between the advocacy of "decep-
tion" and the affirmation of "ethical" goals. Adopting the techniques
of the advocates for "vertical/horizontal" (tsung-heng Mti) alliances,
such as sophistical argument, fifth-columnists, probing envoys, and
double agents, Li promoted the devious ways espoused in the Kuei-ku
Tzu C67 to know an enemy's mind, subjugate his plans, and
confuse him about one's own status and goals. On the other hand,
he was careful to emphasize the ethical motives involved.

Now one who utilizes the techniques of "spying upon the mind" (t'an-hsin I..L,)
blends the Way and virtue, benevolence and righteousness, propriety and music,
loyalty and trustworthiness, [quotations from] the Book of Poetry and the Book of
Documents, classics and commentaries, philosophical writings and histories, as well
as plans and stratagems for victory and defeat into his assorted suasions, in order
to envelop and entrap [his adversary]. He purifies his mind, concentrates his
will, and espies others' predispositions-their loves and hates, rejections and
selections-attacking them according to their desires. To have hidden intentions
and yet manifest actions one must appear to go but actually come; one alternative

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118 CHRISTOPHER C. RAND

is to go [based on] empty words, while the other is to come with a "solid" mind.
Follow his heart, examine his countenance, listen to his voice, study his phrases.23

And elsewhere there are other anomalies:

For one skilled in warfare, unless he fights for trust and righteousness, he will not
stand [in combat]; unless [he is aware of] yin-yang factors, he will not be victorious;
unless [he can use] "extraordinary" (ch'i -2) and "normal" (cheng iE) maneuvers,24
he will not align [his troops]; and unless [he can utilize] deceptive and wily [tac-
tics], he will not go to battle. Stratagems are hidden in the mind; actions are
manifest in the record of events. When [the stratagems of] the mind are the same
as the record of events, there is defeat; when they are different, there is victory
(TPYC, 2.3a).

To be successful in war requires stealth, ruses, feints, and the ability


to show what you are not. In the words of the Sun Tzuping-fa ,
quoted by Li, "War is a way of deceit" ;25 therefore normative goals
must, paradoxically, be married to unethical techniques. This very
necessity shows the danger of war superseding rightful purposes and
the consequent need to counteract that tendency by stressing an
"ethical" and "compartmental" view towards martiality-civility.
For further evidence of Li Ch'uian's basic commitment to wen, we
note the hierarchy of noncontention, founded by the Chan-kuo "ob-
jectors," that Li repeats: "One skilled in leading an army does not
align in battle array; one skilled in aligning in battle array does not
initiate battle; one skilled in initiating battle is not defeated; one
skilled in being defeated does not lose [his entire force]. * 26 On the
one hand, he adopts the well-known adage of the Sun Tzu ping-fa:
"The technique of a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not
the acme of skill. It is not as good as defeating another's soldiers
without battle-this is the acme of skill."27 And, on the other, Li
agrees with Hsiin Tzu's emphasis on morality in warfare: "Those

23 TPYC, 2.3a. Cf. Kuei-ku Tzu, 1.12b-13a, 15a-b; 2.4b, 12b-13a, 26a-b.
24 Cheng-ch'i refers to the two principal modes of offensive-defensive deployment. Cheng
pertains to an element which meets an opponent directly, as a holding or fixing force for
ch'i elements. Ch'i pertains to those troops which cause the opponent to defend on one or
both of his flanks, or to the rear. The modes of forces in a battle may be reversed in accord-
ance with tactical contingencies. An etymological consideration of the terms can be found
in Benjamin E. Wallacker, "Two Concepts of Early Chinese Military Thought," Language,
42 (1966), 295-99.
25 TPYC, 2.3a; Sun Tzu ping-fa, 1.18a.
26 TPYC, 2. la-b. Cf. Lao Tzu, 30.
27 Sun Tzu ping-fa, 3.2b.

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CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 119

with superior persuasive abilities take Sun [Wu] B and Wu [Ch'i]


%E as mentors. Only Hsuin Ch'ing understood the kingly way and
rebutted them."28 Indeed, according to Li, it was the "deceptive"
tactics of these Chan-kuo military leaders which led to the unra-
tionalized and unheralded state of military thought. "Down to later
ages they relied unwarrantedly on deceit, force, avarice and destruc-
tion. Thus the disciples of Sun [Wu], Wu [Ch'i], Han [Hsin] Oro
[i.e., Huai-yin hou AMR], and Pai [Ch'i] bE were all punished
and degraded, and their descendants did not transmit their learning
to later generations" (TYPC, 2. ib).
In all cases, therefore, the "ethical" component conditions any
commitment to martiality. "Those who find pleasure in employing
inauspicious tools [i.e., military weapons], unless they [accord with]
the Way, virtue, loyalty, and trustworthiness, they cannot use war
to settle the calamities of the world, or expunge injuries to the
people."29 One is convinced that only by segregating martiality from
moral probity can the excellence of wen be perpetuated and, indi-
rectly, elevated above wu in ultimate value. This we see in the separa-
tion of responsibilities he advocates: "Within the four borders the
affairs of the people are entrusted to the [civil] chief minister; outside
the four boundaries the affairs of enemy countries are entrusted to
generals. As the saying has it, 'When general and minister are en-
lightened, the state will have no war.' 1 30 And when conflict threatens,
civility is the prime "weapon":

Place civility and virtue foremost to cherish them. If by cherishing them they do
not submit, use embellished jade and silk to entice them; if by enticing them they
do not come [in surrender], only then should you order your commander-in-chief
to train charioteers and horsemen [i.e., troops in general], [strengthen] armor and
sharpen weapons, and [thereafter] attack where they are undefended, emerge
where they are unaware. Thus it is said, "If they revolt, they will surely be pun-
ished; if they submit, they will surely be treated with kindness.""3

Without manifesting the disdain for war that appears in the Lao
Tzu,32 Li Ch'iian at least demonstrates a high regard for "ethical"

28 TPYC, 2.1a. Cf. Hsun Tzu (SPTK ed.), 10.2b, 9a-lOa, 13b-15a, 17b-18a.
29 TPYC, 2.1b. Cf. Meng Tzu, 2B.1; Hsun Tzu, 10.l1a-b.
30 TPYC, 1.4b. Cf. Huai-nan Tzu a-A-T (SPTK ed.), 15.13a-b; K'ung Ts'ung Tzu
TLh:# (SPTK ed.), 6.35a-38a.
31 TPYC, 2.2a-b. Cf. e.g., Yen-t'ieh lun !a, (SPTK ed.), 8.10a-b.
32 See Lao Tzu, 30, 31, 46, 50, 67, 68, 69, 76.

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120 CHRISTOPHER C. RAND

maxims, and at times even reveals, with ambivalence, a slight ten-


dency to separate and denigrate wu in favor of civil solutions. Indeed,
this attitude is held even though Li goes on in later chapters of the
TPYC to purvey the tested "pragmatic" methods of siegecraft,
logistical preparations, personnel selection and management, train-
ing and battle drill, and even medical prescriptions. In other words,
despite the avid interest Li expresses throughout the TPYC in all
aspects of warfare, his view towards the uses of martiality in situations
of potential friction is closer to the "compartmental-ethical" than to
either the "syncretic" or "militarist" views.
When we turn to Li's commentary on the YFC, we find some of the
same apprehension about wu when ill-managed against a threatening
force. But now his justifications are more "metaphysical," and
importantly, there is a certain tendency to reconcile wen and wu with
"metaphysical" and "ethical" consistency by stressing to a greater
degree than in the TPYC the esoteric, sagelike quality of the military
protagonist.33 That is, Li gives wu positive value when exercised by
the ideal man the ideal Taoist sage-who can penetrate the natural
"births and killings" that populate reality (YFC, 2.1).34
In section one, for instance, he uses the YFC to elaborate upon the

33 In the fictional preface to the YFCS we are told how Li Ch'uan, after discovering the
YFC in Sung-shan, carefully packaged and inscribed by K'ou Ch'ien-chih ARU, sought
to understand its content, but in vain. Travelling to Ch'in and passing by famous Li-shan
JU, however, he came upon a lady reciting passages from the YFC. Inquiring after her
knowledge of the tract, he found her to be a sage capable of resolving all his perplexities.
But on finishing her explanations, she slipped magically away, leaving Li in a state of won-
der and delight. (See the story also in the Shen-hsien kan-yu chuan account [repeated verbatim
in T'ai-p'ing kuang-chi tz = (Peking: Jen-min wen-hsiieh ch'u-pan she, 1959), 14.102]
and in Ching Mu-chen , $ P, Shuo Sung F*' [Yiieh-sheng t'ang -tQ ed.], 20.17b-
18a.) Thus the YFC is treated, like other military treatises of the past (e.g., Su Ch'in's
T'ai-kung yin-fu ta;t- [see Chan-kuo ts'e (SPTK ed.), 3.4b-5b] and Chang Liang's
T'ai-kung ping-fa taA& [see Shih chi (1-wen yin-shu kuan ed.), 55.2a-3a, 12b-13a])
as an esoteric text, hidden away in a special casement or mountain cache, and compre-
hensible only to certain superhuman figures, as often male as female. (Besides the Chang
Liang account, see Liu t'ao, 1.la-2a; Huang-ti Hsiuan-nii chan-fa i [T'ai-p'ing
yii-lan Zjcpj 15].) Although the preface to the YFCS was clearly not Li Ch
fabrication, he was aware of the legend of the matron of Li-shan (Li-shan m
from whom he twice "quotes" (YFCS, A.3b, 8b-9a), and he was also conscious of the need
to retain a certain esotericism in such texts in order to prevent the dire effects of abusing
their principles. It is a suspicion shown likewise in the "preface" to the TPYC, if we can
accept at least the content of that piece as reflecting Li's own mind.
34 Also see YFCS, A.4a.

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CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 121

nature of a sage-or sage-general-who morally participates as a


"bandit" (tsei M) in the Heaven-Earth-man process (YFC, 1.1).
According to his explication, one who understands the ways in which
the tripartite relationship is one of "banditry" and how the Five
Phases "ravage" one another in succession can comprehend the role
of war in human events and employ it for cosmic harmony. To that
extent, "the cosmos exists in the hand; the myriad transformations
(things) arise in the body" (YFC, 1.2). In taking such a position, Li
repeats the rationalistic thesis of the TPYC that man supplies a
unique, creative element to the working out of Heavenly processes.
But perhaps more convinced of Taoist philosophical ''naturalism,"
Li also postulates the subsumption of human psychicity to outward
patterns of reality that must occur even while man exerts his inde-
pendence; only to the degree that he can match such patterns can
man further his own ends. And yet his hsinlchi is still a partial deter-
mining factor in the course of change. "For one desirous of activating
the Five Phases, there is nothing more important than mind" (YFCS,
A.4a). "The human mind is a 'trigger'" (YFC, 1.3).
The problem for the military theorist is that man generally fails
to realize this dual necessity to obey T'ien-tao and, at the same time,
contribute originally to its fulfillment. Blinded by egoistic designs,
he is not conscious that, although perceptivity of mind controls
Heavenly spirit (hun ;A), and "the body is the storehouse of psych
city," the task of transforming the ch'i of the objective world is not
entirely dependent on human shen, but also occurs spontaneously
(tzu-jan OM) as part of a uniform, impartial T'ien-tao. That is, chi
exist apart from man's organizing mind and in a uniform way. And
whereas the "trigger of death" (sha-chi J.A; YFC, 1.4) in Heaven is
totally disinterested, existing always to maintain universal harmony,
man, who does not act uniformly, is prone to partiality in his trans-
formations; his hsin/chi stimulates disharmony as often as it creates a
new homeostasis. Thus the caveat to coordinate (ho -t) one's hsinlchi
with that of Heaven, for when such a complementarity obtains-as
it does in a sage-general-man may attain the serenity of the uni-
versal Way and thereby mitigate luan. Indeed, this coordination or
identity of determining factors is considered by Li and the Taoist
tradition as the original state of being. Man, as the progeny of the
Five Phases, cannot exceed these cyclic processes; if he tries, he only

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122 CHRISTOPHER C. RAND

violates, to his ultimate regret, the Heavenly actuation of "triggers


of death."
It is here that the "ethical" concern evident in the TPYC again
becomes important to Li's martial philosophy. To compensate for
the "metaphysical" lapse that often haunts human decision-making,
Li turns to normative training to impart the proper identity of man
and Heavenly process. Conflict, in Li's opinion, is the result of moral
entropy, wherein techniques of self-interest supersede moral truths.

When the petty man studies [the universal Way], he attains disaster. This is
because he takes the ch'i of the Heavenly Way without being versed in the applica-
tion of good; because he uses [only] the faculties of knowledge and cleverness,
eloquence and erudition to concentrate on thrice reflecting day and night (san-fan
chou-yeh _EH a ), on provoking battle and overextending war, on covert planning
of violent harm, on unrestrained search for extravagance and luxury, and on
upsetting and taking over the world. Although he may have temporary wealth and
status, he will not think of the imminence of calamity. Rather, he will bring on
disaster and loss [so that] it will extend to later generations. This is how he attains
disaster (YFCS, A.9a-b).

Whereas an ignorant man will expose his stupidities and invite ridi-
cule, injury, and catastrophe, the sage will in quiescence examine the
talents and idiocies he possesses, making corrections when needed to
nourish the Way and perfect his nature (YFC, 1.5). Li supports his
interpretation by reference not only to the Lao Tzu-"Great elo-
quence resembles stammering; great talent resembles stupidity"35-
but to the Book of Changes: "If the prince is not secret, he loses his
ministers; if the minister is not secret, he loses himself; and if policy
changes are not made secret, harm will occur."36 Further, in dis-
cussing the importance of controlling the input and output of the
sense orifices, the Confucian Hsiao ching *ff_ (Classic of Filial Piety) is
invoked: "A state of affairs in which words fill the world, [and yet]
there are no regretful evils"'3 results because the body and mind are
quiescent and upright and without perverseness. Simply by taking
action when meeting good and remaining quiescent when encounter-
ing evil, the self will then have no error or worry; it is all in the defense
and surveillance of the ears, eyes, and mouth. Thus Li uses his Con-

35 YFCS, A.6a; Lao Tzu, 45.


36 YFCS, A.6a; Chou-i (SPTK ed.), 7.6b.
37 YFCS, A.7a; Hsiao ching (SPTK ed.), 5a.

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CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 123

fucian background to prove an essentially Huang-Lao position


toward controlling conflict, namely, that guarding one's sensual
faculties, cultivating benevolence and righteousness, and remaining
serene and concealed in the absence of ethically acceptable condi-
tions, are the best means to harmonize oneself into the Heaven-Earth-
man triumvirate and prevent luan. As YFC, 1.6 metaphorically ex-
presses it, when one attains such harmony, fire will not break out of its
origin in wood and treachery will not emerge from its source in the
state. In this way, Li has shown "metaphysical" and "ethical" to be
not only complementary but synergistic.
In section two of the commentary the themes and specific motifs
of section one are applied anew, according to Li's classification, to
civil government. But the statements of the YFC here are frequently
relevant to martial affairs as well. Indeed, the section, as most edi-
tions have it, begins with a statement apposite to military thought:
"Heaven gives life and Heaven gives death-such is the ordering
principle of the Way" (YFC, 2.1). However, the present redactions
of the YFCS omit this passage and begin with a consideration of
cosmic "thievery" (tao 2) that harks back to the "T'ien-tuan iX"
chapter of the Lieh Tzu kUe:

Mr. Kuo of Ch'i was very rich. Mr. Hsiang of Sung, who was very poor, travelled
from Sung to Ch'i to inquire about his methods.
"I am good at stealing," Mr. Kuo told him. "After I first became a thief, within
a year I could keep myself, within two I was comfortable, within three I was
flourishing, and ever since then I have been the benefactor of the whole neighbor-
hood."
Hsiang was delighted; he understood from what Kuo said that he was a thief,
but misunderstood his Way of being a thief. So he climbed over walls and broke
into houses, and grabbed anything in reach of his eye and hand. Before long, he
was found guilty of possessing stolen goods, and lost his whole inheritance. Think-
ing that Kuo had deceived him, he went to him to complain.
"In what way have you been stealing?" Kuo asked him.
Hsiang described what had happened.
"Alas!" Kuo said. "Have you erred so far from the true Way of stealing? Let me
explain. I have heard it said: 'Heaven has its seasons, earth has its benefits.' I rob
heaven and earth of their seasonal benefits, the clouds and rain of their irrigating
floods, the mountains and marshes of their products, in order to grow my crops,
plant my seed, raise my walls, build my house. I steal birds and animals from the
land, fish and turtles from the water. All this is stealing; for crops and seed, clay
and wood, birds and animals, fish and turtles, are all begotten by heaven, and how

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124 CHRISTOPHER C. RAND

can they become my possessions? Yet I suffer no retribution for robbing heaven.
On the other hand, precious things such as gold and jade, and commodities such as
grain and silk, are collected by men, and how can we claim that it is heaven which
provides theni? When you steal them, why should you resent being found guilty ?"
Hsiang was highly perplexed, and thought that Kuo was trapping him again.
Happening to meet Master Tung-kuo, he questioned him and got this answer:
"Is not your very body stolen? When you must steal theyin andyang energies in
harmonious proportions even to achieve your life and sustain your body, how can
you take the things outside you without stealing them? In reality the myriad
things of heaven and earth are not separate from each other; and to claim anything
as one's own is always wrong-headed. Kuo's way of stealing is common to all
(kung-tao ;aM), and so he escapes retribution; your motive for stealing is priv
(ssu-hsin tGiL,), and so you were found guilty. Whether or not you distinguish be
tween common and private, you are still stealing. It is the power of heaven and
earth which makes the common common and the private private. For the man who
understands the power of heaven and earth, what is stealing and what is not
stealing ?"38

Referring to the corresponding passage of the YFC (2.2), Li comes to


a similar conclusion, but makes the following expansion: There is
not only an ineluctable "exploitation" of the objective world by man,
but also an "exploitation" by Heaven and Earth, and parallel mani-
pulation of man by the objective world. In this tri-element relation-
ship, however, "thievery" does not apply between Heaven and Earth,
on the one hand, and man, on the other. Neither does the objective
world in any way control Heaven and Earth. In such pairings, co-
ordination and harmony, and unity of intent, are the principles of
engagement. The span of man's independent action is thereby
clarified: He may exert his mind over the objective world in response
to the exertions of the objective world upon him, but he may never
confront the universal elements that hold a dominating, creative

38 Lieh Tzu (SPPY ed.), 1.16a-17a (A. C. Graham, tr., The Book of Lieh-tzu [London:
John Murray, 1960], pp. 30-31). Translating tao as "stealing" or "thievery" is only to
give the common nuance of the term. Tao is differentiated from tsei R ("banditry")
used in YFC, 1.1 in that the latter usually involves robbery accompanied by violence and
even murder, whereas the former ranges in practice from misappropriation or "borrowing"
to premeditated stealing. Consequently, the "tao" of YFC, 2.2 may be best understood in
the sense of tao-yung l -a mere availing or "exploitation" of another's assets. The
"banditry" of YFC, 1.1, on the other hand, implies the martial "overcoming" sequence
of the Five Phases. This differentiation was made not only in early legalist literature (see
Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China [Cambridge: Harvard Univ.
Press, 1967], p. 57, n. 13), but can be intuited from the use of "tao-tsei" in several pre-Han
and early Han texts, including Lao Tzu, 57 and Chuang Tzu, 10 and 24.

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CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 125

interface with that same objective world.39 Man's dual connection


with outer and inner reality, which Li places in a moral framework,
determines the nature of his participation in the control of conflict.
Using Confucian constructs, Li affirms the necessity of "violence"
in cosmic change, but subsumes that violence in the impartiality of
the Heavenly Way, as incarnated by the sage-general.
Li Ch'ian now goes on to consider psychicity, explaining that its
sometimes unmanifest, Heavenly essence is embedded both in the
objective world and in man (YFC, 2.3, 2.4). The peculiar power of a
spiritlike man to discriminate entities of the outer reality is precisely
due to the shen which is present in him and in the reality he scruti-
nizes; his ability to overcome or "rob" from the "myriad things"
and vice versa is due to the mutual application of a common
psychicity. It is this commonality which allows man to identify the
Tao-chi M and to accord with Heavenly timing and Earthly ad-
vantage (YFC, 2.5). But as Li reiterates, the discernment is possible
only for the truly sagacious. "One has only to set forth his estimable
plans, quietly cultivate [moral] action, act at opportunities for
practiced good, and accord with the Way; then one will succeed in
protecting unity and sustaining [moral] thought. Purifying the mind
and concentrating on practice, one takes over his profound subtlety
in order to nourish his nature" (YFCS, B.6b). In the words of the YFC,
the sage-ruler/general must "strengthen his exhausted capacities"
(YFC, 2.5). Some may use Taoist medicinal preparations to become
immortals, but "worthy men and true gentlemen know the incipient
point (chi) of this subtle Way, cultivating and refining it to become

39 It would be interesting to compare this view of cosmic operation to the "skeptical"


theory of Heaven-man formulated by Liu Yu-hsi -Ji in the early ninth century. In his
essay "T'ien lun Xp," Liu also allows for a morally creative independence on the part of
man, who is at the same time the product of amoral, undirected, but creative forces of
Heaven. Man, unlike Heaven, can shape objective conditions to his own ends, and there-
fore there is a certain parallel separateness between the realms of man and Heaven. To
that extent Li Ch'iian agrees with Liu Yu-hsi. And yet, Liu goes on to point out, in Hsun-
Tzuesque fashion, the tendency of man to fall back into an amoral state of brute force
where his normative creativity is lost and Heavenly processes predominate. This con-
ception is slightly different from that of Li Ch'uan, which sees the errors of man as abnega-
tions of the ultimately moral processes of Heaven that man has failed creatively to realize
in his own self-interest. For a discussion of Liu Yu-hsi's contributions and those of Liu
Tsung-yiian p to cosmology, see H. G. Lamont, "An Early Ninth Century Debate
on Heaven: Liu Tsung-yiian's T'ien Shuo and Liu Yu-hsi's T'ien Lun," AM, NS 18 (1973),
181-208; 19 (1974), 37-85.

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126 CHRISTOPHER C. RAND

sages" (YFCS, B.6b). Petty men, on the other hand, devote them-
selves to material gain, sparing no effort to locate with "embroidered
passions and clever knowledge" (YFCS, B.6b) the incipient point of
worldly dalliance and luxury, or that of militarist glory. Because
they do not grasp the Tao-chi they are inevitably defeated, "making
light of life" (YFC, 2.5).
Coming to section three, we at last discover how Li formally applies
"metaphysical" ideas of universal and political significance to the
martial realm. He begins with the importance of correct perception
which is the key for an unconfused mind and, hence, a harmonious
coordination of pure thought, initiative, and action with T'ien-tao
(YFC, 3. 1). Not restricting the meaning of the text to military affairs,
he nonetheless suggests the following affinity between this general
policy and martial planning:

Weapons are inauspicious instruments, war is a dangerous matter. To be placed


on a site of war or in a realm of danger and death, one must thrice reflect to purify
one's thoughts, and [devise] profound stratagems and far-reaching plans. For if
one is deficient in stratagems and safeguards and makes light of [timely] advance
and retreat, ultimately one will be defeated and killed (YFCS, C.2a).

Again, this ideal vision of generalship fails, in Li's estimation, to be


represented by the great generals of antiquity; their actions were
merely for shortsighted profit.

When we come to the famous generals of history, such as Sun [Wu], Wu [Ch'i],
Han [Hsin], Pai [Ch'i], the Marquis of Wu [i.e., Chu-ko Liang j and the
Duke of Wei [i.e., Li Ching ] each was skillful in employing armies; all were
capable of thrice reflecting day and night; and all were successful in establishing
situations which led to wealth and glory. But in the end one must consider these
methods of strengthening arms for victory in battle as opportunities (chi) for
derogating life (YFCS, C.2a-b).

Therefore, Li affirms the psychophilosophical qualities inherent in


generalship, but is ambivalent about their realization by other than
ideal men.
The next two sets of annotations actually reiterate previous caveats
against sensual delusions and reemphasize the impartial manner by
which the objective world is both subject to and master of human
actions (YFC, 3.2, 3.3). Once more we are told that the mercy which
Heaven affords is not particularistic amnesty or restitution; rather,

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CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 127

a noninterventionist rapport exists in which on-going Heavenly


processes of life and death result in a dynamic balance inherent in
outer reality. But coming as it does in a context labeled "military,"
these tenets suggest a wider basis for Li's aversion to much of warfare
and its incompetent protagonists. As stated in the TPYC, through
human insensitivity war is often not a dispassionate activity but a
self-conscious thrust for personal or national aggrandizement, result-
ing not in homeostasis but in chaos and renewed conflict. Li Ch'uan
grants that this is the case, but in his commentary to the passages
quoted above posits by indirection a "metaphysical-ethical" recon-
ciliation of wen-wu that would theoretically obviate militaristic ten-
dencies and provide a slightly altered philosophical resolution for the
civil-martial controversy-one akin to the "syncretic" view. If
generals would follow the example of the ancients and act as Heaven
does- "like swift thunder and violent wind," "unmercifully" and
without obvious desire for lucre and fame-then the search for
uninterrupted peace would be the result of wu as much as wen. "In
this ordering of armies, the general is courageous and his soldiers
strong; superiors are awesome and subordinates fearful. [The
commander] will surely be able to execute the cruel and settle the
chaotic... ." (YFCS, C.4b) The qualities of happiness, unknowing
quiescence, and incorruptibility spoken of in YFC, 3.4 can now be
made applicable to a man of wu.

Now as for the essence of the general, he esteems his [urges toward] uncorrupted
and quiescent behavior, and closes off his [impulses for] wrangling and alterca-
tions. Rewards and punishments are not variably [meted out], and "fathers" and
"sons" make up the army; the heart/mind harbors delight and happiness and the
nature has a superfluity of courage. In this way he may destroy the inauspicious and
overcome his enemies; he will surely secure merit and attainments (YFCS, C.5b).

Li continues the motif of Heavenly impartiality in his commentary


to YFC, 3.5, where, in order better to maintain his stance of re-
conciliation, he interprets ssu fL to be. "hidden" rather than "partial"
(YFCS, C. 6a). By so doing, Li may claim that the sage-ruler/general,
as co-participant with Heaven, can embody the same "hiddenness,"
but act with the same "openness" or manifest public-mindedness
as Heaven. Explicating the military analogy, he says:

Constituting the essence of the general, he can employ [his soldiers] with hidden-
ness and secretiveness; his incipient action and calculations are difficult to perceive;

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128 CHRISTOPHER C. RAND

his seizures and abandonments [of ground] are spiritlike; his awesomeness and
mercy are manifest. Superiors are pure-minded and subordinates are upright; the
general is courageous and his soldiers strong. Overcoming enemies and destroying
the inauspicious, his merits and attainments will be abundant (YFCS, C.6a-b).

Li's vision of an enlightened military leader who is at the same time


a Taoist civil savant is further elaborated upon by utilizing the
YFC's symbol of a bird riding freely upon the "ether," as would
a shen-hsien (YFC, 3.6). Metaphorically, military wisdom is shown
to have utter control of the ch'i of Heavenly incipience (T'ien-chi)
and the virtue of the Way (Tao-te ) And this combination of
"metaphysical" and "ethical" ideas surfaces in Li's "military"
explanation:

Constituting the essence of the general, he is skilled in using the chi of the Five
Phases in their [successive periods of] retirement and dominance, and he is capable
of knowing the sources ofyin-yang in their [successive states of] control and subordi-
nation. Therefore, the destruction of the inauspicious and the overcoming of en-
emies is not viewed as difficult (YFCS, C.7a).

In the succeeding commentary there is likewise a joining of


classical Taoist ideas and military applications. Paradoxes of
opposites can only be understood and utilized for practical benefit
by cultivating an attitude of simplicity and moderation (YFC, 3.7).
Life, and with it social harmony, may be retrieved from an activity
of death only if the leader has comprehended the true meaning of
the irony. "Now the essence of the general is that he can know that
life adventitiously secured will become death, and that [what seems
to be] certain death may nevertheless be life. Accordingly, he
consolidates his army and preserves the people, becoming a good
general therefrom. Thus the military methods say to employ soldiers
in deadly ground and yet live" (YFCS, C.8a). Although the YFC
goes on to declare that injury and mercy can also propagate one
another, this reversal, unlike death and life, is, according to Li, the
result of "small" men's misapprehensions. These extremes may be
circumvented if one will endeavor to maintain quiescence of mind
and from such self-collectedness exert mercy and injury sparingly
at the proper chi; the conditions of extreme harm that induce mercy,
and of extreme mercy, which, because it is expected, leads to
increased violence, will thereby not occur.

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CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 129

Constituting the essence of the general, he does not turn his back on imperial
mercy, nor become arrogant for splendor and esteem; he is as careful at the end as
at the beginning. Protecting and preserving mercy and honor, exhausting his
strength and exerting his loyalty to the full, securing merit and establishing [a
record of] accomplishments, mercy indeed has no means for originating in injury,
and injury indeed has no means for arising from mercy. He uses the virtue of the
Way to approach barbarian [enemies], and prosecutes them without battle. Is this
not excellent? (YFCS, C.9a).

Once again, we see the "ethical" element bolstering Taoist "meta-


physics," and even occupying coequal status. This is particularly
evident in the next commentary (YFC, 3.8), where rationalism and
anti-superstition are stressed again. It is ignorant men who consider
the frightening happenstances of nature to be sagely interventions,
unpredictable and awesome. The more intelligent position to take
is that man can, by observing natural patterns, create favorable
conditions for himself. That is, "metaphysical" keenness can be
enhanced by conjoining it with "ethical" motives and civil-political
preventives. Reasserting his commitment to wen, Li says that it is the
moral actions of sage-rulers which create the bulwarks against luan.
"Thus, supernatural events and calamities do not overcome good
government; weird fantasies do not overcome good actions.... If
we understand the ordering principles of the seasons and objective
things, then in every case we can change calamity into good fortune,
and replace death with life" (YFCS, C. 1 Oa-b). Even in his references
to the military, this civil element is included:

Now in constituting the essence of a general, solar halos [appear] in the five
colors, stars flow in the four directions, strange beasts charge the encampment,
wild birds enter one's lodgings-these are the patterns of Heaven and Earth
manifesting good and bad omens. [But] one has only to be capable of cultivating
government policy and statutes, setting forth stratagems and protective plans,
allaying one's officers and soldiers, and changing [potential] calamity into [certain]
good fortune. By so doing, how will enemies dare to confront him? This is how the
patterns of time and objective things are [the substance of] knowledge (YFCS,
C.lOb).

The result of this juxtaposing of military and civil virtues, cosmic


and normative ideas, is that Li has created a philosophical basis for
martiality-civility wherein the sage-general, observant of both
"ethical" and "metaphysical" obligations, acts in accord with
T'ien-tao. Furthermore, in conformity with the Taoist-Confucian

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130 CHRISTOPHER C. RAND

intellectual heritage which inheres in Chinese military philosophy,


and which provides for a universal Way that may be realized by
various means, Li makes it clear that T'ien-tao, as so practiced, is
both wen and wu in nature. By designating the three sections of the
YFC as pertaining to universal conditions, civil-political requirements,
and martial principles, he indicates that matters of wen and wu
are not only equivalent in status, but coherent in purpose, if and
when their agents yield to the primary moral and transmoral forces
of Heaven and Earth. As a result of this "military" interpretation
of an ostensibly "civil" work, we are convinced that Li thought to
coalesce wen and wu in "metaphysical" and "ethical" terms and
thereby develop a new "syncretism."40
Restricted as we are by the quantity of evidence, we cannot be
certain that Li, having written a manual which included a reasoned
confirmation of the "compartmental" view, albeit with descriptions
of all the matrical features of warfare, subsequently chose, in his
YFC commentary, to meld the latter factors into a "neo-syncretic"
wen-wu identity. Neither can we be sure what effect, if any, Li Ch'iuan's
ideas had on policies for dealing with the dismemberment of central
power in north China during the mid-eighth century. But it is not
merely coincidental that his works appeared in such a period of
military crisis. Like previous military treatises, Li's intellectual
inquiries were stimulated to some degree by the historical need to
develop a conflict ideology. Therefore, whatever his final opinions
on the mode of military thought, Li Ch'iian's ideas show again the
importance of the wen-wu controversy for Chinese martial thinking,
and also of the Taoist tradition in formulating a military philosophy
for coping with violent change.

40 This coalescence may not be unprecedented. At least one earlier text, the "Pen-ching
yin-fu" section of the Kuei-ku Tzu, with which Li may have been familiar, shows a less
defined tendency to blend civil and martial activities into a common trans-ethical sageli-
ness.

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CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 131

APPENDIX

Though usually classified as a "Taoist" work, the anonymous


YFC has been linked to military thought from its inception-possibly
in the late sixth century A.D.41- both through commentaries at-
tributed to T'ai-kung Wang, Chang Liang, and Chu-ko Liang, and
through Li Ch'iian himself, whose exegesis along military lines is
the earliest that can be dated with any degree of certainty.42 Indeed,
although most of the interpreters from Chang Kuo 0 (d. 881 ?)
to the present have taken a strictly Taoist or latter-day Huang-Lao
approach to the work, the YFC has retained its position as a classic
of martial philosophy.43
Philologically, however, the YFC, despite its brevity, presents a

41 See Wang Ming 3IP, . ["An Assay of the Yin-fu ching


and its Materialist Thought"], Che-hsuehyen-chiu , 1962, No. 5, pp. 59-68, esp.
59-62. Wang hypothesizes, on the basis of the inscription attributed to K'ou Ch'ien-chih
in the tale of Li Ch'uan's discovery of the YFC, that the text must have some connection
with the Toba Wei. He further speculates, in spite of the fictitious nature of this account
that the inclusion of the dynastic designation "Ta Wei 7 which was not adopted until
531 (see Wei shu N [I-wen yin-shu kuan ed.], 1. lOa), may be sufficient evidence to
assign that date as the earliest year of composition; he takes 580, the year of Northern
Chou collapse, as the latest possible year. While the former date may have some validity
(though questionable), there is little persuasive evidence that the text was completed
before the Sui unification. Since the earliest manuscripts appear in T'ang T'ai-tsung's
reign, it is equally possible that the text was first drafted in the early seventh century.
The first extant bibliographical references to the YFC are in the Ch'ung-wen tsung-mu ;
S ([TSCCed., ts'e 22], 3.136-37) and in the Hsin T'ang shu "I-wen chih" i
([I-wen yin-shu kuan ed.] 59.7b-8a), both from the mid-eleventh century.
42 At least one of these commentaries-that attributed to T'ai-kung Wang-existed
before Li Ch'uian's explication; it is quoted by Li in YFCS, A.7b. In present-day editions
the YFCS exegeses follow unidentified commentaries to the text, but do not discuss these
commentaries. The character shu lIf- in the title is therefore not strictly accurate.
43 See a ku-shih t on the YFC by Lu Kuei-meng kga (d. 881) in T'ang Fu-li hsien-
sheng wen-chi WgjEL--t; (SPTK ed.), 2.18a-19a, and a notice on the YFC by Kao
Ssu-sun Afgr, in Tzu lieh =7f (SPPY ed.), 1.3b-4a. Ch'ao Kung-wu ..'ZA in his
Chiin-chai tu-shu chih UW RJ: ([SPTK ed.], 3A. 16b) has noted the "laughable" mixture
of military lore into the work, as noted by Huang T'ing-chien jR, while Ch'en Yuan
Vf (d. 1145) has stated more sympathetically: "Huang-ti received the Yin-fu ching from
Kuang-ch'eng Tzu : that is, Lao Tan. People often associate it with Taoist dogma,
but they do not know that it is the ancestor of military writings." (Quoted in T'ang Shun-
chih fJAZ (1507-60), comp., Ping-yuan ssu-pien -gm, ts'e 1; not contained in Ch'en's
collected writings, Mo-t'ang chi R*_$.) The text has also been collected by T'ang Shun-
chih in Ping-yuan ssu-pien and by Li Yii-jih 4iro B in a modern anthology, Chung-kuo ping-
hsueh ta-hsi rPXA1F. (Taipei: Shih-chieh ping-hsiieh she, 1957).

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132 CHRISTOPHER C. RAND

number of insoluble problems. From the first manuscripts of the


text in the early T'ang, it has existed in almost as many written ver-
sions as there are editions. Most of the variations can be attributed
either to copyists' errors or to the mistaken transcription(s) of an
oral rendition, but a few commentators have attempted to add or
subtract certain characters, or to shuffle the terse passages into
new combinations according to their respective understandings of
the whole. One possible interpolation of major proportions is worth
brief mention, namely, the 113 or so characters that occur at the end
of the work. While several editions omit this subsection altogether,
others show considerable mutual differences, especially in the latter
part of passage 3.8. Besides the fact that Li Ch'iian does not comment
on these passages, it is also significant that this addition makes for a
quantitative imbalance among the three sections of the text; i.e., it
causes a contradiction with the frequent description of the YFC as
being some 300 characters in length." Without this addition there
are approximately 128 characters in section one, 100 in section two,
and 104 in section three-a total of 332. With the additional text
there are 217 characters in section three, giving an overall sum of
445. Furthermore, these final sentences can be organized more easily
into cohesive paragraphs than the remainder of the text, which tends
toward one- or two-line clusters of graphs. Having extremely little
information on which to base a textual history, one cannot determine
whether these sentences constitute an interpolation, but it is an
apparent aberration not easily explained.
As for the text presented here, instead of attempting to devise a
complete variorum edition, which would be cumbersome at best, we
have decided, as a compromise, to base the following translation of
the YFC on the Ch'u Sui-liang #Sk (596-658) manuscript (Pai-
ch'uan shu-wu ts'ung-shu W)I I;kt photoreprint edition, ts'e 6;
transcribed ca. A.D. 633), which is the oldest edition extant and one
which agrees on the whole with most later redactions.45 The sub-

44 See, e.g., the Shen-hsien kan-yu chuan account; preface to YFCS.


45 In addition to the ta-tzu version used here, Ch'u was apparently responsible for both
a hsiao-tzu and a ts'ao-shu manuscript, the authenticity of which is attested by Ch'en Ssu
, (fl. 1228-32) in Pao-k'o ts'ung-pien . ([TSCC ed., ts'e 1604] 13.339), and in
the Pao-k'o lei-pien %(IJM ([ TSCC ed., ts'e 1514] 2.28) by an anonymous Sung author.
(The Ssu-k'u ch'iian-shu editors have doubts about the authenticity of the latter two manu-

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CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 133

divisions made in the text are my own, founded on what seem to be


logical semantic groupings. Any major differences from the various
editions of the YFCS46 and/or the majority of other versions consulted47
are indicated in the notes.
One final word: As the reader will soon see, the YFCis an extremely
abstruse work. Nonetheless, I have avoided giving a lengthy exegesis
apart from Li Ch'iian's interpretations, for such is properly the.sub-
stance of a separate article. It is only hoped that the present rendering
will not further obfuscate the meaning of the text, but will stimulate
future analysis of its mystifying statements.

HUANG-TI YIN-FU CHING f

[The immortal embraces the One: on the Way]48


1.1 X t ,k)t?Aj:, t. g 49 3ja, HVAV)L-,5
To perceive the Way of Heaven and grasp the phases of Heaven is
to exhaust [all]. Thus Heaven has five "bandits" and he who detects
them will be brilliant. They reside in the mind/heart and are
actuated in Heaven.

scripts [see Ssu-k'u ch'iian-shu (sung-mu, 146.2b-3a].) A k'ai-shu manuscript by Ou-yang


Hsiin RWg (557-641) also dates from about the same time (638), and already shows
textual differences from the Ch'u Sui-liang version. (See text in Yueh K'o f-TJ (1183-
1234), comp., Pao-chen chaifa-shu tsan Vwt# ([TSCC ed., ts'e 1628], 5.53.)
48 Tao tsang, ts'e 55; Chu-ts'ungpieh-lu gij?, ts'e 24; Hu-pei hsien-cheng i-shu M4LthE
M;, ts'e 72; Mo-hai chin-hu, ts'e 154.
47 I have not attempted to locate every edition of the YFC, but have taken a wide
sampling of versions sufficient to determine the best and most favored reading of the text.
Besides the YFCS editions and the Ou-yang Hsun version cited above, the following were
consulted: Han- Wei ts'ung-shu M,t (1791), ts'e 83; Han- Wei ts'ung-shu (1880), ts'e 49;
K'uai-ko ts'ang-shu M;Sg , ts'e 1; Pai-ling hsueh-shan -f iFJ -, ts'e 8; Ping-yuan ssu-pien, ts'e
1 ; Shuo fu (1646), ts'e 9, 152; Tao-shu ch'uan-chi M:ffi, ts'e 22; Tao tsang, ts'e 27, 54 (two
eds.), 55 (three eds.), 56 (five eds.), 57 (three eds.), 58 (five eds.), 161; Wu-feng lou chi-yin
E:1k,gM *R, ts'e 49; Yang-wu ts'ung-ch'ao gfa , ts'e 16; Chu Tzu i-shu = ts'e
12; Hsu Ling-t'ai i-shu g A , ts'e 24; Tao-shu erh-shih-ssu chung z--f (1819),
ts'e 12; Ku-shu-yin lou ts'ang-shu -@Xl:&GX, ts'e 4; Pao-yen t'ang pi-chi It Uj,, ts'e
13, 83; Tzu shupai chung-=ffj , ts'e 98; Hsi-kuo ts'ao-t'ang ho-k'an g?f,-ejJ, ts'e 12;
Jung-ts'un ch'uan-shu , ts'e 26; Yang Jen-shan chu-shih i-chu ti-ch'i chung *f: t4 X?
gt, ts'e 6; Chih-hai , ts'e 87; Fen-hsin ko ts'ung-shu ; rA.@, ts'e 3; Wang Shuang-
ch'ih ts'ung-shu jVita,, ts'e 134; Chung-kuo ping-hsueh ta-hsi, Vol. 2.
48 Titles in brackets are those assigned by Li Ch'uan.
41 All editions of YFCS omit &.

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134 CHRISTOPHER C. RAND

1.2 $ 5 0 TI
The cosmos exists in the hand, and the myriad transformations
arise in the body.
1.3 X ,f AJLM. ft :JYtA
Heavenly nature is [the essence of] man, and the mi
is the "trigger." Man is defined in the establishing of the Way of
Heaven.
1.4 XVR*5 Ifi+ R 1trMPI; AgR0 Xitag. XA r3
&, {L)tA52
Heaven releases the "trigger of death," moving stars and shifting
lunar lodges; Earth releases the "trigger of death," and dragons and
snakes arise from the ground; man releases the "trigger of death,"
and Heaven and Earth topple over and over. When Heaven and man
release in harmony, [however,] the myriad transformations are firmly
founded.
1.5 t4L5IIii, j 14J{)l ) TP$, JJli
The natures [of men] may be clever or dull; by them one may lie in
concealment. The disruption of the nine orifices lies in the three
principal [apertures]; by them one may be active or quiescent.
1.6 !kSt*, *A2Y1 A &M 0000". f.1;5 = KWJ
Since fire originates in wood, if calamity breaks out, the wood will
surely succumb. Since treachery originates in a state, if it is activated
with timeliness, the state will surely collapse. One who knows this
and cultivates [his consciousness of it] is called a sage.

[SmZk, AU*]
[Enriching the state and pacifying the people: on (civil) law]
2.1 , ;?i5
Heaven gives life and Heaven gives death-such is the ordering
principle of the Way.
2.2 Hv tartht ar "thiev,e oXfthe. mEriad -things the ARa

Heaven and Earth are "thieves" of the myriad things; the myr

50 All editions of YFCS have MJt.


61 All editions of YFCS omit f#A T, J;R.
52 All editions of YFCS except Tao tsang have ;gtj; Tao tsang edition has AR2
63 All editions of YFCS and most other editions consulted have Anf@g.
54 All editions of YFCS omit this passage; in a few editions this passage is placed at th
end of section one.

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CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 135

things are "thieves" of man; and man is a "thief" of the myriad


things. In this way, the three "thieves" are all in accord, and the
three "cosmic elements" are all at peace. Thus it is said, "Fed at its
due time, the body will be properly ordered; activated at their points
of actuation, the myriad transformations will [occur] in serenity."
2.3 A W ;,55 4T_nA56 -T-1 0.
Men are aware of the psychicity of [those who are] psych
not aware of how the [apparently] non-psychical are psy
2.4 FlA ;t, *5it 9 b , t PA m
The sun and moon have periodicities, and small and large have
delimitations. [Those who are] sagacious and meritorious grow from
them and [those who are] psychical and perspicacious emerge from
them.
2.5 AtNuJi, 3 fiA q, tI4Z 9 }H60 9
The point of actuating "thievery" is not someth
can perceive or know. If a true gentleman seizes
his exhausted capacities; but if a petty man sei
make light of life.

D&AA , AMM]
[Strengthening soldiers for victory in battle: o
3.1 , . IJ-P, JU+i+{f. -EL, )Ihgr{*.
The blind are skilled in listening; the deaf are skil
[By coalescing these] fractured6 assets [of perception] into their
single source, the employment of one's forces will be [successful]
ten times over. By thrice reflecting day and night, the employment
of one's forces will be [successful] ten thousand times over.
3.2 .L-4Mt, X;t. 010
The mind/heart is engendered in [the context of] objective
and expires in [the context of] objective things. The point o
tion lies in the eyes.

55All editions of YFCS have }?ijij4.


56 All editions of YFCS omit A. This passage has undergone significant v
existing editions; however, with only a few exceptions, the meaning of the
been greatly altered.

57 All editions of YFCS and most other editions consulted have )kyJ'.
58 editions of YFCS have X1F J X,,jgA
59 All editions of YFCS and most other editions consulted have M.
60 All editions of YFCS and most other editions consulted have /ftAk.
61 M might be alternatively translated as "outstanding."

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136 CHRISTOPHER C. RAND

3.3 X;L3E, fikKul. .{,t .


Heaven's lack of mercy is yet great mercy. [It engenders] swift
thunder and violent winds, and there are none who are not dumb-
founded.
3.4 0,f62 _P 63
In ultimate happiness the nature is unknowing; in ultimate quies-
cence the nature is uncorrupted.
3.5 X;Lt04)
The ultimate partiality of Heaven is ultimate impartiality in its
applications.
3.6 *;AJV
The power of birds lies in ch'i.
3.7 y LJ.64 1W M
Birth is the root of death; death is

4t66 9p13T _. &F) VZ* 1g


harm; harm arises in mercy.
3.8 8AR413Z)EQ? fW}4t3Z 9; f 1

An ignorant man considers the patterns of Heaven and Earth to be


[the substance of] sageness. I consider the patterns of time and
objective things to be [the substance of] knowledge. Some people
use ignorance to measure sageness; I take non-ignorance to measure
sageness. Some people take extraordinary measures in expectation
of sageness; I take unextraordinary measures in expectation of
sageness. Thus it is said, "Sinking into water, entering into fire, one
seizes upon destruction and death."
3.9 PtAe- , LAPA X1ttAM&iWAMN B. iSEl0
A? m2 f42e7 p1LpMZ.
The Way of self-so is quiescence, and thus are engendered H
Earth, and the myriad things. The Way of Heaven and Earth

62 All editions of YFCS and most other editions consulted have .


63 All editions of YFCS have j?IJ.
64 The Tao tsang edition of YFCS reverses the phrases.
65 Li Ch'iian's commentary ends with this phrase.
66 - seems, as in several editions consulted, to be better read as M, although the sense
of the phrase is in doubt. The portion of the passage beginning )"J}l&JX and ending
0 tgA has undergone the greatest variation of any part of the YFC among the editions
consulted; it is omitted in all editions of YFCS.
67 All editions of YFCS have ;A* A op

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CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 137

pervades all, and thus yin and yang overcome [each other]. Yin and
yang impel [each other]; changes swift and slow [successively] yield.
Accordingly, the sage knows that the Way of self-so may not be
transgressed; thus he takes it under control.
3.10 35EAt, OfffiTZ . AtAX. AVTg #6) %e68
AMRO5. MINIM
The way of ultimate quiescence cannot be matched by pitchpipes
and calendars. Therefore there are extraordinary vessels, which
engender the myriad symbols. [Interpretations by means of] the
eight trigrams and the sexagenary cycle, psychical "triggers" and
spirits concealed,69 are methods pertaining to the mutual overcoming
ofyin and yang. Brilliant they are! For they enter into the symbols
[of cosmic change].

68 All editions of YFCS have "1,'a.


69 The last two in the series are tentative translations; the meanings of f$ and qM as
particular mystical methods are presently obscure.

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