TORTS notes
Tort, Definition(definition by author, book, dictionary)
it is an act or omission of a person which causes some
injury or damage directly or indirectly to another person,
without any previous legal relation
- Tort is an old French word derived from the Latin
“tortus” which means “twisted” or “crooked.” At one
time it was a general synonym for “wrong.” In time,
however, the word, passed from the realm of general
literature into that of law, ceased to be used in its
general sense, and acquired its more specialized
meaning as designating a class of legal wrongs.
- Common law: unlawful violation of private right, not
created by contract, and which gives rise to an action
for damages
twisted -
- It is a wrong independent of a contract, which arises
from an act or omission of a person which causes
some injury or damage directly or indirectly to
another person. (PINEDA)
contract (1305 NCC) A contract is a meeting of
minds between two persons whereby one binds
himself, with respect to the other, to give something or
to render some service.
- An act of or omission producing an injury to another,
without any previous legal relation of which the said
act or omission may be said to be a natural
overgrowth or incident
- Can be based on all 5 sources of obligations as
enumerated in Art. 1157, NCC
Article 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)
- Winfield definition: “tortuous” liability which arises
from the breach of duty primarily fixed by laws. Such
duty is toward persons generally, and its breach is
redressible by an action for unliquidated damages.
- It may either be:
a. direct invasion of some legal right of the
individual;
b. infraction of some public duty by which
special damage accrues to the individual;
c. the violation of some private obligation by
which like damage accrues to the individual.
- It is an act or omission, not a breach of contract and
not involving a quasi-contract, which causes injury and
which at common law or by statute creates a claim for
damages in the injured person (Philippine
Encyclopedia)
- French word “tort” for wrong.
TORTS notes
- Most important torts are libel, slander, negligence,
false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, nuisance,
assault and battery, fraud, conversion, interference with
contractual relations and malpractice.
Quasi-delict:
-Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties is called a
quasi-delict and governed by the provisions of New
Civil Code.
-TERM quasi-delict was deliberately in the Civil code
used by the code commission to designate obligations
which do not arise from law, contracts, quasi-contracts
or criminal offenses. Term tort was not used because it
is broader in coverage as it covers, in common law
countries, acts which are intentional or malicious,
which latter acts in the general plan of the legal system
are governed by the penal code.
Sources of Law on torts and damages:
Based on several articles in the New Civil Code and special
laws:
a. chapter on quasi-delicts (Arts. 2176 to 2194)
b. Chapter on quasi-contracts (Art. 2144, 2145, 2146,
2147, 2148,2149,2150,2151 and 2159)
c. Chapter on Human Relations (Arts. 19-36)
d. Arts. 1172 to 1174 of the new civil code made
applicable to quasi-delicts (2178)
e. Art. 1723 New Civil Code-Art. 2192
f. Art. 2003 New Civil Code
g. Art. 309 New Civil Code-Art. 2219
h. Art. 1314 (Contractual interference)
i. Family Code
j. Arts. 100 to 103 of the Revised Penal Code-Art 2177
NCC
k. Title 18 (damages) covering art. 2195 to 2235
l. Chapter on Nuisance (Art. 694 to 707)
m. Chapter 3 Section 4 (Common carriers) covering
1755 to 1763
n. RA no 7877 Anti-sexual harassment Act;
o. SC decisions
p. American law and jurisprudence;
q. Opinion of legal authors.
Three Classes of Tort under Philippine Law
1. Intentional Tort
- Conduct where the actor desires to cause the
consequences of his acts or believes that consequences
are substantially certain to result from it.
• Battery, assault, false imprisonment,
defamation, invasion of privacy, interference of
property (B-A, F, D,I)
2. Negligent Tort
- Voluntary acts or omissions which result in injury to
another without intending to cause the same. The actor
TORTS notes
fails to exercise due care in performing such acts or
omissions.
3. Strict Liability Tort
- The person is made liable independent of fault or
negligence upon submission of proofs of certain facts.
Three Classes of Tort under Philippine Law
1. Intentional Tort
- Conduct where the actor desires to cause the
consequences of his acts or believes that consequences
are substantially certain to result from it.
- An intentional tort is when an individual or entity
purposely engages in conduct that causes injury or
damage to another.
- Ex: Battery, assault, false imprisonment,
defamation, invasion of privacy, interference of
property
2. Negligent Tort
- Voluntary acts or omissions which result in injury to
another without intending to cause the same. The actor
fails to exercise due care in performing such acts or
omissions.
- when an individual or entity is careless and fails to
provide a duty owed to another person.
- The most common examples of negligence torts are
cases of slip and fall, which occur when a property
owner fails to act as a reasonable person would, thus
resulting in harm to the visitor or customer.
- Ex: Car accidents, Medical malpractice, Slip and fall
accidents
Excuse for negligence (fortuitous event 1174 )
3. Strict Liability Tort
- The person is made liable independent of fault or
negligence upon
- submission of proofs of certain facts.
Ex: ultra-hazardous activities like keeping a wild
animal or using explosives (Possessor and user of an
anima)
– liable if else is injured, Even if the defendant
took necessary precautions and followed safety
requirements, strict liability crimes are unique in that
they would still hold the defendant responsible. Due to
the nature of the activity, the defendant should be able
to foresee that a person could be harmed by it.
Nuisance Defective products
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Kinds of negligence or culpa
1. Culpa contractual (contractual negligence) -
Negligence which results from the breach of contract;
2. Culpa aquiliana (civil negligence or tort or quasidelict)
Acts or omissions that cause damage to another, there
being no contractual relation between the parties (NCC,
Art. 2176);and
negligent – absence of proper care expected (tagalog
term
3. Culpa criminal (criminal negligence) – Those
TORTS notes
which results in the commission of a crime or a delict. not a proper, proper and is automatically
complete defense complete defense the employer’s
Distinctions among Culpa Aquiliana, Culpa Contractual, although this may insofar as guilt, if the
and Culpa Criminal mitigate damages. employers or former is
Culpa Culpa Aquiliana Culpa Criminal Here we follow the guardians are insolvent. The
Contractual rule of concerned. liability of the
Negligence is Negligence here is Negligence here Respondeat or employer
merely incident to direct, is direct, Command however is only
the performance of substantive, substantive, and Responsibility of subsidiary
an obligation independent independent of a the Master and
already existing contract. Servant Rule.
because of a There is There is no Accused is
contract presumption of presumption of presumed
There is a pre- No pre-existing No pre-existing negligence as long negligence innocent until
existing obligation (except obligation as it can be proved the contrary is
obligation (a the duty to be (except the duty that there was a Ordinarily the proved, so
contract either careful in all to never harm breach of contract. victim has to prove prosecution has
express or human actuations) others) negligence of the the burden of
implied) As long as it is defendant. This is proving the
Proof needed – Proof needed – Proof needed – proved that there because his action negligence of the
Preponderance of Preponderance of Proof Beyond was a contract and is based on alleged accused.
Evidence Evidence Reasonable that it was not negligence on the
Doubt carried out, it is part of the
Defense of “good Defense of “good This is not a presumed that defendant.
father of a family” father of a family” proper defense the debtor is at
in the selection in the selection and in culpa criminal. fault, and it his
and supervision supervision of Here the duty to prove that
of employees is employees is a employee’s guilt there was no
TORTS notes
negligence in Culpa Aquiliana Culpa Contractual
carrying out the The foundation of The liability is founded
terms of the liability is independent of on a contract.
contract. a contract.
Negligence is direct, Negligence is merely
substantive and incidental to the
independent. performance of the
Tort law v Culpa Aquiliana: contractual obligation.
The defense of “good The defense of “good
Culpa Aquiliana- quasi-delict : it is an act or father of a family” is a father of a family” is not
omission which causes damage to another, there being complete and proper a complete defense in the
fault or negligence and there being no pre-existing defense insofar as selection of employees.
contractual relationship between the parties. Concept parents, guardians,
of quasi-delict under Art. 2176 is broad and it includes employers are concerned.
not only injuries to persons but also damage to There is no presumption There is presumption of
property. of negligence. The party negligence as long as it
injured must prove the can be proved that there is
Quasi-delict is within the concept of Art. 2176 of the negligence of the a breach of contract.
civil code and is limited to negligent acts. defendant.

On the otherhand, Tort includes negligent and Torl law v Crime

intentional criminal acts and assault and battery, false
imprisonment and deceit.
Tort law v Culpa contractual:
1. Culpa contractual (contractual negligence) -
Negligence which results from the breach of contract;
2. Culpa aquiliana (civil negligence or tort or quasi-
delict) Acts or omissions that cause damage to another,
there being no contractual relation between the parties
(NCC, Art. 2176); and
Tort is a private wrong or injury. It is an infringement of
the private or civil rights of another hence pursued by
the private individual.
- it seeks indemnity for the damage or injury sustained
without seeking imprisonment of the tortfeasor.
Crime on the other hand, is an offense against the public
being a punishable act and is pursued by the sovereign
authority, It generally seeks the curtailment of the liberty
TORTS notes
or imprisonment of the offender with possible civil Fault OR Culpa
liability. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
omission of that diligence which is required by the
Quantum of evidence in torts or quasi-delict is only nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
preponderance of evidence whereas in crime it is proof circumstances of the persons, of the time and the place.
beyond reasonable doubt. Former governed by the Civil When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
code while the latter by RPC. Art. 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. If the law
or contract does not state the diligence which is to be
Difference Between Fault and Dolo observed in the performance, that which expected of a
Fault Dolo good father of a family shall be required (NCC, Art.
There is no deliberate There is deliberate intention 1173).
intention to cause damage or to cause damage
2 Kinds of Fraud
injury even if the act was
Kinds of Fraud in the Fraud in the
done voluntarily
fraud Basis performance perfection
Liability may be mitigated Liability cannot be Time of It occurs It occurs
mitigated occurrence after the before or
As a general rule, waiver for Waiver for future fraud is valid simultaneous
future negligence may be void. execution of with the
allowed in certain cases the contract. creation or
Exception: Nature of the It is employed perfection of
in the the
obligation or public policy performance obligation.
requires extraordinary of a pre-
diligence (e.g. common existing
carrier) obligation
Consent Consent is Consent is
DOLO (fraud) free and not vitiated by
vitiated. serious
It is an intentional evasion of the faithful performance
deception or
of the obligation misrepresenta
tion.
TORTS notes
Effect It is not a It is a ground Effect It renders the It does not
ground for for annulment contract affect the
annulment of of the voidable. validity of the
the contract. contract. contract.
Remedy Action for Action for Remedy Annulment Contract
damages annulment with damages. remains valid.
only. with Remedy is
damages. claim for
damages only.
DOLO Causante and incidente
Dolo causante Dolo causante Dolo CULPA OR NEGLIGENCE
v. Dolo (causal fraud) incidente The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
incidente (incidental omission of that diligence which is required by the
Basis fraud) nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
Nature This is the This is the circumstances of the persons, of the time and the place.
essential cause kind of fraud When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
of the consent which is not Art. 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. If the law
without which the efficient or contract does not state the diligence which is to be
the party cause for the observed in the performance, that which expected of a
would not giving of the good father of a family shall be required (NCC, Art.
have agreed to consent to the 1173).
enter into the contract, as it
contract refers merely Test of negligence
(NCC, Art. to an incident Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
1338). therein and, the reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
which even if prudent person would have used in the same situation?
not present, If not, then he is guilty of negligence. (Picart v. Smith,
the contracting G.R. No. L-12219, March 15, 1918).
party would
have still NOTE: When negligence is so gross that it amounts to
agreed to the wanton attitude on the part of the debtor or such negligence
contract. shows bad faith, the laws in case of fraud shall apply.
TORTS notes
Effect of good faith or bad faith of the obligor
If the obligor acted in good faith, he is responsible for
the natural and probable consequences of the breach
of contract and which the parties have reasonably
foreseen at the time of the constitution of the
obligation.
If the obligor is guilty of fraud, bad faith, malice or
wanton attitude, he shall be responsible for all
damages which may be reasonably attributed to the
non-performance of the obligation.
Contributory negligence of the creditor
GR: It reduces or mitigates the damages which he can
recover.
XPN: If the negligent act or omission of the creditor is
the proximate cause of the event which led to the
damage or injury complained of, he cannot recover.
Elements of Quasi-Delict
1. Negligent act or omission of the defendant
2. Damages to plaintiff
Negligence Under Article 2176 and Article 1173
3. The connection of cause and effect between such
negligence and damages
4. No pre-existing contractual relationship between the
parties
Instances when Art. 2176 is inapplicable
a) When there was a pre-existing contractual relation
because the breach of contract is the source of the
obligation (Robles v. Yap Wing, 41 SCRA 267, G.R. No.
L-20442, October 4, 1971);
NOTE: However, if the act that breaches the contract
is tortuous, the pre-existing contractual relation will not
bar the recovery of damages (Singson v. BPI, G.R. No.
L-24837, June 27, 1968);
b) When the fault or negligence is punished by law as
a crime, Art. 100 of RPC shall be applicable;
c) If the action for quasi-delict is instituted after four
years, it is deemed prescribed (Afialda v. Hisole, G.R.
No. L-2075, November 29, 1949);
d) When the injury suffered by a person is the result of
a fortuitous event without human intervention;
e) If there is no damage or injury caused to another
(Walter A. Smith & Co., Inc. v. Cadwallader Gibson
Lumber Company, G.R. No. L-32640, December 29,
1930).
• Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relations between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
TORTS notes
• Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the
obligor consists in the omission of that diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation
and corresponds with the circumstances of the
person, of the time and of the place. When
negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence
which is to be observed in the performance, that
which is expected of a good father of a family
shall be required
Criminal Negligence Under Article 365
• Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person
who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor
in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
medium period; if it would have constituted a less
grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it
would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of
arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence,
shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in
its medium and maximum periods; if it would have
constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed. virtual law
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall
have only resulted in damage to the property of another,
the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an
amount equal to the value of said damages to three times
such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-
five pesos
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall
be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence
or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done
maliciously, would have constituted a light felony
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise
their sound discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be
applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or
lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of
this article, in which case the court shall impose the
penalty next lower in degree than that which should be
imposed in the period which they may deem proper to
apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation
of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be
caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
TORTS notes
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without
malice, doing or falling to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing of failing
to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution
displayed in those cases in which the damage impending
to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly
manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in
this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to
lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be
in this hand to give. (As amended by R.A. 1790, approved
June 21, 1957).
Purposes of Tort Law
1. To provide a peaceful means of adjusting the rights of
the parties who might otherwise take the law into their
own hands.
2. Deter wrongful conduct
3. To encourage socially responsible behavior as
exemplified by Article 19, NCC:
“Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.”
4. To restore injured parties to their original condition,
insofar as the law can do this, by compensating them
for their injury.
Fundamental Principles:
These purposes of tort law are sought to be achieved in the
pursuit of fundamental principles upheld under the NCC.
1. EQUITY & JUSTICE
• NCC upholds the “spirit that giveth life rather than the
letter that killeth”
• Art. 21 & 26 of NCC
• Justice and equity demand that persons who may have
damaged by the wrongful or negligent act of another
are compensated.
• Acting with justice involves the duty to indemnify for
damages caused under Arts. 20, 21, 28, 27; to
indemnify by reason of unjust enrichment under Arts.
22 & 23; and to protect the weaker party under Art. 24
• “The precepts of law are these, to live honestly, not to
injure others, and to give each one his due.”
• “Justice is a steady and unceasing disposition to render
every man his due.”
TORTS notes
Two levels of justice
• Social
Distributive
Retributive – sanctions or penalties that
are applied to those who engage in certain
kinds of antisocial behavior
• Individual
Compensatory – a person who wrongfully
inflicts harm on another or that person’s
property must pay or repair the damage
Commutative – fairness of a private
bargain or exchange
• Equity is defined as justice according to natural law
and right.
Justice outside legality
Invoked in justifying the rule regarding
mitigation of liability if the plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence
2. DEMOCRACY
• Art. 32 provides for independent civil actions for
damages against any public officer or employee, or any
private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates, or in any manner impedes or impairs
the civil rights and liberties of another person.
3. RESPECT FOR HUMAN DIGNITY
• Art. 26 and the provisions on moral damages are
included in order to remedy defects in old CC in so
far as it did not properly exalt human personality.
• The touchstone of every system of laws, of the culture
and civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies
man.
Justification for Tort Liability
In cases of noncontractual obligations, it is the wrongful or
negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum
juris whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists
independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by
the parties.
1. Moral perspective
• Tort liability may be justified because the conduct is
considered moral wrong.
• The law of torts abounds in mora phraseology it has
much to say of wrongs, malice, fraud, intent and
negligence. Hence, it may naturally be supposed that
the risk of man's conduct is thrown upon him as a result
of some moral shortcomings.
• Ubi jus ibi remedium (there is no wrong without
remedy)
• Moral turpitude was considered the outstanding though
not exclusive principle of tortious liability.
TORTS notes
2. Social and economic perspective
• Liability may be provided for certain tortious conduct
because of the good that it will do to the society as a
whole and its function of encouraging socially
responsible behavior.
• Economic analysis of tort law focuses on the allocation
of the risks of loss due to the destruction of property or
injury to persons created by those activities.
Persons Who Can Sue and be Sued
1. Plaintiff
• Any person who had been injured by reason of a
tortious conduct can sue the tortfeasor.
• Plaintiff can be a natural person or juridical person.
• An unborn child is not entitled to damages. But the
bereaved parents may be entitled to damages, on
damages inflicted directly upon them. (Geluz vs.
CA, 2 SCRA 802)
2. Defendant
• May be held liable even if he does not know the
identity of the plaintiff at the time of the accident.
• Can either be a natural or juridical being
Remedies
The primary purpose of a tort action is to provide
compensation to a person who was injured by the tortious
conduct of the defendant.
Preventive remedy is available in some cases
Alternative Compensation Schemes
These include insurance and work employees compensation
II. QUASI-DELICTS
1. Article 2176 – 2194
A. Article 2176
ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
1A.1. PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION, et al v. COURT OF APPEALS, et
al.
G.R. No. 84698, February 4, 1992
FACTS:
• A stabbing incident caused the death of Carlitos
Bautista while on the second-floor premises of PSBA,
prompting the parents to file a suit against PSBA and
its corporate officers.
TORTS notes
• The private respondents sought to adjudge them liable
for the victim’s untimely demise due to their alleged
negligence, recklessness and lack of security
precautions, means and methods before, during and
after the attack on the victim.
• The petitioners sought to have the case dismissed,
alleging that they are presumably sued under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause
of action as jurisprudence dictates that academic
institutions are beyond ambit of the rule in the
aforestated article.
• The trial court denied their motion to dismiss and the
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s orders.
ISSUE:
Whether PSBA may be held liable under the law of quasi-
delicts.
HELD:
NO. Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. Article
2180 provides that damage should have been caused or
inflicted by students of the educational institution sought to
be held liable. This, however, does not exist in the present
case as the assailants were not students of the PSBA.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment,
there is established a contract between them, resulting in
bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply
with. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps
are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus
premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a
contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista,
the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of
Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts
or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only
between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether
express or implied. (However, this impression has not
prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort
even when there obtains a contract.)
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however,
there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school
and Bautista had been breached thru the former’s negligence
in providing proper security measures. This would be for the
trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of
negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of
contractual obligation only.
A.2. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO. Vs CA
ET AL.
G.R. No. 112576, October 26, 1994
SUMMARY: Credit memorandum; “Nag-issue kayo ng
tseke, wala namang pondo”; blood pressure rose to dangerous
level and had to undergo medical treatment for 2 days.
FACTS:
• The case emanated from a dispute between the Rural
Bank of Padre Garcia, Inc. (RBPG) and Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company (MBTC) relative to a credit
TORTS notes
memorandum dated April 5, 1982 from the Central
Bank in the amount of P304,000.00 in favor of RBPG.
• The records show that Isabel Katigbak is the president
and director of RBPG, owning 65% of the shares
thereof. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
(MBTC) is the rural bank's depository bank, where
Katigbak maintains current accounts with MBTC's
main office in Makati as well as its Lipa City branch.
• On April 6, 1982, MBTC received from the Central
Bank a credit memo dated April 5, 1982 that its demand
deposit account was credited with P304,000.00 for the
account of RBPG, representing loans granted by the
Central Bank to RBPG.
• On the basis of said credit memo, Isabel Katigbak
issued several checks against its account with MBTC
in the total amount of P300,000.00, two (2) of which
were payable to Dr. Felipe C. Roque and Mrs. Eliza
Roque for P25,000.00 each.
• Said checks issued to Dr. and Mrs. Roque were
deposited by the Roques with the Philippine Banking
Corporation on April 12, 1982, but the checks were
returned by MBTC with the annotations "DAIF —
TNC" (Drawn Against Insufficient Funds — Try Next
Clearing) so they were redeposited on April 14, 1982,
which however again was dishonored and returned
unpaid for “DAIF—TNC—No ADVICE FROM CB.”
• After the second dishonor of the two (2) checks, Dr.
Felipe Roque, a member of the Board of Directors of
Philippine Banking Corporation, allegedly went to the
Office of Antonio Katigbak, an officer of RBPG,
chiding him for the bouncing checks. In order to
appease the doctor, RBPG paid Dr. Roque P50,000.00
in cash to replace the aforesaid checks.
• On April 13, 1982, Isabel Katigbak who was in
Hongkong on a business vacation trip together with her
sons Alfredo and Antonio, both of whom were also
officers of RBPG, received overseas phone calls from
Mrs. Maris Katigbak-San at her residence, informing
Isabel Katigbak that a certain Mr. Rizal Dungo,
Assistant Cashier of MBTC insisted on talking to her
(Mrs. San Juan), berating her about the checks which
bounced, saying "Nag-issue kayo ng tseke, wala
namang pondo," even if it was explained to Mr. Dungo
that Mrs. San Juan was not in any way connected with
RBPG.
• Mrs. Katigbak testied that she informed Mrs. San Juan
to request defendant MBTC to check and verify the
records regarding the aforementioned Central Bank
credit memo for P304,000.00 in favor of RBPG as she
was certain that the checks were sufficiently covered
by the CB credit memo, but the following day, Mrs.
San Juan received another insulting call from Mr.
Dungo ("Bakit kayo nag-issue ng tseke na wala
namang pondo, Three Hundred Thousand na.") When
Mrs. San Juan explained to him the need to verify the
records regarding the Central Bank memo, he merely
brushed it aside, telling her sarcastically that he was
very sure that no such credit memo existed.
• Mrs. San Juan was constrained to place another long
distance call to Mrs. Katigbak in Hongkong that
evening. Tense and angered, the Katigbaks had to cut
short their Hongkong stay with their respective families
TORTS notes
and flew back to Manila, catching the first available
flight on April 15, 1982.
• Immediately upon arrival, Mrs. Katigbak called up
MBTC, through a Mr. Cochico, for a re-examination of
the records of MBTC regarding the Central Bank credit
memo dated April 5, 1982 for P304,000.00. Mr.
Dungo, to whom Cochico handed over the phone,
allegedly arrogantly said: "Bakit kayo magagalit, wala
naman kayong pondo?" These remarks allegedly so
shocked Mrs. Katigbak that her blood pressure rose to
a dangerous level and she had to undergo medical
treatment at the Makati Medical Center for two (2)
days.
• RBPG and Isabel Katigbak filed a civil case for
damages against MBTC in the RTC of Lipa.
• Defendant MBTC in its answer alleged that its
messenger, Elizer Gonzales, received from the Central
Bank several credit advices on rural bank accounts,
which included that of plaintiff RBPG, that due to the
inadvertence of said messenger, the credit advice
issued in favor of plaintiff RBPG was not delivered to
the department in charge of processing the same.
• That the P304,000.00 which was a re-discounting loan
from the Central Bank, the same was credited only on
April 15, 1982 after the Central Bank finally confirmed
that a credit advice was indeed issued in favor of
RBPG.
• After the confirmation, MBTC credited the amount of
the credit advice to plaintiff RBPG's account and thru
its officers, allegedly conveyed personally on two
occasions its apologies to plaintiffs to show that the
bank and its officers acted with no deliberate intent on
their part to cause injury or damage to plaintiffs.
• Metrobank's negligence arising from their messenger's
misrouting of the credit advice resulting in the return of
the checks in question, despite daily reporting of credit
memos and a corresponding daily radio message
confirmation, and Mr. Dungo's improper handling of
clients led to the messenger's dismissal from service
and Mr. Dungo's transfer from Metro Manila to
Mindoro.
• The RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff and awarded
P50,000.00 as temperate damages, P500,000.00 as
moral damages, P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses and costs of suit.
• The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court but
deleted the award of temperate damages and the
reduction of moral damages from P500,000.00 to
P50,000.00 in favor of RBPG and P100,000.00 for
Isabel Katigbak, and attorney’s fees to P50,000.00.
ISSUE:
WON plaintiff may be allowed to recover damages, including
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and the costs of the suit
HELD:
YES, the dishonoring of the respondent’s checks committed
through negligence by the petitioner bank. Petitioner bank
was remiss in its duty and obligation to treat private
respondents' account with the highest degree of care,
considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The
bank must bear the blame for failing to discover the mistake
of its employee despite the established procedure requiring
TORTS notes
bank papers to pass through bank personnel whose duty it is
to check and countercheck them for possible errors.
Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of
every kind of obligation is demandable. While the bank's
negligence may not have been attended with malice and bad
faith, nevertheless, it caused serious anxiety,
embarrassment and humiliation to private respondents
for which they are entitled to recover reasonable moral
damages.
As the records bear out, insult was added to injury by
petitioner bank's issuance of debit memoranda representing
service and penalty charges for the returned checks. In the
case of Leopoldo Araneta vs Bank of America, "The financial
credit of a businessman is a prized and valuable asset, it being
a significant part of the foundation of his business. Any
adverse reflection thereon constitutes some financial loss to
him.” It was established that when Mrs. Katigbak learned
that her checks were not being honored and Mr. Dungo
repeatedly made the insulting phone calls, her wounded
feelings and the mental anguish suffered by her caused
her blood pressure to rise beyond normal limits,
necessitating medical attendance for two (2) days at a
hospital.
The damage to private respondents' reputation and social
standing entitles them to moral damages. Moral damages
include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation and similar injury. Temperate or
moderate damages which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with
certainty. Temperate damages may be allowed in cases where
from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss
cannot be adduced, although the court is convinced that there
has been such loss.
The appellate court, however, justified its deletion when
MBTC reasoned out that the amount of P50,000.00 is not part
of the relief prayed for in the complaint, aside from the fact
that the amount allegedly suffered by Mrs. Katigbak is
susceptible of proof.
Moral and temperate damages which are not susceptible of
pecuniary estimation are not awarded to penalize the
petitioner but to compensate the respondents for injuries
suffered as a result of the former's fault and negligence, taking
into account the latter's credit and social standing in the
banking community, particularly since this is the very first
time such humiliation has befallen private respondents. The
amount of such losses need not be established with exactitude,
precisely due to their nature.
The carelessness of petitioner bank, aggravated by the lack of
promptness in repairing the error and the arrogant attitude of
the bank officer handling the matter, justifies the grant of
moral damages, which are clearly not excessive and
unconscionable. The Court deems it just and equitable that
attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00 be awarded.
TORTS notes
A.3. MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and
in behalf of the minor children KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH,
BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all surnamed
DULAY v. THE COURT OF APPEALS SAFEGUARD
INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., and
SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 108017, April 3, 1995, Bidin, J.
SUMMARY: The case is about an altercation between the
spouse of the petitioner and a security guard employed by the
respondents. The altercation resulted to the death of DULAY
causing the widow to file for an action for damages against
the respondents, as it was alleged that defendants impliedly
acknowledge their responsibility for the acts of their
employee when they extended their sympathies to the
petitioners.
FACTS:
• An altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty.
Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang Sa
Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of
which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at
the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
• Maria Benita Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon
Dulay, filed an action for damages against Torzuela
and SAFEGUARD and SUPERGUARD as alleged
employers of Torzuela. Dulay prayed for actual,
compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees.
• The action alleged that the incident resulting in the
death of NAPOLEON V. DULAY was due to the
concurring negligence of the defendants. Defendant
TORZUELA'S wanton and reckless discharge of the
firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD
and/or SUPERGUARD was the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury, while the negligence of
defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD
consists in its having failed to exercise the diligence of
a good father of a family in the supervision and control
of its employee to avoid the injury.
• SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of
shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and
that since the alleged act of shooting was committed
with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor
is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
which states: Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable. Respondent
SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for
damages based on negligence under Article 2176 of the
New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners,
cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176
applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code.
• Petitioners based their cause of action on their liability
under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which
provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or an
TORTS notes
ISSUES:
1. Whether Dulay’s may file an independent civil action
against the respondents despite having a cause of action
based on delict and not on quasi-delict. YES
2. Whether Dulay has a sufficient cause of action to file
for an action for damages.
HELD:
1. YES. In the case of Elcano v. Hill, this Court already held
that:
. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or
negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by
law" but also acts criminal in character; whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently,
a separate civil action against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages
on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to
in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to
civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case
that the criminal act charged has not happened or has
not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We
here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law.
2. YES. The complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable
breach on the part of the defendant Torzuela and respondents
SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the
complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon
Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting occurred
while Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD
and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and
responsible for his acts. This does not operate however, to
establish that the defendants below are liable.
Whether or not the shooting was actually reckless and
wanton or attended by negligence and whether it was
actually done within the scope of Torzuela's duties;
whether the private respondents SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family; and whether the defendants are actually
liable, are questions which can be better resolved after trial on
the merits where each party can present evidence to prove
their respective allegations and defenses.
The general rule is that the allegations in a complaint are
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the
defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render
a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer
therein. A cause of action exist if the following elements are
present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect
or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the
TORTS notes
part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages
A.4. VICENTE VERGARA v. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and AMADEO AZARCON
G.R. No. 77679, September 30, 1987
SUMMARY: An action for damages based on quasi-delict
(Art. 2176 of the Civil Code) was filed arising from a
vehicular accident, where a cargo truck rammed the store
residence of private respondent causing damages. Petitioner
argued the diligence of his driver and placed the blame on
defective brakes, calling the accident an act of God.
Ultimately, the court found the petitioner guilty of fault or
negligence.
FACTS:
• Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck
belonging to petitioner, rammed "head-on" the store-
residence of the private respondent, causing damages
thereto which were inventoried and assessed at
P53,024.22.
• Petitioner alleged that his driver operated the cargo
truck in a very diligent and careful manner; that the
steering wheel refused to respond to his effort and as a
result of a blown-out tire and despite application of his
brakes, the said cargo truck hit the store-residence and
that the said accident was an act of God for which he
cannot be held liable.
• Petitioner also filed a third-party complaint against
Travellers Insurance and Surety Corporation, alleging
that said cargo truck involved in the vehicular accident
was insured by the third party defendant.
• RTC rendered judgment in favor of private respondent.
CA affirmed in toto, which ordered petitioner to pay,
jointly and severally with Travellers Insurance and
Surety Corporation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of a quasi-delict.
HELD:
YES. It was established by competent evidence that the
requisites of a quasi-delict are present in the case at bar: (1)
damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission,
of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must
respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect
between such negligence and the damages.
It is undisputed that private respondent suffered damages as a
result of an act or omission of petitioner. The issue of whether
or not this act or omission can be considered as a "negligent"
act or omission was passed upon by the trial court. The
findings of said court, affirmed by the respondent court,
which we are not prepared to now disturb, show that the fact
of occurrence of the "vehicular accident" was sufficiently
established by the policy report and the testimony of
Patrolman Masiclat. And the fact of negligence may be
deduced from the surrounding circumstances thereof.
TORTS notes
According to the driver of the cargo truck, he applied the
brakes but the latter did not work due to mechanical defects.
Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, a mishap caused by
defective brakes cannot be considered as fortuitous in
character. Certainly, the defects were curable and the accident
preventable.
Furthermore, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to
overcome the disputable presumption of negligence on his
part in the selection and supervision of his driver.
A.5. AMADO PICART v. FRANK SMITH, JR.
G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918
SUMMARY: Amado Picart was riding on his pony when the
defendant, riding on his car, approached. Defendant blew his
horn to give warning. Plaintiff moved the horse to the right
instead of moving to the left, reasoning that he had no
sufficient time to move to the right direction. Defendant
continued to approach, and when he had gotten quite near, he
quickly turned to the left. The horse was frightened that it
turned his body across the bridge. His limb was broken and
the rider was thrown off and got injured. The horse died. An
action for damages was filed against the defendant. The SC
held that the control of the situation had then passed entirely
to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to
an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons
on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far
away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead
of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost
upon the horse.
FACTS:
• Amado Picart was riding on his pony over Carlatan
Bridge in San Fernando, La Union when Smith
approached from the opposite direction in an
automobile.
• As the Smith neared the bridge he saw a horseman on
it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach.
• Picart saw the automobile and heard the warning
signals. Being perturbed by the rapid approach of the
vehicle, he pulled the pony closely up against the
railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going
to the left.
• The vehicle approached without slowing down. Smith
quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape
hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as
then standing; but due to the automobile’s close
proximity to the animal, the animal became frightened
and turned its body across the bridge with its head
toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on the hock
of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb
was broken.
• The horse fell and its rider was thrown off. As a result
of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received
contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness
and required medical attention for several days.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the
manner above described was guilty of negligence such as
gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done
TORTS notes
HELD:
YES. The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor
in the situation before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in
a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant
in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used
in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the
position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect
harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his
foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the
present case we think that negligence is clearly
established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the
defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the
course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and
would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider
as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these
circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to
guard against the threatened harm.
The plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was
guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the
wrong side of the road. But the defendant was also negligent;
and in such case the problem always is to discover which
agent is immediately and directly responsible. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has the last
fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so
is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to
the prior negligence of the other party.
While contributory negligence on the part of the person
injured did not constitute a bar to recovery, it could be
received in evidence to reduce the damages which would
otherwise have been assessed wholly against the other party.
A.6. GLAN PEOPLE'S LUMBER AND HARDWARE v.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 70493 May 18, 1989
FACTS:
• Engineer Orlando T. Calibo, Agripino Roranes, and
Maximo Patos were on the jeep owned by the
Bacnotan Consolidated Industries, Inc., with Calibo
at the wheel, as it approached from the South Lizada
Bridge going towards the direction of Davao City at
about 1:45 in the afternoon of July 4,1979.
• At about that time, the cargo track, loaded with
cement bags, GI sheets, plywood, driven by
defendant Paul Zacarias y Infants, coming from the
opposite direction of Davao City and bound for Glan,
South Cotabato, had just crossed said bridge.
• At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge, the cargo
truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of which
Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and Patos
sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt.
TORTS notes
• As a result of the impact, the left side of the truck was
slightly damaged while the left side of the jeep,
including its fender and hood, was extensively
damaged.
• After the impact, the jeep fell and rested on its right
side on the asphalted road a few meters to the rear of
the truck, while the truck stopped on its wheels on the
road.
• On November 27, 1979, the instant case for damages
was filed by the surviving spouse and children of the
late Engineer Calibo who are residents of Tagbilaran
City against the driver and owners of the cargo truck.
• For failure to file its answer to the third-party
complaint, third party defendant, which insured the
cargo truck involved, was declared in default.
ISSUE:
Whether Zacarias was negligent
HELD:
No. The evidence not only acquits Zacarias of any
negligence in the matter; there are also quite a few
significant indicators that it was rather Engineer Calibo's
negligence that was the proximate cause of the accident.
Zacarias had told Patrolman Dimaano at the scene of the
collision and later confirmed in his written statement at the
police headquarters that the jeep had been "zigzagging,"
which is to say that it was travelling or being driven erratically
at the time. The other investigator, Patrolman Jose Esparcia,
also testified that eyewitnesses to the accident had remarked
on the jeep's "zigzagging."
There is moreover more than a suggestion that Calibo had
been drinking shortly before the accident. The decision of the
Trial Court adverts to further testimony of Esparcia to the
effect that three of Calibo's companions at the beach party he
was driving home from when the collision occurred, who,
having left ahead of him went to the scene when they heard
about the accident, had said that there had been a drinking
spree at the party and, referring to Calibo, had remarked:
"Sabi na huag nang mag drive . . . . pumipilit," (loosely
translated, "He was advised not to drive, but he insisted.")
Even, however, ignoring these telltale indicia of negligence
on the part of Calibo, and assuming some antecedent
negligence on the part of Zacarias in failing to keep within his
designated lane, incorrectly demarcated as it was, the physical
facts, either expressly found by the Intermediate Appellate
Court or which may be deemed conceded for lack of any
dispute, would still absolve the latter of any actionable
responsibility for the accident under the rule of the last clear
chance.
Both drivers, as the Appellate Court found, had had a full
view of each other's vehicle from a distance of one hundred
fifty meters. Both vehicles were travelling at a speed of
approximately thirty kilometers per hour. The private
respondents have admitted that the truck was already at a full
stop when the jeep plowed into it. And they have not seen fit
to deny or impugn petitioners' imputation that they also
admitted the truck had been brought to a stop while the
jeep was still thirty meters away. From these facts the
logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had
TORTS notes
what judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last
clear chance to avoid the accident, while still at that
distance of thirty meters from the truck, by stopping in his
turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of which
he had sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only
thirty kilometers per hour. In those circumstances, his duty
was to seize that opportunity of avoidance, not merely rely on
a supposed right to expect, as the Appellate Court would have
it, the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path.
The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and
complete a defense to accident liability today as it did
when invoked and applied in the 1918 case of Picart vs.
Smith.
A.7. PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE v. COURT
OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 97626, March 14, 1997
SUMMARY: Bank teller was negligent for validating checks
but may konting liability pa rin si respondent
FACTS:
• Rommel’s Marketing Corporation (RMC),
represented by its President and General Manager
Romeo Lipana, filed to complaint to recover from
the Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) the
amount of P304,979.74 representing various deposits
it had made in its current account with said bank but
which were not credited to its account and were
instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido
Cotas, allegedly due to the gross and inexcusable
negligence of PBC. RMC maintained two current
accounts with PBC.
• In the ordinary course of banking operations, current
account deposits are accepted by the bank on the basis
of deposit slips prepared and signed by the depositor,
or the latter's agent or representative, who indicates
therein the current account number to which the deposit
is to be credited, the name of the depositor or current
account holder, the date of the deposit, and the amount
of the deposit either in cash or checks. The deposit slip
has an upper portion or stub, which is detached and
given to the depositor or his agent; the lower portion is
retained by the bank. In some instances, however, the
deposit slips are prepared in duplicate by the depositor.
The original of the deposit slip is retained by the bank,
while the duplicate copy is returned or given to the
depositor.
• Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in
the form of cash totalling P304,979.74 to his secretary,
Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds in
the current accounts of RMC with PBC. It turned out,
however, that these deposits, on all occasions, were not
credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited
to Account No. 53-01734-7 of Yabut's husband,
Bienvenido Cotas who likewise maintains an account
with the same bank
• Irene Yabut would accomplish two copies of the
deposit slip, an original and a duplicate. The original
showed the name of her husband as depositor and his
current account number. On the duplicate copy was
TORTS notes
written the account number of her husband but the
name of the account holder was left blank. PBC's
teller, Azucena Mabayad, would, however, validate
and stamp both the original and the duplicate of
these deposit slips retaining only the original copy
despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip.
The second copy was kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for
record purposes.
• After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of
RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and
change the account number written thereon, which is
that of her husband's, and make it appear to be RMC's
account number
• With the daily remittance records also prepared by Ms.
Yabut and submitted to private respondent RMC
together with the validated duplicate slips with the
latter's name and account number, she made her
company believe that all the while the amounts she
deposited were being credited to its account
• Upon discovery of the loss of funds, RMC demanded
from the PBC the return of its money.
• RTC: Ruled in favor of RMC
• CA: Affirmed
ISSUE:
What is the proximate cause of the loss?
HELD:
The proximate cause of the loss is PBC’s negligence.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages
suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the
defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must
respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between
the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages
incurred by the plaintiff
Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or
the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
would do. The seventy-eight (78)-year-old, yet still relevant,
case of Picart v. Smith, provides the test by which to
determine the existence of negligence in a particular case
which may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law
here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by
the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the
Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor
in the situation before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
Applying the above test, it appears that the bank's teller,
Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in validating,
officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips
prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring
TORTS notes
fact that the duplicate copy was not completely
accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of
the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit
slips, original or duplicate.
Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but
also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical
selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad. This was
exemplified in the testimony of Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then
Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner bank and now
its Vice-President, to the effect that, while he ordered the
investigation of the incident, he never came to know that
blank deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the
bank's validation procedures
Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon
mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and
precedent. Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina, reiterated in the case
of Bank of the Phil. Islands v. Court of Appeals, defines
proximate cause as "that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. . . ." In this case, absent the act of
Ms. Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete
duplicate copy of the deposit slip, Ms. Irene Yabut would not
have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent
scheme with impunity.
The doctrine of last clear chance would also mean that an
antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the
recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or
bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the
latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Here,
assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in
entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the
latter with the opportunity to defraud the company, as
advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the
petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity
to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully
observing their self-imposed validation procedure.
In the case of banks, however, the degree of diligence
required is more than that of a good father of a family.
Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with
their depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of
their clients with the highest degree of care.
Private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its
monthly statements of account. Had it done so, the company
would have been alerted to the series of frauds being
committed against RMC by its secretary. The damage would
definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC,
particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little
vigilance in their financial affairs. This omission by RMC
amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the
damages that may be awarded to the private respondent under
Article 2179 of the New Civil Code
A.8. NATIONAL POWER CORP. v. CA
G.R No. L-47379, May 16, 1988
TORTS notes
SUMMARY: In the happening of fortuitous event, if there
concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation
or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation,
which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape
liability. NPC is found negligent when it opened the spill
gates of the Angat Dam only at the height of typhoon when it
knew very well that it was safer to have opened the same
gradually and earlier, as it was also undeniable that NPC
knew of the coming typhoon at least four days before it
actually struck.
FACTS:
• In Aug. 1964, plaintiff Engineering Construction Inc.
(ECI), being a successful bidder, executed a contract
with National waterworks and Sewage Authority
(NAWASA), where the former undertook to furnish all
tools, labor, equipment and materials and to construct
proposed 2nd lpo-Bicti Tunnel, Intake and Outlet
Structures, and Appurtenant Structures, and
Appurtenant Features, at Norzagaray, Bulacan, and to
complete said works within 800 calendar days from the
date the Contractor receives the formal notice to
proceed.
• The project involved 2 major phases. The first phase
comprises the tunnel work covering the Ipo river,
where the Ipo dam of defendant National Power Corp
(NPC) is located. The other phase consists of outworks
at both ends of the tunnel.
• By September 1967, ECI had already completed the
first major phase of the work, namely, the tunnel
excavation work. As soon as ECI finished the
excavation work, all the equipment no longer needed
there were transferred to another site where some
projects were yet to be completed. Some portions of the
Bicti site were still under construction (2nd phase).
• However typhoon Welming hit central Luzon passing
through the Angat Dam project. To prevent an
overflow of water from the dam, since the water level
had reached the danger height, the NPC caused the
opening of the spillway gates.
• Extraordinary large volume of water rushed out of the
gates, and hit the installations and construction works
of ECI at Ipo site with terrific impact, as a result of
which the latter’s stockpile of materials supplies, camp
facilities and permanent structures and accessories
were either washed away, lost or destroyed.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the destruction and loss of the ECI's
equipment and facilities were due to force majeure hence
NPC is not liable
HELD:
NO, The SC held that petitioner NPC was undoubtedly
negligent hence liable.
Based on the appellate and trial court’s findings, it opened
the spillway gates of the Angat Dam only at the height of
typhoon "Welming" when it knew very well that it was
safer to have opened the same gradually and earlier, as it
was also undeniable that NPC knew of the coming
typhoon at least four days before it actually struck. And
even though the typhoon was an act of God or what we may
TORTS notes
call force majeure, NPC cannot escape liability because its
negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and damage.
As ruled in the case of Nakpil & Sons v. CA, the Court ruled
that “If upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act
of God, there concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence,
delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the
tenor of the obligation, which results in loss or damage,
the obligor cannot escape liability.
The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly
requires that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by
the violence of nature and human agencies are to be
excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the
mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be
considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation
of man, whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or
failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby HUMANIZED,
as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to the acts
of God.”
Furthermore, question whether there is negligence on the part
of NPC is a question of fact that falls within jurisdiction of
CA and will not be disturbed by the SC, unless clearly
unfounded.
SC also upheld that the consequential damages should
represent only the service of the temporary crane for 1 month,
otherwise, it would result to unjust enrichment on the part of
ECI (it will not be based on the value of the new crane).It also
eliminated the 120K bonus (ECI’s lost opportunity to earn 1
month bonus from NAWASA) as the loss or damage to ECI’s
equipment occurred long after the stipulated deadline to finish
construction. As to the exemplary damages, SC eliminated the
dame because it found no bad faith on the part of NPC and
neither can the latter’s negligence be considered gross.
A.9. AIR FRANCE v. CARRASCOSO
G.R. No. 121438, September 28, 1966
FACTS:
• On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France,
through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines,
Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip
airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.
• From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first
class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first
class" seat that he was occupying because, in the
words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a
"white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better
right" to the seat.
• When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff,
as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's
Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead
body.
• After some commotion, plaintiff reluctantly gave his
"first class" seat in the plane.
• CFI Manila: sentenced petitioner to pay respondent
Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral
damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20
representing the difference in fare between first class
TORTS notes
and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-
Rome, these various amounts with interest at the legal
rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until
paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs
of suit.
• CA: slightly reduced the amount of refund on
Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and
voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other
respects", with costs against petitioner.
• Air France contends that respondent knew that he did
not have confirmed reservations for first class on any
specific flight, although he had tourist class protection;
that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was
no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but
that such would depend upon the availability of first
class seats.
ISSUE:
WON there is a breach of contract of carriage between Air
France and Carrascoso that would hold Air France liable
for damages.
HELD:
YES. Petitioner’s contract with Carrascoso is one attended
with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso’s action as we have
said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation
of public duty by the petitioner air carrier, a case of quasi-
delict. Damages are proper.
To achieve stability in the relation between passenger and air
carrier, adherence to the ticket issued is desirable. Quoting the
court, "We cannot understand how a reputable firm like Air
France could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it
never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding
amount in payment of the tickets and yet it allowed the
passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in
keeping with the ordinary course of business that the
company should know whether or not the tickets it issues are
to be honored or not." Evidence of bad faith was presented
without objection on the part of the Carrascoso. In the
case, it could have been easy for Air France to present its
manager to testify at the trial or secure his deposition but
defendant did neither. There is also no evidence as to whether
or not a prior reservation was made by the white man.
The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from
enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed
his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat,
made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the
tourist class compartment, just to give way to another
passenger whose right thereto has not been established.
Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has
assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law.
For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some
motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." For
the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner,
his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They
TORTS notes
have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with Elements of Quasi-Delict
kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are 1. Negligent act or omission of the defendant
entitled to be protected against personal is conduct, injurious 2. Damages to plaintiff
language, indignities and abuse from such employees. Any
3. The connection of cause and effect between such
discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages against negligence and damages
the carrier. 4. No pre-existing contractual relationship between the
parties (essential requisite)
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation
attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the A.10. AFRICA v. CALTEX
carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966
for damages.
SUMMARY: The action is for damages under Articles 1902
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They and 1903 of the old Civil Code
have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with
kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. Although FACTS:
• While gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into
the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in
origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the the underground storage, a fire broke out at the Caltex
contract may be also a tort". service station in Antipolo.
• The fire spread to and burned several neighboring

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to houses, including the personal properties and effects
inside them.
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
• Their owners, among them petitioners here, sued
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren,
pre-existing contractual relations between the parties, is the first as alleged owner of the station and the second
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this as its agent in charge of operation. Negligence on the
Chapter. part of both of them was attributed as the cause of the
fire.
• Police Department report: — Investigation disclosed
that at about 4:00 P.M. March 18, 1948, while Leandro
Flores was transferring gasoline from a tank truck,
plate No. T-5292 into the underground tank of the
TORTS notes
Caltex Gasoline Station located at the corner of Rizal
Avenue and Antipolo Street, this City, an unknown
Filipino lighted a cigarette and threw the burning
match stick near the main valve of the said
underground tank. Due to the gasoline fumes, fire
suddenly blazed. Quick action of Leandro Flores in
pulling off the gasoline hose connecting the truck with
the underground tank prevented a terrific explosion.
However, the flames scattered due to the hose from
which the gasoline was spouting. It burned the truck
and the following accessorias and residences.
• The Fire Department report: — In connection with
their allegation that the premises was subleased for the
installation of a coca-cola and cigarette stand, the
complainants furnished this Office a copy of a
photograph taken during the fire and which is
submitted herewith. it appears in this picture that there
are in the premises a coca-cola cooler and a rack which
according to information gathered in the neighborhood
contained cigarettes and matches, installed between the
gasoline pumps and the underground tanks. The report
of Captain Tinio reproduced information given by a
certain Benito Morales regarding the history of the
gasoline station and what the chief of the fire
department had told him on the same subject.
• RTC and CA: found that petitioners failed to prove
negligence and that respondents had exercised due care
in the premises and with respect to the supervision of
their employees.
• Both the RTC and the CA refused to apply the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur in the instant case on the grounds
that "as to (its) applicability ... in the Philippines, there
seems to be nothing definite," and that while the rules
do not prohibit its adoption in appropriate cases, "in the
case at bar, however, we find no practical use for such
doctrine."
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained
in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or
presumed, and while the mere happening of an
accident or injury will not generally give rise to an
inference or presumption that it was due to
negligence on defendant’s part, under the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or
transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction,
that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the
facts or circumstances accompanying an injury
may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least
permit an inference of negligence on the part of the
defendant, or some other person who is charged with
negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or
instrumentality which caused the injury complained
of was under the control or management of the
defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the
injury was such as in the ordinary course of things
would not happen if those who had its control or
management used proper care, there is sufficient
evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
TORTS notes
defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused
by the defendant’s want of care.
One of the theoretical bases for the doctrine is its
necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or
not available. it is within the power of the defendant
to show that there was no negligence on his part,
and direct proof of defendant’s negligence is beyond
plaintiff’s power.
Accordingly, some courts add to the three
prerequisites for the application of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it must appear that
the injured party had no knowledge or means of
knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the
party to be charged with negligence has superior
knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the
accident.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Police Department report and Fire
Department report are hearsay evidence
2. WON, without proof as to the cause and origin of the
fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as
to presume negligence on the part of appellees
HELD:
1. YES
Petitioners maintain, however, that the reports in themselves,
that is, without further testimonial evidence on their contents,
fall within the scope of section 35, Rule 123, which provides
that "entries in official records made in the performance of his
duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated."
There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just
mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or
by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that
it was made by the public officer in the performance of his
duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or
other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or
through official information (Moran, Comments on the Rules
of Court, Vol. 3 [1957] p. 398). Of the three requisites just
stated, only the last need be considered here.
Obviously, the material facts recited in the reports as to the
cause and circumstances of the fire were not within the
personal knowledge of the officers who conducted the
investigation. Was knowledge of such facts, however,
acquired by them through official information? As to some
facts the sources thereof are not even identified.
To qualify their statements as "official information"
acquired by the officers who prepared the reports, the persons
who made the statements not only must have personal
knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give
such statements for record.
The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the
hearsay rule; the facts stated therein were not acquired by the
TORTS notes
reporting officers through official information, not having
been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so.
2. WON, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire,
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to presume
negligence on the part of appellees YES
Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is
shown to be under the management of defendant or his
servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course
of things does not happen if those who have its management
or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in
absence of explanation by defendant, that the accident arose
from want of care.
The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and
employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire
occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring
houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the
fire started were appellees and their employees, but they gave
no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable
inference that the incident happened because of want of care.
The fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring
houses were it not for another negligent omission on the part
of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a concrete
wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping over it.
As it was the concrete wall was only 2-1/2 meters high, and
beyond that height it consisted merely of galvanized iron
sheets, which would predictably crumple and melt when
subjected to intense heat. Defendants' negligence, therefore,
was not only with respect to the cause of the fire but also with
respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses.
A decision of the Supreme Court of Texas, upon facts
analogous to those of the present case, states the rule which
we find acceptable here. "It is the rule that those who
distribute a dangerous article or agent, owe a degree of
protection to the public proportionate to and commensurate
with a danger involved ... we think it is the generally accepted
rule as applied to torts that 'if the effects of the actor's
negligent conduct actively and continuously operate to
bring about harm to another, the fact that the active and
substantially simultaneous operation of the effects of a third
person's innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a substantial
factor in bringing about the harm, does not protect the actor
from liability.' (Restatement of the Law of Torts, vol. 2, p.
1184, #439). Stated in another way, "The intention of an
unforeseen and unexpected cause, is not sufficient to relieve
a wrongdoer from consequences of negligence, if such
negligence directly and proximately cooperates with the
independent cause in the resulting injury." (MacAfee, et al.
vs. Traver's Gas Corporation, 153 S.W. 2nd 442.)
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and
respondents-appellees are held liable solidarily to appellants,
and ordered to pay them the aforesaid sum of P9,005.80 and
P10,000.00, respectively, with interest from the filing of the
complaint, and costs.
- Check their man power requirement.(para
majustify na fortuitous event)
- - man power complement (quasi delict part)
TORTS notes
aantok antok ba employee
A.11. BACHELOR EXPRESS, INCORPORATED, and
CRESENCIO RIVERA v. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS (Sixth Division), RICARDO BETER,
SERGIA BETER, TEOFILO RAUTRAUT and
ZOETERA RAUTRAUT
G.R. No. 85691 July 31, 1990
Bachelor Express vs. CA
SUMMARY: Two passengers died as a result of the
stampede inside the bus. The parents of the two passengers
filed a complaint for sum of money against the bus
company. The ruling of the SC is that the general rule is that
common carrier are presumed to be guilty of negligence
unless it has proved that it exercised extra-ordinary diligence.
FACTS:
• the bus came from Davao City on its way to Cagayan
de Oro City passing Butuan City
• a passenger at the rear portion suddenly stabbed a PC
soldier which caused commotion and panic among the
passengers;
• the stampede resulted the death of passengers
Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut.
• when the bus stopped, passengers Ornominio Beter and
Narcisa Rautraut were found lying down the road, the
former already dead as a result of head injuries and the
latter also suffering from severe injuries which caused
her death later.
• The passenger assailant alighted from the bus and ran
toward the bushes but was killed by the police.
• the heirs of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut,
(their parents) filed a complaint for "sum of money"
against Bachelor Express, Inc. its alleged owner
Samson Yasay and the driver Rivera
DEFENSE OF THE BUS
• the driver was able to transport his passengers
safely to their respective places of destination
except Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut who
jumped off the bus without the knowledge and
consent, much less, the fault of the driver and
conductor and the defendants in this case;
• the bus corporation had exercised due diligence in
the choice of its employees to avoid as much as
possible accidents
• what happened is not a traffic accident or vehicular
accident; it was an incident or event very much
beyond the control of the defendant
RTC RULING: dismissed the complaint
CA RULING: REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
entered finding the appellees jointly and solidarily liable to
pay. It found other facts that were disregarded by the RTC
• According to other witness, the conductor opened the
door when the passengers were shouting that the bus
stop while they were in a state of panic. Hence, it
cannot be said that the passengers, specifically the two
deceased, jumped out of the window
• that the bus was commissioned to travel and take on
passengers and the public at large, while equipped with
only a solitary door for a bus its size and loading
TORTS notes
capacity, in contravention of rules and regulations
provided for under the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code
ISSUE:
Should Bachelor express be held liable? YES
HELD:
YES. Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were
passengers of a bus belonging to Bachelor Express, Inc. and,
while passengers of the bus, suffered injuries which caused
their death. Consequently, pursuant to Article 1756 of the
Civil Code, Bachelor Express, Inc. is presumed to have
acted negligently unless it can prove that it had observed
extraordinary diligence in accordance with Articles 1733 and
1755 of the New Civil Code.
(art 1756 in case of death of or injuries to passengers, common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence
as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.)
The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause
of the incident as it triggered off a commotion and panic
among the passengers such that the passengers started running
to the sole exit shoving each other resulting in the falling off
the bus by passengers Beter and Rautraut causing them fatal
injuries. The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another
passenger in the bus is within the context of force majeure.
However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved
from liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that
the accident was caused by force majeure. The common
carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing
the injuries resulting from such accident.
Considering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals-the
bus driver did not immediately stop the bus at the height of
the commotion; the bus was speeding from a full stop; the
victims fell from the bus door when it was opened or gave
way while the bus was still running; the conductor panicked
and blew his whistle after people had already fallen off the
bus; and the bus was not properly equipped with doors in
accordance with law-it is clear that the petitioners have
failed to overcome the presumption of fault and negligence
found in the law governing common carriers.
Negligence
- absence of proper care expected during the commotion
Expected to do something habang may nagyayare
- Act of a 3rd person attributable to bus company(quasidelict)
A.12. AUSTRIA vs. CA
G.R. No. L-29640 , June 10, 1971
FACTS:
• Maria G. Abad acknowledged having received from
Guillermo Austria one (1) pendant with diamonds
valued at P4,500.00, to be sold on commission basis or
to be returned on demand.
• However, while walking home to her residence in
Mandaluyong, Rizal, Abad was said to have been
accosted by two men, one of whom hit her on the face,
while the other snatched her purse containing jewelry
and cash, and ran away.
TORTS notes
• Among the pieces of jewelry allegedly taken by the
robbers was the consigned pendant.
• As Abad failed to return the jewelry or pay for its value
notwithstanding demands, Austria brought in the Court
of First Instance of Manila an action against her and
her husband for recovery of the pendant or of its
value, and damages.
• Answering the allegations of the complaint, defendants
spouses set up the defense that the alleged robbery had
extinguished their obligation.
RTC- ordered defendants spouses, jointly and severally, to pay to the
former the sum of P4,500.00, with legal interest thereon, plus the amount
of P450.00 as reasonable attorneys' fees, and the costs.
- defendants failed to prove the fact of robbery
- defendant Maria Abad was guilty of negligence when she went
home without any companion,
CA- overruling the finding of the trial court
SC- no merit in the contention of petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of robbery of the defendant
would lead to the category of a fortuitous event and relieve
the obligor from his obligation under a contract. NO
HELD:
NO. It is recognized in this jurisdiction that to constitute a
caso fortuito that would exempt a person from responsibility,
it is necessary that (1) the event must be independent of the
human will (or rather, of the debtor's or obligor's); (2) the
occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and that (3) the
obligor must be free of participation in or aggravation of
the injury to the creditor.
A fortuitous event, therefore, can be produced by nature, e.g.,
earthquakes, storms, floods, etc., or by the act of man, such as
war, attack by bandits, robbery, etc., provided that the event
has all the characteristics enumerated above.
To avail of the exemption granted in the law, it is not
necessary that the persons responsible for the occurrence
should be found or punished; it would only be sufficient to
established that the enforceable event, the robbery in this
case did take place without any concurrent fault on the
debtor's part, and this can be done by preponderant
evidence. To require in the present action for recovery the
prior conviction of the culprits in the criminal case, in order
to establish the robbery as a fact, would be to demand proof
beyond reasonable doubt to prove a fact in a civil case.
Furthermore, the act of Maria G. Abad, in returning alone to
her house in the evening, carrying jewelry of considerable
value is not in the confines of the definition of negligent,
for the reason that in 1961, when the robbery in question did
take place, for at that time criminality had not by far reached
the levels attained in the present day.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision of the Court
of Appeals under review, the petition in this case is hereby
dismissed with costs against the petitioner.
CA’s decision: declared respondents not responsible for the
loss of the jewelry on account of a fortuitous event, and
relieved them from liability for damages to the owner.
TORTS notes
Robbery is a fortuitous event • The pilot explained to them, of the inherent fuel
Independent of the will of the agent (robbery) limitations of the plane and that they are not rated for
- not negligence international flights, the hijackers directed the pilot to
fly to Sabah. With the same explanation, they relented
A.13. FRANKLIN G. GACAL and CORAZON M.
and directed the aircraft to land at Zamboanga
GACAL, the latter assisted by her husband, FRANKLIN G.
Airport, Zamboanga City for refueling.
GACAL v. PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC.,
• The aircraft landed at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
G.R. No. L-55300 March 15, 1990
May 21, 1976 at Zamboanga Airport. When the plane
began to taxi at the runway, it was met by two armored
SUMMARY: PAL airplane en route to Manila from Davao
cars of the military with machine guns pointed at the
was hijacked by members of the MNLF. The court ruled that
plane, and it stopped there.
PAL cannot be held liable because the hijacking incident in
• The rebels thru its commander demanded that a DC-
question occurred during Martial Law where there was a
aircraft take them to Libya with the President of the
military take-over of airport security including the frisking
defendant company as hostage and that they be given
of passengers and the inspection of their luggage.
$375,000 and six (6) armalites, otherwise they will
blow up the plane if their demands will not be met by
the government and Philippine Air Lines.
FACTS:
• Meanwhile, the passengers were not served any food
• Plaintiffs Franklin G. Gacal and his wife, Corazon M.
nor water and it was only 2 days after, at about 1:00
Gacal, Bonifacio S. Anislag and his wife, Mansueta L.
o'clock in the afternoon that they were served 1/4 slice
Anislag, and the late Elma de Guzman, were then
of a sandwich and 1/10 cup of PAL water.
passengers boarding defendant's BAC 1-11 at Davao
• After that, relatives of the hijackers were allowed to
Airport for a flight to Manila,
board the plane but immediately after they alighted
• They did not know that 6 members of the Moro
therefrom, an armored car bumped the stairs. That
National Liberation Front (MNLF), were their co-
commenced the battle between the military and the
passengers. Three (3) armed with grenades, two (2)
hijackers which led ultimately to the liberation of the
with .45 caliber pistols, and one with a .22 caliber
surviving crew and the passengers, with the final score
pistol.
of ten (10) passengers and three (3) hijackers dead
• Ten (10) minutes after take off at about 2:30 in the
on the spot and three (3) hijackers captured.
afternoon, the hijackers brandishing their respective
• City Fiscal Franklin G. Gacal was unhurt. Mrs.
firearms announced the hijacking of the aircraft and
Corazon M. Gacal suffered injuries in the course of her
directed its pilot to fly to Libya.
jumping out of the plane when it was peppered with
TORTS notes
bullets by the army and after two (2) hand grenades
exploded inside the plane.
• She was hospitalized for two (2) days, spending
P245.60 for hospital and medical expenses.
• Assistant City Fiscal Bonifacio S. Anislag also escaped
unhurt but Mrs. Anislag suffered a fracture at the
radial bone of her left elbow for which she was
hospitalized and operated on, spending P4,500.00.
• Elma de Guzman died because of that battle.
• Plaintiffs instituted an action of damages instituted
demanding:
Spouses Gacal— actual damages: P245.60 for hospital
and medical expenses of Mrs Gacal; P8,995.00 for their
personal belongings which were lost and not recovered;
P50,000.00 each for moral damages; and P5,000.00 for
attorney's fees, apart from the prayer for an award of
exemplary damages.
• The trial court dismissed the complaints finding that
all the damages sustained in the premises were
attributed to force majeure.
Petitioners argument: that the main cause of the unfortunate
incident is the gross, wanton and inexcusable negligence of
respondent Airline personnel in their failure to frisk the
passengers adequately in order to discover hidden
weapons in the bodies of the six (6) hijackers. They claimed
that despite the prevalence of skyjacking, PAL did not use
a metal detector which is the most effective means of
discovering potential skyjackers among the passengers.
PAL averred the security checks and measures and
surveillance precautions in all flights, including the inspection
of baggages and cargo and frisking of passengers at the Davao
Airport were performed and rendered solely by military
personnel who under appropriate authority had assumed
exclusive jurisdiction over the same in all airports in the
Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not hijacking or air piracy during martial law
and under the circumstances obtaining herein, is a caso
fortuito or force majeure which would exempt an aircraft
from payment of damages to its passengers whose lives were
put in jeopardy and whose personal belongings were lost
during the incident. YES
HELD:
YES. In order to constitute a caso fortuito or force majeure
that would exempt a person from liability under Article
1174 of the Civil Code, it is necessary that the following
elements must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the
obligation must be independent of the human will (the will of
the debtor or the obligor); (b) the event must be either
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as
to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation
in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any
participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor.
Caso fortuito or force majeure, by definition, are
extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are
inevitable. It is, therefore, not enough that the event should
not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly
believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to
avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not
TORTS notes
impossibility to foresee the same (Republic v. Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation, 21 SCRA 279 [1967]).
Applying the above guidelines to the case at bar, the failure
to transport petitioners safely from Davao to Manila was due
to the skyjacking incident staged by six (6) passengers of the
same plane, all members of the MNLF, without any
connection with private respondent, hence, independent of
the will of either the PAL or of its passengers.
Under normal circumstances, PAL might have foreseen
the skyjacking incident which could have been avoided
had there been a more thorough frisking of passengers
and inspection of baggages as authorized by R.A. No. 6235.
But the incident in question occurred during Martial Law
where there was a military take-over of airport security
including the frisking of passengers and the inspection of their
luggage preparatory to boarding domestic and international
flights.
Otherwise stated, these events rendered it impossible for PAL
to perform its obligations in a nominal manner and obviously
it cannot be faulted with negligence in the performance of
duty taken over by the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
the exclusion of the former.
Finally, there is no dispute that the fourth element has also
been satisfied. Consequently the existence of force majeure
has been established exempting respondent PAL from the
payment of damages to its passengers who suffered death or
injuries in their persons and for loss of their baggages.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court
of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
EXTRA: (just in case mag tanong si sir about sa common
carrier)
Under the Civil Code, common carriers are required to
exercise extraordinary diligence in their vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of passengers transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of each case (Art.1733).
They are presumed at fault or to have acted negligently
whenever a passenger dies or is injured (PAL v. NLRC, 124
SCRA 583 [1983]) or for the loss, destruction or deterioration
of goods in cases other than those enumerated in Article 1734
of the Civil Code (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 463 [1987]).
The source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract
of carriage, and by entering into said contract, it binds itself
to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide. There is breach of this obligation if it
fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to all the
circumstances of the case in exercise of the utmost diligence
of a very cautious person (Isaac v. Ammen Transportation
Co., 101 Phil. 1046 [1957]; Juntilla v. Fontanar, 136 SCRA
624 [1985]).
It is the duty of a common carrier to overcome the
presumption of negligence (Philippine National Railways v.
Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 87 [1985]) and it must be shown
that the carrier had observed the required extraordinary
TORTS notes
diligence of a very cautious person as far as human care and
foresight can provide or that the accident was caused by a
fortuitous event (Estrada v. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 523
[1976]). Thus, as ruled by this Court, no person shall be
responsible for those "events which could not be foreseen or
which though foreseen were inevitable. (Article 1174, Civil
Code). The term is synonymous with caso fortuito (Lasam v.
Smith, 45 Phil. 657 [1924]) which is of the same sense as
"force majeure".
B. Article 2177
ARTICLE 2177. Responsibility for fault or
negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same
act or omission of the defendant.
- crim law/ crim pro crim case may kasamang civil liability
- civil action(pmt for damage)
Art. 100, RPC.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.
Rule 111, Sec 3
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed
independently. – In the cases provided in Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended
party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal
action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action.
B.1. FILOMENO URBANO v. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 72964, January 7, 1988
FACTS:
• Filomeno Urbano found palay flooded with water
coming from the irrigation canal. He found Marcelo
Javier and Emilio Erfe. Upon learning that it was Javier
who opened the irrigation canal, he got angry,
unsheathed his bolo, and hacked Javier on the right
palm of his hand.
• Erfe brought Javier to Dr. Meneses. The medico-legal
certificate stated that the “incapacitation is from 7-9
days period.”
• Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences.
Urbano agreed to pay P700.
• On November 14, 1980, Javier had lockjaw and
convulsions due to tetanus toxins. He died the
following day.
FACTS:
One morning petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield
found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water
coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had
overflowed. He went to the irrigation and saw Javier & erfe
cutting grass.
TORTS notes
Marcelino Javier opened the irrigation of a canal by
means of cutting grass which caused the flooding
of the storage area of the petitioner. Urbano got
angry and demanded Javier to pay for the soaked
palay. Javier refused and a quarrel between them
ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo and hacked
Javier hitting him on the right hand and left leg. Javier
went to the hospital for the treatment of the wounds.
Two weeks after, Javier returned to his farm and
tended to his tobacco plants. Then, on a fateful day
of November 14, Javier was rushed to the hospital.
Doctors findings showed that he was suffering from
tetanus infection. The next day, Javier died.
RTC and CA found the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide. Petitioner raised the
case to the SC arguing that the cause of the death of
Javier was due to his own negligence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from
the time Javier was wounded until his death which would
exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier’s death
HELD:
YES, there was an efficient intervening cause.
The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury
and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from
2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients become
symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period
indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2
or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found
inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the
disease.
Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm
when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him.
This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days,
or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of
tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day,
November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier was already infected by
tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that
Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of
tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the
22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after
the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should
have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the
second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion
is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the
appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not
yet present. His wound could have been infected by tetanus 2
or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct,
natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon
TORTS notes
him by the accused. The proof that the accused caused the
victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to
a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus
was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time
Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection
was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
The discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is
limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It
does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free
of civil liability. The two liabilities are separate and distinct
from each other. One affects the social order and the other,
private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the
offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered
by the aggrieved party.
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of
criminal liability. At the very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting
slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal liability in this
respect was wiped out by the victim's own act.
Proximate cause means “legal cause,” or one that the
law recognizes as the primary cause of the
injury. Instead, it is an action that produced
foreseeable consequences without intervention
from anyone else. In other words, the plaintiff will have
to show that the injuries were the natural and direct
consequence of the proximate cause, without which the
injuries would not have occurred.
C. Article 2178
ARTICLE 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to
1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict.
ARTICLE 1172. Responsibility arising from
negligence in the performance of every kind of
obligation is also demandable, but such liability may
be regulated by the courts, according to the
circumstances. (1103)
ARTICLE 1173. The fault or negligence of the
obligor consists in the omission of that diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of
the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201,
paragraph 2, shall apply. (-----In case of fraud, bad
faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall
be responsible for all damages which may be
reasonably attributed to the non-performance of
the obligation. (1107a)--------)
If the law or contract does not state the diligence
which is to be observed in the performance, that
which is expected of a good father of a family shall
be required. (1104a)
ARTICLE 1174. Except in cases expressly
specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the
TORTS notes
obligation requires the assumption of risk, no
person shall be responsible for those events which
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
were inevitable. (1105a)
Article 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the
damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith
is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which
the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably
foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude,
the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which
may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of
the obligation. (1107a)
CLASS DISCUSSION:
WHO CAN SUE?
Person who are inflicted with damages by
torfeasor
WHO CAN BE SUED?
Natural and Juridical persons- even their
employees.
Elements of quasi-delict
1. Negligence
2. damage
3. Causal connection between the first two
requisites.
PSBA vs. CA
3 requisites of quasi-delict or additional one.
DULAY vs. CA
Intentional tort: definition-act done which the law
considers wrong or failed to do.
NPC vs CA:
Air France vs. Carrascoso
Is it a quasi-delict? Cause there is a contract of
carriage?
Public duty.
Cannot collect twice if filed another action. Dual
collection not allowed.
Quasi-delict dapat kasi dito nagarise yung damage.
Pagcontract of carriage, that is about transportation.
Mas malaki kapag quasi-delict, racism can be placed
there…. Pagcontract of carriage lang yun lang at
konting damage…
Hindi sya breach of contract
NEXT MEETING: Africa vs Caltex upto cases under
Art. 2179
TORTS notes
D. Article 2179
ARTICLE 2179. When the plaintiff’s own
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause
of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate
and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded. (n)
• when would the pmt of damage be lessen?
Contributory negligence
• who would prove contributory? Defendant – to
lessen damage
Esteria Garciano vs. CA, GR. No. 96126, August
10, 1992
Bataclan vs. Medina, 102 PHIL 181
Pilipinas Bank vs. CA, GR. No. 97873, August 12,
1993, 234 SCRA 435
D.1 ESTERIA F. GARCIANO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 96126, August 10, 1992
FACTS:
• Petitioner was hired to teach in the Immaculate
Concepcion Institute. Before the year ended, she
applied for an indefinite leave of absence, which was
eventually approved by the President of the school’s
Board of Directors.
• A letter was addressed to the petitioner, informing her
of the decision of the school’s founder to terminate
her services as a member of the teaching staff. Upon
making inquiries, the members of the Board of
Directors, with the exception of the founder, signed a
letter reinstating her as a classroom teacher.
• Several members of the board resigned their positions
from the board "for the reason that the ICI Faculty has
reacted acidly to the Board's deliberations regarding the
petitioner’s reinstatement, thereby questioning the
integrity of the Board’s decision.”
• Petitioner filed a complaint for damages in the RTC
against the school’s founder and some members of the
faculty for discrimination and illegal dismissal.
• The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioner, while
the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s
decision and absolved the defendant-appellants from
any liability.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in setting aside the
damages awarded by the trial court. YES
HELD:
YES. The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that
petitioner's discontinuance from teaching was her own
choice. While the respondents admittedly wanted her service
terminated, they actually did nothing to physically prevent her
from reassuming her post.
The letter of termination sent had no legal effect and did not
effectively prevent her from reporting from work. It was even
subsequently repudiated by the Board which directed her
TORTS notes
from work. No evidence had been presented to show that
defendants-appellants prevented her from reporting for work.
The teachers allegedly threatened to resign en masse, even
if true, did not make them liable to her for damages. They
were simply exercising their right of free speech or their right
to dissent from the Board's decision. Their acts were not
contrary to law, morals, good customs or public policy. They
did not "illegally dismiss" her for the Board's decision to
retain her prevailed. She was ordered to report for work but
she did not comply with that order.
Consequently, whatever loss she may have incurred in the
form of lost earnings was self-inflicted. Volenti non fit
injuria (“to a willing person, injury is not done”).
D.2. BATACLAN vs MEDINA
G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957
SUMMARY: Overturned bus; Lighted torch; Proximate
legal cause.
FACTS:
• Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952, bus No.
30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its
owner, defendant Mariano Medina, under a certificate
of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo,
Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular
chauffeur, Conrado Saylon.
• There were about eighteen passengers, including the
driver and conductor. Among the passengers were Juan
Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of the driver,
Felipe Lara, seated to the right of Bataclan, another
passenger apparently from the Visayan Islands whom
the witnesses just called Visaya, apparently not
knowing his name, seated on the left side of the driver,
and a woman named Natalia Villanueva, seated just
behind the four last mentioned.
• At about 2 :00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus
was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite,
one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to
zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side
of the road and turned turtle.
• Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the
best way they could, others had to be helped or pulled
out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver,
named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman
behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get
out of the overturned bus.
• There, is nothing in the evidence to show whether or
not the passengers already free from the wreck,
including the driver and the conductor, made any
attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four
passengers trapped inside the vehicle, but calls or
shouts for help were made to the houses in the
neighborhood.
• After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them
carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick
on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These
men presumably approached the overturned bus, and
almost immediately, a fierce re started, burning and all
but consuming the bus, including the four passengers
trapped inside it.
TORTS notes
• It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline
began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on the
side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the
body of the bus and the ground under and around it, and
that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who
answered the call for help set it on fire.
• By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva,
in her name and in behalf of her five minor children,
brought the present suit to recover from Mariano
Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of
P87,150.
• After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite
awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs, plus P600 as
attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise
being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and
which was lost in the re.
• The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision
to the Court of Appeals, but the latter court endorsed
the appeal to the Supreme Court because of the value
involved in the claim in the complaint.
ISSUE:
WON the plaintiffs are entitled to damages YES
We agree with the trial court that the case involves a
breach of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina
Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan
safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree with
the trial court that there was negligence on the part of
the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon
- the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers
HELD:
YES, considering the earning capacity of the deceased, as
well as the other elements entering into a damage award, we
are satisfied that the amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000)
PESOS would constitute satisfactory compensation, this to
include compensatory, moral, and other damages. The Court
also believe that plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees, and
assessing the legal services rendered by plaintiffs' attorneys
not only in the trial court, but also in the course of the appeal,
and not losing sight of the able briefs prepared by them, the
attorney's fees may well be fixed at EIGHT HUNDRED
(P800) PESOS. The award made by the trial court of ONE
HUNDRED (P100) PESOS for the loss of the merchandise
carried by the deceased in the bus, is adequate and will not be
disturbed.
The Court agrees with the trial court that the case involves a
breach of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina
Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to
his destination, Pasay City and that there was negligence on
the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver
Saylon.
However, regarding the question as to what degree are
plaintiffs are entitled, the Court disagrees with the opinion of
the trial court that the proximate cause of the death of
Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the
fire that burned the bus. A satisfactory
definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, p
ages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence, that “the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
TORTS notes
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close casual connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances
that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.”
D.3. PILIPINAS BANK v. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPPEALS
G.R. NO. 97873, August 12, 1993, Quiason, J.
SUMMARY: The case is about an obligation arising from a
contract of sale which the petitioner refused and failed to pay.
There is an issue on the application of the interest. CA applied
the interest rate of 12% as mandated by CBC Circular No.
416, which is for contract of loan or mutuum, when it should
have applied the 6% interest rate under the Art. 2209 for
contract of sale.
FACTS:
• Private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner
and its president, Constantino Bautista, for collection
of a sum of money. The complaint alleged: (1) that
petitioner and Greatland Realty Corporation
(Greatland) executed a "Dacion en Pago," wherein
Greatland conveyed to petitioner several parcels of
land in consideration of the sum of P7,776,335.69; (2)
that Greatland assigned P2,300,000.00 out of the total
consideration of the Dacion en Pago, in favor of private
respondent; and (3) that notwithstanding her demand
for payment, petitioner in bad faith, refused and failed
to pay the said amount assigned to her.
• Petitioner, while admitting the execution of the Dacion
en Pago, claimed: (1) that its former president had no
authority to enter into such agreement; (2) that it never
ratified the same; and (3) that assuming arguendo that
the agreement was binding, the conditions stipulated
therein were never fulfilled.
• Petitioner filed a motion in the trial court praying that
private respondent and Standard Insurance Co. (which
furnished the bond required in the advance execution
of the decision of the trial court) to refund to her the
excess payment of P1,898,623.67 with interests at 6%.
It must be recalled that while private respondent was
able to collect P5,517,707.00 from petitioner pursuant
to the writ of advance execution allowed in CA-G.R.
No. SP No. 05909, the final judgment in the main case
(CA-G.R. No. 06017) awarded to private respondent
damages in the total amount of only P2,655,000.00
(P2,300,000.00 representing the amount assigned by
Greatland to private respondent, P100,000.00 as moral
damages; P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and
attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the
P2,300,000.00), together "with interest on the amount
of P2,300,000.00 at the legal rate starting July 24, 1981,
date when demand was first made.
• The Court of Appeals was of the theory that the action
in Civil Case No. 239-A filed by private respondent
against petitioner "involves forbearance of money, as
the principal award to plaintiff-appellee (private
TORTS notes
respondent) in the amount of P2,300,000.00 was the
overdue debt of defendant-appellant to her since July
1981. The case is, in effect, a simple collection of the
money due to plaintiff-appellee, as the unpaid creditor
from the defendant bank, the debtor" (Resolution, p. 3;
Rollo, p. 33). Applying Central Bank Circular No. 416,
the Court of Appeals held that the applicable rate of
interest is 12% per annum.
• Petitioner argues that the applicable law is Article 2209
of the Civil Code, not the Central Bank Circular No.
416. Said Article 2209 provides:
"Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the
payment of a sum of money, and the debtor
incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there
being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the
payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the
absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which
is six per cent per annum."
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner’s obligation to the private
respondent arose from a contract of sale and not from a
contract of loan or mutuum.
2. Whether it was proper to apply the CBC Circular No.
416 in this case.
HELD:
1. Whether petitioner’s obligation to the private
respondent arose from a contract of sale and not from a
contract of loan or mutuum.
YES. The said amount was a portion of the P7,776,335.69
which petitioner was obligated to pay Greatland as
consideration for the sale of several parcels of land by
Greatland to petitioner. The amount of P2,300,000.00 was
assigned by Greatland in favor of private respondent. The said
obligation therefore arose from a contract of purchase and
sale and not from a contract of loan or mutuum. Hence, what
is applicable is the rate of 6% per annum as provided in
Article 2209 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and not the
rate of 12% per annum as provided in Circular No. 416.
2. Whether it was proper to apply the CBC Circular No. 416
in this case.
NO. The Court held that the judgments spoken of and referred
to in Circular No. 416 are "judgments in litigation involving
loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits. Any
other kind of monetary judgment which has nothing to do
with nor involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods
or credits does not fall within the coverage of the said law for
it is not, within the ambit of the authority granted to the
Central Bank."
The Court held that Circular No. 416 does not apply to
judgments involving damages and compensation in
expropriation proceedings. It was also held that Circular No.
416 applies to judgments involving the payment of
unliquidated cash advances to an employee by his employer
and the return of money paid by a buyer of a leasehold right
but which contract was voided due to the fault of the seller.
Basis of damage:
Act of giving the dacion en pago is the bank right in doing
it?
PILIPINAS BANK v. CA and FLORENCIO REYES
TORTS notes
1994 / Puno / Petition for review of a CA decision
The cause > Different categories > Proximate
Florencio Reyes issued postdated checks to Winner
Industrial Corporation (20k~) and Vincent Tui (11k~) as
payments for the purchased shoe materials and rubber
shoes. To cover the face value of the checks, Reyes
requested PCIB Money Shop’s manager to effect the
withdrawal of 32k from his savings account and have it
deposited with his current account with Pilipinas Bank.
Roberto Santos was requested to make the deposit.
In depositing in the name of Reyes, Santos
inquired from the teller Reyes’ current account
number to complete the deposit slip he was
accomplishing. He was informed that it was “815” so that
was the number he placed on the slip. Noting that the
account number coincided with the name “Florencio,”
Efren Alagasi [Pilipinas Bank Current Account
Bookkeeper] thought it was for Florencio Amador, so he
posted the deposit in the account of Amador.
The check in favor of Winner was presented for
payment. Since Reyes’ ledger indicated that his account
only had 4k~ balance, the check was dishonored. This
check was redeposited 4 days later but it was dishonored
again. This also happened with the check issued in Tui’s
favor. Tui returned the check to Reyes and demanded a
cash payment of its face value.
Furious over the incident, Reyes proceeded to
Pilipinas Bank and urged an immediate verification of his
account. It was then that the bank noticed the error. The
32k posted in Amador’s account was transferred to Reyes’
account upon being cleared by the former that he did not
effect a deposit of 32k. The bank then honored the check.
RTC ordered Pilipinas Bank to pay damages to
Reyes, and the CA affirmed the RTC.
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY: ALAGASI’S
NEGLIGENCE IN ERRONEOUSLY POSTING REYES’ CASH
DEPOSIT IN THE NAME OF ANOTHER DEPOSITOR
HAVING THE SAME FIRST NAME
• For NCC 2179 to apply, it must be established
that Reyes’ own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury.
• Proximate cause – any cause which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the result
complained of and without which would not have
occurred and from which it ought to have been
foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of
ordinary case that the injury complained of or some
similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural
and probable consequence.
Alagasi failed to exercise degree of care required in
the performance of his duties
• He posted the cash deposit in Amador’s
account from the assumption that the name
Florencio appearing on the ledger without going
through the full name, is the same Florencio stated
in the deposit slip
TORTS notes
• He should have continuously gone beyond
mere assumption and proceeded with clear
certainty, considering the amount involved and the
repercussions it would create --> checks issued by
Reyes were dishonored because his ledger
indicated an insufficient balance
(E-I for 3/23/21)
E. Article 2180
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and
live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by
their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts
through a special agent; but not when the damage has been
caused by the official to whom the task done properly
pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176
shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (1903a)
E1. MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor represented by her
father ULISES P. CUADRA, ET AL. v. ALFONSO MONFORT
G.R. No. L-24101, September 30, 1970
SUMMARY: A 13yo girl tossed her headband to her 12yo classmate
as a prank while they were weeding the school grasses. This hit the
latter’s eye and caused eventual blindness which led to her parents to
sue for damages against the former’s father, citing Art 2180. The court
TORTS notes
ruled that the father is not liable for he could not have prevented the
damage.
FACTS:
• While weeding the grass in the school premises as assigned by the
grade school teacher, Maria Teresa Monfort, 12, found a plastic
headband and jokingly said aloud that she had found an earthworm and
tossed the object to the Maria Teresa Cuadra 13.
• At that precise moment Cuadra turned around, the object hit her right
eye. The next day the eye became swollen and her parents, learning
about the incident, took her to a doctor for treatment.
• Cuadra underwent surgical operation twice and stayed in the hospital
for 23 days, which amounted to a sum of P1,703.75, but despite the
medical efforts, she completely lost the sight of her right eye.
• In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf of their
minor daughter against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's
father, the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages;
P20,000.00 as moral damages; and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the
costs of the suit
ISSUE: WON a parent is made liable for the act of his minor child
which causes damage to another under the specific facts of this case in
relation to Arts 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
HELD: NO. The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article
2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying the act or the omission,
there being no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. When the
act or omission is that of one person for whom another is responsible,
the latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180, in the different
cases enumerated therein, such as that of the father or the mother under
the circumstances above quoted. The basis of this vicarious, although
primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault or negligence, which is
presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission.
The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted.
This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last
paragraph of Article 2180, which states "that the responsibility treated
of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage."
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that
the defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of
due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental
authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it.
On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send
her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the
care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused
the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among
children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any
special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal
any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character
which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the
blame could be attributed to her parents.
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy
for the tragedy that befell her. But if the defendant is at all obligated to
compensate her suffering, the obligation has no legal sanction
enforceable in court, but only the moral compulsion of good conscience
E.2. CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI v. HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG
and SHIRLEY GOTIONG G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992
SUMMARY: Wendell Libi shot his lover Julie Ann Giotong, both
minors, before he turned the firearm on himself. As a result, the parents
of Julie Ann filed against Wendell's parents to recover damages. The
trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint for insufficiency
of evidence. CA reversed the decision. The SC held that petitioners were
gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising the
activities of their son. Both parents were wanting in their duty and
responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their son. The
petitioners utterly failed to exercise all the diligence of a good father of
a family in preventing their son from committing the crime by means of
the gun which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi because they have
TORTS notes
not regularly checked whether the gun was still under lock, but learned
that it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime had
been committed. The civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their
minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180, is primary and not
subsidiary.
FACTS:
• Synthesized from the findings of the lower courts, it appears that
respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who,
at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from which
she died on January 14, 1979, was an 18-year old first year commerce
student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are
the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of
age living with his aforesaid parents, and who also died in the same
event on the same date.
• For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and
Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann
broke up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him
to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and second weeks of
January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for
reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the
former to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann
stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso, at the corner of
Maria Cristina and Juana Osmeña Streets, Cebu City, from January 7 to
13, 1978.
• On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single
gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson
revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was
recovered from the scene of the crime inside the residence of private
respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets
of the same city.
• Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter,
submitted that Wendell caused her death by shooting her with the
aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit
suicide. On the other hand, Petitioners, puzzled and likewise distressed
over the death of their son, rejected the imputation and contended that
an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or
antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the
Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused
Wendell’s death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and
thereby avoid identification.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
• As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No.
R-17774 in the then Court of First Instance of Cebu against the parents
of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s vicarious
liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether the parents should be held liable
HELD: Yes. Petitioners’ defense that they had exercised the due
diligence of a good father of a family, hence they should not be civilly
liable for the crime committed by their minor son, is not borne out by
the evidence on record either.
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her
husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit
box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a
key to the safety deposit box and Amelita’s key is always in her bag, all
of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never seen their son
Wendell taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that
fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. 16 We,
accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses
had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by
safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten hold
thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently
left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where
the other key was.
The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent
and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and
supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties
as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son, despite
his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of
Wendell’s death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU
agent and that Cresencio’s gun was missing from the safety deposit box.
TORTS notes
Both parents were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in
monitoring and knowing the activities of their children who, for all they
know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as being drug informers,
17 or even drug users. Neither was a plausible explanation given for the
photograph of Wendell, with a handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at
the back thereof, 18 holding upright what clearly appears as a revolver
and on how or why he was in possession of that firearm. The subsidiary
liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed
by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from
both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The subsidiary liability of
parent’s arising from the criminal acts of their minor children who acted
with discernment is determined under the provisions of Article 2180,
N.C.C. and under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, because to
hold that the former only covers obligations which arise from quasi-
delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would
result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence
intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the
damages caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage
is caused with criminal intent.
E.3. MACARIO TAMARGO, ET AL v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992
FACTS:
• Adelberto Bundoc, then a 10-year old minor, shot Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle, resulting to her death. The parents of Jennifer filed a
complaint for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with
whom he was living the time of the tragic incident.
• Prior to the incident, Spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt
Adelberto. The petition was granted after the incident.
• In their Answer, Spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, claimed
that not they, but rather the adopting parents, Spouses Rapisura, were
indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to
the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for
adoption was filed. Spouses Bundoc relied on Arts. 36 and 39 of the
Child and Youth Welfare Code.
• Spouses Tamargo filed their Reply contending that since Adelberto
was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had
not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a
petition for adoption.
• The trial court ruled in favor of Spouses Bundoc.
ISSUE: WON the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is
concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting
parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their
adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody was
yet lodged with the biological parents.
HELD:
It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-
delict against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and,
in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may
be caused by a minor child who lives with them. Article 2180 of the
Civil Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one
is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
TORTS notes
The responsibility treated in this Article shall cease when the person
herein mentioned proves that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently
designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence"
under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only liable for
torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with
whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible.
Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the
duties and responsibilities of parents — their parental authority —
which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child.
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor
children living with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental
authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law
assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents
commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance
of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in
their custody and control. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored
upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in
the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The parental
dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption can be
overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents
had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle
occurred when parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc
spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow
that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor
Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having
been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not
consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption
so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time
when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the
adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting
of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual
of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant
case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively
lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a
tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not
have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had
no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and
unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the
philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious
liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction
on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have
arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time
the tort was committed.
E.4. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES v. PHIL-AM
FORWARDERS Inc G.R. No. 12345, February 22, 2021
FACTS:
• Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned by Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc along the national highway on Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.
The truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was owned by
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
• As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus
was damaged and could not be used for seventy-nine days, thus
depriving the company of earnings amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit
was the manager of PhilAmerican Forwarders, Inc.
• Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the bus driven by
Pangalangan, which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As
a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was
damaged and could not be used for seventy-nine days, thus depriving
the company of earnings amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the
manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
TORTS notes
• Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the
ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action
against him
• Lower court dismissed the action as to Balingit
ISSUE: Whether the terms “employer” and “owners and managers of
establishment or enterprises” used in article 2180 of the Civil Code,
formerly article 1903 of the old Code, embrace the manager of a
corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of which allegedly
resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage arose.
HELD:
No, it does not. We are of the opinion that those terms do not include
the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from the context of
article 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version)
is used in the sense of "employer". Hence, under the allegations of the
complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on
Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection
with the vehicular accident already mentioned because he himself may
be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc.
The bus company and its driver, in their appellants' brief, injected a new
factual issue which was not alleged in their complaint. They argue that
Phil- American Forwarders, Inc. is merely a business conduit of Balingit
because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41,200, Balingit and
his wife had subscribed P40,000 and they paid P10,000 on their
subscription, while the other incorporators, namely, Rodolfo Limjuco,
Ponciano Caparas and Rafael Suntay paid P250.25 and P25,
respectively.
That argument implies that the veil of corporate fiction should be
pierced and that PhilAmerican Forwarders, Inc. and Balingit and his
wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality. We cannot
countenance that argument in this appeal. It was not raised in the lower
court. The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in
the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses.
E.5. DUAVIT vs CA G.R No. 82318, May 18, 1989
SUMMARY: Owner of a vehicle is not liable for an accident involving
the vehicle if driven without the owner’s consent by one not employed
by him. The Court cannot blindly apply absolute rules based on
precedents whose facts do not jibe four square with pending cases.
Every case must be determined on its own peculiar factual
circumstances. Where, as in this case, the records of the petition fail to
indicate the slightest indicia of an employer-employee relationship
between the owner and the erring driver or any consent given by the
owner for the vehicle’s use, we cannot hold the owner liable.
FACTS:
• Plaintiffs Sarmiento, Sr. and Virgilio Catuar were aboard a jeep,
owned by plaintiff Ruperto Catuar, when it was slowing down
approaching Roosevel Ave. when suddenly another jeep driven by
defendant Oscar Sabiniano bumped the former’s jeep on the portion
near the left rear wheel, as result jeep fell, skidded and its windshield
was damged. Virgilio broke his wrist and sustained contusions on the
head and Sarmiento’s legs were likewise fractured.
• Plaintiff filed this case against Sabiniano as driver and against Duavit
as owner of the jeep. Duavit admitted ownership of the jeep but denied
that Sabiniano was his employee. Sabiniano himself admitted that he
took Duavit’s jeep from the garage without consent or authority of the
owner. He testified further that Duavit even filed charges against him
for theft of the jeep, but which Duavit did not push through as the
parents of Sabiniano apologized to Duavit on his behalf.
• Trial Court found Sabiniano negligent in driving the vehicle but
absolved Duavit on the ground that there was no employer-employee
relationship between them, and that former took the vehicle without
consent or authority of the latter.Petitioner was absolved from liability
under Art. 2180 of Civil Code.
TORTS notes
• CA held petitioner jointly and severally liable with Sabiniano. Invoke
Vargas v. Langcay, where it was held that it is immaterial won driver
was actually employed by registered owner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the owner of a private vehicle which was
involved in an accident can be held liable under Art. 2180 when the said
vehicle was neither driven by an employee of the owner nor taken with
the consent of the latter
HELD:
NO. In Duquillo v Bayot (1939), SC ruled that an owner of a vehicle
cannot be held liable for an accident involving a vehicle if the same was
driven without his consent or knowledge and by a person not employed
by him. This ruling is still relevant and applicable, and hence, must be
upheld.
CA’s reliance on the cases of Erezo v Jepte and Vargas v Langcay is
misplaced and cannot be sustained. In Erezo v Jepte case, defendant
Jepte was held liable for the death of Erezo even if he was not really the
owner of the truck that killed the latter because he represented himself
as its owner to the Motor Vehicles Office and had it registered under his
name; he was thus estopped from later on denying such representation.
In Vargas, Vargas sold her jeepney to a 3rd person, but she did not
surrender to the Motor VehiclesOffice the corresponding AC plates. So
when the jeepney later on figured in an accident, she was held liable by
the court. Holding that the operator of record continues to be the
operator of vehicle incontemplation of law, as regards the public and
3rd persons.
The circumstances of the above cases are entirely different from those
in the present case. Hereinpetitioner does not deny ownership of vehicle
but denies having employed or authorized the driver Sabiniano. The jeep
was virtually stolen from the petitioner’s garage.
Decision and resolution appealed from was annulled and set aside.
E.6. JOSE E. GENSON v. EDUARDO ADARLE ET AL G.R. No.
73928, August 31, 1987
SUMMARY: Petitioner's identification as the Highway District
Engineer in the complaint did not result in said complaint becoming a
suit against the government or state.
FACTS:
• Arbatin was the successful bidder in a public auction of junk and other
unserviceable government property in the Highway District Engineer’s
Office of Roxas City. Arbatin then employed Adarle to help him haul
the junk.
• On a non-working day, when Adarle and Buensalido, the driver of the
pay-loader, were at the site continuing to gather the junk, a bucket from
the pay-loader fell and injured Adarle to the point of paralyzing his
lower extremities.
• While still in the hospital, Adarle instituted the action below for
damages against Arbatin, his employer; Buensalido, the payloader
operator; Candelario Marcelino, the civil engineer; and petitioner, the
Highway District Engineer.
• During the trial on the merits, Genson put up the defense that he had
no knowledge of or participation in the accident and that, when it
happened, he was not present in the government compound.
• RTC ruled in favor of Adarle, finding that, with the exception of the
petitioner, all of the defendants were present at the Highway's
compound when the accident occurred. However, it still adjudged the
petitioner liable for damages because the petitioner was supposed to
know what his men do with their government equipment within an area
under his supervision.
• IAC affirmed the decision of the trial court and further ordered the
defendants to pay P5,000.00 exemplary damages. Defendant Candelario
Marcelino was, however, absolved from liability.
• Petitioner Genson then appealed the decision to the SC, stating that
IAC has no basis in declaring that his liability is based on fault by
allowing the men to work on a non-working holiday. Furthermore, he
contends that by filing a suit against him, Adarle is then filing a suit
against the Republic, which violates the nonsuability of the State.
TORTS notes
ISSUES:
1. WON Genson is liable under the principle of non-suability of the
state?
2. WON appellate court based its conclusions on an erroneous finding
of fact?
3. WON there is sufficient basis for the "master-servant" doctrine in tort
law to apply.
HELD:
1. NO. We hold that the petitioner's identification as the Highway
District Engineer in the complaint filed by the private respondent did
not result in the said complaint's becoming a suit against the government
or state. In Belizar v. Brazas, we ruled that "the fact that the duties and
positions of the defendants are indicated does not mean that they are
being sued in their official capacities, especially as the present action is
not one against the Government." Furthermore, the accident in the case
at bar happened on a nonworking day and there was no showing that the
work performed on that day was authorized by the government. While
the equipment used belongs to the Government, the work was private in
nature, for the benefit of a purchaser of junk. Therefore, the defense of
the petitioner that he cannot be made liable under the principle of
nonsuability of the state cannot be sustained.
2. YES. The evidence fails to establish petitioner Genson's presence
when the payloader's bucket fell on the head of Mr. Adarle, any liability
on his part would be based only on his alleged failure to exercise proper
supervision over his subordinates. Insofar as work on a Saturday is
concerned, and assuming Mr. Genson verbally allowed it, we see
nothing wrong in the petitioner's authorizing work on that day. As a
matter of fact, it could even be required that the hauling of junk and
unserviceable equipment sold at public auction must be done on non-
working days as it would also be safer for all concerned to effect the
clearing of the junk pile when everything is peaceful and quiet.
3. NO. Buensalido was not working overtime as a government
employee. It is doubtful if the district engineer can be considered an
"employer" for purposes of tort liability who may be liable even if he
was not there. No evidence was presented to show that an application
for overtime work or a claim for overtime pay from the district
engineer's office was ever filed. It is more logical to presume that
Buensalido, the operator of the payloader, was trying to earn a little
money on the side from the junk buyer and that his presence in the
compound on that Saturday was a purely private arrangement. From the
records of this case, we are not disposed to rule that a supervisor who
tolerates his subordinates to moonlight on a non-working day in their
office premises can be held liable for everything that happens on that
day. It would have been preferable if Mr. Arbatin brought his own
payloader operator and perhaps, his own equipment but we are not
dealing with sound office practice in this case. The issue before us is
subsidiary liability for tort comitted by a government employee who is
moonlighting on a nonworking day. According to the respondent court,
"Genson and Buensalido divested themselves of their public positions
and privileges to accomodate an acquaintance or probably for inordinate
gain." There is no showing from the records that Genson received
anything which could be called "inordinate gain." It is possible that he
permitted work on a Saturday to accomodate an acquaintance but it is
more plausible that he simply wanted to clear his compound of junk and
the best time for the winning bidder to do it was on a non-working day.
At any rate, we see no malice, bad faith, or gross negligence on the part
of Genson to hold him liable for the acts of Buensalido and Arbatin.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint against Jesus
Genson is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
E.7. FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE v. COURT OF
APPEALS G.R. No. 75112, August 17, 1992
FACTS:
• Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar
of petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee
even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2)
hours in the morning of each school day.
TORTS notes
• Having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested the driver, Allan
Masa, and was allowed, to take over the vehicle while the latter was on
his way home one late afternoon.
• Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving
down a road, negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the
road was clear.
• A fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that they had
to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a
sound as if something had bumped against the vehicle, but they did not
stop to check.
• Actually, the Pinoy jeep swerved towards the pedestrian, Potenciano
Kapunan who was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular
traffic, and hit him. Allan affirmed that Funtecha followed his advise to
swerve to the right.
• At the time of the incident in Roxas City, the jeep had only one
functioning headlight.
• The Court ruled that the petitioner is not liable for the injuries caused
by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver
for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable,
and that Funtecha was merely a working scholar who, under Section 14,
Rule X, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code is not considered an employee of the petitioner.
• The private respondents assert that the circumstances obtaining in the
present case call for the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
since Funtecha is no doubt an employee of the petitioner.
• The private respondents maintain that under Article 2180 an injured
party shall have recourse against the servant as well as the petitioner for
whom, at the time of the incident, the servant was performing an act in
furtherance of the interest and for the benefit of the petitioner. Funtecha
allegedly did not steal the school jeep nor use it for a joy ride without
the knowledge of the school authorities.
ISSUES: WON Funtecha is an employee of petitioner and thus, Article
2180 of the Civil Code shall apply
HELD:
YES. The Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in
taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his
employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any
responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his
janitorial duties. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks"
for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer,
includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of
the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the
infliction of the injury or damage. Even if somehow, the employee
driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act, the existence of a
presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the
question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident
performing any act in furtherance of his master's business.
Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an
official appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner
may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient
that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of
the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or
was not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve
the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum
that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant
or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to
show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good
father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.
The Court reiterates that supervision includes the formulation of suitable
rules and regulations for the guidance of its employees and the issuance
of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and
persons with whom the employer has relations through his employees.
An employer is expected to impose upon its employees the necessary
discipline called for in the performance of any act indispensable to
the business and beneficial to their employer.
In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such
rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its employees from
taking control over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or
TORTS notes
prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer president from authorizing
another employee to drive the school vehicle. Furthermore, the
petitioner has failed to prove that it had imposed sanctions or warned its
employees against the use of its vehicles by persons other than the
driver.
The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising
from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. In the
absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the supervision of its employees, the law
imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its
employees. The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary
and solidary. However, the employer shall have recourse against the
negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the
plaintiff.
It is an admitted fact that the actual driver of the school jeep, Allan
Masa, was not made a party defendant in the civil case for damages.
This is quite understandable considering that as far as the injured
pedestrian, plaintiff Potenciano Kapunan, was concerned, it was
Funtecha who was the one driving the vehicle and presumably was one
authorized by the school to drive. The plaintiff and his heirs should not
now be left to suffer without simultaneous recourse against the
petitioner for the consequent injury caused by a janitor doing a driving
chore for the petitioner even for a short while. For the purpose of
recovering damages under the prevailing circumstances, it is enough
that the plaintiff and the private respondent heirs were able to establish
the existence of employer-employee relationship between Funtecha and
petitioner Filamer and the fact that Funtecha was engaged in an act not
for an independent purpose of his own but in furtherance of the business
of his employer. A position of responsibility on the part of the petitioner
has thus been satisfactorily demonstrated.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the decision dated
October 16, 1990 is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the respondent
appellate court affirming the trial court decision is REINSTATED SO
ORDERED.
E.8. MARIA BENITA A. DULAY v. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
and SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO.,
INC., and SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION G.R. No.
108017 April 3, 1995
SUMMARY: Atty. Dulay was shot by a security guard. The family of
Atty. Dulay are seeking compensation to the security guard agency.
According to the security agency, they should not be held liable since
quasi-delict acts do not cover voluntary acts. The SC held that quasi-
delict act DO COVER voluntary acts.
FACTS
• an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay
occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa
as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the
said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
• SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was
beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting
was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor
is governed by Article 100 of the RPC
• further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence under
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners,
cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to
quasioffenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Dulay opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against
the private respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 of
the New Civil Code
RTC RULING:
• granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S
motion for exclusion as defendant.
• held that the complaint did not state facts necessary or sufficient to
constitute a quasi-delict since it does not mention any negligence on the
part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon Dulay or that the same was done
in the performance of his duties. Respondent judge ruled that mere
TORTS notes
allegations of the concurring negligence of the defendants (private
respondents herein) without stating the facts showing such negligence
are mere conclusions of law
• also declared that the complaint was one for damages founded on
crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal
Code as distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict.
CA RULING: affirmed
ISSUES:
1. Are quasi-delicts not limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts
that are intentional and voluntary?
2. Should the employer be held liable to the acts of his employee who
acted beyond his scope of duties?
HELD:
1. YES. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only
acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77
SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that: . . .
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only
acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character;
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action against the offender in a criminal act, whether or
not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled
in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of
civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated,
We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
2. YES. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted, when
an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the
master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or
in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the
employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a
prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is
incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
their employee.
E.9. CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORP. v. VICENTE VASQUEZ
G.R. No. 132266, December 21,1999
FACTS:
• At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez, was
driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. He was
traveling counterclockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but
without any protective helmet or goggles.
TORTS notes
• He was also only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time.
• Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant
Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux
Pick-up.
• On the same date and time, Abad drove the said company car out of a
parking lot but instead of going around the Osmeña rotunda he made a
short cut against [the] flow of the traffic
• In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad
collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad
stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands
Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital.
• Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital.
• It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party
• Wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills, professional fees and
other incidental charges Vasquez may incur.
• After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the
accident, a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was
subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute.
• So, the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente
Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So Vasquez, parents of the deceased Romeo So
Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial
Corporation.
• In the same action, Cebu Doctor's Hospital intervened to collect unpaid
balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez.
ISSUE: Whether or not Castilex may be held vicariously liable as an
employer for the death resulting from negligent operation by a
managerial employee of a company- issued vehicle
HELD: NO. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some
overtime work at the petitioner's office, which was located in
Cabangcalan, Mandaue City. Thereafter, he went to Goldie's Restaurant
in Fuente Osmeña, Cebu City, which is about seven kilometers away
from petitioner's place of business. A witness for the private
respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified that Fuente Osmeña is a "lively
place" even at dawn because Goldie's Restaurant and Back Street were
still open and people were drinking thereat. Moreover, prostitutes,
pimps, and drug addicts littered the place.
At the Goldie's Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with
friends. It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident
in question occurred. That same witness for the private respondents
testified that at the time of the vehicular accident, ABAD was with a
woman in his car, who then shouted: "Daddy, Daddy!" This woman
could not have been ABAD's daughter, for ABAD was only 29 years
old at the time.
To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or
was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the
time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of
28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABAD's
working day had ended; his overtime work had already been completed.
His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a "haven
for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts," had no connection
to petitioner's business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a
manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even for personal purposes
was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position.
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the
scope of the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no
duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity
require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the
consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the appealed decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the
modification that petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation be absolved
of any liability for the damages caused by its employee, Jose Benjamin
Abad.
E.10. MEDARDO AG. CADIENTE v. BITHUEL MACAS G.R.
NO. 161946 : November 14, 2008
TORTS notes
SUMMARY: 15 yr old Macas was standing on the uncemented part of
the highway meant for pedestrians, when he was bumped and run over
by a Ford Fiera driven by Chona. To save his life, both his legs had to
be amputated. The car was registered in the name of petitioner, who
alleged that he had already sold it to Jalipa, who in turn alleged that he
had already sold to it to Abubakr. The court ruled that there was no
contributory negligence on the part of Macas since he was were he
should be when the incident happened. Petitioner is liable because the
registered owner of any vehicle, even if he had already sold it to
someone else, is primarily responsible to the public for whatever
damage or injury the vehicle may cause. Since the Ford Fiera was still
registered in the petitioner's name at the time when the misfortune took
place, the petitioner cannot escape liability for the permanent injury it
caused the respondent.
FACTS:
• Rosalinda Palero testified that on July 19, 1994, at about 4:00 p.m., at
the intersection of Buhangin and San Vicente Streets in Davao City, 15-
year old high school student Bithuel Macas, was standing on the
shoulder of the road.
• She was about two and a half meters away from the respondent when
he was bumped and run over by a Ford Fiera, driven by Chona C.
Cimafranca.
• Dr. Hilario Diaz, the orthopedic surgeon who attended to the
respondent, testified that the respondent suffered severe muscular and
major vessel injuries, as well as open bone fractures in both thighs and
other parts of his legs. In order to save his life, the surgeon had to
amputate both legs up to the groins.
• Cimafranca had since absconded and disappeared.
• Records showed that the Ford Fiera was registered in the name of
herein petitioner, Atty. Medardo Ag. Cadiente. However, Cadiente
claimed that when the accident happened, he was no longer the owner
of the Ford Fiera.
• He alleged that he sold the vehicle to Engr. Rogelio Jalipa on March
1994, and turned over the Certificate of Registration and Official
Receipt to Jalipa, with the understanding that the latter would be the one
to cause the transfer of the registration.
• The victim's father, Samuel Macas, filed a complaint for torts and
damages against Cimafranca and Cadiente before the RTC of Davao
City. Cadiente later filed a third-party complaint7 against Jalipa.
• In answer, Jalipa claimed that he was no longer the owner of the Ford
Fiera at the time of the accident. He alleged that he sold the vehicle to
Abraham Abubakar on June 20, 1994. He thus filed a fourth-party
complaint9 against Abubakar.
RTC: held Atty. Cadiente and Engr. Jalipa jointly and severally liable
for their own negligence and ordered them to pay 300k as compensatory
damages, 150k for moral damages, 18.9k for medical expenses, etc.
CA: affirmed.
Petitioner’s arguments: contends that the victim's negligence
contributed to his own mishap. The petitioner theorizes that if witness
Rosalinda Palero, who was only 2 1/2 meters away from the victim, was
not hit, then the victim must have been so negligent as to be bumped
and run over by the said vehicle. The petitioner further argues that
having filed a third-party complaint against Jalipa, to whom he had sold
the car, the CA should have ordered the latter to reimburse him for any
amount he would be made to pay the victim, instead of ordering him
solidarily liable for damages
ISSUES:
1. Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim
2. whether the petitioner and third-party defendant Jalipa are jointly and
severally liable to the victim.
HELD:
1. NO. Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides: When the plaintiff's
own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury,
he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory,
the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's
TORTS notes
lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall
mitigate the damages to be awarded.
The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff
who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to
recover damages in full, but must proportionately bear the consequences
of his own negligence. The defendant is thus held liable only for the
damages actually caused by his negligence.
In this case, records show that when the accident happened, the victim
was standing on the shoulder, which was the uncemented portion of the
highway. As noted by the trial court, the shoulder was intended for
pedestrian use alone. Only stationary vehicles, such as those loading or
unloading passengers may use the shoulder. Running vehicles are not
supposed to pass through the said uncemented portion of the highway.
However, the Ford Fiera in this case, without so much as slowing down,
took off from the cemented part of the highway, inexplicably swerved
to the shoulder, and recklessly bumped and ran over an innocent victim.
The victim was just where he should be when the unfortunate event
transpired.
Cimafranca, on the other hand, had no rightful business driving as
recklessly as she did. The respondent cannot be expected to have
foreseen that the Ford Fiera, erstwhile speeding along the cemented part
of the highway would suddenly swerve to the shoulder, then bump and
run him over. Thus, we are unable to accept the petitioner's contention
that the respondent was negligent.
2. YES. In PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. UCPB General Insurance
Co., Inc., the Court reiterated that the registered owner of any vehicle,
even if he had already sold it to someone else, is primarily responsible
to the public for whatever damage or injury the vehicle may cause. We
explained,
'Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by
proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it would be
easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape
said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person,
or to one who possesses no property with which to respond
financially for the damage or injury done. A victim of
recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to
discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or
damage. He has no means other than by a recourse to the
registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the
owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would
become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity
to escape liability by disproving his ownership.
In the case of Villanueva v. Domingo, we said that the policy behind
vehicle registration is the easy identification of the owner who can be
held responsible in case of accident, damage or injury caused by the
vehicle. This is so as not to inconvenience or prejudice a third party
injured by one whose identity cannot be secured.
Therefore, since the Ford Fiera was still registered in the petitioner's
name at the time when the misfortune took place, the petitioner
cannot escape liability for the permanent injury it caused the
respondent, who had since stopped schooling and is now forced to face
life with nary but two remaining limbs.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed
Decision dated September 16, 2002 and Resolution dated December 18,
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64103 are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.
Article 2180.
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
TORTS notes
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and
live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by
their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts
through a special agent; but not when the damage has been
caused by the official to whom the task done properly
pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176
shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage. (1903a)
F. Article 2181
ARTICLE 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his
dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has
paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904)
Reason: unjust enrichment
Person who commit the damage ultimately pays for his
negligence (who actually caused the damage)
G. Article 2182
ARTICLE 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has
no parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be
answerable with his own property in an action against him where a
guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n)
H. Article 2183
ARTICLE 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make
use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause,
although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease
only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from
the fault of the person who has suffered damage. (1905)
TORTS notes
- fault or negligence of one of who being able and duty
bound to prevent the consequences of the use of
animals, does not prevent it
- not adopting convenient and adequate means of
precaution
- the risk may occur in their use being imputed to him,
inasmuch as in making use of them, he voluntarily
accepts the responsibilities arising from the
consequences of the same.
UNDER ENGLISH LAW
• owner or possessor of nondomesticated animals
known as animals ferae naturae, was subject to
strict liability if the animals attacked a person.
• owners or possessors of domestic animals are
liable only if they knew or had reason to know that
the animal had vicious properties.
Article 2183 by the Civil Code, does not admit of the distinction under English law,
applicable whether the animal is domestic, domesticated or wild.
Reason:
Defenses:
• Force majeure
• fault of the person who has suffered damage.
ex: passerby hit the dog first
I. Article 2184 (page 670 aquino)
`ARTICLE 2184.
In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his
driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use
of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of
reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within
the next preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article
2180 are applicable.
- Solidary liability is imposed on the owner of the vehicle not
because of his imputed liability but because his own omission is
a concurring proximate cause of the injury.
- Chapman vs. Underwood
the owner who was present is liable if the negligent acts of
the driver are continued for such a length of time so as to give
the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct
his driver to desist
- Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of
diligence as are professional drivers
refrain from driving their own cars and instead hire other
persons to drive for them precisely because they are not trained
or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the rules of
traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers posed by the different
situations that are continually encountered on the road
- The test of his negligence, within the meaning of Article 2184,
is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses
tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident
(1st part) Liability of owner
• Owner is inside the vehicle when the accident happened
(Solidary liability) employer and employee may be held liable
Sue owner and driver. Pay solidarity in whole. The other can ask for
reimbursement
TORTS notes
• Not in car (subsidiary liable) employer is only liable if employee can’t pay
2nd part Presumption of negligence
Driver is assumed guilty
- guilty of reckless driving
- or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next
preceding two months.
I.1. REYNATO MANLANGIT v. JUDGE MELITO URGEL A.M.
No. MTJ-95-1028, December 4, 1995
SUMMARY: A public utility vehicle was caught in a vehicular mishap,
resulting in the injuries of the passengers. Judge issued a warrant of
arrest against the jeepney owner.
FACTS:
• Reynato Manlangit is the owner and operator of a passenger jeepney.
It was driven by Edgardo Castillo on the way to Catanduanes, and
Manlangit was among the passengers. While approaching a blind curve,
Castillo occupied the wrong lane. At the curve, they suddenly saw a
parked dump truck and ended in a collision. Manlangit and Castillo
managed to jump off the jeepney before it plunged into the river. The
other passengers sustained injuries.
• A criminal complaint for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence was filed against Castillo and Manlangit.
• Judge Melito Urgel issued a warrant for the arrest of Castillo and
Manlangit. Judge Urgel later dropped the criminal complaint against
Manlangit.
• Manlangit filed a complaint charging that the erroneous issuance of
the warrant of arrest caused him and his family grave humiliation,
undue embarrassment, and anxiety.
• Judge Urgel, in his answer, cited Chapman v. Underwood in justifying
his issuance of the warrant; according to the case, “an owner who sits
in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue
in violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he
has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the
driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts.”
• The Court Administrator recommended that Judge Urgel be meted a
severe reprimand for the erroneous issuance of an arrest warrant against
Manlangit.
ISSUE: WON the issuance of the warrant of arrest against Manlangit
was erroneous
HELD: YES, Judge Urgel’s issuance of an arrest warrant against
Manlangit was erroneous. the criminal act of one person cannot be
charged to another without showing that the other participated
directly or constructively in the act or that the act was done in
furtherance of a common design or purpose for which the parties were
united in intention. In cases of employer-employee relations, an
employer is not criminally liable for the criminal acts of his employee
or agent unless he, in some way, participates in, counsels or abets his
employee's acts or omissions. In such case, the employer himself
becomes a participant in the criminal act of his employee. His liability
under the circumstances is direct and criminal. However, under Article
102, in relation to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, the employer's
liability for the criminal negligence of his employee is subsidiary in
nature and is limited only to civil indemnity. Thus, an employer is party
to a criminal case for the criminal negligence of his employee only by
reason of his subsidiary civil liability under the law.
Nowhere does it show that Manlangit participated in, abetted or even
approved the negligent and reckless manner in which his driver
maneuvered the vehicle on that blind curve. Moreover, it does not
appear that Castillo continuously pursued a reckless and
thoughtless control of the wheel throughout the journey, with nary an
admonition or reproof and the part of complainant/jeepney owner. It is
evident that Castillo’s decision to go on the wrong lane while
approaching a blind curve was a split second judgment which left
neither the complainant nor any of the passengers time to react to the
perilous maneuver.
TORTS notes
J. Article 2185
ARTICLE 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any
traffic regulation.
- It should be noted, however, that the party invoking
such presumption must still establish certain
preconditions before the presumption can operate.
Thus, Article 2185 requires proof that there was a
violation of a traffic regulation
- Ex: Driving under the influence of alcohol is a
violation of traffic regulations
K. Article 2186
ARTICLE 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file
with the proper government office a bond executed by a
government-controlled corporation or office, to answer for
damages to third persons. The amount of the bond and
other terms shall be fixed by the competent public official.
Car owner cannot renew the registration of his car without first
securing an insurance against 3rd party liability.
The registered owner of any vehicle is directly and primarily
responsible to the public and third persons while it is being operated.
LTO
L. Article 2187
ARTICLE 2187. Manufacturers and processors of
foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall
be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or
harmful substances used, although no contractual relation
exists between them and the consumers.
- The only provision in the Civil Code which imposes
strict liability for defective products is Article 2187
- Privity of contract is not required under Article 2187
because it expressly allows recovery although no
contractual relation exists. The use of the word
“shall” indicates that the liability of the manufacturer
and processor is strict.
- Product Liability is the law which governs the
liability of manufacturers and sellers for damages
resulting from defective products.
No pre existing contractual obli (torts)
If there is a contractual relation?
- Breach of contract.
- Against special law(consumers act)
- Intent(crime)
Application of strict liability herein. Means that proof of negligence
is not necessary. It applies even if defendant manufacturer or
processor has exercised all the possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product.
TORTS notes
Contractual relationship between manufacturer or processor
and consumer not necessary
-Consumer not direct buyer or he acquired the foodstuffs, thru
intermediate dealers, manufacturers and processors are liable by
EXPRESS provision of the law.
Basis of liability:
Rule of strict liability is justified because the
manufacturer/processor have assumed responsibility to the
consuming public that their products are safe and not harmful or
injurious. Extraordinary diligence is required of them because the
life or health of the consuming public is involved in the
consumption of foodstuffs or processed products.
In the event of the presence of contract between manufacturer
/processor with plaintiff,
Strict liability still applies. Plaintiff is not precluded from filing a
suit based on the breach of warranty whether express or implied.
Requisites of strict liability:
1. defendant is the manufacturer/processor of foodstuff,drinks, toilet
articles and similar goods involved,
2. defendant used noxious or harmful substances in the manufacture
or processing of said articles or goods;
3. plaintiff consumed or used such product unaware of the injurious
condition of the product;
4. plaintiff injury or death was caused by product used or consumed;
5. forms or kinds of damages suffered and amount thereof.
Plaintiff must prove that at the time product left the hands of
defendant, the product was in a defective or injurious condition.
Options on remedies:
Plaintiff has 4 options to pursue a claim under Art. 2187: he may
base his complaint on:
1. theory of strict liability in torts
2. fault or negligence
3. breach of warranty
4. crime anchored on violation of the foods and Drugs Act wherein
enforcement of which the doctrine of absolute criminal liability may
be applied
M. Article 2188
ARTICLE 2188. There is prima facie presumption of
negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or
injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or
substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the
possession or use thereof is indispensable in his
occupation or business.
- while Article 2188 requires proof of possession of dangerous
weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison.
Fam code
Evid
Rebuttable presumption that he is negligent.
Ex. A in possession of muriatic acid. Children playing around got
affected and were injured.
A is presumed negligent in the keeping of the acid.
TORTS notes
EXP: if A’s occupation is one of being a dealer of such muriatic
acid. Burden now shift to plaintiff to prove that A was negligent
which allegedly caused the damage or injury.
EX. A licensed gunholder. While walking, if fell and fired off
harming somebody.
- A is presumed negligent but if he is policeman, presumption not
applicable.
N. Article 2189
ARTICLE 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities
shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other public works under their control or supervision.
2189
- only speaks for death or injury of person
- (letter of law is clear)
Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan, GR. No. 61516, March 21,
1989
N.1. FLORENTINA A. GUILATCO v. CITY OF DAGUPAN and
CA
G.R. No. 61516, March 21, 1989
FACTS:
• When Guilatco was about to board a motorized tricycle at
a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a National Road, under
the control and supervision of the City of Dagupan), she
accidentally fell into a manhole, causing her right leg to
be fractured.
• As a result thereof, she incurred hospitalization,
medication and other expenses.
• Due to the mishap, she has not yet reported for duty as
court interpreter as she has difficulty of locomotion. This
has deprived her of her means of income.
• She has lost several pounds as a result of the accident and
she is no longer her former jovial self, she has been unable
to perform her religious, social, and other activities which
she used to do prior to the incident.
• Guilatco filed an action for damages against the City of
Dagupan.
• The City of Dagupan contends that Perez Blvd. is a
national road not under the control or supervision of the
City, and that it is actually the Ministry of Public Highways
that has control or supervision.
ISSUE:
Whether control or supervision over a national road by the City of
Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to answer for damages
in accordance with Article 2189 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
YES. The City of Dagupan is liable. The liability of public
corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by
pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in
the Civil Code as follows:
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be
liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by,
any person by reason of the defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works
under their control or supervision.
It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong
to the province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The
TORTS notes
article only requires that either control or supervision is
exercised over the defective road or street.
In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the
charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer.
The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying out,
construction and improvement of streets, avenues and
alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may
be legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus the charter clearly
indicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over the
sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located.
The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for
damages or injuries sustained by persons or property due to the
failure of any city officer to enforce the provisions of the charter,
cannot be used to exempt the city, as in the case at bar. The
charter only lays down general rules regulating the liability of the
city. On the other hand, Article 2189 applies in particular to the
liability arising from "defective streets, public buildings and other
public works."
There is no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or
supervision over the public works in question. Hence, the liability
of the city to the petitioner under Article 2198 of the Civil Code is
clear.
O. Article 2190
ARTICLE 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial
collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary
repairs.
Applies when a building or structure, due to lack of necessary
repairs, collapsed and caused harm to somebody. Collapse may be
total or partial. Owner of building or structure shall be responsible
for damage or injury caused.
EXP: collapse is caused by force majeure or defect in the
construction contemplated in Art. 1723, owner is not responsible for
resulting damage or injury
Article 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and
specifications for a building is liable for damages if within fifteen years
from the completion of the structure, the same should collapse by reason
of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the
ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damages if the
edifice falls, within the same period, on account of defects in the
construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or
due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect
supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the contractor.
Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of
any of the cause of action by reason of any defect mentioned in the
preceding paragraph.
The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the
building. (n)
Last clear chance is not applicable to buildings.
This is also called as the “ Humanitarian Negligence
Doctrine.” Where both parties are negligent but the
negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by an
appreciable interval of time, the one who has the last
reasonable opportunity to avoid the impending harm
and fails to do so, is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party (Picart v. Smith, G.R. No.
TORTS notes
P. Article 2191
ARTICLE 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for
damages caused:
(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been
taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of
explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe
and adequate place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons
or property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or
lanes, if not caused by force majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits
of infectious matter, constructed without precautions
suitable to the place.
Basis of liability: diligence is required, lack of diligence caused damage.
They are liable
• Proprietor of the machinery, not necessarily of the owner of the
tenement where it is located, is presumed negligent.
• Excessive smoke- smoke when excessive and prolonged is
harmful to persons or property. Same is a nuisance. It can be
abated in accordance with the law and without prejudice to
payment of damages by the proprietor of the thing emitting the
smoke.
• Falling of trees- tree falls owner thereof is liable for damage or
injury caused to another
EXP: force majeure or pure accident.
Basis: owner is required to cut or fell the tree or to remove it if the
tree is imminently inclined to fall in such way as would cause
damage to persons or property.
• Harmful or injurious emanations from tubes, canals, sewers
or deposits of infectious matter because of improper
construction of the tubes, canals etc, proprietor thereof shall
be liable for resulting damage
EXP: Unless the defect in the construction is covered by Art. 1723
in which case it is the contractor, engineer or architect who made the
same will be held liable alone.
Injunction mat be resorted to prevent damage or injury above.
Q. Article 2192
ARTICLE 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding
articles should be the result of any defect in the
construction mentioned in article 1723, the third person
suffering damages may proceed only against the engineer
or architect or contractor in accordance with said article,
within the period therein fixed.
If building or structure were constructed with Substantial defects
which defects are the cause of the damage or injury, injured party
may proceed against the engineer or architect or contractor.
Prescriptive period: 15 years from the time the cause of action had
accrued, one can file of the action for damages.
In lease and usufruct, possession of subject property is transferred
to the lessee or usufructuary. If during the existence of the lease or
TORTS notes
usufruct, events mentioned in the article occurred but reason of the
sole negligence of the lessee or usufructuary, then he is liable. If
lessor or owner of the property is also negligent, both will be liable
for damage or injury caused to another.
Under the law, lessee must immediately notify the proprietor of the
need to make necessary repairs on the property. Otherwise, he will
be liable to the proprietor for the damage caused and suffered by the
latter.
R. Article 2193
ARTICLE 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building
or a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by
things thrown or falling from the same.
Know who is the head of the family?
Sa barangay conciliation usually natatapos na.
Ex: sa condominium building, naayos sa barangay kasi nag
kakabayadan.
Head: Father or in his absence, Mother.
Single person may be the head if he is the one supporting his family
including adopted children, unemployed parents bro and sis.
As head, he is under obligation to supervise the members of the
Family even if he had nothing to do with the occasioning of the
damage, he is co-responsible with actual tortfeasor whether
member of the family, guest or domestic helper.
Imputed liability in nature and solidary in consequence. If he paid
for the damages, he may recover from the actual tortfeasor.
Nature of liability: Absolute and exclusive.
Absolute-as long as he is the head of the family that lives in the
building or part thereof like rented room, he is liable even if he is
not present at the time of accident.
Exclusive-that it is only the head of the fam who is made liable.
Purpose of absoluteness:
1. Compel the head to see to it that no dangerous things are placed
on the window sills and other parts of their dwelling place which
may be thrown or fall by accident
2. Compel the head to supervise the members of the family or guest
from doing acts or activities which may result in the throwing or
falling of things from their house or dwelling; and
3. relieve the victim of the difficult burden of identifying the person
who caused the throwing or falling of the injurious things.
S. Article 2194
ARTICLE 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons
who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary.
solidary obligation
- multiple debtors, creditor may pursue only one debtor for the full
amount.
*co-authors or co-principals
Applies only if there is joint tortfeasorships. Necessary that there be
only one quasi-delict. And two or more participated in the commission
of that single quasi-delict. Injury must be indivisible.
In the case where the independent concurring acts have cased distinct
and separate injuries to the plaintiff, or when some reasonable means of
apportioning the damage is evident, court generally will not hold
tortfeasors jointly and severally liable.
TORTS notes
Exemplified in a case where plaintiff’s car is struck first by recklessly d. Equitable Bank vs. Tan, GR. No. 165339,
speeding automobile and then almost at the same time was hit by another
August 23, 2010
car.
e. PNB vs. Chowking Food Corp, GR. No,
Jointly and severally liable for tort=person injured may sue all of them 177526, July 4, 2008, 557 SCRA318
or any number less than all, and all together are jointly and severally
liable for the whole damage.
2. Unreasonable or Undue Risks and Forseeability
3. Probability
Joint tortfeasor are not liable pro rata. They cannot insist upon an 4. Circumstances that may affect the determination of
apportionment for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are
jointly and severally liable for the full amount.
Negligence
5. Standard of Conduct: Good Father of a Family
Bus OPERATOR is not co-author or co-principal for tort committed by a. The Heirs of Redentor Completo, et al. vs. Albayda
its bus driver hence it cannot be made sollidarily liable.
Jr. GR. No, 172200, July 6, 2010
Where both drivers of colliding vehicle are negligent : b. Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.
Injury to passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on 15 Phil 8 (1910)
which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, drivers as well
as the owners of the 2 vehicles are jointly and severally liable for c. Jarco Marketing Corporation et al., vs. Honorable
damages. Court of Appeals, et al. GR. No. 129792, December
21, 1999
6. Standard in Deciding Negligence Cases
III. NEGLIGENCE 7. Proof of Negligence
a. Mercury Drug Corporation vs, Huang, GR. No.
1. Definition and Test of Negligence 172122, June 22, 2007
a. PNR, et al. vs. CA, et al. GR. No. 157658, 8. Res Ipsa Loquitor
October 15, 2007 a. Africa vs. Caltex (Phil) Inc. 16 SCRA 448
b. E.M. Wright vs. Manila Electric R.R. and b. Republic vs. Luzon Stevedoring Corp 21 SCRA 279
Light Co. GR. No. L-7760, October 1, 1914 9. Malpractice
c. La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Company a. Negligence of Health Care Professionals
vs. Valentin De Jesus, et al. GR. No. L- 1. Dr. Victoria L. Batiquin and Allan
21486, May 14, 1966 Batiquin vs. Court of Appeals 258
SCRA 334 (1996)
TORTS notes
2. Aldaba vs. Court of Appeals, GR. No.
21676, February 28, 1969 b. Negligence of Lawyers
3. Lucas, et al. vs. Ma. C. Tuano, GR. No. 1. Adarne vs. Aldaba, 83 SCRA 734
171636, April 7, 2009 2. Atienza vs. Evangelista, 80 SCRA 338
4. Reyes vs. Sisters of Mercy Hospital,
GR. No. 130547, October 3, 2000, 341 c. Negligence of Accountants and Auditors
SCRA 760 1. Bank of Philippine Islands vs. Casa
5. Cereno vs. Court of Appeals, GR. No. Montessori Internationale, et al., GR.
167366, September 26, 2012 Nos. 49454 and 149507, May 28, 2004
10. Negligence of some Business Organizations
6. Solidum vs. People, GR. No. 192123,
a. Schools and Administrators
March 10, 2014
1. Regino vs. Pangasinan Colleges of
7. Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, GR. No.
Sciences and Technology, GR. No.
122445, November 18, 1997
156109, November 18, 2004
8. Garcia-Rueda vs. Pascasio, GR. No.
2. Child Learning Center, Inc, vs.
11841, September 5, 1997
Tagario, GR. No. 150920, November
9. Mendoza vs. Casumpang, GR. No.
25, 2005
197987, March 19, 2012
b. Banks
10. Dr. Rubi Li vs. Spouses Soliman,
1. Philippine National Bank vs. Pike, GR.
GR. No. 165279, June 7, 2011
No. 157845, September 20, 2005
11. Professional Health Services, Inc.
c. Firearms Dealer
vs. Agana, G.R. No. 126297
1. Pacis vs. Morales, GR. No. 169467,
January 31, 2007
February 25, 2010
12. Rogelio Ramos et al., vs. Court of
d. Security Agency and Guards
Appeals, GR. No. 124354, April 11,
1. Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. vs.
2002
Tangco, GR. No. 165732, December
13. Look for possible negligent acts of
14, 2006
nurses, pharmacists, clinical
e. Resort and Swimming Pool Operator
laboratories
TORTS notes
1. Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District, V. HUMAN RELATIONS: INTENTIONAL TORTS
104 Phil 398
f. Hotels Articles 19 - 36
1. Makati Shangri la Hotel and Resorts,
Inc. vs. Harper, GR. No. 189998,
August 29, 2012
g. Theater
1. Gotesco Investment Corporation vs.
Chatto, GR. No. L-87584, June 16,
1992
h. Building Contractors
1. De Guzman vs. Tumolva, GR. No.
188072, October 19, 2011
i. Towage
1. Cargolift Shipping, Inc. vs. L. Actuario
Marketing Corp. and Skyland
Brokerage, Inc. GR. No. 146426, June
27, 2006
j. Stevedoring
1. Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage
Service, Inc. vs. Phoenix Assurance
Company of New York/Mcgee and
Co., Inc., GR. No. 162467, May 8,
2009

IV. DEFENSES IN NEGLIGENCE CASES