Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse Case Study

Problem Statement
Maintaining government safety requirements and properly testing structural components are
critical when building potentially dangerous structures, such as aerial walkways. However, poor
management and changes throughout the engineering process do not always guarantee that these
fundamental regulations are met, jeopardizing the capabilities of these structures. The absence of
appropriate safety inspections and failure to examine design adjustments puts innocent lives at risk.
Without collective oversight of the engineering process, a building’s structural integrity cannot be
trusted, as seen in the Kansas City Hyatt Regency disaster, where two walkways collapsed, injuring and
killing many. The engineers involved in building the Hyatt Regency Hotel should have been required to
submit proof that government requirements were met and to perform safety tests during each major
step of the design and manufacturing process.

Background
On July 17, 1981, a tea dance was held in the lobby of the Hyatt Regency Kansas City Hotel,
during which the fourth-floor walkway collapsed under the weight of several hundred partygoers. The
dismantled walkway fell to the ground floor, killing 114 and injuring 186 people, making it one of the
most devastating structural failures in U.S. history (Texas A&M University, 2009). Thorough investigation
by the Kansas City court ruled that the main project engineers were primarily at fault for failing to
identify errors made throughout the engineering process and for unprofessional conduct (Robbins,
1985). A key design adjustment called for the implementation of a double-rod system, by which the load
on the walkway connections was doubled. Due to the increased stress on the connections, the walkway
could only withstand approximately 30% of the government minimum load requirements (Munger,
2007). As a result, lawsuits amassed over $100 million in settlements and the company under contract,
G.C.E. International Inc., had its license revoked (Wander, 2008).

Engineering Failure
Development of the Hyatt Regency began in 1976, operated by G.C.E. International Inc., Crown
Center Redevelopment Company (CCRC) and Havens Steel Company. G.C.E. was primarily in charge of
the structure and design of the project, Havens Steel Co. oversaw the construction, and CCRC owned the
overall project (Wander 2008). The Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel held its grand opening in July of
1980, just one year before the disaster. Holding 43 stories, the hotel was heralded as one of the tallest
buildings in Kansas City. Towering above its multistory atrium were three suspended walkways, dubbed
“sky bridges”, spanning across the second, third, and fourth floors. The fourth-floor walkway was built
directly above the second-floor walkway, while the third-floor walkway was several meters to the east,
as shown in Figure 1.
 The original design called for the walkways to be supported by a
single-rod system, by which a continuous hanger rod connected the ceiling
to the box beam connections supporting the fourth and second-floor
walkways. However, upon reviewing this initial design, Havens Steel Co.
modified the design to a two-rod system. In this system, there would be
separate rods connecting the fourth-floor walkway to the ceiling and the
second-floor walkway to the fourth-floor walkway, as shown in Figure 2.
Although this change was made to simplify manufacturing and assembly of
the structure at a lower cost, this effectively doubled the load acting on the
fourth-floor box beam connections. These connections were now
withstanding both the weight of the fourth-floor walkway suspended from
the ceiling and the weight of the second-floor walkway directly below.

Later investigation found that both designs failed to satisfy the

Kansas City Building Code. The original double-rod design was capable of
withstanding only 60% of the mandated minimum load requirement and the
modified single-rod design even less, at approximately 30%. This flawed Figure 1: Illustration of the
design, however, was approved by structural engineers working for G.C.E. walkways above the lobby.
who were responsible for reviewing and approving structural shop
drawings, which would then be manufactured by Havens Steel Co. Upon receiving the new drawings,
“the structural engineer did not review the revised detail for conformity with the design concept nor for
compliance with the requirements of the Kansas City building code” (Roddis, 1993). Furthermore,
investigation by the National Bureau of Standards fell short in discovering any calculations made for
both the safety factor and the loads induced on the walkway connections (Wander, 2008).

Daniel M. Duncan, the project engineer, and Jack

D. Gillum, the engineer of record, had their licenses
revoked and were charged for their unprofessional
conduct and gross negligence (Roddis, 1993). Gillum,
however, claimed that a lack of clear communication
between G.C.E. and Havens Steel Co. resulted in the
approval of the faulty design. The Hyatt Regency “was a
fast-track construction project, meaning that the
construction team had begun to build the hotel while the
design team was still finalizing the plans”, contributing to
the swift action taken when reviewing the structural
Figure 2: Original and modified designs of box beam
designs. G.C.E. had originally submitted an incomplete rod connections.
design to Havens Steel Co., anticipating that they would
finish the safety and design analysis. Havens, however, assumed that the submitted shop drawings had
already been analyzed and did not bother to perform any calculations, subsequently manufacturing the
flawed structural components. Upon receiving the drawings from Havens, Gillum approved the final
design under the assumption that all analysis had been completed. Because of this chain of assumptions
and lack of responsibility, the critically faulty design had gone completely unnoticed.

During the evening of July 17, 1981, with approximately a total of 63 people occupying the two
walkways, the fourth-floor walkway collapsed. Physical evidence shows that failure initiated in the box
beam rod connections on the fourth-floor walkway, where the load experienced was double of that
which was expected. Initially, a single box beam connection on the east side of the walkway began to
experience significant deformation due to the relatively high load, breaking its connection with the
hanger rod and allowing it to pull out of place. With the hanger rods out of place, the box beams no
longer had any support to withstand the load. The remainder of the box beam connections promptly
failed following this initial break. The fourth-floor walkway collapsed on top of the walkway and its
occupants directly below before crashing to the lobby’s floor, crushing those below.

Ethical Analysis
The engineers from G.C.E. and Havens made several ethical decisions throughout the design and
production phase of the walkways that contributed to the disaster. These decisions can be analyzed
through the ethical frameworks of deontology, also known as “duty ethics”, and utilitarianism. Duty
ethics is dependent on two categorical imperatives, the universality principle and the reciprocity
principle. The universality principle argues that one should act on a maxim only if it can be agreed that it
should be applied to all people. The reciprocity principle states that people must be able to retain their
moral autonomy, a person’s natural right to make his or her own moral decisions. Utilitarianism is
defined on the process by which actions are deemed acceptable only if their outcomes are beneficial.
Outcomes can be labelled as “good” if the benefits outweigh the costs; however, it is nearly impossible
to determine what a “good outcome” is because it is inherently subjective.

The critical choices made by Hyatt Regency engineers clearly violated duty ethics laws.
Structural engineers at G.C.E. and manufacturers at Havens were both unaware of their respective
project responsibilities, resulting in a series of crucial management errors. G.C.E. submitted unfinished
shop drawings without calculations to Havens, trusting that Havens would oversee the drawings and
perform the necessary analysis. Havens, however, were dissatisfied with the original single-rod
arrangement, and proposed that a new double-rod system be used to simplify the manufacturing and
assembly process at a lower cost. Havens sent these modified designs back to G.C.E. for approval, which,
“indicated by their stamps, these shop drawings were reviewed by the contractor, structural engineer,
and architect” (National Bureau of Standards, 1982). Upon receiving approval, Havens went ahead and
fabricated the structural components based on the assumption that the designs had already been
analyzed by G.C.E. Due to this miscommunication, the flawed designs had gone through both companies
unnoticed. By overlooking the new design and failing to identify the structural flaws, engineers at G.C.E.
failed to follow the maxim, “Engineers shall approve only those engineering documents that are in
conformity with applicable standards” (National Society of Professional Engineers, 2007). The
engineering management ultimately failed in performing in a professional manner by approving the
designs without legitimately analyzing the documents and producing structures that were incapable of
fulfilling their intended purpose. Furthermore, these engineers violated the reciprocity principle by
denying the partygoers moral autonomy. The people dancing on the walkways were unaware of its
structural incompetency, and therefore were unable to decide for themselves whether they wanted to
risk using the walkways.

G.C.E. and Havens also failed to acknowledge that from a utilitarianism standpoint, approving
the modified designs without careful analysis and failing to test the walkways were not worth the costs.
Ultimately, engineering management made the decision to produce walkways that were not guaranteed
to function properly in hopes that it would be worth the time and money saved. Meeting deadlines and
taking shortcuts seemed to be more valuable than ensuring the safety of hundreds of people. The
double-rod design was approved based on the assumption that by simplifying the fabrication and
assembly process, the company would lower costs and save time. The engineers, however, were
unaware of the consequences that would follow: over 100 deaths and nearly 200 injuries, over $100
million in civil lawsuits, and a tainted reputation for the hotel and the company’s engineers. This
outlines one of the major flaws built into utilitarianism, that there may be unforeseeable consequences
that cannot be accounted for when making decisions.

Recommendations
The Code of Ethics states that “Engineers, in the fulfillment of their professional duties, shall
hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public” (National Society of Professional
Engineers, 2007). G.C.E. and Havens would have been able to follow this maxim had they fulfilled their
duties in properly analyzing and testing their structures. Although Kansas City Building Code regarding
minimum load requirements existed at the time of development, there were not enough effective ways
to regulate the company’s designs. Structural engineers should be required to submit proof to the
government that their shop drawings abide by the local building code requirements. Not only would this
put additional pressure on engineers to meet requirements, but any critical flaws would also be caught
by the government, ensuring the safety of the design. Furthermore, the company management should
be required to clearly establish their responsibilities for the project. Had Havens Steel Co. stated that
they intended to manufacture the structures without analyzing the design, G.C.E. would have made sure
to make all necessary calculations before submitting the drawings. Finally, had the G.C.E. properly
indicated on the preliminary shop drawings that they were unfinished and without analysis, it would
have been evident to Havens that this design was in no position to be manufactured. Structural
engineers should clearly indicate the extent of their work to avoid miscommunication.

Conclusion
The Hyatt Regency walkway collapse demonstrates the consequences of miscommunication,
negligence, and poor ethical decision making. Had the contracted companies sufficiently communicated
their roles throughout the engineering process and properly analyzed the structural designs, the critical
flaws would have been identified, saving hundreds of lives and millions of dollars. Instead, structural
engineers violated the categorical imperatives of duty ethics by approving drawings that did not meet
standards and by denying the walkway users of moral autonomy. Firm government involvement
throughout the engineering process would prevent errors passing unseen and should be implemented
into law. Furthermore, clear communication must be emphasized between contracted companies to
reduce the occurrence of faulty assumptions. By improving upon these fundamental principles, future
engineering projects will be able to better ensure the safety of people.

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